Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold Gao ID: GAO-06-573T March 30, 2006Polar-orbiting environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. They are critical to long-term weather prediction, including advance forecasts of a hurricane's path and intensity. Our nation's current operational polar-orbiting environmental satellite program is a complex infrastructure that includes two satellite systems, supporting ground stations, and four central data processing centers. In the future, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is to combine the two current systems into a single, state-of-the-art environment-monitoring satellite system. NPOESS is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring though the year 2020. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have formed a tri-agency integrated program office to manage NPOESS. GAO was asked to determine the NPOESS program's current status and plans and to discuss considerations in moving the program forward.
The future direction of the NPOESS program--what will be delivered, at what cost, and by when--is currently on hold pending a decision on how to proceed. In recent years, the program has experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays, with cost estimates increasing to about $10 billion and launch delays approaching 3 years. These factors triggered the need for difficult decisions about the program's direction and capabilities. In mid-November 2005, GAO reported that the NPOESS executive committee expected to make a decision by December 2005 on the direction of the program. GAO noted the importance of making a decision quickly so that the program could proceed. However, in late November 2005, NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires DOD to certify the program to Congress. This placed any decision about future direction on hold until certification takes place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program office has implemented an interim plan to continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal year 2006 funding. Following certification, a decision on future direction should be clear. Proceeding will require a new program baseline and renegotiated contracts--efforts that could take up to a year. As NPOESS undergoes the Defense certification process and important decisions are made on how the program is to proceed, there are several important considerations. First, NOAA and NASA representation in the DOD certification process is imperative. It will be important for these agencies to remain active players in the deliberation of options and the final decision on how to move the program forward. Second, continued indecision increases the risk of a gap in satellite coverage if the final satellite in the predecessor satellite series (the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites or POES) were to fail. Thus, once program direction is decided, it will be important to move quickly to adjust agency budgets and contracts. Third, continuing oversight of program and executive management is essential to avoid repeating past problems.
GAO-06-573T, Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Disaster Prevention and Prediction,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 11 a.m. EST Thursday, March 30, 2006:
Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold:
Statement of David A. Powner, Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
GAO-06-573T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-573T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Disaster Prevention and Prediction, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, US Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Polar-orbiting environmental satellites provide data and imagery that
are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to
map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the
environment. They are critical to long-term weather prediction,
including advance forecasts of a hurricane…s path and intensity. Our
nation‘s current operational polar-orbiting environmental satellite
program is a complex infrastructure that includes two satellite
systems, supporting ground stations, and four central data processing
centers.
In the future, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) is to combine the two current systems into a
single, state-of-the-art environment-monitoring satellite system.
NPOESS is considered critical to the United States‘ ability to maintain
the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global
climate monitoring though the year 2020. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have formed a
tri-agency integrated program office to manage NPOESS.
GAO was asked to determine the NPOESS program‘s current status and
plans and to discuss considerations in moving the program forward.
What GAO Found:
The future direction of the NPOESS program”what will be delivered, at
what cost, and by when”is currently on hold pending a decision on how
to proceed. In recent years, the program has experienced significant
cost increases and schedule delays, with cost estimates increasing to
about $10 billion and launch delays approaching 3 years. These factors
triggered the need for difficult decisions about the program‘s
direction and capabilities. In mid-November 2005, GAO reported that the
NPOESS executive committee expected to make a decision by December 2005
on the direction of the program. GAO noted the importance of making a
decision quickly so that the program could proceed. However, in late
November 2005, NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated
threshold that requires DOD to certify the program to Congress. This
placed any decision about future direction on hold until certification
takes place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program office has
implemented an interim plan to continue work on key sensors and other
program elements using fiscal year 2006 funding. Following
certification, a decision on future direction should be clear.
Proceeding will require a new program baseline and renegotiated
contracts”efforts that could take up to a year.
As NPOESS undergoes the Defense certification process and important
decisions are made on how the program is to proceed, there are several
important considerations. First, NOAA and NASA representation in the
DOD certification process is imperative. It will be important for these
agencies to remain active players in the deliberation of options and
the final decision on how to move the program forward. Second,
continued indecision increases the risk of a gap in satellite coverage
if the final satellite in the predecessor satellite series (the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites or POES) were to fail
(see figure). Thus, once program direction is decided, it will be
important to move quickly to adjust agency budgets and contracts.
