Military Pay
Inadequate Controls for Stopping Overpayments of Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers Assigned to Fort Bragg Gao ID: GAO-06-384R April 27, 2006Over the past several years, we have reported on significant pay problems experienced by mobilized Army National Guard and Army Reserve (Army Guard and Reserve) soldiers in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack. These reports included examples of hundreds of soldiers receiving inaccurate and untimely payroll payments due to a paper-intensive, error-prone pay process and the lack of integrated pay and personnel systems. In response to our reports, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken some action to improve controls designed to pay Army Guard and Reserve soldiers accurately and on time, especially those who had become sick or injured in the line of duty. This report responds to a Congressional request that we investigate the allegation that 37 Army Guard and Reserve soldiers assigned to the Medical Retention Processing Unit (MRPU) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were overpaid for hostile fire and hardship duty pay while in an outpatient status. Our objectives were to determine (1) whether the allegations were true, and if so, whether the pay issues were more widespread at Fort Bragg and (2) the key causes of the overpayments and the resulting impact on soldiers and their families.
Our investigation confirmed that 28 of the 37 Army Guard and Reserve soldiers assigned to the MRPU in an outpatient status at Fort Bragg with alleged pay problems were in fact overpaid for hostile fire and hardship duty pay. We also identified at least 204 additional cases of sick or injured soldiers assigned to the MRPU who were overpaid for the same entitlements. An estimated $218,000 in hostile fire and/or hardship duty overpayments were made to a total of about 232 Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in an outpatient status at Fort Bragg during the period April 2003 through June 2005. As we have previously reported, internal control weaknesses in Army processes, human capital, and the lack of integrated systems caused the overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay. Our investigation disclosed that the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion and MRPU controls often failed to detect the overpayments in a timely manner. A Fort Bragg Finance official acknowledged that the Finance Battalion "dropped the ball" by failing to promptly detect and stop the overpayments to sick or injured Army Guard and Reserve soldiers upon their arrival to the Fort Bragg MRPU. Further, in October 2005, DFAS completed an annual performance inspection of the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion that confirmed our conclusion about the problems soldiers were having with hostile fire and hardship duty pay. Our case studies showed that as a result of these overpayments, some soldiers and their families had to expend significant time and effort dealing with pay and resulting debt problems while recovering from their injuries. Several soldiers experienced large, unexpected deductions--as much as $1,172 from a single paycheck--for repaying the debt resulting from the Army's failure to stop the overpayments. On the other hand, the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion did not consistently take action to recover overpayments from other MRPU soldiers during the time of our investigation.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-384R, Military Pay: Inadequate Controls for Stopping Overpayments of Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers Assigned to Fort Bragg
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of Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army
National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers Assigned to Fort Bragg' which
was released on April 27, 2006.
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April 27, 2006:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Military Pay: Inadequate Controls for Stopping Overpayments of
Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army
National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers Assigned to Fort Bragg:
Over the past several years, we have reported[Footnote 1] on
significant pay problems experienced by mobilized Army National Guard
and Army Reserve (Army Guard and Reserve) soldiers in the wake of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attack. These reports included examples
of hundreds of soldiers receiving inaccurate and untimely payroll
payments due to a paper-intensive, error-prone pay process and the lack
of integrated pay and personnel systems. In response to our reports,
the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken some action to improve
controls designed to pay Army Guard and Reserve soldiers accurately and
on time, especially those who had become sick or injured in the line of
duty.
This report responds to your request that we investigate the allegation
that 37 Army Guard and Reserve soldiers assigned to the Medical
Retention Processing Unit (MRPU) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were
overpaid for hostile fire and hardship duty pay while in an outpatient
status.[Footnote 2] Our objectives were to determine (1) whether the
allegations were true, and if so, whether the pay issues were more
widespread at Fort Bragg and (2) the key causes of the overpayments and
the resulting impact on soldiers and their families.
