Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges Gao ID: GAO-06-610T April 6, 2006The current generation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) has been in development for defense applications since the 1980's. As of February 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) had more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft, about 2,000 of which are supporting ongoing operations in Iraq. DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review validates the importance of unmanned systems and establishes plans to significantly expand investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations over the next several years. The Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to determining UAS needs and managing the growing number of UAS programs. This testimony addresses GAO's prior work and preliminary observations on (1) the operational successes and challenges U.S. forces are experiencing with UAS in combat operations, and the extent to which DOD has taken steps to address challenges; (2) DOD's progress in establishing a strategic plan and oversight framework to guide joint and service-specific UAS development efforts and related investment decisions; and (3) our assessment of the Global Hawk and Predator programs' business cases and acquisition strategies and the lessons learned that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems program.
DOD has experienced a high level of mission successes with UAS, but continues to face challenges in fully maximizing the use of these assets. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used UAS for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive strike missions in support of joint and service-specific operations. As the numbers of UAS operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft grows, DOD continues to face operational challenges related to interoperability, availability of communications bandwidth, and airspace integration. While DOD and the services have taken some positive initial steps to address these challenges, such as issuing guidance and developing initiatives to improve interoperability, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of these efforts cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented. While DOD continues to request funds to support service plans for acquiring UAS, it still lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment decisions. Since GAO last reported, DOD established new oversight bodies and updated its UAS Roadmap, but it is too early to tell how the new entities will interrelate and whether they will be able to influence service plans. Also, the updated roadmap identifies broad goals, desired capabilities, and service acquisition plans, but lacks critical elements, such as a clear link among goals, capabilities, and plans, opportunities for joint endeavors, and funding priorities and needs. Until DOD develops a strategic plan, it will not be well positioned to validate requirements, evaluate and integrate services plans, and establish program and funding priorities, nor will Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate funding requests. Such a plan would also help DOD anticipate and minimize the types of challenges that are being experienced today. While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development programs have shared many of the same problems as other major weapon systems that begin an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about requirements, funding, and immature technology, design, and production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes--changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition programscan learn from past efforts to craft better and less risky acquisition plans. Key steps conducive to success include preparing a comprehensive business case, adopting a knowledge-based and incremental acquisition strategy, and sustaining disciplined leadership and direction. Frequent changes to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems technology demonstration program and recent budget actions raise some questions about the Department's priorities and future directions for UAS. Concerns have also been raised about possible duplication of systems as the services look to expand individual fleets. Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to coordinate the Warrior and Predator programs are encouraging and could be a model for limiting duplication and fostering jointness and interoperability.
GAO-06-610T, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, April 6, 2006:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address
Operational Challenges:
Statement of Sharon Pickup, Director, Defenses Capabilities and
Management:
Michael J. Sullivan, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-06-610T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-610T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The current generation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) has been in
development for defense applications since the 1980‘s. As of February
2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) had more than 3,000 unmanned
aircraft, about 2,000 of which are supporting ongoing operations in
Iraq. DOD‘s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review validates the importance of
unmanned systems and establishes plans to significantly expand
investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations
over the next several years. The Congress has been particularly
interested in DOD‘s approach to determining UAS needs and managing the
growing number of UAS programs.
This testimony addresses GAO‘s prior work and preliminary observations
on (1) the operational successes and challenges U.S. forces are
experiencing with UAS in combat operations, and the extent to which DOD
has taken steps to address challenges; (2) DOD‘s progress in
establishing a strategic plan and oversight framework to guide joint
and service-specific UAS development efforts and related investment
decisions; and (3) our assessment of the Global Hawk and Predator
programs‘ business cases and acquisition strategies and the lessons
learned that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems
program.
What GAO Found:
DOD has experienced a high level of mission successes with UAS, but
continues to face challenges in fully maximizing the use of these
assets. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used
UAS for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive
strike missions in support of joint and service-specific operations. As
the numbers of UAS operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft
grows, DOD continues to face operational challenges related to
interoperability, availability of communications bandwidth, and
airspace integration. While DOD and the services have taken some
positive initial steps to address these challenges, such as issuing
guidance and developing initiatives to improve interoperability,
limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of these efforts
cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented.
While DOD continues to request funds to support service plans for
acquiring UAS, it still lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS
development and investment decisions. Since GAO last reported, DOD
established new oversight bodies and updated its UAS Roadmap, but it is
too early to tell how the new entities will interrelate and whether
they will be able to influence service plans. Also, the updated roadmap
identifies broad goals, desired capabilities, and service acquisition
plans, but lacks critical elements, such as a clear link among goals,
capabilities, and plans, opportunities for joint endeavors, and funding
priorities and needs. Until DOD develops a strategic plan, it will not
be well positioned to validate requirements, evaluate and integrate
services plans, and establish program and funding priorities, nor will
Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate funding
requests. Such a plan would also help DOD anticipate and minimize the
types of challenges that are being experienced today.
While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development
programs have shared many of the same problems as other major weapon
systems that begin an acquisition program too early, with many
uncertainties about requirements, funding, and immature technology,
design, and production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar
outcomes”changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery,
performance shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future
acquisition programs can learn from past efforts to craft better and
less risky acquisition plans. Key steps conducive to success include
preparing a comprehensive business case, adopting a knowledge-based and
incremental acquisition strategy, and sustaining disciplined leadership
and direction. Frequent changes to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air
Systems technology demonstration program and recent budget actions
raise some questions about the Department‘s priorities and future
directions for UAS. Concerns have also been raised about possible
duplication of systems as the services look to expand individual
fleets. Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to coordinate the Warrior
and Predator programs are encouraging and could be a model for limiting
duplication and fostering jointness and interoperability.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-610T.