Third, continuing oversight of program and executive management is
essential to avoid repeating past problems. Potential Gap in Satellite
Coverage:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-573T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David Powner at (202) 512-
9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today‘s hearing to
discuss our work on the planned National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. NPOESS is expected to
be a state-of-the-art environment-monitoring satellite system that will
replace two existing polar-orbiting environment satellite systems.
Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery that are used by
weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and
monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment.
The NPOESS program is considered critical to the United States‘ ability
to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting
(including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and global climate
monitoring through the year 2020. Three agencies share responsibility
for NPOESS: the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). To manage the program, these agencies
established a tri-agency integrated program office. At your request, we
will discuss the program‘s current status and plans, as well as
considerations in moving the program forward.
This statement builds on other work we have done on environmental
satellite programs over the last several years. [Footnote 1] An
overview of the approach we used to perform this work (our objectives,
scope, and methodology) is provided in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The future direction of the NPOESS program”what will be delivered, at
what cost, and by when”is currently on hold pending a decision on how
to proceed. In recent years, the program has experienced significant
cost increases and schedule delays, with cost estimates increasing to
about $10 billion and launch delays approaching 3 years. These factors
triggered the need for difficult decisions about the program‘s
direction and capabilities. In mid-November 2005, we reported that the
NPOESS executive committee expected to make a decision by December 2005
on the direction of the program. We noted the importance of making a
decision quickly so that the program could proceed. However, in late
November 2005, NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated
threshold that requires DOD to certify the program to Congress. This
placed any decision about future direction on hold until certification
takes place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program office has
implemented an interim plan to continue work on key sensors and other
program elements using fiscal year 2006 funding. Following
certification, a decision on future direction should be clear. That
will require a new program baseline [Footnote 2] and renegotiated
contracts”efforts that could take up to a year.
As NPOESS undergoes the Defense certification process and important
decisions are made on how the program is to proceed, there are several
important considerations. First, NOAA and NASA representation in the
DOD certification process is imperative. It will be important for these
agencies to remain active players in the deliberation of options and
the final decision on how to move the program forward. Second,
continued indecision increases the risk of a gap in satellite coverage.
NPOESS is the backup satellite for the final satellite in the
predecessor satellite series. If this predecessor satellite were to
fail, there could be a significant data gap until NPOESS is launched
and operational. Thus, once a program direction is decided, it will be
important to move quickly to adjust agency budgets and contracts.
Third, continuing oversight of program and executive management is
essential to avoid repeating past problems.
Background:
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, managed by
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), managed by the
Department of Defense (DOD). The satellites obtain environmental data
that are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized
weather products and are the predominant input to numerical weather
prediction models. These models are a primary tool for forecasting
weather 3 or more days in advance, including forecasting the path and
intensity of hurricanes. The models are used to predict the potential
impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency managers can
help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar satellites also provide
data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion
and drought conditions, as well as data sets that are used by
researchers for a variety of studies, such as climate monitoring.
Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position above
the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in an
almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that
affect the weather and climate. Each satellite makes about 14 orbits a
day. As the earth rotates beneath it, each satellite views the entire
earth's surface twice a day. Currently, there are two operational POES
satellites and two operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so
that they can observe the earth in early morning, mid-morning, and
early afternoon polar orbits. Together, they ensure that, for any
region of the earth, the data provided to users are generally no more
than 6 hours old. Figure 1 illustrates the current operational polar
satellite configuration. Besides the four operational satellites, six
older satellites are in orbit that still collect some data and are
available to provide some limited backup to the operational satellites
should they degrade or fail. In the future, both NOAA and DOD plan to
continue to launch additional POES and DMSP satellites every few years,
with final launches scheduled for 2007 and 2011, respectively.
Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Each of the polar satellites carries a suite of sensors designed to
detect environmental data that are either reflected or emitted from the
earth, the atmosphere, and space. The satellites store these data and
then transmit them to NOAA and Air Force ground stations when the
satellites pass overhead. The ground stations then relay the data via
communications satellites to the appropriate meteorological centers for
processing. The satellites also broadcast a subset of these data in
real time to tactical receivers all over the world.
Under a shared processing agreement among four satellite data
processing centers--NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and
Information Service (NESDIS), the Air Force Weather Agency, the Navy's
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center, and the Naval
Oceanographic Office--different centers are responsible for producing
and distributing, via a shared network, different environmental data
sets, specialized weather and oceanographic products, and weather
prediction model outputs.[Footnote 3] Each of the four processing
centers is also responsible for distributing the data to its respective
users. For the DOD centers, the users include regional meteorology and
oceanography centers, as well as meteorology and oceanography staff on
military bases. NESDIS forwards the data to NOAA's National Weather
Service for distribution and use by government and commercial
forecasters. The processing centers also use the Internet to distribute
data to the general public. NESDIS is responsible for the long-term
archiving of data and derived products from POES and DMSP.
