Space Acquisitions
DOD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy for Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-06-449 March 14, 2006For more than two decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested heavily in space assets to provide the warfighter with mission-critical information. Despite these investments, DOD commanders have reported shortfalls in space capabilities. To provide tactical capabilities to the warfighter sooner, DOD recently began developing TacSats--a series of small satellites intended to be built within a limited time frame and budget--and pursuing options for small, low-cost vehicles for launching small satellites. GAO was asked to (1) examine the outcomes to date of DOD's TacSat and small, low-cost launch vehicle efforts, (2) identify the challenges in pursuing these efforts, and (3) determine whether experiences with these efforts could inform DOD's major space system acquisitions.
Through effective management of requirements and technologies and strong leadership, DOD was able to deliver the first TacSat satellite in 12 months and for less than $10 million. The Office of Force Transformation, TacSat 1's sponsor, set requirements early in the satellite's development process and kept them stable. DOD modified existing technologies for use in space, significantly reducing the likelihood of encountering unforeseen problems that could result in costly design changes. The satellite was also built within DOD's science and technology environment, which enabled service laboratory scientists to address problems quickly, inexpensively, and innovatively. The vision and support provided by leadership were also key to achieving the successful delivery of TacSat 1. DOD has also made progress in developing three additional TacSats and is working toward developing a low-cost launch vehicle available on demand. Despite this achievement, DOD faces several challenges in providing tactical capabilities to the warfighter sooner. First, DOD has yet to develop a low-cost, small launch vehicle available to quickly put tactical satellites, including TacSat 1, into orbit. Second, limited collaboration between the science and technology and the acquisition communities--as well as the acquisition community's tendency to expand requirements after program start--could impede efforts to quickly procure tactical capabilities. Securing funding for future TacSat experiments may also prove difficult because they are not part of an acquisition program. Finally, DOD lacks a departmentwide strategy for implementing these efforts, and because key advocates of the experiments have left DOD, it is unclear how well they will be supported in the future. Regardless of these challenges, DOD's experiences with the TacSat experiments thus far could inform its major space system acquisitions. DOD's approach to developing the TacSats--matching requirements to available resources, using proven technologies, and separating technology development from product development--reflects best commercial practices that lead to quicker delivery with less risk. According to some DOD officials, the TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles--once they are developed--could also provide an avenue for large space system acquisitions to prove out technologies in the space environment, something DOD has avoided because of the high cost of launching such experiments. These officials also believe that giving space professionals the opportunity to manage small-scale projects like TacSats may better prepare them for managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions. Finally, these officials noted that building small-scale satellite systems and launch vehicles could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to compete for DOD contracts and thereby broaden the space industrial base.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-449, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy for Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2006:
Space Acquisitions:
DOD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy for Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive
Tactical Space Capabilities:
GAO-06-449:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-449, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
For more than two decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested
heavily in space assets to provide the warfighter with mission-critical
information. Despite these investments, DOD commanders have reported
shortfalls in space capabilities.
To provide tactical capabilities to the warfighter sooner, DOD recently
began developing TacSats”a series of small satellites intended to be
built within a limited time frame and budget”and pursuing options for
small, low-cost vehicles for launching small satellites.
GAO was asked to (1) examine the outcomes to date of DOD‘s TacSat and
small, low-cost launch vehicle efforts, (2) identify the challenges in
pursuing these efforts, and (3) determine whether experiences with
these efforts could inform DOD‘s major space system acquisitions.
What GAO Found:
Through effective management of requirements and technologies and
strong leadership, DOD was able to deliver the first TacSat satellite
in 12 months and for less than $10 million. The Office of Force
Transformation, TacSat 1‘s sponsor, set requirements early in the
satellite‘s development process and kept them stable. DOD modified
existing technologies for use in space, significantly reducing the
likelihood of encountering unforeseen problems that could result in
costly design changes. The satellite was also built within DOD‘s
science and technology environment, which enabled service laboratory
scientists to address problems quickly, inexpensively, and
innovatively. The vision and support provided by leadership were also
key to achieving the successful delivery of TacSat 1. DOD has also made
progress in developing three additional TacSats and is working toward
developing a low-cost launch vehicle available on demand.
Despite this achievement, DOD faces several challenges in providing
tactical capabilities to the warfighter sooner. First, DOD has yet to
develop a low-cost, small launch vehicle available to quickly put
tactical satellites, including TacSat 1, into orbit. Second, limited
collaboration between the science and technology and the acquisition
communities”as well as the acquisition community‘s tendency to expand
requirements after program start”could impede efforts to quickly
procure tactical capabilities. Securing funding for future TacSat
experiments may also prove difficult because they are not part of an
acquisition program. Finally, DOD lacks a departmentwide strategy for
implementing these efforts, and because key advocates of the
experiments have left DOD, it is unclear how well they will be
supported in the future.
Regardless of these challenges, DOD‘s experiences with the TacSat
experiments thus far could inform its major space system acquisitions.
DOD‘s approach to developing the TacSats”matching requirements to
available resources, using proven technologies, and separating
technology development from product development”reflects best
commercial practices that lead to quicker delivery with less risk.
