Hurricane Katrina
Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts
Gao ID: GAO-06-622T April 10, 2006
The devastation experienced throughout the Gulf Coast region in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has called into question the government's ability to effectively respond to such disasters. The government needs to understand what went right and what went wrong, and to apply these lessons to strengthen its disaster response and recovery operations. The federal government relies on partnerships across the public and private sectors to achieve critical results in preparing for and responding to natural disasters, with an increasing reliance on contractors to carry out specific aspects of its missions. At the same time, the acquisition functions at several agencies are on GAO's high-risk list, indicating a vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. This testimony discusses how three agencies--the General Services Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)--conducted oversight of key contracts used in response to the hurricanes. Efforts are ongoing by these agencies to address issues GAO and others have identified.
Agency acquisition and contractor personnel have been recognized for their hard work in providing the goods and services required to be responsive. The response efforts nonetheless suffered from three primary deficiencies: First, there was inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for needed goods and services. Some key agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency situation. For example, while contracts for some items were in place prior to the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency did not adequately anticipate needs for such services as providing temporary housing and public buildings. There were also competing tensions between the selection of national contractors and the Stafford Act requirement that there be a preference for contractors from the affected area. Better planning could have alleviated those tensions. Second, there was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities across agencies and jurisdictions to ensure effective outcomes. In a disaster situation, sometimes local or state officials determine the requirements and communicate them to FEMA, which then may write and award the contract or communicate the requirements to another agency that writes and awards the contract; and then FEMA or another agency will oversee contract performance. To ensure effective execution of the contract, this approach puts a premium on clear alignment of responsibilities and good communications, but our fieldwork identified examples where unclear responsibilities and poor communications resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. For example, the process for ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on effective communications between FEMA and the Corps. However, according to Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the contracting approach used by the Corps and ordered at least double the amount of ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites to handle the volume ordered. And third, there were insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective contractor oversight. The purpose of monitoring is to ensure that contracted goods and services are delivered in accordance with the agreed upon schedule, cost, quality, and quantity provisions stated in the contract. Without sufficient numbers of trained people properly deployed, however, monitoring will not be effective, agencies may not be able to quickly identify and correct poor contractor performance, and agencies will be at risk of overpaying contractors. Our work indicated that while monitoring was occurring on the contracts we reviewed, the number of staff available was not always sufficient and staff were not effectively deployed. For example: FEMA's contracts for installing temporary housing in four states had only 17 of the 27 technical monitors that had been determined necessary to oversee contractor performance.
GAO-06-622T, Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, and International Security, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 11:30 a.m. CDT:
Monday, April 10, 2006:
Hurricane Katrina:
Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts:
Statement of William T. Woods, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-06-622T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-622T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International
Security, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The devastation experienced throughout the Gulf Coast region in the
wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has called into question the
government‘s ability to effectively respond to such disasters. The
government needs to understand what went right and what went wrong, and
to apply these lessons to strengthen its disaster response and recovery
operations.
The federal government relies on partnerships across the public and
private sectors to achieve critical results in preparing for and
responding to natural disasters, with an increasing reliance on
contractors to carry out specific aspects of its missions. At the same
time, the acquisition functions at several agencies are on GAO‘s high-
risk list, indicating a vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse.
This testimony discusses how three agencies”the General Services
Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)”conducted oversight of key
contracts used in response to the hurricanes. Efforts are ongoing by
these agencies to address issues GAO and others have identified.
What GAO Found:
Agency acquisition and contractor personnel have been recognized for
their hard work in providing the goods and services required to be
responsive. The response efforts nonetheless suffered from three
primary deficiencies:
First, there was inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating
requirements for needed goods and services. Some key agencies did not
always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency
situation. For example, while contracts for some items were in place
prior to the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency did not
adequately anticipate needs for such services as providing temporary
housing and public buildings. There were also competing tensions
between the selection of national contractors and the Stafford Act
requirement that there be a preference for contractors from the
affected area. Better planning could have alleviated those tensions.