In addition to the infrastructure supporting satellite data processing
noted above, properly equipped field terminals that are within a direct
line of sight of the satellites can receive real-time data directly
from the polar-orbiting satellites. There are an estimated 150 such
field terminals operated by U.S. and foreign governments and academia.
Field terminals can be taken into areas with little or no data
communications infrastructure--such as on a battlefield or a ship--and
enable the receipt of weather data directly from the polar-orbiting
satellites. These terminals have their own software and processing
capability to decode and display a subset of the satellite data to the
user. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from the polar-
orbiting satellites to the data processing centers and field terminals.
Figure 2: Generic Data Relay Pattern for the Polar Meteorological
Satellite System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
NPOESS Overview:
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive[Footnote 4] required NOAA and DOD to
converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program
capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. The
converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States'
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting and global climate monitoring through the year 2020. To
manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated
Program Office, located within NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain
activities. NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the
converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the
acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the
development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged
system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA
funds specific technology projects and studies. Figure 3 depicts the
organizations that make up the Integrated Program Office and lists
their responsibilities.
Figure 3: Organizations Coordinated by the NPOESS Integrated Program
Office:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Current program acquisition plans call for the procurement and launch
of six NPOESS satellites over the life of the program, as well as the
integration of 13 instruments, consisting of 10 environmental sensors
and 3 subsystems. Together, the sensors are to receive and transmit
data on atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climate,
oceanographic, and solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems are
to support nonenvironmental search and rescue efforts, sensor
survivability, and environmental data collection activities.
According to the program office, 7 of the 13 planned NPOESS instruments
involve new technology development, whereas 6 others are based on
existing technologies. In addition, the program office considers 4 of
the sensors involving new technologies critical, because they provide
data for key weather products; these sensors are shown in bold in table
1, which lists the planned instruments and the state of technology on
each.
Table 1: Expected NPOESS Instruments:
Note: Critical sensors in bold.
Instrument name: Advanced technology microwave sounder;
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the
atmosphere and is to be used with infrared sounding data from NPOESS's
cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily global atmospheric
temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles;
State of technology: New.
Instrument name: Aerosol polarimetry sensor;
Description: Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols
(liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the atmosphere, such
as sea spray, smog, and smoke);
State of technology: New.
Instrument name: Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder; (CMIS);
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain
rate, ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the
clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at
different atmospheric levels;
State of technology: New.
Instrument name: Cross-track infrared sounder;
Description: Collects measurements of the earth's radiation to
determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and
pressure in the atmosphere;
State of technology: New.
Instrument name: Data collection system;
Description: Collects environmental data from platforms around the
world and delivers them to users worldwide;
State of technology: Existing.
Instrument name: Earth radiation budget sensor;
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave
radiation released by the earth back into space on a worldwide scale to
enhance long-term climate studies;
State of technology: Existing.
Instrument name: Ozone mapper/profiler suite;
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and
distribution of ozone in the earth's atmosphere;
State of technology: New.
Instrument name: Radar altimeter;
Description: Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface
height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to
provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction
models;
State of technology: Existing.
Instrument name: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system;
Description: Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based
users in distress;
State of technology: Existing.
Instrument name: Space environmental sensor suite;
Description: Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects
of space weather on technological systems, including satellites and
radio links;
State of technology: New.
Instrument name: Survivability sensor;
Description: Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other
instruments in case of an attack;
State of technology: Existing.
Instrument name: Total solar irradiance sensor;
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance
data;
State of technology: Existing.
Instrument name: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS);
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide
information on the earth's clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land
surfaces;
State of technology: New.
Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[End of table]
In addition, the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), which is being
developed as a major risk reduction and climate data continuity
initiative, is a planned demonstration satellite to be launched several
years before the first NPOESS satellite is to be launched. It is
planned to host three of the four critical NPOESS sensors (the
visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS), the cross-track
infrared sounder, and the advanced technology microwave sounder), as
well as a noncritical sensor (the ozone mapper/profiler suite). NPP
will provide the program office and the processing centers an early
opportunity to work with the sensors, ground control, and data
processing systems. Specifically, this satellite is expected to
demonstrate the validity of about half of the NPOESS environmental data
records[Footnote 5] and about 93 percent of its data processing load.
