Defense Logistics
Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations Gao ID: GAO-06-160 March 22, 2006In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely production of up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as other items critically needed by deployed forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this subsequent engagement to examine issues affecting the production and installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor. To address these objectives, GAO collected and analyzed supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks used by Army forces.
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully meet the requirement until May 2005--18 months after the initial requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. A number of factors contributed to the time to provide truck armor kits to deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of protection. For example, the Army missed a valuable opportunity to have substantial numbers of truck armor kits available for Operation Iraqi Freedom by not fully capitalizing on approved operational requirements established in 1996. In addition, production time lengthened because contracts were awarded for amounts less than total requirements due to increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. As was the case for other critical wartime shortages that GAO previously examined, sufficient documentation was lacking to determine why funding was not available when needed, limiting effective oversight over funding decisions. Material shortages and limited tanker kit installation rates also impacted the availability of truck armor. DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions, such as leveraging available funding, to improve truck armor availability during current operations. The Army is also developing a long-term armoring plan to improve the availability of truck armor for future operations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-160, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations
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Report to Congressional Committees:
March 2006:
Defense Logistics:
Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck
Armor during Current Wartime Operations:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-160]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-160, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely production
of up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and
add-on armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as other items critically needed
by deployed forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest
by Congress and the public regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this
subsequent engagement to examine issues affecting the production and
installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were
to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and
installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors
affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have taken to improve the
timely availability of truck armor. To address these objectives, GAO
collected and analyzed supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks
used by Army forces.
What GAO Found:
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the
production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006
except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for
tankers is expected by January 2007. Although the Army first identified
a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in
November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits until February 2005
and did not install the kits to fully meet the requirement until May
2005 – 18 months after the initial requirement was identified. However,
by that time, requirements had increased substantially. As subsequent
requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were
identified, the time lag to meet them lessened.
Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Note: Does not include the 5-ton
truck or fuel tankers, which had not been identified at the time of the
initial November 2003 requirement.
[End of figure]
A number of factors contributed to the time to provide truck armor kits
to deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they conducted
wartime operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of
protection. For example, the Army missed a valuable opportunity to have
substantial numbers of truck armor kits available for Operation Iraqi
Freedom by not fully capitalizing on approved operational requirements
established in 1996. In addition, production time lengthened because
contracts were awarded for amounts less than total requirements due to
increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. As was the
case for other critical wartime shortages that GAO previously examined,
sufficient documentation was lacking to determine why funding was not
available when needed, limiting effective oversight over funding
decisions. Material shortages and limited tanker kit installation rates
also impacted the availability of truck armor.
DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions, such as
leveraging available funding, to improve truck armor availability
during current operations. The Army is also developing a long-term
armoring plan to improve the availability of truck armor for future
operations.
What GAO Recommends:
Expanding on one of its April 2005 recommendations, GAO is recommending
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to establish a process to
document and communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for
supplies and equipment when identified and the disposition of funding
decisions. DOD concurred with the intent of the recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-160.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William Solis at (202)
512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January 2006:
Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits:
DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts:
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
Heavy Equipment Transporter:
Palletized Load System:
M939 5-Ton Truck:
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles:
M915 Truck Family:
Tankers:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
Tables:
Table 1: Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type:
Table 2: Time to Meet Latest Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type:
Table 3: Comparison of Types of Vehicles Requiring Armor Kits in 1996,
2003, and 2005 and Quantities of Kits Needed and Available:
Table 4: Organizations Interviewed during Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Production and Installation of Truck Armor Kits to Meet Army
Requirements:
Figure 2: Army Truck Armor Requirements, November 2003 through
September 2005:
Figure 3: Availability of Funding Compared to Truck Armor Requirements:
Figure 4: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
Figure 5: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed:
Figure 6: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
Figure 7: Heavy Equipment Transporter:
Figure 8: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
Installed:
Figure 9: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
Figure 10: Palletized Load System:
Figure 11: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed:
Figure 12: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
Figure 13: M939 5-Ton Truck:
Figure 14: Comparison of M939 5-Ton Truck Armor Kit Requirements to
Kits Produced and Installed:
Figure 15: FMTV RACK Truck:
Figure 16: FMTV LSAC Truck:
Figure 17: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed:
Figure 18: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
Figure 19: M915 Truck Tractor:
Figure 20: Comparison of M915 Family of Trucks Armor Kit Requirements
to Kits Produced and Installed:
Figure 21: Comparison of M915 Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
Figure 22: An M969 Tanker:
Figure 23: Comparison of Tanker Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed:
Abbreviations:
AR2B: Army Requirements and Resourcing Board:
ASBP: Army Strategic Planning Board:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
CFLCC: Coalition Forces Land Component Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FMTV: Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles:
GSIE: Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise:
HEMTT: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
HET: Heavy Equipment Transporter:
HMMWV: High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle:
IED: Improvised Explosive Device:
LSAC: Low Signature Armored Cab:
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom:
OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom:
ONS: Operational Needs Statement:
ORD: Operational Requirements Document:
PLS: Palletized Load System:
RACK: Radian Armor Crew Kit:
TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command:
Letter March 22, 2006:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization
operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since
that time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from
insurgents using a variety of weapons that include improvised explosive
devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers. During this situation
there have been numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry
supplies and equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in
particular, has become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the
number one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs
consist mainly of dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells or other
types of military ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along
traffic routes and are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military
personnel.
As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the
protection of military forces operating in the region. Among these is
the fielding of new capabilities to counter emerging threats
encountered in Iraq, to include such improvements as add-on-armor for
trucks and systems for detecting and defeating IEDs.
Since the onset of OIF, we have reported on several supply chain
management issues that have impeded support to the warfighter.[Footnote
1] For example, after visiting the theater in 2003, we provided our
preliminary observations on the effectiveness of logistics support
during OIF.[Footnote 2] Among the problems we observed were the
unavailability of spare parts, hundreds of backlogged shipments, and an
inability to track shipments at the distribution centers. In April
2005, we reported on shortages of a number of critical items during
OIF, to include certain protective items such as body armor and armored
high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV).[Footnote 3] We
identified a number of systemic causes for these shortages, including
inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and ineffective distribution
processes. As a result, we made several recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense calling for actions, such as ensuring the accuracy
of Army war reserve requirements and developing and exercising
deployable distribution capabilities, to improve DOD's system for
supplying items to U.S. forces.
Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding the
availability of armor for HMMWVs and other vehicles, we initiated this
subsequent engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General of
the United States to examine issues affecting the production and
installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Army forces
during OIF and other ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility.[Footnote 4] Our objectives were to
(1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and
installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors
affected the time to provide truck armor to deployed forces, and (3)
identify what actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve the timely
availability of truck armor.
In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical
trucks used by Army forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which
included those in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 5] We also reviewed
the production and installation of truck armor for Marine Corps forces,
which we will report separately. To identify the extent to which truck
armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, we
visited numerous DOD and Army organizations to obtain data on the
requirements, funding, production, and installation of truck armor
kits. We considered the armor requirement as met for each type of truck
when the quantity of armor kits produced and installed onto vehicles
equaled the requirement. Based on the information gathered, we
identified factors that affected the time to provide truck armor kits
to deployed forces. We also identified DOD's and the Army's short-term
and long-term efforts to improve the availability of truck armor. We
assessed the reliability of the data we obtained and determined that
they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We
performed our review from April 2005 to January 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed discussion
of our scope and methodology is located in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the
production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006
except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for
tankers is expected by January 2007. Although the Army first identified
a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in
November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits until February 2005
and did not install the kits to fully meet the initial requirement
until May 2005--18 months after the requirement was identified.
However, by that time, requirements had increased substantially. As
subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding
tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. Until add-
on armor kits were installed, units in the theater developed their own
interim improvised armor of locally fabricated steel armor plates to
obtain some level of protection for their vehicles.
We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to
provide truck armor kits to deployed troops, placing them at greater
risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles that were not
equipped with the preferred level of protection. The factors we
identified include:
* The Army did not fully capitalize on approved operational
requirements for truck armor that were established in 1996. The 1996
requirements were similar to those developed in 2003 in response to
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressing similar threats for
most of the same types of trucks. Generally, official requirements such
as these lead to the development and production of new systems to
address the specified required capabilities. Production of armor kits
based on the 1996 requirements may have increased the availability of
truck armor for current operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle
East.
* The Army's award of contracts to armor contractors for amounts less
than the total requirement caused production schedules to be longer
than they might have otherwise been. Instead of awarding contracts in a
way that maximized production rates, the Army awarded contracts in
amounts less than the total requirement because requirements increased
due to operational conditions and the Army received its allocation of
funding from DOD at less than the total requirement. Funding was not
always available to award contracts at the time requirements were
identified, but neither DOD nor Army officials could explain or
document why increased funding was not provided earlier or how funding
decisions were made. In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and
delayed funding also contributed to critical wartime shortages of
armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires, and that we
could not determine why sufficient funding was not provided earlier
because adequate documentation of funding requests was not available.
Without formal documentation and communication of urgent wartime
funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions, the
rationale for funding decisions and the officials and organizations
accountable for making those decisions may not be subject to effective
oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense.
* Material shortages impacted the availability of Army truck armor. For
example, production levels for several Army kits were constrained, in
part, by shortages of material and components such as steel and door
handles. Further, competition between the Army and Marine Corps for
limited contractors and materials exacerbated problems with limited
availability of materials.
* Limited installation rates affected the Army's ability to install
armor kits onto tankers. The rotation of fuel trucks into the
maintenance area as they returned from missions paced the installation
of armor. In addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a
protective chemical limited the numbers of armor installation sites
available for armor installation due to the need for controlled
environmental conditions. As a result, the total length of time to
field tanker armor was stretched out over a longer period.