Scope and Methodology:
To investigate the allegation that Army Guard and Reserve soldiers
assigned to the MRPU while in an outpatient status received
overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay, we interviewed Fort
Bragg MRPU and Finance Battalion staff and observed MRPU and finance in-
processing procedures. We also used Defense Finance and Accounting
Service (DFAS) data extracts from monthly pay records and Fort Bragg
MRPU records containing the dates soldiers arrived at the Fort Bragg
MRPU to determine whether soldiers being treated at Fort Bragg during
the period April 1, 2003, through June 30, 2005, improperly received
hostile fire and/or hardship duty payments while at Fort Bragg. We
performed procedures to assure ourselves that the data we used were
sufficient for our purposes. The scope of our investigation did not
include verification of the accuracy of soldiers' entire pay accounts.
In addition, our scope did not include inpatient soldiers assigned
directly to the Womack Army Medical Treatment Facility (hospital) at
Fort Bragg.
Because of data reliability concerns we identified in our prior
work,[Footnote 3] we did not rely on DFAS records to calculate precise
overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay. Instead, we
estimated overpayments based on the time period starting with the date
the soldier arrived at Fort Bragg until the date the soldier's improper
pays were stopped.[Footnote 4] We provided Fort Bragg Finance Battalion
officials an opportunity to confirm our estimates, identify the amount
of debt established for the overpaid soldiers, and determine whether
the debts had been collected. We did not review Fort Bragg's debt
collection processes and procedures for compliance with DOD regulations
and requirements. In light of the Army's lack of progress in
integrating pay and personnel systems, we reviewed controls used by the
MRPU and Fort Bragg Finance Battalion staff to stop hostile fire and
hardship duty pay. We conducted this investigation from August 2005,
through March 2006, in accordance with quality standards for
investigations as set forth by the President's Council on Integrity and
Efficiency.
Summary of Investigation:
Our investigation confirmed that 28 of the 37 Army Guard and Reserve
soldiers assigned to the MRPU in an outpatient status at Fort Bragg
with alleged pay problems were in fact overpaid for hostile fire and
hardship duty pay. We also identified at least 204 additional cases of
sick or injured soldiers assigned to the MRPU who were overpaid for the
same entitlements. An estimated $218,000 in hostile fire and/or
hardship duty overpayments were made to a total of about 232 Army Guard
and:
Reserve soldiers in an outpatient status at Fort Bragg during the
period April 2003 through June 2005.[Footnote 5]
As we have previously reported,[Footnote 6] internal control weaknesses
in Army processes, human capital, and the lack of integrated systems
caused the overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay. Our
investigation disclosed that the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion and MRPU
controls often failed to detect the overpayments in a timely manner. A
Fort Bragg Finance official acknowledged that the Finance Battalion
"dropped the ball" by failing to promptly detect and stop the
overpayments to sick or injured Army Guard and Reserve soldiers upon
their arrival to the Fort Bragg MRPU. Further, in October 2005, DFAS
completed an annual performance inspection of the Fort Bragg Finance
Battalion that confirmed our conclusion about the problems soldiers
were having with hostile fire and hardship duty pay.
Our case studies showed that as a result of these overpayments, some
soldiers and their families had to expend significant time and effort
dealing with pay and resulting debt problems while recovering from
their injuries. Several soldiers experienced large, unexpected
deductions-as much as $1,172 from a single paycheck-for repaying the
debt resulting from the Army's failure to stop the overpayments. On the
other hand, the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion did not consistently take
action to recover overpayments from other MRPU soldiers during the time
of our investigation.
Background:
The MRPU at Fort Bragg is one of 23 MRPUs located throughout the United
States. Soldiers are assigned to these units while receiving outpatient
treatment for their illnesses or injuries under the Medical Retention
Program. The objective of the Medical Retention Program is to heal
injured soldiers and return them to their units or to discharge them
from the Army Guard or Reserve if they are unable to perform their
military duties. The Medical Retention Program is an option for
mobilized National Guard and Reserve soldiers who become sick or
injured. Soldiers who are injured or become ill during predeployment
training or other predeployment activities can also apply for treatment
through the Medical Retention Program.
