Defense Acquisitions
Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful Development of the Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System Gao ID: GAO-06-593 May 19, 2006Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 billion on unmanned aircraft systems, including the Army's "Warrior." Because of congressional concerns that some systems have been more costly and taken more time to produce than predicted, GAO reviewed the Warrior program. This report (1) describes the Army's requirements underlying its decision to acquire Warrior instead of existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator, and (2) assesses whether the Army has established a sound acquisition strategy for the Warrior program.
The Army determined the Warrior is its best option for an unmanned aircraft system directly controlled by field commanders, compared with existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator A. The Army believes that using the Warrior will improve force capability through teaming with other Army assets; using common ground control equipment; and allowing soldiers in the field to operate it. Warrior's key technical features include a heavy fuel engine; automatic take-off and landing system; faster tactical common data link; ethernet; greater carrying capacity for weapons; and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army projects that Warrior will offer some cost savings over Predator A. In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule, the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition strategy for Warrior. Two of four of the Warrior's critical technologies were immature at the contract award for system development and demonstration and remain so in early 2006, and the mature technologies still have some risk associated with them because neither has previously been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Warrior schedule allows 32 months from award of the development and demonstration contract to the initial production decision. Achieving this schedule will require concurrency of technology and product development, testing, and production. Once developmental aircraft are available for testing, the Army plans to fund procurement of long-lead items in August 2007. Experience shows that these concurrencies can result in design changes during production that can prevent delivery of a system within projected cost and schedule. The Warrior program faces these same risks.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-593, Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful Development of the Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
May 2006:
Defense Acquisitions:
Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful Development of the
Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System:
GAO-06-593:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-593, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20
billion on unmanned aircraft systems, including the Army‘s ’Warrior.“
Because of congressional concerns that some systems have been more
costly and taken more time to produce than predicted, GAO reviewed the
Warrior program. This report (1) describes the Army‘s requirements
underlying its decision to acquire Warrior instead of existing systems
such as the Air Force‘s Predator, and (2) assesses whether the Army has
established a sound acquisition strategy for the Warrior program.
What GAO Found:
The Army determined the Warrior is its best option for an unmanned
aircraft system directly controlled by field commanders, compared with
existing systems such as the Air Force‘s Predator A. The Army believes
that using the Warrior will improve force capability through teaming
with other Army assets; using common ground control equipment; and
allowing soldiers in the field to operate it. Warrior‘s key technical
features include a heavy fuel engine; automatic take-off and landing
system; faster tactical common data link; ethernet; greater carrying
capacity for weapons; and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army
projects that Warrior will offer some cost savings over Predator A.
In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic
schedule, the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based
acquisition strategy for Warrior. Two of four of the Warrior‘s critical
technologies were immature at the contract award for system development
and demonstration and remain so in early 2006, and the mature
technologies still have some risk associated with them because neither
has previously been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The
Warrior schedule allows 32 months from award of the development and
demonstration contract to the initial production decision. Achieving
this schedule will require concurrency of technology and product
development, testing, and production. Once developmental aircraft are
available for testing, the Army plans to fund procurement of long-lead
items in August 2007. Experience shows that these concurrencies can
result in design changes during production that can prevent delivery of
a system within projected cost and schedule. The Warrior program faces
these same risks.
Figure: Best Practices Approach:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends the Secretary of the Army ensure that a sound, knowledge-
based acquisition strategy guide the Warrior program. Specifically, GAO
recommends that the Army not approve long-lead items for Warrior low-
rate initial production until it can clearly demonstrate that the
program‘s technologies are mature and its design stable. DOD states
that delaying procurement of long-lead items will increase program
costs and delay fielding of Warrior. GAO‘s past work shows that
programs proceeding without needed knowledge on technologies and design
ultimately take longer and cost more money.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-593].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact John Hutton at (202) 512-
7773 or huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Warrior Capability Is Targeted to Support Army Commanders‘ Needs:
Warrior Acquisition Strategy Not Consistent with Best Practices 10
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix:
Comments from the Department of Defense:
Table:
Table 1: Comparison of Warrior and Predator A Technical Features:
Figures:
Figure 1: Time Line for Warrior Program:
Figure 2: Concurrency in Warrior‘s Technology Development, Product
Development, Testing, and Production Compared to Best Practices Model:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
SDD: System Development and Demonstration:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
Unmanned aircraft systems[Footnote 1] are being developed and fielded
in growing numbers and the diversity of designs and applications is
also increasing. Through 2011, the Department of Defense plans to spend
$20 billion to develop, procure, and support a rapidly increasing
inventory of such systems. Among the new developments is the Army's
Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System, also known as
"Warrior." The Army expects Warrior to replace its aging Hunter
unmanned system, which has grown technologically obsolete and
increasingly expensive to maintain. Warrior is being developed and
produced by the contractor also involved in the Air Force's existing
Predator A and planned Predator B unmanned aircraft systems, and
Warrior shares some similarities with them. In early February, the Air
Force and the Army signed a memorandum of understanding that recognized
that complementary/joint requirements exist between the Predator and
Warrior systems, and they committed to reaching agreement on how to
develop and use these capabilities.