DOD and the Army have taken several actions to improve truck armor
availability. Several short-term solutions to increase the rate of
production were instituted during operations in Iraq. For example, to
mitigate the effects of funding requirements at less than the total
requirements, the Army used money budgeted for other procurement
programs to award contracts for production of armor kits before
additional armor funds arrived. In addition, Army headquarters also
developed the initial armor kit requirements based on emerging needs 5
months before units in the theater formally submitted their
requirements for validation, which allowed it to begin seeking funds
for armor kits and award contracts for design and production earlier.
The Army also expanded its armor installation capacity to increase
installation rates. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff)
established a team, called the Joint Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the
progress of armoring trucks as well to provide assistance to the Army
to expedite the availability of armor kits. For example, the Joint
Armor Fusion Cell helped identify and deploy personnel from the Air
Force and Navy to perform armor installations in the theater and in the
United States, thereby speeding up the availability of truck armor to
the units. The Army is also developing a long-term plan to address
future truck armoring needs. While we did not evaluate the plan's
potential for success, we did note that it is aimed at identifying long-
term requirements for truck armor and developing solutions to address
these requirements.
We are expanding upon a recommendation in our April 2005 report that
was directed at improving the effectiveness of the Army's wartime
supply support--to address a broader systemic problem that affected the
availability of truck armor. To ensure that funding needs for urgent
wartime requirements are identified quickly, requests for funding are
well documented, and funding decisions are based on risk and an
assessment of the highest priority requirements, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
establish a process to document and communicate all urgent wartime
funding requirements for supplies and equipment at the time they are
identified and the disposition of funding decisions.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
stated it agreed with the intent of our recommendation but stated that
it believes the Army's current requirements validation process conforms
to the process described in our recommendation. Our work has
demonstrated, however, that once requirements are validated, funding
must be made available to execute programs to respond to those
requirements. Because, as we noted in this report and in April 2005,
funding requests from the Army to DOD to resource validated
requirements and the corresponding decisions as to the amount and
timing of funding to be provided were not adequately documented, we
were unable to determine the reasons why funding was not made available
to respond to urgent wartime requirements as needed. We continue to
believe these events in the funding process for urgent wartime
requirements must be fully documented to provide effective program
oversight and to ensure funding decisions are made based on risk and an
assessment of the highest priority requirements. The Department's
responses are reprinted in appendix III and our evaluation of them
appears later in this report.
Background:
Army convoys carrying supplies and equipment in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents
using IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Army
has undertaken several force protection measures such as adding armor
to a number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other CENTCOM locations.
Deployed Army Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs:
Army convoys operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have been
subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in
Iraq by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at
tremendous risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the
region. In May 2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization
operations in Iraq that continue today. However, since that time, the
United States has incurred more casualties than during major combat
operations, mostly due to ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents
operating in Iraq. The threat from IEDs has grown progressively, from
single mortar rounds, to multiple explosives linked together, to
suicide car bombs. In the spring of 2004, nearly every attack from an
IED resulted in a coalition casualty. In particular, U.S. military
convoys have been the targets of these types of attacks. In addition to
attacks in Iraq, U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan have been
subjected to IED attacks.
IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a
number of different ways. They can contain commercial or military
explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance
components. For example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been
employed as IEDs in Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many
vehicles--from small sedans to large cargo trucks--and stationed along
the roadways. Furthermore, "person-borne" suicide bombs have also been
used, with explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is
specifically modified to conceal and carry this material.
Outfitting Army Trucks with Armor:
In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars
and rocket launchers, the Army has taken several force protection
measures to include adding armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks
operating in Iraq, and Afghanistan.[Footnote 6] The Army's medium and
heavy tactical trucks that are being armored include: M939 5-ton
trucks, family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV), heavy expanded
mobility tactical trucks (HEMTT), heavy equipment transporters (HET),
palletized load systems (PLS), the M915 truck family, and tankers.
Appendix II contains a detailed description of each Army vehicle in
addition to a discussion of the armor kit availability and the
significant factors that affected armor availability for each truck.
The Army's medium tactical trucks include the M939 5-ton and FMTV. The
M939 tactical truck is a general-purpose military vehicle, primarily
designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a 5-ton capacity, six-
wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of all types of
supplies and comes in various vehicle types, including a cargo truck,
dump truck, and wrecker. The Army's FMTV addresses medium tactical-
vehicle requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and
transportation of equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the
light medium tactical vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the
medium tactical vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity.
The Army's heavy tactical trucks include the HEMTT, HET, PLS, M915, and
tankers. The Army utilizes the HEMTT to provide transport capabilities
for the resupply of various combat vehicles and weapons systems. The
HET is used to transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle
tanks and other heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the
battlefield. The PLS performs long distance and local hauls and unit
resupply in the tactical environment to support combat units. The PLS
consists of a truck with self-loading capabilities and a trailer. The
Army's family of M915 trucks consists of highway tractors used
primarily for the long distance transport of containers, which is
similar to commercial tractor-trailer trucks.
The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. Four models
of fuel tankers are involved in the Army's armoring program: the M967,
the M969, the M978, and the M1062. The primary component of the tanker
armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto
the exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the
coating material and the fuel tank, the hole self seals and the fuel
leak is stopped within minutes. A secondary component is composed of a
set of armor panel kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker
to protect critical equipment that is not protected by the coating
material.
Processes for Developing Truck Armor Requirements and Solutions:
The Army identified wartime truck armor requirements and initiated a
procurement program to develop an armor solution, which involved
seeking funding from a variety of sources, identifying and contracting
with suppliers for armor materials and components, designing and
testing armor solutions, and installing armor onto trucks in the
CENTCOM area of responsibility or other installation sites in the
United States and Europe.
Process for Developing Wartime Requirements:
When a need for new equipment is identified by Army warfighters
deployed to Iraq and other CENTCOM locations in support of the global
war on terrorism, official requirements for these items are developed
through the submission of the Army's operational needs statement (ONS).
Army field commanders prepare an ONS, which documents the urgent need
for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a
capability that impacts mission accomplishment. The ONS is sent forward
through the unit's chain of command to the Coalition Forces Land
Component Command (CFLCC) for theater-level approval, while an
information copy is provided directly to Army headquarters for an
initial check to ensure the requested capability and operational
concept are clearly stated.
Once approved by CFLCC, the ONS is forwarded to the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff G-3 at Army headquarters where it is reviewed and
validated by the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB).[Footnote 7] The
ASPB is chaired by the G-3, with representatives from other Army
headquarters staff offices and major Army commands. In the case of
truck armor, once the requirement is validated by the ASPB, it is
transmitted to the Program Executive Office-Combat Support and Combat
Service Support, which manages the procurement of truck armor through
its Project Manager for Tactical Vehicles (Project Manager). Validated
requirements are also passed to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
G-8 and the Army Budget Office to obtain the necessary funding.
Development of Truck Armor Solutions:
To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Army initiated a
procurement program to develop an armor solution for its deployed
trucks. Procurement is funded through congressional appropriations.
However, at the time requirements for current operations were
identified in November 2003, there were no truck armor kit procurement
programs in place. Consequently, funding for armor kits in the current
Army procurement budgets did not exist. Because no funding was
available at the time the requirements were identified, the Army
obtained funding for its program from a variety of sources. While the
Army can reprogram a small amount of funds from one program budget to
another, the majority of funding had to be approved by the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and in some cases,
Congress. Specifically, to obtain funding for truck armor, the Army
sought approval from the DOD Comptroller and Congress to reprogram
funding from other procurement or appropriations accounts,[Footnote 8]
requested funding from the DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund,[Footnote 9]
and requested armor funding through supplemental appropriations.
The Army's approved armor protection for medium and heavy tactical
vehicles consisted of add-on armor kits to be installed on vehicles
already in use in the theater of operations or prior to deployment.
These kits included armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other
components such as air conditioners. For all trucks except the M939 5-
ton, the Army awarded contracts to armor companies to produce add-on
kits for each type of truck. According to Army officials, as needed
production quantities increased, the Army modified these contracts to
reflect the additional quantities and revised prices. In the case of
the 5-ton truck, the armor kits were produced by the Ground Systems
Industrial Enterprise (GSIE), an Army organization of depots and other
facilities.[Footnote 10] Instead of a contract, agreements on
quantities and costs for work were provided through Military Inter-
departmental Purchase Requests (MIPR), which were issued to GSIE for
each new production order. Once armor kits were produced by contractors
or Army depots, they were shipped to installation sites in the United
States, Middle East, and Europe, where they were installed onto trucks
by military or contractor personnel.
Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January 2006:
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the
production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006
except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for
tankers is expected by January 2007. Figure 1 shows the overall
production and installation quantities of truck armor as compared to
requirements. The Army's solution to addressing truck armor
requirements focused on developing add-on armor kits to be attached to
the vehicles. These add-on armor kits included armor panels and
ballistic glass, as well as other components such as air conditioners.
Figure 1: Production and Installation of Truck Armor Kits to Meet Army
Requirements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor
kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all
of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully
meet the initial requirement until May 2005, or 18 months later. As
shown in table 1, the time to produce and install armor kits to meet
initial requirements varied by truck type, and ranged from 15 to 18
months. However, as shown in figure 1, by that time requirements had
increased substantially. More detailed information on requirements,
production, and installation times for each specific truck is provided
in appendix II.
Table 1: Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type:
Truck type: HEMTT; Initial November 2003 requirement: 1,080; Date
required quantities produced: January 2005;
Date required quantities installed: February 2005; Total months to
fully meet initial requirement: 15.
Truck type: HET;
Initial November 2003 requirement: 500;
Date required quantities produced: February 2005;
Date required quantities installed: March 2005; Total months to fully
meet initial requirement: 16.
Truck type: PLS;
Initial November 2003 requirement: 800;
Date required quantities produced: January 2005;
Date required quantities installed: May 2005; Total months to fully
meet initial requirement: 18.