According to some DOD officials, the TacSats and small, low-cost launch
vehicles”once they are developed”could also provide an avenue for large
space system acquisitions to prove out technologies in the space
environment, something DOD has avoided because of the high cost of
launching such experiments. These officials also believe that giving
space professionals the opportunity to manage small-scale projects like
TacSats may better prepare them for managing larger, more complex space
system acquisitions. Finally, these officials noted that building small-
scale satellite systems and launch vehicles could create opportunities
for small, innovative companies to compete for DOD contracts and
thereby broaden the space industrial base.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD assign accountability for developing and
implementing a departmentwide strategy for pursuing low-cost tactical
capabilities”both satellite and launch vehicles”and identify
corresponding funding. In commenting on the report, DOD agreed with the
recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-449.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at
(202) 512-4841 or sullivanmj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Successfully Delivered First TacSat through Managing Requirements
and Is Moving Forward with Additional Efforts:
DOD Faces Several Challenges in Pursuing Responsive Tactical
Capabilities for Warfighters:
Experiences with TacSats May Inform Major Space System Acquisitions and
Lead to Long-Term Benefits:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Development Cost and Schedule Estimates and Target Launch
Dates for TacSats 2, 3, and 4, as of March 2006:
Table 2: DOD Current Planning Efforts:
Figures:
Figure 1: Overview of TacSat Experiments:
Figure 2: TacSat 1 Ready for Vibration Testing at Naval Research
Laboratory:
Figure 3: Capability Selection Process for TacSats 3 and 4:
Abbreviations:
ARES: Affordable Responsive Spacelift:
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OFT: Office of Force Transformation:
ORS: Operationally Responsive Space:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 14, 2006:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Department of Defense (DOD) satellites and other space-related assets
provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, missile warning,
navigation, and other information critical to conducting military
operations. DOD's space network is expected to play an increasingly
important role in military operations. According to DOD, approximately
70 percent of weapons used in Operation Iraqi Freedom were precision-
guided--mostly through global positioning satellites. Yet in each major
conflict over the past decade, senior military commanders reported
shortfalls in space capabilities, such as those intended to provide
imagery data.
To address such shortfalls and provide tactical capabilities to the
warfighter sooner, DOD recently began building a series of small
satellites, referred to as TacSats, within the science and technology
environment--an environment that lends itself to demonstrating
technologies within a relatively short time frame and small budget.
Although small satellites offer less performance than large satellites
in areas like resolution, operational control, and power, the TacSats
are expected to quickly provide the warfighter with the information
needed to conduct operations in theater. DOD is also developing a
small, low-cost launch vehicle that could be used to launch small
satellites like the TacSats.
Given the potential these efforts may offer in changing the way DOD
does business, you asked us to (1) examine the outcomes to date from
the TacSat experiments as well as from efforts to develop small, low-
cost launch vehicles, (2) identify the challenges in pursuing TacSats
and the launch vehicles, and (3) determine whether DOD's experiences
with TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles could inform major
space system acquisitions.
To conduct our work, we interviewed DOD officials in the Office of
Force Transformation, Air Force Space Command, Space and Missile
Systems Center, the Air Force and Navy research labs, and in other
cognizant offices, and analyzed documents obtained from these
officials. We also interviewed industry representatives involved in
developing large space systems and small commercial launch vehicles. We
analyzed a number of GAO and DOD studies that discuss acquisition
problems and associated challenges, including our work on best
practices in weapon system development that we have conducted over the
past decade. We conducted our review from June 2005 to March 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. For
more on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD delivered the first TacSat satellite in 12 months and for less than
$10 million.[Footnote 1] A number of elements enabled this achievement.
First, the Office of Force Transformation, as TacSat 1's sponsor,
effectively managed the satellite's requirements by reaching consensus
on requirements early in the development process and keeping them
stable. Second, DOD incorporated existing technologies and adapted them
for new uses in space, significantly reducing the likelihood of
encountering unforeseen problems that could result in costly design
changes. Third, DOD built the satellite within the science and
technology environment, enabling scientists at DOD's service labs to
address problems quickly, inexpensively, and innovatively. Finally, DOD
leadership provided a motivating vision, prompt funding, and high-level
support throughout the experiment--a key factor in positioning new
development efforts for success. DOD has made progress toward
developing three additional TacSats--expected to be launched in May
2007, summer 2007, and April 2008--and is working toward developing a
low-cost launch vehicle.
While DOD delivered the first TacSat on time and within its overall
budget, the department faces several challenges in providing tactical
capabilities to the warfighter sooner. First, while DOD is working to
demonstrate a low-cost small launch vehicle to quickly put the tactical
satellites into orbit, it has yet to deliver such a vehicle. As a
result, TacSat 1 has not been launched. Second, the procurement of
tactical capabilities in the future could be hindered if collaboration
between the science and technology and acquisition communities is
limited and the acquisition community expands requirements after
program start--as has been the case in the past. Third, it may be
difficult to secure continued science and technology funding for future
TacSat experiments since they currently are not part of an acquisition
program. Finally, DOD lacks a departmentwide strategy and leadership
for implementing efforts in this area. Because key advocates of the
experiments have left DOD, it is unclear how well the experiments will
be supported in the future.
DOD's experiences with TacSats thus far may inform major space system
acquisitions, and some DOD officials and industry representatives
believe there are potential long-term benefits. The approach to
developing TacSats reflects best practices--managing requirements to
match available resources, using relatively mature technologies, and
keeping additional technology development separate from product
development--that larger space system programs could emulate to achieve
quicker delivery of more robust systems that meet program objectives
with less risk. In addition, according to some DOD officials, the
TacSats could provide an avenue for incremental capabilities as well as
a venue for large space system acquisitions to prove out technologies
in the space environment--something DOD has avoided because of the high
cost of conducting such experiments. These officials also believe that
giving space professionals the opportunity to manage small-scale
projects like TacSats may better prepare them for managing larger, more
complex space system acquisitions in the future. Finally, these
officials noted that building small-scale satellite systems and launch
vehicles could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to
compete for DOD contracts and thereby broaden the space industrial
base.