Before being injured, soldiers serving in certain locations were
entitled to several types of special duty pay, including hostile fire
pay and hardship duty pay. Soldiers are entitled to hostile fire pay
when a commander certifies that they are subject to hostile fire or
explosions of hostile mines; on duty in an area in close proximity to
hostile fire incidents; or are killed, injured, or wounded by hostile
fire, explosions, or other hostile actions.[Footnote 7] Hostile fire
pay is $225 a month while the above circumstances prevail. Any soldier
injured under the above circumstances is entitled to hostile fire pay
for up to 3 months' of hospitalization after the month in which the
injury occurred, unless the soldier is discharged sooner and does not
return to a designated hostile fire or hardship duty location.
Soldiers serving in designated areas are also entitled to hardship duty
pay. This entitlement stops, however, as soon as the soldier leaves the
designated area, whether or not the soldier is hospitalized for
injuries that occurred there. The maximum amount of hardship duty pay
for any designated area is $150 a month as long as the soldier serves
in that area. If a soldier leaves the duty location before the end of
the month, the hardship duty pay is prorated.
Soldiers assigned to the Fort Bragg MRPU in an outpatient status were
not entitled to either hostile fire pay or hardship duty pay because
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is not a designated location for these pay
entitlements. Additionally, soldiers who were assigned to the MRPU
during their predeployment phase were never entitled to hostile fire
pay or hardship duty pay. Finally, MRPU outpatient soldiers whose
medical evaluations indicated a need for future hospitalization were
not entitled to receive hostile fire pay or hardship duty pay for
subsequent hospital stays.
It should be noted that our previous reports demonstrate that finance
offices in theater were often unable to start or stop hostile fire pay
or hardship duty pay as required because of problems with human
capital, processes, and lack of integrated pay and personnel systems.
Accordingly, installations processing soldiers from in theater have a
responsibility to confirm that the soldiers' pay is accurate and to
adequately inform soldiers about their responsibilities regarding their
military pay. For example, soldiers are responsible for reviewing their
leave and earnings statements and for prompt and accurate reporting of
changes in their personal circumstances that affect their entitlement
pay to their commander and servicing finance office.
Allegation Regarding Overpayments of Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay
Was Confirmed:
The allegation that some Army Guard and Reserve outpatients assigned to
the Fort Bragg MRPU were receiving hostile fire and hardship duty pay
they were not entitled to receive was true, and these were not isolated
instances of overpayments. We found that 28 of the 37 soldiers with
alleged pay problems were overpaid an estimated $32,000 for hostile
fire and/or hardship duty pay. We selected 10 of these 28 soldiers for
our case studies during this investigation. Nine told us that they had:
contacted the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion in an attempt to stop the
overpayments in order to avoid escalating debt accumulation.
Our investigation also disclosed that the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion
failed to timely detect and stop hostile fire and hardship duty pay for
at least 204 additional outpatient soldiers. Fort Bragg Finance
Battalion's delays resulted in overpayments of about $218,000 for 232
sick or injured Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in the MRPU. To the
extent that some of these payments should have been stopped before the
soldiers arrived at Fort Bragg, the total overpayments may have been
higher. MRPU records showed that these 232 soldiers arrived at the Fort
Bragg MRPU over a 3-year period: 23 soldiers from April 2003 through
December 2003, 187 soldiers in calendar year 2004, and 22 soldiers from
January 2005 through June 2005.
The Fort Bragg MRPU classified the 232 outpatient soldiers whom we
identified as receiving overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty
pay while in an outpatient status as follows: [Footnote 8]
* 161 soldiers were medically evacuated out of theater generally before
their active duty assignment period was completed and were assigned to
the MRPU,
* 31 soldiers were found to need medical evaluation during the
demobilization process at Fort Bragg and were assigned to the MRPU,
* 19 soldiers were found to need medical evaluation during
predeployment training or other activities and were assigned to the
MRPU, and:
* 21 soldiers were not classified into a specific category.
For 9 of the 10 MRPU soldiers in our case studies, it took pay
technicians at the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion from 14 to 203 days to
stop the overpayments once the MRPU soldier visited the Finance
Battalion. We could not determine the amount of time it took the pay
technician to stop overpayments for one of our case studies because
there was no documentation supporting the date he visited the Finance
Battalion. Due to such delays, overpayment amounts ranged from $553 to
$2,300. Two of the 10 soldiers never deployed and therefore should have
never received any hostile fire and hardship duty pay. The following
case study illustrates one of these.
