Defense Management
Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense Gao ID: GAO-06-473 May 31, 2006The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. In 2002, recognizing the new security environment after the September 11 attacks, President Bush directed that an initial set of defensive ballistic missile capabilities be put in place in 2004. Although DOD is developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to meet an urgent need, preparing to operate and support a system under continuous development poses significant challenges. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in planning to operate the BMDS, and (2) the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on BMDS operational costs.
DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not established criteria that would have to be met before declaring BMDS operational, nor has DOD resolved security issues or completed training and personnel plans. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are typically established and met prior to declaring a system operational, and that planning for new systems includes identifying personnel requirements, developing training programs, and identifying logistics and maintenance requirements. DOD has developed BMDS procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate planning and operational support, and conducted some training and exercises. However, DOD has not established formal criteria for declaring that limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability are operational or completed planning for security, training, and personnel. DOD has not done this because it is developing BMDS in a unique way and BMDS is exempted from traditional requirements guidance. Without specific operational criteria, the Secretary of Defense will not be in a sound position to objectively assess combatant commands' and services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations nor have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and identification of responsibility for ensuring necessary actions have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the necessary pieces are in place before declaring the system operational, and determine whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized. The FYDP, a major source of budget information, does not provide complete and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs. DOD and GAO have repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to facilitate decision making and oversight. However, complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP because the FYDP's structure does not provide a way to identify and aggregate these costs. Four primary factors impair the visibility of ballistic missile defense operational costs in the current FYDP structure: (1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not identified all costs associated with the New Triad, of which BMDS is an important part. Without the ability to identify and assess total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to make funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; provide assurance that ballistic missile defense capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of employing the New Triad.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-473, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense
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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2006:
Defense Management:
Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs
for Ballistic Missile Defense:
Ballistic Missile Defense:
GAO-06-473:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-473, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the
mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic
missiles. In 2002, recognizing the new security environment after the
September 11 attacks, President Bush directed that an initial set of
defensive ballistic missile capabilities be put in place in 2004.
Although DOD is developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
to meet an urgent need, preparing to operate and support a system under
continuous development poses significant challenges. GAO was asked to
assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in planning to
operate the BMDS, and (2) the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
provides complete and transparent data on BMDS operational costs.
What GAO Found:
DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not
established criteria that would have to be met before declaring BMDS
operational, nor has DOD resolved security issues or completed training
and personnel plans. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are
typically established and met prior to declaring a system operational,
and that planning for new systems includes identifying personnel
requirements, developing training programs, and identifying logistics
and maintenance requirements. DOD has developed BMDS procedures and
guidance, created an organization to integrate planning and operational
support, and conducted some training and exercises. However, DOD has
not established formal criteria for declaring that limited defensive
operations or subsequent blocks of capability are operational or
completed planning for security, training, and personnel. DOD has not
done this because it is developing BMDS in a unique way and BMDS is
exempted from traditional requirements guidance. Without specific
operational criteria, the Secretary of Defense will not be in a sound
position to objectively assess combatant commands‘ and services‘
preparations to conduct BMDS operations nor have a transparent basis
for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as
capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers
requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria,
and identification of responsibility for ensuring necessary actions
have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and
prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the necessary pieces
are in place before declaring the system operational, and determine
whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS
can be realized.
The FYDP, a major source of budget information, does not provide
complete and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational
costs. DOD and GAO have repeatedly recognized the need to link
resources to capabilities to facilitate decision making and oversight.
However, complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational
costs are not visible in the FYDP because the FYDP‘s structure does not
provide a way to identify and aggregate these costs. Four primary
factors impair the visibility of ballistic missile defense operational
costs in the current FYDP structure: (1) operational costs are included
in many program elements and there is no mechanism to link and compile
these costs, (2) the Missile Defense Agency is authorized to use
research and development funds to pay for operational costs, (3) DOD
has not included all known operational costs in its budget estimates,
and (4) DOD has not identified all costs associated with the New Triad,
of which BMDS is an important part. Without the ability to identify and
assess total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the
Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to make
funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; provide
assurance that ballistic missile defense capabilities are affordable
over time; and assess the costs of employing the New Triad.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD develop operational criteria that must be
met and a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be taken
before declaring BMDS operational, and provide Congress and DOD
complete data on BMDS operational costs. Although DOD concurred or
partially concurred with our recommendations, DOD did not state that
they planned to take corrective actions. Therefore, GAO added a Matter
for Congressional Consideration because GAO continues to believe its
recommended actions are needed to prepare for BMDS operations and
assist oversight.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-473].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate BDMS but Planning Is
Incomplete:
The Future Years Defense Program Does Not Provide Complete and
Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and Their Roles:
Table 2: Missile Defense Agency's Planned Delivery of Ballistic Missile
Defense Elements by Block:
Table 3: Status of Operational Criteria Development for Ballistic
Missile Defense Elements:
Figure:
Figure 1: Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Engagement:
Abbreviations:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FYDP: Future Years Defense Program:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 31, 2006:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Chairman:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the
mid-1980s to develop the capability to intercept and destroy incoming
ballistic missiles. DOD initially focused its attention exclusively on
research and development activities. In 2002, recognizing the changed
security environment after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
President Bush directed that an initial set of capabilities be put in
place in 2004 to defend against ballistic missiles that may carry
weapons of mass destruction. This missile defense capability is a major
part of DOD's New Triad of capabilities, which also includes offensive
nuclear and conventional capabilities and a revitalized defense
infrastructure to provide more options to address future
contingencies.[Footnote 1] In 2003, the U.S. Strategic Command was
assigned responsibility for coordinating global ballistic missile
defense operations. Each combatant command is responsible for ballistic
missile operations in their geographic area and individual ballistic
missile defense elements will be operated by the services or the
Missile Defense Agency.
Acknowledging that hostile states are investing resources to develop
ballistic missiles that could be used against the United States and its
friends and allies, the President directed in 2002 that this initial
set of capabilities be available to the warfighter on an emergency or
contingency basis as the system's development continues. To expedite
development, the Secretary of Defense exempted ballistic missile
defense development from the traditional requirements
guidance.[Footnote 2] DOD refers to this initial capability as limited
defensive operations, with the development and fielding of additional
capabilities planned in 2-year blocks.
In an era of increased fiscal challenges, DOD and Congress face
difficult decisions concerning how to allocate available defense
resources to provide for the range of capabilities needed to meet 21st
century threats. The ballistic missile defense mission involves a
substantial investment prior to achieving operational status as well as
significant ongoing costs to operate and sustain this capability.
Complete information on planned defense spending for the ballistic
missile defense system can assist decision makers in making choices
among the competing demands for DOD's resources. The Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP), a centralized report to Congress consisting of
the budget year and the 4 succeeding years, is one of the principal
tools used to inform DOD senior leaders and Congress about resources
planned to support various programs, and reflects DOD decisions in
allocating federal resources.
You asked us to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in
planning to operate the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS), and
(2) the FYDP provides complete and transparent data on ballistic
missile defense operational costs. During this review, we focused on
the warfighter's preparations to operate the ballistic missile defense
system. Specifically, to assess DOD's planning to operate the ballistic
missile defense system, we compared the planning DOD had completed for
operating BMDS with plans and actions that DOD generally performs for
new weapon systems and discussed the results of our comparison with DOD
officials. In this report, our discussion of declaring BMDS operational
refers to both limited defensive operations and subsequent blocks of
capability. To assess the extent to which the FYDP provides complete
and transparent data for ballistic missile defense operational costs,
we assessed the FYDP structure to determine if it could be used to
identify program elements related to BMDS operations. We also
corroborated our methodology and data with agency officials and
determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We
conducted our work between January 2005 and February 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I
for a more complete description of our scope and methodology.