Truck type: FMTV;
Initial November 2003 requirement: 1,150;
Date required quantities produced: February 2005;
Date required quantities installed: March 2005; Total months to fully
meet initial requirement: 16.
Truck type: M915;
Initial November 2003 requirement: 250;
Date required quantities produced: December 2004;
Date required quantities installed: March 2005; Total months to fully
meet initial requirement: 16.
[End of table]
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck or fuel tankers, which had not
been identified at the time of the initial November 2003 requirement.
As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding
tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. The Army
now estimates that the total demand for all 11,627 required truck armor
kits, excluding tankers, will have been met in January 2006, or 10
months after the latest requirements increase was validated in March
2005.[Footnote 11] Table 2 shows the time needed to complete production
and installation of armor kits to meet the latest validated
requirements increase from March 2005. The Army estimates that
production of a sufficient number of tanker kits to meet requirements
will be completed by May 2006, but does not expect to complete
installation of tanker kits until January 2007.
Table 2: Time to Meet Latest Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type:
Truck type: HEMTT; Current requirement as of September 2005: 2,246;
Date required quantities produced: September 2005;
Date required quantities installed: December 2005; Total months to
fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 9.
Truck type: HET; Current requirement as of September 2005: 663;
Date required quantities produced: August 2005;
Date required quantities installed: September 2005;
Total months to fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 6.
Truck type: PLS; Current requirement as of September 2005: 944;
Date required quantities produced: March 2005;
Date required quantities installed: July 2005;
Total months to fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 4.
Truck type: FMTV; Current requirement as of September 2005: 3,377;
Date required quantities produced: August 2005;
Date required quantities installed: December 2005;
Total months to fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 9.
Truck type: M915; Current requirement as of September 2005: 1,805;
Date required quantities produced: December 2005;
Date required quantities installed: January 2006 (estimated);
Total months to fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 10.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck, for which requirements
decreased in March 2005 or tankers, for which requirements did not
increase in March 2005. As of September 2005, the current 5-ton truck
armor requirement was 2,592 and the tanker requirement was 1,192.
[End of table]
Before armor kits were available, units operating in the CENTCOM area
of responsibility developed their own interim improvised armor,
consisting of locally fabricated steel armor plates, to obtain some
level of protection for their vehicles. As a result, interim armor with
minimum protection standards in accordance with Army policy was in
place on some vehicles by the time the preferred add-on armor kits were
available for installation. In addition, CFLCC issued a directive in
February 2005 stating that no unarmored vehicles would be allowed to
operate in Iraq outside of secured forward operating bases. During
congressional testimony held in the spring and summer of 2005, Army
officials confirmed that this policy had been fully implemented with
use of approved interim improvised armor or add-on armor kits.
Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits:
We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to
provide truck armor to deployed troops. First, the Army did not fully
capitalize on a requirement for truck armor that had been identified
prior to operations in OIF. Second, availability of armor kits was
constrained by the Army's funding of contracts at less than the total
requirement. Third, material shortages also affected the availability
of armor kits. Finally, limited installation rates lengthened the time
to provide armor kits for tankers. As a result, troops were placed at
greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles not
equipped with the preferred level of protection.
Army Did Not Fully Capitalize on Truck Armor Requirements Identified
Prior to Operations in Iraq:
The Army did not fully capitalize on an earlier operational requirement
for truck armor that was identified several years before current
operations in Iraq began, which caused the Army to lose an opportunity
to have a significant number of armor kits already available when
operational needs arose in Iraq for this capability. An official
requirement for truck add-on armor kits was identified and approved by
the Army in 1996 to address threats similar to what deployed forces are
currently facing in Iraq. On January 19, 1996, the Army's Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) issued an operational requirement document
(ORD) for the tactical wheeled vehicle crew protection kit.[Footnote
12] Generally, official requirements documents lead to the development
and production of new systems to address the specified required
capabilities.
According to Army officials, the Army developed this ORD because
officials recognized that operations in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia
exposed troops to a civilian threat and led to concerns over
countermine protection for supply and troop transport vehicles. The
crew protection kit was to provide increased crew survivability in
tactical wheeled vehicles against small arms fire, artillery/mortar
fire, mines, submunitions, and IEDs where needed while operating
throughout an area of operations. The ORD described the threat against
U.S. forces usually consisting of small arms, hand portable antitank
weapons such as light antitank weapons and rocket propelled grenades,
and IEDs. According to the document, tactical wheeled vehicles at that
time lacked armor protection to provide crew survivability against
these threats. No existing ballistic protection systems had met this
requirement, with one exception of the Up-Armored Heavy HMMWV.
According to the ORD, the kit's capabilities would enable all units to
provide ballistic protection to crews of tactical wheeled vehicles,
including most of the same types of trucks being armored today in the
Middle East.
Once the ORD was approved, the Army Tank-Automotive Research,
Development and Engineering Center built prototype armor kits for the
HMMWV and 5-ton truck, and blast testing was also done at Fort A.P.
Hill. The ORD specified a number of kits to be built and available to
add on to vehicles as operations dictated the need for them. However,
the Army never fully addressed this requirement. The need for armor
kits after Somalia never materialized, and, according to Army
officials, the ORD was not completed because funding was not available
to fully meet the 1996 requirement due to other higher funding
priorities in the Army. According to one Army official, given the
amount of effort expended to develop and approve the ORD, it is
relatively uncommon for an ORD not to be funded through production,
especially when research and development funds had been spent,
prototypes developed, and blast testing performed.
Even though the 1996 requirement was not fully addressed, a small
number of armor kits were produced around this time period for two
types of trucks, the HEMTT and the PLS, to support operations in
Bosnia.[Footnote 13] According to the Army's Project Manager,
development of these kits was initiated in response to an ONS from
units deployed to Bosnia. The ONS was submitted prior to completion of
the ORD. However, these kits did not meet all the protective
requirements specified in the ORD, such as providing blast protection.
The Bosnia kits were never installed on vehicles and were placed into
storage because the need for them was never realized.
The Army's November 2003 armor requirement, developed in response to
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressed the same vehicles
confronting similar threats as those found in the January 1996 ORD.
This November 2003 requirement for the crew protection kit validated an
operational wartime need for add-on armor kits for light, medium, and
heavy tactical wheeled vehicles in support of OIF and OEF. The
requirement cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the basis for add-
on armor and extends the requirement to continue identifying
alternative capabilities for development, testing, and procurement. The
November 2003 requirement noted that the armor kits are necessary to
provide a capability to protect against small arms fire, IEDs, mine
blast protection, and artillery fragmentation; and to minimize
degradation of the vehicle mission. Army officials in theater modified
the November 2003 requirement by changing the distribution of armor and
prioritizing armor needs; however, the amounts of armor kits required
remained the same. Table 3 shows the 1996 and 2003 requirements, as
well as the most recent armor requirements.
Table 3: Comparison of Types of Vehicles Requiring Armor Kits in 1996,
2003, and 2005 and Quantities of Kits Needed and Available:
Types of vehicles: 5-Ton;
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 750;
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0;
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 0;
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 2,592.
Types of vehicles: HET;
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 50;
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0;
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 500;
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 663.
Types of vehicles: PLS;
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 50;
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 32;
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 800;
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 944.
Types of vehicles: HEMTT;
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 450;
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 182;
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 1,080;
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 2,246.
Types of vehicles: M915;
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 200;
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0;
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 250;
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 1,805.
Types of vehicles: FMTV;
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 500;
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0;
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 1,150;
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 3,377.
Types of vehicles: Tanker;
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 0;
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0;
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 0;
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 1,192.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
NOTE: The kits for the HEMTT and PLS were not developed in response to
the 1996 ORD. Rather, they were developed in response to anticipated
needs for operations in Bosnia and did not meet the blast protection
requirements specified in the ORD.
[End of table]
Because not all the kits required under the 1996 ORD were developed,
the Army went into Iraq with less protective capability than it might
otherwise have done. However, the Army's work done in support of the
ORD and the Bosnia kits laid a foundation to meet future truck armor
requirements. For example, the limited number of kits developed for
military operations in Bosnia was pulled from storage and used in Iraq.
Furthermore, according to Army officials, the knowledge gained and the
processes for design, research, development, and testing of these kits,
as well as the kits themselves, were used to address and meet the need
for armor during current operations. Based on these efforts, the Army's
Project Manager for truck armor in 2003 had knowledge of the concepts
of designing and building armor kits, the necessary materials in terms
of weight and protective capabilities, and system performance
requirements and technical specifications for ballistic protection. In
addition, the 2003 requirement for kits cites the January 1996 ORD as
providing the basis for add-on armor.
Army's Awarding of Contracts for Less Than the Total Requirement
Constrained Armor Kit Production:
The Army's award of armor contracts for quantities less than the total
requirement constrained the production of armor kits. The award of
contract quantities in amounts less than the total requirements instead
of all at one time affected production rates and caused production
schedules to be longer than they might otherwise have been. The award
of contracts in this manner was, in part, a result of several increases
in requirements over time due to changing operational conditions.
Another factor that contributed to obtaining less than the total
requirement was the delayed flow of funding available for armor kits.
Awarding Contracts at Less Than the Total Requirement Lengthened the
Time to Meet Requirements:
For all of the Army trucks we reviewed except for the 5-ton truck, the
Army's award of contracts for quantities less than the total
requirement instead of all at one time caused production schedules to
be longer than they might otherwise have been. Contractors tend to size
their production levels to the contract orders they have on hand. Thus,
larger contract quantities generally mean increased production rates.
Larger up-front contracts can affect a contractor's production capacity
for a number of reasons. For example, according to one contractor
producing armor kits for all four of the Army's heavy trucks, ordering
smaller quantities of armor kits caused a lack of continuity for its
supply base and fluctuations in kit deliveries. More specifically, the
contractor experienced (1) a lack of supplier commitment, which wavered
with the uncertainty of future orders; (2) fluctuations in its labor
force; (3) constrained ability to make process improvements to expedite
production, such as the creation of specialized tooling, due to a short-
term focus of work; and (4) insufficient support for investment and
facility decisions that would have resulted in more efficient
production operations for the contractor and its supply base.