Individual Case Illustration: Soldier Who Never Deployed Received
Improper Payments of Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay.
An Army National Guard soldier from Maryland who was initially
mobilized with her unit for Operation Iraqi Freedom never made it
overseas because she was diagnosed with anxiety and depression during
her predeployment training. She arrived at the Fort Bragg MRPU on
October 5, 2004, and visited the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion on
October 13, 2004. She explained to us that, during her time at Fort
Bragg, she told Finance that she was receiving improper hostile fire
pay and hardship duty pay since she never deployed and was therefore
ineligible to receive these entitlements. According to the soldier, the
finance office told her that the improper payments would be collected
from her later paychecks. Her hostile fire and hardship duty pay
continued until March 10, 2005, 5 months after her initial visit to the
Fort Bragg Finance Battalion. By this time, her improper hostile fire
and hardship duty payments had grown to about $1,823, of which $986 was
collected from her paychecks as of November 2005.
According to MRPU records, 17 other soldiers whom we identified as
having received hostile fire and hardship duty payments while at the
MRPU also never deployed because of injuries being treated during the
predeployment period for their unit.
Figure 1 below shows delays for each of the 10 case study soldiers.
Figure 1: Length of Time Fort Bragg Finance Battalion Took to Stop 10
Soldiers' Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay and the Resulting
Overpayments (as of June 30, 2005):
[See PDF for Image]
[A] Days elapsed = Number of days between date soldier visited Finance
and date ineligible pay was stopped.
[B] Estimated overpayments = Hostile fire and hardship duty payments
made to soldier after arrival at Fort Bragg MRPU.
[End of Figure]
Internal Control Weaknesses Hamper Accuracy of Army Guard and Reserve
Soldiers' Pay:
Fort Bragg did not have well-defined processes for ensuring that MRPU
soldiers' pay was accurate. While MRPU soldiers were provided a
checklist for in-processing at Fort Bragg that was intended to channel
them to the Finance Battalion[Footnote 9] to validate pay, neither that
checklist nor the Battalion's desk procedures offered adequate
specificity regarding what was expected of the finance staff.
Furthermore, according to an MRPU administrative staff member, some
MRPU soldiers may not have gone to the Finance Battalion because they
did not return completed checklists initialed by a pay technician to
the MRPU as required to document their visit to the Finance Battalion.
We interviewed the Finance Battalion officials and observed their
processes. There was a requirement for pay technicians to review pay
accounts of the MRPU soldiers for accuracy, including the
identification of overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay,
and stop these unearned payments expeditiously. Pay technicians were
also required to initial the in-processing checklist to signify that
the MRPU soldier's pay account was reviewed. Stopping hostile fire and
hardship duty pay entailed entering the correct pay termination date
and transaction codes for each of these pay entitlements into the
Defense MilPay Office system, which would routinely be used by DFAS to
correct soldiers' pay accounts in the Defense Joint Military Pay System-
Reserve Component (DJMS-RC). However, as shown in figure 1 above, pay
problems continued for soldiers who had their in-processing checklist
initialed by a pay technician.
For example, although the finance technician signed off on one MRPU
soldier's checklist on July 26, 2004, this soldier's hostile fire and
hardship duty pay continued until December 23, 2004, about 5 months
after he made his initial visit to finance, and his hostile fire and
hardship duty overpayments grew to $2,000. A Fort Bragg Finance
official acknowledged that the Finance Battalion did not promptly
detect and stop the overpayments to injured Army Guard and Reserve
soldiers upon their arrival to the Fort Bragg MRPU.
Our investigation also disclosed that there was no routine follow-up to
assure that all MRPU soldiers reported to the Fort Bragg Finance
Battalion as directed. For example, when we asked an MRPU clerk to
provide copies of completed in-processing checklists for the 37
soldiers alleged to have been overpaid, the clerk only provided 20
completed checklists. The MRPU clerk told us that soldiers did not
always return the completed checklists to the MRPU administrative
staff. Without a personal visit by the MRPU soldier to the Finance
Battalion, pay technicians were provided no other routine means to
initiate a review of the pay accounts of soldiers arriving at the Fort
Bragg MRPU.
