Defense Acquisitions
Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs Gao ID: GAO-06-391 March 31, 2006In the last 5 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its planned investments in new weapon systems from about $700 billion in 2001 to nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006. While the weapons that DOD develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition remains a long-standing high risk area. GAO's reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the need to deliver its new weapon programs within estimated costs and to obtain the most from these investments. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practices. Programs for the assessments were selected based on several factors including, (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3) congressional interest. The majority of the 52 programs covered in this report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. This report also highlights higher level issues raised by the cumulative experiences of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually under the Comptroller General's authority.
GAO assessed 52 systems that represent an investment of over $850 billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency's Airborne Laser to the Army's Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. DOD often exceeds development cost estimates by approximately 30 to 40 percent and experiences cuts in planned quantities, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. Such difficulties, absent definitive and effective reform outcomes, are likely to cause great turmoil in a budget environment in which there are growing fiscal imbalances as well as increasing conflict over increasingly limited resources. While these problems are in themselves complex, they are heightened by the fact that this current level of investment is by no means final and unchangeable. A large number of the technologies under development in these systems are sufficiently new and immature that it is uncertain how long it will take or how much it will cost to make them operational. Most of the 52 programs GAO reviewed have proceeded with lower levels of knowledge than suggested by best practices. Programs that start with mature technologies do better. As shown in the figure below, programs that began with immature technologies have experienced average research and development cost growth of 34.9 percent; programs that began with mature technologies have only experienced cost growth of 4.8 percent. If DOD continues to move programs through development without requisite technology, design, and production knowledge, costs and schedules will increase, which will reduce the quantity delivered to the warfighter. This practice will also continue to reduce DOD's buying power, as less capability will be provided for the money invested. In the larger context, DOD needs to make changes in its requirements and budgeting processes that are consistent with getting the desired outcomes from the acquisition process.
GAO-06-391, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs
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Report to Congressional Committees:
March 2006:
Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs:
GAO-06-391:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-391, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In the last 5 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its
planned investments in new weapon systems from about $700 billion in
2001 to nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006. While the weapons that DOD
develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition
remains a long-standing high risk area. GAO‘s reviews over the past 30
years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as
cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In
addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the
need to deliver its new weapon programs within estimated costs and to
obtain the most from these investments.
This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an
independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs
that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program‘s
projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practices.
Programs for the assessments were selected based on several factors
including, (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3)
congressional interest. The majority of the 52 programs covered in this
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. This
report also highlights higher level issues raised by the cumulative
experiences of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually
under the Comptroller General‘s authority.
What GAO Found:
GAO assessed 52 systems that represent an investment of over $850
billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency‘s Airborne Laser to
the Army‘s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. DOD often exceeds
development cost estimates by approximately 30 to 40 percent and
experiences cuts in planned quantities, missed deadlines, and
performance shortfalls. Such difficulties, absent definitive and
effective reform outcomes, are likely to cause great turmoil in a
budget environment in which there are growing fiscal imbalances as well
as increasing conflict over increasingly limited resources. While these
problems are in themselves complex, they are heightened by the fact
that this current level of investment is by no means final and
unchangeable. A large number of the technologies under development in
these systems are sufficiently new and immature that it is uncertain
how long it will take or how much it will cost to make them
operational.
Most of the 52 programs GAO reviewed have proceeded with lower levels
of knowledge than suggested by best practices. Programs that start with
mature technologies do better. As shown in the figure below, programs
that began with immature technologies have experienced average research
and development cost growth of 34.9 percent; programs that began with
mature technologies have only experienced cost growth of 4.8 percent.
Average Program Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Cost Growth
from First Full Estimate:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
If DOD continues to move programs through development without requisite
technology, design, and production knowledge, costs and schedules will
increase, which will reduce the quantity delivered to the warfighter.
This practice will also continue to reduce DOD‘s buying power, as less
capability will be provided for the money invested. In the larger
context, DOD needs to make changes in its requirements and budgeting
processes that are consistent with getting the desired outcomes from
the acquisition process.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-391.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or FrancisP@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Forword:
Letter:
Fiscal Challenges Confronting DOD Necessitate Better Acquisition
Outcomes:
DOD's Weapon Programs Portfolio Often Experiences a Reduced Return on
Investment:
A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes:
Most Programs Proceed with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical
Junctures:
Historically, Most Cost Growth Is Reported after the Critical Design
Review:
How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed:
Assessments of Individual Programs:
Airborne Laser (ABL):
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS):
Advanced Deployable System (ADS):
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites:
Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA):
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS):
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS):
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System:
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP):
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
CH-47F:
Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21:
DD(X) Destroyer:
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE):
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V, Delta IV:
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
F-22A Raptor:
Future Combat Systems (FCS):
Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System:
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS:
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS):
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):
Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site (JTRS AMF):
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1:
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5:
Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS):
Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI):
Land Warrior:
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
Longbow Apache Block III:
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA):
21" Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV):
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit:
MQ-9 Predator B:
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB):
Space Radar (SR):
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft:
VH-71A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program:
Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Warrior UAV):
Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS):
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T):
Agency Comments:
Scope of Our Review:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Macro Analysis:
Historical Analysis:
System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment:
Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment:
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Total Projected Cost of DOD's Top Five Programs in Fiscal
Years 2001 and 2006:
Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems:
Table 3: Examples of DOD Programs with Reduced Buying Power:
Table 4: Programs in Our Assessment Yet to Hold a Critical Design
Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key
Junctures:
Figure 2: RDT&E Percentage Increase throughout the Product Development
Cycle for 29 Programs Completed or in Production:
Figure 3: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
with Best Practices:
Abbreviations:
AMRDEC: Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering
Center:
ARS: analysis and reporting system:
ATACMS BAT: Army Tactical Missile System Brilliant Antiarmor
Submunition:
BAMS: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance:
CDA: Commander's Digital Assistant:
CEC: Cooperative Engagement Capability:
CMUP: Conventional Mission Upgrade Program:
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency:
DBCS: Dismounted Battle Command System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EKV: exoatmospheric kill vehicle:
EPLRS: Enhanced Position Location Reporting System:
FY: fiscal year:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit:
GMLRS: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System:
HEO: highly elliptical orbit:
ICD: Interface Control Design:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
JASSM: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile:
JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition:
JLENS: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System:
JPATS: Joint Primary Aircraft Training System:
JSOW: Joint Standoff Weapon:
MCS: Maneuver Control System:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
MDAP: Major Defense Acquisition Program:
MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System:
MIDS-LVT: Multifunctional Information Distribution System - Low Volume
Terminal:
MM III GRP: Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program:
NA: not applicable:
NAS: National Airspace System:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
OCS: Operational Control System:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
PTIR: precision track illumination radar:
RDT&E: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation:
SAR: Selected Acquisition Report:
SDACS: Solid Divert and Attitude Control System:
SDR: Systems Design Review:
SOCOM: Special Operations Command:
SPC: statistical process control:
SUR: surveillance radar:
TBD: to be determined:
TBIP: Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:
UHF: ultra high frequency:
U.S.C.: United States Code:
Foreword March 31, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
Current and expected fiscal imbalances demand that the Department of
Defense (DOD) maximize its return on investment and provide the
warfighter with needed capabilities at the best value for the taxpayer.
Since 1990, we have assessed weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area.
Not only does it continue to be a high risk area, but it has also taken
on heightened importance. To transform military operations, DOD has
embarked on developing multiple megasystems that are expected to be the
most expensive and complex ever. However, these costly acquisitions are
running head-on into the nation's unsustainable fiscal path. In the
past 5 years, DOD has doubled its planned investments in new weapon
systems from $700 billion to $1.4 trillion. This huge increase has not
been accompanied by more stability, better outcomes, or more buying
power for the acquisition dollar.
This is our fourth annual assessment of weapon programs. It contains
our assessment of 52 weapon programs representing a projected
investment of about $850 billion. Unfortunately, our assessments do not
show appreciable improvement in the acquisition of major weapon
systems. Rather, programs are experiencing recurring problems with cost
overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. These cost
increases mean that DOD cannot produce as many weapons as intended nor
deliver those weapons to the warfighter when promised. These problems
occur, in part, because weapon programs do not capture the requisite
knowledge when needed to efficiently and effectively manage program
risks. Programs consistently move forward with unrealistic cost and
schedule estimates, use immature technologies in launching product
development, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at
appropriate points in development.
The past year has seen several major defense reviews that lay down
approaches to improve the way DOD buys weapons. These reviews contain
many constructive ideas. If they are to produce better results,
however, they must heed the lessons taught--but perhaps not learned--of
acquisition history. Specifically, policy must be manifested in
decisions on individual programs or reform will be blunted. DOD's
current acquisition policy is a case in point. The policy supports a
knowledge-based, evolutionary approach to acquiring new weapons. The
practice--decisions made on individual programs--sacrifices knowledge
and executability in favor of revolutionary solutions. It's time to
challenge such solutions. Reform will not be real unless each weapon
system is shown to be both a worthwhile investment and an executable
program. Otherwise, we will continue to start more programs than we can
finish, produce less capability for more money, and create the next set
of case studies for future defense reform reviews.
Signed by:
David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States:
Letter March 31, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
One of the single largest investments the federal government makes is
the development and production of new weapon systems. In the last 5
years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its planned
investments in new weapon systems from about $700 billion in 2001 to
nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006. It is imperative that these investments
deliver as promised not only because of their value to the warfighter
but because every dollar spent on weapon systems means one dollar less
of something else DOD or the Government can do. There is ample basis
for serious concerns on this score. The cost of developing a weapon
system continues to often exceed estimates by approximately 30 percent
to 40 percent. This in turn results in fewer quantities, missed
deadlines, and performance shortfalls. In short, the buying power of
the weapon system investment dollar is reduced; the warfighter gets
less than promised; and opportunities to make other investments are
lost. This is not to say that the nation does not get superior weapons
in the end, but that at twice the level of investment, DOD has an
obligation to get better results. In the larger context, DOD needs to
make changes in its requirements and budgeting processes that are
consistent with getting the desired outcomes from the acquisition
process.
Given growing fiscal imbalances as well as competition for increasingly
scarce resources, this current level of investment is by no means final
and unchangeable. To get better results, programs need to have higher
levels of knowledge when they start, which enable better estimates of
how much they will cost to finish. Currently, a large number of the
technologies under development in major systems are sufficiently new
and immature that it is uncertain how long it will take or how much it
will cost to make them operational. Predictably, developing these
systems without sufficient knowledge will take longer and cost even
more than promised and deliver fewer quantities and other capabilities
than planned. Over the years, we have made a number of recommendations
to address these issues, both systemically and on individual programs.
In this report, we assess 52 programs that represent an investment of
approximately $858 billion.[Footnote 1] Our objective is twofold: to
provide decision makers with a cross-cutting analysis of DOD weapons
system investment and also to provide independent, knowledge-based
assessments of individual systems' attained knowledge and potential
risks.
Programs were selected for individual assessment based on several
factors including, (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and
(3) congressional interest. The majority of the 52 programs covered in
this report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD.
Fiscal Challenges Confronting DOD Necessitate Better Acquisition
Outcomes:
DOD's investment in the research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) and procurement of major weapon systems is expected to rise
from $147 billion in fiscal year 2006 to $178 billion in fiscal year
2011.[Footnote 2] DOD's total planned investment in Major Defense
Acquisition Programs is nearly $1.4 trillion (2006 dollars) for its
current portfolio, with over $840 billion of that investment yet to be
made.[Footnote 3]
Budget simulations by GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, and others
show that, over the long term, we face a large and growing structural
deficit due primarily to known demographic trends and rising health
care costs. As the Comptroller General has noted, continuing on this
unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage,
our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national
security. Federal discretionary spending, along with other federal
policies and programs, will face serious budget pressures in the coming
years stemming from new budgetary demands and demographic trends.
Defense spending falls within the discretionary spending accounts.
Further, current military operations, such as those in Afghanistan and
Iraq, consume a large share of DOD budgets and are causing faster wear
on existing weapons. Refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned
is putting further pressure on DOD's investment accounts.
At the same time DOD is facing these problems, programs are commanding
larger budgets. DOD is undertaking new efforts that are expected to be
the most expensive and complex ever and on which DOD is heavily relying
to fundamentally transform military operations. Table 1 shows that just
5 years ago, the top five weapon systems were projected to cost about
$291 billion combined; today, the top five weapon systems are projected
to cost about $550 billion.
Table 1: Total Projected Cost of DOD's Top Five Programs in Fiscal
Years 2001 and 2006:
Billions of constant 2006 dollars.
2001: Program: F-22A Raptor aircraft;
2001: Cost: $65.0;
2006: Program: Joint Strike Fighter aircraft;
2006: Cost: $206.3.
2001: Program: DDG-51 class destroyer ship;
2001: Cost: $64.4;
2006: Program: Future Combat Systems;
2006: Cost: $127.5.
2001: Program: Virginia class submarine;
2001: Cost: $62.1;
2006: Program: Virginia class submarine;
2006: Cost: $80.4.
2001: Program: C-17 Globemaster airlift aircraft;
2001: Cost: $51.1;
2006: Program: DDG-51 class destroyer ship;
2006: Cost: $70.4.
2001: Program: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter aircraft;
2001: Cost: $48.2;
2006: Program: F-22A Raptor aircraft;
2006: Cost: $65.4.
Total;
2001: Cost: $290.8;
Total;
2006: Cost: $550.0.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
The larger scope of development associated with these megasystems
produces a much larger fiscal impact when cost and schedule estimates
increase. The top 5 programs in 2001 and the top 5 programs in 2006
have both experienced about a 40 percent increase in projected RDT&E
costs from the first full estimate to the latest estimate. In the same
base-year dollars, the total fiscal impact was much greater for the
2006 top 5 programs, however, as RDT&E costs increased by $33.9 billion
as opposed to $16.9 billion for the top 5 from 2001 because of the
larger scope of development planned for the 2006 top 5 programs. The
Joint Strike Fighter and Future Combat Systems contribute significantly
to this projected cost growth, as their combined cost is greater than
all of the top 5 programs in 2001.
DOD's Weapon Programs Portfolio Often Experiences a Reduced Return on
Investment:
The way DOD develops and produces its major weapon systems has had
disappointing consequences. A large number of the programs in our
assessment are costing more and taking longer to develop than
estimated. As shown in table 2, total RDT&E costs for 26 common
set[Footnote 4] weapon programs increased by nearly $44.6 billion, or
37 percent, over the original business case (the first full estimate).
The same programs have also experienced an increase in the time needed
to develop capabilities with a weighted-average schedule increase of
nearly 17 percent.[Footnote 5]
Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems:
Billions of constant 2006 dollars
Total cost;
First full estimate: $547.7;
Latest estimate: $627.4;
Percentage change: 14.6%.
RDT&E cost;
First full estimate: $120.4;
Latest estimate: $164.9;
Percentage change: 37.0%.
Weighted average acquisition cycle time[A];
First full estimate: 154.5 months;
Latest estimate: 180.2 months;
Percentage change: 16.7%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for
the 26 programs based on total program costs at the first full and
latest estimates. The simple average for these two estimates was 112.1
months for the first full estimate and 131.3 months for the latest
estimate resulting in a 17.2 percent change.
[End of table]
Quantities for 9 of the common set programs have been reduced since
their first estimate.[Footnote 6] In addition, the weighted-average
program acquisition unit cost for 25 of the 26 programs increased by
roughly 57 percent.[Footnote 7]
The consequence of cost and cycle-time growth is manifested in a
reduction of the buying power of the defense dollar. Table 3
illustrates six programs included in this assessment with a significant
reduction in buying power; we have reported similar outcomes in many
more programs. For example, the Air Force initially planned to buy five
Spaced Based Infrared System High satellites at a program acquisition
unit cost of about $816 million (fiscal year 2006 dollars). Technology
and design components matured late in the development of the satellite,
which contributed to cost growth and four Nunn-McCurdy[Footnote 8] unit
cost breaches. Now, the Air Force plans to buy 3 satellites at a
program acquisition unit cost of about $3.4 billion, a 315 percent
increase.
Table 3: Examples of DOD Programs with Reduced Buying Power:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes:
Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work that
examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon
lessons learned from best product development practices. Leading
commercial firms expect that their program managers will deliver high-
quality products on time and within budget. Doing otherwise could
result in the customer walking away. Thus, those firms have created an
environment and adopted practices that put their program managers in a
good position to succeed in meeting these expectations. Collectively,
these practices comprise a process that is anchored in knowledge. It is
a process in which technology development and product development are
treated differently and managed separately. The process of developing
technology culminates in discovery--the gathering of knowledge--and
must, by its nature, allow room for unexpected results and delays.
Leading firms do not ask their product managers to develop technology.
Successful programs give responsibility for maturing technologies to
science and technology organizations, rather than the program or
product development managers. The process of developing a product
culminates in delivery and, therefore, gives great weight to design and
production. The firms demand--and receive--specific knowledge about a
new product before production begins. A program does not go forward
unless a strong business case on which the program was originally
justified continues to hold true.
Successful product developers ensure a high level of knowledge is
achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize these
junctures as knowledge points. These knowledge points and associated
indicators are defined as follows:
* Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This point occurs when
a sound business case is made for the product--that is, a match is made
between the customer's requirements and the product developer's
available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, and capacity.
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system
development is an important indicator of whether this match has been
made. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment.
* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a
program determines that a product's design is stable--that is, it will
meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-
level critical design review, usually held midway through development.
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the system
design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable.
* Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature and the design is
reliable. This point is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the
company can manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality
targets. A best practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing
processes are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable,
sustainable, and capable of consistently producing parts within the
product's quality tolerances and standards--at the start of production.
A result of this knowledge-based process is evolutionary product
development, an incremental approach that enables developers to rely
more on available resources rather than making promises about unproven
technologies. Predictability is a key to success as successful product
developers know that invention cannot be scheduled, and its cost is
difficult to estimate. They do not bring a technology into new product
development unless that technology has been demonstrated to meet the
user's requirements. Allowing technology development to spill over into
product development puts an extra burden on decision makers and
provides a weak foundation for making product development estimates.
While the user may not initially receive the ultimate capability under
this approach, the initial product is available sooner and at a lower,
more predictable cost.
There is a synergy in this process, as the attainment of each
successive knowledge point builds on the preceding one. Metrics gauge
when the requisite level of knowledge has been attained. Controls are
used to ensure a high level of knowledge is attained before making
additional significant investments. Controls are considered effective
if they are backed by measurable criteria and if decision makers are
required to consider them before deciding to advance a program to the
next level. Effective controls help decision makers gauge progress in
meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals and ensure that managers
will (1) conduct activities to capture relevant product development
knowledge, (2) provide evidence that knowledge was captured, and (3)
hold decision reviews to determine that appropriate knowledge was
captured to move to the next phase. The result is a product development
process that holds decision makers accountable and delivers excellent
results in a predictable manner.
Most Programs Proceed with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical
Junctures:
To get the most out of its weapon systems investments, DOD revised its
acquisition policy in May 2003 to incorporate a knowledge-based,
evolutionary framework. The policy requires decision makers to have the
knowledge they need before moving to the next phase of development.
However, most of the programs we reviewed proceeded with lower levels
of knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product
knowledge later in development than specified in DOD policy. Once a
program gets behind in demonstrated knowledge, it stays behind (see
fig. 1).
Figure 1: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key
Junctures:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Only 10 percent of the programs in our assessment demonstrated all of
their critical technologies as mature at the start of development,
meaning they fell far short of attaining knowledge point 1 when they
should have. By the time of their design review--when they should have
demonstrated knowledge point 2 (stable design)--only 43 percent had
actually attained knowledge point 1 (all critical technologies mature).
By the time of the decision to start production when the programs
should have demonstrated knowledge point 3 (production processes in
control) one third still had not attained knowledge point 1. Similarly,
only 35 percent of the programs in our assessment believed they had
attained knowledge point 2 at the design review and only 58 percent
believed they had attained knowledge point 2 by the time of the
decision to start production. None of the programs we assessed that are
now in production reported using statistical process control data to
measure the maturity of production processes. This is the data needed
to demonstrate knowledge point 3. In other words, none of the programs
demonstrated knowledge point 3. This suggests that programs that follow
the policy are the exception; the predominant practice is to still
proceed with knowledge gaps.
Consequences accrue to programs that are still working to mature
technologies well into system development when they should be focused
on maturing system design and preparing for production. These
consequences involve increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays
throughout the life of the program. The cost effect of proceeding
without the necessary knowledge can be dramatic. For example, RDT&E
costs for the programs that started development with mature
technologies increased by a modest average of 4.8 percent over the
first full estimate, whereas the RDT&E costs for the programs that
started development with immature technologies increased by a much
higher average of 34.9 percent over the first full estimate. Likewise,
program acquisition unit costs for the programs with mature technology
increased by less than 1 percent, whereas the programs that started
development with immature technologies experienced an average program
acquisition unit cost increase of nearly 27 percent over the first full
estimate.[Footnote 9]
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it is the
department's policy that technologies should be demonstrated in at
least a relevant environment before a program enters system
development; whereas, GAO utilizes the best practice standard that
calls for technologies to be assessed one step higher--demonstration in
an operational environment. If we applied the DOD's lower standard, the
number of programs with mature technologies at program start would have
increased to 23 percent, compared with 10 percent using the best
practices standard. This is a higher number but does not alter the fact
that most programs begin development without mature technology. A cost
consequence for using the lower standard does occur, however. While the
RDT&E cost growth for programs that started development with immature
technologies (using the DOD standard) was about the same at 34.6
percent, the cost growth for the programs that met DOD's maturity
standard was significantly greater at 18.8 percent than the 4.8 percent
experienced by those that met the higher best practice standard.
The order of how knowledge is built throughout product development is
important to delivering products on time and within cost. Knowledge
gaps have a cumulative effect. For example, design stability cannot be
attained if key technologies are not mature. The lack of technical
maturity weakens the knowledge available at the design review. The
majority of programs in our assessment that have held a design review
did so without first maturing critical technologies. Twenty of the 52
programs we assessed are currently scheduled to hold their critical
design reviews by the year 2011. Only 2 of those 20 programs currently
expect to have their technologies fully mature by the time of their
design reviews, and only 4 of those 20 programs currently expect to
have at least 90 percent design stability by the time of their critical
design reviews.
Historically, Most Cost Growth Is Reported after the Critical Design
Review:
We reviewed the development cost experience of 29 programs that have
completed their product development cycle--the time between the start
of development and production.[Footnote 10] We found a significant
portion of the recognized total development cost increases of these
programs took place after they were approximately half way into their
product development cycle. These increases typically occurred after the
time of the design review of the programs. As shown in figure 2, the
programs experienced a cumulative increase in development costs of 28.3
percent throughout their product development. Approximately 8.5 percent
of the total development cost growth occurred up until the time of the
average critical design review. The remaining 19.7 percent occurred
after the average critical design review.
Figure 2: RDT&E Percentage Increase throughout the Product Development
Cycle for 29 Programs Completed or in Production:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
This historical pattern underscores the challenges DOD faces in
executing programs currently in development. Table 4 lists the programs
in our assessment that have yet to hold their critical design
review.[Footnote 11]
Table 4: Programs in Our Assessment Yet to Hold a Critical Design
Review:
Aerial Common Sensor.
Advanced Deployable System.
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System.
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program.
Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21.
Future Combat Systems.
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Joint Tactical Radio System Cluster 5.
Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System Combined Aggregated Program.
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft.
Mobile User Objective System.
National Polar--Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System.
MQ-9 Predator B.
Warrior UAV.
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: List includes only those programs that have started development.
Four additional programs in our assessment have scheduled their
critical design review but have not yet started development.
[End of table]
The current planned total RDT&E investment of these 16 programs is
approximately $142 billion with a total planned investment of over $521
billion. While most of these programs have yet to experience any
significant cost increases, some have already experienced double digit
cost increases prior to their design review. Furthermore, all 16
programs listed began development with immature technologies--10
currently still have over half of their critical technologies immature.
For these programs, the markers for risk are present--historical
experience and technology immaturity--as are the cost, schedule, and
quantity consequences that attend that risk. If past is prologue, the
decisions to continue to move programs through development without the
requisite knowledge will continue to result in programs that are not
delivered on time nor with the quantities and capabilities promised.
These consequences are exacerbated in an environment of constrained
resources as trade-offs become necessary not only within these
programs, but across the entire weapons portfolio--resulting in a
reduction of the department's buying power.
How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed:
We assess each program in two pages and depict the extent of knowledge
in a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of
the first page. As illustrated in figure 3, the knowledge graph is
based on the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the
attainment of knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange),
design stability (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted
in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment
of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. The
closer a program's attained knowledge is to the best practice line, the
more likely the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and
schedule. A knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by
a gap between the technology knowledge attained and the best practice
line--means the program proceeded with immature technologies and faces
a greater likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks
are discovered and resolved.
Figure 3: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
with Best Practices:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design
review as some technologies were still not mature and only a small
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for
the production decision show that the program is expected to achieve
greater levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that
this program would have had significant cost and schedule increases.
We conducted our review from June 2005 through March 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II
contains detailed information on our methodology.
Assessments of Individual Programs:
Our assessments of the 52 weapon systems follow.
[End of section]
Airborne Laser (ABL):
MDA's ABL element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of their
flight. Carried aboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL
employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the beam on a
target, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel tanks of enemy
missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan and execute
engagements. We assessed the Block 2004 design that is under
development and expected to lead to an initial capability in a future
block.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Kirtland AFB, N. Mex.
Funding, FY06-FY11:
R&D: $4,064.1 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $4,064.1 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Latest costs include all costs from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2009. Total known cost through fiscal year 2011 is $7,416.2
million.
Although program officials expected ABL to provide an initial
capability during Block 2006, this event has been delayed and only one
of its seven critical technologies is fully mature. During Block 2004,
the program continues work on a prototype expected to provide the basic
design for a future operational capability. Program officials expect to
demonstrate the other six technologies during a prototype flight test,
in late 2008, that will assess ABL's lethality. MDA has released about
94 percent of the engineering drawings for the prototype's design,
which will be the basis for an initial operational capability during a
future block if the test is successful. However, additional drawings
may be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems encountered
during flight-testing force design changes.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ABL Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only one of ABL's seven critical technologies--managing the high power
beam--is fully mature. The program office assessed the remaining six
technologies--the six-module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric
compensation, transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter
control--as nearly mature. According to program officials, all of these
technologies are needed to provide the system with an initial
operational capability.
The program office assessed the six-module laser as being close to
reaching full maturity. In November 2004, the program demonstrated the
simultaneous firing of all six laser modules. However, the initial
operation of the laser was too short to make meaningful predictions of
its power, and problems experienced during recent tests limited the
duration of lasing. In December 2005, the program conducted a longer
duration test of the laser and was able to sustain the beam for more
than 10 seconds. The program also produced approximately 83 percent of
the laser's design power, which, according to program officials, is
sufficient to achieve 95 percent of lethal range against all classes of
ballistic missiles.
The program recently completed a series of beam control/fire control
flight tests and, as a result, has reassessed three of its critical
technologies--transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter
control--as nearing full maturity. The program plans to demonstrate all
technologies in an operational environment during a flight test of the
system prototype, referred to as lethal demonstration, in which ABL
will attempt to shoot down a short-range ballistic missile. Challenges
with integrating the laser and beam control/fire control subcomponents
have delayed this test into late 2008.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability because ABL's initial
capability will not be fully developed until the second aircraft is
well underway. While the program has released 10,280 of the 10,910
engineering drawings for the prototype, it is unclear whether the
design of the prototype aircraft can be relied upon as a good indicator
of design stability for the second aircraft. More drawings may be
needed if the design is enhanced or if problems encountered during
flight testing force design changes.
Production Maturity:
The program is producing a limited quantity of hardware for the
system's prototype. However, we did not assess the production maturity
of ABL because MDA has not made a production decision.
Other Program Issues:
In fiscal year 2004, MDA directed the ABL program to restructure its
prime contract, increase its cost ceiling, and refocus the contractor's
efforts on making technical progress. However, recent technical
challenges associated with the program's beam control/fire control
flight test series and long duration laser testing are causing further
cost growth and schedule slippage for the program. Since our last
assessment in January 2005, ABL's planned budget through fiscal year
2009 increased by $483 million (9.4 percent), primarily in fiscal year
2009.
The program plans to award a contract for the second ABL aircraft,
initially to include only trade studies, in fiscal year 2009. MDA has
budgeted approximately $16 million for these trade study initiatives in
an effort to determine the second aircraft system performance
capabilities and to initiate the design of the second weapon system.
However, program officials stated that the commitment to purchase a
second aircraft will not be made until after the system prototype's
lethal demonstration.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA provided technical
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS):
The Army's ACS is an airborne reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition system and is being designed to
provide timely intelligence data on threat forces to the land component
commander. The ACS will replace the Guardrail Common Sensor and the
Airborne Reconnaissance Low airborne systems. ACS will co-exist with
current systems until it is phased in and current systems retire. The
Navy will also acquire ACS to replace its current airborne intelligence
platform, the EP-3.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $879.1 million;
Procurement: $2,892.9 million;
Total funding: $3,775.6 million;
Procurement quantity: 33.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
These costs and quantities are expected to change due to the ACS
program restructuring, as is the acquisition timeline.
Due to a significant increase in the weight to integrate the prime
mission equipment on the platform, the Army terminated the development
contract. However, the ACS program will continue although development
effort will be scaled back. At development start, only one of ACS' six
critical technologies was fully mature and two more were nearing
maturity. Currently, one additional technology is nearing maturity. The
Army expected to have demonstrated the maturity of all but one critical
technology by the design review, which was scheduled for December 2006.