To help ensure low-cost tactical capabilities continue to be developed
and delivered to the warfighter quickly, we are recommending that DOD
assign accountability for developing and implementing a departmentwide
strategy for pursuing low-cost, responsive tactical capabilities--both
satellite and launch--for the warfighter, and identify corresponding
funding. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred
with our findings and recommendation (DOD's letter is reprinted in app.
II).
Background:
The TacSat experiments and efforts to develop small, low-cost launch
vehicles are part of a larger DOD initiative: Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS). In general, ORS was created by DOD's Office of Force
Transformation (OFT) in response to the Secretary of Defense's
instruction to create a new business model for developing and employing
space systems. Under ORS, DOD aims to rapidly deliver to the warfighter
low-cost, short-term joint tactical capabilities defined by field
commanders--capabilities that would complement and augment national
space capabilities, not replace them.[Footnote 2] ORS would also serve
as a test bed for the larger space program by providing a clear path
for science and technology investments, enhancing institutional and
individual knowledge, and providing increased access to space for
testing critical research and development payloads. ORS is a
considerable departure from the approach DOD has used over the past two
decades to acquire the larger space systems that currently dominate its
space portfolio. These global multipurpose systems, which have been
designed for longer life and increased reliability, require years to
develop and a significant investment of resources.[Footnote 3] The slow
generational turnover--currently 15 to 25 years--does not allow for a
planned rate of replacement for information technology hardware and
software. In addition, the data captured through DOD's larger space
systems generally go through many levels of analysis before being
relayed to the warfighter in theater.
The TacSat experiments aim to quickly provide the warfighter with a
capability that meets an identified need within available resources--
time, funding, and technology. Limiting the TacSats' scope allows DOD
to trade off reliability and performance for speed, responsiveness,
convenience, and customization. Once each TacSat satellite is launched,
DOD plans to test its level of utility to the warfighter in theater. If
military utility is established, according to a DOD official, DOD will
assess the acquisition plan required to procure and launch numerous
TacSats--forming constellations--to provide wider coverage over a
specific theater. As a result, each satellite's capability does not
need to be as complex as that of DOD's larger satellites and does not
carry with it the heightened consequence of failure as if each
satellite alone were providing total coverage. DOD currently has four
TacSat experiments in different stages of development (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Overview of TacSat Experiments:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to Naval Research Laboratory officials, TacSat 2's delay is
primarily the result of overestimating the maturity of its main
payload--an off-the-shelf imager that was being refurbished for space
use. Officials also noted that the contracting process, which took
longer than expected, used multiple and varied contracts awarded under
standard federal and defense acquisition regulations.
DOD is also using the TacSat experiments as a means for developing
"bus" standards--the platform that provides power, attitude,
temperature control, and other support to the satellite in space.
Currently, DOD's satellite buses are custom-made for each space system.
According to DOD officials, establishing bus standards with modular or
common components would facilitate building satellites--both small and
large--more quickly and at a lower cost.
To achieve one of the TacSat experiments' goals--getting new
capabilities to the warfighter sooner--DOD must secure a small, low-
cost launch vehicle that is available on demand. Instead of waiting
months or years to carry out a launch, DOD is looking to small launch
vehicles that could be launched in days, if not hours, and whose cost
would better match the small budgets of experiments. A 2003 Air Force
study determined that DOD's current class of launchers--the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle--would not be able to satisfy these
requirements.
DOD Successfully Delivered First TacSat through Managing Requirements
and Is Moving Forward with Additional Efforts:
DOD delivered the TacSat 1 satellite within cost and schedule targets.
To develop the first TacSat, DOD effectively managed requirements,
employed mature technologies, and built the satellite in the science
and technology environment, all under the guidance of a leader who
provided a clear vision and prompt funding for the project. DOD is also
moving forward with developing additional TacSats; bus standards; and a
small, low-cost launch vehicle available on demand.
TacSat 1's Development Approach Enabled Successful Delivery:
In May 2004, 12 months after TacSat 1 development began, the Naval
Research Laboratory delivered the satellite to OFT at a cost of about
$9.3 million, thereby meeting its targets to develop the satellite
within 1 year and an estimated budget of $8.5 million to $10
million.[Footnote 4] Once TacSat 1 is placed into orbit, it is expected
to provide capabilities that will allow a tactical commander to
directly task the satellite and receive data over DOD's Secure Internet
Protocol Router--a need identified by the warfighter.
Figure 2: TacSat 1 Ready for Vibration Testing at Naval Research
Laboratory:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Before TacSat 1's development began, OFT and the Naval Research
Laboratory worked together to reach consensus on known warfighter
requirements that would match the cost, schedule, and performance
objectives for the satellite. Our past work has found that when
requirements are matched with resources, goals can be met within
estimated schedule and budget. To inform the requirements selection
process, the Naval Research Laboratory used an informal systems
engineering approach to assess relevant technologies and determine
which could meet TacSat 1 mission objectives within budget and
schedule. Once TacSat 1's requirements were set, OFT did not change
them. To meet its mission objectives, OFT sought a capability that
would be "good enough" for the warfighter, given available resources--
rather than attempting to provide a significant leap in capability. OFT
and the Naval Research Laboratory agreed to limit TacSat 1's
operational life span to 1 year, which allowed the laboratory to build
the satellite with lower radiation protection levels, less fuel
capacity, and fewer backups than would have been necessary for a
satellite designed to last 6 years or longer.