Second, there was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities
across agencies and jurisdictions to ensure effective outcomes. In a
disaster situation, sometimes local or state officials determine the
requirements and communicate them to FEMA, which then may write and
award the contract or communicate the requirements to another agency
that writes and awards the contract; and then FEMA or another agency
will oversee contract performance. To ensure effective execution of the
contract, this approach puts a premium on clear alignment of
responsibilities and good communications, but our fieldwork identified
examples where unclear responsibilities and poor communications
resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. For example, the process for
ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on effective communications
between FEMA and the Corps. However, according to Corps officials, FEMA
did not fully understand the contracting approach used by the Corps and
ordered at least double the amount of ice required, resulting in an
oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites to handle the volume
ordered.
And third, there were insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of
personnel to provide for effective contractor oversight. The purpose of
monitoring is to ensure that contracted goods and services are
delivered in accordance with the agreed upon schedule, cost, quality,
and quantity provisions stated in the contract. Without sufficient
numbers of trained people properly deployed, however, monitoring will
not be effective, agencies may not be able to quickly identify and
correct poor contractor performance, and agencies will be at risk of
overpaying contractors. Our work indicated that while monitoring was
occurring on the contracts we reviewed, the number of staff available
was not always sufficient and staff were not effectively deployed. For
example: FEMA‘s contracts for installing temporary housing in four
states had only 17 of the 27 technical monitors that had been
determined necessary to oversee contractor performance.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making any recommendations
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-622T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William T. Woods at (202)
512-4841 or woodsw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the management and
oversight of federal disaster recovery contracts related to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. The size and strength of Hurricane Katrina resulted
in one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history, and in
its aftermath major questions have been raised about our nation's
readiness and ability to respond to catastrophic disasters. Hurricane
Rita increased demands on an already stressed response and recovery
effort by all levels of government.
GAO has a large body of ongoing work on a range of issues relating to
all phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding
efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO's work has been
coordinated with the rest of the accountability community at the
federal, state, and local levels to ensure that all significant issues
associated with relief and recovery, including contracting, are
addressed while avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts.
Comptroller General Walker recently testified on GAO's preliminary
observations on the challenges encountered in the response to Hurricane
Katrina, and he identified four themes that are similar to lessons
learned from past catastrophic disasters.[Footnote 1] These include the
central importance of (1) clearly defining and communicating leadership
roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for response in advance
of a catastrophic disaster; (2) clarifying the procedures for
activating the National Response Plan and applying them to emerging
catastrophic disasters; (3) conducting strong advance planning and
robust training and exercise programs; and (4) strengthening response
and recovery capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.
These themes directly relate to what I will discuss today, namely how
three agencies planned for and conducted oversight of several key
contracts in support of Katrina and Rita response and recovery efforts:
the General Services Administration (GSA), the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the
Corps). In doing our review we selected 13 mission-critical contracts
each with a dollar value in excess of $5 million that were awarded to
12 contractors performing work for the three agencies. We analyzed in
detail how monitoring policies and processes were put into practice. We
conducted our work from October 2005 through February 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Given the environment in which they were operating, agency acquisition
and contractor personnel have been recognized for their hard work in
providing the goods and services required to be responsive. The
response efforts nonetheless suffered from three primary deficiencies:
* inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for
needed goods and services,
* lack of clearly communicated responsibilities across agencies and
jurisdictions to ensure effective acquisition outcomes, and:
* insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to
provide for effective contractor oversight.
A number of efforts are under way by these agencies to address the
issues we and others have identified.
Contractors Role in Responding to Emergencies is Increasing:
The private sector is an important partner with the government in
responding to and recovering from natural disasters such as Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. As we recently noted,[Footnote 2] such partnerships
increasingly underlie critical government operations. With hundreds of
billions of tax dollars spent each year on goods and services, it is
essential that all federal agency acquisitions be handled in an
efficient, effective, and accountable manner.
Over $87 billion of federal funding has been appropriated in response
to the recent hurricanes. In responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
the government depended heavily on contractors to deliver ice, water,
and food supplies; patch rooftops; and provide housing to displaced
residents and temporary facilities to local government agencies.