The program office estimated that 50 percent of drawings would have
been releasable at that time. The Army plans to reevaluate
requirements, possibly eliminating some, which will likely affect the
system's technologies, design, cost, and schedule.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ACS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only one of ACS's six critical technologies was mature when the program
started development in July 2004 and two more were nearing maturity.
When the Army terminated the development contract, one additional
technology was nearing maturity. The maturity of one of the remaining
technologies was tied to the development of the airborne version of the
Joint Tactical Radio System, which would not have been available until
after ACS was fielded. The Army expected that all of the critical
technologies except the one tied to the radios would be fully mature by
2006. It is not clear at this time which requirements might be
eliminated or the resulting impact to the technology maturity.
Design Stability:
The program office estimated that 50 percent of the drawings expected
for ACS would have been by the design review, which was scheduled for
December 2006. However, solving the problem of the increased weight to
integrate the prime mission equipment will likely affect the system's
design.
Other Program Issues:
In December 2004, five months after the program began development, the
contractor informed the Army that the weight to integrate prime mission
equipment onto the selected platform had exceeded the structural limits
of the aircraft. In January 2005, a contractor team including Lockheed
Martin and the integration subcontractor initiated a risk mitigation
strategy to address the problem. At the Army's and Navy's direction,
the contactor also began to explore using a larger aircraft. In May
2005, the program manager submitted a program deviation report
notifying DOD that the issue would likely lead to a nonrecoverable
program schedule breach. At the Army's request, the Navy convened a
review team to study the problem without advocating a particular
solution. In September the review team reported back to the Army. The
team identified several factors that contributed to the problem,
including inadequate prime contractor program management as evidenced
by instability on the contractor's engineering team, lack of design
specifications for the subcontractors, and insufficient exploration of
the integration challenges during technology development.
In September 2005, the Army ordered the contractor to stop all work
under the current contract except for work necessary to provide a
written plan with solutions and alternative strategies to maximize
performance and minimize cost and schedule impacts to the government.
In November, the contractor briefed the Army on three courses of
action: refine the configuration to reduce requirements and keep the
current platform; allow the contractor to acquire a larger platform
that can accommodate the current prime mission equipment; or decouple
the platform from system development and have the contractor deliver
only the prime mission equipment. The Army rejected all three solutions
and in January 2006, terminated the development contract for the
convenience of the government. The Army has not yet estimated the
effect to the development cost and schedule.
Recent funding cuts appear to reduce the total program cost by $43.1
million in current year dollars. Reductions were due to reprogramming
and changes in inflation indices.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Advanced Deployable System (ADS):
The Navy's ADS is a rapidly deployable undersea surveillance system,
scheduled for initial deployment as part of the antisubmarine warfare
mission package on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). ADS is designed to
detect, track, and report conventional and nuclear submarines in
shallow waters by laying sensor fields on the ocean floor that send
data back to the LCS for processing and analysis. We assessed the
entire system, including its sensors, sensor installation system, in-
buoy processors, and onboard analysis and reporting system.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $219.6 million;
Procurement: $581.3 million;
Total funding: $809.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 15.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The ADS program entered system development in November 2005 with none
of its four critical technologies mature. The sensors and the on-board
processing system are more mature because they leverage existing Navy
technology. Program officials identified several remaining risks for
ADS, however, such as the ability of the system to relay data from the
in-buoy processor to the on-board analysis and reporting system and the
successful deployment and installation of sensors. According to the
program office, all technologies are expected to reach maturity in
2007. ADS is expected to be fully operational with the delivery to LCS
in 2009. We were unable to assess design stability due to a lack of
design data at this time.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ADS Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of ADS's four critical technologies reached maturity by the start
of system development in November 2005. Program officials stated,
however, that the maturity of all critical technologies will be
demonstrated through complete end-to-end system testing in fiscal year
2007.
Two critical technologies--the sensor subsystem, consisting of sensors
and fiber optic connecting cables, and the on-board analysis and
reporting system (ARS)--are relatively mature, in part because they
leverage existing technologies. The ARS is comprised of previously
developed software and only requires repackaging and integration into
the ADS. However, although the ARS currently meets its requirements, an
ongoing challenge is developing enhanced automation tools to reduce
operator workload, due to limited space on the LCS. The sensor system
is relatively mature because it uses sensors from previous program
development. Prototypes of both technologies have already been tested
in the ocean environment.
The remaining two critical technologies are less mature, and face
several risks and challenges. The in-buoy processor system, which
compresses and processes data from the ocean floor before sending it to
the LCS, is still in early development. According to program officials,
the system's ability to transfer data to the ARS is a high-risk area.
Recent risk reduction efforts aimed to address this issue. The system
may also employ a reduced-range radio technology as a fallback
technology. Additional development challenges for ADS include improving
the overall survivability of the buoys and increasing their endurance.
The sensor installation system, which deploys and installs sensors on
the ocean bottom, is complicated by its dependence on many smaller
technologies. Successful installation of sensors, as well as the
survivability of connector cables--from fish bites and trawling, for
example--are major development concerns. Back-up options for sensor
installation include deploying the arrays manually, as demonstrated in
a 2003 test or using a deployment vehicle that was demonstrated in a
fleet exercise in 1999. Recent risk reduction efforts, however, have
improved the system's performance. In 2004 and 2005, for example,
sensor deployment and high-speed cable pullout were demonstrated
successfully.
Design Stability:
We were unable to assess ADS design stability due to a lack of design
data at this time.
Other Program Issues:
Originally designed for deployment on another platform, the ADS program
was redirected in 2003 to focus its initial increment on deployment
from the LCS. This developmental change caused some redesign of the
program, but incorporated previously developed sensors and processing
algorithms. Moreover, although future spirals will provide the
capability to deploy ADS from an alternate platform, the first
increment of ADS is wholly focused on deployment from the LCS.
The LCS also only allows for limited manpower to support ADS processing
operations. To maximize efficiency, operators may need to be trained in
multiple systems of the LCS's antisubmarine warfare mission area. ADS
program officials are concerned that operators may not have the
expertise necessary to employ ADS effectively.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on this assessment, the Navy stated that according to its
standards two ADS technologies--the sensor subsystem and the ARS--are
already mature. According to Navy officials, they evaluate ADS
technology maturity based on standards set by a Naval research group,
which considers technologies mature when they have been demonstrated in
a relevant, rather than an operational environment.
The Navy stated that it is making progress in reducing risks on key
technologies through the execution of a Technology Maturity Plan.
Specifically, Navy officials stated that they are mitigating system
risks through additional testing of the sensor installation system and
risk mitigation planning.
[End of section]
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):
MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed
U.S. forces, allies, and friends from short-and medium-range ballistic
missile attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hit-
to-kill missiles, and command and control systems. It will also be used
as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of
intercontinental ballistic missiles. We assessed only Block 2004 of the
element's missile, the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3).
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin (AWS), Raytheon (SM-3);
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding FY06-FY11:
R&D: $4,962.1 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $4,962.1 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
Costs and quantities are for all known blocks from the program's
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through
fiscal year 2011 is $10,038.4 million and total quantities are 101.
[End of table]
According to program officials, the Block 2004 increment of SM-3
missiles being fielded during 2004-2005 has mature technologies and a
stable design. However, the program deferred full functionality of the
missile's Solid Divert and Altitude Control System, which maneuvers the
missile's kinetic warhead to its target, to a future upgrade. Program
officials noted that even with reduced capability, the first increment
of missiles provide a credible defense against a large population of
the threat. All drawings for the first increment of missiles have been
released to manufacturing. The program is not collecting statistical
data on its production process but is using other means to gauge
production readiness.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Aegis BMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials estimate that all three technologies critical to the
SM-3 missile are mature. These technologies--the missile's third stage
rocket motor and the kinetic warhead's infrared seeker and Solid Divert
and Attitude Control System (SDACS)--have been tested in flight. While
the first two technologies were fully demonstrated in flight tests, the
SDACS, which steers the kinetic warhead, was only partially
demonstrated. The SDACS operation in "pulse mode," which increases the
missile's divert capability, failed during a June 2003 flight test.
According to program officials, the test failure was likely caused by a
defective subcomponent within the SDACS, a problem that should be
corrected through specific design modifications. To implement these
corrective actions, the program is deferring full functionality of the
missile's SDACS technology to the next upgrade of the hit-to-kill
missile. Program officials note that only partial functionality of the
SDACS is required for Block 2004, which has been successfully
demonstrated in flight tests.
Design Stability:
Program officials reported that the design for the first 11 SM-3
missiles being produced during Block 2004 is stable with 100 percent of
its drawings released to manufacturing. The program plans to implement
design changes in subsequent blocks (delivered during 2006-2007) to
resolve the SDACS failure witnessed in the June 2003 flight test.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the production maturity of the SM-3 missiles being
procured for Block 2004. Program officials stated that given the low
quantity of missiles being produced, statistical process control data
on the production process would have no significance. The Aegis BMD
program is using other means to assess progress in production and
manufacturing, such as integrated product team reviews, risk reviews,
Engineering Manufacturing Readiness Levels, and missile metrics.
Other Program Issues:
The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of Aegis-
equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the ballistic
missile defense mission. In particular, the program is working to
upgrade Aegis destroyers for surveillance and tracking of
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Because this function is new to
the element, the program has faced a tight schedule to develop and test
this added functionality during the Block 2004 time frame. Although the
program aims to upgrade ten destroyers as part of its Block 2004
increment, this new functionality has been exercised in a limited
number of flight tests and has never been validated in an end-to-end
flight test with the GMD system, for which it is providing long range
surveillance and tracking. Since our last assessment, Aegis BMD's
planned budget through fiscal year 2009 increased by $453.5 million
(5.6 percent), primarily in fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
Agency Comments:
The Program Office provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites:
The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing
Milstar system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-resistant,
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international
partnership program that includes Canada, United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,108.2 million;
Procurement: $538.5 million;
Total funding: $2,646.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 1.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
According to the program office, the AEHF program's technologies are
mature and the design is stable. However, in late 2004 the program was
delayed 12 months because key cryptographic equipment would not be
delivered in time and to allow the program time to replace some
critical electronic components and add testing. Program officials
stated the 12-month slip should allow ample time to resolve the issues,
but added significant cost. Total program cost increased about $1
billion. The program still faces schedule risk due to the continued
concurrent development of two critical path items managed and developed
outside the program. Current plans are to meet full operational
capability with three AEHF satellites and the first Transformational
Satellite Communications System (TSAT) satellite, but additional AEHF
satellites may be acquired if there are deployment delays with TSAT.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
AEHF Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all of the 14 critical technologies
are mature, having been demonstrated in a relevant environment and most
progressing into environmental and functional performance testing.
Design Stability:
AEHF's design is stable. Virtually all of the expected design drawings
have been released. The program completed its system level critical
design review in April 2004.
Production Maturity:
Production maturity could not be assessed as the program office does
not collect statistical process control data.
Other Program Issues:
In late 2004, the concurrent development of two critical path items led
to schedule delays and cost increases. The program was restructured in
October 2004, when the National Security Agency did not deliver key
cryptographic equipment to the payload contractor in time to meet the
launch schedule. The restructuring added 12 months to the program to
allow time to resolve the cryptographic delivery issues and resolve
other program problems including replacement of critical electronic
components and additional payload testing. Delaying the launches and
resolving these issues added about $800 million to the program. Earlier
cost increases brought the total increase to about $1 billion,
incurring a Nunn-McCurdy breach in December 2004 (10 U.S.C. 2433) at
the 15 percent threshold.
The program still faces schedule risk due to the continued concurrent
development of two critical path items developed and managed outside
the program; the cryptographic components developed and produced by the
National Security Agency and the Command Post Terminals managed by
another Air Force Program Office. During 2005, the program developed
emulators to simulate key cryptographic equipment to allow payload
testing and integration to continue, and National Security Agency began
delivery of some actual components, meeting its revised delivery dates.
Program officials told us the mission control segment continues to meet
or exceed its schedule and performance milestones. In addition, the
program made progress in several areas including: completion of end-to-
end testing for the payload and terminal communications utilizing test
terminals, completion of static load testing on the satellite
structure, and delivery of the flight cryptographic hardware, which has
been installed and tested on the first satellite.
Three AEHF satellite launches are scheduled for 2008, 2009, and 2010.
In December 2002, satellites four and five were deleted from the
program with the intention of using TSAT to achieve full operational
capability. However, the AEHF contract contains options to buy
additional satellites if there are deployment problems with TSAT.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA):
The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F
aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon
control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current
radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the
Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness
of the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be
inserted in new production aircraft and retrofitted into lot 26 and
above aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: McDonnell Douglas, Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $76.4 million;
Procurement: $1,483.7 million;
Total funding: $1,560.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 373.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Procurement funding for the radar is included in the funding for the
F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft programs.
The AESA radar's critical technologies appear to be mature and the
design appears stable. However, radar development continues during
production. The program is tracking a number of risks with the
technical performance of the radar. If problems are discovered, design
changes could be required while the radar is in production. Software
development continues to be the program's top challenge. Problems in
developing radar software have resulted in deferring several advanced
capabilities until future software configurations. Radar production
faces a high risk in 2006 because a material for one of the radar's
critical technologies is expected to go out of production. Several
other development and production risks have not been resolved.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
AESA Program:
Technology Maturity:
A technology readiness assessment for the radar in fiscal year 2004
determined that the four critical technologies were mature. To further
ensure technology maturity, a final technology assessment was held in
November 2005.
Design Stability:
Although the AESA design appears to be stable, development of the radar
has continued during production. According to program officials, radar
software continues to be the top program challenge. Several advanced
radar capabilities have been deferred to future software
configurations. The radar schedule could not be extended because it is
directly tied to the F/A-18E/F schedule. According to the program
office, these capabilities will not be deferred beyond the first
deployment, and no key performance parameters will be affected by the
deferral. Since the start of development, the number of lines of
software code has increased by 17 percent, and software development
costs have increased by over 40 percent.
According to a program office risk assessment, other development risks
could result in design changes: the radar may not be able to track
sufficient targets simultaneously or detect tail targets at low
altitude; radiation emissions may interfere with F/A-18E/F weapon
systems; and the radar power supply may not prevent voltage modulation
on the aircraft power system. Also, the radar simulation model
integrated into the F/A-18 training simulator may not accurately
represent radar operation and performance. Mitigation plans are in
place to address the design risks and, according to the program office,
the likelihood of a design change is minimal due to over 500 flights
with the AESA radar.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because statistical process
control data are not being collected. Instead, manufacturing processes
continue to be monitored and controlled at each manufacturing center
and laboratory. Twenty percent of the 415 radars are to be procured
during 4 low-rate production runs. The radar's third production run has
been approved. Nine radars had been delivered as of August 2005. Most
radars will be installed in F/A-18E/Fs on the aircraft production line,
but 135 radars are to be retrofitted into already produced aircraft.
Radar production continues to face a number of risks. A high risk
involves a foam material for the radar's wideband radome, a critical
technology. The manufacturer plans to stop producing the material in
the 2006 time frame, which would affect future radar production. The
program office plans to mitigate this risk by making a lifetime buy of
the foam material. According to the program risk assessment, other
risks include whether: radar manufacturing capacity can ramp up enough
to meet production and reliability problems with a radar critical
technology will allow initial radars to meet a specification. Also, low-
rate production is exceeding design-to-cost and firm, fixed-price
costs. For example, the estimate at completion for the radar contract
is projected to overrun the target cost by up to 34 percent.
Other Program Issues:
In response to a 1999 DOD directive, a requirement was added to the
radar for antitamper protection to guard against exploitation of
critical U.S. technologies. According to the program office, a
successful critical design review for this requirement was completed in
November 2005. While officials said there is a requirement for this
protection to have no effect on radar performance, operational tests of
antitamper models may identify problems that require design changes to
the protection package. By then, 84 radars are expected to have been
produced.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS):
The Army's APKWS is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile designed
to engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system is intended to
add a new laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket System and
is expected to provide a lower cost, accurate alternative to the
Hellfire missile. Future block upgrades are planned to improve system
effectiveness. We assessed the laser guidance technology used in the
new seeker.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $56.1 million;
Procurement: $1,329.6 million;
Total funding: $1,385.6 million;
Procurement quantity: 71,565.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Since our assessment of APKWS last year, the Milestone Decision
Authority curtailed the program. We reported the APKWS entered
development and held its design review before demonstrating its
critical guidance technology was fully mature and that initial system-
level testing identified problems with the design. According to program
officials, placement of the laser seeker proved to be problematic. The
combination of development cost overruns, a projected schedule slip of
1-2 years, unsatisfactory contract performance, and environmental
issues resulted in curtailment of the initial APKWS program in January
2005. Program officials expect to award the contract for a restructured
APKWS program in the second quarter of fiscal year 2006. Due to program
uncertainty, we were unable to assess design, technology, or production
maturity.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
APKWS Program:
Technology Maturity:
At the time of our last report, APKWS had one critical technology--
laser guidance. Since the laser technology was employed on other
platforms, program officials considered it to be mature. However,
according to program officials, integration of the laser on the fins
rather than in the head of the missile proved to be more problematic
then originally estimated. The configuration difficulty presented
problems that the contractor could not overcome and keep the missile
within cost and on schedule. The integration issue contributed to the
cost overrun and protracted schedule, which subsequently led to program
curtailment and restructuring. Program officials stated they have since
identified several laser seeker and guidance and control systems
suitable for the Guided Rocket requirement. Furthermore, program
representatives feel they have sufficient information to proceed with
the critical design review immediately after contract award. Because
the contractor and the specific technical approach to be pursued are
yet to be determined, we could not assess the maturity of the design,
technology, or production for the restructured program.
Other Program Issues:
Although the APKWS program was scheduled to start production of the
rocket in fiscal year 2006, a number of program problems related to
development cost overruns, schedule slippage, and contract performance
resulted in the Army Program Executive Officer for Missiles and Space
curtailing the program in January 2005. Following curtailment, the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army validated the requirements and approved a
restructured APKWS program and timeline. Program officials released a
Draft Request for Proposal in June 2005 and are expecting to award a
new contract for the restructured APKWS program during the second
quarter of fiscal year 2006. According to program officials, the
current fiscal year 2006 President's budget was prepared and submitted
prior to the Milestone Decision Authority's decision to curtail the
initial APKWS contract and restructure the program. Ongoing program
office efforts to align program funding to the new structure have not
yet been completed.
Agency Comments:
The Army provided technical changes, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS):
The Special Operations Forces' ASDS is a battery-powered dry interior
hybrid combatant submersible for clandestine insertion/extraction of
Navy SEALs and their equipment. It is carried to a deployment area by
specially configured 688-class submarines. ASDS is intended to provide
increased range, payload, on-station loiter time, endurance, and
communication/sensor capacity over current submersibles. The 65-foot-
long 8-foot-diameter ASDS is operated by a two-person crew and includes
a lock out/lock in diving chamber.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD;
Procurement: TBD;
Total funding: TBD;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The ASDS program is being restructured due to reliability problems with
the first boat, and the production decision for additional units has
been cancelled. Restructuring includes developing a reliability
improvement plan and conducting a critical system review to identify
issues that need to be addressed. ASDS design changes since our last
report include replacing the silver-zinc battery with a lithium-ion
battery, replacing the aluminum tail with a titanium tail, and several
other modifications. At-sea development testing of the lithium-ion
battery has been completed. Acoustic, or noise level problems, are
being addressed; however, this requirement does not have to be met
until delivery of the second ASDS boat. Until ASDS reliability is
assessed, problems are addressed, and operational testing is completed,
ASDS technology maturity and design stability remain uncertain.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ASDS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The program office identified three ASDS critical technologies.
Although two of the three technologies were mature at the time of our
last assessment, since that time the aluminum tail (mature) has been
replaced with a titanium tail. The silver-zinc battery was replaced
with a lithium-ion battery. In an August 2005 at-sea development test
of the battery, requirements for speed, range, and endurance were
exceeded. Acoustic, or noise level problems, are being addressed. In
earlier tests, the ASDS propeller was the source of the most
significant noise, and a new composite propeller was installed before
operational test and evaluation in 2003. Although program officials
believe the improved propeller will significantly reduce the ASDS
acoustic signature, precise acoustic measurements are incomplete. Other
acoustic issues will be addressed on a time-phased basis because the
acoustic requirement has been deferred until delivery of the second
boat.
Design Stability:
The ASDS experienced a propulsion-related failure during Follow-on
Operational Test and Evaluation in October 2005, and the Navy
decertified ASDS from operational test readiness. The Navy is
investigating the causes of the failure and plans to complete repairs
and post-repair testing in January 2006. On November 30, 2005, the
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Navy announced
the restructuring of the ASDS program to focus on correcting
reliability deficiencies with the first boat and to conduct
verification testing of improvements before continuing operational
testing. The ASDS Reliability Action Panel, a panel of submarine and
submersible technical experts from government and industry chartered by
SOCOM and the Navy in September 2005, noted that there were numerous
examples of unpredicted component reliability problems and failures
resulting from design issues and that operational testing should not be
resumed until completion of a detailed review of mission critical
systems.
Consequently, the production decision for additional units has been
cancelled until the first boat's reliability has been improved. Under
the ASDS restructuring plan, the critical system review is expected to
identify known problems and other potential issues and identify what
design changes are needed. A Vulnerability Assessment Report assessing
ASDS survivability design features was issued in September 2005 and a
Capabilities Production Document (to replace the June 2004 ASDS
operational requirements document) is under review. Until the program's
critical system review is completed, all requirements are addressed,
technical problems are solved, and testing is completed, we believe the
ASDS final design will remain uncertain and may have cost and schedule
implications. Because the ASDS program is being restructured, we are
not assessing the current level of ASDS design stability.
Other Program Issues:
In December 2004 SOCOM reduced the ASDS program quantity to three units
due to resource constraints. However, it affirmed that the operational
requirements document remained valid at six ASDS vehicles.
Agency Comments:
The Navy concurred with our assessment and provided updated costs,
which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System:
The Army's and Special Operations' ATIRCM/CMWS is a component of the
Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures planned to defend U.S.
aircraft from advanced infrared-guided missiles. The system will be
employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. ATIRCM/CMWS includes
an active infrared jammer, missile warning system, and countermeasure
dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, such as flares,
chaff, and smoke.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $71.9 million;
Procurement: $3,605.4 million;
Total funding: $3,677.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 2,458.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with
technologies mature and designs stable. However, one of the five
critical technologies was recently downgraded due to continued
technical difficulties. Currently, the program's production processes
are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion of the program
entered limited production in February 2002 to meet urgent deployment
requirements. However, full-rate production for both components was
delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past several years,
the program has had to overcome cost and schedule problems brought on
by shortfalls in knowledge. Key technologies were demonstrated late in
development and only a small number of design drawings were completed
by design review. At the low rate production decision point, the Army
developed a new cost estimate reducing program procurement cost
substantially.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ATIRCM/CMWS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The five critical technologies were considered mature until a
government/industry team recently downgraded the maturity level of the
infrared jamming head due to technical issues. Additionally, the other
four technologies did not mature until after the design review in
February 1997. Most of the early technology development effort focused
on the application to rotary wing aircraft. When system development
began in 1995, requirements were expanded to include Navy and Air Force
fixed wing aircraft. This change caused problems that contributed to
cost increases of over 150 percent. The Navy and the Air Force
subsequently dropped out of the program, but the Navy and the Army are
currently pursuing future joint production planning.
Design Stability:
The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the
drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not stable at the
time of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings
complete due to the expanded requirements. Two years after the design
review, 90 percent of the drawings were released and the design was
stable. This resulted in inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional
testing, and a 3-year schedule delay.
Production Stability:
Production maturity could not be assessed based on the information
provided by the program office. According to program officials, the
program has 21 key manufacturing processes in various phases of control
(7 CMWS and 14 ATIRCM). The CMWS production portion of the system has
stabilized and benefited from increased production rates. Also,
processes supporting both ATIRCM and CMWS will continue to be enhanced
as data is gathered and lessons learned will be included in the
processes. The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002 to
meet an urgent need. Subsequently, full rate production was delayed for
both components due to reliability testing failures. The program
implemented reliability fixes to six production representative
subsystems for use in initial operational test and evaluation. These
systems were delivered in March 2004. The full-rate production decision
for the complete system was recently delayed until June 2010 due to
ATIRCM performance issues.
Other Program Issues:
The Army uses the airframe as the acquisition quantity unit of measure
even though it is not buying an ATIRCM/CMWS system for each aircraft.
When the program began, plans called for putting an ATIRCM/CMWS on each
aircraft. Due to funding constraints, the Army reduced the number of
systems to be procured and will rotate the systems to aircraft as
needed. The Army is buying kits for each aircraft, which include the
modification hardware, wiring harness, cables necessary to install and
interface the ATIRCM/CMWS to each platform. The Army plans to buy 1,710
ATIRCM/CMWS systems and 3,571 kits to use for aircraft integration. As
a result, the true unit procurement cost for each ATIRCM/CMWS system is
more on the order of $2.8 million.
The current program baseline includes accelerated funding to procure
additional ATIRCM/CMWS systems additional nonrecurring engineering
driven by an increase in the number and types of platforms. The
quantity of ATIRCM/CMWS systems was increased from 1,076 to 1,710 in
June 2005. A new Army cost position has been established that reflects
the impact of the CMWS full rate production decision, the increased
quantities, and the schedule delays.
Agency Comments:
The ATIRCM/CMWS program has been realigned to address Global War on
Terrorism requirements and implement improvements. In response to a
November 2003 memo from the Assistant Secretary of the Army to equip
all Army helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan with the most effective
defensive systems, the program office proposed accelerating the CMWS
portion of ATIRCM. To date, 506 installation kits and 214 CMWS's have
been fielded. Full-rate production decision for CMWS required a
separate Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, completed November
2005. CMWS full rate production decision is planned for February 2006.
The ATIRCM system experienced performance and reliability issues during
October 2004 testing. The program has been rebaselined, allowing for
improved performance, adding a multiband laser capability and increased
ATIRCM system reliability. Full rate production is currently planned
for fiscal year 2010. This rebaselined plan was presented and approved
by the Army Acquisition Executive in December 2005.
[End of section]
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):
The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. To comply with
federal requirements, the frequency must be changed to a band where the
B-2 will be designated as a primary user. The modified radar system is
being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of
stealth, range, payload, and near precision weapons delivery
capabilities.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $464.6 million;
Procurement: $508.5 million;
Total funding: $973.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 14.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The total quantity of 21 units includes 14 to be bought with
procurement funds and 7 to be bought with R&D funds. All 21 units will
eventually be placed on operational B-2 aircraft.
Since our assessment of the B-2 RMP last year, the program successfully
completed its design review in May 2005 with all four critical
technologies considered mature. The program had released 85 percent of
its design drawings by the design review and plans to have 100 percent
released by the start of production. Program officials told us
production maturity metrics will be formulated during development and
these metrics may or may not include manufacturing process control
data. The program plans to build seven radar units during development
for pilot training with the B-2 wing prior to the planned completion of
flight testing. Six of these units will later be modified and placed on
B-2 aircraft. These units are necessary, but building them in
development adds to the risk of later design changes because most of
the radar flight testing will not occur until after these units are
built.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
B-2 RMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
All four B-2 RMP critical technologies were considered mature at the
design review in May 2005. While the program entered development in
August 2004 with two of these four critical technologies mature and two
approaching maturity, the receiver/exciter for the electronic driver
cards and aspects of the antenna designed to help keep the B-2's radar
signature low, all four are now considered mature. The program expects
these technologies to reach a slightly higher level of maturity at the
start of production in 2007.
Design Stability:
The program office completed its design readiness review in May 2005
and at that time had 85 percent of its drawings released to
manufacturing. The program plans to have 100 percent of its drawings
released by the start of production in 2007. The program, however, does
not use the release of design drawings as a measure of design maturity
but instead uses the successful completion of design events, such as
subsystem design reviews, as its primary measure of design maturity.
Production Maturity:
Production maturity metrics are planned to be formulated during
development. These metrics, which may or may not include manufacturing
process control data, are planned to be used as measures of progress
toward production maturity during a production readiness review prior
to the start of production in February 2007. The program is also
involved in a proof-of-manufacturing effort to demonstrate that the
transmit/receive modules can be built to specifications.
Other Program Issues:
The program plans to build seven radar units during development and
later modify six of these units for placement on operational B-2
aircraft. The Air Force needs these radar units for air crew training
and proficiency operations. Even though these units are necessary,
building them early in development adds risk because most of the radar
flight-test activity will not occur until after these units are built.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force concurred with this assessment.
[End of section]
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP):
The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and
avionics for 14 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It
consolidates and installs the mandated DOD Navigation/Safety
modifications, the Global Air Traffic Management systems, and the C-130
broad area review requirements. It also incorporates other reliability,
maintainability, and sustainability upgrades and provides increased
situational awareness capabilities and reduces susceptibility of
Special Operations aircraft to detection/interception.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $829.5 million;
Procurement: $2,620.4 million;
Total funding: $3,449.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 454.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The C-130 AMP is utilizing commercial and modified off-the-shelf
technologies, and it entered system development with five of its six
critical technologies mature. The final technology reached maturity in
2005 through a series of demonstration flights. Program officials plan
to release 90 percent of engineering drawings by the design review and
have made progress toward that goal. As of December 2005, 100 percent
of required drawings for Combat Delivery First Flight had been
released. Program delays have resulted from funding cuts, and sustained
development contract protests required a portion of the contract to be
recompeted. The August 2005 design review has been postponed
indefinitely, and the low rate initial production decision has been
delayed until June 2006. These dates may change again after program
restructuring is completed.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
C-130 AMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
All of the C-130 AMP's six critical technologies are fully mature, as
the program is primarily utilizing proven commercial and modified off-
the-shelf technology for all AMP capabilities. A program official
stated that the last immature critical technology, Terrain Following
and Terrain Avoidance radar, reached full maturity in 2005 by meeting
the key requirement of operability at 250 feet during demonstration
flights.