NPOESS Acquisition Strategy:
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that consists of three key phases:
the concept and technology development phase, which lasted from roughly
1995 to early 1997; the program definition and risk reduction phase,
which began in early 1997 and ended in August 2002; and the engineering
and manufacturing development and production phase, which began with
the award of the development and production contract in August 2002 and
will continue through the end of the program. Before the contract was
awarded in 2002, the life cycle cost for the program was estimated to
be $6.5 billion over the 24-year period from the inception of the
program in 1995 through 2018. Shortly after the contract was awarded,
the life cycle cost estimate was estimated to be $7 billion.
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, program officials
identified an anticipated schedule and funding stream for the program.
The schedule for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement
that the satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP
satellites should anything go wrong during the planned launches of
these satellites. In general, program officials anticipate that roughly
1 out of every 10 satellites will fail either during launch or during
early operations after launch.
Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May 2006, (2)
having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES
satellite launch in March 2008, and (3) having the second NPOESS
satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite launch in
October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up the
final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch dates would have
been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.
NPOESS Has Experienced Continued Cost Increases and Schedule Delays:
Over the past several years, the NPOESS program has experienced a
series of cost increases and schedule delays. In 2003, we reported that
changes in the NPOESS funding stream caused a delay in the program's
schedule.[Footnote 6] Specifically, a DOD program official reported
that between 2001 and 2002 the agency experienced delays in launching a
DMSP satellite, causing delays in the expected launch dates of another
satellite. In late 2002, DOD shifted the expected launch date for the
final satellite from 2009 to 2010. As a result, the department reduced
funding for NPOESS by about $65 million between fiscal years 2004 and
2007. According to program officials, because NOAA is required to
provide the same level of funding that DOD provides, this change
triggered a corresponding reduction in funding by NOAA for those years.
As a result of the reduced funding, program officials were forced to
make difficult decisions about what to focus on first. The program
office decided to keep NPP as close to its original schedule as
possible, because of its importance to the eventual NPOESS development,
and to shift some of the NPOESS deliverables to later years. This shift
affected the NPOESS deployment schedule. To plan for this shift, the
program office developed a new program cost and schedule baseline.
After this new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the
program office increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion
to $8.1 billion, and delayed key milestones, including the planned
launch of the first NPOESS satellite--which was delayed by 7
months.[Footnote 7] The cost increases reflected changes to the NPOESS
contract as well as increased program management funds. According to
the program office, contract changes included extension of the
development schedule, increased sensor costs, and additional funds
needed for mitigating risks. Increased program management funds were
added for noncontract costs and management reserves.
At that time, we also noted that other factors could further affect the
revised cost and schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor was
not meeting expected cost and schedule targets on the new baseline
because of technical issues in the development of key sensors,
including the critical VIIRS sensor. Based on its performance through
May 2004, we estimated that the contractor would most likely overrun
its contract at completion in September 2011 by $500 million. In
addition, we reported that risks associated with the development of the
critical sensors, integrated data processing system, and algorithms,
among other things, could contribute to further cost increases and
schedule slips.
Most recently, in our November 2005 testimony, we noted that NPOESS
schedules, costs, and trends had continued to worsen.[Footnote 8] We
reported that over the past year, NPOESS cost increases and schedule
delays demonstrated worsening trends, and that there were continuing
problems in the development of a key sensor. We further noted that
contractor data showed that costs and schedules were likely to continue
to increase in the future. Our trend analysis at the time showed that
the contractor would most likely overrun costs by $1.4 billion,
resulting in a life cycle cost of about $9.7 billion, unless critical
changes were made. We also noted that program risks, particularly with
the development of critical sensors, could further increase NPOESS
costs and delay schedules. At the November hearing, program officials
confirmed that the program's life cycle cost estimate would likely grow
to $10 billion unless critical changes were made to the program. Table
2 provides a summary of recent growth in program cost estimates.
As for schedule changes, in November 2005, we noted that the program
office anticipated at least a 10-month delay in the launch of the first
satellite (totaling at least a 17-month delay from the time the
contract was awarded) and a 6-month delay in the launch of the second
satellite. A summary of those schedule changes is shown in table 3. The
effect of these delays is evident in the widening gap between when the
last POES satellite is expected to launch and when the first NPOESS
satellite could be available if needed as a backup. This is significant
because if the last POES satellite fails on launch, it will be at least
3 years before the first NPOESS satellite could be launched. During
that time, critical weather and environmental observations would be
unavailable--and military and civilian weather products and forecasts
could be significantly degraded.