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
pickups@gao.gov, or Michael J. Sullivan at (937) 258-7915 or
sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of
Defense's (DOD) unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).[Footnote 1] As you
know, the current generation of UAS has been under development for
defense applications since the 1980s and is providing combat forces
with intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike
capabilities that are helping to transform today's military operations.
We appeared before you last year to discuss the performance of UAS in
current operations, and DOD's progress in improving strategic and
acquisition planning. At the time, we testified on our preliminary
observations that while unmanned aircraft operations had achieved
significant mission successes, emerging operational challenges could
affect DOD's ability to maximize the use of UAS to enhance operations
and effectively promote force transformation.[Footnote 2] We also
emphasized the need for DOD to develop a strategic plan to guide UAS
development and highlighted lessons learned from our prior UAS
development and acquisition reviews that could be instructive for the
development and fielding of UAS. Since last year's testimony, we issued
two reports on these matters and made several recommendations intended
to improve DOD's management and acquisition of UAS.[Footnote 3]
Since last year, we have seen an increasingly high level of UAS use in
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, DOD has issued
an updated UAS roadmap and recently released its Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) report, both of which indicate the department is planning
to increase its inventory of unmanned aircraft and associated funding
requests significantly over the next several years. At the same time,
we understand that DOD has initiated several studies to determine
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements, including
those for UAS, which could affect future investment decisions. We
understand Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach
to determining UAS needs and managing the growing number of UAS
programs. We are also aware that DOD has made some changes in its plans
for key future UAS acquisitions.
Today, you asked us to discuss the results of our previous reports and
our preliminary observations on the ongoing work we are conducting for
this Subcommittee on the integration of unmanned aircraft systems into
combat operations. Specifically, we will highlight (1) operational
successes and challenges U.S. forces are experiencing with UAS in
combat operations, and the extent to which DOD has taken steps to
address these challenges; (2) DOD's progress in establishing a
strategic plan and oversight framework to guide joint and service-
specific UAS development efforts and related investment decisions; and
(3) our assessment of the Global Hawk and Predator programs' business
cases and acquisition strategies and the lessons learned that can be
applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program. We
will be continuing our work on the integration of UAS in combat
operations and plan to issue a report to you based on this work later
this year.
To address our first two objectives, we interviewed officials and
reviewed documentation from the UAS Planning Task Force within the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics; each of the military services; U.S. Joint Forces
Command; the Joint Staff; U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and other
organizations. We also observed Predator training and support to
ongoing operations, and updated our previously issued reports on UAS
strategic planning and operational challenges. Additionally, we
discussed operational challenges with CENTCOM officials and UAS
operators who recently returned or are currently supporting operations
in Iraq to better understand the use of UAS in ongoing operations. To
address our third objective, we interviewed officials and obtained data
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics; Air Force Headquarters; Navy Headquarters;
Air Combat Command; Air Force Materiel Command's Aeronautical Systems
Center; and prime contractors. We reviewed acquisition strategies,
plans, and outcomes for the three largest UAS acquisition programs, the
Global Hawk, Predator, and J-UCAS. We compared plans to DOD's
acquisition policy preferences and best practices to identify lessons
learned for improving future programs.
We conducted our ongoing work from August 2005 to April 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Warfighting commanders are experiencing a high level of mission success
with UAS in ongoing operations but, as we observed last year, they
continue to face operational challenges in fully maximizing the use of
these assets. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have
used UAS with great success for intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and offensive strike missions in support of joint and
service-specific operations. For example, commanders continue to rely
on the Air Force Predator and Army Shadow UAS to help identify
improvised explosive devices and locate the enemy forces who planted
them, allowing for the detonation of the devices and the capture of the
enemy forces. Notwithstanding these successes, interoperability remains
a challenge as we previously reported, and integrating UAS into combat
operations is becoming more complicated. For example, some UAS
components cannot easily exchange and transmit data with ground forces
because they were not designed to interoperable standards. Further, the
availability of communications bandwidth[Footnote 4] is constrained,
limiting the number of UAS and other systems that can be operated
simultaneously, and the amount of data that can be transmitted from the
UAS. In the absence of standards requiring sensor payloads to be
reprogrammable from one band to another, UAS were designed and built
without this flexibility. In our December 2005 report, we recommended
that DOD take steps to develop or adjust standards to address these
interoperability and bandwidth challenges.[Footnote 5] Additionally,
our preliminary work indicates that airspace integration is a growing
challenge as demand for UAS remains high and the number of assets
operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft steadily grows. Among
other things, unmanned aircraft are deployed and controlled at
different levels of command, and have generally been rapidly fielded
without the benefit of a commonly accepted concept of operations. As
the number and usage of UAS increases, effective airspace integration
will be crucial to avoid duplicative deployments of UAS and safety
mishaps. While DOD has taken some positive steps to address these
challenges and our prior recommendations, such as issuing guidance and
developing initiatives to improve interoperability, progress to date
has been limited and the effectiveness of these steps cannot be
adequately assessed until they are fully implemented.
While DOD continues to request funds for UAS and the services continue
to plan, develop, and field UAS systems, it still lacks a robust
oversight framework and strategic plan to guide UAS development and
investment decisions. Since we last testified, DOD established
additional oversight bodies - a Joint Center of Excellence and Joint
Material Review Board - to supplement the efforts of its already
existing UAS Planning Task force and to facilitate planning and
coordination for the acquisition and use of UAS. While these actions
appear to be steps in the right direction, it is too early to determine
how these entities will interrelate with one another, what impact they
will have on addressing the challenges we have identified, and whether
they will be able to influence service UAS investment decisions or
deployment. While DOD has updated its UAS Roadmap, it is still not a
viable strategic plan because it lacks key planning elements. For
example, while it describes broad goals, desired capabilities for UAS,
and service-specific acquisition plans, it does not provide clear
linkages nor does it address the relationship among service plans,
opportunities for joint endeavors, investment priorities and related
funding needs. As we have previously reported, without a strategic plan
and effective oversight framework for using UAS, DOD has little
assurance that it will have a basis for validating requirements,
integrating service efforts, and establishing program and funding
priorities. Furthermore, Congress may not have all the information it
needs to evaluate DOD's UAS funding requests. Such a plan would help
DOD assure that service plans for developing UAS anticipate and
potentially minimize the types of challenges that are emerging today,
particularly in the areas of interoperability, bandwidth, and airspace
integration.