The use of existing technologies for the satellite and the bus also
helped to keep TacSat 1 on schedule and within cost. For example,
hardware from unmanned aerial vehicles and other aircraft were modified
for space flight to protect them in the space environment, and bus
components were purchased from a satellite communications company.
Using items on hand at the Naval Research Laboratory--such as the space
ground link system transponder and select bus electronics--resulted in
a savings of about $5 million. Using and modifying existing
technologies provided the laboratory better knowledge about the systems
than if it had tried to develop the technologies from scratch.
According to a laboratory official, the TacSat 1 experiment also
achieved efficiencies by using the same software to test the satellite
in the laboratory and fly the satellite.
Developing the TacSat within the science and technology environment
also helped the experiment meet its goals. As we have stressed in our
reports on systems development, the science and technology environment
is more forgiving and less costly than the acquisition environment. For
example, when engineers encountered a blown electronics part during
TacSat 1's full system testing, they were able to dismantle the
satellite, identify the source of the problem, replace the damaged
part, and rebuild the satellite--all within 2 weeks of the initial
failure. According to the laboratory official, this problem would have
taken months to repair in a major space acquisition program simply
because there would have been stricter quality control measures, more
people involved, and thus more sign-offs required at each step.
Moreover, the contracting mechanism in place at the Naval Research
Laboratory allows the laboratory to respond quickly to DOD requests.
Specifically, the center used several existing engineering and
technical support contracts that are competed, generally, at 5-year
intervals, rather than competing a specific contract for TacSat 1.
According to a number of DOD officials, the ultimate success of the
TacSat 1 procurement was largely the result of the former OFT director,
who:
* provided the original impetus and obtained support for the experiment
from high levels within DOD and the Congress;
* negotiated a customized mission assurance agreement with Air Force
leaders to launch TacSat 1 from Vandenberg Air Force Base at a cost
that was affordable given the experiment's budget;
* empowered TacSat 1's project manager at the Naval Research Laboratory
to make appropriate trade-off decisions to deliver the satellite on
time and within cost; and:
* helped OFT staff develop an efficient work relationship with the
Naval Research Laboratory team and provided the laboratory with prompt
decisions.
DOD Is Working on Developing Future TacSats and Low-Cost Launch
Vehicles:
DOD is currently working on developing three additional TacSat
experiments--along with bus standards--and a low-cost, on-demand launch
vehicle. These efforts are generally in the early stages. DOD expects
to launch TacSat 2--which began as an Air Force science and technology
experiment and was altered to improve upon TacSat 1's capability--in
May 2007. TacSat 3, which will experiment with imaging sensors, is in
the development phase. TacSat 4, which will experiment with friendly
forces tracking and data communication services, is in the design
phase. Table 1 shows the development cost and schedule estimates and
the target launch date for each satellite.
Table 1: Development Cost and Schedule Estimates and Target Launch
Dates for TacSats 2, 3, and 4, as of March 2006:
TacSat 2;
Development cost estimate: $39 million;
Development completion: 29 months;
Target launch: May 2007.
TacSat 3;
Development cost estimate: $40 million;
Development completion: 18 months;
Target launch: Summer 2007.
TacSat 4;
Development cost estimate: $41 million;
Development completion: 24 months;
Target launch: April 2008.
Source: Naval Research Laboratory and Air Force Research Laboratory.
[End of table]
With TacSat 3, the Air Force began to formalize the process for
evaluating and selecting potential capabilities for the TacSats,
leveraging the experiences from the first two TacSats. The selection
process, which currently takes 3 to 4 months, includes a presentation
of capability gaps and shortfalls from the combatant commands and each
branch of the military, and analyses of the suitability, feasibility,
and transferability of the capabilities deemed the highest priority.
According to DOD officials, this process allows the science and
technology community to obtain early buy-in from the warfighter,
thereby increasing the likelihood that requirements will remain stable
and the satellite will have military utility. Obtaining warfighter
involvement in this way represents a new approach for the TacSat
series. See figure 3 for a more complete description of this evolving
process.
Figure 3: Capability Selection Process for TacSats 3 and 4:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Air Force has also begun to create plans for procuring TacSats for
the warfighter should they prove to have military utility. The Air
Force has developed a vision of creating TacSat reserves that could be
deployed on demand, plans to establish a program office within its
Space and Missile Systems Center, and plans to begin acquiring
operational versions of successful TacSat concepts in 2010.
DOD is also working to develop bus standards. Establishing bus
standards would allow DOD to create a "plug and play" approach to
building satellites--similar to the way personal computers are built.
The service research labs, under the sponsorship of OFT, and the Space
and Missile Systems Center are in the process of developing small bus
standards, each using a different approach. The service labs expect to
test some standardized components on the TacSat 3 bus, and system
standards by prototyping a TacSat 4 bus. The Space and Missile Systems
Center is also proposing to develop three standardized bus models for
different-weight satellites, one of which may be suitable for a TacSat.
The service labs expect to transition bus standards to the Space and
Missile Systems Center in fiscal year 2008, at which time the center
will select a final version for procurement for future TacSats.