Although the Army issued revised procedures that included the handling
of sick and injured soldiers' pay accounts by finance personnel on June
1, 2004, the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion and MRPU continued to operate
under their own procedures, which emphasized the individual soldier's
responsibility regarding pay accuracy and personal visits to the
Finance Battalion. In contrast, the Army's revised procedures emphasize
finance staff responsibility to proactively work with the MRPU to
obtain information on all incoming soldiers that is to be used to
ensure that all MRPU soldiers' pay accounts are timely and
appropriately updated as well as accurate. This is important to note
because between June 2004 and June 2005, 146 of the 232 soldiers, the
majority of soldiers included in our investigation, arrived at Fort
Bragg for medical evaluation and treatment. Had the Fort Bragg Finance
Battalion followed Army guidance when the Army's revised procedures
were instituted in June 2004, the Finance Battalion may have identified
overpayments of unearned entitlements more quickly for these sick or
injured soldiers.
Army's Failure to Stop Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay Expeditiously
Resulted in Significant Time and Effort Spent Addressing Debts:
The Army's failure to stop hostile fire and hardship duty pay
expeditiously for Army Guard and Reserve soldiers resulted in
significant time and effort spent addressing debts[Footnote 10] for
some soldiers and their families. For example, some soldiers whose
overpayments were detected and established as a debt experienced large,
unexpected deductions--as much as $1,172 from a single paycheck--to
repay the debt resulting from the Army's failure to stop the
overpayments.
Our investigation did not include work to determine whether the Fort
Bragg Finance Battalion complied with DOD policies and procedures for
collecting overpayments from soldiers or whether these policies were
reasonable under the circumstances. However, we noted that the longer
it took the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion to stop the overpayments, the
greater the amount of debt that accumulated for the soldier and the
greater the financial impact since more money was eventually withheld
from the soldier's pay. Our past work clearly showed the ramifications
of protracted payment errors. Establishing the exact amount owed and
collecting overpayments of active duty pays and allowances erroneously
provided to soldiers imposes a large administrative burden on DOD and a
financial burden on the soldier.
Even when overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay were
stopped by the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion, it sometimes did not
establish debts and collect the overpayments from the soldier's pay in
a timely manner. For example, 2 of the 10 soldiers in our case studies
described in figure 1 did not have any pay deductions for overpayments
of hostile fire and hardship duty pay as of June 30, 2005, 6 months
after these overpayments were stopped.
We referred the names of the 232 soldiers, including the 10 soldiers in
our case studies, for which we estimated hostile fire and/or hardship
duty overpayments to the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion for follow-up to
determine whether correct amounts were established as debts and
appropriate debt collection measures were taken. The Fort Bragg Finance
Battalion had not completed its review at the time our investigation
was completed.
The following case studies show the experiences of three MRPU soldiers
with hostile fire and hardship duty overpayments.
Case Illustration 1: Errors Made in One Soldier's Pay Created Financial
Hardship for The Soldier's Family.
An Army Guard National soldier from North Carolina described his
experience as follows: "In September 2003, my National Guard Unit
received orders to report for duty in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Our federal orders were issued 10/1/03. We began training at
Ft. Bragg in preparation for our deployment. The majority of soldiers
were deployed in mid-February. I was deployed in March. After arriving
in Iraq, I was injured when my vehicle hit a crater caused by an IED. I
was airlifted to the hospital in Baghdad for treatment. I was returned
to my unit for continued duty. My leg began to swell and it was
determined that I should be returned home for treatment. I was
medically evacuated out of Iraq in late May; "When I reached Germany, I
scanned my ID through finance. When I reached Walter Reed Army
Hospital, I scanned my ID card through finance. When I reached Ft.