While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development
programs have exhibited similar problems as other major weapon systems
that began an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties
about requirements and funding, and immature technologies, design, and
production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes--
changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance
shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition
programs can learn from past efforts to craft better and less risky
acquisition plans. Key steps conducive to success include (1)
establishing a comprehensive business case that matches customer
requirements with available resources to include proven technologies,
sufficient time, and realistic funding; (2) implementing an
incremental, knowledge-based acquisition strategy that separates
technology development from product development and minimizes
concurrency between testing and production; and (3) maintaining
disciplined leadership support and direction. Frequent changes to the
Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) technology demonstration
program and recent budget actions raise some questions about the
department's priorities and future directions for UAS. Garnering the
benefits from improved coordination among the military services'
individual programs and maintaining an emphasis on joint development
and employment strategy seem to be at some risk. Concerns have also
been raised about possible duplication of systems as the services look
to expand individual fleets. The ongoing Army and Air Force effort to
coordinate the Warrior and Predator programs is encouraging and could
be a model for limiting duplication and fostering jointness and
interoperability.
Background:
DOD defines an unmanned aircraft as a powered aerial vehicle that does
not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle
lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Generally,
unmanned aircraft systems consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight
control station; information and retrieval or processing stations; and,
sometimes, wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery
platforms. According to DOD, many elements are needed for the use of
UAS, including a systems architecture that allows data to be moved,
adequate spectrum and bandwidth for communication, airspace management
and deconfliction, common data standards and formats to allow sharing
and data fusion, common operating systems, and system interoperability.
Potential missions considered appropriate for unmanned aircraft systems
have expanded from the original focus on the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance mission areas to the area of limited
tactical strike capabilities, with projected plans for persistent
ground attack, electronic warfare, and suppression of enemy air
defenses.
As shown in table 1, DOD had more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft as of
February 2006, compared to fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in
2000.[Footnote 6] As of January 2006, more than 2000 of these aircraft
were supporting ongoing operations in Iraq. Over 88 percent of the
unmanned aircraft currently in inventory are small UAS, those launched
by hand or by bungee. As a point of comparison, no small unmanned
aircraft were in inventory in 2000.
Table 1: Number and Type of Unmanned Aircraft in DOD's Inventory, as of
February 2006:
Type: Small UAS (weight less than 10 lbs./airspeed less than 100 kts);
System: Pointer;
Service/Command: Air Force/Special Operations Command;
Total aircraft inventory: 126.
System: Raven;
Service/Command: Army/Air Force/; Special Operations Command;
Total aircraft inventory: 1776.
System: Dragon Eye;
Service/Command: Marine Corps/; Special Operations Command;
Total aircraft inventory: 402.
System: Force Protection Airborne Surveillance System;
Service/Command: Air Force;
Total aircraft inventory: 126.
System: Swift;
Service/Command: Special Operations Command;
Total aircraft inventory: 212.
System: BATCAM;
Service/Command: Air Force;
Total aircraft inventory: 54.
Type: Tactical UAS (weight less than 500 lbs./airspeed less than 120
kts.);
System: Pioneer;
Service/Command: Navy and Marine Corps;
Total aircraft inventory: 34.
System: Shadow 200;
Service/Command: Army;
Total aircraft inventory: 140.
System: Neptune;
Service/Command: Special Operations Command;
Total aircraft inventory: 15.
System: Tern;
Service/Command: Special Operations Command;
Total aircraft inventory: 15.
System: Mako;
Service/Command: Special Operations Command;
Total aircraft inventory: 15.
System: Tigershark;
Service/Command: Special Operations Command;
Total aircraft inventory: 6.
Type: Theater-level UAS;
System: Predator A;
Service/Command: Air Force;
Total aircraft inventory: 70.
System: I-Gnat;
Service/Command: Army;
Total aircraft inventory: 4.
System: Hunter;
Service/Command: Army;
Total aircraft inventory: 32.
System: Fire Scout;
Service/Command: Navy/Army;
Total aircraft inventory: 4.
System: Predator B;
Service/Command: Air Force;
Total aircraft inventory: 6.
System: Global Hawk;
Service/Command: Air Force/Navy;
Total aircraft inventory: 11.
Type: Total;
System: [Empty];
Service/Command: [Empty];
Total aircraft inventory: 3048.
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
[End of table]
Similarly, UAS flight hours have also increased. For example, as shown
in figure 1 below, flight hours have increased from about 5,000 hours
in 1996 to 109,000 hours in 2005.
Figure 1: Unmanned Aircraft Flight Hours, 1996-2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Numbers do not reflect small unmanned aircraft.
[End of figure]
As the numbers of unmanned aircraft and flight hours have increased, so
has UAS funding. Total UAS funding shows an increase from about $363
million in fiscal year 2001 to about $2.06 billion in fiscal year 2006.
In addition, the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget projects funding
will grow to about $3.02 billion in fiscal year 2011. These figures do
not include supplemental funding. DOD has requested approximately $208
million for UAS in its fiscal year 2006 supplemental request.