Because of the growth in requirements and new technologies for unmanned
aircraft systems and your concerns that some unmanned aircraft systems
have not produced the expected cost and schedule outcomes, you asked us
to review the Army's Warrior program. Specifically, this report (1)
describes the unique requirements that led to the Army's decision to
acquire Warrior, and (2) assesses whether the Army has established a
sound business case for the acquisition of Warrior.
To address the first objective, we analyzed Army requirements documents
as well as compared key technical features of the planned Warrior and
Predator. We also reviewed the process the Army used to select the
Warrior system. To address the second objective, we reviewed the
Warrior acquisition strategy and business case and evaluated them
according to best practices criteria utilizing GAO's "Methodology for
Assessing Risks on Major Weapons Systems Acquisition Programs." We also
analyzed budget-related, programmatic, and planning information to
determine the soundness of the Army's business case. For both
objectives, we interviewed Army officials and obtained information on
Army requirements and acquisition strategy for Warrior. We also
leveraged other recent GAO work on the Air Force's Predator
system[Footnote 2] and overall body of work on best practices of
leading companies. We conducted our review from September 2005 to March
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results In Brief:
The Army has determined that the Warrior was the best option available
to meet Army operational requirements. The Army's requirement is for an
unmanned aircraft system dedicated to direct operational control by
Army field commanders; however, the Army believes that the Predator A
is operationally and technically mismatched with this requirement. The
Army intends to use Warrior to enhance overall force capability by
teaming Warrior with other Army assets such as the Apache helicopter;
using common ground control equipment to network with other unmanned
aircraft systems; and allowing soldiers in the field to operate the
aircraft. The Army expects Warrior to have several key technical
features that the Army believes will better meet its operational needs
than those found on the Predator A, including a heavy fuel engine that
uses a single Army-wide fuel; an automatic take-off and landing system
to improve safety; a faster tactical common data link for
interoperability with other Army assets; a faster ethernet for quicker
communications within the Warrior system; greater carrying capacity for
weapons; and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army estimates
that each Warrior aircraft and associated basic equipment will cost
about $4.4 million; less than the aircraft and similar equipment for
the Predator A at $4.8 million. While the planned Predator B system is
expected to meet or exceed some of the Warrior's capabilities, it is
estimated to cost $9 million for similar equipment.
In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic
schedule, the Army has not established a sound business case for
Warrior that is consistent with best acquisition practices. The Army
contracted for Warrior system development and demonstration in August
2005 even though two of four critical technologies were not mature.
These two critical technologies still are not mature as of early 2006,
and the two that are mature still have some risk associated with them
because neither has previously been integrated onto an unmanned
aircraft. The Army does have back-ups in place for the two immature
critical technologies, but use of these would result in a less capable
system. It is uncertain if the Army will be able to complete maturation
of these technologies and achieve Warrior's overall design stability by
the time of the planned design readiness review in July 2006. Overall,
the Warrior schedule is very aggressive, with 30 months from the award
of the design and development contract to the initial production
decision. Moreover, the Warrior schedule overlays technology
development, product development, testing, and production. For example,
the Army is establishing production capabilities while the first 17
aircraft prototypes are being designed and fabricated. Within months of
these prototypes becoming available for developmental testing, the Army
plans to commit funding for procurement of long-lead items as early as
August 2007. Such concurrency can result in design changes during
production, when changes are likely to be more costly and can possibly
delay delivery of a capability. Considering these issues and the
weaknesses they expose within the business case for Warrior, the Army
may be unable to deliver the Warrior system as promised and within cost
and schedule.
We are recommending that the Secretary of the Army take action to
ensure that a sound business case and knowledge-based strategy guide
the future Warrior program. Specifically, we recommend that the Army
not approve long-lead items for Warrior low-rate initial production
until it can clearly demonstrate that the program is proceeding based
on accumulated knowledge such as technology maturity and design
stability.
Background:
Currently, DOD has 5 major unmanned aircraft systems in use: the Air
Force's Predator A and Global Hawk, the Marine Corps' Pioneer, and the
Army's Hunter and Shadow. The services also have developmental efforts
underway, for example, the Air Force's Predator B, the Army and Navy's
vertical take-off and landing system, and the Army's Warrior. Overall,
DOD now has about 250 unmanned aircraft in inventory and plans to
increase its inventory to 675 by 2010 and 1,400 by 2015[Footnote 3].
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review reached a number of decisions that
would further expand investments in unmanned systems, including
accelerating production of Predator and Global Hawk. It also
established a plan to develop a new land-based, long-strike capability
by 2018 and set a goal that about 45 percent of the future long-range
strike force be unmanned.
DOD expects unmanned aircraft systems to transform the battlespace with
innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as take on the
so-called "dull, dirty, and dangerous missions" without putting pilots
in harm's way. Potential missions for unmanned systems have expanded
from the original focus on intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance to limited tactical strike capabilities. Projected plans
call for unmanned aircraft systems to perform persistent ground attack,
electronic warfare, and suppression of enemy air defenses.