Design Stability:
As of December 2005, the program office had released 100 percent of
required drawings for Combat Delivery First Flight. According to the
Air Force, due to program restructuring, the Combat Talon critical
design review was postponed indefinitely, and a new review date will be
established under the current replan effort.
The modernization effort is divided into a number of capability spirals
due to the various aircraft designs. The first spiral will outfit C-130
aircraft with core capabilities and an integrated defensive system.
Special Operations C-130 aircraft will be outfitted first, and future
spirals are planned for these aircraft because they require additional,
and unique, defensive systems integration and enhanced situational
awareness.
Other Program Issues:
Since GAO's last review of the C-130 AMP, the program office has
postponed the design readiness review indefinitely, pushed back the low-
rate initial production 4 months, and delayed the production readiness
review 18 months.
Funding reductions in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the
development program and contributed to the rescheduling of program
milestones and the rebaselining of the program. In addition, sustained
protests associated with the C-130 AMP development contract awarded in
2001 required that a portion of the contract be recompeted.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):
The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and
reduce ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment,
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We
assessed the C-5 AMP.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $0.0 million;
Procurement: $145.1 million;
Total funding: $145.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 12.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Since our assessment of the C-5 AMP last year, the program completed
developmental test and evaluation in August 2005, 10 months later than
planned. The program's technologies and design are considered mature as
they are relying on commercial-off-the-shelf technologies that are
installed in other commercial and military aircraft. The main challenge
to the program has been the development and integration of software--to
which the schedule delay as well as a $23 million cost overrun has been
attributed. The Air Force plans to modify 59 of the 112 C-5 aircraft.
The Air Force is also seeking funding to modify the remaining 53 C-5s;
however, that decision will not be made until the Air Force determines
the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft needed to meet DOD's airlift
needs. If the Air Force decides to use the C-17s, it may not upgrade
some, or all, of the remaining 53 C-5s.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
C-5 AMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the
program used commercial technologies that are considered mature.
Program officials stated that those technologies are in use on other
aircraft and that they have not significantly changed in form, fit, or
function. For example, the new computer processors are being used in
the Boeing 777, 717, other commercial aircraft, the KC-10, and a Navy
reconnaissance aircraft.
Design Stability:
Last year we reported that the C-5 AMP had released 100 percent of
their drawings; however, due to modifications in the design an
additional 270 drawings were added. As a result, the program had
completed only 54 percent of the total number of drawings for the
system by the time of the production decision. The program now reports
that the contractor has released all of the drawings for the AMP. In
addition, seven major subsystem-level design reviews were completed
along with integration activities. Demonstration of these activities
were completed during developmental test and evaluation, which started
in December 2002 and was completed in August 2005.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity because most components are
readily available as commercial-off-the-shelf items. This equipment is
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. In addition, the
C-5 AMP is incorporating many other off-the-shelf systems and
equipment, such as the embedded global positioning system, the inertial
navigation system, and the multifunction control and display units. To
ensure production maturity, the program office is collecting data
regarding modification kit availability and the installation schedules.
Other Program Issues:
Over the past year, the AMP program ran into significant problems while
trying to complete software development that have impacted the cost and
schedule of the program. Most notably, a software build was added to
fix problems with AMP integration, flight management system stability
and system diagnostics. The added build caused a $23 million cost
overrun, which was paid for by shifting funds from the RERP program,
and extended developmental testing to 10 months. The program office
acknowledged that an another software build may be added, depending on
the results of operational testing that is now scheduled to be
completed in July 2006.
Last year we reported that the Air Force was conducting mobility
studies to determine the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft it would
need in the future. This decision has not been made yet. In the
meantime, the program office is continuing its plan to provide AMP
modifications for 59 of the aircraft while all 112 aircraft are
projected to go through the RERP program. If all 112 aircraft are
needed and do go through the RERP program, then the Air Force will need
to request additional money to fund AMP modifications for the remaining
53 aircraft.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. RERP
is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and
availability of the C-5 through engine replacement and modifications to
subsystems, i.e. electrical and fuel, while the C-5 Avionics
Modernization Program (AMP) is designed to enhance the avionics. The
upgrades are part of a two-phased modernization effort to improve the
mission capability rate, performance, and transport throughput
capabilities and reduce total ownership costs. We assessed the C-5
RERP.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $417.3 million;
Procurement: $8,150.3 million;
Total funding: $8,571.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 109.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The RERP is utilizing demonstrated commercial off-the-shelf components
that require little or no modification. The program ensured that its
technologies and design were stable at critical points in development.
The program, which is currently in system development and
demonstration, plans to enter low-rate production in December 2006.
However, since last year the program has experienced a 9-month schedule
delay due to multiple issues, such as a pylon redesign, and has been
subject to almost $50 million in budget cuts that further increases
schedule risk. The C-5 RERP program is also dependent on the number of
aircraft approved to undergo the C-5 AMP modernization program. Until
additional aircraft are approved for the AMP, it is uncertain how many
aircraft will undergo the RERP.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
C-5 RERP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. New engines
account for 64 percent of the expected improvement in mission
capability rate for the aircraft. The new engines are commercial jet
engines currently being used on numerous aircraft. According to the Air
Force technology assessment, these engines have over 238 million flying
hours of use.
Design Stability:
The C-5 RERP's design is undergoing changes due to a necessary redesign
of the pylon/thrust reverser to address overweight conditions and
safety concerns for the engine mount area. According to program
officials, the redesign has contributed 4 months to the overall 9 month
schedule delay of the program. Prior to this redesign, 98 percent of
the design drawings were complete. It is unclear what effect the latest
redesign will have on the completed drawings. According to the program
office, the seven major subsystem level design reviews were completed
before the December 2003 system-level design review.
The program is taking advantage of AMP developed products and lessons
learned in the C-5 RERP to reduce the risk of potential schedule slips
associated with software development and integration. For example,
according to program officials, some of the baseline software and
systems integration facilities that were developed for C-5 AMP can be
reused for RERP activities.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air
Force is buying commercially available items. However, we expect that
production maturity would be at a high level because the engines have
been commercially available for many years.
Other Program Issues:
The program has experienced a 9-month schedule delay since last year
due to multiple issues including, pylon weight and redesign, asymmetric
thrust reverser development problems, C-5 AMP delays, and wing rib web
structure design and manufacture. The 9-month delay has cost the
program an additional $45 million. In addition, recent budget
reductions of almost $50 million are increasing the schedule risk of
the program. Almost half of this money was shifted to the C-5 AMP to
help that program complete software development activities. The
remaining funds were cut by OSD because it appeared the program was
under executing its funds. These cuts, along with the pylon development
problems mentioned earlier, have forced the delay of the trainer
program until fiscal year 2008. Program officials are also considering
aggressive steps, such as hiring additional workers and using multiple
shifts, to address potential schedule increases.
RERP officials are currently monitoring negotiations between DOD and
General Electric to bring General Electric into full compliance with
the Berry Amendment, which requires certain metals used in military
systems to be purchased from domestic sources. According to Air Force
officials, General Electric expects to be in full compliance with the
Berry Amendment by January 2007, without impact to C-5 RERP.
The program is still waiting on the results of a mobility study to
determine the mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft the Air Force plans to use
in the future. Until that decision is made, the Air Force is continuing
its plan to re-engine all 112 C-5 aircraft. Before that can be done,
however, all 112 will need to complete the AMP upgrade. Yet, the Air
Force has only provided funding for 59 of the aircraft to receive the
AMP upgrade at this time.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
CH-47F:
The Army's CH-47F heavy lift helicopter is intended to provide
transportation for tactical vehicles, artillery, engineer equipment,
personnel, and logistical support equipment. It is also expected to
operate in both day and night. The program goal is to enhance
performance and extend the useful life of the CH-47 as well as produce
new helicopters. This effort includes installing a digitized cockpit,
rebuilding the airframe, and reducing aircraft vibration.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Helicopters;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $7.8 million;
Procurement: $9,064.4 million;
Total funding: $9,072.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 454.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The CH-47F technologies appear mature and the design stable, with 100
percent of the engineering drawings released for manufacturing. CH-47F
production maturity could not be assessed as the program is not
collecting statistical process control data on key manufacturing
processes. Program officials believe that CH-47F production is low risk
because no new technology is being inserted into the aircraft, two
prototypes have been produced, and the production process was
demonstrated during the delivery of one low-rate initial production
aircraft. Since our last assessment, the CH-47F program entered full
rate production and increased quantities from 339 to 512 aircraft.
Because the increase in quantities includes 55 new build helicopters,
program unit cost increased approximately 12 percent over what we
reported last year.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
CH-47F Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess technology maturity or determine the number of
critical technologies in detail. The CH-47F is a modification of the
existing CH-47D helicopter. Program officials believe that all critical
technologies are mature and have been demonstrated prior to integration
into the CH-47F development program.
Design Stability:
The Army entered full rate production in November 2004, with 100
percent of the drawings released to manufacturing. However, the number
of drawings completed increased substantially since the start of low
rate production. As a result, the level of maturity achieved at design
review was only 11 percent and at low rate production was 31 percent.
The majority of the new drawings were instituted to correct wire
routing and installation on the aircraft. Accordingly, the program
office believed the total number of drawings could not be determined
until after the first prototype was delivered.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the CH-47F program does
not collect statistical process control data on its production of
helicopters. The program office relies on inspections as its means to
ensure acceptable production results.
According to the program office, the CH-47 production is low risk
because two prototypes have been produced during development and the
Army recently took delivery of its first low-rate initial production
aircraft. Further, the program reported that during low-rate
production, it made significant advances in the refinement of CH-47
production processes. Advances include the implementation of the
automated management execution system and the introduction of laser
tracking to identify key mounting points. These enhancements are geared
toward improving the manufacturing learning curve. However, the program
office acknowledges that the program will lose some of the learning
benefits during the anticipated break in production of the CH-47F in
favor of producing more MG-47 special operations configuration
helicopters during the next lot of production.
Other Program Issues:
In November 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive approved the revised
program acquisition strategy and approved the start of full rate
production. This acquisition strategy includes service life extension
upgrades for the CH-47D fleet and a number of new-build aircraft to
meet operational fleet requirements. Included in the new baseline is a
revised acquisition objective quantity of 512 upgraded aircraft as
opposed to the 339 previously reported. Of the larger quantity, 2 are
developmental; 55 will be new build CH-47Fs; 58 will be remanufactured
in the special operations configuration; and 397 remanufactured into CH-
47Fs to replace the current CH-47Ds. Because new builds, as opposed to
only remanufactured helicopters, have been included in the acquisition
plan, unit cost increased 12 percent over what we reported last year.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army concurred with
the information presented in this report. One technical comment was
provided, which was incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21:
The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft
carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion,
aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability.
These technologies are to allow for increased sortie rates and
decreased manning rates as compared to existing systems. Many of the
technologies were intended for the second ship in the class, but they
were accelerated into the first ship in a December 2002 restructuring
of the program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Newport News;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,370.0 million;
Procurement: $23,457.7 million;
Total funding: $25,827.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 3.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Costs decreased due to adjustments in inflation figures and refinements
to third ship estimates.
The CVN-21 entered system development in April 2004 with few of its
critical technologies fully mature. This is due in part to DOD's
decision to accelerate the installation of a number of technologies
from the second ship to the first. Program officials state that the
extended construction and design period allows further time for
development. They have established a risk reduction strategy that
includes decision points for each technology's inclusion based on a
demonstrated maturity level. Fallback technologies exist for 11 of 18
total critical technologies, but their use would lead to drawbacks,
such as performance shortfalls and/or an increase in manpower
requirements. The program has reported a 1-year schedule slip based on
decisions to balance ship construction in the President's fiscal year
2006 budget. Program officials expect to meet their design review date,
currently set for March 2007.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
CVN-21 Program:
Technology Maturity:
There are currently a total of 18 CVN-21 critical technologies, of
which 3 are presently mature and 3 are approaching maturity. The
remaining 12 are at lower levels of maturity. The Navy expects that 14
of the 18 total technologies will be mature or close to mature by the
design review in fiscal year 2007, and they expect all but 1 technology
to be near maturity by production start in 2008. Program officials
originally reported 16 critical technologies at development start.
However, one technology was re-defined into two, more specific
technologies and another was added since that time.
Six of the critical technologies are being developed by programs other
than CVN-21. Progress in those programs could affect the CVN-21
timeline. Those technologies are the Advanced Arresting Gear, Evolved
Sea Sparrow Missile, Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, Multi-
Function Radar, Volume Search Radar, and the Advance Weapons
Information Management System/Aviation Data Management and Control
System. This last technology was redefined after development start. In
the case of four technologies the program has mature alternate systems
as backup technologies. Program officials stated that no backup is
feasible for either Volume Search Radar or Multi-Function Radar without
major ship redesign.
Two technologies modified since development start are also not mature.
The Shipboard Weapons Loader is a self-propelled unit to decrease the
time required to load weapons onto aircraft. The other technology is
Smart Stores, which is a software-based system to automate CVN-21's
inventory and material asset management capabilities. The Navy's
primary risks identified for this technology center on successful
integration with planned ship systems. The Navy has identified backup
technologies for each of these technologies.
Only one critical technology, the 1,100-ton air conditioning plants, is
not planned to be near maturity by construction start. Program
officials believe the plants will reach mature levels shortly after the
start of construction. Risks associated with the plants are considered
low by officials since the technology being used is derived from
commercial applications and enhancements leveraging experience from
plants found on other US Navy ships.
Design Stability:
The CVN-21 program is currently planning a design review date for March
2007. Rather than measuring design stability by percentage of
engineering drawings completed, the program uses an alternative metric
that measures earned hours completed in product model development. As a
result we could not assess the ship's design stability.
Other Program Issues:
The program has delayed delivery of both the first and second ship by
adding one year to the development schedule. According to program
officials, the Navy made this decision with the intent to balance ship
construction dollars in the President's fiscal year 2006 budget.
Research and development funds were added to the program to bridge the
additional year, which allows additional time and funding to mature
technologies in the program. The one year shift does create an
additional gap, where the Navy will have to operate with only 11
carriers, between de-commissioning of the USS Enterprise aircraft
carrier and delivery of the first CVN-21 to the fleet.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy emphasized that,
based on product model development progress, the CVN-21 program's
overall design was 44 percent complete as of November 2005 and that the
program is on schedule to support the construction of the lead ship. In
addition, the department said that although there was a one year slip
based on decisions to balance ship construction in the President's
fiscal year 2006 budget, technology development efforts were unaffected
and remain on track.
[End of section]
DD(X) Destroyer:
The Navy's DD(X) destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to
provide advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and
contribute to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. The
program recently completed the system design phase and was authorized
to begin detail design and construction of the lead ships in November
2005. The program will continue to mature its technologies and design
as it approaches construction.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman Ship
Systems, Raytheon;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,241.7 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $3,241.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Costs increased due to changes in cost estimating, additional
technology development, and a program restructuring.
Since last year's assessment, the program completed demonstrations of a
number of its 12 critical technologies. One of the technologies was
fully mature by the November 2005 production decision. Eight
technologies were demonstrated in a relevant environment and are near
full maturity. Some of these technologies will not be fully mature
until after installation on the first ship as testing in an operational
environment is not considered feasible. The integrated deckhouse, ship
computing system, and volume search radar are at lower levels of
maturity, having completed component level demonstrations. The Navy
approved the system design to proceed into the next phase, but a number
of risks remain in both design and technology that could lead to
changes.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DD(X) Program:
Technology Maturity:
At the November 2005 production decision, one of 12 critical
technologies for DD(X) was fully mature. While completion of tests in
2005 advanced the maturity of technologies, development continues as
the program proceeds with detail design. Eight technologies, the
advanced gun system and its projectile, autonomic fire suppression,
hull form, infrared suppression, integrated power system, multifunction
radar, and peripheral vertical launch system are short of full maturity
but have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Program officials
state that the undersea warfare system is fully mature, based on the
use of mature components. However, the components will not be
integrated and tested together until after ship installation. Due to
practical limitations some of these technologies, the advanced gun
system and its projectile, hull form, and infrared suppression, will
not be fully demonstrated until after installation on the lead ship.
The integrated deckhouse, volume search radar, and ship computing
system are at lower levels of maturity. The program tested a physical
model of the deckhouse for stealth requirements and placement of
apertures to minimize interference, but with only a portion of the
apertures expected. Analysis of deckhouse resilience to fire and shock
has been completed, and will be tested during detail design. The volume
search radar will require additional development to increase
performance, which may aggravate an already aggressive schedule.
Software development has been progressing as planned, although about
three-quarters of the effort remains.
Design Stability:
The metric for design maturity used in other programs does not apply to
DD(X), and therefore the program was not assessed according to this
metric. Instead the program assesses design stability by reviewing
design artifacts, which include items like system drawings, ship
specifications, and major equipment lists. The program office states
that all 2010 design artifacts are complete, though some may be altered
as systems continue to mature or are changed to meet cost reduction
goals.
On September 14, 2005 the Navy completed the critical design review of
DD(X) and approved the start of detail design. Risk remains in the
system design due to issues in the power system, deckhouse, and hull
form. The concern with the power system is ensuring the design meets
limits on space and weight. As this system is needed early in
construction, it could have an impact on schedule if not resolved
quickly. A number of systems in the deckhouse, including the volume
search radar and electronic warfare system, are still in development
and design of the deckhouse could be affected if they exceed margins
for weight and space. Furthermore, due to the hull form's unique
design, it has reduced stability in very severe weather conditions.
Program officials state they can reduce this risk through guidance that
helps the crew avoid these conditions. Model testing for heavy sea
conditions also revealed some areas which may require strengthened
structure, and program officials believe this can be corrected.
Agency Comments:
The Navy stated that the design, development and testing of critical
technologies mitigated the significant technical risks prior to
critical design review. The DD(X) ship design remained stable
throughout critical technology testing, successfully incorporating all
necessary component modifications and entering detail design with
adequate weight margin. A comprehensive test program will address all
remaining risk areas described in the report.
The Navy further noted that given the unique nature of shipbuilding,
with detail design and construction spread over 5 years, comparing
DD(X) technology readiness levels to the GAO-developed best practices
is not valid. DD(X) technology readiness levels met current acquisition
policy guidance in support of the decision to proceed into system
development in November 2005.
GAO Response:
Our approach is valid because our work has shown that technological
unknowns discovered late in development lead to cost increases and
schedule delays. Some of the technologies still under development for
DD(X) could have major impact on ship design and construction
schedules.
[End of section]
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE):
The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin engine, carrier-based,
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2D AHE is
designed to improve battle space target detection and situational
awareness, especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and
Missile Defense operations; and improve operational availability.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop-Grumman Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,464.8 million;
Procurement: $9,695.1 million;
Total funding: $12,159.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 69.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The E-2D AHE program entered system development in June 2003 without
demonstrating that its four critical technologies had reached full
maturity. Since that time, one of the program's four critical
technologies has reached full maturity. The program expects the
remaining three critical technologies to mature before the production
decision in March 2009. While more mature backup technologies exist for
the three critical technologies, use of the backup technologies would
result in degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate
future system growth. The design met best practice standards at the
time of design review in October 2005. However, until all the
technologies are mature, the potential for design changes remains. We
could not assess production maturity because the program does not plan
to use statistical process controls.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
E-2D AHE Program:
Technology Maturity:
One of the E-2D AHE's four critical technologies (the space time
adaptive processing algorithms and associated processor) is mature. The
program expects the remaining technologies (the rotodome antenna, a
silicon carbide-based transistor for the power amplifier to support UHF
radio operations, and the multichannel rotary coupler for the antenna)
to be fully mature before the start of production in March 2009.
More mature backup technologies exist for the three technologies (the
rotodome antenna, the silicon carbide-based transistor, and the
multichannel rotary coupler) and were flown on a larger test platform
in 2002 and 2003. However, use of the backup technologies would result
in degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate future
system growth due to size and weight constraints. The next AHE
technology readiness assessment is to be performed prior to the
production decision in fiscal year 2009, and the program office
anticipates that the critical technologies will be mature at that time.
Design Stability:
The program had completed 90 percent of its engineering drawings at the
Critical Design Review, which was completed on October 21, 2005.
Program officials project that they will have 100 percent completed by
the planned start of production in March 2009. However, the technology
maturation process may lead to more design changes.
Production Maturity:
The program expects a low-rate production decision in March 2009, but
does not require the contractor to use statistical process controls to
ensure its critical processes are producing high quality and reliable
products. According to the program, the contractor assembles the
components using manual, not automated, processes that are not
conducive to statistical process control. The program relies on post-
production data, such as defects per unit, to track variances and non-
conformance. The program also conducts production assessment reviews
every 6 months to assess the contractor's readiness for production. The
program has updated the manufacturing processes that were established
and used for the E-2C over the past 30 years. The program considers the
single station joining tool; the installation of electrical, hydraulic
and pneumatic lines; and the installation of the prime mission
equipment all critical manufacturing processes.
The program is currently building the first two development aircraft.
According to the program office, there are no significant differences
in the manufacturing processes for the development aircraft and the
production aircraft.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the E-
2D AHE program successfully executed all component and subsystem design
reviews, culminating in the successful completion of the weapon system
design review in October 2005. This review included a thorough
evaluation of the four critical technologies and all program risks.
According to the Navy, critical technologies do not represent a high
risk to the AHE program at present.
Flight testing, which will include the four critical technologies, is
planned to begin in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. The test
program expects to demonstrate the design maturity of all technologies
and capabilities at that time. A Technology Readiness Assessment will
be conducted prior to the low rate production decision.
According to the Navy, integration of statistical process controls
would require significant investment to update the E-2D aircraft
manufacturing process. The Navy has elected not to make this investment
due to the maturity and over 30 years of E-2 production.
[End of section]
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V, Delta IV:
The Air Force's EELV program acquires commercial satellite launch
services from two competitive families of launch vehicles--Atlas V and
Delta IV. Initiated as an industry partnership, the program's goal is
to support and sustain assured access to space and reduce the life-
cycle cost of space launches by at least 25 percent over previous
systems while meeting the government's launch requirements. A number of
variants are available depending on the lift capability necessary for
each mission. We assessed both the Atlas V and Delta IV.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Launch Services, Lockheed Martin Space
Systems;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $43.4 million;
Procurement: $23,282.7 million;
Total funding: $23,326.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 118.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
While the EELV program office has access to technology, design, and
production maturity information, it does not collect this information
because it is buying the launch service. To date, eleven successful
launches have occurred--three government and eight commercial. A
technical review was completed, and the program is implementing
corrective actions to eliminate the cause of an earlier-than-expected
engine shutdown during the Delta IV Heavy Lift Vehicle launch
demonstration. The EELV program's total costs have increased due to a
decline in the commercial launch market upon which the business case
was based.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
EELV Program:
Technology Maturity:
We could not assess the technology maturity of EELV because the Air
Force has not formally contracted for information on technology
maturity from its contractors.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability of EELV because the Air Force
has not formally contracted for the information needed to conduct this
assessment.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity of EELV because the Air
Force has not formally contracted for information that would facilitate
this assessment.
Other Program Issues:
A decline in commercial launch demand for the EELV launch vehicles
resulted in a cost increase of more than 25 percent over the program's
objective and triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach (10 U.S.C. 2433), that
required DOD to certify in 2004 that the program is critical to
national security and its cost estimates are reasonable. In conjunction
with the certification, the Air Force revised its mission model to
reflect a reduction of launch vehicles, conducted a study on assured
access to space, and revised its acquisition strategy.
DOD continues to be the primary user of EELV launch services due to the
decrease in commercial demand for launches--which has resulted in a
reduction in the number of launch vehicles needed. An Air Force study
on assured access to space addressed concerns about retaining both EELV
launch providers given the limited number of launches. To ensure access
to space with two distinct launch vehicles and address the decline in
commercial launch demand, the government has agreed to share a level of
risk with the launch providers through a new acquisition strategy. The
new strategy provides for a contracting approach that supports each
contractor's annual infrastructure through a launch capability contract
and replaces price-based competition with an annual award of launch
service contracts. In April 2005, the Air Force released a Request for
Proposals for EELV Launch Services and EELV Launch Capabilities
Contracts. The Air Force planned to award the contracts by October
2005. However, this has been delayed. Negotiations are currently
ongoing for the launch capability contracts, and updated proposals are
being submitted for the launch services contracts covering the
anticipated fiscal year 2006 launch awards.
In August 2005, competitors Boeing and Lockheed Martin submitted a
request to the Federal Trade Commission for an antitrust review to
support a joint venture. This was withdrawn and resubmitted in
September 2005. The Federal Trade Commission has requested additional
information to support the review. The joint venture will combine their
production, engineering, test, and launch operations for all U.S.
government launch activity. Both contractors will share equally in the
profits and costs of all government launches.
The EELV program is taking corrective action to address a problem with
the liquid oxygen feed line that falsely indicated propellant depletion
and resulted in an early engine shutdown of the first stage engine on
the Delta IV during the Heavy Lift Vehicle Operational Launch Service
Demonstration that occurred in December 2004.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
it collects data for technology, design, and production maturity.
However, the Air Force has not contracted for delivery of this data and
therefore does not have authority to provide this information. Program
officials also provided technical comments, which were incorporated
where appropriate.
[End of section]
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships
offshore to their inland destinations at higher speeds and from longer
distances than the system it is designed to replace, the Assault
Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV-7A1). The EFV will have two variants---a
troop carrier for 17 combat equipped Marines and 3 crew members and a
command vehicle to manage combat operations in the field. We assessed
both variants.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics;
Program office: Woodbridge, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $742.9 million;
Procurement: $8,437.9 million;
Total funding: $9,236.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 1,012.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The EFV's technologies are mature and the design is stable. Early
development of fully functional prototypes facilitated design
stability. Technical problems have been encountered, and system
reliability requirements have been reduced; plans are to fully
demonstrate all requirements in fiscal year 2010. Fixes for technical
problems have been identified and corrective actions are in place.
Production maturity remains a concern because the contractor will not
start collecting statistical process control data until after
production starts, and the software development effort is a continuing
challenge. A fourth program restructuring has resulted in a 2-year
schedule increase and about a $2-billion increase in cost. The program
office has had reduced insight into its prime contractor's work
progress since December 2004 because it has not received detailed
earned value cost and schedule data.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
EFV Program:
Technology Maturity:
All five of the EFV system's critical technologies are mature and have
been demonstrated in a full-up system prototype.
Design Stability:
The program has now released all of its drawings for the troop carrier
and command variants, but anticipates that about 12 percent of the
drawings will require changes to address reliability issues. While
reliability requirements have been reduced, the program office expects
to fully demonstrate both reliability and interoperability--key
performance parameters--during initial operational testing and
evaluation in fiscal year 2010. The program expects to hold a final
design review in 2010 that will include any reliability design changes.
Furthermore, testing in the early system design and demonstration phase
revealed problems in the hull electronic unit, bow flap, and
hydraulics. In addition, problems with the hardware and software
modules caused unsafe testing conditions---the EFV prototypes made
turns without a direct command. After about a two-month delay to
address these problems, full vehicle testing was resumed. According to
the program office, corrective actions for all these problems have been
identified.
Production Maturity:
The program plans to enter low-rate initial production in September
2006. However, the program office does not plan to require the
contractor to collect statistical process control (SPC) data until
after the start of low-rate-initial production to demonstrate that
critical manufacturing processes will produce products within cost,
schedule, performance, and quality targets. The program office is still
in the planning stages for its production readiness reviews that will
assess the production processes, identify any additional critical
manufacturing processes, and determine the benefit of using SPC.
According to the program office, to date, no suppliers have collected
SPC data for EFV-unique components, but some suppliers are collecting
SPC data on high-volume commercial parts used on the EFV. Twelve
critical processes have already been identified and more are expected.
Other Program Issues:
The EFV program relies on software to provide all electronic,
firepower, and communication functions. The program is collecting
metrics relating to cost, schedule, and quality; is using an
evolutionary development approach; and has set and completed about 98
percent of the software requirements for the pending early operational
assessment. Nevertheless, software development continues to present a
risk. The program has already experienced growth in the size and cost
of the software development as well as schedule delays. The program
manager recognized the risk and has initiated a software risk
mitigation plan.
DOD's December 2004 budgetary action to reallocate funding for higher
priorities served as the basis for the EFV's fourth rebaselining.
However, according to the program manager, a testing schedule slip of
about 15 months would have been needed even without DOD's budgetary
action because additional time would have been needed after the start
of low-rate initial production in September 2006, for more robust
reliability testing, production qualification testing and training.
DOD's budgetary action resulted in a 24-month schedule increase---
possibly 9 months more than would have been needed---and a cost
increase of about $2 billion. According to the program office, the
rebaselining effort was required in order to make the EFV program
executable.
The program office has not collected and managed the program with
detailed earned value management data since it began restructuring the
program in December 2004. According to a program official, the earned
value management system was re-established after a new contractor
schedule was approved in December 2005.