Bragg, I scanned my ID card through finance on several occasions. I
continued to receive hazardous duty and hostile fire pay through 12/04;
"When I was released from active duty in May 2005, I was processed out
through Ft. Bragg finance. A clerical error was made and my start date
for active duty was entered as 10/04. This created a debt of 1 years
pay owed by me to the government. In the process of correcting this
error, it was determined that I was paid hostile fire and hazardous
duty in error. I am not convinced that my pay is correct now; "I
attended drill twice in May and once in June. I did not receive drill
pay. Monies were held to pay this debt. A debt remission package was
finally submitted as the repayment of these funds would cause undo
hardship to my family. While this error was being 'corrected', we used
all of our accumulated savings to cover our normal bills. Since I did
my part by swiping my card through finance on numerous occasions, I do
not feel obligated to repay these funds.".
Case Illustration 2: Pay Deductions Result in Family's Delay of Bill
Payments.
An Army National Guard soldier from North Carolina suffered a stroke on
June 26, 2004, while serving in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. He was flown to Germany and treated at the Landstuhl Regional
Medical Center before returning to the United States. He arrived at
Fort Bragg in early July 2004. Our investigation revealed that the
soldier visited the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion on July 30, 2004, as
part of his in-processing into the unit, and had his checklist signed
by the finance technician. The soldier returned his completed checklist
to the MRPU.
Despite adhering to the MRPU's in- processing procedures, this
soldier's hostile fire and hardship duty pay continued until November
5, 2004, approximately 4 months after he made his initial visit to the
Fort Bragg Finance Battalion. By this time, his hostile fire and
hardship duty pay overpayments had grown to $1,300. The Fort Bragg
Finance Battalion eventually collected about $972 of this total from
the soldier in a single paycheck, which was about 50 percent of his
disposable pay. The collections had a negative financial impact on the
soldier and his wife. The soldier's wife told us that she had to call
and defer some of their bills, including the monthly payment on their
second mortgage. According to information provided by the Finance
Battalion to us on January 7, 2006, the soldier still owes about $100.
Case Illustration 3: Soldier Frustrated by Efforts to Get His Pay
Corrected.
An Army Reservist from California serving in Iraq in February 2004 in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom experienced cardiovascular problems
while on duty in Baghdad. In October 2004 he was sent to Kuwait and
then later stateside for demobilization and assignment to the Fort
Bragg MRPU in November 2004.
Shortly after his arrival at Fort Bragg, he noticed that his Leave and
Earnings Statement showed that he was still receiving hostile fire pay
and hardship duty pay. He brought this error to the attention of a
finance technician who said that his account would be corrected, and
the combat entitlements would stop. He had accumulated overpayments for
hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay totaling $553. According to the
Fort Bragg Finance Battalion, as of January 9, 2006, $328 of the $553
in overpayments for hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay had not been
deducted from the soldier's pay.
In addition to overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay, this
soldier told us that he also experienced overpayments of basic pay and
benefits after he was released from the MRPU in July 2005 to return to
his home unit in California. He then noticed on his July 2005 leave and
earnings statement that he was continuing to receive basic pay as if he
was still on active duty status while assigned to the MRPU. These basic
pay overpayments continued for an additional pay period after the
soldier made repeated calls to Fort Bragg to correct his pay account.
By September 9, the Army corrected the problem by deducting about
$7,600 from other earned pay. He had participated in a 4-week training
exercise in Korea in August 2005 and had 33 days of accrued leave which
the Army used to offset previous overpayments of basic pay and
benefits. Had he not participated in the training exercise, it would
have taken many monthly pays for weekend drills for him to be able to
repay the $7,600.
We spoke with Army and DFAS officials in December 2005 and January 2006
about our observations at the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion and Fort
Bragg MRPU. They told us that they were not surprised that we found pay
account review deficiencies at Fort Bragg and that it was troubling
that the proactive approach to pay management advocated by the Army in
2004 had not been instituted at Fort Bragg until we were completing our
investigation. To help improve the skills of the finance staff at Fort
Bragg, DFAS provided on-site training in late September 2005 as part of
their efforts to improve pay account management for soldiers wounded in
action. We were also told that the pay account management capabilities
of finance offices at other installations varied and that they were
taking steps to improve performance where needed.