Unmanned aircraft fly at altitudes ranging from below 10,000 feet to
above 50,000 feet and are typically characterized by approximate
altitude --"low-altitude" if operating at 10,000 feet or less, "medium-
altitude" if flying above 10,000 but below 35,000 feet, and "high-
altitude" if operating above 35,000 feet. The Army's classifies Warrior
as a medium-altitude system, in the same category as the Hunter system
that it will replace, its Warrior prototype known as I-GNAT, and the
Air Force's Predator A. The Air Force's Predator B is expected to
operate at both medium and high altitudes.
The Warrior as envisioned by the Army shares some similarities with the
Air Force's Predator A and B models. First, all 3 systems share the
same contractor, General Atomics. Second, Predator A and Warrior are
expected to be somewhat similar in physical characteristics. In
particular, the build of the main fuselage, the location of fuel bays,
and design of the tailspar are alike. According to Army program
officials, the planned Predator B and Warrior are expected to share the
same flight controls and avionics. Predator A and Warrior are
anticipated to perform some similar missions, including reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition and attack.
The development of the Warrior program began in late 2001 when the Army
started defining requirements for a successor to its Hunter system. In
September 2004, the Army released a request for a "systems capabilities
demonstration" so that companies could demonstrate the capabilities of
their existing aircraft. In December 2004, the Army awarded
demonstration contracts worth $250,000 each to 2 contractors, Northrup
Grumman and General Atomics. The Army did not perform a formal analysis
of the alternatives comparing expected capabilities of Warrior with
current capabilities offered by existing systems; rather, its rationale
was that the Warrior is needed near-term for commanders' missions and
considered this competition to be a rigorous analysis of available
alternatives.
Subsequent to the competition, in August 2005, the Army awarded the
system development and demonstration (SDD) contract to General Atomics.
The contract is a cost plus incentive fee contract, with a base value
of about $194 million, approximately another $15 million available to
the contractor in the form of incentive fees, and about an additional
$12 million available as award fees. The time line below illustrates
the sequence of past and planned events for the Warrior program.
Figure 1: Time Line for Warrior Program:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of Figure]
The Army plans for a full Warrior system to entail 12 aircraft as well
as 5 ground control stations, 5 ground data terminals, 2 portable
ground control stations, 2 portable data terminals and other associated
ground support equipment. The Army expects to buy 1 developmental
system with 17 aircraft and 11 complete production systems with a total
of 132 production aircraft through 2015. However, the Army has not yet
decided the number of systems it might buy beyond that date.
The Army is employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy to produce
Warrior. The Army expects the current Warrior program of record to
provide for immediate warfighting needs and plans to build on the
capabilities of this increment as evolving technology allows.
Warrior Capability Is Targeted To Support Army Commanders' Needs:
The Army has an operational requirement, approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, for an unmanned aircraft system
dedicated to direct operational control by Army field commanders. The
Army has determined that the Warrior was the best option available to
meet those operational requirements. However, Army program officials
believe that the Predator is operationally and technically mismatched
with this requirement. In order to meet operational requirements, the
Army expects Warrior to offer key technical features that will better
meet Army operational needs than Predator A.
Army Operational Requirements Focus on Control by Commanders in the
Field:
According to the Army, the Predator is operationally mismatched with
its division-level needs. Army program officials noted that one of the
Army's current operational difficulties with Predator is that frontline
commanders cannot directly task the system for support during tactical
engagements. Rather, Predator control is allocated to Theater and Joint
Task Force Commands, and the system's mission is to satisfy strategic
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance needs as well as joint
needs. Army programmatic and requirements documents maintain that Army
division commanders in the field need direct control of a tactical
unmanned aircraft asset capable of satisfying operational requirements
for dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
communications relay, teaming with other Army assets, and target
acquisition and attack[Footnote 4].
Additionally, Army program officials indicated that Predator's time is
apportioned among various users, and the Army typically does not
receive a large portion of that time. According to Warrior program
documents, the Army has historically been able to draw only limited
operational support from theater assets such as Predator. For example,
a program office briefing stated that the Army's average daily need for
video information in Iraq is 192 hours, that the Multi- National Corps
in Iraq as a whole only receives 10-20 hours of such information a day
from Predator due to asset shortages and other DOD priorities, and that
the Army's share of that 10-20 hours is not responsive to dynamic
changes on the battlefield. The briefing also said that the shortfall
was expected to continue, even with the addition of more Predators and
Global Hawks. The same briefing further noted that overall Iraq theater-
level support was neither consistent nor responsive to its needs, and
that division level support was often denied or cancelled entirely. The
briefing also said that the shortfall was expected to continue, even
with the addition of more Predators and Global Hawks.