Overall, the circumstances caused by the hurricanes created a difficult
environment in which agencies had to balance the need to deliver goods
and services quickly with the need for appropriate controls. Although
achieving that balance is sometimes hard to accomplish, that fact must
not be allowed to serve as an excuse for poor contracting practices.
There Was Inadequate Planning and Preparation in Anticipating
Requirements for Needed Goods and Services:
The need for strong planning is one of the themes identified by the
Comptroller General in regard to the government's overall response to
the hurricanes. Planning also must explicitly address the need for and
management of the contractor community. In this regard, we found that
some key agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in
a major contingency situation. We also noted the competing tensions
between the selection of national contractors and the requirement under
the Stafford Act for a preference for contractors from the affected
area. Better planning could have alleviated those tensions.
For example:
* While contracts for some items were in place prior to the storm, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency did not adequately anticipate needs
for such services as providing temporary housing and public buildings.
* The practice of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is to establish
Planning and Response Teams for various missions assigned to it by FEMA
prior to an event, with specific responsibilities assigned to team
members. However, the Corps indicated it did not know prior to the
hurricane that it would be tasked by FEMA with some of the mission
assignments it received. In one case, faced with a compressed time
frame for acquiring portable classrooms and with no prior knowledge
about the classroom mission they were assigned, Corps contracting
officials placed an order, under an existing agreement, with a
subsidiary of an Alaska Native Corporation under the Small Business
Administration's section 8(a) Business Development Program. The Corps
accepted the contractor's proposed price of $39.5 million even though
the Corps had information that the cost for the classrooms was
significantly less than that. Based on our analysis of a quote obtained
by the contractor from a local Mississippi business, the price the
contractor actually paid for the classrooms, and prices for similar
units from General Services Administration (GSA) schedule contracts,
our preliminary conclusion is that the Corps could have, but failed to,
negotiate a lower price.
* Similarly, better management of requirements development could have
avoided costs to house workers and victims. Based on information
provided by local officials, FEMA spent $3 million for 4,000 base camp
beds that were never used.
* Preparation was also lacking in implementation of the Stafford Act
preference for contractors residing or doing business in the affected
area.[Footnote 3] The Corps staff expressed uncertainty regarding how
to apply preferences or determine if a company was in an affected
area.[Footnote 4] Several GSA and FEMA officials indicated they were
aware of the Stafford Act, but stated it is difficult to immediately
factor in local businesses in such a catastrophic event. GSA officials
stated they plan to review the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to
see if additional Stafford Act guidance is necessary.[Footnote 5]
In discussing our findings and observations with FEMA officials, they
indicated that in order to better respond to future disasters, they
were taking steps to improve in areas such as staffing and
premobilization capabilities. However, they also stated that such pre-
planning and preparedness has a cost. The Corps commented that
contracting staff need to have defined requirements in order to get the
right type of contracts put in place, and the contracting staff did not
always get defined requirements in a timely manner. Additionally, a
Corps official commented that until funding for a particular mission is
secured, preparation for it cannot go forward and this also delayed
contracting efforts. Finally, both GSA and the Corps noted that they
tried to reach out to local and small businesses through forums and
other means to make them aware of opportunities to contract with the
federal government.
There Was a Lack of Clearly Communicated Responsibilities Across
Agencies and Jurisdictions:
We also found that processes for executing contracts were hindered by
poor communication. As envisioned under the National Response Plan
(NRP), federal agencies responding to a disaster carry out their
acquisition functions through a network of federal, state, and local
agencies. In some instances, the local or state officials determine the
requirements and communicate them to FEMA; FEMA may write and award the
contract or communicate the requirements to another agency that writes
and awards the contract; and then FEMA or another agency oversees
contract performance. This approach puts a premium on aligning roles
and responsibilities clearly and maintaining good communications to
ensure effective execution of the contract.
Our fieldwork identified examples where unclear responsibilities and
poor communications resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. For example:
* FEMA officials stated that a contractor spent approximately $10
million to renovate 160 rooms and furnish another 80 rooms in military
barracks in Alabama that a FEMA survey team identified for use as
temporary housing. To renovate the facility, FEMA headquarters awarded
a contract without consulting local FEMA officials in Alabama.