In some cases, increases in requirements caused contracts to be awarded
in an intermittent fashion. In other cases, funding was not available
to award complete contract quantities to meet requirements at the time
requirements were identified. Although it is difficult to determine the
exact effects of intermittent contracting on the availability of armor
kits, we identified a number of specific cases where it lengthened the
production schedule. For example, there were breaks in production for
three different types of truck kits (the FMTV, HEMTT, and HET) because
the contractors had completed their current contact orders and new
orders were not placed early enough to maintain continuous production.
In one of these cases regarding an armor kit for the FMTV, the
contractor received an additional contract from the Army in December
2004 for 1,049 kits as it neared completion of its current requirement
of 771 kits. Although the new requirement for additional kits was
validated by the Army in April 2004, funding was not available to award
the new contract until December 2004, which was not early enough to
overcome the required 15-week material lead time. As a result,
production stopped and new production did not resume until 2 months
later. According to the contractor, production could have been
maintained or even accelerated if the new contract had been awarded in
time to meet the long lead time item requirements.
In the cases of the HEMTT and the HET armor kits, the production lines
stopped when the contractor completed the current contract quantities
of 1,598 and 665 armor kits respectively. The contractor did not
receive additional contract awards of 791 HEMTT kits and 131 HET kits
until April 2005, or about a month after completion of the previous
contract quantities in March 2005. By that time, production had already
stopped, employees and subcontractors were released, and equipment and
facility space were given up for other uses. As a result, there was a
two and a half month break in production. The reason the additional
production quantities were not awarded earlier was that validated
requirements did not increase until March 2005, which, according to
Army Project Manager officials, was too late to avoid a production
stoppage.
In another example of the impact of intermittent contract awards, the
initial armor kit production contract for the M915 was awarded in April
2004 for 250 kits, which was based on the validated Army requirement at
the time. However, when subsequent contracts for 240 and 136 kits were
awarded in September and October 2004 respectively, due to increasing
Army requirements, the manufacturer, an Israeli subcontractor to the
primary contractor, did not have sufficient capacity to keep up with
the demand. This was due, in part, to other commitments the
manufacturer already had for producing Marine Corps truck armor. As a
result, the production levels for M915 kits were lower than desired
based on the new requirements and remained so until July 2005 when the
contractor was able to transition production from the Israeli
subcontractor to its own facilities in the United States. According to
contractor officials, if they had known in the beginning that the total
quantities needed by the Army would have been as high as they were,
they would have proceeded differently from the outset, such as using a
different manufacturer.
In one instance, the quantities of contracts also adversely affected
the costs of armor kits. Specifically, the first contract for the FMTV
armor kits was awarded in February 2004 for 270 kits. Subsequently, in
March 2004, a second contract was placed for 501 kits. According to the
contractor, the quantity in the initial contract was too low for the
Army to receive the highest price break, which was received for the
second contract. As a result, the first 270 kits cost the Army over
$1.7 million more than if the two production quantities had been
combined. The Army made the two orders separately because funding was
not available to award all quantities at one time.
Truck Armor Requirements Increased Due to Changing Operational
Conditions:
The Army's requirements for truck armor increased numerous times since
November 2003 due to changing operational conditions. Army headquarters
developed and approved the first requirement for truck armor kits in
November 2003 in consultation with Army officials from the theater of
operations. Army headquarters validated an operational wartime need for
kits in support of OIF and other CENTCOM operations, and approved 3,780
armor kits for medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles. According to
Army officials, this requirement arose based on an identification of
the need for truck armor and an August 2003 requirement from Army units
in the theater for additional up-armored HMMWVs. All subsequent
requirements for specific numbers of armor kits have been generated by
Army theater commanders in the field and forwarded to Army headquarters
for approval and funding.
The Army has continued to validate additional requirements for truck
armor as the need has evolved and increased over the course of
operations to the present, with March 2005 being the most recent date
for validated requirements increases. In September 2005, the total
requirement for truck armor decreased slightly based on revised unit
needs.[Footnote 14] Army theater level commanders have requested
additional kits by documenting their requirements in ONSs. Army
headquarters validated these requirements on several occasions between
April 2004 and March 2005. Figure 2 illustrates the increases in the
Army's requirements for truck armor according to the approval of the
multiple ONSs.
Figure 2: Army Truck Armor Requirements, November 2003 through
September 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Increasing requirements for truck armor from the first requirement in
November 2003 were a direct result of operational conditions. Army
officials from the theater of operations attributed these increasing
requirements to the enemy's changing tactics and the increase in
frequency and lethality of IEDs. In addition, the number of trucks in
Iraq increased over time, which drove a corresponding increase in truck
armor requirements. As noted previously, changing requirements
necessitated the Army awarding production contracts in an intermittent
manner; and, in some cases, led directly to gaps in production levels.
Incremental Funding Lagged Behind Requirements, Delaying Contract
Awards:
The flow of funding for truck armor kits was initially provided in
amounts less than total requirements and lagged significantly behind
validated requirements. As a result, the Army could not award contracts
for the full required quantities of armor kits at the time requirements
were validated. Instead, the Army awarded contracts as funding became
available. Figure 3 shows the availability of funding for truck armor
kits as compared to armor kit requirements.[Footnote 15]
Figure 3: Availability of Funding Compared to Truck Armor Requirements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although funding was not always available to award contracts at the
time requirements were identified, the Army did provide some advanced
funding to the contractors to buy items with long lead times, such as
steel and ballistic glass, to mitigate some of the effects of delayed
production contracts. To do this, the Army Project Manager used funds
designated for the installation of armor kits already under contract
until sufficient armor kit production funding was made available.
However, according to Army Project Manager officials, they only used
this advanced funding approach when they were certain additional
funding would be administratively approved, because of the risks
associated with using these installation funds and not being able to
replace them.
We could not specifically determine why the required funds for armor
kits were not made available when the Army first identified the
requirements because neither the Army nor DOD could provide us with
sufficient records to track when the Department of the Army requested
funding from the DOD Comptroller. Special funding requests from the
Army to the DOD Comptroller were required because funding for armor
kits was not available in the Army's procurement budget. According to
Army officials, the Army requested full funding for the truck armor
requirements when first identified, but the DOD Comptroller denied the
requests and provided only a limited amount of funding over several
months. However, the Army was not able to document these funding
requests.
Additionally, DOD Comptroller officials were unable to verify or
document how much funding the Army asked for and when it was requested.
DOD Comptroller officials further noted that although there was
sufficient funding available in the Iraqi Freedom Fund to fund all of
the truck armor requirements at the time they were initially identified
by the Army, there were other competing funding priorities that would
have prevented DOD from fully funding the entire truck armor
requirement at once. Examples of these competing priorities include
other force protection requirements such as the procurement of up-
armored HMMWVs and night vision equipment, IED countermeasures,
reimbursements to other coalition forces for logistics support,
operational costs associated with deploying a Marine Expeditionary
Force to Iraq, financing clearance of captured munitions, and funding
for various classified programs.
In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also
contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track
shoes, lithium batteries, and tires. However, we could not determine
why sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate
documentation was not available to track when the Army requested the
additional funding from DOD.[Footnote 16] Without formal documentation
and communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the
disposition of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions
and the officials and organizations accountable for making those
decisions may not be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the
Secretary of Defense.
Material Shortages Affected Availability of Army Truck Armor Kits:
Material shortages negatively impacted the Army's ability to meet
requirements for all of its vehicles except for the FMTV and tankers.
For example, the contractor producing armor kits for the Army's heavy
trucks stated that shortages of armor-grade steel and aluminum
constrained production rates for the HEMTT, HET, PLS, and M915 armor
kits between July 2004 and November 2004. The shortage was alleviated
through Army, Joint Staff, and congressional efforts to work directly
with material suppliers to increase the amount of armor plates for the
military.
In addition, shortages of material negatively impacted the production
of M939 5-ton armor kits, which were produced by the Army depots.
According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for 5-ton truck
armor kits was established based on the availability of material and
components that are used to build the armor kits. When GSIE was asked
to accelerate the production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of
availability of certain materials limited GSIE's ability to increase
production levels. Examples of items that were difficult to obtain
included several sizes and types of steel, door handles, and wiper
components.
Army and Marine Corps officials also found themselves in competition
for armor contractors and materials, which exacerbated the problems
with material shortages. For example, as mentioned previously, the
initial manufacturer for the Army's M915 armor kits did not have
sufficient capacity to meet needed production levels as requirements
increased. This was due, in part, to the fact that the company had
committed most of its capacity to producing Marine Corps truck armor by
the time additional Army requirements were identified. Although minor
schedule improvements were achieved as a result of discussions and
agreements on joint schedules between the two services, it was still
insufficient to meet the Army's needs. As a result, the Army moved
production of the M915 to another company in the United States, which
created further delays.
Limited Installation Rates Constrained the Availability of Tanker Armor
Kits:
A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for
tankers was a limited installation rate. For example, the installation
of add-on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of trucks into
the in-theater installation facilities as they returned from missions.
Operational constraints limited the number of vehicles that could be
taken out of use at any one time. In addition, unique requirements to
coat the tankers with a protective chemical prior to installing armor
panels also limited the installation rate. The primary component of the
tanker armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is
sprayed onto the exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round
penetrates the coating material and the fuel tank, the hole self-seals
and the fuel leak stops. The proper application of the chemical coating
requires controlled environmental conditions, such as humidity and
temperature, which has led to a limited number of spray locations
accessible to the Army. Thus, although production of armor kits for
tankers is expected to be completed by May 2006, because of these
constraints, installation of enough kits to meet requirements is not
expected to be finished until 8 months later in January 2007.
DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability:
DOD and the Army have taken a number of actions to improve the timely
availability of truck armor. Some of the actions were short-term and
were meant to address the immediate armor need for deployed forces in
Iraq and other CENTCOM locations. Other efforts are long-term plans
designed to improve the overall availability of truck armor for future
operations.
DOD and the Services Took Actions to Improve Availability of Truck
Armor during Current Operations:
DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions to improve
the availability of truck armor to meet the needs of forces deployed
for OIF and other CENTCOM operations. Examples of these efforts include
the following:
* Leveraging of available Army funds. The Army's Project Manager for
Tactical Vehicles took a number of steps to leverage available funding
in an attempt to mitigate the effects of an inadequate funding flow for
truck armor. For example, it used funding designated for future armor
kit installations to buy long lead time materials and award some
contracts for armor kits until additional armor kit funding could be
made available. In addition, when the Project Manager received funding
for armor kits from Army headquarters, it allocated the funding among
all the armor kit contracts to maintain sufficient work flow to keep
all production lines open, rather than fund some truck kits to the full
level of requirements. While these efforts may have improved the timely
availability of armor kits, as we noted earlier, the inadequate
availability of funding still contributed to a longer schedule in many
cases.
* Early identification of Army requirements. Army headquarters
developed the initial requirements for truck armor based on emerging
needs before formal requirements were submitted by units in the
theater. As noted earlier, the first requirement for truck armor was
developed and validated by Army headquarters in November 2003, while
the first requirements submitted from units in the theater were not
actually validated until April 2004. As a result, the Army was able to
begin seeking funding and awarding contracts for design and production
of armor kits earlier than if it had waited for an official request
from units in the theater.
* Addition of armor installation sites. To reduce armor installation
time, as requirements and production levels for truck armor increased,
the Army expanded its installation capacity in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility through the addition of installation sites, going from
one initial facility in Kuwait to nine facilities in Kuwait, Iraq, and
Afghanistan between August 2004 and July 2005. As indicated in figure
1, during this period, production levels increased dramatically from
220 kits per month in August 2004 to a peak level of almost 1,800 kits
per month by May 2005. After increasing the numbers of installation
facilities, according to Army officials, total installation capacity
has grown from approximately 50 kits per week to more than 350 kits per
week.
* Establishment of Joint Staff fusion cell. In December 2004, the Joint
Staff's Directorate of Logistics established a team, called the Joint
Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the progress of the services' armoring
efforts to enhance visibility of the program to DOD and congressional
leadership. In addition, the armor fusion cell was established to
accelerate the availability of armor kits by identifying and fixing
gaps in the supply chain. For example, the Joint Staff armor fusion
cell, working with the Army, helped identify and deploy certified
welders from the Air Force and Navy to assist with production and
installation of armor in the United States and in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, thereby speeding up the availability of truck armor to
the units. The cell also worked with the U.S. Transportation Command to
increase the use of airlift for armor kits within the CENTCOM area of
operations, which reduced the need for ground transportation and
increased the speed of deliveries to armor installation sites.
Army Has Developed a Long-term Plan to Address the Availability of
Truck Armor for Future Operations:
The Army is taking long-term actions to improve the availability of
truck armor for future operations through the development of a long-
term armoring plan. While we did not evaluate the plan's potential for
success, we did note it is aimed at identifying long-term requirements
for truck armor and developing solutions to address these requirements.
The Army's long-term plans, designed to improve the overall
availability of truck armor for future operations, are outlined in the
Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Long Term Armoring Strategy. The Army's
G8 division for programming, analysis, and materiel integration tasked
TRADOC to develop this plan in January 2005. The Long Term Armoring
Strategy incorporates the Army's plan to provide add-on armor to its
tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. Under the plan, add-on armor will
consist of two kits, one that includes hardware to be placed on the
vehicle to receive the armor, and another that contains the actual
armor. The plan also includes provisions to facilitate the production
and availability of armor. Estimated costs for the armor are based on
current armor models that use heavy metals, such as steel and aluminum;
however, according to Army program office officials, they are
considering the use of lighter metals for greater efficiency but at
higher costs.
According to the Long Term Armoring Strategy, its purpose is to
demonstrate the Army's deliberate process to outline a path forward and
avoid long response times for providing truck armor in the future. The
plan further notes that the framework supports a balanced approach for
procurement of armoring kits that mitigates risk and enhances safety
and force protection. According to the plan, the end state is a
tactical wheeled vehicle fleet that provides the commanders with
flexibility to increase the protection level when needed and ensures
the Army's ability to rapidly acquire additional kits. The initial
draft concept was completed in March 2005 and a final plan was
presented to the G8 division in June 2005. According to the program
office, Army headquarters approved the plan in August 2005 with a few
outstanding issues to be resolved. The necessary protection level for
trucks is based on the Department of the Army's approved threat
assessment, developed by the intelligence community, which spans
through 2018. The Long Term Armoring Strategy will be implemented in
concert with the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity
and Modernization Strategy,[Footnote 17] which is aimed at addressing
the Army's truck needs through fiscal year 2018.
The Army's long-term plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two
kits. The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks
ready to accept armor and includes hard to install parts and permanent
mounting provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor
to be applied to all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular
components to be installed and removed by two crewmen. The B kits will
be procured based on operational and training requirements, while all
trucks will be outfitted with A kits. The A kits will be installed by
2018 on current trucks during recapitalization and on newly produced
vehicles at the factory. The second quarter of fiscal year 2006 is the
program manager's proposed deadline to begin installing all trucks with
A kits; however, as of September 2005 the date was not finalized.
Program officials advocate the use of lighter materials for producing
the kits instead of the heavier metals currently being used. According
to these officials, lighter materials like ceramics are more expensive
but could provide greater efficiencies such as reducing the amount of
weight on a vehicle, preventing wear and tear, and allowing for more
weight to be apportioned for operational purposes.
The long-term plan includes provisions to facilitate the production and
availability of armor in the future. As part of the plan, the Army will
own the blueprints for the armor to expand competition from multiple
sources and avoid relying on one contractor at critical decision points
when more kits are needed. According to Army officials, contractors
currently own the blueprints, and the Army's ability to buy quantities
on demand could be restricted by the contractors' production
capabilities. Technical requirements to facilitate the availability of
armor in the future include maximizing the commonality of kit
components among vehicles, and ensuring compatibility of the A and B
kits with future armor upgrades.
Army program officials stated that preliminary budget estimates for the
armoring plan have been developed and included in the Army's future
budget plans for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. However, these
estimates are based on the costs of the current armor kits produced
with heavy metals and do not include estimates of the costs of lighter
armor as advocated by the program office. Final cost estimates and a
decision about the types of armor to be used have not yet been
finalized.
Conclusions:
A number of challenges hindered the Army's ability to provide truck
armor in the timeliest manner to its deployed forces operating in the
Middle East. While some of these challenges may have resulted from
operational conditions in the region that the Army and DOD had little
control over, other limitations were a direct result of key decisions
and ineffective supply processes within the Army and DOD. The
availability of truck armor was limited by the Army's decision not to
fully fund previously identified requirements, numerous increases in
requirements, the Army's inability to timely obtain funding for current
wartime needs from DOD or within its own budget, and limited industrial
base resources.
In our prior report examining critical supply shortages during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, we recommended that the Army take actions to
address two of these same issues.[Footnote 18] Specifically, we
recommended the Army expedite the funding process to support timely and
sufficient funding for wartime requirements, and assess the industrial
base capacity to minimize acquisition delays. One of these
recommendations, to assess the industrial base, would also apply to the
Army's approach to armoring trucks. The other related recommendation to
improve the timeliness of the funding process was specific to the
individual types of supplies we examined, and may not be directly
applicable to truck armor as it was written.
The results of both our current and prior work indicate a broader
systemic problem of not documenting and communicating urgent wartime
funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions. We
reported in April 2005 that funding delays also contributed to critical
wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries,
and tires, but we could not determine why sufficient funding was not
provided earlier because adequate documentation of funding requests was
not available. Without formal documentation and communication of urgent
wartime funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions,
the rationale for funding decisions and the officials and organizations
accountable for making those decisions may not be subject to effective
oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense. It is likely DOD
could again face urgent requirements to rapidly develop and produce
materiel solutions to improve force capability or protection of
deployed forces. Without improving DOD's ability to provide that
support to the warfighters in the timeliest manner, deployed military
personnel and their missions may be placed at significant risk because
they lack the necessary equipment and supplies at the critical times
they may be needed.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To ensure funding needs for urgent wartime requirements are identified
quickly, requests for funding are well documented, and funding
decisions are based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority
requirements, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Army to establish a process to document and
communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for supplies and
equipment at the time they are identified and the disposition of
funding decisions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the
intent of our recommendation, but stated that it believes the Army
Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) process, previously the ASPB
process discussed earlier in this report, conforms to the process
described in our recommendation. As noted by DOD, the AR2B is a forum
where urgent wartime requirements are reviewed, staffed, and validated.
However, as demonstrated by our work, once requirements are validated,
funding must be made available to execute programs to respond to those
requirements. When sufficient funding is not available in the Army's
budget for the validated requirement, the Army must seek additional
funding through DOD. Because, as we noted in this report and in April
2005, funding requests from the Army to DOD to resource validated
requirements and the corresponding decisions as to the amount and
timing of funding to be provided were not adequately documented, we
were unable to determine the reasons why funding was not made available
to respond to urgent wartime requirements as needed. In addition, in
April 2005 we also reported that funding requests for critical wartime
supplies such as armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and
tires also could not be tracked from the Army Materiel Command, where
they originated, to Army headquarters for validation, which precluded
our ability to determine why funding for these items lagged behind the
time the need was identified. We continue to believe these events in
the funding process for urgent wartime requirements must be fully
documented to provide effective program oversight and to ensure funding
decisions are made based on risk and an assessment of the highest
priority requirements. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III.