In December 2002, DOD created the 2002-2027 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Roadmap, which was designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAS
development and describe current programs, identify potential missions
for UAS, and provide guidance on developing emerging technologies. In
August 2005, DOD issued an updated version of the roadmap covering the
period 2005-2030. Like its predecessor, the 2005 roadmap contains broad
goals for unmanned systems that support the department's larger goals
of fielding transformational capabilities, establishing joint
standards, and controlling costs.
Furthermore, DOD's 2006 QDR published in February 2006 validates the
importance of unmanned systems. Overall, the QDR provides direction for
accelerating the department's transformation to focus more on combatant
commanders' needs and to develop portfolios of joint capabilities. In
particular, the QDR report highlighted the department's plans to expand
investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations.
For example, it states DOD's intent to nearly double unmanned aircraft
coverage by accelerating the acquisition of the Predator and Global
Hawk systems. It also plans to restructure the Joint Unmanned Combat
Air Systems program and develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based
aircraft to increase naval reach and persistence. Further, the QDR
plans to develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike
capability by 2018 and sets a goal that about 45 percent of the future
long-range strike force be unmanned. Lastly, the 2006 QDR directs the
Air Force to establish an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron under the
U.S. Special Operations Command.
Combat Successes Realized, but Challenges Remain:
DOD has experienced a high level of mission success using UAS in combat
operations, but faces some operational challenges that could hamper
joint operations. We previously identified interoperability and limited
bandwidth as challenges and, according to our preliminary work, as the
number of unmanned systems increases, airspace integration is becoming
a growing challenge. While DOD has taken initial steps to address these
challenges, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of
these actions cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully
implemented.
Recent UAS Successes in Combat Operations:
DOD has achieved significant operational successes in combat operations
from its use of a variety of unmanned aircraft and their sensor,
communications, and armaments payloads, thereby increasing the demand
for and use of UAS. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces
have used a variety of UAS, such as the Predator, Raven, and Shadow, in
integral roles on intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
offensive strike joint or service-specific missions. For example, a
Predator UAS provided video to a U.S. military element which provided
situational awareness that contributed to the success of a mission that
resulted in the capture of an al Qaida operational commander.
Similarly, the Army used its Shadow UAS to identify an improvised
explosive device and guide U.S. forces to the location of the enemy
forces, enabling the capture of the enemy forces and safe detonation of
the improvised explosive device.
Additionally, small UAS such as the Raven have been instrumental in
enabling troops to find, locate, and destroy numerous targets. For
example, a Raven was used to identify a suspicious vehicle in the
courtyard of a residence, which facilitated the discovery of a large
weapons and ammunition cache when soldiers conducting the ground combat
operations confirmed the vehicle contained explosives. As a result of
successes such as these, the demand for and use of UAS are continuing
to grow.
DOD Faces Operational Challenges in Integrating UAS into Combat
Operations:
Notwithstanding these operational successes, DOD continues to face
challenges in effectively integrating unmanned systems into joint
combat operations, and progress in addressing these challenges has been
limited. Key challenges identified in ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan relate to interoperability,[Footnote 7] the availability of
communications bandwidth, and managing UAS and manned systems in the
same airspace.
First, while numerous UAS are being called on to conduct important
missions in recent operations, interoperability remains a challenge.
For example, as we reported in December 2005, some unmanned aircraft
sensor and communications payloads and ground stations cannot easily
exchange data because they were not designed to interoperable
communications standards, even within a single service in certain
circumstances. When communication systems are incompatible, operating
forces may be required to operate their own UAS to accomplish a
mission, rather than using UAS that are already operating in the same
area, thus increasing the numbers of systems being operated. To permit
the sharing of tactical intelligence obtained by unmanned aircraft
sensors, the services or combatant commands have developed certain
technical patches that permit compatibility but slow data transmission.
DOD guidance requires interoperability and DOD's 2005 roadmap
identifies it as a key goal. In the absence of specific standards, the
services have tended to initiate separate development programs,
specifically tailored to service specific requirements. Officials from
U.S. Central Command have also emphasized the need for improved
interoperability and standards. For example, the commander of U.S.
Central Command recently testified that while UAS have transformed the
battlespace and demand for their capabilities is significant, there is
a need to develop an integrated architecture of many sensors to support
operational units. He further stated that experiences to date highlight
the importance of an established interoperability standard for all
intelligence systems that can function in a joint and combined
environment.
Second, communications bandwidth continues to represent a major
challenge for UAS. Unmanned aircraft and their sensor, armaments, and
communications payloads depend on reliable access to communications
bandwidth. Bandwidth is needed to support systems that control the
flight of certain unmanned aircraft, to transmit data collected by
payload sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers.
Because UAS and other weapons or communications systems, including
manned aircraft, often operate on the same frequency, certain
frequencies can become congested and interference can occur. Such
capacity constraints may limit the number of UAS and other systems that
can be effectively operated simultaneously and the amount of available
data that can be transmitted. Despite having the capability to operate
multiple UAS simultaneously, DOD's roadmap states that the limited
number of frequencies available often restricts the number of unmanned
aircraft airborne at any point in time to one. As we reported in
December 2005, the problem with constrained bandwidth cannot be easily
overcome without potentially costly modifications to existing systems
because DOD has not established standards requiring unmanned aircraft
or sensor payloads to be reprogrammable from one band to another.
To address these challenges, we recommended that DOD develop standards,
including overall UAS interoperability standards and standards that
will allow for future UAS to be reprogrammable to different
frequencies. We are also aware that, in the Fiscal Year 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act, Congress required that the Secretary of
Defense take such steps to ensure that all[Footnote 8] service tactical
unmanned aerial vehicles are equipped and configured so that the data
link used is the Tactical Common Data Link and those vehicles use data
formats consistent with the architectural standard for tactical
UAS.[Footnote 9] We understand that some of the military services have
provided a report to Congress to identify which systems are currently
in compliance with the Tactical Data Link requirement. According to
DOD, use of this link is expected to reduce the amount of bandwidth
used and allow the UAS to utilize a broader band of frequencies;
however, it will not totally alleviate the problem because it is too
heavy to use on small UAS and may result in shifting the frequency
congestion to other bands.