Table 2: Changes in NPOESS Life Cycle Cost Estimates through November
2005:
As of: July 2002;
Life cycle cost estimate: $6.5 billion;
Life cycle range: 1995-2018.
As of: July 2003;
Life cycle cost estimate: $7.0 billion;
Life cycle range: 1995-2018.
As of: September 2004;
Life cycle cost estimate: $8.1 billion;
Life cycle range: 1995-2020.
As of: November 2005;
Life cycle cost estimate: $10 billion[A];
Life cycle range: To be determined.
Source: GAO analysis, based on Integrated Program Office data.
[A] Anticipated decisions on program direction are likely to affect
this estimate.
[End of table]
Table 3: Changes in NPOESS Schedule Estimates as of November 2005:
Milestones: NPP launch;
As of August 2002 contract award: May 2006;
As of February 2004 (rebaseline): October 2006;
As of August 2005: April 2008;
Net change from contract award: 23-month delay;
Minimum change from rebaseline: 18-month delay;
Potential data gap: Not applicable.
Milestones: Final POES launch[ A];
As of August 2002 contract award: March 2008;
As of February 2004 (rebaseline): March 2008;
As of August 2005: December 2007;
Net change from contract award: 4-month advance;
Potential data gap: Not applicable.
Milestones: First NPOESS satellite planned for launch;
As of August 2002 contract award: April 2009;
As of February 2004 (rebaseline): November 2009;
As of August 2005: September 2010;
Net change from contract award: 17-month delay;
Minimum change from rebaseline: 10-month delay;
Potential data gap: Not applicable.
Milestones: First NPOESS satellite launch if needed to back up the
final POES;
As of August 2002 contract award: March 2008;
As of February 2004 (rebaseline): February 2010[B];
As of August 2005: December 2010[C];
Net change from contract award: 33-month delay;
Potential data gap: 3-year data gap if final POES fails on launch.
Milestones: Final DMSP launch[A];
As of August 2002 contract award: October 2009;
As of February 2004 (rebaseline): May 2010;
As of August 2005: October 2011;
Net change from contract award: 24-month delay;
Potential data gap: Not applicable.
Milestones: Second NPOESS satellite planned for launch;
As of August 2002 contract award: June 2011;
As of February 2004 (rebaseline): June 2011;
As of August 2005: December 2011;
Net change from contract award: 6-month delay;
Minimum change from rebaseline: 6-month delay;
Potential data gap: Not applicable.
Source: GAO analysis, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.
[A] POES and DMSP are not part of the NPOESS program. Their launch
dates are provided because of their relevance to the NPOESS satellite
schedules.
[B] A program official reported that if the first NPOESS satellite is
needed to back up the final POES satellite, the contractor will prepare
the satellite to be launched in a different orbit with a different
suite of sensors. These factors will prevent launch from taking place
until February 2010.
[C] If the first NPOESS satellite is needed to back up the final POES
satellite, the contractor will prepare the satellite to be launched in
a different orbit with a different suite of sensors, adding 3 months to
the September 2010 launch date.
[End of table]
Problems involving multiple levels of management--including
subcontractor, contractor, program office, and executive leadership--
played a role in bringing the NPOESS program to its current state. For
example, the VIIRS sensor development issues were attributed, in part,
to the subcontractor's inadequate project management. Specifically,
after a series of technical problems, internal review teams sent by the
prime contractor and the program office found that the subcontractor
had deviated from a number of contract, management, and policy
directives set out by the main office and that both management and
process engineering were inadequate. Neither the contractor nor the
program office had recognized the underlying problems in time to fix
them. After these issues were identified, the subcontractor's
management team was replaced. Further, in January 2005, the NPOESS
Executive Committee (Excom) called for an independent review of the
VIIRS problems. This independent review, delivered in August 2005,
reported that the program management office did not have the technical
system engineering support it needed to effectively manage the
contractor, among other things. We also reported that the involvement
of NPOESS executive leadership had wavered from frequent heavy
involvement to occasional meetings with few resulting decisions.
Specifically, the Excom had met five times over the preceding 2 years.
Most of these meetings did not result in major decisions, but rather
triggered further analysis and review.