DOD also provided technical comments that have been incorporated where
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and
the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [Hyperlink, solisw@gao.gov].
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we examined the Army's programs to produce
and install armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled
vehicles, or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
area of responsibility, which included Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote
19] The Army trucks we examined included the family of medium tactical
vehicles (FMTV), heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), heavy
equipment transporter (HET), palletized load system (PLS), M915 truck
tractor, M939 5-ton tactical truck, and fuel tankers. Descriptions of
each of these trucks along with detailed information on the
availability of armor for each truck are included in appendix II.
To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed
to meet identified requirements, we interviewed DOD and Army officials
involved in identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and
acquiring truck armor for deployed forces. We also met with truck armor
contractors from the industrial base. A complete list of the DOD and
other organizations that we met with during this review is found in
table 4. We also collected and analyzed armor supply data such as
requirements, funding levels, contract order awards, production levels,
and installations for the period November 2003 (when truck armor
requirements were first formally identified) through September 2005,
which we obtained from the Army based on source documents. We
considered the armor requirement met for each type of truck when the
quantity of armor kits installed onto vehicles equaled the requirement.
We did not, however, visit the CENTCOM area of responsibility to
validate the extent to which armor kits had been installed and were
actually in use by trucks.
Table 4: Organizations Interviewed during Review:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Arlington, Va.
Joint Staff, Directorate of Logistics, Arlington, Va.
U.S. Army:
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and
Comptroller, Arlington, Va.
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics), Arlington, Va.
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Arlington, Va.
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions,
Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Va.
Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support,;
Project Manager Tactical Vehicles, Warren, Mich.
U.S. Army Central Command/Coalition Forces Land Component Command
(Logistics), Fort McPherson, Ga.
U.S. Army Materiel Command:
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Fort Belvoir, Va.
Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich.
Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise, Rock Island, Ill.
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va:
U.S. Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Va.
U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Ga.
National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Va.
Defense Contract Management Agency, District West, Phoenix, Ariz.
Armor Holdings, Inc. and Simula, Inc., Phoenix, Ariz.
Stewart and Stevenson, Inc., Sealy, Tex.
Radian, Inc., Troy, Mich.
VSE Corporation, Alexandria, Va.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To determine what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to
deployed forces, we analyzed the armor supply data we collected to
identify trends and isolate factors that impacted the timeliness of
producing and installing armor. We also met with and collected
additional information from DOD, Army and armor contractor officials
involved with the armor acquisition programs to evaluate the
significance of these factors and to determine the extent of their
impact on the availability of truck armor.
To determine what actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve the
availability of truck armor for current and future operations, we
interviewed military service and Joint Staff personnel to identify
short-and long-term efforts to address supply shortages. We also
reviewed documentation related to addressing future truck armor needs.
However, we did not evaluate the identified solutions' potential for
success.
We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained
for this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about
the data and corroborating it with other information gathered from
other military service organizations and armor contractors, and by
reviewing existing documentation about the data and the sources that
produced the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our audit from
April 2005 through January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts:
We assessed the armoring efforts for each of the following medium and
heavy trucks: heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks, heavy equipment
transporters, palletized load systems, M939 5-ton trucks, family of
medium tactical vehicles, M915 truck family, and tankers. For these
seven types of trucks we reviewed, each assessment provides the status
of the armoring efforts at the time of our review. The profile presents
a general description of the truck and the approach to developing armor
solutions. The assessments also include our evaluation of the extent to
which armor kits were produced and installed to meet identified
requirements and the significant factors that affected armor
availability.
The Army's efforts to armor its heavy and medium tactical wheeled
vehicles have been hindered by awarding contracts for quantities less
than the total requirement, material shortages, and a limited rate of
installation. The Army's efforts to armor its trucks experienced 12 to
18 month delays between when initial requirements were identified and
when the initial requirements were met, although requirements for all
vehicles increased over time such that by the time the initial
requirements were met, the actual requirements were in excess of that
initial amount. The schedule for contract orders constrained the Army's
ability to meet requirements for all vehicles except 5-ton trucks.
Material shortages negatively impacted the Army's ability to meet
requirements for all vehicles except for medium tactical vehicles and
tankers. Limited installation rates constrained the availability of
tanker armor.
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
The Army uses its heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) to
provide transport capabilities for the resupply of various combat
vehicles and weapons systems. Figure 4 shows an example of a HEMTT. To
protect the HEMTT crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army contracted
with Simula Inc. to develop and build add-on armor kits for
installation on HEMTTs. The Army's armoring program involves applying
armor kits to 2,705 HEMTTs.
Figure 4: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Simula developed about 180 armor kits for the HEMTT in 1996 to support
operations in the Balkans. However, the kits were placed in storage and
never actually used. When armor requirements were identified for
operations in Iraq, the Army and Simula retrieved and tested the stored
kits and subsequently shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq.
In February 2004, the Army contracted with Simula to begin production
of new kits.
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
Requirements for 1,080 HEMTT armor kits were first identified in
November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement
were not installed until February 2005, or 15 months after the first
requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow
to a level of 2,430 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in
September 2005 to 2,246. However, as of September 2005 the total amount
of kits installed was 2,088, or 158 fewer than the quantity required.
Figure 5 compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit
requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed.
According to Army officials, the total number of required armor kits
was installed by December 2005.
Figure 5: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits:
Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
HEMTT. First, the Army's lack of timeliness of contract awards over the
life of the program constrained the overall production schedule.
Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum
negatively impacted the contractor's ability to maximize production in
the early stages of the program.
Contracts Constrained Production:
The Army issued five contracts for HEMTT armor kits, which affected the
contractor's ability to produce more kits faster. For example,
according to contractor officials, they have not had capacity
constraints in the building of HEMTT armor kits; however, they sized
production capacity to meet the quantities in the contract that the
contractor had been awarded. Therefore, production levels were lower
than they could have been if the contractor had received a contract for
larger quantities of kits upfront, which prevented production of more
of the kits sooner. One reason for the Army's use of a contract in this
manner was the fact that funding was received in amounts less than the
total requirements and initially lagged several months behind
requirements. As shown in figure 6, the availability of funding
affected the pace of contract awards.
Figure 6: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Another reason for the lower quantity of contract orders was the
changing requirements for HEMTT armor kits. For example, armor kit
production output for the HEMTT dropped to zero in April and May
because the contractor had completed production for the current
requirement. However, subsequent contract orders were awarded after the
contractor had ceased production. By the time that the contractor had
received the last two contracts for 791 and 319 HEMTT armor kits,
respectively, production had already stopped, employees and sub-
contractors were released, and equipment and facility space were given
up for other uses. Consequently, production of the 791 and 319 kits had
to wait about two months until the contractor could restart this
industrial base.
Although an additional requirement had been identified in March 2005, a
contract to meet this requirement was not awarded until April 2005,
which was not soon enough to prevent the stoppage of the production
line. According to the Army's program manager, to prevent a production
stoppage the requirement would have had to be identified and the
contract order issued several months earlier.
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production:
A shortage of armor materials, specifically steel and aluminum,
negatively impacted the HEMTT armor kit program. Shortages of high hard
armor steels and aluminum negatively affected the start up and pace of
production through the end of 2004. The material shortages were
eventually rectified by the intervention of the Army's Tactical Wheeled
Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various congressional staff
appealing directly to the material suppliers.
Heavy Equipment Transporter:
The heavy equipment transporter (HET) is a system used by the Army to
transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and other
heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield. The HET
system consists of a truck tractor and HET trailer, as shown in figure
7. The Army's armoring effort involves applying armor to a total of 796
HETs. In April 2004, the Army contracted with Simula Inc. to begin
producing armor kits for the HET.
Figure 7: Heavy Equipment Transporter:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
Requirements for 500 HET armor kits were first identified in November
2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement
were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first
requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow
to 758 by March 2005, but dropped in September 2005 to 663. As of
September 2005 the total number of kits installed was 700, or 37
greater than the quantity required. Figure 8 compares the time elapsed
from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits
were produced and installed.
Figure 8: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
Installed:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits:
Two significant factors affected the contractor's ability to produce
armor kits for the HET. First, the award of contracts over the armoring
program's life and a lack of contractor visibility into upcoming
contracts affected HET production. Second, the HET armoring program was
also negatively impacted by a material shortage.
Contracts Constrained Production:
The Army issued four contracts for the HET, which lagged behind
requirements. This limited the contractor's ability to maximize
production of HET kits. Specifically, contractor officials told us that
they did not have capacity constraints in the building of HET armor
kits; however, they sized production capacity to meet the quantities in
the contract orders that they had been awarded. Therefore, production
levels were lower than they could have been if the contractor had
received contract orders for larger quantities of kits upfront, which
prevented production of more of the kits sooner. Significant reasons
for awarding less than the total requirements were changing
requirements and delayed and less than the total funding. Figure 9
demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding,
and contracts.
Figure 9: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
A lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contract awards also
affected HET production. Specifically, the Army awarded a contract for
131 additional HET add-on-armor kits in April 2005. However, in
February 2005 the contractor's supply base had completed production for
HET components related to the previous contract order for 66 HET kits.
Consequently, the supply base required two months to reinitiate
production of these components from a cold start. If the contractor had
had visibility into the upcoming contract, it could have maintained the
needed supply base and reduced production time for the additional 131
HETs by 2 months.
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production:
The HET armoring program was also negatively impacted by a material
shortage. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor
steels and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle
contract orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The
material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the
Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various
congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers.
Palletized Load System:
The Army's palletized load system (PLS) performs long distance and
local haul, and unit resupply in the tactical environment to support
combat units. The PLS is supposed to facilitate the rapid movement of
combat configured loads of ammunition as well as all classes of
supplies and containers. The PLS consists of a truck with self-loading
capabilities and a trailer, as shown in figure 10.