This report is one in a series of reports that we have issued on
ballistic missile defense (see the list of related GAO products at the
end of this report). During this review, we did not evaluate DOD's
testing plans, research and development programs, or the technical
effectiveness of individual elements. Rather, we focused on assessing
issues DOD faces in planning to operate BMDS such as operational
criteria, training, security, and cost transparency. However, we have
issued two reports on the status of BMDS that included assessments of
program goals, testing plans, and progress in developing each
element.[Footnote 3] Our March 2005 report found that system
performance remains uncertain and unverified because DOD has not
successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally
representative hardware and software. We also reported in September
2005 on DOD's criteria for transferring missile defense elements to the
services and the need to ensure operational costs are included in
future budgets.[Footnote 4]
Results in Brief:
DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not
established operational criteria or fully completed training, security,
and personnel plans. As part of the planning that has been completed,
DOD has developed procedures for operating the ground-based element to
defend the United States against attacks from incoming ballistic
missiles and the U.S. Strategic Command has established a subcommand
focused on supporting ballistic missile defense operations. However,
DOD has not established formal criteria for what needs to be
accomplished before declaring that limited defensive operations or
subsequent blocks of capability are operational. Moreover, issues
involving responsibility for funding and providing security remain
unresolved and training and personnel plans are still evolving. DOD
officials agree that operational criteria are typically established
prior to declaring weapon systems operational and that actions such as
identifying personnel requirements, developing training programs, and
establishing unit readiness reporting are generally part of these
criteria in addition to completion of successful system testing.
However, DOD has not developed operational criteria or fully completed
planning for BMDS because its development has been unique in several
aspects, including the pace of the system's development and the
Secretary of Defense's decision to exempt it from some DOD requirements
guidance. Without operational criteria, it may be difficult for the
Secretary of Defense to objectively assess combatant commands' and
services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations, and the Secretary
may not have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which
will become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent
blocks and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without
adequate planning, clear criteria, and identification of responsibility
for ensuring necessary actions have been completed, it may be difficult
for DOD to identify and prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress
that the necessary pieces are in place before declaring the system
operational, and determine whether the return on its significant
development investment in BMDS can be realized. We are recommending
that DOD develop operational criteria, comparable to those developed
for new weapon systems, assign responsibility to specific organizations
and hold them accountable for developing the criteria and ensuring they
are met, and develop a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must
be completed before declaring the system operational for either limited
defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability.
The FYDP does not provide complete and transparent data on ballistic
missile defense operational costs. We and DOD have repeatedly
recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to facilitate
DOD's decision making and congressional oversight. For example, we
previously recommended that DOD should identify New Triad costs, and
ballistic missile defense is an important part of the New Triad.
However, complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational
costs are not visible in DOD's FYDP because the FYDP's structure does
not provide a way to identify and aggregate these costs, even though
DOD plans to field an increasing number of elements (such as sensors,
missiles, launchers, ships, and command and control nodes) between 2006
and 2011. There is a mechanism in the FYDP, called defense mission
categories, that has been used to identify costs for certain missions,
but this mechanism does not provide a way to effectively identify
operational costs for the ballistic missile defense system. DOD
Comptroller and Program Analysis and Evaluation officials agreed that
ballistic missile defense operational cost data are not visible in the
FYDP; instead, they have to rely on special data requests to the
services and the Missile Defense Agency which may not be answered using
a consistent methodology. These officials agreed, however, that being
able to collect and analyze these data would enable DOD to analyze
trends over time as more elements are added to the system and begin
operating. Four primary factors impair the visibility and transparency
of ballistic missile defense operational costs in the current FYDP
structure. First, operational costs are contained in many program
elements throughout the FYDP and there is no mechanism to link and
compile these costs. Second, the Missile Defense Agency is funding some
operational costs with research and development funds, as authorized by
statute.[Footnote 5] Third, DOD has not included all known ballistic
missile defense costs in its budget.[Footnote 6] Fourth, DOD has not
yet identified all costs associated with the New Triad, of which the
ballistic missile defense system is an important part. Without the
ability to identify and assess total ballistic missile defense
operational costs, neither DOD nor Congress has complete information to
make funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities;
provide assurance that DOD's plans to field ballistic missile defense
capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of
operating the New Triad. We are recommending that DOD develop a
structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense
operational costs.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or
partially concurred with our recommendations. However, DOD did not
state whether it plans to take any corrective actions in response to
our recommendations, and for this reason, we have added a Matter for
Congress to consider directing the Secretary of Defense to develop a
comprehensive plan which includes operational criteria and to develop a
structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense
operational costs. We continue to believe that the specific actions we
recommended are needed to prepare for conducting BMDS operations and
assist in DOD and congressional oversight of ballistic missile defense
operational costs. The department's comments and our evaluation of them
begins on page 37.