Agency Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated, as appropriate. The Navy concurred with our assessment of
the EFV program.
Further, the program manager believes the EFV program is on track to
begin a comprehensive operational assessment in January 2006 and to
begin its low-rate initial production review in September 2006.
[End of section]
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based,
fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions. It is
intended to improve the accuracy and range of cannon artillery. Also,
the Excalibur's near vertical angle of fall is intended to reduce the
collateral damage area around the intended target, making it more
effective in urban environments than the current artillery projectiles.
The Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon requires the
Excalibur to meet its required range.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon, Tucson, Ariz.
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $376.0 million;
Procurement: $1,126.3 million;
Total funding: $1,502.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 29,900.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The Excalibur program is proceeding into early production to support an
urgent early fielding requirement in Iraq for more accurate artillery
that will reduce collateral damage. This early production run of the
Excalibur's first block will involve 180 rounds, with planned fielding
by the last quarter of 2006. According to program officials,
Excalibur's critical technologies reached full maturity in May 2005,
and all of its 790 drawings were completed in July 2005. The Excalibur
unitary variant will be developed in three blocks, which will
incorporate increased capabilities and accuracy over time. Since our
last assessment, the planned quantities have been cut in half. The
program continues to experience increasing unit cost as quantities are
lowered.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Excalibur Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Excalibur program is developing its unitary variant in three
blocks. All three of the unitary variant's critical technologies
reached full technology maturity in May 2005 at the time of the
Excalibur's design review. These technologies were the airframe,
guidance system, and warhead.
Design Stability:
Excalibur's design appears to be stable because at the time of the May
2005 design review, 750 of 790 design drawings were releasable. All the
drawings were complete for the first Excalibur block in July 2005. The
second block is expected to have a similar number of drawings, and it
is unknown how many drawings will be involved with the third block.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess Excalibur's production maturity. The first block
has entered limited production, to support an urgent fielding
requirement in Iraq, without statistical control data. The program
plans to collect statistical data during production of all blocks.
Production of the second block is scheduled for fiscal year 2007 and
the third block in fiscal year 2010.
Other Program Issues:
The program has encountered a number of changes since development began
in 1997, including a decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of
the contractor's plant, early limited funding, technical problems, and
changes in program requirements. It was almost immediately restructured
due to limited funding, and it was restructured again in 2001. The
program was again restructured in 2002 and merged with a joint
Swedish/U.S. program known as the Trajectory Correctable Munition. This
merger has helped the Excalibur deal with design challenges, including
issues related to its original folding fin design. In May 2002, due to
the cancellation of the Crusader, the Army directed the restructure of
the program to include the Future Combat Systems' Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon.
In December 2002, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) approved an early fielding plan for the
unitary version. The plan currently includes developing the unitary
version of the Excalibur in three blocks. In the first block, the
projectile would meet its requirements for accuracy in a non-jammed
environment and lethality and would be available for early fielding. In
the second block, the projectile would be improved to meet its
requirements for accuracy in a jammed environment and reliability and
would be available for fielding to the Future Combat System's Non-Line-
of-Sight Cannon in September 2008 or when the cannon is available.
Finally, in the third block, the projectile would be improved to meet
its range requirement and would be available for fielding to all
systems in late fiscal year 2011.
The net effect of these changes has been to lengthen the program's
schedule and to substantially decrease planned procurement quantities.
As a result, the program's overall costs and unit costs have
dramatically increased.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on the draft, the Army noted that Excalibur started as a
combination of three smaller artillery-related programs with the intent
to extend range capability with an integrated rocket motor. The current
Excalibur program will allow three different Army howitzers to fire
farther away and defeat threats more quickly, lowering collateral
damage while reducing the logistic support burden. Recent program
achievements include a production decision for the first block
configuration to support early fielding to the multinational combat
forces in Iraq, and successful tests demonstrated both proximity and
point-detonating modes approximately 5 meters from the target.
[End of section]
F-22A Raptor:
The Air Force's F-22A, originally planned to be an air superiority
fighter, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. It is being
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to
make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for
long ranges. It also has integrated aviation electronics (avionics)
designed to greatly improve pilots' awareness of the situation
surrounding them. It is designed to replace the Air Force's F-15
aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,233.1 million;
Procurement: $16,965.4 million;
Total funding: $20,509.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 80.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
In December 2005, the F-22A procurement quantities increased to 183
aircraft. The additional two aircraft are not reflected in this table.
[End of table]
The F-22A entered production without ensuring that production processes
were in control. In December 2004, the Secretary of Defense reduced F-
22A procurement quantities from 279 to 183. Since our last assessment
of the program, the Air Force held a full rate decision in April 2005.
At that time, about 42 percent of the aircraft were already on
contract. Technology and design matured late in the program and have
contributed to numerous problems. Avionics problems were discovered
late in development, which resulted in large cost increases and caused
testing delays. The Air Force completed initial operational test and
evaluation in December 2004 and identified several deficiencies that
required modifications to the aircraft's fuel system, canopy
transparency, and the applications of low observable materials.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
F-22A Program:
Technology Maturity:
The three critical F-22A technologies (supercruise, stealth, and
integrated avionics) appear to be mature. However, two of these
technologies, the integrated avionics and stealth, did not mature until
several years after the start of development. Integrated avionics has
been a source of major problems, delaying developmental testing and the
start of initial operational testing. Since 1997 the costs of avionics
has increased by over $951 million or 24 percent and problems
discovered late in the program were the major contributor. In April
2004, the Air Force began initial operational test and evaluation after
reporting that these problems were corrected.
Design Stability:
The F-22A design is essentially complete, but it matured slowly, taking
over 3 years beyond the critical design review to meet best practice
standards. The late drawing release contributed to parts shortages,
work performed out of sequence, delayed flight testing, and increased
costs. Design changes resulted from flight and structural tests. For
example, problems with excessive movement of the vertical tails and
overheating problems in the fuselage and engine bay required design
modifications. The Air Force completed initial operational testing in
December 2004 and development testing in December 2005. There were
several design changes required to the aircraft as a result of
operational testing. These included changes to improve the application
of low observable materials, modifications to improve the durability of
canopy transparencies, and implemented software improvements to the
diagnostic health management system.
Production Maturity:
The program office stopped collecting process control information in
November 2000. The contractor estimated that nearly half of the key
processes had reached a marginal level of control, but not up to best
practice standards. The Air Force has 98 production aircraft on
contract. The Air Force relies on the contractor's quality system to
verify manufacturing and performance requirements are being met.
However, the Air Force has not demonstrated the F-22A can achieve its
reliability goal of 3 hours mean time between maintenance. It does not
expect to achieve this goal until the end of 2009 when most of the
aircraft will have already been bought. Best practices call for meeting
reliability requirements before entering production. At the conclusion
of initial operational test and evaluation in December 2004, the Air
Force had only demonstrated about 15 percent of the reliability
required to meet the current operational requirement.
Other Program Issues:
The Air Force is counting on $2.2 billon in future cost reduction plans
to offset estimated cost growth and enable the program to meet the
latest production cost estimate. If these cost reduction initiatives
are not achieved as planned, production costs could increase.
In January 2005, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation reported
the F-22A was "overwhelmingly effective" as an air superiority fighter
and that its support systems were "potentially suitable." Some
deficiencies were noted, particularly in reliability and
maintainability. In August 2005, the Air Force begin follow-on test and
evaluation, which is designed to demonstrate limited air-to-ground
capability and correct the deficiencies identified during initial
operational test and evaluation. The F-22A declared initial operational
capability in December 2005.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Future Combat Systems (FCS):
The FCS, a program that will equip the Army's new transformational
modular combat brigades, consists of a family of systems composed of
advanced, networked combat and sustainment systems, unmanned ground and
air vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. Within a system-of-
systems architecture, the first increment of the FCS features 18 major
systems and other enabling systems along with an overarching network
for information superiority and survivability.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Hazelwood, Mo.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $23,579.1 million;
Procurement: $98,469.7 million;
Total funding: $122,724.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 15.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The FCS program has not demonstrated high levels of knowledge.
Requirements have been sent to system developers to begin preliminary
designs, but program officials say they may change due to feasibility
and affordability constraints. Three years after system development
began, none of FCS' 49 critical technologies are fully mature.
Technology maturation will continue throughout system development, with
an associated risk of cost growth and schedule delays. Based on program
office estimates, the cost of the restructured FCS program has grown
substantially. Earlier cost estimates were based on lower levels of
program knowledge and undefined requirements. Higher levels of
knowledge have resulted in a more realistic and higher cost estimate.
Since the FCS dominates Army investment accounts over the next decade,
further cost growth and schedule delays could affect other Army
acquisitions.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
FCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Since our last assessment of FCS, the program assembled an independent
review team to assess critical technologies. Although a few
technologies appear to have matured, most have either shown no
improvement or are now assessed less mature. None of the FCS program's
critical technologies are fully mature and only 18 technologies are
nearing full maturity.
The program is no longer reporting on 5 of the 54 technologies from a
year ago. According to FCS officials, they met last year with the
users' representative, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, to
discuss FCS requirements and critical technologies. They agreed that a
few of the listed technologies were in fact not technologies. Instead,
they were capabilities that could be satisfied by existing or planned
assets.
The FCS program is not following best practices in maturing its
technologies. The program's approach involves integration phases that
allow a staggered start for technologies to be "spun out" to current
forces. However, program officials allow technologies to be included in
the integration phases before they are mature. Further, as currently
scheduled, all four of the currently-planned integration phases will
have begun before the program has a preliminary design review for the
system of systems, and each of those integration phases will likely
begin with immature technologies. As a result, the program will involve
concurrent technology and product development and face the associated
risks of such an approach. Furthermore, the individual integration
phases will not be subjected to the milestone decision process.
Other Program Issues:
The cost of the restructured FCS program has increased substantially,
based on program office estimates. An independent cost estimate will
not be completed until the spring of 2006. Projected procurement costs
have increased over 50 percent. Earlier cost estimates were based on
lower levels of program knowledge and undefined requirements. Higher
levels of knowledge, such as more defined design concepts for the
manned ground vehicles and progress in requirements definition, have
produced a higher fidelity cost estimate. The Army has adopted an
initiative to substantially reduce FCS procurement acquisition costs.
However, requirements may have to be reduced accordingly.
In August 2005, the FCS program completed the System of Systems
Functional Review. This event demonstrated that the Army understands
FCS system of systems requirements and is prepared to begin preliminary
individual system designs. Although it is a significant achievement,
the program should have demonstrated this level of knowledge 3 years
ago to support the decision to start development. In addition, program
officials say they are reserving the right to reduce requirements,
pending user approval, if technologies do not mature as planned or if
satisfying a particular requirement is not affordable. The requirements
uncertainty and immature state of technologies make the FCS acquisition
approach risky. Furthermore, successful operation of FCS-equipped Units
of Action depends on the contributions of up to 170 complementary and
associated programs. FCS will utilize these systems to help satisfy FCS
operational requirements. However, according to program officials, the
list of complementary programs continues to evolve and some are
unfunded.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army stated that
technology maturity is a key aspect of the process of deciding when a
technology is provided to current forces. It also stated that while the
individual integration phases will not be subjected to the milestone
decision process, the program will have annual reviews with the
milestone decision authority. The Army commented that the program is
primarily focused on about 52 critical complementary programs
considered essential to meeting the top-level key performance
parameters.
GAO Response:
Although technology maturity may drive decisions on providing
technologies to the current forces, the Army's definition of mature
technology is below the best practices standard. Our prior work has
shown that when programs proceed into development with technologies
that do not comply with best practices, they are exposed to an
increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays. Also, the list of
critical complementary programs continues to evolve, and the program
must manage the associated cost, schedule, and performance gaps that
may result.
[End of section]
Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System:
The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high altitude, long endurance
unmanned aerial vehicle with integrated sensors and ground stations
providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
After a successful technology demonstration, the system entered
development and limited production in March 2001. Considered a
transformational system, the program was restructured twice in 2002 to
acquire 7 air vehicles similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ-
4A) and 44 of a new, larger, and more capable model (the RQ-4B).
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,053.3 million;
Procurement: $2,773.0 million;
Total funding: $3,913.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 37.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Key product knowledge on Global Hawk is lower now than in March 2001
due to program restructurings. Under the original plan to produce
aircraft very similar to demonstrators and slowly acquire advanced
systems, technology maturity and design stability were near best
practices standards. Program restructurings, however, added the new RQ-
4B aircraft and advanced sensors, overlapped development and production
schedules, and accelerated planned deliveries. The new technologies are
still maturing and the RQ-4B design required extensive changes.
Officials are implementing statistical process controls, but data is
incomplete. In November 2004, we reported significant risks from gaps
in product knowledge and recommended reducing near-term RQ-4B buys to
only those needed for testing. The program is now experiencing
development and procurement cost increases, schedule delays, and
quality problems.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Global Hawk Program:
Technology Maturity:
Of the Global Hawk's 13 critical technologies, 6 are mature by best
practices standards; 3 are approaching maturity; and 4 are less mature.
The less mature technologies include enhanced imagery and signals
intelligence sensors and improved radar. The desire for these
capabilities drove the decision to develop and acquire the new RQ-4B
aircraft, which can carry 50 percent more payload than the RQ-4A.
Integrating and testing advanced sensors won't be completed until late
in the program after most of the fleet has already been bought. If
space, weight, and power limitations or other performance issues
surface as technologies mature, the program may experience costly
rework, extended development times, or diminished capabilities.
Design Stability:
Program officials reported achieving the best practice standard for
design drawings approved for manufacturer release in October 2004,
shortly after RQ-4B production began. However, during the first year of
production, there were more than 2,000 authorized drawing changes to
the total baseline of 1,400 drawings. More than half of those changes
were considered major, requiring model changes. Substantial commonality
between the A-and B-models had been expected, but as designs were
finalized and production geared up, design differences were more
extensive and complex than anticipated. By the time of our review,
design deficiencies, engineering changes, and work delays had
contributed to a development contract cost overrun of $209 million.
Adding to design risk, the Air Force plans to buy almost half the RQ-4B
fleet before it completes operational tests to verify the aircraft
design.
Production Maturity:
The contractor has completed RQ-4A production and is fabricating the
first RQ-4Bs. Program and contractor officials are in the process of
implementing statistical process controls.They've identified critical
manufacturing processes and started to collect data for demonstrating
that new processes are capable of meeting cost, schedule, and quality
targets. Officials also collect and analyze other performance
indicators such as defects and rework rates to monitor manufacturing
quality.
Technology immaturity, increased cost for sensors, and extensive design
changes contributed to higher RQ-4B production costs than forecast.
Although improving, there have been recurring concerns about the
performance and work quality of several key subcontractors. The
subcontractor building the tail scrapped seven of the first eight main
box spars due to design maturity and process issues. The wing
manufacturer terminated its subcontractor due to poor performance and
quality; subsequently completed wings passed proof load testing and
were installed onto RQ-4B aircraft.
Other Program Issues:
With RQ-4B costs increasing and schedules slipping, the Global Hawk
program is rebaselining, its fourth since the March 2001 start. In
April 2005, the Air Force notified the Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy
breach (see U.S.C. 2433) with an 18-percent unit procurement cost
increase over the current baseline. Further cost increases are
expected. In December 2005, we reported that the Nunn-McCurdy notice to
Congress did not include $400.6 million (in base year 2000 dollars)
budgeted for retrofit activities, including the procurement and
installation of signal intelligence sensors in already-built aircraft.
Including this amount would increase procurement unit cost growth to 31
percent and require the Secretary of Defense to certify the program to
Congress.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this product, Air Force officials partially
concurred and offered technical comments that we incorporated where
appropriate. They emphasized Global Hawk's early and continuing support
to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with about 5,000 combat
hours flown by demonstrator aircraft. They stated that DOD conducts
comprehensive and forward-looking oversight, understands the risks and
benefits, and implements an appropriate acquisition strategy to
mitigate risk. Software, not hardware, is the critical element to the
RQ-4B capability, drives the deployment schedule, and represents the
chief technical and management challenges. Radar and signals sensors
are the two critical technologies and portend revolutionary capability
improvement. Each payload has a dedicated program office and
contractor. Payload integration includes test and decision points to
evaluate progress.
[End of section]
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
MDA's GMD element is being developed to defend the United States
against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks. The first block,
Block 2004, consists of a collection of radars and interceptors, which
are integrated by a central control system that formulates battle plans
and directs the operation of GMD components. We assessed the maturity
of all technologies critical to the Block 2004 GMD element, but we
assessed design and production maturity for the interceptors only.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Company;
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding, FY06-FY11:
R&D: $12,410.2 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $12,410.2 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Costs are for all known blocks from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2009. Total known program funding through fiscal year 2011
is $32,439.8 million.
Even though only 6 of GMD's 10 critical technologies are fully mature,
MDA released all hardware drawings to manufacturing and had 10 Block
2004 interceptors in silos for operational use by December 2005.
However, ongoing efforts to mature technologies, along with concurrent
testing and fielding efforts may lead to additional design changes.
Although MDA is producing hardware for operational use, it has not made
a formal production decision. Additionally, we could not assess the
stability of the production processes because the program is not
collecting statistical data for them. We expect that the prime contract
could overrun its target cost by as much as $1.5 billion.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
GMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials assessed all of GMD's 10 critical technologies as
mature. However, four have not been demonstrated in an operational
environment and we believe that they cannot be considered fully mature.
Mature technologies include the fire control software, the
exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) infrared seeker, the Orbital Sciences
Corporation booster, the Cobra Dane radar, the EKV guidance,
navigation, and control subsystem; and the in-flight interceptor
communications system. The remaining four technologies are nearing
maturity. These technologies are the Beale radar; EKV discrimination;
the sea-based X-band radar; and the BV+ booster. The program expected
to demonstrate all remaining technologies in an operational environment
by December 2005, but flight test delays and failures prevented the
demonstrations. The program now plans to demonstrate the remaining four
technologies by the end of 2007.
Design Stability:
Technology issues aside, the design of the Block 2004 ground-based
interceptor appears stable with 100 percent of its drawings released to
manufacturing. However, ongoing efforts to mature technologies and the
concurrent testing and fielding efforts may lead to additional drawings
and design changes.
Production Maturity:
Officials do not plan to make an official production decision, although
they are delivering interceptors for the Block 2004 emergency
capability. We could not assess the maturity of the production
processes for these interceptors because the program is not collecting
statistical control data. According to program officials, data are not
tracked because current and projected quantities of GMD component
hardware are low. Instead, the GMD program measures production
capability and maturity with a monthly evaluation process called a
Manufacturing Capability Assessment that assesses critical
manufacturing indicators for readiness and execution.
MDA delivered 5 interceptors for the initial capability by September
2004, and it had 10 interceptors ready for alert by December 2005. MDA
planned to have 18 interceptors fielded by this time; however, 4
interceptors procured for fielding were later designated as test assets
and production of 4 others was delayed as quality control improvements
were implemented.
Qualification of a new BV+ booster propellant subcontractor has been
completed ending a 2 year slowdown in BV+ activities. MDA plans to
procure the eight BV+ boosters currently under contract, but these
interceptors will not be fielded until Block 2006.
Other Program Issues:
GMD's prime contractor, Boeing, has overrun its budget by $600 million,
primarily because of quality issues that delayed flight and ground
tests. Although Boeing expects the large unfavorable cost variances to
improve as flight testing resumes, we anticipate that the contract will
overrun its target cost by as much as $1.5 billion. Since our last
assessment, GMD's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 has increased
by $2.9 billion (11.2 percent), primarily in fiscal years 2008 and
2009.
Agency Comments:
The program office provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS:
GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department
of Transportation, National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, United
Kingdom, and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system
nominally consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation
and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000,
Congress approved the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF
satellites. In addition to satellites, GPS includes a control system
and receiver units. We focused our review on the Block IIF.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing for IIF, Boeing for OCS, Lockheed Martin for
IIR-M;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $575.5 million;
Procurement: $1,256.3 million;
Total funding: $1,831.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 10.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Costs and quantities include Block IIR, IIR-M, and IIF satellites, and
the Operational Control System (OCS). Lockheed Martin is the contractor
for IIR and IIR-M. Boeing is the contractor for IIF and OCS.
According to the program office, the Block IIF technologies are mature.
Since the start of the GPS program in 1973, GPS satellites have been
modernized in blocks with the newer blocks providing additional
capabilities and benefits. The space-qualified atomic frequency
standards for the Block IIF satellites are mature but considered a
critical technology because there is no backup technology for these
clocks. The contractor was not required to provide data on design
drawings, and statistical process control techniques are not being used
to monitor production. As a result, design stability and production
maturity could not be assessed. R&D cost growth amounted to $399
million (20.4 percent) for satellite component modernization and the
control system, and procurement cost growth amounted to $717 million
(20.1 percent) to procure seven additional IIF satellites.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
GPS Block II Modernization Program:
Technology Maturity:
The only critical technology on the Block IIF satellites is the space-
qualified atomic frequency standards and is considered mature. However,
maintaining an industrial base capable of manufacturing frequency
standards for GPS appears to be an issue.
Design Stability:
We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract
does not require that design drawings be delivered to the program.
However, the program office assesses design maturity by reviewing
contractor development testing, participating in technical interchange
meetings and periodic program reviews, and conducting contractor
development process and configuration audits. The contractor for the
Block IIF satellites faced significant challenges designing and
implementing the programming logic for the Application Specific
Integrated Circuit microcircuit chips. Failure to recognize and
understand the complexity of the Application Specific Integrated
Circuit design and delays in security clearances resulted in $46
million in cost overruns. To offset the overruns, the program office
reallocated $22 million, and the Congress approved $24 million to be
reprogrammed from other space programs. According to program officials,
additional Block IIF satellites are not expected to experience cost
increases because the microcircuit chip problem has been resolved with
a dual design.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not
collect statistical process control data. However, the program office
reviews earned value management reports, integrated master schedules,
and test dates as a means of monitoring the contractors' production
efforts. When monthly earned value management reports and schedule
reviews show cost overruns and/or schedule slips, the program office
may choose to request additional information from the contractor.
Other Program Issues:
The GPS Operational Control System consists of monitor stations that
track the navigation signals of all the satellites, remote ground
antennas that actively send commands to the satellite constellation,
and two master control stations (primary and backup) that update the
satellites' navigation messages. Software for the control system,
referred to as Version 6, is needed to support the operational
capability of the satellites with new military code signals. The first
satellite with the new military code was launched in September 2005 and
a total of 18 satellites with this code need to be on orbit to provide
initial operational capability to military users. The program office
estimates that 18 satellites will be on orbit in fiscal year 2011, but
that Version 6 will not be operational until fiscal year 2012. Thus the
satellites on orbit with the new military code, while supporting
constellation sustainment, will not be fully utilized.
Under the current schedule the initial operational capability for
Version 6 had already slipped from 2008 to 2010, because funding was
reallocated to complete development of Block IIF satellites to sustain
the GPS constellation. During 2005, the program office reorganized and
stopped work on Version 6 due to the reduced funding and concerns about
parallel development of two different control systems, Block II and
Block III (the next generation of satellites and a new control system),
by potentially two different contractors. The program office plans to
award a single competitive contract for Version 6 and the Block III
control system with a first increment that will enable full military
code capability in 2012.
R&D cost growth amounted to $399 million (20.4 percent) for satellite
component modernization and the control system, and procurement cost
growth amounted to $717 million (20.1 percent) to procure seven
additional IIF satellites.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force generally concurred with this assessment and provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System:
The Army's JLENS is designed to provide over-the-horizon detection and
tracking of land attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is completed and served as a
test bed to demonstrate initial capability. Spiral 2 will utilize two
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking as well
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing
stations. JLENS provides surveillance and engagement support to other
systems, such as PAC-3 and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,795.2 million;
Procurement: $4,107.5 million;
Total funding: $5,967.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 14.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The program began development in August 2005 with one of its five
critical technologies mature. The Army determined that JLENS is
primarily an integration effort based on relatively mature technologies
from other programs and concluded that none of JLENS technologies meet
the definition of a critical technology. However, we identified five
technologies in its technology assessment that could be defined as
critical because they are essential to JLENS capabilities and
integrating them will involve changes in size, the arrangement and
interconnections of subcomponents, and software development challenges.
The program plans to release 90 percent of the engineering drawings by
the design review; however, the program faces risk of redesign until
technologies demonstrate full maturity.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JLENS Program:
Technology Maturity:
JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with one of its five
critical technologies mature. The communications payload technology
consisting of radios and fiber optic equipment is fully mature and the
processing station technology--which serves as the JLENS operations
center--is approaching full maturity. Both sensors--the precision track
illumination radar (PTIR) and the surveillance radar (SUR) along with
its platform--are not yet mature.
In June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Research and Technology determined that JLENS is primarily an
integration effort based on relatively mature technologies from other
programs and therefore concluded that none of the JLENS technologies
meet the definition of a critical technology. According to the project
office, many of the JLENS technologies have legacy components that have
either been tested or fielded in an environment similar to the expected
JLENS deployment environment. However, we identified five critical
technologies based on review of the program's technology maturity
assessment, an independent assessment by the Army's Aviation and
Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC), and
through discussions with program officials. We determined that these
technologies are critical because they are essential to the attainment
of JLENS' required capabilities, and some will require physical
modification and demonstration of subcomponents for use in the JLENS
operational environment.
The JLENS sensors support its primary mission to acquire, track,
classify, and discriminate targets and are being developed using
components from other programs such as MDA's THAAD and the Navy's SPY-
3 Radar used on the DD(X) and the Marine Corps' Affordable Ground Based
Radar. Although the PTIR is similar to the design of the existing SPY-
3 radar and the program has developed prototypes of PTIR components,
the radar is not yet mature because only a partial structure of the
antenna has been built in prototype form. The antenna structure is a
key component for maintaining the weight requirements of the PTIR and
has yet to be demonstrated for the JLENS application. Furthermore, the
antenna patch assemblies, used to transmit and receive radio frequency
energy, will require unique circuitry and design changes to meet form
and fit requirements. According to program officials, tests to
integrate the PTIR prototype components will occur sometime in fiscal
year 2006.
While approximately 80 percent of the software used by the PTIR is from
the SPY-3 radar, nearly two-thirds of the software used by the SUR
sensor will need to be developed or modified. Also, the SUR uses a
different processor than legacy software, and some new modules have yet
to be tested. According to program officials, software items for the
SUR are the primary challenges for achieving technology maturity
because they are still being developed and designed. The program
expects to fully demonstrate full maturity of these items in 2009.
The JLENS platform consists of the aerostat, mobile mooring station,
power and fiber optic data transfer tethers, and ground support
equipment. The mobile mooring station, used to anchor the aerostat
during operations, is based on a fixed mooring station design. However,
it is the least well-defined component of the JLENS system because a
mobile mooring station for large aerostats has never been developed. As
a result, the current mooring station will need modifications in order
to meet JLENS mobility requirements.
Design Stability:
Program officials estimate that 90 percent of its 6,230 drawings will
be released by the design review scheduled for September 2008. However,
until the maturity of the JLENS' critical technologies has been
demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army stated that the
JLENS technology maturity and technology readiness assessments were
reviewed by the Department of the Army and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense prior to the JLENS Defense Acquisition Board review that was
held in June 2005. Based upon these and the independent assessment
conducted by AMRDEC, the review board concluded that the JLENS
technologies were at an appropriate maturity level to proceed into the
development phase of the program. The Army also stated that as the
program moves further into development, it is anticipated that these
technologies will prove out in the integration process.
[End of section]
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):
The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy,
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S.
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier
suitable version will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The
conventional take-off and landing version will primarily be an air-to-
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and the A-10 aircraft, and
will complement the F-22A. The short take-off and vertical landing
version will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $24,717.5 million;
Procurement: $161,111.5 million;
Total funding: $185,980.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 2,443.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
JSF program data indicates that 7 of the system's 8 critical
technologies will not be fully mature until after the first design
reviews in 2006. Not only is design stability not projected by the time
of those reviews, one of the two variants to be reviewed in 2006 is
expected to have released significantly fewer drawings than suggested
by best practices. Furthermore, the demonstration of a production
representative aircraft that includes design changes to reduce weight
will not occur until late 2007, after the start of production. Less
than a year after the design review, the program plans to enter
production with little demonstrated knowledge about performance and
producibility. Software also poses a risk as the program plans to
develop nearly 19 million lines of code. At the production decision,
the program will have released about 35 percent of the software needed
for the system.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JSF Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JSF entered development without its eight critical technologies
being mature. Recent data provided by the program office indicates that
maturity has progressed; however, seven technologies are still not
fully mature and are not expected to be until after the design review.
Design Stability:
Currently, 26 percent of the short take-off and vertical landing
variant and less than 3 percent of the conventional variant drawings
have been released. Design reviews for these variants are scheduled for
February 2006. Program data indicates that 75 percent of the drawings
for the short take-off and vertical landing variant and 18 percent of
the conventional variant are expected to be released by that time.
Program officials state that these represent the most critical
drawings. The program has not yet prototyped any of the expected
designs. An early prototype is expected to have its first flight in
August 2006, but does not include many of the design changes that
resulted from an effort to reduce airframe weight. The first
demonstration of a prototype that incorporates the design changes is
scheduled for late 2007. The carrier version design review is not
scheduled until late 2006. It will not be until 2009 that all three
variants will be undergoing flight testing.