Figure 10: Palletized Load System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to contractor officials, the Army's Tank-Automotive Research,
Development and Engineering Center had developed and built around 30
armored kits to support operations in the Balkans; however, the kits
were placed in storage and never used. Subsequently, when armor
requirements were identified for operations in Iraq, the Army retrieved
the kits from storage and shipped them to southwest Asia for use in
Iraq. In February 2004, the Army issued contract orders to Simula Inc.
to produce additional PLS armor kits. Simula Inc. has completed
production of a total of 1,282 armor kits, which satisfies the current
requirement for 914 armor kits and provides 368 spare PLS armor kits
for future requirements.
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
Requirements for 800 PLS armor kits were first identified in November
2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement
were not installed until May 2005, or 18 months after the first
requirement was established. By March 2005, the identified requirements
had increased by 114, which were met in July 2005. In September 2005,
the identified requirements increased again by 30, which were met in
September 2005. Figure 11 compares the time elapsed from the
identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were
produced and installed. In anticipation of a greater requirement, the
Army program office ordered 338 kits above the Army's current
requirement.
Figure 11: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits:
Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
PLS. First, the Army's use of contracts for quantities less than total
requirements over the life of the program constrained the overall
production schedule. Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically
steel and aluminum, negatively impacted the contractor's ability to
maximize production.
Contracts Constrained Production:
The Army issued four contracts for PLS kits, which initially lagged
behind requirements and affected the contractor's ability to maximize
the production of PLS kits. According to contractor officials, they
have not had capacity constraints in the building of PLS armor kits;
however, they sized production capacity to meet the quantities in the
contracts that the contractor had been issued. Therefore, production
levels were lower than they could have been if the contractor had
received contracts for larger quantities of kits upfront, which
prevented the production of more of the kits sooner. Significant
reasons for awards for less than the total requirements were changing
requirements and delayed and less than total funding. Figure 12
demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding,
and contracts.
Figure 12: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production:
The PLS armoring program was also negatively impacted by material
shortages. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor
steels and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle
contract orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The
material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the
Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various
Congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers.
M939 5-Ton Truck:
The Army's M939 5-ton tactical truck is a general-purpose military
vehicle, primarily designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a
5-ton capacity, six-wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of
all types of supplies and comes in various vehicle types, including a
cargo truck, dump truck, and wrecker. Figure 13 shows an example of an
M-939 5-ton truck.
Figure 13: M939 5-Ton Truck:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The M939 5-ton truck armoring effort includes manufacturing armoring
kits for 3,000 5-ton trucks at six army facilities through a program
manager agreement with the Army's Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise
(GSIE).[Footnote 20] GSIE began producing truck kits in December 2004
and completed the last kits in July 2005.
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
Requirements for 2,229 M939 5-ton truck armor kits were first
identified in April 2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet
that requirement were not produced until June 2005, or 14 months after
the first requirement was established. As of September 2005, 2,224 kits
had been installed. Identified requirements grew to 3,073 by August
2004, but dropped 2,688 by March 2005, and dropped again slightly in
September 2005 to 2,592. By June 2005 a sufficient quantity of kits had
been produced to meet those requirements. Figure 14 compares the time
elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time
when kits were produced and installed. The Army estimated the required
quantity of kits would have been installed by January 2006. According
to GSIE officials, GSIE does not anticipate any further production
orders for the M939 armor kits.
Figure 14: Comparison of M939 5-Ton Truck Armor Kit Requirements to
Kits Produced and Installed:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Availability of Armor Kits:
Shortages of material negatively impacted the production of M939 5-ton
armor kits. According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for
the 5-ton truck armor kits was established based on the availability of
material and components that are used to build the armor kits. When
GSIE was asked to accelerate the production of M939 5-ton kits, the
lack of availability of certain materials limited GSIE's ability to
increase the production quantity of the armor kit. Examples of items
that were difficult to obtain included armor grade steel, door handles,
and wiper components.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles:
The Army's family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) addresses medium
tactical-vehicle requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and
transportation of equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the
Light Medium Tactical Vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the
Medium Tactical Vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity. Variants of the
FMTV include cargo trucks and tractor, van, wrecker, and dump truck
models. The FMTV armoring effort involves producing a total of 3,890
armor kits.
The FMTV armoring production is split between two separate contractors,
Radian Inc. and Stewart and Stevenson Inc. The Army's Tank-Automotive
Research, Development and Engineering Center designed and produced a
small number (approximately 35) of FMTV armor kits with components that
bolt onto the cab. In March 2003, the Army arranged for Radian to help
with the installation of these kits onto vehicles. In February 2004,
Radian received a contract to produce 270 kits based on the Army
design. The kit being produced by Radian is called the Radian Armor
Crew Kit (RACK). Figure 15 shows an example of an FMTV RACK truck.
Stewart and Stevenson produces an armored cab, called the Low Signature
Armored Cab (LSAC), that replaces the FMTV cab in its entirety. Figure
16 shows an example of an FMTV LSAC truck. On its own initiative, in
2002, Stewart and Stevenson developed an FMTV armored cab design to
protect against mine blasts. Subsequent to its first armored cab
design, Stewart and Stevenson modified its design based on the emerging
threats in Iraq, and in October 2004, after completing design and
testing, received its initial contract from the Army to produce 385
LSAC cabs.
Figure 15: FMTV RACK Truck:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 16: FMTV LSAC Truck:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
Requirements for 1,150 FMTV armor kits were first identified in
November 2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that
requirement were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the
first requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to
grow to 3,335 by March 2005, and again to 3,377 by September 2005.
However, as of September 2005 only 3,053 RACK and LSAC kits had been
installed, or 324 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 17 compares
the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to
the time when kits were produced and installed. According to Army
officials, the total number of required armor kits was installed by
December 2005.
Figure 17: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Contracts Constrained Production:
Orders for FMTV armor kits were awarded for less than the total
requirement and lagged behind requirements. These contracts slowed
production of armor kits for both FMTV contractors. For Radian, there
was a complete break in production because the final contract for 1,049
FMTV armor kits was received after its long lead time for ordering
items needed to maintain continuous production. According to the Radian
officials, production could have been maintained or even accelerated if
the requirements had been identified and funding provided in time to
meet the long lead time. However, the contractor did not have any
visibility into the pending requirements and was told by the Army that
there would be no further contracts for kits. In addition, according to
a Stewart and Stevenson official, if they had been awarded the contract
for the final 292 armor kits in the March/April 2005 time frame, they
could have finished producing the kits in the July/August 2005 time
frame, or 3 months earlier than the October/November 2005 time frame
when the kits were estimated to be completed. Significant reasons for
ordering in this manner were changing requirements and delayed and less
than total funding. Figure 18 demonstrates the relationship between
timing of requirements, funding, and contracts.
Figure 18: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Contracts Affected Price:
The award of contracts in quantities less than total requirements
resulted in the Army not receiving the best price available for the
RACK. The Army ordered FMTV kits from Radian in increments of 270 and
501 in February 2004 and March 2004, respectively. The 270 kits that
the government ordered did not allow for receiving the highest price
break for production quantities, while the 501 kits the government
ordered allowed for the best price break available. For the 272 kit
contract, the cost was about $51,603 for each kit, and for the 501 kit
contract, the cost was $45,271 for each kit, a difference of $6,332 per
kit. According to the Army program officials, the reason there were two
contract awards was that funding was not available for the full
quantity in February 2004.
M915 Truck Family:
The Army's family of M915 trucks comprises highway tractors used
primarily for the long distance transport of containers. The M915 is
very similar to commercial tractor-trailer trucks. Figure 19
illustrates an M915 truck. To protect the M915 crew from enemy fire in
Iraq, the Army contracted with Simula Inc., Radian Inc. and Armor Works
Inc. to develop and build add-on armor kits. The Army's armoring
program involves producing armor kits for 2,026 M915s.
Figure 19: M915 Truck Tractor:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
Requirements for 250 M915 truck armor kits were first identified in
November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement
were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first
requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow
to 1,877 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in September
2005 to 1,805. However, as of September 2005 the total number of kits
installed was 1,295, or 510 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 20
compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit
requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. Army
officials estimated that the total number of required armor kits would
have been installed by January 2006.
Figure 20: Comparison of M915 Family of Trucks Armor Kit Requirements
to Kits Produced and Installed:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits:
Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
M915. First, the Army's award of contracts for less than the total
requirement over the life of the program constrained production.
Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum,
negatively impacted the contractor's ability to maximize production.
Contracts Constrained Production:
Contracts for the M915 truck armor kits were awarded in quantities less
than the total requirement and generally lagged behind requirements.
This manner of contracting for M915 armor kits constrained production,
particularly for Simula. The Army issued four contracts to Simula for
1,228 of the M915 armor kits over a 9-month period. According to Simula
officials, they subcontracted the workload to Plasan Sasa in Israel
based on the first contract of 250. However, subsequent to the first
contract, the Army validated additional requirements of 1,627 kits
between April 2004 and March 2005. However, Simula was not aware when
the first contract was awarded that the total quantities could
eventually exceed 1,600. Had the contractor been aware of this, it
would have proceeded differently from the outset, such as using a
different manufacturer. By the time the additional contracts came into
Simula, Plasan Sasa was facing capacity constraints in the production
of the M915 armor kits. Unable to overcome the capacity constraints at
Plasan Sasa, Simula negotiated with Plasan Sasa to bring some of the
M915 production to the United States. In total, Simula arranged to
complete 738 of the 1,228 M915 armor kits in the United States.
Significant reasons for awarding contracts in this manner were changing
requirements and delayed and less than total funding. Figure 21
demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding,
and contracts.
Figure 21: Comparison of M915 Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production:
Shortages of strategic armor materials negatively impacted M915 armor
kit production. Shortages of high-hard armor steels and aluminum
affected the start up of contract orders and the pace of production
through the end of 2004. The material shortages were eventually
rectified by the intervention of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
Office to set priorities and by various congressional staff appeals
directly to the material suppliers.