According to FEMA officials in Alabama, however, the facility was not
needed and they tried to stop the renovation. These same FEMA officials
stated that few evacuees agreed to live at the facility, and when
officials decided to close the facility, it had only six occupants.
* The process for ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on
effective communications between FEMA and the Corps. However, according
to Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the contracting
approach used by the Corps and ordered at least double the amount of
ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of
distribution sites available to handle the volume ordered.
Additionally, the local Corps personnel were not always aware of where
ice might be delivered and did not have the authority to redirect ice
as shipments arrived, resulting in inefficient distribution and receipt
at the state level.
* FEMA tasked GSA to write three contracts in Louisiana for base camps,
hotel rooms, and ambulances, with a total value of over $120 million.
GSA contracting officers awarded the contracts, but could not tell us
which FEMA officials would be responsible for overseeing contractor
performance. The FEMA official identified as the main point of contact
by GSA did not have any knowledge of these contracts or who was
responsible for oversight. Only after contacting multiple FEMA
officials over a 3-week period were we able to determine the agency
officials responsible for contract oversight.
In commenting on our findings, GSA officials stated that their role is
to provide resource support in the response phase of a disaster,
meaning they are responsible for executing contracts under the NRP, and
FEMA is responsible for monitoring the contracts. FEMA officials
commented that there needs to be more clarity regarding procurement
roles and indicated one of their goals is to work with GSA to clarify
procurement responsibilities for the future. GSA officials indicated
that the current memorandum of understanding between GSA and FEMA is
being updated to reflect the standards of the new NRP as well.
There Were Insufficient Numbers and Inadequate Deployment of Personnel
to Provide for Effective Contractor Oversight:
The purpose of agencies' monitoring processes is to ensure that
contracted goods and services are delivered in accordance with the
agreed-upon schedule, cost, quality, and quantity provisions stated in
the contract. Without sufficient numbers of trained people properly
deployed, however, effective monitoring is hampered and agencies may
not be able to identify and correct poor contractor performance in a
timely manner. Furthermore, agencies can be at risk of paying
contractors more than the value of the services performed.
Our work indicated that while monitoring was occurring on the contracts
we reviewed, the number of monitoring staff available was not always
sufficient, and staff were not always effectively deployed. For
example:
* FEMA's contracts for installing temporary housing in four states had
only 17 of the 27 technical monitors that had been determined necessary
to oversee contractor performance.[Footnote 6]
* Corps officials responsible for overseeing the "blue roof" program's
field operations told us it was slowed down due to the lack of
sufficient monitors.[Footnote 7]
Deployment practices did not always provide for appropriate
notification of responsibilities or overlap of rotating contracting
officers and oversight personnel, thus making knowledge transfer and
continuity of contract management operations difficult. For example:
* For four of the contracts we reviewed, officials were either unaware
or not notified by FEMA of their oversight responsibilities.
* The lack of overlap between oversight personnel for a large temporary
housing contract left the most recent contract administrator with no
knowledge or documentation of who had authorized the contractor to
perform certain activities or why the activities were being performed.
While discussing our findings and observations with FEMA officials,
they emphasized that they lacked adequate staffing, but said they have
made efforts to fill staffing gaps. Additionally, FEMA officials stated
they recognize the need for continuity in contract oversight and
indicated they are implementing a process to ensure workload and
knowledge sharing among rotating personnel. However, they also believe
that fewer transition difficulties exist now as a result of hiring more
people and having more oversight officials staying in the affected
areas. GSA officials indicated there may also be other alternatives for
ensuring adequate contract oversight, such as designating GSA employees
to conduct oversight on some contracts. Corps officials stated their
policy is to rotate certain personnel every 29 days to keep personnel
costs to a minimum because of regulations under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.[Footnote 8]
Previous Lessons Can Guide Agency Contracting Actions in Emergencies:
In reviewing contracts awarded for Iraq--another contingency situation-
-GAO found that without effective acquisition planning, management
processes, and sufficient numbers of capable people, poor acquisition
outcomes resulted. GAO made recommendations regarding the need for
ensuring that requirements for placing orders are within the scope of
contracts; timely definition of contract terms and conditions, and
sufficient numbers of trained staff who have clear responsibilities and
guidance for overseeing contractor performance. Having these
capabilities requires preparation, such as having prearranged contracts
in place in advance of the disaster or other contingency.