Background:
In response to the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction, in
December 2002 President Bush signed National Security Presidential
Directive 23, which stated an initial ballistic missile defense
capability to defend the United States and deployed forces should be
deployed in 2004. Also in 2002, the Secretary of Defense created the
Missile Defense Agency to develop an integrated system that would have
the ability to intercept incoming missiles in all phases of their
flight. The Secretary of Defense's goals for the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) included using prototypes and test assets to
provide an early capability and enable the services to field elements
of the system as soon as possible. In order to develop a system that
can more readily respond to a changing threat and be more easily
modified to enhance system performance using new technologies, the
Secretary of Defense exempted the Missile Defense Agency from the
traditional requirements processes.
BMDS Capabilities and Elements:
Ballistic missile defense is a challenging mission for DOD,
simultaneously involving multiple combatant commands and services
employing complex capabilities that require the development of many
elements. Figure 1 shows how a notional scenario to engage an incoming
ballistic missile, including the commands and services involved, could
unfold.
Figure 1: Notional Ballistic Missile Defense Engagement:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
BMDS is eventually intended to be capable of defeating ballistic
missiles during all three phases of a missile's flight.[Footnote 7]
However, the initial capability is intended to have the capability to
intercept missiles in the midcourse and terminal phases. BMDS requires
a unique combination of elements--space-based sensors, surveillance and
tracking radars, advanced interceptors, command and control, and
reliable communications--working together as an integrated
system.[Footnote 8] Table 1 below explains the role of the BMDS
elements that DOD plans to be available to the warfighter between
fiscal years 2006-11.
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and Their Roles:
Element: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense;
Missile defense role: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is a ship-based
capability designed to destroy short-and medium-range ballistic
missiles during the midcourse phase of flight. Its mission is two-fold:
to protect deployed U.S. forces, allies, and friends against ballistic
missile attacks, and to serve as a forward-deployed BMDS sensor,
especially in support of the ground-based mission. The Missile Defense
Agency plans to deliver up to 81 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
missiles--the Standard Missile 3-- and 18 ships by the end of fiscal
year 2011.
Element: Sensors;
Missile defense role: Sensors include Upgraded Early Warning Radars to
provide updated midcourse missile tracking data to the ground-based
element. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System is a space-based
sensor to identify and track ballistic missiles from boost phase
through reentry.
Element: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications
(C2BMC);
Missile defense role: C2BMC is the integrating and controlling element
of the BMDS. Although it was part of the Block 2004 defensive
capability, its role during this period was limited to mission planning
and situational awareness--monitoring system status and missile
trajectories.
Element: Ground-based Midcourse Defense;
Missile defense role: This ground-based element is designed to destroy
ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of flight. Its mission is
to protect the U.S. homeland against ballistic missile attacks from
Northeast Asia and the Middle East. The Missile Defense Agency plans to
field up to 48 interceptors by the end of 2011.
Element: PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3;
Missile defense role: The Patriot is a hit-to-kill interceptor that
uses active seeker radar and guidance to hit and destroy targets. The
Patriot element defends against short-and medium-range ballistic
missiles, protecting advance forces, strategic assets, and population
centers against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
hostile aircraft. The Missile Defense Agency plans to field 862 Patriot
PAC-3 missiles by the end of 2011.
Element: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense;
Missile defense role: The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense is a
ground-based element designed to destroy short-and medium-range
ballistic missiles during the late- midcourse and terminal phases of
flight. Its mission is to defend deployed U.S. forces and population
centers. The Missile Defense Agency plans to field two units consisting
of 24 missiles each, the first one in 2009 and the second one by
December 2011.