Third, our preliminary work indicates that effectively integrating UAS
into the airspace is becoming a growing challenge in ongoing
operations. With the growing numbers and increasing use of UAS of
various types and sizes to support combat missions, particularly in
Iraq, coordination, integration, and deconfliction of airspace among
UAS and manned systems are becoming more complex. In addition to
limitations on communications interoperability, UAS are deployed and
controlled at different levels of command. Furthermore, UAS have
generally been rapidly fielded without the benefit of a commonly
accepted concept of operations for the different types of UAS,
including tactics, techniques, and procedures for employment and use of
assets. According to U.S. Central Command officials, because there are
numerous UAS in theater now, many with multirole capabilities and
disparate command and control, the potential exists for deployment of
multiple UAS capabilities to support the same operation. Moreover, UAS
are not currently equipped with the capability to sense and avoid other
unmanned or manned aircraft but instead rely on procedural control
methods for deconfliction. While aware of only a few mishaps, many of
the officials we spoke with are concerned about problems in the future
as the numbers of UAS steadily increase. For example, according to a
U.S. Central Command official, there have been some collisions between
small UAS and helicopters. Army officials stated that they were aware
of one collision between a Raven UAS and a helicopter. The cause of the
collision was attributed to the helicopter pilot being outside of his
designated flight area. With the number of UAS in support of ongoing
operations increasing, effective airspace integration is critical to
maximize service capabilities, avoid duplicative deployments, and
minimize safety mishaps.
DOD is taking some initial steps to address interoperability,
bandwidth, and airspace integration challenges, but progress has been
limited. For example, to promote interoperability and address bandwidth
issues, in December 2005 DOD issued guidance reminding the services
that common data link[Footnote 10] remains the DOD standard for all
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance links. Further, DOD
continues to refine its guidance for improved interoperability and
supportability of information technology and national security systems,
which include UAS. In March 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff issued an instruction addressing certification and validation of
DOD information technology and national security systems acquisition
programs to meet emerging key interoperability performance parameters,
such as information exchange.[Footnote 11] Additionally, DOD's 2005
roadmap contains an appendix which outlines interoperability standards.
However, DOD officials acknowledge that the UAS roadmap and the
parameters included in the March guidance are evolving and neither
provides an inclusive list of all standards required to achieve
interoperability. The services are also initiating efforts to improve
interoperability. For example, the Army and Marine Corps are moving to
a "one system" ground control station to allow multiple UAS platforms
to be operated by a single ground control station. In addition, the Air
Force has demonstrated a multiaircraft control ground control station
that would control up to four Predator air vehicles at any one time.
Furthermore, an initiative originally started by the Air Force--as the
Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver System--has been embraced by
each of the services to enable ground forces to receive information
directly from certain airborne unmanned aircraft. Also, the Army has
begun to integrate Blue Force Tracker[Footnote 12] into some of its UAS
to improve situational awareness. All of these efforts are in
preliminary stages and, while these steps are positive, their
effectiveness cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully
implemented.
Progress Made but Additional Elements Needed to Establish a UAS
Strategic Plan and Effective Oversight:
While DOD has made some progress, it still lacks a robust oversight
framework and strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment
decisions. DOD's progress includes an update to its roadmap and the
establishment of new oversight bodies to facilitate planning and
coordination regarding the development, procurement, and use of UAS.
Despite our prior recommendations on the subject, DOD's updated roadmap
still lacks key planning elements such as a clear link between goals,
capabilities, plans, funding priorities, and needs. Therefore, it is
not yet a viable strategic plan for guiding UAS development and
investment.
Additional UAS Oversight Bodies Established:
As you may recall, in October 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the Joint Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Planning Task Force (now known as the UAS Planning Task
Force) to provide oversight for the department's UAS programs and to
provide guidance, as necessary, to promote interoperability and
commonality. To communicate its vision and promote commonality of UAS
systems, the Task Force published its first UAS roadmap in 2002 and an
updated version in 2005. The roadmap describes current programs,
identifies potential missions, and provides guidance on emerging
technologies. According to DOD officials, the Task Force is currently
focused on coordinating with the services as they procure and field
greater numbers of UAS in an effort to ensure the military services
avoid duplication of systems, while developing integrated systems that
can work together in joint combat operations.
To supplement the efforts of its UAS Planning Task Force, DOD has
established two additional UAS oversight bodies since we last
testified. For example, in July 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council[Footnote 13] established a new Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Center of Excellence to focus on UAS operational issues and the Joint
UAS Material Review Board[Footnote 14] to address joint UAS material
issues and prioritize solutions. The Center of Excellence--assisted by
an advisory council composed of representatives from each of the
combatant commands, the services, and the Joint UAS Material Review
Board--is responsible for facilitating the development and integration
of UAS common operating standards, capabilities, concepts, doctrine,
tactics, techniques, procedures, and training. The Center of Excellence
has been charged with developing a joint concept of operations for
unmanned aircraft systems. According to center officials, the concept
of operations will likely address issues such as interoperability and
airspace integration.