Production Maturity:
The program plans to enter low rate production in early 2007 without
demonstrating production maturity. The program is taking steps to
collect key information on the maturity of manufacturing processes but
will not demonstrate that the aircraft can be produced efficiently by
the production decision. If schedules are met, the program will deliver
only one nonproduction representative aircraft before the production
decision. This aircraft, while not yet complete, has experienced labor
inefficiencies, part shortages, and major work performed out of
sequence. The program will also not demonstrate that the aircraft works
as intended. At the production decision, it will (1) have completed
less than 1 percent of the planned flight test program, (2) not have
flight tested a fully configured and integrated JSF, (3) have released
only 35 percent of the software needed for the system, and (4) have
little or no data from full scale structural testing. Before
development is complete in 2013, DOD plans to buy 424 low rate
production aircraft at an estimated cost of about $49 billion. DOD
plans to use cost reimbursement-type contracts for its initial
production orders, meaning that the government will pay any cost
overruns.
Other Program Issues:
The program plans to develop about 19 million lines of software code.
Officials consider software a high risk item. The first of five major
software blocks is scheduled to be released in June 2006 to support
first flight. However, the Defense Contract Management Agency projects
that this release could be delayed 1 to 3 months. Subsequent blocks are
showing early indications of falling behind as well.
At this point the cost estimate represents the program office's
position. The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group was to update its
formal independent cost estimate in the spring of 2005, but now does
not expect to formally complete its estimate until after the 2006
design review. However, a preliminary estimate was higher than the
program office's with large projected funding shortfalls in the 2007 to
2011 time frame.
Agency Comments:
The JSF Program Executive Officer continues to nonconcur with GAO's
methodology and conclusions on technology maturity. Hardware and
software integration for multiple subsystems is ongoing in labs, years
sooner than in legacy programs. Critical design reviews were completed
in March 2004 for all design areas except the airframe. The air system
design review in early 2006 will evaluate design maturity and
performance against requirements. Manufacturing of the first test
aircraft is well underway with much shorter assembly times than planned
and exceptional quality demonstrated in fabrication, assembly, and
mate. As of November 2005 the actual weight of 7,600 delivered
components is within 1 percent of predictions. While the first aircraft
lacks some design improvements, demonstrated processes and outcomes
justify high confidence in design and weight predictions for all
variants due to commonality of design, tools, and manufacturing
methods. JSF acquisition strategy, including software development,
reflects a block approach. Development is on track.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site (JTRS AMF):
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across
the services. Program/product offices are developing radio hardware and
software for users with similar requirements. The Air Force/Navy-led
AMF program is developing radios that will be integrated into over 160
different types of aircraft, ships, and fixed stations.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass.
Funding FY06-FY11:
R&D: $842.6 million;
Procurement: $1,649.1 million;
Total funding: $2,545.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 3,261.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected
to change as a part of a program restructuring currently underway.
JTRS AMF has taken steps to develop knowledge prior to the start of
system development. As part of the program's acquisition strategy, a
pre-system development phase started in September 2004 with the award
of competitive system design contracts to two industry teams led by
Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Through this acquisition strategy, program
officials expect competitive designs that will help mitigate costs and
other risks. While challenges remain, program officials noted that
significant progress has been made by both industry teams in
demonstrating technology and design maturity. The program is scheduled
to enter system development in June 2006. The JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office is currently conducting a broad assessment of JTRS.
The assessment may result in changes to the current JTRS AMF
acquisition strategy.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JTRS AMF Program:
Technology Maturity:
To help mitigate technical risks and address key integration
challenges, JTRS AMF awarded competitive predevelopment contracts to
two industry teams led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. In July 2006,
after a full and open competition, a contracting team will be selected
for the JTRS AMF system development. The program office will use an
Army organization to prepare an independent Technology Readiness
Assessment before entry into the system development and demonstration
acquisition phase. The identification of critical technologies and the
assessment of their respective maturities will not be available until
the conclusion of the competitive system design contract work and the
Technology Readiness Assessment is submitted by the independent
assessment team. The competitive system design contract work will be
completed in February 2006.
Although critical technologies have not been formally assessed for JTRS
AMF, both teams have demonstrated progress in developing key functions
of the radio, according to program officials. Preliminary design
reviews were held in early August 2005 for both teams, and program
officials indicated that both preliminary designs met the National
Security Agency's information security requirements. Although the
program is likely to face challenges as it proceeds through system
development and demonstration, program officials are confident that the
program can enter the system development and demonstration phase with
sufficiently mature technology. This assurance is based on technical
exchange and review meetings with the contractors, along with vigorous
risk reduction programs by both the contractors and program office
established during the pre-system development and demonstration
contract.
Other Program Issues:
The JTRS AMF is depending on the JTRS Cluster 1 program to develop the
necessary waveforms. However, the JTRS Cluster 1 program is currently
being restructured due to significant cost and schedule problems. As a
result, the waveforms being developed under the Cluster 1 contract may
not be developed in time or may not meet JTRS AMF user requirements
which may negatively affect hardware design and cause an increase in
cost and schedule.
Another issue the program office will need to address is the
development of technologies necessary to effectively dissipate heat in
some of its smaller radios. If cooling techniques are not improved, the
performance of these radios will be limited. In addition, integrating
the radios into the diverse platforms covered by JTRS AMF will be a
challenge.
Because of the ongoing cost, schedule, and technical problems with the
Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has begun a
broader assessment of all JTRS clusters. At this point, it is unclear
how the JTRS AMF program will be affected by the results of the broader
assessment. Because of the progress made in the JTRS AMF program, DOD
may expand the numbers and types of platforms on which it will be
based. For example, JTRS AMF program officials noted that it is likely
that the Army's rotary wing JTRS requirements will be moved from JTRS
Cluster 1 to JTRS AMF. The JTRS Joint Program Executive Office
developed several alternative acquisition strategies which were
presented to the Defense Acquisition Board in November 2005.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on our draft, the program office generally concurred with
our findings and offered technical comments for our consideration. We
incorporated the technical comments where appropriate.
In addition, the program office stated that the JTRS AMF program has
managed the identified risks with mitigation plans and monitoring of
the competing contractors' technical designs and their use of advanced
technologies. The waveform dependency risk, for example, is being
mitigated by the contractors' access to alternate waveform software
that is similar in features to the Cluster 1 waveform system. The
contractors have also focused considerable investment in addressing the
heat dissipation of their designs and projected performance limits as a
function of industry technology improvements, such as processor speeds
or device sizes.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1:
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and
software for users with similar requirements. The Army-led JTRS Cluster
1 product office, within the Ground Radio Systems program office, is
developing radios for ground vehicles.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $619.1 million;
Procurement: $14,815.6 million;
Total funding: $15,434.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 108,836.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected
to change as part of the program's restructuring.
The JTRS Cluster 1 program is currently being restructured due to
significant cost and schedule problems that came to light in late 2004.
Since development began in 2002, the program has struggled to mature
and integrate key technologies and been forced to make design changes.
For example, the Cluster 1 design does not meet size, weight, and power
constraints or security requirements to operate in a networked
environment. The JTRS program restructure has been approved by the
Defense Acquisition Executive and provides for a path forward to meet
security requirements. Over the next year, the program will seek full
approval of the strategy, targeted for early fiscal year 2007. Due to
the program restructuring, we did not assess the current overall
attainment of product knowledge.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JTRS Cluster 1 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The maturity of Cluster 1's critical technologies is unclear. The
program reported that 13 of its 20 critical technologies were mature
indicating that progress has been made since the program entered system
development in 2002 when none of the program's critical technologies
were mature. However, this progress is based on a series of contractor
demonstrations conducted in spring 2005 that used only partially
functioning prototypes. A planned operational assessment was canceled
after the Army informed the contractor of possible contract
termination. Among other things, the demonstrations did not show
extensive Wideband Networking Waveform capabilities. The Wideband
Networking Waveform represents the core of the JTRS networking
capability and its integration is the most significant technical
challenge to the radio's development, according to program officials.
In addition, critical technologies such as the network bridging
software are immature. Moreover, the program continues to be challenged
by security requirements. The program has identified an interim
approach to address security requirements that complies with National
Security Agency guidance and supports the operation of networking
waveforms and interoperability with non-JTRS networks. However, the
approach utilizes only partially functioning prototypes and is expected
to provide only limited capabilities. Program officials noted that a
follow-up effort involving actual prototypes will provide full
capabilities. Until the program demonstrates an actual prototype under
realistic conditions and completes its restructuring of the program, it
is difficult to evaluate the maturity of its critical technologies.
Design Stability:
The program reports achieving design stability for the basic Cluster 1
radio design. However, the National Security Agency has determined that
the current design is not sufficient to meet newly discovered security
requirements needed to operate in an open networked environment. The
program also continues to reconcile size, weight, and power
requirements. These challenges and the uncertainty of technology
maturity raise concern about the program's design stability.
Other Program Issues:
In light of the technical problems and cost growth, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense in January 2005 directed the Army to stop work on
portions of the Cluster 1 development. In April 2005, the Army notified
the prime contractor that it was considering contract termination. This
action was taken based on initial findings of an assessment of the
Cluster 1 program conducted by the newly established JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office, which concluded that the current program was not
executable and the contractor's ability to develop the radio was
questionable. Despite these concerns, the partial stop work order was
allowed to expire, and the prime contractor was allowed to continue
portions of the Cluster 1 contract.
The JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is now proceeding with a major
restructuring of the program. It has completed its assessments of the
JTRS clusters, revising the programs' management and financial
structure and has reviewed Cluster 1 requirements with the intent of
making the program more achievable. The JTRS Joint Program Executive
Office developed several acquisition strategies which were presented to
the Defense Acquisition Board in October and November 2005. The JTRS
restructure has been approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive, and
the program will seek full approval of the strategy over the next year.
Program officials expect the restructured program to be up and running
in early fiscal year 2007. In the meantime, the program continues to
mature and support prototype design. The restructured program will
emphasize an evolutionary acquisition of the radio in increments rather
than attempting to field a complete capability all at once. In
addition, DOD officials expect that the development of the helicopter
variant will be moved to the JTRS Airborne, Maritime and Fixed-Site
program.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
generally agreed with the information provided in this report. Program
officials also provided technical comments, which were incorporated
where appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5:
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and
software for users with similar requirements. The Army-led JTRS Cluster
5 product office, within the Ground Radio Systems program office, is
developing handheld, manpack, and small embeddable radios.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems;
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $341.0 million;
Procurement: $8,431.1 million;
Total funding: $8,772.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 328,514.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected
to change as a part of a program restructuring currently underway.
[End of table]
JTRS Cluster 5 began system development with one of its six critical
technologies considered mature. The program considers the five other
technologies low risk and anticipates increased levels of maturity,
though not full maturity, by the production decision in March 2008. We
did not assess design stability because no production representative
drawings had been released at the time of our assessment. The total
number of drawings has also not been identified. The JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office has conducted a broad assessment of the entire JTRS
program. A JTRS program restructure has been approved by the Defense
Acquisition Executive. The program will seek full approval of the
revised strategy by the start of fiscal year 2007. The revised Cluster
5 program is described as a moderate risk program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JTRS Cluster 5 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies and
is focused on a common set of core circuit card assemblies for all its
handheld, manpack, and small form factor radios. The program office has
assessed one of the Cluster 5 critical technologies, termed
environmental protection, as mature for use. The program office has
assessed two other critical technologies, antenna and power management,
at a high level of readiness, although not fully mature. However, the
power management technology may not be as mature as assessed given the
Cluster 5 requirement to support a JTRS Wideband Networking Waveform.
This waveform is essential to providing JTRS networking services to
ensure interoperability over a wide range of frequencies. While it is
not designated a Cluster 5 critical technology, the JTRS Operational
Requirements Document designates it as a key performance parameter.
Operation of this waveform carries with it a large power requirement.
Because of the technical challenges of meeting that power requirement
in an acceptable size and weight, the Cluster 5 program is seeking some
relief from the waveform's requirements and attempting to optimize the
software code to increase its power efficiency. It is also evaluating
alternative waveforms such as the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide in
a power efficient way the needed networked services for radios with
highly constrained power and antenna size. The remaining Cluster 5
critical technologies--microelectronics, multichannel architecture, and
security--require additional development. According to the program
office, however, all three represent a moderate level of risk and are
anticipated to reach increased levels of maturity by the production
decision.
The program continues to address size, weight, and power requirements.
The Cluster 5 two-channel manpack radios are to have a maximum weight
of 9 pounds. In comparison, current single channel manpack radios weigh
in excess of 13 pounds. However, the JTRS Joint Service Capabilities
Working Group recently gave the program relief in meeting this weight
requirement.
Design Stability:
We did not assess the design stability of JTRS Cluster 5 because the
total number of drawings is not known and there are currently no
releasable drawings complete.
Other Program Issues:
In authorizing the Cluster 5 program to begin system development in
April 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive directed that the program
assess the technological maturity of its plans for acquiring Future
Combat System unique small form factor JTRS capability. This review was
scheduled for spring 2005. However, in February 2005 the newly
appointed JTRS Joint Program Executive Officer assumed responsibility
for all JTRS Clusters, including Cluster 5, and began an assessment of
all JTRS Clusters. Based on this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office developed several alternative acquisition strategies
which were presented to the Defense Acquisition Board in October and
November 2005. The restructured program will emphasize developing and
evolving the radio products in increments rather than attempting to
field a complete capability all at once. According to program
officials, delivering a JTRS capability in increments will make the
JTRS Program executable and reduce cost, schedule, and performance
risk.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on our draft, the program office generally concurred with
our findings and offered technical comments for our consideration. Many
of the technical comments involved updated information on the status of
the JTRS restructuring. We incorporated all relevant updated
information into our report.
[End of section]
Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS):
The J-UCAS program is a joint Air Force and Navy effort to develop and
demonstrate the technical feasibility and operational value of a
networked system of high performance, weaponized unmanned aircraft.
Planned missions include suppression of enemy air defenses, precision
strike, persistent surveillance, and potentially others such as
electronic attack as resources and requirements dictate. The program
consolidates two formerly separate service efforts and is to develop
and demonstrate larger, more capable, and interoperable aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing, Johns-Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab,
Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding, FY06-FY12:
R&D: $3,876.7 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $3,876.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Costs and quantities are budgeted amounts from the joint program's
inception in fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2009. Total known
program cost through fiscal year 2012 is $4,792.5 million.
None of the eight critical technologies for this pre-acquisition
program are currently mature, but J-UCAS officials project that, due
primarily to planned risk reduction efforts, three will be mature and
five will be approaching maturity to support a potential system
acquisition start in fiscal year 2012. The J-UCAS program has been
buffeted by frequent changes in leadership, funding, and priorities.
Leadership recently transitioned from the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency to the Air Force with Navy participation and funding
was reduced. The Quadrennial Defense Review then recommended
restructuring the J-UCAS program to develop a longer-range carrier-
based unmanned combat aircraft for the Navy. The Air Force plans to
consider J-UCAS technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to
develop a new long-range persistent strike capability.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
J-UCAS Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the eight critical technologies identified for this pre-
acquisition program are currently mature. Technologies include adaptive
autonomous operations (for controlling groups of aircraft flying in a
coordinated manner without human inputs) and force integration (for
interoperating with intelligence sources and strike and surveillance
packages). Most technologies are in a maturity range in which basic
components are integrated to establish they will work together and
components are integrated with reasonably realistic support elements
for testing in a simulated environment.
J-UCAS program officials have established a structured and disciplined
framework for maturing technologies, using both in-house efforts and
technology developments outside the program. Officials project that, at
a potential system start-up in fiscal year 2012, three technologies
will be mature at the best practices standard and the remaining five
will be approaching maturity.
As currently envisioned, the J-UCAS program will develop technologies
and operationally assess demonstrator aircraft from two prime
contractors sharing a common operating system, payloads, and
subsystems. Boeing X-45, Northrop-Grumman X-47, and common systems and
technologies are on contracts and proceeding forward. The Air Force and
Navy could then use the results of the operational assessment to decide
whether to start system development program(s).
Other Program Issues:
The just-completed Quadrennial Defense Review recommended restructuring
the J-UCAS program and develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based
aircraft to increase naval reach and persistence. The Air Force is
focusing its resources on delivering a new long-range strike
capability. Officials will consider J-UCAS technologies and
accomplishments in the analysis of alternatives for the new strike
capability. Final decisions, future plans, and funding requirements
were not available to us at the time of our review.
Prior to the Quadrennial Defense Review, the J-UCAS program had already
undergone several changes in leadership, program direction and
priorities, and funding. Recognizing the potential for synergy and cost
savings, OSD consolidated separate Air Force and Navy efforts in a
joint program in October 2003 under DARPA leadership. The previous
service efforts had been targeted to specific service needs and
different missions; under the joint program, the emphasis was on
developing interoperable and networked systems utilizing a common
operating system, sensors, and weapons. A December 2004 program budget
decision by OSD reduced future budgets, directed a restructure to
emphasize development of air vehicles, and directed that management be
transitioned to the Air Force with Navy participation; this was
accomplished in November 2005.
Congress reduced funding in the 2005 and 2006 budget requests. For
2005, Congress expressed concerns that the joint program had not
properly coordinated with the two services and directed that the
technology demonstrators be completed in support of Air Force and Navy
requirements. For 2006, Congress expressed concerns about fluctuations
in the program, including Service ownership, and apparent
incompatibility of the Air Force and Navy requirements. The Congress
also directed DOD to conduct an independent study to review technical
requirements and options for cost savings, and to provide an analysis
and recommendation on whether the Air Force and Navy are sufficiently
different in their respective requirements and level of development to
merit separation into service-unique programs.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, DOD said that all critical
technologies are projected to be mature enough to support start of
system development expected in fiscal year 2012. Subsequently, J-UCAS
program officials briefed us on the process and results of a new
reassessment of technology maturity levels. We updated this product to
reflect the reassessment and incorporated current events from the
Quadrennial Defense Review.
[End of section]
Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI):
MDA's KEI element is a missile defense system designed to destroy
medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles during
the boost and midcourse phases of flight. Key components include hit-
to-kill interceptors, mobile launchers, and fire control and
communications units. We assessed the proposed land-based KEI
capability, which according to program officials, will be available in
2014.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Fair Lakes, Va.
Funding FY06-FY11:
R&D: $5,137.3 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $5,137.3 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Table reflects known costs of program from program inception through
fiscal year 2009. Procurement cost has yet to be determined. Total
known cost through fiscal year 2011 is $5,678.0 million.
KEI's seven critical technologies are at a relatively low level of
maturity, with two rated as high risk--the interceptor's booster motors
and the algorithm that enables the kill vehicle to identify the threat
missile's body from the luminous exhaust plume. According to MDA
officials, integration issues and hardware manufacturability are being
addressed, and the design of the demonstration hardware should become
the design for the operational KEI element. In 2008, MDA will assess
KEI's achievements and decide how the program should proceed. If a
decision is made to move forward, MDA plans to finalize the design
during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011. At that time, two
technologies will have been demonstrated in flight tests, and four in
ground tests. KEI underwent a replan to compensate for fiscal year 2005
funding cuts and additional requirements, causing program delays.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
KEI Program:
Technology Maturity:
All seven KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of
maturity. These technologies are part of the element's interceptor, the
weapon component of the element consisting of a kill vehicle mounted
atop a boost vehicle. Of the seven technologies, four pertain to the
boost vehicle that propels the kill vehicle into space. Boost vehicle
technologies include two types of booster motors, an attitude control
system, and a thrust vector control system. The remaining three
technologies are related to the kill vehicle--its infrared seeker,
divert system, and plume-to-hardbody algorithms. Although all
technologies are immature, three of the seven are new applications of
existing technologies developed by other missile defense programs. The
infrared seeker and the third stage rocket motor come from the Aegis
BMD program, and the divert system comes from the GMD program. Backup
technologies exist for all technologies, but the infrared seeker.
However, these technologies are at the same low level of maturity as
the critical technologies.
Program officials noted that they expect the design of the
demonstration hardware to be the design of the operational hardware.
Therefore, integration and manufacturability issues are being addressed
in the design of the demonstration hardware. According to program
officials, KEI's operational design will be finalized in 2011. By that
time, MDA plans to demonstrate two critical technologies--the thrust
vector control system and one of the two types of boosters--in two
booster flight tests. Other technologies will have been demonstrated in
ground tests, such as hardware-in-the-loop tests and flight tests. The
integration of all critical technologies will be demonstrated in an
element characterization test early in fiscal year 2012, a sea risk
reduction flight test in late 2012, followed by the first integrated
flight test early in 2013.
Design Stability:
The KEI program office estimates that KEI's design will incorporate
about 7,500 drawings. Program officials expect 5,000 of these drawings
to be complete when it holds a critical design/production readiness
review for the land-based capability in 2009. However, it is too early
to make an accurate assessment of KEI's design because all of KEI's
technologies are not mature. In addition to using the number of
drawings released as a measure of the design's maturity, the program
also plans to use Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels to
determine the design's manufacturability and Software Readiness Levels
to assess the maturity of KEI's software.
Other Program Issues:
In fiscal year 2008, MDA plans to assess KEI's accomplishments and make
decisions about the program's future. If MDA decides to acquire KEI,
program officials expect to begin development of a space-based test
bed. MDA expects to expend about $673 million between fiscal years 2008
and 2011 on the test bed's development, which, when complete, is
envisioned as a limited constellation of space based interceptors
capable of providing an additional layer of defense against ICBMs. In
spite of its unknown future, program officials are working to extend
KEI's contract from January 2012 (98 months) to September 2015 (143)
months. Additionally, the program has directed its contractor to
investigate the effect of making KEI capable of defeating threat
missiles during the midcourse of their flight.
The KEI program underwent a program replan to compensate for fiscal
year 2005 funding cuts and the addition of new requirements, such as a
requirement for nuclear hardening imposed by MDA. Under the replan the
Block 2010 land-based capability was combined with the Block 2012 sea-
based capability, both of which utilize the same interceptor. According
to program officials, KEI is undergoing further restructuring which has
delayed the land-based capability into Block 2014 and the sea-based
capability into Block 2016. Program officials noted that if they
receive additional funding, the land-based capability could still be
delivered during Block 2012.
Agency Comments:
MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated where
appropriate.
[End of section]
Land Warrior:
The Army's Land Warrior program is developing modular, integrated,
soldier-worn systems intended to enhance the lethality, situational
awareness, and survivability of dismounted combat and support soldiers.
The program restructured in 2005 in an effort to field capability to
the current force, focusing on the Dismounted Battle Command System
(DBCS). DBCS comprises the Commander's Digital Assistant and the
MicroLight Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System, elements of
the previously planned Land Warrior system. We assessed DBCS.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics;
Program office: Fort Belvoir, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $438.5 million;
Procurement: $8,255.8 million;
Total funding: $8,694.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 84,658.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
As an early spiral of Land Warrior, the Dismounted Battle Command
System is technologically less ambitious than previous efforts. The
system's three critical technologies (power, radio communications, and
the personal area network) are mature; however, the personal area
network that connects the components together did not reach maturity by
the time of the DBCS critical design review in February 2005. The
program did not achieve design stability by this design review, but all
drawings are currently releasable. We could not assess production
maturity for DBCS because the program is not collecting statistical
process control data at this time. However, the results of an early
evaluation of DBCS conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation Command in
August 2005 recently led the Army to terminate the DBCS effort and
focus on developing the full Land Warrior ensemble.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Land Warrior Program:
Technology Maturity:
An early spiral of Land Warrior, DBCS is intended to provide a limited,
near-term capability to the current force to improve infantry unit
battle command and situational awareness. As a partial capability, DBCS
is technologically less ambitious than the system we assessed last
year. The DBCS comprises two adapted commercially available components:
the Commander's Digital Assistant (CDA) and the MicroLight Enhanced
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). Running the Army's Force
XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below situational awareness software,
the CDA is intended to provide leaders at the platoon and company level
with blue (friendly) force tracking capability. The MicroLight EPLRS
will provide voice and data communications at the squad level and
higher. The three critical technologies for DBCS, radio communications
(the MicroLight EPLRS), power for the CDA (batteries), and the personal
area network that connects the components together, are mature by best
practice standards.
We did not assess technology maturity for the limited number of full
Land Warrior ensembles the Army is procuring for assessment purposes in
2006. Last year we assessed what was then Block II of the program, the
Land Warrior--Stryker Interoperable system. At that time, two of the
system's four critical technologies were not mature (the personal area
network and radio communications). The Land Warrior system will
eventually use the JTRS Cluster 5 embedded radio (assessed elsewhere in
this report), scheduled to be available in fiscal year 2011.
Design Stability:
The program reported that 23 design drawings out of a total expected
number of 70 were releasable at the February 2005 critical design
review for DBCS, and that all 70 drawings are currently releasable.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the maturity of production processes for DBCS
because the program is not collecting statistical process control data
at this time. Officials told us that while General Dynamics has not
fully identified the key manufacturing processes, the company has
initiated manufacturing planning in accordance with ISO 9000
guidelines.
Other Program Issues:
The Army restructured the program in 2005 in response to congressional
direction to immediately field some Land Warrior capabilities to the
current force, terminating the Block II effort that was underway. The
restructured program comprised three phases. The first phase was
focused on fielding the Dismounted Battle Command System to leaders of
up to 30 of the Army's Brigade Combat Teams. The Army conducted an
early evaluation of DBCS in August 2005, during which soldiers from the
10th Mountain Division used the system in training for an upcoming
deployment to Afghanistan. The Army Test and Evaluation Command
concluded that DBCS was not suitable for light infantry operations and
reported that the system's weight and physical configuration reduced
soldiers' mobility. In addition, the demonstration revealed concerns
about power consumption as well as an inability to interoperate with
the unit's existing radios. Noting that the unit would not take DBCS to
Afghanistan, DOD's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
concluded that the system did not demonstrate the necessary
capabilities and that the current system was not mature.
The second phase of the program, still on track, is focused on
developing an integrated Land Warrior capability in support of the
Army's Stryker Brigades. Slightly less capable than the system we
assessed last year, the program plans to field 486 of these systems to
one Stryker battalion in fiscal year 2006 for assessment purposes. The
third phase, Ground Soldier System, is the future iteration of Land
Warrior capability intended to provide a dismounted soldier capability
to the Army's Future Combat Systems. In early 2005, the program
completed a plan to consolidate the Land Warrior program with the
Army's Future Force Warrior Advanced Technology Demonstration effort.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
The Navy's LCS is to be a surface combatant optimized for littoral
warfare with innovative hull designs and reconfigurable mission
packages to counter threats in three mission areas: mine,
antisubmarine, and surface warfare. The ship and mission packages are
being developed in spirals with the first four ships, Flight 0,
produced in two designs. We assessed only Flight 0 ships and their
associated mission packages.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $654.4 million;
Procurement: $592.0 million;
Total funding: $1,246.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 2.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Two of the ships will be procured using research and development funds.
Quantity shown is the number of ships procured, seven mission packages
will also be procured with funds shown.
The LCS program entered system development in June 2004. The program
office identified 41 critical technologies for the mission packages and
43 technologies between the two ship designs. Since our last review,
LCS has continued to test and mature its technologies for the mission
packages. Currently 19 of the 41 mission package technologies are fully
mature; seven are near full maturity; and 15 remain in development. The
technologies that have not reached maturity affect all three of the
mission packages, each of which will go through critical design review
in 2006. The majority of technologies for the ship designs are fully
mature or near maturity, except for those used for launch and recovery
or command and control of off-board vehicles. Both ship designs have
begun production.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
LCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Nine of the technologies under development for LCS are used in multiple
applications or mission packages. Since these technologies are used on
different platforms or in different environments, the program office
chose to assess them in each setting separately. This results in a
total of 41 critical technologies, 19 of which are currently mature.
The first mine warfare mission package will align with delivery of the
first ship in January 2007. In this mission, the MH-60S helicopter is
to carry subsystems for either detection or neutralization of mines. A
key component for attaching subsystems to the helicopter is currently
undergoing flight testing to correct deficiencies. Delay of the MH-60
could leave gaps in the ability to detect some mines while increasing
the time needed to neutralize others. The unmanned surface vehicle has
a similar mine neutralization capability as the MH-60S, which also acts
as its fallback. Neither the vehicle nor its payload is currently
mature, and failure to deploy it on LCS will lead to increased use of
the MH-60S. For mine warfare the vertical tactical unmanned autonomous
vehicle, an unmanned helicopter, will employ the coastal battlefield
reconnaissance and analysis system for detection of mines on the beach.
Both the vehicle and its payload are currently immature, and no
fallback is available to LCS.
The first antisubmarine and surface warfare packages will align with
delivery of the second LCS in fiscal year 2008. The MH-60R helicopter,
fully mature in each configuration, is critical for these missions.
Antisubmarine and surface warfare will also be performed by a number of
other immature systems, including the vertical tactical unmanned
autonomous vehicle and the unmanned surface vehicle. The MH-60R is the
fallback for those systems should they fail to mature. As a
consequence, reliance on helicopters will increase should the unmanned
systems fail to deploy with LCS.
Demonstration of mission package technologies will continue through
2008 and includes experiments with surrogate platforms. All
technologies are expected to reach maturity by delivery of their
respective mission package.
While the designs of the first LCS ships are novel in the experience of
the Navy, the majority of ship-specific technologies are mature or
close to full maturity. The Lockheed Martin design, the first to be
produced, currently has 16 of 21 technologies mature or close to full
maturity. The General Dynamics design currently has 20 of 22
technologies mature or close to full maturity. Most of the immature
technologies are used to launch and recover or control the vehicles
used in mission packages.