Both DOD and private industry are working to develop small, low-cost,
on-demand launch vehicles. DOD's Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), along with the Air Force, established FALCON, a joint
technology development program to accelerate efforts to develop a
launch vehicle that meets these objectives. Through FALCON, DARPA
expects to develop a vehicle that can send 1,000 pounds to low-earth
orbit for less than $5 million with an operational cost basis of 20
flights per year for 10 years. FALCON is expected to flight-test
hypersonic technologies and be capable of launching small satellites
such as TacSats. DARPA is currently pursuing two candidates for its
FALCON launch vehicle--AirLaunch, a company that expects to launch
rockets that have been ejected from the back of a C-17 cargo airplane,
and SpaceX, whose two-stage launch vehicle will include the second U.S.-
made rocket booster engine to be developed and flown in more than 25
years, according to the company's founder.[Footnote 5] DARPA could
transition the AirLaunch concept to the Air Force after its
demonstration launch in 2008. TacSat 1 is contracted to launch for
about $7 million on SpaceX's vehicle. In addition, in 2005, the Air
Force began pursuing a hybrid launch vehicle to support tactically and
conventionally deployed satellites. The project is known as Affordable
Responsive Spacelift, or ARES, and the Air Force has obtained internal
approval to build a small-scale demonstrator that would carry
satellites about two to five times larger than TacSats.
DOD Faces Several Challenges in Pursuing Responsive Tactical
Capabilities for Warfighters:
DOD has several challenges to overcome in pursuing a responsive
tactical capability for the warfighter. Although DOD and others are
working to develop small, low-cost launch vehicles for placing
satellites like the TacSats into space, such a vehicle has yet to be
developed, and TacSat 1 has waited nearly 2 years since its completion
to be launched. Transferring knowledge from the science and technology
community to the acquisition community is also a concern, given that
these two communities have not collaborated well in the past. Further,
it may be difficult to secure funding for future TacSat science and
technology projects since DOD allocates the majority of its research
and development money to acquisition programs. Finally, there is no
departmentwide vision or strategy for implementing this new capability,
and the recent loss of leadership makes it uncertain to what extent
efforts to develop low-cost, responsive tactical capabilities such as
TacSats will continue to be pursued.
DOD Has Yet to Provide a Low-Cost, Small Launch Vehicle:
While DOD has delivered TacSat 1 on time and within budget, the
satellite is not yet operational because it lacks a reliable low-cost-
-under $10 million--small launch vehicle to place it in orbit. TacSat
1's original launch date was in 2004 on the SpaceX's first flight of
its low-cost small launch vehicle. However, because of technical
difficulties with the launch vehicle and launch facility scheduling
conflicts, the TacSat 1 launch has been delayed 2 years and more than
$2 million has been added to the total mission costs.[Footnote 6]
SpaceX now plans to use a different small satellite for its first
launch.
* Placing satellites in orbit at a low cost has been a formidable task
for DOD for more than two decades because of elusive economies of
scale. There is a strong causal relationship between satellite
capabilities and launch lift. As capabilities and operational life are
added, satellites tend to become heavier, requiring a launch vehicle
that can carry a heavier payload. With longer-lived satellites, fewer
launches are needed, making per unit launch costs high. In addition,
the high cost of a large launch vehicle can only be justified with an
expensive, long-living multimission satellite. Ultimately, the high
cost of producing a complex satellite has created a low tolerance for
risk in launching the satellite and a "one shot to get it right"
mentality.
Over the past 10 years, DOD and industry have attempted to develop a
low-cost launch vehicle. Three launch vehicles in DOD's inventory--the
Pegasus, Taurus, and, to some extent, the Minotaur--were designed to
provide space users with a low-cost means of quickly launching small
payloads into low-earth orbit.[Footnote 7] DOD expected that relatively
high launch rates, from both commercial and government use, would keep
costs down, but the market for these launch vehicles did not
materialize. For example, since its introduction in 1990, Pegasus has
launched only 36 times, an average of 3 launches per year; Taurus has
been launched only 7 times since it was introduced in 1994. The average
cost of these launch vehicles is $16 million to $33 million. To provide
another avenue for launching small satellites, the Air Force has
proposed refurbishing part of its fleet of decommissioned
intercontinental ballistic missiles--450 of which have been dismantled.
The cost of retrofitting the missiles and preparing them for launch is
about $18 million to $23 million. However, one Air Force official
questioned whether these vehicles are too large for current TacSats.
Some new developers in the space industry are cautiously optimistic
about the small satellite market. For example, SpaceX signed seven
contracts to launch various small satellites, including TacSat 1.
Despite this optimism, SpaceX's first launch of its new vehicle has yet
to occur--in part because it lacks a suitable launch facility. The
launch facilities located in the United States cannot readily
accommodate quick-response vehicles. Vandenberg Air Force Base--one of
two major launch sites in the United States--has lengthy and detailed
scheduling processes and strict safety measures for preparing for and
executing a launch, making it difficult to launch a small satellite
within a tight time frame and at a low cost.[Footnote 8] SpaceX's
launch of TacSat 1 at Vandenberg was put on hold because of the
potential risks it posed to a billion-dollar satellite that was waiting
to be launched from a nearby pad. In addition, the Air Force licensed
the use of another nearby pad at Vandenberg to a contractor for larger-
scale launches. Given the proximity of the launch pads, SpaceX's
insurance premium increased 10-fold, from about $50,000 to as much as
$500,000, which added $2.3 million to TacSat 1's total mission costs.
Because of these delays, SpaceX decided to carry a different
experimental satellite on its first launch and to use a launch facility
on Kwajalein Atoll, in the Pacific Ocean.[Footnote 9] The potential
effect of changes--such as increased premiums or the need to transport
satellites to distant locations--on efforts to keep costs low and
deliver capabilities to the warfighter sooner is unknown.