Corrective Action Briefing:
On December 22, 2005, we discussed the results of our investigation
with the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion command. The command pointed out
that problems with ensuring timely termination of hostile fire pay and
hardship duty pay are due in part to the medical evacuation process,
and the existence of stove-piped pay and personnel systems that
increase the likelihood of inaccurate pay accounts. They said that at
least some of these pay problems should have been rectified before the
soldier was assigned to Fort Bragg.
The Battalion Commander stated that our identification of the 232 pay
accounts[Footnote 11] provided his staff with a good snapshot of pay
issues that MRPU soldiers were experiencing. The commander noted that
since his battalion is responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the pay
accounts for all soldiers who arrive at Fort Bragg, our investigation
also provides his staff with an opportunity to improve their services
to Army Guard and Reserve soldiers.
The Fort Bragg Finance Battalion officials informed us that they are
implementing the following corrective actions to provide reasonable
assurance that overpayments for hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay
do not affect future soldiers assigned to the MRPU at Fort Bragg:
* Coordinating with MRPU personnel staff to obtain regular updated
lists of new arrivals to the MRPU to review those pay accounts in order
to confirm that hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay entitlements are
stopped in a timely manner.
* Coordinating with the MRPU personnel staff to identify MRPU soldiers
who are unable to visit Finance due to their medical conditions and
ensuring that Finance schedules personal visits with these sick or
injured soldiers to individually review these soldiers' pay accounts.
* Regularly distributing Leave and Earnings Statement reports to the
MRPU Commander in order to assist in the identification of MRPU
soldiers who typically would not be receiving hostile fire pay and
hardship duty pay.
* Regularly distributing Unit Commander's Financial Reports to the MRPU
Commander to assist him in reviewing the accuracy of his soldiers' pay.
* Periodically briefing Fort Bragg units concerning combat pay
entitlements.
* Adhering to a December 2005 revision of Fort Bragg's Finance Standard
Operating Procedures that clarify how to review the pay accounts of
MRPU soldiers to detect and stop hostile fire pay and hardship duty
overpayments.
In subsequent correspondence to us on January 6, 2006, the MRPU
Commander informed us that the in-processing checklist will no longer
be used as a tool to alert the Finance Battalion to stop any hostile
fire and hardship duty pay to MRPU soldiers in a timely manner.
Instead, beginning January 9, 2006, MRPU officials were to coordinate
with the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion weekly to assure that newly
arriving soldiers' pay accounts are correct based on the agreed-upon
corrective actions listed above.
Conclusions:
Fort Bragg did not carry out its responsibilities to ensure that the
Army Guard and Army Reserve soldiers assigned to the Fort Bragg MRPU
received accurate pay. Given the number of ongoing pay problems
experienced by these soldiers--problems that our investigation revealed
extended far beyond the initial allegation-and the systemwide pay
problems we have reported on in the past, it is conceivable that many
other soldiers assigned to the other 22 MRPU locations may be
experiencing the same pay problems. While soldiers have some
responsibility to assist in correcting pay errors, including setting
aside amounts not earned, the primary responsibility rests with DOD for
timely pay adjustments to avoid the types of problems and hardships
surfaced by this investigation.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In conjunction with the Army's proactive efforts to improve Army Guard
and Reserve pay account management, we recommend that the Secretary of
the Army, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness), follow up with finance offices supporting the other 22
MRPUs that were not part of our investigation to determine the extent
to which hostile fire and hardship duty overpayments to outpatient Army
Guard and Reserve soldiers had occurred and ensure that appropriate
corrective action is taken. This review should include the pay accounts
for outpatient soldiers who had been or are currently assigned to MRPU
units, including those soldiers with nonbattle injuries and other
illness.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD officials, in oral comments, partially concurred with our
recommendation to review the pay accounts for outpatient MRPU soldiers.
For example, DOD agreed to review the pay accounts for soldiers who are
currently assigned to MRPU units, including those soldiers with
nonbattle injuries and other illness, and take corrective action when
required. In addition, DOD said it plans to review the pay accounts of
all soldiers who received medical treatment in theater for serious
injuries or illnesses since October 2001, which it expects will include
a significant percentage of soldiers who were assigned to MRPUs after
receiving initial treatment in theater. However, because the scope of
our investigation did not include verification of the number of
soldiers medically treated in theater, the comprehensiveness of DOD's
planned corrective actions is uncertain.