Army program officials also told us that they expect Warrior to enhance
overall force capability in ways that Predator cannot. Specifically,
the Army expects Warrior to support teaming with Army aviation assets
and aid these assets in conducting missions that commanders were
previously reluctant to task to manned platforms. Under this teaming
concept, manned assets, including the Apache helicopter, Army Airspace
Command and Control system, and Aerial Common Sensor, would work
jointly with Warrior to enhance target acquisition and attack
capabilities. The Army plans for the manned platforms to not only
receive data, voice, and video communications from Warrior but also
control its payloads and flight. The Army also plans to configure
Warrior for interoperability with the Army One System Ground Control
Station, an Army-wide common ground control network for unmanned
aircraft systems. According to Army documents, Warrior's incorporation
into this network will better support the Army ground commander by
allowing control of Warrior aircraft to be handed off among ground
stations, provide better battlefield coverage for Joint Forces, and
ensure common operator training among unmanned aircraft systems,
including the Army's Warrior, Shadow, and Hunter and the Marine Corps'
systems. Additionally, Army program officials pointed out that Warrior
will be physically controlled by an enlisted soldier deployed in the
theater where Warrior is being used. They contrast this with Predator,
which is typically controlled from a location within the continental
United States by a pilot trained to fly manned aircraft.
Army Expects Warrior to Address Operational Needs with Key Technical
Features at Less Cost Than Predator:
The Army believes that the Warrior design will offer key technical
features to address Army operational requirements and maintains that
these features will better meet its operational needs than those found
on Predator A. The technical features include:
* Multi-role tactical common data link:
* Ethernet:
* Heavy fuel engine:
* Automatic take-off and landing system:
* More weapons:
* Interoperability with Army One Ground Control System:
* Dual-redundant avionics:
Table 1 below shows the respective purpose of each technical feature,
describes whether or not a particular feature is planned for Warrior
and exists now on Predator A, and provides the Army's assessment of
operational impact provided by each feature.
Table 1: Comparison of Warrior and Predator A Technical Features:
Technical Feature: Tactical Common Data Link;
Purpose: -Communications between ground control station and aircraft;
-Interoperability with Army aviation platforms;
Warrior: Yes-digital Ku-band data link[A];
Predator A: No - analog C-band data link;
Army's Assessment of Operational Impact: - Faster external data
transmission; -Improved control of aircraft; - Teaming with Army
aviation.
Technical Feature: Ethernet;
Purpose: -Real-time internal communications, including among avionics,
payloads, weapons;
Warrior: Yes;
Predator A: No;
Army's Assessment of Operational Impact: -Faster internal data
transmission.
Technical Feature: Heavy Fuel Engine; Purpose: -Powers aircraft;
Warrior: Yes;
Predator A: No;
Army's Assessment of Operational Impact: -Single Army fuel on
battlefield; -Improved endurance and take-off weight.
Technical Feature: Automatic Take-off and Landing;
Purpose: -Launch and recovery;
Warrior: Yes;
Predator A: No - pilot using manual controls;
Army's Assessment of Operational Impact: -Safer; -Reduced chance for
operator error.
Technical Feature: Weapons;
Purpose: -Target attack;
Warrior: Yes - 4 Hellfire;
Predator A: Yes - 2 Hellfire;
Army's Assessment of Operational Impact: -Prosecute more targets.
Technical Feature: Dual-Redundant Avionics;
Purpose: -Improve airworthiness;
Warrior: Yes;
Predator A: No;
Army's Assessment of Operational Impact: -More reliable.
Technical Feature: Ground Control Station;
Purpose: -Control of unmanned aircraft system;
Warrior: Yes - common with other Army/Marine Corps systems;
Predator A: Yes - unique to Predator;
Army's Assessment of Operational Impact: -Single control of several
unmanned aircraft systems; -Broader battlefield coverage.
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[A] Ku-band and C-band ranges of radio frequencies used in wireless
communications.
[End of table]
According to the Army, Warrior will offer not only improved technical
features over Predator A but also will be less expensive. A February
2006 Warrior program office comparison of costs for Warrior and
Predator A projects that Warrior's unit cost will be $4.4 million for
each aircraft, including its sensors, satellite communications, and
Hellfire launchers and associated electronics. The cost comparison
indicates that Predator A's unit cost for the same elements is $4.8
million. Although the Air Force's Predator B is planned to be more
capable than Warrior in such areas as physical size and payload and
weapons capacity, the Warrior program office estimates that it will
have a unit cost of $9.0 million - about double the anticipated cost
for Warrior. The Army's cost estimates for the Warrior are, of course,
predicated on Army plans for successful development and testing.
Warrior Acquisition Strategy Not Consistent With Best Practices:
In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic
schedule, the Army has not yet established a business case for Warrior
that is consistent with best practices for successful acquisition.
Warrior relies on critical technologies that were not mature at the
time of the system development and demonstration contract award in
August 2005 and were still not mature in March 2006. Furthermore, it
appears that the Army may be unable to complete maturity of these
technologies and achieve overall design stability by the time of the
design readiness review scheduled for July 2006. Moreover, the Warrior
schedule is very aggressive and overlaps technology development,
product development, testing, and production. For example, the Army
plans to consider awarding a contract for procurement of long-lead
items at a time when it is still unclear if Warrior will be
technologically mature and have a stable design. Such concurrency adds
more risk, including the potential for costly design changes after
production begins, to the already compressed schedule.