The Air Force is beginning to examine ways to better accommodate a new
generation of quick-response vehicles. For example, Air Force officials
are examining the feasibility of establishing a location on Vandenberg
specifically for these vehicles that is separate from the larger launch
vehicle pads. Officials are also assessing the suitability of other
locations, such as Kodiak Island, for quickly launching small
satellites.
Procurement of TacSats by DOD's Acquisition Community May Be Hindered
by Limited Transfer of Knowledge and Requirements Instability:
To achieve a low-cost, on-demand tactical capability for the
warfighter, the TacSat experiments will need to be transitioned into
the acquisition community. We have previously reported that DOD's
acquisition community has been challenged to maximize the amount of
knowledge transferred from the science and technology community, and
that DOD's science and technology and acquisition organizations need to
work more effectively together to achieve desired outcomes. Many of the
space programs we reviewed over the past several decades have incurred
unanticipated cost and schedule increases because they began without
knowing whether technologies could work as intended and invariably
found themselves addressing technical problems in a more costly
environment.[Footnote 10] Although DOD recently developed a space
science and technology strategy to better ensure that labs' space
technology efforts transition to the acquisition community, the
acquisition community continues to question whether labs adequately
understand acquisition needs in terms of capabilities and time frames.
As a result, the acquisition community would rather use its own
contractors to maintain control over technology development.
According to DOD officials, action has been taken to improve the level
of collaboration and coordination on the TacSat experiments. Officials
from DOD laboratories involved in TacSats and acquisition communities
agree that they are working better together on the experiments than
they have on past space efforts. However, in pursuing a low-cost, on-
demand tactical capability, the science and technology and acquisition
communities have moved forward on somewhat separate tracks, and it is
unclear to what extent the work and knowledge gained by the labs will
be leveraged when the TacSat experiments are transferred to the
acquisition community. For example, the Air Force and Navy labs are
working to develop bus standards for the TacSat experiments that are
scheduled to be transitioned to the Space and Missile Systems Center,
the Air Force's acquisition arm, in fiscal year 2008. Yet, the Space
and Missile Systems Center, working with the Aerospace Corporation, has
proposed three different options for standardizing the bus. While two
of the options are generally larger--and are intended for larger space
assets--one of the proposed designs may be suitable for TacSats,
although it will likely be costlier than a lab-generated counterpart.
In addition, our past work has shown that DOD's space programs--as well
as other large DOD programs--have been unable to adequately define
requirements and keep them stable, and seldom achieve a match between
resources and requirements at the start of the acquisition. One factor
that contributes to poorly defined and unstable requirements is that
space acquisition programs have historically attempted to achieve full
capability in a single step and serve a broad base of users, regardless
of the design challenge or the maturity of technologies. Given this
track record, some DOD officials expressed concern over Space and
Missile Systems Center's ability to adopt the TacSat approach of
delivering capabilities that are good enough to meet a warfighter need
within cost and schedule constraints. Air Force officials identified
the center's organizational culture of risk avoidance and the
acquisition process as two of the most significant barriers to
developing and deploying space systems quickly.
Short-Term Funding for Upcoming TacSats Uncertain:
TacSats 1 and 2 have been fully funded within DOD, and TacSats 3 and 4
were recently funded. However, funding is uncertain for TacSats beyond
3 and 4. While the Congress added funding to DOD's 2006 budget to
support TacSat efforts, such as developing bus standards, DOD did not
request such funding. According to a DOD official, there would not be
an effort to develop bus standards if funding had not come from the
Congress.
Historically, DOD's research and development budget has been heavily
weighted to system acquisitions--80 percent of this funding goes to
weapon system programs, compared with 20 percent going to science and
technology. In addition, science and technology funding is spread over
thousands of projects, while funding for weapon system programs is
spread over considerably fewer, larger programs. This funding
distribution can encourage financing technology development in an
acquisition program. However, as we have previously reported,
developing technologies within an acquisition program typically leads
to cost and schedule increases--further robbing the science and
technology community and other acquisition programs of investment
dollars.
Lack of DOD-wide Strategy and Loss of Leadership:
DOD currently has no departmentwide strategy for providing a responsive
tactical capability for the warfighter. Without such a strategy, it is
unknown whether and to what degree there may be gaps or overlaps in
efforts. DOD efforts to develop low-cost satellite and launch
capabilities are moving forward under multiple offices at different
levels (see table 2).
Table 2: DOD Current Planning Efforts:
DOD organization: National Security Space Office (primarily aligned
with the Secretary of the Air Force as Executive Agent for Space);
Planning action: Developing a responsive space investment architecture
and road map.
DOD organization: U.S. Strategic Command (primarily aligned with the
Secretary of Defense via the Joint Chiefs of Staff);
Planning action: Developing a joint capabilities document.
DOD organization: Air Force Space Command (primarily aligned with U.S.
Strategic Command);
Planning action:
* Developing four initial capabilities documents;
* Planning for establishment of an acquisition office;
* Developing Enabling Concept Document.
DOD organization: Space and Missile Systems Center (primarily aligned
with Air Force Space Command);
Planning action:
* Planning for establishment of an acquisition office;
* Planning for establishment of an office that coordinates the
transition of experiments to acquisition programs.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
Since these efforts are occurring simultaneously, it is unclear how and
if they will be used to inform one another. Moreover, there are
different visions for the roles of low-cost, responsive satellites and
launch vehicles in DOD's overall space portfolio. For example, one Air
Force official stated his office is looking for direction from the
Congress on how to move forward rather than from somewhere within DOD.