Tankers:
The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. There are
four models of fuel tankers involved in the Army's armoring program:
the M967, the M969, the M978, and the M1062. Figure 22 shows an example
of an M969 tanker. The primary component of the tanker armoring effort
is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the exterior of
the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the coating material
and the fuel tank, the hole self-seals and the fuel leak is stopped
within minutes. The second component of tanker armoring comprises armor
panel kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker to protect
critical equipment not protected by the coating material. VSE
Corporation is applying the self-sealing coating to the tankers and is
manufacturing the armor kit for the M967, the M969, and the M1062
tankers. Oshkosh Truck Corporation is manufacturing the armor kit for
the M978 tanker.
Figure 22: An M969 Tanker:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
Requirements for armoring 371 tankers were first identified in August
2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement
were not produced and installed until August 2005, 12 months after the
initial requirement was identified. Identified requirements have
continued to grow to 1,375 armor kits by January 2005, but dropped in
September 2005 to 1,192. However, as of September 2005 the total amount
of armor kits installed was 443, or 749 fewer than the quantity
required. Figure 23 compares the time elapsed from the identification
of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were produced and
installed. Army officials estimate that the total number of required
armor kits will be produced by May 2006 and installed by January 2007.
Figure 23: Comparison of Tanker Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits:
Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for
tankers. First, the Army's award of contracts for less than the total
requirement over the life of the program constrained production.
Second, installation of armor kits was constrained by a limited rate of
rotation for tankers into installation facilities and unique
requirements for applying the protective spray-on coating.
Contracts Constrained Availability of Armor Kits:
The production time line for one of the armor kits, for the M967
tanker, is longer than it would have been if contract awards had been
for the total requirement. The Army awarded two contracts for M967
armoring with quantities of 171 and 152, with an 8-month interval
between the two contracts. According to the contractor, if all 323
tanker kits had been awarded together, the total production time line
would have decreased due to production efficiencies. Contracts for the
other three tankers, the M969, the M978, and the M1062, were awarded
for the total requirement and, therefore, the contractor stated that
production has gone as efficiently as possible.
Limited Installation Rates Paced Availability of Armor Kits:
A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for
tanker trailers was a limited installation rate. For example, the
installation of add-on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of
trucks into the in-theater installation facilities as they returned
from missions. Operational constraints limited the number of vehicles
that could be taken out of use at any one time. In addition, unique
requirements to coat the tankers with a protective chemical prior to
installing armor panels also limited the rate of installation. The
proper application of the chemical coating requires controlled
environmental conditions, such as humidity and temperature, which has
led to a limited number of spray locations accessible to the Army.
Thus, although production of armor kits for tankers is expected to be
completed by May 2006, because of these constraints, installation of
enough kits to meet requirements is not expected to be finished until 8
months later in January 2007.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3000:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
DEFENSE LOGISTICS: Several Factors Limited the Production and
Installation of Army Truck Armor during current Wartime Operations,
dated January 30, 2006 (GAO Code 350658/GAO-06-160).
The Department concurs with the intent of the recommendation in the
draft report. Our specific comments concerning the recommendation, as
well as minor editorial comments, are attached.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Mark D. Schaeffer:
Acting Director:
Defense Systems:
Attachment: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JANUARY 30, 2006
GAO CODE 350658/GAO-06-160:
"DEFENSE LOGISTICS: Several Factors Limited the Production and
Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a process to document and
communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for supplies and
equipment at the time they are identified and the disposition of
funding decisions. (p. 35/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with intent. The Army Requirements and Resourcing
Board (AR2B) conforms to the process described in the GAO
recommendation.
As referenced in the report, the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB)
was established to manage the Army's transition to a wartime focus in
response to the attacks in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania
on September 11, 2001. The ASPB was an element of the Army Strategic
Campaign Plan for the War on Terrorism. In December 2004, the ASPB was
merged with the Army's Setting the Force General Officer Steering
Committee to form the AR2B.
The AR2B serves as the venue for cross-leveling information and
requirements to include urgent wartime requirements for supplies and
equipment with corresponding resourcing solutions. AR2B includes
representation from all major Headquarters Department of the Army staff
sections, Army Material Command, Multinational Force-Iraq, Army
European Command, and Army Pacific Command. This process synchronizes
Army Staff agency and Major Commands executing war support and
reconstitution efforts as they interface with their Joint Staff and
Army counterparts. The AR2B is the mechanism for presenting critical
information to the Army Senior Leadership for rapid-decision making,
through weekly Executive Updates. The AR2B functions as an iterative
and adaptive forum to provide an integrating framework to organize and
synchronize support for the Army Campaign Plan and the Global War on
Terrorism. It provides a bridge between national strategic guidance,
national military guidance, and Major Command/Army Service Component
Command plans and efforts. The AR2B links near-term demands in the Year
of Execution and Budget Year for resource realignment, and provide a
framework for future planning and analysis that enables responsive risk
mitigation. The AR2B is a forum where numerous urgent wartime
requirements are presented as operational needs from Combatant
Commanders and are reviewed, staffed, and validated. The AR2B has
developed recommendations to the Army Senior Leadership for over 3200
tasks in support of immediate Combatant Commander needs. The
accelerated process is completed within 2 weeks to 2 months, as opposed
to the normal 12-24 months for routine budget processes.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or [Hyperlink, solisw@gao.gov]:
Acknowledgements:
In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant
Director; Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard
G. Payne, Jay Rangaram, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary
B. Russell, Patricia Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, and John D. Strong also
made key contributions to this report.
(350658):
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD relies on a number of individual processes and activities,
known collectively as supply chain management, to purchase, produce,
and deliver products and services to the warfighter during contingency
operations. The goal of supply chain management is to deliver the
"right items" to the "right place" at the "right time."
[2] GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the
Effectiveness of Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom,
GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003).
[3] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[4] CENTCOM is one of DOD's five geographic combatant commands, whose
area of responsibility encompasses 27 countries in Southwest Asia,
South and Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. In addition to OIF,
CENTCOM is involved in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.
The other four geographic combatant commands are U.S. European Command,
U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Northern Command.
[5] The Army also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical wheeled
vehicle. We examined issues affecting the production of armor for
HMMWVs in our prior report on wartime supply availability, so we did
not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions
Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and
Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[6] Other force protection measures taken include the fielding of
personal body armor and electronic IED countermeasures, as well as
changes to unit level tactics and training.
[7] The ASPB was established by the Army on September 14, 2001 in
response to the terrorists attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and
Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. The charter of the ASPB is to
manage the Army's rapid transition to a wartime focus as well as
sustain the Army's continuing contribution to homeland security and the
war against terrorism.
[8] The services are allowed to reprogram, without DOD approval, a
total of up to $20 million per year into the procurement account that
includes armor kits. However, because the funding needed for armor kits
exceeded this amount, the services had to request approval for any
funding reprogramming in excess of the $20 million from the DOD
Comptroller, which in turn had to be approved by Congress.
[9] The Iraqi Freedom Fund is a special account providing funds for
additional expenses for military forces in Iraq and those operations
authorized by Pub. L. No. 107-40 (Sept. 13, 2001), Authorization for
Use of Military Force, and other operations and related activities in
support of the global war on terrorism.
[10] GSIE comprises Anniston Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Sierra
Army Depot, Rock Island Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, the Lima Tank
Plant (a government-owned, contractor-operated facility), and a
business center staff located at Rock Island Arsenal. GSIE's objective
is to operate as a single business unit, efficiently using the
industrial capabilities of each installation while simultaneously
transforming those capabilities to meet the needs of Army forces.
GSIE's goal is to continuously improve support to the soldiers and
reduce the cost of GSIE products and services.
[11] In March 2005 the Army validated a requirement for 13,377 trucks
and tankers, which was the last validated requirement for truck armor.
However, in September 2005, the total requirement decreased slightly to
12,819 based on revised nonvalidated needs from units in the theater.
[12] During this time, the need for and operational capabilities
required of new systems were documented in an ORD, which is a statement
containing operational effectiveness, suitability, and related
operational parameters for a proposed concept or system. ORDs were
approved by the Commander of TRADOC. In 2003, the ORD was replaced by
the Capability Development Document and the Capability Production
Document in accordance with a new joint requirements determination
process as part of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System.
[13] These kits included approximately 182 kits for the HEMTT and 32
kits for the PLS.
[14] In March 2005 the Army validated a requirement for 13,377 trucks
and tankers, which was the last validated requirement for truck armor.
However, in September 2005, the total requirement decreased slightly to
12,819 based on revised nonvalidated needs from units in the theater.
[15] Funding requirements and availability data provided includes armor
kits for HMMWVs as well as medium and heavy tactical trucks.
[16] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[17] The purpose of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer
Modularity and Modernization Strategy is to lay out a comprehensive
strategy for meeting modularity requirements and modernizing the
current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. The strategy aims to fill
shortages of vehicles through new tactical wheeled vehicle
procurements; modernize the fleet through recapitalization of existing
vehicles and acquisition of new vehicles; conduct future competition
for certain trucks in fiscal year 2007; and use advanced concept and
technology demonstrations and analysis of alternative results to
determine whether to improve the future vehicle fleet by either
continuing modernization or beginning a new program.
[18] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[19] The Army also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical wheeled
vehicle. We examined issues affecting the timely production of armor
for HMMWVs in our prior report on wartime supply availability, so we
did not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense Logistics:
Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during
Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8,
2005).
[20] GSIE is composed of Anniston Army Depot, Red River Army Depot,
Sierra Army Depot, Rock Island Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, the Lima
Tank Plant (a government-owned, contractor-operated facility), and a
business center staff located at TACOM Rock Island. GSIE's objective is
to operate as a single business unit, efficiently utilizing the
industrial capabilities of each installation, while simultaneously
transforming those capabilities to meet the needs of the Army.
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