In the last several years, we have undertaken a best practices body of
work on how leading developers in industry and government use a
knowledge-based approach to develop high-quality products on time and
within budget. A knowledge-based approach to product development
employs a process wherein a high level of knowledge about critical
facets of a product is achieved at key junctures known as "knowledge
points." [Footnote 5] This event-driven approach wherein each point
builds on knowledge attained in the previous point enables developers
to be reasonably certain that their products are more likely to meet
established cost, schedule, and performance baselines. A key to such
successful product development is a business case that matches
requirements to resources and includes, among other elements, a high
level of technology maturity in the product at the start of system
development and demonstration, design maturity at the system's design
readiness review usually held about half-way through the system's
development phase, and adequate time to deliver the product.
Some Warrior Critical Technologies Have Yet to Reach Maturity:
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system
development is an important indicator that a match has been made
between the customer's requirements and the product developer's
resources in term of knowledge, money, and time. This means that the
technologies needed to meet essential requirements - known as "critical
technologies" - have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment. Our best practices work has shown that technology
readiness levels (TRLs) [Footnote 6] can be used to assess the maturity
of individual technologies and that a TRL of 7 - demonstration of a
technology in an operational environment - is the level that
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program.
The Warrior program contains four critical technologies: (1) ethernet,
(2) multi-role tactical common data link, (3) heavy fuel engine, and
(4) automatic take-off and landing system. Two of the four critical
technologies - ethernet and data link - were not mature at the time the
Army awarded the Warrior system development and demonstration contract
in August 2005, and in early 2006 remain immature at TRLs of 4. Army
program officials told us that they project the ethernet to be at TRL 6
and the data link at TRL 5 or 6 by the time of the design readiness
review scheduled for July 2006. However, it is not certain that these
two technologies will be as mature at design readiness review as the
Army anticipates. Army program officials indicated that the data link
hardware is still in development and expect its integration with other
Warrior components to be a challenge. As such, they rated data link
integration status as a moderate schedule risk to the Warrior program.
While they stated that use of the ethernet has been demonstrated on
Army helicopters and should not be a technical integration challenge,
the officials also said that neither the ethernet or data link
technologies has been integrated previously onto an unmanned aircraft
platform. Further, if the technologies are demonstrated at TRL 6 by
design readiness review, they will meet DOD's standard for maturity
(demonstration in a relevant environment) but not the best practices
maturity standard of TRL 7 (demonstration in an operational
environment).
The Army has technologies in place as back-ups for the data link and
ethernet, but these technologies would result in a less capable system
than the Army originally planned. According to Army program officials,
there are several potential back-ups for the data link that could be
used on the Warrior aircraft. Among the back-ups they cited is the same
data link used on the Predator A - analog C-band. However, as we noted
in a report last year, C-band is congested, suffers from resulting
delays in data transmission and relay, and the Department of Defense
has established a goal of moving Predator payloads from this data
link.[Footnote 7] Similarly, the other data link back-ups cited by the
officials either had slower data transmission rates or also were not
yet mature. Program officials indicated that the back-up for the
ethernet is normal ground station control of the on-board communication
among such components as the payloads, avionics, and weapons. While
they stated that there would be no major performance penalty if the
back-up was used, they did note that the ethernet would significantly
improve ease of integrating payloads and of integrating with other Army
assets that might need control of a Warrior payload to support
missions.
The other 2 critical technologies, the automatic take-off and landing
system and the heavy fuel engine, are mature at respective TRLs of 7
and 9. Nevertheless, some program risk is associated with these
technologies as well. The contractor has never fielded an automatic
take-off and landing component on an unmanned aircraft system. Army
program officials told us that they feel confident about the take-off
and landing system because a similar landing system had been fielded on
the Shadow UAV, but they also indicated that the take-off component has
not been fielded on an unmanned aircraft. The officials also expressed
confidence in the heavy fuel engine because it is certified by the U.S.
Federal Aviation Administration and is in use on civilian manned
aircraft. However, like the complete take-off and landing system, it
has not previously been integrated onto an unmanned aircraft.
Warrior Design Stability Uncertain:
Best practices for successful acquisition call for a program's design
stability to be demonstrated by having at least 90 percent of system-
level engineering drawings released to manufacturing at the time of the
design readiness review. If a product's design is not stable as
demonstrated by meeting this best practice, the product may not meet
customer requirements and cost and schedule targets. For example, as we
reported previously, the Army's Shadow unmanned aircraft system program
did not meet best practices criteria because it had only 67 percent of
its design drawings completed when the system entered low- rate
production. Subsequent testing revealed examples of design immaturity,
especially relating to system reliability, and ultimately the Army
delayed Shadow's full-rate production by about 6 months.[Footnote 8]
The Warrior program also faces increased risk if design drawings do not
meet standards for best acquisition practices. The Warrior program
office projects that Warrior's design will be stable and that 85
percent of system-level drawings will have been released to
manufacturing by the time of the design readiness review in July 2006.