DOD's planned reviews of sick and wounded soldiers' pay accounts are a
step in the right direction. Our investigation at Fort Bragg though
included a number of former MRPU soldiers who did not receive medical
treatment in theater for serious injuries or illnesses or who never
deployed and yet received overpayments of hostile fire and hardship
duty pay. This is a potential population of soldiers who need to be
covered as well when DOD reviews pay at other MRPUs.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7455 (kutzg@gao.gov). Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in the enclosure.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gregory D. Kutz:
Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
Enclosure:
[End of Section]
Enclosure I:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gregory D. Kutz (202) 512-7455:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Kord Basnight, Gary Bianchi,
Mary Ellen Chervenic, Dennis Fauber, Daniel Kaneshiro, Jason Kelly,
Barbara C. Lewis, Renee McElveen, Wayne Turowski, and John Ryan made
key contributions to this report.
(192182):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial
Hardships for Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers, GAO-05-
125 and GAO-05-322T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17, 2005); Army National
Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel Reimbursement
Problems For Mobilized Soldiers, GAO-05-79 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2005) and GAO-05-400T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005); Military Pay:
Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant
Pay Problems, GAO-04-911 (Washington, D.C: Aug. 20, 2004) and GAO-04-
990T (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004); and Military Pay: Army National
Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay
Problems, GAO-04-413T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2004) and GAO-04-89
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2003).
[2] For the purposes of this report, "outpatient" means a soldier who
is being medically evaluated for specialized treatment. This may
include surgery, which would require hospitalization at a later date.
[3] GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability
of Cost Data and Provide Additional Guidance to Control Cost, GAO-05-
882 (Washington, D.C: Sept. 21, 2005); GAO-04-89; and GAO-04-911.
[4] We did not estimate overpayment amounts for hostile fire and
hardship duty pay prior to the soldier's arrival to Fort Bragg.
[5] As a result of the lack of supporting documents and data
reliability concerns, we likely did not identify precise overpayment
amounts. We have provided information for the overpayments we
identified to cognizant Fort Bragg officials for further research to
determine the proper amounts that are owed to the government or the
soldier.
[6] See footnote 1.
[7] Additionally, soldiers in certain designated locations face what
has been determined to be imminent danger and are therefore entitled to
imminent danger pay. Notably, soldiers are entitled to either hostile
fire pay or imminent danger pay but not both. We mention the imminent
danger pay for background information only because the paperwork that
we reviewed for the soldiers in the MRPU at Fort Bragg only mentions
hostile fire pay.
[8] These categories are provided in this report for context only. We
did not verify the classifications for accuracy.
[9] The Fort Bragg Finance Battalion was one of nine locations the sick
and injured soldiers had to personally visit in order to complete in-
processing to the MRPU. The soldiers' injuries ranged from those
inflicted by improvised explosive devices (IED) to post-traumatic
stress disorder. Soldiers with limited mobility were assigned a "buddy"
to assist them in getting around post to complete their in-processing.
[10] Collection of overpayments is not pursued until a debt is
established. To repay debts, the amount of the debt generally is
deducted from a soldier's pay in increments until the total debt is
repaid, unless a waiver is granted.
[11] We referred 259 MRPU soldiers' pay accounts to the Finance
Battalion in September 2005 for review. On December 22, 2005, Finance
Battalion officials informed us that additional factors such as
deployment from MRPU may have subsequently entitled some of the
soldiers to hostile fire and/or hardship duty pay. We adjusted our
estimated number of cases from 259 to 232 taking into account at least
27 instances where the MRPU data summary file noted that the MRPU
soldier deployed subsequent to arrival at the Fort Bragg MRPU and as
such, may have been entitled to some amount of hostile fire and/or
hardship duty pay. The remaining 232 cases are those where we did not
see any indication in the MRPU summary file that the MRPU soldier
deployed.
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