Further, when interviewed, other Air Force officials were not in
agreement over how the Air Force's vision for using TacSats fits in
with OFT's proposed use of this capability for DOD.
In addition to the lack of a DOD-wide strategy, the recent departure of
key personnel may have created a gap in leadership, making it uncertain
to what extent efforts to develop tactical capabilities such as TacSats
will be pursued. As we reported in November 2005, program success
hinges on whether leaders can make strategic investment decisions and
provide programs with the direction or vision for realizing goals and
alternative ways of meeting those goals.[Footnote 11]
One official involved in developing the overall architecture described
the pursuit of these capabilities as a "grassroots effort,"
underscoring the importance of having enthusiastic individuals involved
in moving it forward. According to a number of DOD officials, the
former OFT director was widely respected within and outside the agency
and served as a catalyst for transformation across DOD, and was
credited with championing and pursuing innovative concepts that could
sustain and broaden military advantage. With the departure of the OFT
director and other key advocates of the TacSat concept, service lab
officials told us they are concerned about the fate of the TacSat
experiments. DOD officials we spoke with acknowledged that there is no
agreement on who should ultimately be responsible for deciding the
direction of the TacSat experiments and other efforts to develop low-
cost responsive tactical capabilities for the warfighter.
Experiences with TacSats May Inform Major Space System Acquisitions and
Lead to Long-Term Benefits:
DOD's experiences developing a tactical capability for the warfighter
through TacSats may be used to inform the way major space systems are
acquired. Specifically, DOD's process for developing TacSat 1 reflects
best practices that larger space system programs could employ to
achieve better acquisition outcomes. In addition, some DOD officials
believe that these efforts--focusing on delivering capabilities to the
warfighter through TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles--could
lead to long-term benefits, including providing opportunities for major
space systems to test new technologies, enhancing the skills of DOD's
space workforce, and broadening the space industrial base.
Our past work has shown that commercial best practices--such as
managing requirements, using mature technologies, and developing
technology within the science and technology community--contribute to
successful development outcomes. TacSat 1 confirms that applying these
practices can enable projects to meet cost and schedule targets. While
TacSat 1, as a small experimental satellite with only a few
requirements, is much less complex than a major space system, we have
reported that commercial best practices are applicable to major space
system acquisitions and recommended that DOD implement them for such
acquisitions. Despite our recommendation, DOD's major space system
acquisitions have yet to consistently apply these best practices.
* Manage requirements. DOD's major space acquisition programs have
typically not achieved a match between requirements and resources
(technology, time, and money) at program start. Historically, these
programs have attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step,
regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of technologies
needed to achieve the full capability. As a result, these programs'
requirements have tended to be unstable--that is, requirements were
changed, added, or both--which has led to the programs not meeting
their performance, cost, and schedule objectives. We have found that
when resources and requirements are matched before individual programs
are started, programs are more likely to meet their objectives. One way
to achieve this is through an evolutionary development approach, that
is, pursue incremental increases in capability versus significant
leaps.
* Use mature technologies. DOD's major space acquisition programs
typically begin product development before critical technologies are
sufficiently matured, forcing the program to mature technologies after
product development has begun. Our reviews of DOD and commercial
technology development cases indicate that demonstrating a high level
of maturity before new technologies are incorporated into product
development puts those programs in a better position to succeed.
* Develop technology within the science and technology environment.
DOD's space acquisition programs tend to take on technology development
concurrently with product development, increasing the risk that
significant problems will be discovered late in development and that
more time, money, and effort will be needed to fix these problems. Our
reviews have shown that developing technologies separate from product
development greatly minimizes this risk.
DOD officials and industry representatives we spoke with also noted
that some long-term benefits could result from focusing on delivering
capabilities to the warfighter quickly.
* First, small, low-cost, responsive satellites like the TacSats could
augment major space systems--provided there is a means to launch the
satellites. Because TacSats do not require significant investment and
are not critical to multiple missions, the consequence of failure of a
TacSat is low. In contrast, major space systems typically are large,
complex, and multimission, and take many years to build and deliver. If
a major space satellite fails, there are significant cost and schedule
consequences. Ultimately, the already long wait time for the warfighter
to receive improved capabilities is extended.
* Second, developing small, low-cost launch vehicles could provide an
avenue for testing new technologies in space. According to DOD
officials, less than 20 percent of DOD's space research and development
payloads make it into space, even while relying heavily on the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's Space Shuttle, which was most
recently grounded for 2 ½ years. We recently reported that DOD's Space
Test Program, which is designed to help the science and technology
community find opportunities to test in space relatively cost-
effectively, has only been able to launch an average of seven
experiments annually in the past 4 years.[Footnote 12] According to
industry representatives and DOD officials, efforts to develop a small,
low-cost launch vehicle could improve the acquisition process because
testing technologies in an operational environment could lower the risk
for program managers by providing mature technologies that could be
integrated into their acquisition programs.
* Third, giving space professionals the opportunity to manage small-
scale projects like TacSats from start to finish may better prepare
them for managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions in the
future. According to Navy and Air Force lab officials, managing the
TacSat experiments has provided hands-on experience with the experiment
from start to finish, unlike the experience provided to program
managers of large systems at the Air Force Space and Missile Systems
Center.