The Material Review Board is chartered to provide a forum to identify
or resolve requirements and corresponding material issues regarding
interoperability and commonality, prioritize potential solutions,
assess the focus of current and future programs, and seek strategies
common to all services. The Material Review Board is composed of
members from each of the services, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and Joint Forces Command. Due to the broad nature of UAS,
at various times other stakeholders, such as the combatant commanders,
also attend board meetings. Additionally, the board is not a standing
body with full-time members, but rather an organization that meets
periodically.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council also tasked both the Center of
Excellence and the Material Review Board with submitting
recommendations to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System and with coordinating service-sponsored UAS
submissions.[Footnote 15] DOD officials state that having the center
and board serve in this coordination role will allow them to leverage
service developmental efforts, capabilities, and requirements to enable
joint interoperability, and reduce duplication of effort. As of March
2006, the center and board were in the process of organizing,
establishing guidance and procedures, conducting initial meetings, and
identifying initial efforts.
In addition to the UAS Joint Planning Task Force, DOD views the new
oversight bodies as means to more effectively manage service UAS
programs. While these changes appear to be steps in the right
direction, it is unknown whether they will provide an effective
oversight framework. It is too early to tell how these entities will
interrelate or what impact they will have in addressing
interoperability issues and the other challenges we have identified.
While DOD intends for these entities to play a role in guiding service
UAS acquisition, planning, prioritization, and execution of unmanned
air systems, it is also unclear to what extent they will be able to
influence the services because none of the entities are chartered with
the authority to direct the military services to adopt any of their
suggestions. Rather, they act in an advisory capacity and make
recommendations to the services and Joint Requirements Oversight
Council.
Updated UAS Roadmap Better Identifies Challenges but Still Lacks Key
Strategic Plan Elements:
Notwithstanding our prior recommendations on the subject, DOD's updated
UAS roadmap lacks key planning elements and is not a strategic plan
that can guide UAS development and investment decisions. As we have
previously testified and reported, a strategic plan and effective
oversight can be helpful in guiding efforts to develop and field UAS
and to address the types of challenges that are emerging with
integrating UAS into the force structure. Specifically, we emphasized
that while DOD's 2002 roadmap contained some elements of a strategic
plan--in that it identified approaches to attaining long-term goals and
assessed in part, annual performance goals and performance indictors
that identified progress towards these goals--it only minimally
addressed other elements, such as the interrelationship between service-
specific efforts, opportunities for joint endeavors, or funding
issues.[Footnote 16] We reported that although the joint UAS Planning
Task Force had taken a positive step by developing the Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, a key planning document, neither it nor
other DOD guidance documents represented a comprehensive strategic plan
to guide the development and fielding of UAS. We further reported that
without a strategic framework and an oversight body with sufficient
program directive authority to implement planning, DOD had little
assurance its investment would result in UAS programs being effectively
integrated into the force structure. Consequently, we found that DOD
risked increased costs, future interoperability problems, and
duplication among the military services. We recommended that DOD
establish a strategic plan and designate the Task Force or another body
to oversee implementation of the plan.
Since that time, DOD has established the previously discussed entities
and the UAS Planning Task Force published an updated roadmap--the
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030. Similar to its
predecessor, the 2005 roadmap contains some elements of a strategic
plan such as broad long-term goals and priorities, but lacks other
crucial elements of a strategic plan, such as milestones and
performance measures for achieving these goals and priorities. While it
also describes desired capabilities for UAS, operational issues or
challenges based on ongoing operations, and service-specific
acquisition plans, it does not provide a clear link among the goals,
desired capabilities, and plans, nor does it sufficiently address the
interrelationship among service plans to each other and how they
promote joint operations, opportunities for joint endeavors, and
investment priorities and related funding needs. We believe the roadmap
does not provide specific guidance on UAS development or related force
structure integration. In fact, the roadmap clearly states that it
neither authorizes specific UAS nor prioritizes the requirements, as
this is the responsibility of the services and the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council. DOD officials acknowledged to us that the updated
roadmap is not a strategic plan and does not contain details about
force structure, resources, and other capability implementation issues,
but rather emphasizes technology. U.S. Central Command officials have
cited the need for an integrated roadmap for UAS to ensure
interoperability is achieved and that new UAS systems neither interfere
with nor limit mission performance. We continue to believe that a
strategic plan is needed to better position DOD to validate
requirements, evaluate services plans, integrate service efforts, and
establish program and funding priorities. Without a strategic plan,
Congress may not have all the information it needs to evaluate DOD's
UAS funding requests. Furthermore, a strategic plan and oversight
framework would help DOD assure that service plans for developing UAS
anticipate and potentially minimize the types of challenges that are
emerging today, particularly in the areas of interoperability,
bandwidth, and airspace integration.
Unmanned Aircraft Programs Provide Lessons Learned for Future Systems
to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies:
While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development
programs have exhibited similar problems as other major weapon systems
that began an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties
about requirements and funding, and immature technologies, design, and
production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes--
changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance
shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition
programs can learn from past efforts to limit risks and improve
outcomes by establishing comprehensive business cases to match customer
requirements and available resources and by adopting disciplined
knowledge-based and incremental acquisition strategies consistent with
DOD acquisition policy preferences and best practices. Recent
management decisions and budget actions raise some questions about the
department's priorities, future direction for UAS, and possible
duplication of systems. Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to
coordinate acquisitions, logistics, and employment of two similar
systems are encouraging.
Acquisition Strategies and Outcomes Experienced by Current Programs Can
Be Used to Improve Future Systems:
We recently reported on DOD's three largest UAS programs.[Footnote 17]
We analyzed and contrasted the acquisition strategies and outcomes of
the Air Force's Global Hawk and Predator programs. We identified
lessons learned that could benefit the Joint Unmanned Combat Air
Systems technology demonstration and other future systems.