Sound management is critical to program success. In our reviews of
major acquisitions throughout the government, we have reported that key
factors determining a project's ability to be delivered on time, within
budget, and with promised functionality include sound program
management, contractor oversight, risk identification and escalation,
and effective and timely executive level oversight.[Footnote 9] Given
the history of large cost increases and the factors that could further
affect NPOESS costs and schedules, we reported that continued
oversight, strong leadership, and timely decision making are more
critical than ever.
NPOESS Status and Plans: Decision on Program's Future Direction on
Hold, Interim Efforts Under Way:
The future direction of the NPOESS program--what will be delivered, at
what cost, and by when--is currently on hold pending a decision on how
to proceed. Over the last few years, NPOESS has experienced continued
cost increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions about
the program's direction and capabilities.
In mid-November 2005, we reported that the NPOESS executive committee
expected to make a decision in December 2005 on the direction of the
program. This involved deciding among options involving increased
costs, delayed schedules, and reduced functionality. We urged the
committee to make a decision quickly so that the program could proceed.
However, in late November 2005, NPOESS cost growth exceeded a
legislatively mandated threshold that requires the Department of
Defense to certify the program to Congress. This placed any decision
about the future direction of the program on hold until the
certification takes place in June 2006.
In the meantime, the program office has implemented an interim plan to
continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal
year 2006 funding. Following certification, a decision on future
direction should be clear. That will require developing a new program
baseline and renegotiating contracts--efforts that could take up to a
year.
Nunn-McCurdy Process Puts Program Direction on Hold:
The Nunn-McCurdy Act[Footnote 10] requires DOD to take specific actions
when a major system acquisition exceeds certain cost thresholds. Key
provisions require the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a
major defense acquisition is expected to overrun its project baseline
by 15 percent or more, and to certify the program to Congress when it
is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent or more.
Certification is an assurance that:
* the program is essential to national security,
* there are no alternatives to the program that will provide equal or
greater military capability at less cost,
* the new estimates of the program's cost are reasonable, and:
* the management structure for the program is adequate to manage and
control cost.
In August 2005, the NPOESS program office determined that it could not
execute its planned program within the constraints of its current
baseline and notified its executive committee. In turn, Congress was
notified that the program was expected to overrun its baseline by 15
percent. Subsequently, in late November 2005, it was determined that at
completion the final program cost would be greater than 25 percent over
its baseline. At the beginning of January 2006, DOD notified Congress
that NPOESS was expected to overrun its baseline by more than 25
percent and began the process of certifying the program.
The Nunn-McCurdy Act pertains to Defense acquisitions, but because
NPOESS is a joint program, the certification process was expanded to
include input from NOAA and NASA. Specifically, the Defense Acquisition
Executive, who is responsible for the certification process, invited
the NPOESS executive committee members to participate in the process,
with principal stakeholders from each NPOESS partner agency serving as
intermediaries between the executive committee members and working
groups set up to address each of the four certification elements.
Additionally, these working groups are made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA
personnel, as well as others (such as representatives of the NPOESS
senior user advisory group) as warranted.
As part of the certification process, DOD is evaluating options for the
future of the program. These options could include reducing the number
or function of NPOESS satellites, relying on European satellites,
increasing costs, delaying planned launch dates, or canceling the
program. According to Defense officials, a decision is expected to be
announced during the first week of June 2006. However, the completion
of the certification process does not end the negotiations on this
program. Any major cost changes will need to be worked into the
respective agencies' budgets, and any major program changes will need
to be worked into a new baseline describing what will be delivered by
when and then negotiated with the contractor. According to program
office officials, a revised baseline will likely take 6 to 12 months to
develop and implement from the time a decision is made.
Program Office Has Interim Efforts Under Way:
* The NPOESS Integrated Program Office has several initiatives under
way--both to improve its management of the program and to keep NPOESS
sensor development moving forward--as it waits for completion of the
Nunn-McCurdy process. To address concerns about program management that
we and others have raised, the program office has:
* increased staffing of cost analysts and earned value management
experts to improve contractor and subcontractor oversight,
* increased the presence of system engineers on sensor development
initiatives,
* developed a proposal for restructuring the program office and overall
satellite program to allow for clearer decision-making authority and
more timely decisions, and:
* taken steps to improve communications among the program office, tri-
agency executives, and contractors.
These initiatives should help improve program management, but they are
not yet fully implemented--and will not guarantee success. The proposed
management changes still need to be approved, funded, and implemented.
Further, NPOESS development is technically challenging. Thus, stringent
oversight and risk management will continue to be important throughout
the life of the project.