* Finally, building low-cost, responsive satellites and launch vehicles
could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to compete
for DOD contracts and thereby increase competition and broaden the
space industrial base. In April 2005, over 50 small companies sent
representatives to the Third Responsive Space Conference, an effort
hosted by a small private launch company. An industry representative
stated that a number of small companies are excited about developing
TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles and the potential to garner
future DOD contracts, but he cautioned that it would be important to
maintain a steady flow of work in order to keep staff employed and
preserve in-house knowledge. Other industry representatives told Air
Force officials that they are receiving mixed signals from the
government regarding its commitment to these efforts--there has been a
lot of talk about them, but relatively little funding. In addition,
another industry representative stated that requirements must be
contained; otherwise, costs will increase and eventually squeeze small
companies back out of the business.
Conclusions:
For more than two decades, DOD has invested heavily in space assets to
provide the warfighter with critical information needed to successfully
conduct military operations. Despite this investment, DOD has been
challenged to deliver its major space acquisitions quickly and within
estimated costs. TacSat 1--an experimental satellite--has shown that by
matching user requirements with available resources, using mature
technologies, and developing technologies separate from product
development, new tactical capabilities can be delivered quickly and at
a low cost. By establishing a capabilities selection process, the
TacSat initiative has also helped to ensure that future TacSats will
address high-priority warfighter needs. At the same time, the TacSats
may demonstrate an alternative approach to delivering capabilities
sooner--that is, using an incremental approach to providing
capabilities, rather than attempting to achieve the quantum leap in
capability often pursued by large space systems, which leads to late
deliveries, cost increases, and a high consequence of failure. By not
optimizing its investment in TacSat and small launch efforts, DOD may
fail to capitalize on a valuable opportunity to improve its delivery of
space capabilities. As long as disparate entities within DOD continue
moving forward without a coherent vision and sustained leadership for
delivering tactical capabilities, DOD will be challenged to integrate
these efforts into its broader national security strategy.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To help ensure that low-cost tactical capabilities continue to be
developed and are delivered to the warfighter quickly, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense assign accountability for developing and
implementing a departmentwide strategy for pursuing low-cost,
responsive tactical capabilities--both satellite and launch--for the
warfighter, and identify corresponding funding.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD
concurred with our recommendation and provided technical comments,
which we incorporated where appropriate. DOD's letter is reprinted as
appendix II.
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of the Air Force, and interested congressional
committees. We will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to the report are Arthur
Gallegos, Maricela Cherveny, Jean Harker, Leslie Kaas Pollock, Noah B.
Bleicher, and Karen Sloan.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the outcomes to date from the TacSat experiments and efforts
to develop small, low-cost launch vehicles, we interviewed Department
of Defense (DOD) officials in the Office of Force Transformation,
Washington, D.C; Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base,
Colorado; Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base,
California; Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, New
Mexico, and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; U.S. Naval Research
Laboratory, Washington, D.C; and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, Virginia, via written questions and responses. We also analyzed
documents obtained from these officials. In addition, we interviewed
industry representatives involved in developing large space systems and
small commercial launch vehicles.
To understand the challenges to DOD's efforts and to determine whether
DOD's experiences with TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles
could inform major space system acquisitions, we analyzed a wide body
of GAO and DOD studies that discuss acquisition problems and associated
challenges, including our work on best practices in weapon system
development that we have conducted over the past decade. In addition to
having discussions with officials at the Office of Force
Transformation, the Air Force Space Command, the Space and Missile
Systems Center, and the Air Force and Navy research labs, we spoke with
officials from the National Security Space Office, Virginia, and the
Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. We conducted our review from June
2005 to March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION:
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000:
MAR 02 2006:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, `DEFNSE ACQUISITIONS: DOD
Needs a Department-Wide Strategy for Pursuing Low-Cost Tactical Space
Capabilities,' dated February 10, 2006 (GAO Code 120457/GAO-06-449).
We concur with the report recommendation for the Secretary of Defense
to designate an office to develop and implement department-wide
strategy to develop and implement low-cost tactical space capabilities
(see enclosure). The department is in fact already acting to develop
and assign this responsibility. Thank you for the opportunity to
comment on the subject draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven Huybrechts:
Director, Space Programs:
OASD (C3 Policies & Programs & Space Programs):
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED FEBRUARY 10, 2006 GAO CODE 120457/GAO-06-449:
"DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: DOD NEEDS A DEPARTMENT-WIDE STRATEGY FOR
PURSUING LOW-COST TACTICAL SPACE CAPABILITIES"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
assign accountability for developing and implementing a department-wide
strategy for pursuing low-cost tactical capabilities--both satellite
and launch--for the warfighter, and identify corresponding funding. (p.
21/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] In addition to the $10 million, available surplus hardware valued
at $5 million was used to build the satellite.
[2] Smaller satellites would become a node within a tiered network of
sensors that would include larger space systems, unmanned aircraft, and
air and surface assets.
[3] In fiscal year 2006, DOD plans to spend almost $20 billion to
develop and procure major satellites and other space-related systems.
[4] In addition to the $10 million, available surplus hardware valued
at $5 million was used to build the satellite.
[5] Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX).
[6] Mission costs include spacecraft, launch, equipment, ground station
preparation, and 1 year of flight operations.
[7] Pegasus, Taurus, and Minotaur launch vehicles are built by Orbital
Sciences Corporation.
[8] The other launch facility, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, is
currently not expected to be used for TacSats launches.
[9] The tentative launch window for the first flight of SpaceX's launch
vehicle is March 20 through 25, 2006.
[10] GAO, Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and Technology
Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions
Need to Be More Robust, GAO-05-155 (Washington D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005).
[11] GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program
Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
30, 2005).
[12] GAO-05-155.
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