The Global Hawk and Predator programs had similar beginnings, but
followed different acquisition strategies that resulted in different
outcomes. While both programs began with top leadership support and
accomplished successful, focused demonstration efforts, Global Hawk
switched to a high-risk acquisition strategy by accelerating
development and production. With the substantial overlap in
development, test, and production, the program experienced significant
gaps in knowledge about technology, design, and manufacturing
capabilities while requiring sizable funding. As a result, serious cost
and schedule problems have ensued, some required capabilities have been
deferred or dropped, operational tests have identified performance
problems, and the Global Hawk program is being restructured for the
fourth time. In contrast, the Predator program has pursued an
acquisition strategy that is more consistent with DOD's revised
acquisition guidance and commercial best practices for a more
structured and evolutionary acquisition approach. While the Predator
program has some overlap in development and production and has
experienced some problems, the program's cost growth and schedule
delays have been relatively minor, and testing of prototypes in
operational environments has already begun.
There are trends that run consistently through the Global Hawk and
Predator programs, similar to trends in other major defense acquisition
programs that we have reviewed. That is, when DOD provides strong
leadership at an appropriate organizational level, it enables
innovative, evolutionary, and disciplined processes to work. Once
leadership is removed or diminished, programs have tended to lose
control of requirements and add technical and funding risks. We have
also found that after successful demonstrations to quickly field
systems with existing technologies, problems were encountered after the
programs transitioned into the system development phase of the
acquisition process. The services pushed programs into production
without maturing processes and also began to add new requirements that
stretched beyond technology and design resources. Inadequate
technology, design, and production knowledge increased risk and led to
cost, schedule, and performance problems.
The J-UCAS technology demonstration program and its offspring could
benefit from the lessons learned in the Global Hawk and Predator
programs. Since its inception, the J-UCAS program has been in flux.
Program leadership, funding, and priorities have changed several times.
The recent Quadrennial Defense Review has directed another
restructuring into a Navy program to demonstrate a carrier-based
unmanned combat air system. The Air Force plans to consider J-UCAS
technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to develop a new long-
range strike capability. Before DOD commits to major acquisition
development programs for the Navy and Air Force, it has the opportunity
and time to develop the knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible
business cases and to adopt disciplined, evolutionary strategies
consistent with DOD acquisition policy preferences and best practices
to support advanced unmanned systems acquisitions. Refining
requirements based on proven technologies and a feasible design based
on systems engineering are best accomplished in the concept and
technology development phase that precedes the start of a system
acquisition program. During this early phase, the environment is
conducive to changes in requirements that can be accomplished more cost-
effectively than after systems integration begins and large
organizations of engineers, suppliers, and manufacturers are formed to
prepare for the start of system production.
Key lessons that can be applied to J-UCAS and other future systems
include:
* maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to
that experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the
Predator's Task Force Arnold (a senior group of Air Force leaders that
helped the program maintain a tight focus on program requirements and
direction);
* establishing a clear business case that justifies initial investments
and constrains individual program requirements to match available
resources based on proven technologies, engineering knowledge, and time
available before committing to system development and demonstration;
* implementing an incremental acquisition strategy preferred by defense
policy and best practices that separates technology development from
product development and minimizes concurrency between testing and
production;
* establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and
demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and
used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward and
investing more money; and:
* managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully
resource product development and production based on a cost estimate
that has been informed by proven technologies and a preliminary design.
Additionally, lessons learned from the transition of the Global Hawk
and Predator systems from technology demonstrations into system
production and operation are important. The advanced concept technology
demonstration can be a valuable tool to prove concepts and military
utility before committing time and funds to a major system acquisition.
Designing in product reliability and producibility, and making informed
trade-offs among alternative support approaches are key aspects of
development and can save substantial money in operating and maintaining
systems during their lifetimes. However, if these operational aspects
of system development are not addressed early before production, they
can have major negative impacts on life-cycle costs. The original
Predator demonstration effort did not emphasize design and development
tasks that make a system more reliable and supportable. This made the
transition from demonstration to acquisition more difficult and the Air
Force had to organize a team to respond and resolve reliability and
supportability issues.
Future Direction of DOD's UAS Acquisitions:
Frequent changes to J-UCAS and recent budget actions raise some
questions about the department's priorities and future direction for
unmanned aircraft systems, which a strategic plan would help address.
Garnering the benefits from improved coordination among the military
services' individual programs and maintaining an emphasis on joint
development and fielding strategy seem to be at some risk.
In terms of overall investment, while development and procurement
funding have significantly increased since the terror attacks in
September 2001, annual funding requested in fiscal year 2007 for
unmanned aircraft systems is $1.7 billion, while DOD's funding for
tactical aviation programs in 2007 is $25.1 billion. The total funding
programmed in the fiscal year 2006 defense budget request was $15.4
billion and $153.9 billion, respectively. The near-term investment
plans laid out in the fiscal year 2007 budget request are smaller than
the amounts projected over the same period in the fiscal year 2005
budget.
The termination of the J-UCAS as a joint technology demonstration
program and uncertain, evolving future plans for its offspring also
seem somewhat at odds with official plans for jointness. The J-UCAS was
one of the top priorities in DOD's roadmap published in August 2005 and
was cited as leading the way to the next generation of unmanned
aircraft--extending missions beyond the original focus on intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to persistent,
survivable, and advanced combat capabilities with increased levels of
autonomy. A weaponized, stealthy unmanned aircraft was also selected as
the most effective solution to close capability gaps identified in the
joint strike enabler initial capabilities document published in
December 2004. The system envisioned was to provide a penetrating and
persistent strike aircraft against high-threat enemy air defenses and
other high-value ground targets. Before J-UCAS became a joint program
in October 2003, the Air Force had planned to accelerate its own
unmanned combat air system with initial deliveries in fiscal year 2007.
It appears to us that Air Force support for such a system waned when it
became a joint program on a less aggressive fielding schedule.