However, it seems uncertain whether the Warrior program will meet this
projection because percentages of drawings complete for some sub-
components were still quite low in early 2006 and, in some cases, have
declined since the system development and demonstration contract award.
For example, according to an Army program official, the percentage of
completed design drawings for the aircraft and ground control equipment
dropped after contract award because the Army made modifications to the
planned aircraft and also decided that it needed a larger transport
vehicle for the Warrior's ground control equipment.
Aggressive Schedule and Concurrent Activities Increase Program Risk:
The Warrior program appears driven largely by schedule rather than the
attainment of event-driven knowledge points that would separate
technology development from product development. The latter approach is
characteristic of both best practices and DOD's own acquisition policy.
Warrior's schedule is compressed and aggressive and includes
concurrency among technology development, product development, testing,
and production. Concurrency--the overlapping of technology and product
development, testing, and production schedules--is risky because it can
lead to design changes that can be costly and delay delivery of a
useable capability to the warfighter if testing shows design changes
are necessary to achieve expected system performance. As shown in Table
3 below, the Warrior schedule overlaps technology development, product
development, testing, and production. :
Figure 2: Concurrency in Warrior's Technology Development, Product
Development, Testing, and Production Compared to Best Practices Model:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of Figure]
The following examples highlight some of the concurrency issues within
the Warrior program:
* Thirty-two months have been allotted from the system development and
demonstration contract award in August 2005 to the low-rate production
decision in April 2008. Out of that, 10 months”from July 2006 to May
2007”are set aside for integrating system components (including all
four critical technologies) into the aircraft. Two of these
technologies are not yet mature (as of early 2006); none of the
specific technologies as planned to be used on Warrior have previously
been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Army plans to
continue integration through May 2007 would seem to undermine the
design stability expected to be achieved at the July 2006 design
readiness review. Ideally, system integration is complete by that time.
* Delivery of 17 developmental aircraft is to take place within a 12-
month period from April 2007 to April 2008, and the Army plans for them
to undergo developmental testing as they are delivered. It is unclear
whether all components will be fully integrated for this testing, but
the results of some tests should be available when the Army considers
approval of long-lead items for the first lot of low-rate initial
production in August 2007. The Army is requesting about $31 million in
fiscal 2007 to procure long-lead items, including items associated with
the automatic take-off and landing system, heavy fuel engine assembly,
and ground control. Prior to the planned approval of the first lot in
fiscal 2008, the developmental aircraft will be evaluated in a limited
user test.
The Warrior program office acknowledges that the schedule is high-risk.
Additionally, according to Army program officials, both the program
office and contractor recognize that there are areas of moderate to
high risk within the program, including integration of the tactical
common data link as well as timely availability of a modified Hellfire
missile and synthetic aperture radar used for visibility in poor
atmospheric conditions. Army program officials told us that they are
trying to manage Warrior as more of a knowledge-based, event-driven
rather than schedule-driven program. As an example, they stated that
the contractor is currently building two offcontract aircraft to help
mitigate risk by proving out design, development, and manufacturing.
However, they also told us that these two aircraft would not include
the tactical common data link, Hellfire missile, synthetic aperture
radar, or satellite communications used for relay purposes. They noted
that some of these items are still in development so are not expected
to be available, but they do plan for the two aircraft to have the
ethernet, heavy fuel engine, and automatic take-off and landing system.
Conclusions:
In concept, the Army has determined that the Warrior will meet its
operational requirements better than available alternatives such as the
Predator. In practice, however, the Warrior might very well encounter
cost, schedule, and performance problems that would hinder it from
attaining the Army‘s goals. Half of its critical technologies are not
yet mature, and its design is not yet stable. Compounding this, its
aggressive schedule features extensive concurrency among technology
development and demonstration, design integration, system demonstration
and test, and production, leaving little time to resolve technology
maturity and design stability issues by testing. If the Warrior program
continues forward prior to attaining adequate technology and design, it
may well produce underperforming Warrior aircraft that will not meet
program specifications. The program may then experience delays in
schedule and increased costs.
The next key program event with significant financial implications is
the scheduled approval of long-lead items for the initial lot of
Warrior low-rate initial production in August 2007. That will be the
first use of procurement funding for Warrior. We believe that is a key
point at which the Army needs to demonstrate that the Warrior program
is knowledge-based and better aligned to meet program goals within
available resources than it currently appears.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Army not approve long-lead items for Warrior low-
rate initial production until it can clearly demonstrate that the
program is proceeding based on accumulated knowledge and not a
predetermined schedule. In particular, we recommend that, prior to
approving the Warrior long-lead items for low-rate initial production,
the Secretary of the Army require that:
* critical Warrior technologies are fully mature and demonstrated;
* Warrior design integration is complete and at least 90 percent of
design drawings be completed and released to manufacturing; and
* fully-integrated Warrior developmental aircraft are fabricated and
involved in development testing.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments are reprinted in Appendix I. DOD concurred with one part of
our recommendation but not with the other two parts. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
DOD concurred with the part of our recommendation that it should seek
to have at least 90 percent of design drawings completed and released
to manufacturing prior to procuring long-lead items for Warrior's low-
rate initial production. However, DOD also said that the decision to
procure long-lead items will not be based solely on the percentage of
drawings completed, but also on the schedule impact of unreleased
drawings.