As for continuing sensor development, because any major changes to the
program will not be known until the certification process is completed,
the program office has implemented an interim plan to continue work on
key sensors and other program elements within the fiscal year 2006
funding profile. Officials stated that they chose work activities that
would be needed regardless of the option chosen for the future
direction of the program.
Based on contractor-provided data, our analysis indicates that NPOESS
is making mixed progress against the fiscal year 2006 interim plan.
Between October 2005 and January 2006, the contractor outperformed its
program cost and schedule targets and completed some unplanned work.
However, the contractor continued to experience cost overruns on the
development of its critical sensors--VIIRS and CMIS. The primary cost
drivers were the extensive manpower beyond what was planned to resolve
technical issues.
The development of VIIRS is of particular importance because it is to
be demonstrated on the NPP satellite, which is currently scheduled for
launch in April 2008. While CMIS is not part of NPP, its development is
important because it is one of four critical sensors providing data for
key weather products. Over the past year, work on CMIS was deferred in
order to fund efforts to fix VIIRS and to keep NPP on schedule.
In November, we reported that VIIRS was experiencing continued problems
dealing with the technical complexity of the ground support equipment.
VIIRS also experienced problems with the development of the
cryoradiator,[Footnote 11] excessive vibration of sensor parts, and
errors in the sensor's solar calibration. Since November, the program
office has taken positive steps to contain these technical risks. In
particular, VIIRS now has a baseline plan for serial development of the
sensor design, an approach that is intended to minimize rework. The
program office also added decision gates to provide management review
and approval of progress.
We also reported in November on the problems experienced on CMIS.
Specifically, CMIS continued to face technical challenges in the design
of the receivers, the sensor structure, and the antenna calibration
system. In addition, it experienced system reliability and thermal
issues, among other things. Since November, work has been ongoing to
simplify the CMIS design. These design changes are intended to reduce
the weight of the CMIS structure by moving several subsystems from the
instrument onto the spacecraft. Additionally, the program office
reported that the contractor has demonstrated that a complex component
of the CMIS receiver is feasible.
While positive measures have been taken in the development of both of
these sensors, the program office continues to consider VIIRS to be a
high-risk initiative because of technical challenges that it is facing.
VIIRS is fast approaching a critical developmental milestone that will
determine the extent of progress made. Specifically, a prototype is
expected to begin thermal vacuum testing in summer 2006. This testing
will assess the stability of the current sensor design. If the current
design fails to meet its performance metrics, VIIRS could be in danger
of falling further behind in cost and schedule. Program officials
acknowledge that CMIS requires a watchful eye, but note that there is
more time available to meet its development requirements. To the
program office's credit, however, it is aware of these risks and is
using its risk management plans to help mitigate them.
Considerations in Moving the NPOESS Program Forward:
As NPOESS undergoes the Nunn-McCurdy certification process and
important decisions are made on how the program is to proceed, there
are several important considerations.
NOAA and NASA representation in the DOD Nunn-McCurdy certification
process is imperative. As a joint program, NPOESS is expected to
fulfill many military, civilian, and research requirements for
environmental data. Thus, it is important that all agency partners have
a voice in the DOD proceedings. As noted earlier, DOD has included NOAA
and NASA in its process--both in an executive advisory capacity and on
the teams working to address each of the four certification
requirements. Further, NOAA and NASA officials reported that they
believe that they are being effectively involved in the certification
process. However, because this is a DOD process and decision, and
because Defense requirements differ from NOAA and NASA requirements,
there is risk that the chosen alternative could sacrifice NOAA and NASA
requirements. It will be important for NOAA and NASA to remain active
players in the deliberation of options and the final decision on how to
move the program forward.
Indecision increases the risk of a gap in satellite data. The potential
for a gap in polar-orbiting satellite data is increasing with every day
of delay on the NPOESS program. Specifically, if the final satellite in
the predecessor satellite series (the Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites or POES) were to fail, there would be a gap in
satellite coverage until the first NPOESS satellite was launched and
put into operation (see fig. 2). Such a gap could have a devastating
effect on our national ability to forecast severe weather events, such
as those associated with future hurricane seasons. Since a decision on
how the NPOESS program is to proceed is not expected until June 2006,
and there will likely be at least another year while a new baseline is
established and the contract modified, it is important that the
departments move expeditiously to fund their chosen program direction
and to implement contract changes.
Figure 4: A Potential Gap in Satellite Coverage:
Continuing oversight of program and executive management is warranted.