Design Stability:
Design of mission packages is tracked in a unique manner as some of the
"technologies" used are fully developed systems. These systems are
being designed and produced by other programs and, to ensure that the
mission packages will be compatible with LCS, the program has
established a set of interface specifications that each system must
meet. These specifications regulate issues like electrical,
communications, and maintenance needs. The specifications for
components of mission packages will be reviewed as part of a critical
design review for each warfare package. Both designs of the first
spiral of LCS ships have begun production. Application of commercial
design specifications and standards to Navy shipbuilding have created
some challenges during the design process, as has leveraging designs
with commercial lineage for military use.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
LCS program implements spiral development to rapidly field capabilities
that fill current operational gaps while achieving unprecedented
flexibility for the future. Efficient spiral implementation is achieved
through modular mission packages operated through a common interface
specification. Mission package systems have been selected from best
"state of the practice" technologies to satisfy requirements, ranging
from mature acquisition programs to technology demonstrators. While
component systems may be technically mature, repackaging and
integration into operational mission packages requires verification
testing to validate performance. Program test plans include specific
events to rapidly demonstrate the technical maturity of the modular
systems, and the flexibility of the modular open architecture greatly
reduces the risk and impact from any single component.
[End of section]
Longbow Apache Block III:
The Army's AH-64D Longbow Apache can be employed day or night, in
adverse weather and obscurants, and is capable of engaging and
destroying advanced threat weapon systems. The primary targets of the
aircraft are mobile armor and air defense units, with secondary targets
being threat helicopters. Block III enhancements are to ensure the
Longbow Apache is compatible with the Future Combat System
architecture, is a viable member of the future force, and is
supportable through 2030. We assessed the Block III portion of the
Apache.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $714.9 million;
Procurement: $1,159.2 million;
Total funding: $1,874.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 110.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The Apache Block III program plans to begin system development in March
2006 with approximately 67 percent of its critical technologies fully
mature. However, while the Army plans to develop the Block III in one
acquisition program, it also plans for the program to be comprised of
two development phases. The Army expects to approve funding for the
first phase in 2006 and the second after 2010. Overall, program
officials project that at the start of development seven of the fifteen
critical technologies will be fully mature, six approaching full
maturity, and two immature. Due to the acquisition strategy and
budgetary constraints, no further efforts to mature the less-than-fully
mature technologies will occur until fiscal years 2010 to 2015.
According to the program, these technologies are primarily software
upgrades that will be easy to retrofit into helicopters.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Longbow Apache BLIII Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials report that 6 of 15 critical technologies are
currently fully mature. Further, when the program enters the system
development and demonstration phase in March 2006, an additional
technology--the Level 4 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Control--will have
reached full maturity. These mature technologies are planned for
insertion in the helicopter in the initial production lots. For
example, the composite main rotor blade and the modernized signal
processor units are already fully mature and will be incorporated in
the 2010 to 2012 time frame. Due to the acquisition strategy and
budgetary constraints, no further efforts to mature the 8 immature
technologies will occur until fiscal years 2010 to 2015. As aircraft
come off the production line, the program will have provisions in place
that will allow for these technologies to be inserted when they are
fully mature and available in the 2015 time frame.
Technical insertions for the Apache Block III effort consist of two
general categories: processor upgrades and non-processor upgrades. The
first development phase addresses some of the processor upgrades and
all of the non-processor upgrades. The second developmental effort
addresses the remaining processor upgrades. The processor upgrades are
open or partitioned software architectures that will allow integration
of most of the improvements. Processor upgrades include changes to the
Instrument Flight Rules, the Modernized Signal Processor, the Radar
Frequency Interferometer, the Control of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the
Cognitive Decision Aiding System, the Fire Control Radar Range
Extension, the Multi-Mode Laser, Aided Target Detection and
Classification, Maritime Targeting Modes, and the Radar Frequency
Interferometer passive ranging. Nonprocessor upgrades include changes
to the engine, an improved drive system, and the composite main rotor
blade.
The processor technologies are primarily software upgrades that are low
risk and easily field-retrofitable into helicopters with minimal cost
without having to return to the production-processing facility.
According to program officials, there will be costs associated with
retrofitting the helicopters but these costs should be minimal given
the ability to add software changes in the field and because the
helicopter would have to be returned to the production plant to
accomplish these upgrades. Also, given the fact that the government
will perform the software retrofits on its own as part of the normal
software update process, the financial impact will be minimal. Further,
based on the current technology readiness levels, program officials
believe the technical risk to these technologies is low even though no
back-up technologies exist. If, for some reason, the technology is
unavailable for insertion at its given time, the program would proceed
with the existing technology until the new technology can be
incorporated.
Agency Comments:
The Army concurred with our assessment.
[End of section]
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA):
The Navy's MMA is part of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
family of systems, along with the BAMS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
and Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). This family of systems is intended to
sustain and improve the Navy's maritime warfighting capability. The MMA
is the replacement for the P-3C Orion. Its primary roles are persistent
antisubmarine warfare; antisurface warfare; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Integrated Defense Systems;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $5,910.5 million;
Procurement: $20,540.6 million;
Total funding: $26,572.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 108.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The MMA program entered development with none of its four critical
technologies mature. According to the program office, these
technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant environment by design
review and tested in an operational environment by the production
decision. The program evaluated six other technologies but decided they
were not critical because they had already been demonstrated in a
relevant or operational environment. The system's technology maturity
will be demonstrated at least 3 years later than recommended by best
practices standards. However, if those technologies do not mature as
expected, the program has identified mature back-up technologies. In
addition, during the program's preliminary design review, a
recommendation was made to reassess whether all critical technologies
in the program have been identified.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
MMA Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the four critical technologies--integrated rotary sonobuoy
launcher, electronic support measures digital receiver, data fusion,
and acoustic algorithms--are mature. These technologies have not moved
beyond the laboratory environment. For three of the technologies, the
components have not been integrated into a prototype system. The
program expects the four technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant
environment by design review in July 2007 and tested in an operational
environment by the production decision in May 2010. The system's
technology maturity will be demonstrated at least 3 years later than
recommended by best practices standards.
The program office and the contractor developed maturation plans and
identified mature backup technologies for each of the critical
technologies. According to program officials, the MMA would lose some
capabilities but still meet its minimum system requirements if it used
these backups. For example, one of the biggest technology challenges
for the MMA identified by program officials is the electronic support
measures digital receiver. This technology exists as a prototype and
has been demonstrated in a high fidelity laboratory environment. The
program is leveraging the digital receivers currently in development on
the EA-18G program. If the EA-18G digital receiver program is
unsuccessful, the program will have to use legacy analog off-the-shelf
receivers, which would prevent them from gaining an increased
sensitivity for certain signals.
The four technologies we assessed were identified in the MMA's
technology readiness assessment. The program evaluated six other
technologies but decided they were not critical because they had
already been demonstrated in a relevant or operational environment.
However, during the program's November 2005 preliminary design review,
a recommendation was made to reassess whether all critical technologies
in the program have been identified.
Design Stability:
We did not assess design stability as the number of releasable drawings
is not yet available.
Other Program Issues:
As of August 2005, the MMA program is on budget and on schedule.
However, if the MMA fails to develop as expected or experiences
schedule slippage, the Navy would have to rely on its aging P-3C Orion
fleet, which according to DOD is plagued by serious airframe life
issues, poor mission availability rates, high ownership costs, and
limited system growth capacity.
The MMA shares the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance role with the BAMS UAV. The BAMS UAV development start
and initial operations capability have been delayed 18 months and three
years respectively. If the BAMS UAV does not develop as planned or
continues to experience schedule delays, the MMA is its fallback and
according to the Navy's most recent analysis, the overall cost of the
program would increase due to a need to procure additional MMA
aircraft. In addition, a third element planned for the BAMS family of
systems is the ACS. The ACS is intended to replace three current
systems: the Army's Guardrail Common Sensor, Airborne Reconnaissance
Low, and the Navy's EP-3. However, DOD issued a stop-work order to the
ACS program prime contractor in September 2005 and terminated the
contract in January 2006, because the airframe selected for the ACS
could not accommodate the intended ACS mission equipment. Decisions
concerning the ACS program that have not yet been made may determine
whether the Navy participates in a future ACS program. One of the
alternatives previously assessed by the Navy to replace the EP-3
included incorporating the ACS equipment onto the MMA airframe.
Agency Comments:
The Navy concurred with GAO's assessment of the MMA program. We
incorporated technical comments provided by the Navy as appropriate.
The Navy stated that the program continues to manage the four critical
technologies. It stated that the maturation of these technologies is on
schedule and will be demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to
the July 2007 design readiness review. It also stated that the program
continues to meet or exceed the cost, schedule, and performance
parameters defined in the program's baseline agreement and that the
prime contractor also continues to execute the contract within cost and
schedule parameters.
[End of section]
21" Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV):
Launched and recovered from submarine torpedo tubes, the Navy's 21"
MRUUV will independently perform a range of information gathering
activities. It supplants two related programs now limited to prototype
development, the long-term mine reconnaissance system and the advanced
development unmanned undersea vehicle. Each MRUUV system will include
the vehicle, combat and control interfaces, and enabling equipment for
either mine countermeasure or ISR missions. This assessment is as of
January 2006. The planned July 2006 decision to enter development has
since been delayed.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD;
Procurement: TBD;
Total funding: TBD;
Procurement quantity: 11.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Program costs are business sensitive and cannot be published until
after MRUUV design contract is awarded.
One of the MRUUV program's six critical technologies is currently
mature. While the program expects to have fully matured four of the
five remaining critical technologies by the time of development start
in July 2006, the final technology--a rechargeable battery for the
system--is not expected to reach maturity until 2008. Given the cost
growth and schedule slippage experienced on previous unmanned undersea
vehicle programs, DOD is treating the program as if it were a larger
development effort and providing increased oversight.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
21'' MRUUV Program:
Technology Maturity:
One of the MRUUV's six critical technologies is currently mature and
the program expects to have at least four of the remaining five
critical technologies fully mature by the start of system development
in July 2006. The one exception, a rechargeable battery used for power
supply, may require further development to ensure proper integration.
The Littoral Precision Undersea Mapping Array is a critical sonar
technology that enables object identification and obstacle avoidance,
essentially forming the "eyes" of the vehicle. An advanced development
model of the Mapping Array already has been developed, tested, and
deployed on a 21" vehicle, thereby successfully demonstrating its mine
identification capability. A more advanced, lighter-weight prototype is
scheduled to be completed and tested in an operational environment in
fiscal year 2006.
The synthetic aperture sonar takes detailed pictures of underwater
objects. A surface ship has towed a sonar model in an ocean environment
to provide preliminary engineering data. A final prototype, will be
completed in fiscal year 2006 and will be tested in open water in early
fiscal year 2007.
According to the project manager, the maturity of the software that
provides MRUUV's autonomous operational capability has already been
demonstrated. This software is currently being used in operational
unmanned undersea vehicles and can be applied to the MRUUV to enable it
to perform its basic mission requirements. Nevertheless, software
development will continue, with incremental improvements added as they
are developed. This may include an enhanced ability to make autonomous
decisions and functionality that will facilitate a more efficient
equipment swap process.
Technology to manage the vehicle launch and recovery process involves
acoustic signaling and mechanical activities. A predecessor vehicle on
which MRUUV is based has demonstrated homing, docking, and replacement
into a model submarine hull. Maturity of this technology could be
demonstrated by system development start if at-sea tests with a real
submarine are successful.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology will be used
to provide remote monitoring capability, which involves placing the
vehicle in a strategic location to listen for specific signals. Such
technology, essentially a sensor antenna, already exists and is
operational on Navy unmanned aerial vehicle platforms. However, it
needs to be miniaturized and adapted for an ocean environment, which
should be demonstrated in May 2006 when the technology will be fit onto
a small underwater vehicle shell and used in at sea testing.
MRUUV's final critical technology is battery power. Although a stable
conventional battery has been developed, the Navy is also pursuing the
development of a rechargeable battery. While the rechargeable battery
has attained functional capability, it will require further refinement
to ensure fit into a small unmanned undersea vehicle. This is expected
to occur in 2008.
Other Program Issues:
Although total investment in the MRUUV is expected to be less than $365
million in research and development funding, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense may designate the program as an Acquisition
Category I. Officials at DOD believe that the program requires enhanced
oversight and visibility into program activities because of the cost
growth and schedule slippage that plagued previous unmanned undersea
vehicle programs.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
MRUUV program expects to have demonstrated all major technology risks
through other programs or through the science and technology community
by the time it reaches system development in July 2006. According to
Navy officials, remaining risks will be the responsibility of the prime
contractor to address within the systems engineering and design
integration process. The Navy also commented that a carefully
structured acquisition strategy and risk management program will
continue to mitigate risks as the program progresses through its design
phase. In subsequent comments, Navy officials noted that, as would be
expected of a pre-MDAP program, the MRUUV effort is continuing to
evolve and that since GAO conducted its audit work the program has
experienced significant changes and is likely to experience additional
changes.
[End of section]
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to
provide low data rate voice and data communications capable of
penetrating most weather, foliage, and manmade structures. It is
designed to replace the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On satellite
system currently in operation and provide support to worldwide,
multiservice, mobile, and fixed-site terminal users. MUOS consists of a
network of advanced UHF satellites and multiple ground segments. We
assessed both the space and ground segments.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems;
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,547.0 million;
Procurement: $2,170.1 million:
Total funding: $4,737.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
In September 2004, the MUOS program was authorized to begin
development. The program currently has 9 of 11 critical technologies
mature. The remaining technologies are projected to be mature by March
2007, in time for the critical design review. The program intends to
order long lead items for the first two satellites before achieving a
final design. This early procurement could lead to rework causing cost
increases and schedule delays if relevant designs change prior to
critical design review. In addition, the MUOS development is schedule-
driven, posing several risks to the program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
MUOS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Eight of nine critical technologies were mature at the development
start decision in September 2004. The number of critical technologies
has increased by two since our assessment of the program last year due
to continuing program analyses resulting in increased knowledge of
required technologies. Currently, nine of eleven critical technologies
are mature. The remaining technologies, a new cryptographic chip for
the ground satellite control segment and a digital to analog converter,
are expected to be mature by the time the program reaches its critical
design review in March 2007. Mature backup technologies exist in the
event that they fail to mature in time. However, use of the backup
technologies would increase the vulnerability to attacks on signal
transmissions used to ensure the satellites remain properly placed in
their orbits and increase risk of program cost and schedule growth.
Design Stability:
The MUOS program has begun procuring long lead items for the first two
satellites before achieving a final design. According to the program
office, $125.5 million (then year dollars) in long lead items are to be
ordered before critical design review in March 2007, nearly double the
amount estimated last year. Such procurement could lead to rework if
relevant designs change prior to the system-level critical design
review, causing program cost increases and schedule delays. According
to the program office, delaying long lead procurement until after
critical design review would cause the program schedule to slip. In
addition, the program office noted that the majority of the long lead
procurements are planned after respective segment-level critical design
reviews (which precede the system-level critical design review) and
that most are for standard commercial satellite bus components.
Additionally, the program office has not estimated the total number of
design drawings needed to build the satellites, but this number will
likely be known next year. The development contract requires the
completion of 90 percent of the design drawings as a condition of
conducting critical design review.
Other Program Issues:
In June 2004, DOD delayed the first MUOS satellite launch by one year
to fiscal year 2010 due to a delay in awarding the development contract
and to mitigate schedule risk. While the MUOS program has stayed within
its cost and schedule estimates, its schedule remains compressed. For
example, the importance of the first MUOS launch date has increased due
to an unexpected failure of a UHF Follow-On satellite in June 2005.
Communication capabilities are now expected to degrade in 2009, one
year earlier than previously estimated. Also, operational capability
from the first satellite may be used before formal on-orbit operational
testing is to take place. Usually, such testing occurs prior to placing
a satellite into service. Finally, an independent assessment conducted
for the MUOS development start decision states that the program is
schedule-driven due to software development.
According to the program office, development of MUOS ground software
represents one of the highest risks to the program due to the size and
complexity of the contractor's design. The program office stated that
the ground software is to be developed in three builds comprised of two
to four increments each (for a total of eight increments) to mitigate
schedule risk. Additionally, the program intends to track and assess
software development using numerous metrics we have found to be useful
for program success. However, our review of the software development
shows cost and schedule growth risks remain due to the concurrent
development of the three builds. Specifically, during the approximately
4-year software development time frame, about one-half of this period
consists of concurrent development among the software builds. Such
concurrency can increase the severity of software problems due to their
cascading cost and schedule impacts on other builds.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
NPOESS is a triagency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the
year 2020. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single
national system. The program consists of five segments: space; command,
control, and communications; interface data processing; launch; and
field terminal software. We assessed all segments.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology;
Program office: Silver Spring, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $4,083.7 million;
Procurement: $1,309.6 million;
Total funding: $5,393.3 million;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
As a result of technical problems, the program office now estimates the
total program cost at about $8.3 billion. As of November 2005, our
estimate was about $9.7 billion.
In August 2002, the NPOESS program committed to the development of
operationally capable satellites with only 1 of 14 critical
technologies mature and about half of its drawings released to
manufacturing. All but three of these technologies are expected to be
mature by design review in February 2007. The program office is not
collecting statistical process control data to assess production
maturity because of the small number of units being produced. It
considers two of the four critical sensors key program risks because of
technical development challenges. In November 2005, our analysis showed
the contractor was $253.8 million over budget and may have a potential
overrun of about $1.4 billion at completion. The program reported a
Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost breach in January 2006, at the
25 percent threshold, due to continuing technical problems.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
NPOESS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only 1 of the program's 14 critical technologies was mature at the
production decision in August 2002. One critical technology was deleted
from NPOESS in 2005. The program projects that all but three of the
remaining technologies will be mature by the design review in 2007.
The program undertook the NPOESS Preparatory Project, a demonstration
satellite, to reduce risk and provide a bridging mission for NASA's
Earth Observing System. This satellite is to demonstrate three of the
four critical sensors in an operational environment and was scheduled
for launch in May 2006. However, the launch of this satellite was
delayed 23 months from the contract award date to April 2008. This
effort is to provide data processing centers with an early opportunity
to work with sensors, ground controls, and data-processing systems and
allow for incorporating lessons learned into the NPOESS satellites.
Since our assessment last year, the program office reports that three
sensors continue to experience cost increases and schedule delays due
to technical challenges. Two of these are considered critical sensors.
Design Stability:
In August 2002, the program committed to the fabrication and production
of two satellites with operational capability before achieving design
stability or production maturity. Program officials indicated that
about 55 percent of the design drawings have been released to
manufacturing, and expect to release about 88 percent by the design
review in 2007, which represents a decline of 6 percent from last
year's estimate. The design review date and other schedule dates are
subject to revision based on the results provided by an independent
program assessment, DOD review, and Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433)
certification process.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because, according to the
program office, it does not collect statistical process control data
due to the small number of units to be built. However, program
officials report the contractors track and use various metrics for
subcomponents, such as rework percentages and defect containment, to
track production progress.
Other Program Issues:
In 2002, DOD extended the launch date of one of its legacy
meteorological satellites to 2010, delaying the need for NPOESS and
reducing NPOESS funding by about $65 million between fiscal years 2004
and 2007. Funding reductions prompted a restructuring of the NPOESS
program. In September 2005, the program office submitted a new total
program cost estimate of about $8.3 billion. In November 2005, we
estimated total program cost to increase to about $9.7 billion at
completion. This represented about a 50 percent increase from the
original program cost estimate of $6.5 billion. In January 2006, the
program reported a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost breach, at
the 25 percent threshold, due to continuing technical problems. NPOESS
officials stated the most recent increase is due to technical issues
surrounding the program, including the development of key sensors. In
addition, given the challenges currently facing the program, the
scheduled first launch date slipped 17 months from the contract award
date to September 2010.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
that every aspect of the program is being evaluated by various internal
and external groups and noted that management changes to better align
the management structure with the program phase have recently occurred
at the program office and at the prime contractor. It stated that
management, design, and manufacturing process issues at multiple levels
have contributed to the current instrument problems and resulting cost
and schedule issues. It further stated that several options are being
reviewed for technical viability and cost effectiveness as part of the
Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) certification process. The program office
noted that any changes resulting from this process may produce
substantial cost, schedule, and technical performance changes. The
program office also noted that part of the schedule slips were due to
congressional budget cuts. Technical comments were also provided and
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit:
The Army's Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program is the process by
which the Patriot missile system transitions to the MEADS. The MEADS
mission is to provide low-to-medium altitude air and missile defense
with the capability to counter, defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and other air-breathing threats. MEADS is a
codevelopment program among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We
assessed the MEADS fire unit portion of the program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: MEADS International;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $4,306.8 million;
Procurement: $12,149.2 million;
Total funding: $16,456.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 48.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The program office expects the first complete MEADS fire unit to be
available in fiscal year 2015.
The MEADS fire unit began development in 2004 with two mature critical
technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one
immature critical technology. The technologies remain at these levels.
Program plans call for a system design review in 2009, but program
estimates project that only one of the six fire unit technologies will
be more mature at that time than at development start. The program
office anticipates that all critical technologies will be fully mature
by the start of production in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only two of the six critical technologies--launcher electronics and
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile integration--are mature.
Three other critical technologies--low noise exciter that manages the
radars' frequencies, cooling system for the radars, and slip ring that
carries power and coolants to the radars--are nearing maturity. The
remaining critical technology--the transmit/receive module that
transmits/receives signals for the fire control radar--is immature.
The program office projects that the transmit/receive module will
increase in maturity by the time of the system design review planned
for 2009. The program office expects that the five other critical
technologies will be at the same maturity levels as they were at the
start of development. The office expects all critical technologies to
be fully mature by the start of production in late 2012. There are no
backup technologies for any of the MEADS critical technologies.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of
releasable drawings and total drawings expected were not available. The
program office expects to know the total number of releasable drawings
at the design review in 2009.
Other Program Issues:
MEADS is being developed to employ the current PAC-3 missile and the
future PAC-3 missile segment enhancement variant. The missile segment
enhancement is a U.S.-funded effort to improve on the current PAC-3
missile capability. Program estimates indicate that the Army plans to
develop and procure missiles at a cost of approximately $6.1 billion.
We did not assess the missile and the missile segment enhancement, and
the associated costs are not included in our funding information.
The MEADS program has adopted an incremental acquisition approach
wherein MEADS major items are incrementally inserted into the current
Patriot force. There are three increments, with the first beginning in
2008, another in 2010, and the final in 2013. The program office plans
for each increment to introduce new or upgraded capability into the
program. The Army expects MEADS to achieve initial operating capability
in 2017 with four units.
Agency Comments:
The Army generally concurred with this assessment. It indicated that we
addressed critical technologies that were already areas of intense
management focus. The Army also noted that it still expects all
technologies to be fully mature by production and further stated that
there are risk mitigation plans for the maturing technologies and
alternate back-up technologies identified for the transmit/receive
module. Additionally, the Army noted that, at the design review in
2009, the design work in the critical technologies will be at the
maturity level required to fabricate the system prototype necessary to
demonstrate required system capabilities.
[End of section]
MQ-9 Predator B:
The Air Force's MQ-9 Predator B is a multirole, medium-to-high altitude
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at higher
speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A.
The Predator B is designed to provide a ground attack capability to
find and track small ground mobile or fixed targets. Each Predator B
system will consist of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a
satellite communication suite. We assessed the first increment of the
air vehicle.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding FY06-FY11:
R&D: $127.7 million;
Procurement: $635.5 million;
Total funding: $763.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 32.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Cost data are for all known costs from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2009. Total estimated program cost is $1,209.4 million.
The Predator B entered system development in February 2004 with three
of its four critical technologies mature. The Air Force expects the
fourth technology to be ready in May 2006. However, no suitable back-up
technology is available. If this technology fails to mature as
expected, the Predator B will not be able to effectively perform its
primary mission--to destroy enemy targets. In 2004, the program changed
to an incremental acquisition strategy. The Air Force appears to have
made significant progress in completing design drawings for the first
increment and projects that it will have achieved design stability by
the 2006 critical design review. The program has already begun
production of the Predator B aircraft, but operational testing is not
scheduled to be complete until 2008. At that point, about one-third of
the quantity will be on contract or delivered.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Predator B Program:
Technology Maturity:
Three of the Predator B's four critical technologies--the synthetic
aperture radar, the multispectral targeting system, and the air
vehicle--are fully mature. The prototype of the avionics subsystem
technology, designed to integrate and store data necessary to launch
munitions, will begin ground testing in February 2006. The Air Force
expects that the technology will be integrated and mature in May 2006.
This represents about a 10 month slip from last year's estimate. No
suitable back-up technology exists. If this critical technology fails
to mature, it will prevent the Predator B from effectively performing
its primary mission, to destroy enemy targets. Subsequent increments
may require other new technologies.
Design Stability:
After its Milestone B approval in February 2004, the program office was
directed to revise its acquisition strategy to develop Predator B in
three increments. The Air Force appears to have made significant
progress in completing design drawings for the first increment of
Predator B. At the time of our assessment last year, the program
indicated that just over 35 percent of the drawings for the first
increment had been completed. It now reports that over 85 percent of
the drawings are complete. The program office continues to expect that
94 percent of the drawings for the first increment will be completed by
the time of the critical design review in September 2006. Program
officials acknowledge that additional drawings will be needed for
subsequent increments. Design changes and modification of drawings are
likely to occur late in development, increasing the need to retrofit
already acquired systems.
Production Maturity:
Program officials said the contractor does not plan to use statistical
process controls to ensure product quality. Instead, it plans to use
other quality control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to
track product quality. Also, initial operational testing, which is to
demonstrate that a product is ready for production, is not scheduled to
be complete until mid-2008. By that point, about one third of the
aircraft will either be in production or already delivered.
Other Program Issues:
In 2004, the Predator program office was directed to adopt an
incremental acquisition strategy and field an interim combat capability
by fiscal year 2006. By adopting an incremental acquisition strategy,
the program office is using the preferred approach to weapon
acquisitions. To reduce the risks of concurrently developing and
producing Predator Bs, the program office lowered annual buy quantities
and extended production 5 years through 2014. Nevertheless, the program
schedule still contains a high degree of concurrency. Before the
conclusion of initial operational testing, the Air Force will have
already contracted for about one third of the total aircraft production
quantity. The Air Force currently projects that half of these aircraft
will need to be retrofitted to bring them up to the baseline
capability. Additional changes stemming from the test program would
further perturb the aircraft's cost, schedule, and manufacturing plan.
The Air Force is still evaluating a variety of lightweight munitions
for use on the Predator B. The Air Force is also weighing the
possibility of adding new system capabilities such as launching very
small or micro unmanned aerial vehicles from the Predator B.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
the stores management system is making good progress and its completion
is considered a low risk activity. The hardware has been installed on a
test aircraft and will begin ground testing in February 2006. The Air
Force also noted that Congress has directed an increase to the yearly
production buys in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Program planning is in
place to upgrade these aircraft to support initial operational testing
in 2008. The Air Force stated that the ongoing developmental and
operational testing effort and the operational assessment to be
conducted in 2006 will provide valuable feed back to the acquisition
and operational commands.
[End of section]
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:
The Air Force's SBIRS High program is a satellite system intended to
meet requirements in the missile warning, missile defense, technical
intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions. A replacement
for the Defense Support Program, SBIRS High consisted of four
satellites (plus a spare) in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two
sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and fixed
and mobile ground stations. In 2005, the number of GEO satellites was
reduced to three. We assessed the sensors and satellites only.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,498.9;
Procurement: $1,629.6;
Total funding: $5,128.5;
Procurement quantity: 1.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Acquisition cycle time is currently unknown as the Air Force Space
Command has not defined the initial operational capability.
The SBIRS High program's critical technologies and design are now
mature. Production maturity could not be determined because the
contractor does not collect production statistical process control
data. In August 2004 the contractor delivered the first payload (HEO 1
sensor) after a delay of 18 months; the second was delivered in
September 2005 after a delay of 21 months. Since we last reported,
total costs have increased by more than $1 billion. The cost growth
resulted in two additional Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost
breaches and a decision not to buy two satellites. Although program
officials have acknowledged that the GEO satellites are orders-of-
magnitude more complex than the HEO sensors, they now believe a more
realistic program schedule has been developed. The first GEO satellite
delivery has been delayed an additional 5 months to late 2008.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
SBIRS High Program:
Technology Maturity:
The SBIRS High program's three critical technologies--the infrared
sensor, thermal management, and on-board processor--are mature.
However, program officials stated that flawed initial systems
engineering created first-time integration and test risk associated
with the GEO staring sensor. According to program officials, early test
results of the scanning and staring sensors are positive. The staring
sensor is to have the ability to stare at one earth location and then
rapidly change its focus area, representing a significant leap in
capability over the current system.
Design Stability and Production Maturity:
In portraying the program's events in this assessment, we considered
the production decision to have occurred at the time of design review
because this is when the program office began ordering long lead parts
for the fabrication of satellites. Although the program's design is now
considered stable since almost all drawings have been released, design-
related problems are now the issue. Design problems led to delayed
delivery of both HEO sensors, which were accepted for operations
without meeting all program specifications. Given the added complexity
of the GEO satellites over the HEO sensors, the probability is high
that major design flaws will be discovered on the GEO satellites as
well.
We could not assess the production maturity of SBIRS High because the
contractor does not collect production statistical process control
data. However, the program office tracks and assesses production
maturity through detailed monthly manufacturing and test data and
monthly updates on flight hardware qualifications. The program office,
in late 2005, implemented initiatives for its flight software
development processes and placed full-time program office personnel at
the contractor's facility. According to program officials, about 95
percent of flight hardware for the first GEO satellite and 85 percent
for the second has been delivered.