DOD did not concur with the rest of our recommendation that, prior to
approval of long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate initial production,
the Secretary of the Army needed to ensure (a) critical Warrior
technologies are fully mature and demonstrated and (b) fully-integrated
Warrior developmental aircraft are fabricated and involved in
development testing. Although DOD agreed that two critical technologies
are less mature than the others within the Warrior system, it also
stated that these technologies are at the correct levels to proceed
with integration. However, the Warrior program is nearing the end of
integration and is about to begin system demonstration, signified by
the July 2006 design readiness review. In that review, the design is
set to guide the building of developmental aircraft for testing. These
developmental aircraft will be used to demonstrate the design in the
latter half of System Development and Demonstration. While DOD stated
that risk mitigation steps are in place, including possible use of back-
up technologies, if either of the two critical technologies is not
ready for integration, the decisions on whether to use back-up
technologies in the design would ideally have been made by the design
readiness review. Even if the two critical technologies mature by that
point, they would still have to be integrated into the design, as would
the back-up technologies if DOD chose to use those instead. To the
extent that technology maturation and integration extend beyond the
design readiness review, the program will incur the risk of integrating
the design at the same time it is attempting to build developmental
aircraft to demonstrate the design. Our recommendation to make the
technology decision before committing to long-lead items provides a
reasonable precaution against letting the technology risks proceed
further into the demonstration of the developmental aircraft and into
the purchase of production items. Making the technology decision as
early as possible is particularly important given that the program
schedule allows no more than a year to demonstrate the design with the
developmental aircraft before committing to production. Our past work
has shown that increased costs and schedule slippages may accrue to
programs that are still maturing technologies well into system
development when they should be focused on stabilizing system design
and preparing for production.
With regards to the part of our recommendation that fully integrated
development aircraft are fabricated and involved in developmental
testing prior to approval of long-lead items, DOD indicated that
modeling and simulation, block upgrades, early operational deployments,
and early testing will enable the Department to mitigate design and
performance risks while remaining on schedule. While we agree that
these activities help reduce risk, the most effective way to reduce
risk is to verify the design through testing of fully-integrated
developmental aircraft before committing to production. Our
recommendation underscores the value of conducting such testing, which
can still be done if technology decisions are made early.
Our work over the past several years has shown that a knowledge-based
acquisition strategy consistent with best practices can lead to
successful outcomes. Specifically, proceeding without mature
technologies and a stable design can lead to costly design changes
after production is underway and negatively impact funding in other
Department programs, ultimately affecting DOD‘s ability to respond to
other warfighter needs.
Scope and Methodology:
To address the first objective, to identify the requirements that led
to the Army‘s decision to acquire Warrior, we reviewed Army operational
requirements, acquisition strategy, and other programmatic documents
and briefings. We did not assess the validity of the Army‘s
requirements for Warrior. We also reviewed the process the Army used in
selecting Warrior. In comparing Warrior to existing unmanned systems in
the inventory, we limited our review to comparable medium-altitude
systems within the military services. To assess differences in
operational capabilities for Warrior and Predator, we reviewed
operations-related documents for Predator A and B. We also reviewed
critical technologies as well as other key technical features of the
respective systems that highlighted differences in Warrior and Predator
A capabilities.
To address the second objective, whether the Army established a sound
acquisition strategy for Warrior, we reviewed planning, budget, and
programmatic documents. We also utilized GAO‘s ’Methodology for
Assessing Risks on Major Weapon System Programs“ to assess the Army‘s
acquisition strategy with respect to best practices criteria. The
methodology is derived from the best practices and experiences of
leading commercial firms and successful defense acquisition programs.
We also used this methodology to review risks within the Warrior
program, but we did not focus our assessment on all risk areas the Army
and Warrior contractor identified within the program. Instead, we
focused on those risk areas that seemed most critical to the overall
soundness of the Army‘s acquisition strategy.
To achieve both objectives, we interviewed Army officials and obtained
their views of the Army‘s requirements and soundness of the Army‘s
acquisition strategy. We also incorporated information on Warrior from
GAO‘s recent Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.[Footnote 9]
We performed our review from September 2005 to April 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. Additionally, the report will be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me on 202-512-7773. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Principal contributors to this report
were William R. Graveline, Tana Davis, and Beverly Breen.