Management problems at multiple levels--subcontractor, contractor,
project office, and executive oversight--led to NPOESS recent cost and
schedule overruns. As the program implements a new management structure
and increased contractor oversight, it will be important to measure and
report on the progress of these changes so as to not repeat past
problems.
In summary, in November 2005, we reported that NPOESS was "a program in
crisis" because of technical problems on critical sensors, escalating
costs, poor management at multiple levels, and the lack of a decision
on how to proceed with the program. Today, the program is still
troubled, and its future direction is not yet known. The program office
and contractor are addressing problems on the critical sensors and have
adopted strategies that are expected to reduce risks on these sensors.
Additionally, the program office is working to address management
challenges by increasing program office skills and staffing, increasing
contractor oversight, and restructuring the program office to allow for
more timely and authoritative decisions. Further, the Nunn-McCurdy
certification in June 2006 is expected to result in a firm decision on
how to proceed with the program. Over the next few months, it will be
important for all of the agency partners to have a voice in the final
decision on how to proceed. Once this decision is made, it will be
important to move quickly to implement the decision in agency budgets
and contracts. Further, as the project continues, it will be critical
to ensure that the management issues of the past will not be repeated.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact and Acknowledgements:
If you have any questions regarding this testimony, please contact
David Powner at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov.
Individuals making contributions to this testimony include Colleen
Phillips (Assistant Director), Carol Cha, Barbara Collier, Neil
Doherty, Kathleen S. Lovett, and Karen Talley.
Appendix I. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to determine the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System's (NPOESS) current status
and plans, and to discuss considerations in moving the program forward.
To accomplish these objectives, we focused our review on the Integrated
Program Office, the organization responsible for the overall NPOESS
program. We also interviewed officials from the Department of Defense
(DOD), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and
NOAA's National Weather Service and National Environmental Satellite
Data and Information Service to determine plans for the program.
To identify schedule and cost changes related to NPOESS's status we
reviewed program office data and interviewed program officials. We
compared changes in NPOESS cost and schedule estimates to prior cost
and schedule estimates as reported in our July 2002, July 2003, and
November 2005 testimonies and in our September 2004 report.[Footnote
12]
To further analyze trends that could affect the program in fiscal year
2006, we assessed the prime contractor's cost and schedule performance.
To make these assessments, we applied earned value analysis
techniques[Footnote 13] to data from the contractor earned value and
variance analysis reports. We compared the cost of work completed with
the budgeted costs for scheduled work during January 2006 to show
trends in cost and schedule performance against the interim plan for
fiscal year 2006.
NOAA and DOD officials generally agreed with the facts presented in
this statement and provided some technical corrections, which we have
incorporated. We performed our work at the Integrated Program Office,
DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area,
between February 2006 and March 2006, in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical
Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for
Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16,
2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program
Cost and Schedule Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2004); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could
Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003); Polar-orbiting Environmental
Satellites: Status, Plans, and Future Data Management Challenges, GAO-
02-684T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002); National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration: National Weather Service Modernization and
Weather Satellite Program, GAO/T-AIMD-00-86 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29,
2000); and Weather Satellites: Planning for the Geostationary Satellite
Program Needs More Attention, GAO-AIMD-97-37 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
13, 1997).
[2] A program baseline is a plan for what will be delivered, when it
will be delivered, and at what cost over the life of the program.
[3] These environmental data sets, specialized weather and
oceanographic products, and weather prediction model outputs are
produced through algorithmic processing. An algorithm is a precise set
of procedures that enable a desired end result, such as a measurement
of natural phenomena.
[4] NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.
[5] Environmental data records are weather products derived from sensor
data records and temperature data records.
[6] GAO-03-987T.
[7] GAO-04-1054.
[8] GAO-06-249T.
[9] For example, GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207
(Washington, D.C.: January 2005) and Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2003).
[10] 10 U.S.C. section 2433, as amended by Pub. Law No. 109-163, Div.
A, section 802.
[11] The cryoradiator is a key component of the VIIRS sensor. It is
intended to cool down components of the sensor.
[12] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Status, Plans, and
Future Data Management Challenges, GAO-02-684T (Washington, D.C.: July
24, 2002); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could
Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003); Polar-orbiting Environmental
Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule Changes, GAO-04-
1054 (Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004); and Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost
Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off
Decisions, GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2005).
[13] Earned value analysis is a means of placing a dollar value on a
project's status in order to compare budget versus actual costs versus
project status in dollar amounts. For our analysis, we used standard
earned value formulas to calculate cost and schedule variances.