Other Program Issues:
Integration and testing of the first GEO payload and spacecraft has
begun. It was during this process that the design errors in the HEO
sensors were discovered. Given the high probability that major design
flaws will emerge on these satellites as well, costly redesigns that
could further delay delivery are likely. However, according to program
officials, additional engineering tests have been instituted to address
design issues and reduce the likelihood of significant schedule
impacts. To accommodate these tests, each GEO satellite's delivery was
delayed by an additional five months, bringing the delay to 19 months
for each satellite.
In July 2005, the program reported its third and fourth Nunn-McCurdy
unit cost breaches (10 U.S.C. 2433). As part of the mandatory program
certification process triggered by one of the cost breaches, the
program was restructured in late 2005. The program now includes
procurement of only one GEO satellite--reduced from three--and the
procurement contract is contingent upon the performance of the first
developmental GEO satellite. Although the program has reduced the total
number of satellites it will procure, total program funding continues
to increase, and revised estimates indicate the average procurement
cost per unit is now 224 percent above the 2002 approved program
baseline. The Air Force was recently directed to begin efforts to
develop a viable competing capability, in parallel with the SBIRS
program, and to submit a plan for this new program by April 2006.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force acknowledged
that the cost of the program was significantly underestimated at
inception and the program suffered from a lack of military
specifications with proper quality controls and that past restructures
and replans did not fully recognize the extent of rework necessary to
ensure mission success. It noted that the recent comprehensive review
of the program resulted in a more realistic assessment of integration
and testing timelines and a revised funding profile that accounts for
the potential rework costs and schedule delays. In addition, the
program has developed one integrated schedule for the remaining program
and created a government cost estimating capability. The Air Force
noted that technical issues will be uncovered, but early problem
identification and prompt resolution will minimize the impacts to the
integrated program activity. Technical comments were provided and
incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB):
The Air Force's SDB is a small autonomous, conventional, air-to-ground,
precision bomb able to strike fixed and stationary targets. The weapon
will be installed on the F-15E aircraft and is designed to work with
other aircraft, such as the F-22A. The Air Force is in the process of
implementing a competitive acquisition strategy for a second increment
of the program, which includes a precision strike against moving
targets in adverse weather capability. This analysis addresses only the
first increment of the program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $51.2 million;
Procurement: $1,215.6 million;
Total funding: $1,266.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 23,842.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The six critical technologies for the SDB are mature, and the design is
stable. The program office held the design review prior to starting
system development and, although data were not collected, the program
maintains that the contractor has released 100 percent of the
production drawings. In 2004, the program began a test program, which
combines developmental, live fire, and operational testing in an effort
to decrease time spent in system development. Of 37 developmental tests
conducted, 35 were considered successful. Causes of failure for the
other two have been identified and corrected. Some operational tests
remain to be completed. SDB was approved for low rate production in
April 2005. We could not assess production maturity as statistical
process control data were not available.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
SDB Program:
Technology Maturity:
The program office assessed all six critical technologies for the SDB
as mature. The technologies are the airframe, the Anti-Jam Global
Positioning System, the fuze, the Inertial Navigation System, the
carriage, and warhead. Program officials stated that all technologies
have been tested in realistic environments and have achieved their
final form, fit, and function.
Design Stability:
The design review was held prior to the start of system development
and, although data were not collected, the program office maintains
that Boeing has now completed 100 percent of the production drawings.
According to the program office, although the contractor has ultimate
responsibility for the weapon system and has given the government a 20-
year "bumper to bumper" warranty, the program office has insight into
the contractor's configuration control board process and all changes
are coordinated with the government.
The SDB program began a program of developmental, live-fire, and
operational testing in 2004. This combined testing approach is designed
to eliminate or reduce redundant testing. As of the date of this
review, all developmental tests were complete. Of the 37 developmental
tests conducted, two were classified as failures. Program officials
told us that the causes of the two failures have been corrected and
verified through additional flight tests. However, due to the
concurrency of the test program, SDB continues to face an aggressive
schedule in the coming months. Operational testing will be conducted
throughout fiscal year 2006, to be followed by a full rate production
decision at the end of fiscal year 2006.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because statistical process
control data were not available. In developing the SDB, Boeing used
many key components that are common with the Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM). The SDB production line will be colocated in the same
facility used to produce the JDAM. According to program officials, the
production line layout is very similar to the processes currently used
for the JDAM. As of the date of this review, no critical manufacturing
processes that impact the critical system characteristics had been
identified. SDB was approved for low-rate initial production in April
2005 and will begin full-rate production in 2006.
Other Program Issues:
The Air Force's 2006 budget includes $47 million to begin development
of the second increment of the SDB program. At the time the fiscal year
2006 budget was prepared, the Air Force planned to have Boeing, the
prime contractor for the first increment, add the second increment
requirements to the first increment contract. However, in late 2004,
Lockheed Martin filed a bid protest of the contract award to Boeing,
after a former senior Air Force procurement official acknowledged bias
in favor of Boeing. In February 2005, GAO sustained the protest.
Responding to the GAO's decision and recommendation, the Air Force
agreed to recompete the contract for the second increment. The Air
Force is in the process of implementing a competitive acquisition
strategy for a second increment.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred
with the information presented and provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Space Radar (SR):
SR is an Air Force-led, joint DOD and intelligence community program to
develop a satellite to find, identify, track, and monitor moving or
stationary targets under all-weather conditions and on a near-continual
basis across large swaths of the earth's surface. As envisioned, SR
would generate volumes of radar imagery data for transmission to ground-
, air-, ship-, and space-based systems. We assessed the space segment.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD;
Program office: Colorado Springs, Colo.
Program Office: Eglin AFB, Fla.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $9,726.9 million;
Procurement: $9,767.6 million;
Total funding: $22,970.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 22.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Cost and quantities could change because the Air Force is restructuring
the SR program.
Five critical technologies will support the SR program, and they are
still being matured. The program office is focusing its efforts on
technology risk reduction and concept definition activities. At this
point, the program is expected to enter system development before any
of the technologies are mature. The Air Force is restructuring the
program to address concerns about the affordability of SR, which
includes schedule and cost evaluations and several changes to the
acquisition strategy. In 2007, the program plans to decide whether to
develop on-orbit demonstration satellites to validate technology
maturity and costs. Launch of the first fully operational SR satellite
is scheduled for fiscal year 2015. Design and production maturity could
not be assessed because SR is not yet a formal acquisition and has not
begun product development.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
SR Program:
Technology Maturity:
The program office assessed the electronically steered array, on-board
processing, signal-processing algorithms for moving target indication,
information management system, and moving-target indication
exploitation hardware and software as the critical technologies needing
further development.
The program office is focusing its efforts on technology risk reduction
and concept definition activities. For example, subcomponents for the
electronically steered array are being integrated with laboratory
components to demonstrate proper functioning. In addition, on-board
processing capabilities are being demonstrated and conceptual designs
for storing and processing data have been developed. The program is
also working to further mature the remaining critical technologies.
However, the program expects to start the product development phase
before these technologies mature.
Other Program Issues:
As a result of congressional concerns about the affordability of SR,
DOD and other SR users have now agreed on a path to develop a single
space radar system to meet national needs. The Air Force is
restructuring the program to reflect this agreement and schedule and
associated costs are being evaluated. The new path includes several
changes to the SR acquisition. First, in early 2005, a new Space Radar
Integrated Program Office was established in Chantilly, Virginia, to
work with the intelligence community, DOD and other users, senior Air
Force leadership, and the Congress. Second, the new SR senior
leadership established a framework with overarching guidance for
maturing the critical technologies. Third, a team of program office
personnel and mission partners established a new plan to drive fiscal
year 2006 risk reduction activities and revised cost estimates.
Finally, the SR acquisition strategy now calls for the development of a
smaller constellation of high performance, more affordable satellites
and a potential on-orbit demonstration to validate technology maturity
and costs. A final decision on an on-orbit demonstration is not
expected until fiscal year 2007.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
in response to congressional concerns and as a result of the recent
restructure, the program has implemented a disciplined program
framework approach to mature technology and reduce risk and is working
more closely with all stakeholders. The Air Force also said that this
program framework consolidates and provides coherent big picture
direction to multiple technology-development testing and
experimentation activities--such as ground, existing space, and air
components--with a focus on proving technologies early in the concept
development phase of the program to reduce technical and schedule risk
in the future. Moreover, according to Air Force officials, a robust
requirements definition process has been implemented to provide early
stakeholder input and acceptance to stabilize requirements, further
reducing future risk.
[End of section]
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built
under the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch
these satellites in 2007 to assess how well they work within the
context of the missile defense system. MDA is also studying
improvements to the STSS program, and it will be building next
generation satellites. We assessed the two demonstration satellites.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding, FY06-FY11:
R&D: $3,146.4 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $3,146.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Columns include all known costs and quantities from the program's
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through
fiscal year 2011 is $5,996.34 million.
Three of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature, and
the remaining two technologies are expected to reach maturity in early
2006. The STSS design appears otherwise stable, with all drawings
released to manufacturing. The program office has identified certain
risk areas, such as infrared payload completion, payload data processor
software completion, and system integration and functionality.
Additionally, quality and workmanship problems with the payload have
continued and have resulted in cost and schedule overruns with the
payload contract. However, the program office still expects early
delivery and launch of the satellites. The planned budget for STSS
through fiscal year 2009 grew by more than $1.1 billion, mainly in
fiscal years 2008 and 2009, due to the addition of funds for designing
and developing the program's operational constellation.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
STSS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Three of the five critical technologies--satellite communication cross-
links, on-board processor, and acquisition sensor--are mature. This is
one less than reported last year as MDA corrected its assessment of one
of the technologies. The remaining two technologies--the track sensor
and the single-stage cryocooler--will be mature upon completion of the
thermal vacuum testing on the first satellite's payload, which is
expected to occur in early 2006.
Design Stability:
The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to
manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings
and the satellite components for the partially built satellites from
the Space Based Infrared System Low effort were released to
manufacturing. By the time STSS went through its design review in
November 2003, the program office had released all subsequent design
drawings. However, until the maturity of the remaining two STSS
technologies has been demonstrated, the potential for design changes
remains.
Other Program Issues:
The STSS program is in the process of completing the assembly,
integration, and testing of the satellite components and software
development. Until this work is complete, certain risk areas will
remain. These include infrared payload completion, payload data
processor software completion, and system integration and functionality
testing. Other risk areas that the program office had identified
previously--such as the hardware and software status, ground software
development completion, and parts obsolescence--have been resolved.
The quality and workmanship problems with the payload subcontractor
persist. These problems have continued for the last 2 years and have
contributed to a schedule delay in delivering the payload and a likely
cost overrun of between $20 million and $30 million on the payload
subcontract. Integration issues have also been discovered as the
subcontractor continues to integrate and test the payload at
successively higher levels of integration. The cause of most of these
problems is due to the difference in configuration between the
pathfinder hardware that served as the test bed for the payload
software and the actual flight hardware. In addition, the actual
payload thermal vacuum test is taking about 30 to 45 days longer than
expected to resolve hardware issues that have emerged as a result of
the payload being tested in a vacuum and at cold temperatures--a
relevant environment--for the first time. In response to these issues,
quality control efforts at the subcontractor's site have undergone
significant restructuring. In addition, the prime contractor stepped up
its inspection and supervision of all processes at the subcontractor's
site and has provided mentoring.
According to the program office, many of the quality-related variances
could have been avoided if better quality processes had been in place
at the payload subcontractor. The program office expects that the
quality improvements that the payload subcontractor has implemented
will reduce the number of quality-related problems in the future.
According to the program office, the integration issues that have been
discovered are not unusual for a first time integration effort but are
taking more time than planned to work through. Upon completion of the
first satellite's payload, the program office expects the cost and
schedule variances to abate, although they will not recover. In
addition, the second satellite's hardware has consistently moved
through integration and testing much more efficiently than the first
satellite's hardware. Thus, the program office still expects the prime
contractor to deliver and launch the satellites in February 2007, which
is earlier than the contract date, and has placed an order through NASA
for the Delta II launch vehicle. Since our last assessment, STSS'
planned budget through fiscal year 2009 increased by $1,195.9 million
(35.3 percent), primarily in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, due to the
addition of funds for designing and developing the program's
operational constellation.
Agency Comments:
MDA was provided an opportunity to comment on a draft of this
assessment, but it did not have any comments.
[End of section]
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a fire control and
communications system. We assessed the design for the Block 2008
initial capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to hand off to the
Army in fiscal year 2009 for limited operational use.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding, FY06-FY11:
R&D: $4,135.5 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $4,135.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Costs are for all known blocks from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2009. Total known program funding through fiscal year 2011
is $12,985.3 million.
Program officials assessed THAAD's technologies as mature and its
design as generally stable, with 95 percent of the engineering design
drawings released. The design of Block 2008, which is expected to
provide a limited operational capability, is a further maturation of
THAAD 's Block 2004 design. MDA began flight testing the design with a
successful controlled test flight on November 22, 2005-8 months later
than originally planned. According to program officials, the delay was
the result of technical problems encountered during the integration of
the THAAD missile, most of which have been solved. The current schedule
is aggressive, calling for the completion of as many as five flight
tests within one fiscal year. However, program officials expect to
recover most of the flight schedule and complete 15 flight tests before
handing the first fire unit over to the Army in fiscal year 2009.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
THAAD Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials assessed all of THAAD's critical technologies as
mature. All of these technologies are included in four major
components: the fire control and communications component; the
interceptor; the launcher; and the radar.
After experiencing early test failures, program officials made changes
in the execution of the THAAD program that allowed it to make progress
in maturing critical technologies. Officials placed more emphasis on
risk reduction efforts, including adopting technology readiness levels
to assess technological maturity.
Design Stability:
Program officials reported that THAAD's basic design is nearing
completion, with approximately 95 percent of the expected 9,852
engineering drawings released. However, if problems are encountered
during future flight tests, the total number of drawings could
increase.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because MDA does not know
when it will transition THAAD to the Army for production. The one fire
unit that will be handed off to the Army in 2009 for limited
operational use is considered to be primarily a test asset. Prior to a
production decision, the program office plans to assess production
maturity using risk assessments and verification reviews for assurance
of the contractor's readiness to proceed with repeatable processes and
quality.
Other Program Issues:
MDA expected to begin flight tests in March 2005. However, because of
technical problems experienced during the integration of the THAAD
missile, the first test was pushed out to November 2005. The current
schedule is aggressive, calling for the completion of as many as five
flight tests within one fiscal year. However, program officials told us
that most of the technical problems have been solved and that they are
confident that they will recover most of the flight test schedule. The
program expects to complete 15 flight tests before handing the first
fire unit over to the Army in fiscal year 2009.
The problems incurred by the missile component also affected the
program's cost performance. According to program officials, for the
first time since its contract was awarded in 2000, the THAAD program is
experiencing an unfavorable cumulative cost variance. Program officials
noted that as of October 2005, the program was overunning its prime
contract cost by approximately $50 million. Also, since our last
assessment THAAD's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 has
increased by $514.8 million (4.5 percent) primarily in fiscal years
2008 and 2009.
Agency Comments:
MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated where
appropriate.
[End of section]
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
The Air Force's TSAT system is the space-borne element of the Global
Information Grid that will provide high data rate military satellite
communications services to DOD users. The system is designed to provide
survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose radio
frequency and laser cross-links with other air and space systems. The
TSAT system consists of a constellation of five satellites, plus a
sixth satellite to ensure mission availability. We assessed the six
satellites.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing, Booz Allen Hamilton, Lockheed Martin Corp.,
Northrop Grumman, Raytheon;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $12,351.4 million;
Procurement: $3,814.7 million;
Total funding: $16,192.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
In January 2004, the TSAT program received formal approval to begin
preliminary design development activities. To date, the program has
focused on risk reduction and systems definition (e.g., requirements
allocation and system design) leading to a planned Systems Design
Review (SDR). The first launch schedule has been delayed by 24 months
from its in initial approved program baseline in June 2004, as a result
of 2005 congressional reductions and anticipated reductions in 2006.
TSAT plans to begin product development activities for the first
increment (two satellites) following SDR in November 2006 with all of
its critical technologies mature, and at that time, a contract will be
awarded to acquire operational satellites. According to program
officials, a new acquisition strategy is being developed, which will
result in a new program baseline, cost estimates, and schedule.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
TSAT Program:
Technology Maturity:
In January 2004, DOD approved the TSAT program to enter the preliminary
design phase. One of the program's nine technologies was fully mature.
The program has focused its efforts on maturing critical technologies
and conducting systems definition activities. System definition
activities include requirements allocation and system design
activities. According to program officials, product development
activities will begin in November 2006 after a contractor is selected
to conduct detailed design studies and development efforts. At that
time, the program expects all critical technologies for the first
increment to be mature.
Currently only four of its seven critical technologies are mature.
However, program officials expect all critical technologies to be
mature before initiating product development activities for the first
increment in 2006.
Of the seven technologies, only four technologies--packet processing
payload, communication-on-the-move antenna, information assurance space
for internet protocol encryption and information assurance for
transmission security--are mature. We previously identified information
assurance as a single critical technology, but obtained more detailed
data for this report. The other three--dynamic bandwidth and resource
allocation, protected bandwidth efficient modulation waveforms, and
single access laser communication--are scheduled to reach maturity in
2006, about 3 years after the approval to start preliminary design
development activities.
Other Program Issues:
The TSAT program cannot currently provide data on design stability,
production maturity, or software development for satellite production
because it has not yet selected a contractor to develop, build, and
field the TSAT space segment. Contracting activities to select a single
contractor are scheduled to begin in November 2006, with final award in
early 2007.
The initial June 2004 program baseline had a first satellite launch
scheduled for October 2011. The program office now estimates a first
launch date of October 2013 and attributes the launch delay to
appropriations reductions in fiscal year 2005 as well as anticipated
reductions in fiscal year 2006. The Appropriations conferees reduced
the program by $400 million due to concerns about the state of
technology maturity and concerns that DOD may have prematurely ruled
out the possibility of evolving the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
and the Wideband Gapfiller System programs. The report also stated that
transition to a formal acquisition program should be deferred until the
TSAT technologies are mature and have been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. The report requires that DOD submit the results of an
independent review that: (1) determines whether additional Advanced
Extremely High Frequency or Wideband Gapfiller System satellites will
be required and how many; and (2) whether it is feasible to insert
advanced capabilities by evolving these programs.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
the TSAT risk reduction and systems definition activities are on
schedule. Currently the program is conducting the third independent
evaluation of the contractor's laser communications subsystems, with
the fourth and final tests scheduled for mid 2006. To date, all test
goals have been met, according to the Air Force. Similar testing is
being conducted on other key technologies, and all are on a path to be
fully matured by late 2006. According to the Air Force, the program's
first launch has been delayed from 2011 to late 2013 due to budget
reductions. These delays have resulted in increased life cycle cost and
account for the majority of the increases shown in this draft.
GAO Comment:
In subsequent discussions, TSAT program officials stated that they are
developing a new acquisition strategy, along with an updated baseline
with new milestones, reflecting the $400 million congressional budget
reduction.
[End of section]
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft:
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor, short/vertical takeoff and landing
aircraft being developed by the Navy for Joint Service application.
Variants are designed to meet the amphibious/vertical assault needs of
the Marine Corps, the strike rescue needs of the Navy, and the special
operations needs of the Air Force and the U.S. Special Operations
Command. The MV-22 version will replace the CH-46E and CH-53D
helicopters of the Marine Corps. We assessed the MV-22 Block A. The
Navy completed its operational evaluation of the aircraft in June 2005.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing JPO;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,010.4 million;
Procurement: $27,357.1 million;
Total funding: $28,407.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 375.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Operational test and evaluation of MV-22 Block A has been completed,
and the aircraft found to be operationally effective and suitable.
Block B is predicted to have a drop in performance due to increased
weight. Tests of Block A revealed deficiencies with the troop seat
restraint system that has resulted in a redesign of the seat, which may
require change to the aircraft structure to achieve desired seat crash
retention capability. Also, flight clearance restrictions limited some
aspects of testing, particularly survivability, defense maneuvers, and
tactics. Deficiencies were identified with shipboard operations,
passenger capability, and operations at altitude. In September 2005,
the Department of Defense approved V-22 for full rate production;
however, production aircraft continue to be accepted with numerous
deviations and waivers.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
V-22 Program:
Design Stability:
The design of MV-22 Block A is considered stable. However, recent Block
A operational evaluation tests identified deficiencies that could
result in design changes to parts of the aircraft. Specifically, during
operational tests the troop seat was considered a major deficiency and
has been redesigned to address shoulder harness and comfort issues. In
2002, the Navy established a more crashworthy configuration requirement
to be consistent with DOD and Federal Aviation Administration goals to
meet common crash-worthiness standards for mission equipment. According
to the program office, a change will be made to contract specifications
to require these more stringent standards. Analysis is ongoing to
determine if installation of these newly qualified seats will require
aircraft structural changes to fully achieve their designed crash
retention capability and what impact these changes would have on the
aircraft's key performance parameters.
Production Maturity:
In 2001, the V-22 was approved for a limited annual production rate. In
September 2005, DOD approved the V-22 for full rate production even
though a 2004 review found one contractor had parts production problems
that could affect its ability to support full-rate production. Produced
aircraft continue to be accepted with numerous deviations and waivers,
but the number of deviations and waivers at acceptance are not now as
significant as they have been in the past.
Other Program Issues:
Based on evaluation tests, the Navy reported that the MV-22 Block A is
operationally effective and suitable. However, the Navy's test report
identified three major deficiencies that must be corrected and verified
by additional operational tests. Of the three major deficiencies, troop
seating and egress were considered the most severe. This deficiency
required redesign of the seats to address comfort and seat restraint
deficiencies. Also, while tests proved that the aircraft was capable of
carrying 24 combat-equipped troops, it is anticipated that operational
commanders will prefer that only 18 troops be carried in order to make
room for their extra gear.
Operational tests also identified 38 minor and 50 other deficiencies.
Of the minor deficiencies, the need to eliminate flight clearance
restrictions and increase the defensive-maneuvering envelope of the
aircraft are a priority. Flight clearance restrictions limited some
survivability, defensive maneuvers, and tactics testing and may reduce
aircraft survivability if they are not lifted. The minor deficiencies
identified could also affect operations. They include restricted
shipboard operations, limits on operations above 10,000 feet altitude,
passenger cabin cooling effectiveness, reliability problems with
aircraft components, overheating of the drivetrain gearbox in hot
weather, and the lack of supplemental oxygen for passengers that will
restrict long-range mission profiles with troops on board.
DOD has also concluded that the V-22 Block A aircraft is operationally
effective in low and medium threat environments and is operationally
suitable. However, DOD projects that Block B will not meet the Land
Assault External-Lift and Amphibious External-Lift missions (key
performance parameters). The predicted shortfall could be mitigated by
lower aircraft weight, lower operating altitude, or lower temperatures.
DOD's report does make a number of recommendations that address
operational effectiveness and suitability as well as survivability
concerns. Operational effectiveness recommendations included the need
to conduct follow-on operational tests to assess V-22 survivability in
realistic landing zone tactical approaches. These tests and tactics
development are needed to expand the maneuvering flight envelope as
much as possible and to determine whether there is operational utility
in the use of more extreme helicopter-style maneuvering in a high-
threat environment. Operational suitability recommendations included
the need to implement upgrades to the passenger seats and harnesses.
The report noted that emergency dual engine failures in the
conversion/vertical take-off landing mode below 1,600 feet above the
ground are unlikely to be survivable. Survivability recommendations
included the need to install and test a defensive weapon.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the V-22 program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
VH-71A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program:
The Navy's VH-71A will be a dual-piloted, multi-engine helicopter
employed by Marine Helicopter Squadron One to provide safe, reliable,
and timely transportation for the President and Vice President of the
United States, heads of state, and others in varied and at times
adverse climatic and weather conditions. When the President is aboard,
the VH-71A will serve as the Commander in Chief's primary command and
control platform. The system will replace the VH-3D and VH-60N. It will
be developed in two increments. We assessed increment one.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,822.3 million;
Procurement: $2,253.4 million;
Total funding: $5,179.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 23.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Program costs include costs for increments one and two.
In January 2005, the VH-71A program began system development and
committed to production without fully maturing technologies, achieving
design stability, or demonstrating production maturity. Program
officials recognize that the VH-71A is a nontraditional acquisition
with significant risks due to an aggressive schedule dictated by the
White House in 2002. They stated that most of the system's technologies
are nondevelopmental and are currently deployed on other platforms.
However, neither of the VH-71A's two critical technologies were
demonstrated in an operational environment at development start, and
the program planned to have only 65 percent of its drawings released by
design review. Concurrency in development, design, and production
increases the likelihood of cost growth and schedule delays because
components being procured may have to be reworked to meet the final
design.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
VH-71A Program:
Technology Maturity:
The VH-71A program's two critical technologies were nearing maturity
when the program began development and committed to production in
January 2005. Since then, one of those technologies, the 10-inch
cockpit control displays, matured. A prototype of the other critical
technology, the Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded
Resource Communications Controller, has not been flight tested and is
not projected to be demonstrated in an operational environment until
2007. The program office believes the risk associated with fully
maturing this technology to be low because the subsystem components
that make up the technology are currently flying on other operational
aircraft. Program officials stated that most of the VH-71A technologies
were not identified as critical because they were flying on the EH-101
helicopter, on which the VH-71A is based.
Design Stability and Production Maturity:
In January 2005, the program committed to the production of five
aircraft without a final design or fully defined production processes.
At that time, 55 percent of the program's total estimated drawings were
releasable to manufacturing. Sixty-five percent were projected to be
releasable by the design review in December 2005, and 80 percent were
expected to be completed by early 2006, one year after the production
decision. This concurrency in design and production increases the
likelihood of cost growth and schedule delays because components being
procured may have to be reworked to meet the final design. According to
program officials, the drawings that have not been released are most
likely related to modified communications and navigation systems and
software. The program considers the design for the rest of the air
vehicle and the production processes for the system mature because they
are based on the EH-101, which is currently in service. However, design
development will continue through low rate initial production as the
program concurrently develops its manufacturing processes. The program
will not collect statistical process control data to demonstrate
production maturity, but it will monitor indicators, such as number of
non-conforming products, quality notifications, hours per process, and
scrap and rework rates.
Other Program Issues:
The VH-71A program's aggressive schedule increases risk in the test
program and negatively affects the program's ability to incorporate the
insights gained from testing in increment one. To mitigate some of the
schedule risk, the program has adopted a test philosophy that combines
contractor, development, and operational testing. The Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, has not formally approved the
program's test plans and is working with the program to make the plans
more event-based and to develop metrics to measure progress.
Congressional insight into the program is currently limited because the
program will not start reporting on progress against its cost,
schedule, and performance baselines until June 2006, at the earliest.
This reporting has been delayed because the program does not have an
approved program baseline, even though the decision to start
development and production was made in January 2005.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Additionally, the Navy stated that the program is executing an
accelerated schedule driven by an urgent White House need to replace
existing assets. It believes the GAO assessment does not emphasize the
risk mitigation actions taken. Specifically, the incremental
development approach minimizes risk through modification of a
certified, fielded EH-101 to the VH-71 configuration, with high-risk
items deferred to the second increment. According to the Navy, this
approach allows the program to meet schedule requirements while
mitigating acknowledged risks associated with concurrent design,
development, and procurement. Use of an existing aircraft for increment
one also takes advantage of established manufacturing, production,
logistics, and training capabilities while reducing the requirements
for flight test, and an aggressive integrated test approach maximizes
early, robust testing, including operational tests. Deferring high-risk
development work to increment two provides time to accomplish design,
development, and test activities associated with more traditional
development programs.
[End of section]
Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Warrior UAV):
The Army's Extended Range Multipurpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, now
called Warrior, is to replace the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. A
system is composed of 12 air vehicles, and 5 ground control stations
with associated ground data terminals and portable control stations.
The system is expected to provide reconnaissance, communications,
signal intelligence, lethal and nonlethal attack and interoperability
with manned aviation assets such as Apache and the Advanced
Reconnaissance Helicopter.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $276.7 million;
Procurement: $1,443.8 million;
Total funding: $1,720.6 million;
Procurement quantity: 12.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Cost and quantities include all known quantities from program inception
through fiscal year 2015.
Currently two of Warrior's four critical technologies are mature. The
program expects to have matured the other two critical technologies by
the time of the program's design readiness review in June 2006.
However, if these technologies do not mature in time, the Army reports
that it has two mature back up technologies that can be used in their
place. General Atomics, which makes the Air Force Predator UAV, is the
prime contractor for the Warrior UAV. Program officials estimate that
about 90 percent of Warrior's design is nondevelopmental because it is
already in use on Predator or other systems.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Warrior UAV Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials report that two of four critical technologies are
mature. These technologies are the heavy fuel engine, which is
certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, and the automatic
take-off and landing system whose technology is based on a similar
system in use on the Hunter and other unmanned aerial vehicle systems.
The two remaining critical technologies, the airborne ethernet and the
multirole tactical common data link, are expected to reach maturity
before the June 2006 design readiness review.
The airborne ethernet provides communications capabilities among the
avionics, the payload data recorder, the air link data units and the
payloads and weapons systems. The technology will permit transmission
of live data rather than time-delayed data. Program officials assess
risk to the program associated with this technology as low because a
mature back-up technology exists and because the interfaces for the
system--such as payloads and the support equipment package, the payload
data recorder and the meteorological sensor--are in place. Further,
officials stated that Warrior's design is similar to that of the Air
Force Predator A, which is already fielded.