Also uncertain is how many crossover benefits can be mutually provided
by separate Navy and Air Force efforts as restructured. The Navy is
starting up its own program in fiscal year 2007 with about $1.8 billion
in funds cut from the J-UCAS program. Some of the remaining J-UCAS
programmed funding was redirected to the Air Force's long-range strike
program and other efforts. Requirements are somewhat divergent. The
Navy appears to be most interested in fielding a relatively small
aircraft of moderate endurance that may operate solo from aircraft
carriers to provide surveillance for the battle group. The Air Force's
future striker will likely be a larger land-based platform able to
operate in groups, with a longer range requiring aerial refueling and
employing a large weapons-carrying capacity. The Air Force is expected
to use J-UCAS experience in conducting an analysis of alternatives
during 2006 of the future striker, which may be manned, unmanned, or
some combination. Air Force plans are still evolving at this time and
it is unclear how much of the previous investment in J-UCAS technology
and continuing Navy efforts will benefit the Air Force program.
As the J-UCAS evolves one more time--and efforts return to the
individual services--some key challenges will exist to maintain the
advantages that were offered by a joint effort. The services need to be
aware of those advantages and not arbitrarily reject them for parochial
reasons. For example, exploiting past plans for common operating
systems, components, and payloads could offer cost savings in
acquisition and life-cycle support as well as improved
interoperability. In particular, the common operating system could be a
cutting edge tool to integrate and provide for interoperability of air
vehicles, allowing groups of unmanned aircraft to fly in a coordinated
manner and function autonomously (without human input). A top priority
when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency led J-UCAS, the
common operating system is now likely to be terminated, according to a
program official.
Concerns have also been raised about possible duplication of DOD
unmanned aircraft systems as the services look to expand individual
fleets. The joint decision of the Air Force and Army to develop a
memorandum of understanding on the Predator and Warrior programs is
encouraging and could be a model for inhibiting duplication and
fostering synergy of efforts. These two systems are similar in mission
and design and are manufactured by the same contractor. The services
agreed to a collaborative solution in terms of acquisition, logistics,
and employment and to optimize funding and leverage current and future
systems to rapidly field identified capabilities. A more detailed
memorandum of understanding is expected soon to articulate the path
forward for each of the services in respect to developing complementary
capabilities. One possible outcome could be a decision to acquire one
system to meet the needs of both services. We note, however, that the
Air Force recently substantially increased its planned investments in
Predator A to buy much greater quantities; this year's funding
estimates through 2011 are 165 percent more than was estimated for the
same period last year. It would seem more prudent to do the analysis
and reach the collaborative decisions with the Army before committing
to increased investments.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy
to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For future questions about this statement, please contact Sharon Pickup
at (202) 512-9619 or Michael J. Sullivan at (937) 258-7915. Other
individuals making key contributions to this statement include Patricia
Lentini, Michael Hazard, Susan Tindall, Bruce Fairbairn, Shvetal
Khanna, Rae Ann Sapp, Charlie Shivers III, Brian Simpson, Renee Brown,
Katherine Lenane, and Charles Perdue.
Related GAO Products:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts
to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies. GAO-06-447.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in
Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49.
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning
Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy
Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. GAO-05-6. Washington, D.C.:
November 5, 2004.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD's
Development and Fielding Efforts. GAO-04-530T. Washington, D.C.: March
17, 2004.
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of Cruise
Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology
Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175.
Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. GAO-03-598.
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow
200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.: September
26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved
Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude
Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.:
December 15, 1998.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate to
Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-
138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy
Fleet Use. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short-Range System Still in
Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of
Short-Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4,
1992.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit.
GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of
Short-Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 28,
1990.
Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master
Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Until recently, DOD referred to these aircraft as "unmanned aerial
vehicles." "Unmanned aircraft" is consistent with the Federal Aviation
Administration's classification and emphasizes other components of the
system, such as payload, ground stations, and communications equipment.
[2] GAO, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition
Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges, GAO-05-395T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 9, 2005).
[3] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New
DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky
Acquisition Strategies, GAO-06-447 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).
[4] Bandwidth refers to the available frequencies to support the flight
of UAS, to transmit the output of onboard sensors, and to interface
with air traffic control centers.
[5] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005).
[6] The total number represents the number of unmanned aircraft, rather
than unmanned aircraft systems, and includes test and training assets.
[7] Interoperability is the ability of systems, units, and forces to
provide and receive data and information from other systems, units, and
forces.
[8] The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics may waive the applicability of these requirements to any
tactical UAS if the Undersecretary determines and certifies to the
congressional defense committees that it would be technologically
infeasible or uneconomically acceptable to integrate a tactical data
link.
[9] Pub. L. No. 109-163 § 141 (2006).
[10] The common data link is a family of full-duplex, jam-resistant,
point-to-point microwave communication links developed by the U.S.
government and used in imagery and signals intelligence collections
systems.
[11] CJCSI 6212.01D (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006).
[12] Blue Force Tracker is a satellite-based tracking and
communications system that enables users to monitor the location of
other Blue Force Tracker-equipped aircraft and vehicles.
[13] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is a joint organization
made up of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a four-
star officer designated from each of the services that bases
recommendations to the Chairman on interaction with combatant
commanders and the Joint Staff Director-led Joint Warfighting
Capability Assessment teams that perform detailed assessments of
programmatic alternatives, tradeoffs, risks, bill-payers, and
effectiveness. CJCSI 3180.01 (Washington, D.C.: Oct 31, 2002).
[14] This group was formerly known as the Joint UAV Overarching
Integrated Process Team and was rechartered to form the Joint Material
Review Board and tasked with addressing UAS material issues.
[15] In June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process. It
is a collaborative system that DOD uses to identify capability gaps and
integrated solutions to resolve these gaps.
[16] GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance
DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 17, 2004).
[17] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from
Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies, GAO-
06-447 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).