Signed by:
John Hutton:
Acting Firector, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of Section]
Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
May 12, 2006:
Mr. John Hutton:
Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: U.S. Government
Accountability Office: 441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Hutton:
This is the Department Of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO Draft Report, GAO-06-593, "DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Better
Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful Development Of the Army's
Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System" dated April 18, 2006 (GAO Code]
20485):
The DOD non-concurs with parts a) and c) and concurs with part b) Of
the GAO recommendation. The rationale for the DOD's position is
enclosed,
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment On the draft
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact
Dyke Weatherington, Deputy, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task
Force, 703-695-6188.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mark D. Schaefer:
Acting Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated APRIL 18, 2006 GAO-06-593 (GAO CODE 120485):
"Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed For
Successful Development Of The Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Gao Recommendations:
Recommendation: The GAO recommended that prior to approving the Warrior
long-lead items for low-rate initial production the Secretary of Army
require that:
a) critical Warrior technologies are fully mature and demonstrated;
b) Warrior design integration is complete and at least 90 percent of
design drawings be completed and released to manufacturing;
c) fully-integrated Warrior development aircraft are fabricated and
involved in development testing. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report):
DAD RESPONSE: The Department non-concurs with parts a) and c) and
concurs with part b) of the GAO recommendation, Rationale follows:
Part a) Non-concur. Risk mitigation steps are in place if one of the
critical technologies is not ready for full integration. Design steps
are being taken to provide the flexibility for integration of the
desired critical technology, as well as technology. By definition,
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) consists of two major
efforts: 1) System Integration and 2) System Demonstration. System
Integration is the system design phase during which the chosen
technologies and subsystems are integrated into a detailed system
design and the manufacturing processes are developed. The Department
concurs that the Multi Role-Tactical Common Data Link (MR-TCDL) and
Ethernet, at this point in time, are less mature than other
components/subsystems within the Warrior system. However, it is the
Department's position that these critical technologies are at the
correct maturity levels to proceed with the integration phase of SDD.
If MR-TCDL is not ready for integration, TCDL will be integrated. TCDL
is currently being integrated and has gone through initial
demonstration testing with the Shadow UAS. Prototype versions of the
TCDL have been integrated into the Hunter UAS, as well as manned
platforms, for early evaluation in manned-unmanned teaming
demonstrations. Ethernet is a proven technology, and the contractor has
integrated Ethernet into its UAS ground stations. If Ethernet is not
ready for integration into the Warrior, the 1553 Multiplex Data Bus
will be integrated which is a very mature component that is integrated
within older variants of the manufacturer's UAS's. MR-TCDL and Ethernet
can be integrated later during Block upgrades. The Technology Readiness
Assessment Deskbook indicates Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 is
typical. However, it also indicates lower TRLs are adequate for
critical technologies, if a planned and funded program is in place to
mature the technology quickly or if a mature backup technology exists
that meets the program requirements and schedule exits.
Less than 10% of the long lead items are directly tied to the critical
technologies at a TRL of 6 or lower. The lack of long lead items for
integration will result in a schedule slip that will increase program
costs and further delay fielding this capability. The Department will
weigh programmatic risk vs. fielding combat capability to the Global
War on Terrorism to determine the most prudent course of action for
tong lead items. The Department plans to use block upgrades to provide
capability sooner to the warfighter while further maturing the
technology.
Part b) Concur. The Department will seek to obtain at least 90%
engineering design drawings completed and released to manufacturing
before purchasing long lead parts. However, the decision to procure
long lead items will not be based solely on the percentage of
engineering drawings completed. The Department will base this decision
on what engineering design drawings are completed combined with the
schedule impact of unreleased drawings.
The Warrior successfully completed its Systems Requirements Review and
Preliminary Design Review, and all indications are that the Warrior
design will be well within the mandated requirement by the Critical
Design Review. In order to assure the program maintains schedule,
several additional initiatives have been put in place to enhance
monitoring and managing program and schedule risk. These initiatives
include, but are not limited to, six Integration Product Teams that
meet daily/weekly, regular program reviews, a Limited User Test, and an
early Operational Test prior to low rate initial production. An award
fee contract is also being used to incentivize the contractor to
provide the desired performance within cost and schedule.
Part c) Non-concur. Modeling and simulation, block upgrades, early
operational deployments, and early testing will enable the Department
to mitigate design and performance risks while remaining on schedule.
[End of Section]
Footnotes:
[1] Until recently, DOD referred to these aircraft as "unmanned aerial
vehicles." "Unmanned aircraft" is consistent with the Federal Aviation
Administration‘s classification and emphasizes other components of the
aircraft system, such as payload, ground stations, and communications
equipment.
[2] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from
Past Efforts to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies, GAO-
06-447 (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006).
[3] These numbers are the larger systems and do not count numerous
small and hand-launched systems used by ground forces.
[4] The Army requirements document for Warrior was approved by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council in April 2005. The Council, among
other responsibilities, conducts requirements analyses and validates
mission needs and performance objectives and thresholds.
[5] Ku-band and C-band are ranges of radio frequencies used in
wireless communications.
[6] Best practices for successful product development include 3
knowledge points (KPs). Knowledge Point 1 is development start and is
attained when a technologies and resources match requirements;
Knowledge Point 2 is the mid-point between development and production
and is attained when product design performs as expected; and Knowledge
Point 3 is production start and is attained when production can meet
cost, schedule, and quality targets.
[7] Technology readiness levels characterize the readiness of
technologies for hand-off to project implementers. Nine levels are
defined, representing concepts from fundamental research level (TRL 1)
through technologies fully qualified and demonstrated in flight (TRL
9).
[8] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.; December 13, 2005).
[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-04-248 (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
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