The multirole tactical common data link is being developed to support
data transmission at higher rates, provide interoperability with other
systems, such as the Apache, and provide for controlling the air
vehicle itself from other platforms. According to Army officials, the
technology is based on an Army program that is currently running 6
months ahead of the schedule needed for introduction to the Warrior
system. Similar to the airborne ethernet, a tactical data link
currently exists on other systems and could be used for the Warrior to
provide a capability but at a slower rate and offering remote control
of the payloads though not the entire vehicle.
Design Stability:
The Warrior UAV program office did not provide complete data on the
number of drawings expected or currently completed. As a result, we
could not assess current design maturity. Program officials did
estimate, however, that 90 percent of the system's design was non-
developmental and is already in use in the Predator or other systems.
As a result, the Army expects design stability by the time of the
design review in June 2006.
Other Program Issues:
Cost and quantity data reported in this assessment may change. The Army
has not decided how many Warrior systems it will buy. Since approving
development start in April 2005, the Army has increased the number it
plans to buy from 5 to 12 through fiscal year 2015. For this review,
the Army provided data on cost and quantities and its funding plan
through fiscal year 2015. However, program office officials stated that
the Army has not decided how many Warrior systems it will buy in total
nor how long the system will be produced.
Agency Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated
as appropriate. Program office officials also stated that the Warrior
design utilizes basic airframe technology from the Predator A, but also
borrows from the Predator B design. Warrior's design is tied to the
Apache Block III (manned-unmanned teaming) and Future Combat Systems as
a network enabler.
[End of section]
Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS):
WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential
communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition
partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the
next generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite
Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal
segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and
control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Satellite Systems;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $118.6 million;
Procurement: $786.2 million;
Total funding: $904.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 2.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
The WGS program's technology and design are mature. We did not review
production maturity data because of the commercial nature of the WGS
acquisition, but unit level manufacturing is essentially complete. The
contractor continues to experience problems assembling the satellites.
Improperly installed fasteners on a satellite subcomponent have
resulted in rework on the first satellite and extensive inspections of
all three satellites currently being fabricated. The program office
estimates an increase of about $276.2 million for the program, largely
due to cost growth resulting from a production gap between satellites
three and four. The launch of the first satellite has now been delayed
for over 3 years and is currently scheduled for June 2007. The delay
will increase costs and add at least 22 months to the time it takes to
obtain an initial operational capability from the system.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
WGS Program:
Technology Maturity:
WGS has two technologies that are vital to program success: the digital
channelizer and the phased array antenna. According to program
officials, both technologies were mature when the program made a
production decision in November 2000.
Design Stability:
The WGS design is complete, as the program office has released all the
expected drawings to manufacturing.
Production Maturity:
The commercial nature of the WGS acquisition contract precludes the
program office from having access to production process control data.
However, manufacturing for WGS is essentially complete, as all the
units have been manufactured and delivered for the first satellite.
Although the design for WGS is mature and development of the first
satellite is complete, the program continues to experience problems
assembling the satellites. For example, during the replacement of a
subcomponent on the first satellite, it was discovered that certain
fasteners had been improperly installed. Discovery of the problem
resulted in extensive inspections on all three satellites currently
being fabricated, with rework required on the first satellite. In all,
148 fasteners have been found that required rework and over 1,500
fasteners per satellite required additional inspection or testing. The
testing is expected to be completed in the summer of 2006. According to
program officials, the contractor is considering initiatives to improve
oversight to avoid similar problems in the future.
Other Program Issues:
Last year we reported a December 2005 launch date for the first WGS
satellite. This date slipped to March 31, 2006, because of a launch pad
conflict with a higher priority national security satellite. At that
time, the program office reported that the initial operational
capability would not be impacted by the schedule slip. However, the
launch slipped again when the fastener issue surfaced. The launch of
the first satellite is now scheduled for June 2007. The program office
reports that the 15-month slip in the schedule for all three satellites
will add workforce and rework costs (borne by the contractor) to the
program and delay the time it takes to obtain an initial operational
capability by 22 months.
In December 2002, DOD directed the addition of WGS satellites four and
five as part of the Transformational Communications Architecture. The
purpose of these satellites will be to support increased bandwidth
required for the Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance mission. These satellites are to launch in fiscal years
2009 and 2010, respectively. The current contract options must be
extended and renegotiated to cover the cost of the likely 2-to 3-year
production gap between satellites three and four. The program office
has selected a contractor and is currently negotiating the final
contract price for procuring satellites four and five. Preliminary
estimates show that the production gap is the main driver of the total
overall cost increase of about $276.2 million for the program. Because
of the delays in the schedule for the first three satellites, the
program office is working with the contractor to reassess the schedule
for satellites four and five. The results could impact the full
operational capability date for the system.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
that rework activities associated with the 148 improperly installed
fasteners have been completed and additional inspection and testing of
the remaining fasteners will be completed in 2006. The program office
also stated that the government and contractor are instituting
increased levels of oversight on the supplier's quality management
program to avoid these types of problems on future satellites.
[End of section]
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T):
WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone
communications network. It is to provide reliable, secure, and seamless
video, data, imagery, and voice services, allowing users to communicate
simultaneously at various levels of security. WIN-T is to connect Army
units with higher levels of command and provide Army's tactical portion
of the Global Information Grid. WIN-T is being fielded in blocks. We
assessed the first block.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics Government Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $505.9 million;
Procurement: $10,002.4 million;
Total funding: $10,508.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 1.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions):
[See PDF for image]
The latest cost data reflect the program of record; these data are
expected to change as part of the program's restructuring.
[End of table]
WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies
nearing maturity. While these 12 technologies will not be fully mature
at the time production begins, some were demonstrated during a recent
developmental test/operational test event; the program office expects
that all 12 will be assessed as nearing maturity based on an updated
independent technology readiness assessment that will be completed in
preparation for a milestone B "re-look" scheduled for August 2006.
While design stability is evaluated during WIN-T's design reviews, it
cannot be assessed using our methodology because the program office
does not track the number of releasable drawings. However, the
government will require the contractor to deliver critical Interface
Control Design documents, which, according to the program office, will
allow tracking of design stability by an independent assessor.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
WIN-T Program:
Technology Maturity:
WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies
close to reaching full maturity. While program officials do not expect
these 12 technologies to reach full maturity until the network is built
and can be demonstrated in an operational environment, some of the
technologies were demonstrated in a relevant environment during a
developmental test/operational test event in November 2005; the Army
Test and Evaluation Command will complete its assessment of this event
by April 2006. The WIN-T program office expects that all 12 critical
technologies will be assessed as close to fully mature following the
evaluation of results from this test event. An updated independent
technology readiness assessment will be performed in preparation for
what the program office has described as a WIN-T milestone B "re-look"
currently scheduled for August 2006. This updated assessment will
include demonstration results from the developmental test/operational
test event.
Design Stability:
Design stability could not be assessed using our methodology because
the program office does not plan to track the number of releasable
drawings as a design metric. According to the program, WIN-T is not a
manufacturing effort, but primarily an information technology system
integration effort. Consequently, the government does not obtain
releasable design drawings for many of WIN-T's components, particularly
commercial components. Instead, design stability is evaluated at the
preliminary and critical design reviews using the exit criteria
developed by the government. For the milestone B "re-look," the
government will require the contractor to deliver critical Interface
Control Design documents which, according to the program office, will
allow tracking of design stability by an independent assessor.
According to DOD, the WIN-T design will evolve using performance-based
specifications and open systems design and is to conform to DOD's Joint
Technical Architecture, which specifies the minimum set of standards
and guidance for the acquisition of all DOD systems that produce, use,
or exchange information.
Other Program Issues:
A major revision to the WIN-T acquisition strategy was completed in
2004. In September 2004, DOD approved a decision to combine the
competing contractor teams for WIN-T's system design and development.
The two originally competing contractors are now teamed to establish a
single architecture for WIN-T that, according to the revised
acquisition strategy, will leverage each contractor's proposed
architecture to provide the Army with a superior technical solution for
WIN-T. Establishing the single WIN-T architecture a year earlier than
originally planned is expected to allow other Army programs to begin
following that architecture for the Future Force.
The global war on terrorism and the lessons learned from recent
military operations have shifted the Army's focus toward providing
improved communications and networking capabilities in the near term as
well as for the Future Force. The Army fielded a beyond-line-of-sight
communications network system in 2004 to units deployed in Iraq: the
Joint Network Node. This system is an improvement over past
capabilities, but does not meet all of WIN-T's requirements --
particularly for on-the-move communication. Currently, the Army is
assessing how best to transition the Joint Network Node to WIN-T.
Also, in August 2005, the Department of the Army conducted a study that
explored options for better synchronizing three of its major system
development efforts--WIN-T, the Future Combat Systems, and the Joint
Tactical Radio System program. As a result of this study, the WIN-T
program will be rebaselined to meet emerging requirements; a new WIN-T
capability development document that will support the rebaselining of
the program is currently under review. A milestone B "re-look" to
rebaseline the program is planned for August 2006, and a new date for
the WIN-T production decision, originally scheduled for March 2006,
will be established then.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Agency Comments:
DOD did not provide general comments on a draft of this report, but it
did provide technical comments. These comments, along with agency
comments received on the individual assessments, were included as
appropriate. (See app. I for a copy of DOD's response.)
Scope of Our Review:
For the 52 programs, each assessment provides the historical and
current program status and offers the opportunity to take early
corrective action when a program's projected attainment of knowledge
diverges significantly from the best practices. The assessments also
identify programs that are employing practices worthy of emulation by
other programs. If a program is attaining the desired levels of
knowledge, it has less risk-but not zero risk-of future problems.
Likewise, if a program shows a gap between demonstrated knowledge and
best practices, it indicates an increased risk-not a guarantee-of
future problems. The real value of the assessments is recognizing gaps
early, which provides opportunities for constructive intervention-such
as adjustments to schedule, trade-offs in requirements, and additional
funding-before cost and schedule consequences mount.
We selected programs for the assessments based on several factors,
including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3)
congressional interest. The majority of the 52 programs covered in this
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A
program is defined as major if its estimated research and development
costs exceed $365 million or its procurement exceeds $2.19 billion in
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. (See app. II for details of the
scope and methodology.)
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4841 or Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Katherine V. Schinasi:
Managing Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
MAR 6 2006:
Mr. Paul Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, dated
February 9, 2006 (GAO Code 120460/GAO-06-391). We have enclosed
technical comments to ensure accuracy. These comments should be
reflected in the final report and in the individual program summaries.
My point of contact is Mr. Skip Hawthorne, (703) 692-9556, or e-mail:
skip.hawthorne@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Domenic C. Cipicchio:
Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from
each of the programs included in this report. We summarized our
assessments of each individual program in two components--a system
profile and a product knowledge assessment. We did not validate the
data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took
several steps to address data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the
data and performed various quality checks, which revealed some
discrepancies in the data. We discussed the underlying data and these
discrepancies with program officials and adjusted the data accordingly.
We determined that the data provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable
for our engagement purposes, after reviewing DOD's management controls
for assessing data reliability.
Macro Analysis:
Data for the total planned investment of major defense acquisition
programs were obtained from funding-stream data included in DOD's
selected acquisition reports or from data obtained directly from the
program offices and then aggregated across all programs in base year
2006 dollars.
To assess the total cost, schedule, and quantity changes of the
programs included in our assessment presented in table 2 and on pages 6
and 7, it was necessary to identify those programs with all of the
requisite data available. Of the 52 programs in our assessment, 26
constituted the common set of programs where data were available for
cost, schedule, and quantity at the first full estimate, generally
milestone B, and the latest estimate. We excluded programs that had
planning estimates as their first full estimate and if the first full
estimate and latest estimate fell within a one year period of each
other. Data utilized in this analysis were drawn from information
contained in selected acquisition reports or data provided by program
offices as of January 15, 2006. We summed the costs associated with
RDT&E and total costs consisting of research, development, testing and
evaluation, procurement, military construction, and acquisition
operation and maintenance. The schedule assessment is based on the
change in the average acquisition cycle time, defined as the number of
months between program start and the achievement of initial operation
capability or an equivalent fielding date.
The weighted calculations of acquisition cycle time and program
acquisition unit cost for the common set of programs were derived by
taking the total cost estimate for each of the 26 programs and dividing
it by the aggregate total cost of all 26 programs in the common set.
The resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the
simple percentage change in program acquisition unit costs to obtain
the weighted unit cost change of each program. Next, the sum of this
weighted cost change for all programs was calculated to get the
weighted unit cost change for the common set as a whole. To assess the
weighted-average acquisition cycle time change, we multiplied the
weight calculation by the acquisition cycle time estimate for each
corresponding program. A simple average was then taken to calculate the
change between the first full estimate and the latest estimate. We
believe these calculations best represent the overall progress of
programs by placing them within the context of the common set's
aggregate cost.
To assess the percentage of programs with technology maturity, design
stability, and production maturity at each key juncture presented in
figure 1 and on pages 11 and 12, we identified programs that had
actually proceeded through each key juncture-development start, system
design review, and production start-and obtained their assessed
maturity. The percentage in figure 1 and on pages 11 and 12 include
programs in the 2006 assessment only. The population size for the
technology maturity at development start is 30 programs; design review
is 21 programs; and production start is 15 programs. The population
size for the design stability at design review is 20 programs; and 12
programs at production start. The population size for production
maturity at production start is 16 programs. This information was drawn
from data provided by the program office as of January 15, 2006. For
more information, see the product knowledge assessment section in this
appendix.
Historical Analysis:
For the historical RDT&E cost growth analysis in figure 2, we selected
programs that have completed 100 percent of their product development
cycle-defined as the period of time between the start of the system
development and demonstration phase and the start of production. We
identified 29 programs that are now in production or have been
completed since 1998. We reviewed information provided in DOD's
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) or through schedule information we
obtained from program officials via our assessments to determine which
programs are complete and which ones are in production. We also
reviewed the DOD Selected Acquisition Report Summary tables to identify
completed programs. We chose completed programs that had a final SAR
report month of December 1998 or later. We also chose programs that
only had a development estimate baseline rather than a production
estimate baseline because we could then calculate an associated product
development cycle time.
Development start refers to the commitment to system development that
coincides with either milestone II or milestone B, which begins DOD's
system development and demonstration phase. The product development
cycle concludes with production. The production decision generally
refers to the decision to enter the production and deployment phase,
typically with low rate initial production. To identify the conclusion
of the cycle, or development end, we first attempted to establish the
date of the low rate initial production decision. If this date was not
available we then used the milestone C or III date, or the production
estimate date. We identified these dates using the latest SAR for each
individual program or through schedule information obtained from
program officials via our assessments. Once the product development
cycle dates were identified, we then converted the time between the two
dates into a number of months for each program.
For each of the 29 programs in our analysis, we identified the RDT&E
development estimate and each subsequent estimate of RDT&E costs
throughout the product development cycle by reviewing each of the
program's SAR. Each SAR report date was then used in calculating the
percentage into the product development cycle where the estimate fell.
Once these calculations were completed for each of the 29 programs, we
aggregated the RDT&E estimates at each percentage point from 1 to 100
percent. The end result was the cumulative cost change in 2006 dollars
for 29 programs from the development estimate with a cost change
plotted for each point from 1 to 100 percent complete. For example, the
AIM 9X Air to Air Missile's product development cycle was 45 months.
The development estimate for RDT&E was $602.2 million in December 1996.
The first SAR after development start was the December 1997 SAR, which
reported an RDT&E estimate of $589.9 million (2006 dollars). The
December 1997 SAR was 12 months into development or approximately 27
percent into the product development cycle. Since estimates are
reported on an annual basis, the initial development estimate for the
AIM-9X was carried through up to 26 percent of the cycle time, the 1997
SAR estimate was then plotted at 27 percent and carried through up to
the next reporting period, December 1998, which was plotted at 53
percent and so forth until 100 percent of the cycle time was completed.
Once this was completed for all programs, we were able to identify the
RDT&E cost growth trend for all 29 programs.
To identify the average critical design review date we obtained the
latest date as reported in the program's latest SAR or as provided to
us via our program assessments. If the critical design review date was
not included in the SAR, we attempted to contact the current program
manager and obtain the date. We were able to identify 21 critical
design review dates for the 29 programs. Once this date was identified,
we calculated the percentage into the development cycle the critical
design review occurred. For example, the AIM-9X SAR reported that the
critical design review took place in March of 1998, approximately 15
months, or 33 percent, into the 45 month development cycle. Next, we
calculated a weighted average design review date for the 21 programs.
The weighted calculations were derived by taking the latest RDT&E cost
estimate at the completion of the product development cycle for each of
the 21 programs and dividing it by the sum of all 21 programs. The
resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the
percentage into the product development cycle when the design review
occurred. This resulted in a weighted calculation that was then summed
across all 21 programs. The result was the weighted average design
review percentage.
The maximum RDT&E increase for the 21 design review programs was 129.10
percent for the V-22 program. The minimum RDT&E increase for the 21
programs was -15.9 percent for the Joint Primary Aircraft Training
System. The graphic on page 14 displays the RDT&E cost trend for all 29
programs and is not limited to the 21 programs with design review
dates. We found the same trend of RDT&E cost growth occurred for the 29
programs as for the 21 programs.
System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment:
In the past 5 years, DOD revised its policies governing weapon system
acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major acquisition
events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more consistent across
the 52 program assessments, we standardized the terminology for key
program events. In the individual program assessments, program start
refers to the initiation of a program; DOD usually refers to program
start as milestone I or milestone A, which begins the concept and
technology development phase. Similarly, development start refers to
the commitment to system development that coincides with either
milestone II or milestone B, which begins DOD's system development and
demonstration phase. The production decision generally refers to the
decision to enter the production and deployment phase, typically with
low rate initial production. Initial capability refers to the initial
operational capability, sometimes also called first unit equipped or
required asset availability. For the MDA programs that do not follow
the standard DOD acquisition model, but instead develop systems in
incremental capability-based blocks, we identified the key technology
development efforts that lead to an initial capability for the block
assessed.
The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal
2006 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on information
from SARs or on data from the program office. In some instances the
data were not yet available, and we annotate this by the term "to be
determined" (TBD), or not applicable, annotated (NA). The quantities
listed only refer to procurement quantities. Satellite programs, in
particular, produce a large percentage of their total operational units
as development quantities, which are not included in the quantity
figure.
To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we
reviewed DOD's SARs or obtained data directly from the program offices.
In general, we compared the latest available SAR information with a
baseline for each program. For programs that have started product
development-those that are beyond milestone II or B-we compared the
latest available SAR to the development estimate from the first
selected acquisition report issued after the program was approved to
enter development. For systems that have not yet started system
development, we compared the latest available data to the planning
estimate issued after milestone I or A. For systems not included in
SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and current data from
the individual program offices. For MDA systems for which a baseline
was not available, we compared the latest available cost information to
the amount reported last year.
All cost information is presented in base year 2006 dollars using
Office of the Secretary of Defense approved deflators to eliminate the
effects of inflation. We have depicted only the programs' main elements
of acquisition cost-research and development and procurement; however,
the total program costs also include military construction and
acquisition operation and maintenance costs. Because of rounding and
these additional costs, in some situations the total cost may not match
the exact sum of the research and development and procurement costs.
The program unit costs are calculated by dividing the total program
cost by the total quantities planned. These costs are often referred to
as program acquisition unit costs. In some instances, the data were not
applicable, and we annotate this by using the term "NA." In other
instances, the current absence of data on procurement funding and
quantities precludes calculation of a meaningful program acquisition
unit cost, and we annotate this by using the term "TBD." The quantities
listed refer to total quantities, including both procurement and
development quantities.
The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as
the number of months between the program start, usually milestone I or
A, and the achievement of initial operational capability or an
equivalent fielding date. In some instances, the data were not yet
available, and we annotate this by using the term TBD, or were
classified.
The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum
total of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those
of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes with
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such
detailed distinctions.
Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment:
To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each two-
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews.
To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a
tool, referred to as technology readiness levels, for our analysis. The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed
technology readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force Science and
Technology research organizations use them to determine when
technologies are ready to be handed off from science and technology
managers to product developers. Technology readiness levels are
measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning with paper studies of a
technology's feasibility and culminating with a technology fully
integrated into a completed product. (See app. III for the definitions
of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices work has shown that
a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in an
operational environment--is the level of technology maturity that
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. In
our assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness
level 7, a prototype demonstrated in an operational environment, are
referred to as mature or fully mature and those that have reached
technology readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a relevant
environment, are referred to as approaching or nearing maturity and are
assessed as attaining 50 percent of the desired level of knowledge.
Satellite technologies that have achieved technology readiness level 6
are assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating
maturity in an operational environment-space.
In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system
at key decision points after the passage of many years.
To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our
current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the
percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. We
sought to clarify the percentage of drawings completed in those cases
where information existed that raised concerns. Completed engineering
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build-to"
drawings.
To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate this
information provided by the program office. We sought to clarify the
number of critical manufacturing processes and percentage of
statistical process control where information existed that raised
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, which
is a process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a
process is running to its specification limits. The index can be
translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it
to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework
trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were
unavailable.
Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential
risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of risk that a
program encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our
detailed reviews on individual systems normally provide for a fuller
treatment of risk elements.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology Readiness Level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware/Software: None (Paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration Environment: None.
Technology Readiness Level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware/Software: None (Paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration Environment: None.
Technology Readiness Level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware/Software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale
individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration Environment: Lab.
Technology Readiness Level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware/Software: Low fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach
suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration Environment: Lab.
Technology Readiness Level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
integration of components;
Hardware/Software: High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc.)
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of
several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration Environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology Readiness Level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment;
Hardware/Software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit and
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full
functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration Environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment.
Integration of technology is well defined.
Technology Readiness Level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an
operational environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a
test bed aircraft;
Hardware/Software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate
full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration Environment: Flight demonstration in representative
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology Readiness Level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware/Software: Flight qualified hardware;
Demonstration Environment: DT&E in the actual system application.
Technology Readiness Level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware/Software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration Environment: OT&E in operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841:
Acknowledgments:
David B. Best, Alan R. Frazier, and Bruce H. Thomas made key
contributions to this report. Other key contributors included Robert L.
Ackley, D. Catherine Baltzell, Ridge C. Bowman, Maricela Cherveny,
Thomas J. Denomme, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, David J.
Hand, Michael J. Hazard, Barbara H. Haynes, LaTonya D. Miller, John E.
Oppenheim, Rae Ann H. Sapp, Wendy P. Smythe, Robert S. Swierczek, and
Karen S. Zuckerstein.
The following staff were responsible for individual programs:
System: Airborne Laser (ABL);
Primary Staff: LaTonya D. Miller.
System: Aerial Common Sensor (ACS);
Primary Staff: Dayna L. Foster/Michael W. Aiken.
System: Advanced Deployable System (ADS);
Primary Staff: Cristina A. Connelly/Diana L. Dinkelacker.
System: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD);
Primary Staff: Ivy G. Hubler.
System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF);
Primary Staff: Bradley L. Terry.
System: Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA);
Primary Staff: Joseph E. Dewechter/Jerry W. Clark.
System: Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS);
Primary Staff: Michele R. Williamson/Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS);
Primary Staff: Mary K. Quinlan.
System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning
System (ATIRCM/CMWS);
Primary Staff: Danny G. Owens/Leon S. Gill.
System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP);
Primary Staff: Don M. Springman/Andrew H. Redd.
System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP);
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner/Sean D. Merrill.
System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP);
Primary Staff: Cheryl K. Andrew/Sameena N. Ismailjee.
System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP);
Primary Staff: Sameena N. Ismailjee/Cheryl K. Andrew.
System: CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F);
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe/Danny G. Owens.
System: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVN-21);
Primary Staff: Brendan S. Culley/Trevor J. Thomson.
System: DD(X) Destroyer;
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Marc J. Castellano/Christopher R.
Durbin.
System: E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE);
Primary Staff: Gary L. Middleton/Judy T. Lasley.
System: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV);
Primary Staff: Maria A. Durant.
System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV);
Primary Staff: Leon S. Gill/Danny G. Owens/Steven B. Stern.
System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile;
Primary Staff: John P. Swain/Carrie R. Wilson.
System: F-22A Raptor;
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner.
System: Future Combat Systems (FCS);
Primary Staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/John P. Swain/Guisseli Reyes.
System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle;
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Charlie Shivers.
System: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD);
Primary Staff: Ivy G. Hubler.
System: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System II (GPS) II Modernized
Space/OCS;
Primary Staff: Jean N. Harker/Peter J. Grana.
System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS);
Primary Staff: Alan R. Frazier/Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);
Primary Staff: Matthew B. Lea/Matthew T. Drerup.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site
(JTRS AMF);
Primary Staff: Paul G. Williams/Ridge C. Bowman.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1;
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Paul G. Williams.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5;
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Paul G. Williams/Tristan T. To.
System: Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS);
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Charlie Shivers.
System: Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI);
Primary Staff: Jonathan E. Watkins.
System: Land Warrior;
Primary Staff: Joel C. Christenson/Susan K. Woodward.
System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Christina A. Connelly/Christopher
R. Durbin.
System: Longbow Apache Block III;
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe/Danny G. Owens.
System: Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA);
Primary Staff: Matthew F. Ebert/Heather L. Barker.
System: 21" Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV);
Primary Staff: Diana L. Dinkelacker/Marc J. Castellano.
System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS);
Primary Staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi.
System: MQ-9 Predator B;
Primary Staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp.
System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS);
Primary Staff: Suzanne S. Olivieri/Lisa P. Gardner/Carol R. Cha.
System: PATROIT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined
Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit;
Primary Staff: Tana M. Davis.
System: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High);
Primary Staff: Maricela Cherveny/Leslie K. Pollock.
System: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB);
Primary Staff: Carrie R. Wilson/Guisseli Reyes.
System: Space Radar (SR);
Primary Staff: Tony A. Beckham.
System: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS);
Primary Staff: Sigrid L. McGinty.
System: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD);
Primary Staff: Jonathan E. Watkins.
System: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT);
Primary Staff: Arturo Holguin Jr.
System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22);
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden.
System: VH-71A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program;
Primary Staff: Ronald E. Schwenn/Joseph H. Zamoyta/Kevin J. Heinz.
System: Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Warrior UAV);
Primary Staff: Carol T. Mebane/Michele R. Williamson.
System: Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS);
Primary Staff: Tony A. Beckham.
System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T);
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon/Gwyneth M. Blevins/Paul G. Williams/Amy
L. Sweet.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
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(120460):
FOOTNOTES
[1] This estimate includes total RDT&E; procurement; military
construction; and acquisition operation and maintenance appropriations
to develop the weapon systems. The macro analyses contained in this
report are based on data as of January 15, 2006, and may not reflect
subsequent events. For example, the Joint Tactical Radio System
programs are currently being restructured.
[2] Estimates in then-year dollars as reported in the Fiscal Year 2006
Department of Defense Future Years Defense Program Table 1-1 for RDT&E
and Procurement.
[3] This estimate is for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).
MDAPs are programs identified by DOD as programs that require eventual
RDT&E expenditures of more than $365 million or $2.19 billion in
procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.
[4] The common set refers to the 26 programs that we were able to
assess since development began. The 26 programs are ACS, AEHF, AESA,
APKWS, B-2 RMP, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, CH-47F, CVN-21, E-2D AHE, EFV,
Excalibur, F-22A, FCS, Global Hawk, JSF, JTRS Cluster 5, Land Warrior,
MMA, MUOS, NPOESS, Patriot/MEADS CAP, Predator B, SDB, V-22, and WGS.
We limited this analysis to these 26 programs because all data
including cost, schedule, and quantities were available for comparison
between program estimates. The data in table 2 does not represent the
same common set of 26 programs reported in the 2005 assessment. GAO,
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-05-301 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[5] A weighted average gives more expensive programs a greater value.
[6] The 9 programs are AEHF, Excalibur, APKWS, V-22, JSF, C-5 RERP, F-
22A, Global Hawk, and C-5 AMP.
[7] This estimate is a weighted average based on total program cost and
does not include the Excalibur program because of its extreme unit cost
growth. The simple average program unit cost increase for the same 25
programs is 36 percent. The weighted average, including the Excalibur,
is 62 percent.
[8] 10 U.S.C § 2433. Requires DOD to (1) notify Congress whenever unit
cost growth is at least 15 percent, and (2) "certify" the program to
Congress when unit cost growth is at least 25 percent above the latest
approved acquisition baseline cost estimate.
[9] These percentages are program cost weighted averages. The simple
average increase for program acquisition unit costs is 2.8 percent for
the programs that started development with mature technologies and 19.8
percent for the programs that started development with immature
technologies.
[10] The 29 programs include: ATIRCM/CMWS, AEHF, AESA Radar, AIM-9X/Air
to Air Missile, ATACMS BAT, B-1B CMUP, Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3
Upgrade, CH-47F, CEC, EELV, F/A-18E/F, F-22A, GMLRS Tactical Rocket,
JASSM, JDAM, JPATS, JSOW, Longbow Hellfire, M1A2 Abrams, MCS, MM III
GRP, MIDS-LVT, NAS, SDB, Strategic Sealift, Stryker Family of Vehicles,
Tactical Tomahawk, Tomahawk TBIP, and V-22. The average design review
is based on 21 of the 29 programs that either reported a critical
design review date in the annual Selected Acquisition Reports or was
provided to us by program officials.
[11] Data as of January 15, 2006.
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