Among the issues that we have identified in previous reports that
warrant consideration by agencies when contracting in an emergency are:
* the strategies and flexibilities they will use to plan their
procurements to avoid the risks associated with undefined contracts;
* the knowledge they need to have to identify, select, and manage
contractors to achieve successful outcomes; and:
* the need to have competitively awarded contracts in place prior to
the event against which orders can be placed as needed.
In executing these contracts, agencies should consider such issues as
how to effectively:
* communicate and coordinate with other agencies and with contractors;
* define contract terms and conditions to avoid excessive costs and
ensure desired performance; and:
* monitor contractors.
Finally, agencies should consider crosscutting issues that affect their
overall ability to manage contractors, such as the:
* capability of their information systems to provide visibility into
financial and contracting operations;
* skills and training of the acquisition workforce;
* alignment of responsibilities among the key officials in managing the
award and oversight of contracts; and:
* the policies, procedures, and guidance for managing contracts.
In closing, in any acquisition, agencies must have in place sound
acquisition plans, processes to make and communicate good business
decisions, and a capable acquisition workforce to monitor contractor
performance so that the government receives good value for the money
spent. These components are critical to successfully managing contracts
in any environment--even in a contingency situation such as that
presented by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond
to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact
William T. Woods at (202) 512-4841 or woodsw@gao.gov. Individuals
making key contributions to this testimony included Penny Augustine,
James Kim, John Needham, and Shannon Simpson.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Recent GAO Products on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to
Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance. GAO-06-460, Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006:
Hurricane Katrina: Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure
Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance. GAO-
06-600T, Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006:
Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New Orleans and
Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6
Months After Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R, Washington, D.C.: March
28, 2006:
Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. GAO-06-461R, Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2006:
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T, Washington D.C.:
March 8, 2006:
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington:
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of
Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06-443R. Washington:
D.C.: February 16, 2006.
Investigation: Military Meals, Ready-To-Eat Sold on eBay. GAO-06-410R.
Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's
Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and
Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington: D.C.: February 13, 2006.
Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary
Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National Flood
Insurance Program. GAO-06-335T. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006.
Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee
Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project.
GAO-06-322T. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. GAO-
06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Army Corps of Engineers: History of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity
Hurricane Protection Project. GAO-06-244T. Washington, D.C.: November
9, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting
for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. Washington, D.C.:
November 8, 2005.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery
Efforts. GAO-06-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of the
National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-183T. Washington, D.C.:
October 20, 2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the National:
Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. Washington, D.C.: October 18,
2005.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to Enhance
Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-
06-119. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005.
Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane
Projection Project. GAO-05-1050T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005.
Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation's Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. Washington, D.C.:
September 28, 2005.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T, Washington D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
[2] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
[3] 42 U.S.C. § 5150.
[4] GAO recently issued a decision on a protest of the terms of a
solicitation issued by the Corps for demolition and debris removal in
the State of Mississippi. The protester asserted, in part, that the
Corps decision to limit the competition for this work to Mississippi
firms improperly exceeded the authority granted under a provision of
the Stafford Act to provide a preference to firms residing, or
primarily doing business, in the area affected by a major disaster.
GAO's decision did not view the Corps decision to implement the
Stafford Act preference with a set-aside as an abuse of the agency's
discretion, and the Corps did not act improperly by limiting this
competition to Mississippi firms. AshBritt, Inc. B-297889, March 20,
2006.
[5] See FAR, Subpart 26.2-Disaster or Emergency Assistance Activities.
[6] Data provided by FEMA official was dated November 18, 2005.
[7] he Corps manages the Operation Blue Roof mission for FEMA.
Operation Blue Roof provides assistance to storm victims in disaster
areas through the installation of rolled plastic sheeting on damaged
roofs, helping to protect property and allowing residents to remain in
their homes.
[8] 5 CFR § 551.208.