Element: X-Band Radars;
Missile defense role: X-band Radars are capable of searching,
detecting, and tracking missiles, as well as picking out warheads from
decoys. After an interception of an incoming missile, the radar can
provide an assessment of success. The Missile Defense Agency will field
two types of X-band radars. First, the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (built
upon a movable sea platform), will improve the ability to acquire,
track, and discriminate decoys during the midcourse phase of flight.
The single sea-based radar is expected to be on station in 2006.
Second, the Forward-Based X-Band Radar is a transportable, land- based
radar system that would be placed in strategic areas overseas in order
to provide additional advance warning of ballistic missile launches.
The first of four radars is expected to be fielded in 2006.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
[End of table]
BMDS Development and Force Structure:
In developing BMDS, the Missile Defense Agency is using an incremental
development and acquisition process to field militarily useful
capabilities as they become available. Under this process, the Missile
Defense Agency will develop ballistic missile defense elements and then
transition elements to the military services for operation after
approval by DOD senior leadership. In preparing for each element's
transition, the Missile Defense Agency is expected to collaborate with
the services to develop agreements explaining each organization's
responsibilities, including which organization will pay for operational
costs. Most of these transition plans are currently being drafted. The
only BMDS element that has transferred to a service is the Patriot,
which was transferred to the Army in 2003.
The Missile Defense Agency plans to develop and field capabilities in 2-
year blocks. The configuration of a given block is intended to build on
the work completed in previous blocks. Block 2004, which was scheduled
to be deployed during calendar years 2004-2005, is the first biennial
increment of BMDS that is intended to provide an integrated set of
capabilities. Table 2 below shows, for each block of capability, the
cumulative total number of each element that the Missile Defense Agency
plans to deliver. The capabilities in bolded text show cumulative
totals and show new or additional capabilities from the previous block.
Table 2: Missile Defense Agency's Planned Delivery of Ballistic Missile
Defense Elements by Block:
Fixed Site Interceptors;
December 2005: * 8 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska;
* 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, California;
December 2007: * Up to 20 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska;
* 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, California;
December 2009: * Up to 36 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska;
* 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, California;
December 2011: * 36 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska;
* 2 Ground-Based Interceptors, California;
* 10 Ground-Based Interceptors, Europe.
Fixed Site Sensors;
December 2005: * Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska;
* 2 Upgraded Early Warning Radars (1 expected to be integrated into the
system in 2006);
December 2007: * Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska;
* 2 Upgraded Early Warning Radars;
December 2009: * Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska;
* 3 Upgraded Early Warning Radars;
December 2011: * Cobra Dane Radar, Alaska;
* 3 Upgraded Early Warning Radars;
* Clear Radar, Alaska.
Mobile/ Transportable Sensors;
December 2005: * 1 Sea-Based X-Band Radar, Alaska (expected to be
integrated into the system in 2006);
* 1 Forward-Based X-Band Radar (expected to be integrated into the
system in 2006);
* 10 Aegis Search & Track Destroyers;
December 2007: * 1 Sea-Based X-Band Radar, Alaska;
* 2 Forward-Based X-Band Radars;
* 7 Aegis Search & Track Destroyers;
December 2009: * 1 Sea-Based X-Band Radar, Alaska;
* 3 Forward-Based X-Band Radars;
* 1 Discrimination X- Band Radar;
* Initial Space Tracking and Surveillance Satellites;
December 2011: * 1 Sea-Based X-Band Radar, Alaska;
* 4 Forward-Based X- Band Radars;
* 2 Discrimination X-Band Radars.
Mobile Interceptors;
December 2005: * 2 Aegis Engagement Cruisers;
* 9 Standard Missile-3s;
* 313 Patriot PAC-3 missiles;
December 2007: * 3 Aegis Engagement Cruisers;
* 7 Aegis Engagement Destroyers;
* 24 Standard Missile-3s;
* 534 Patriot PAC-3 missiles;
December 2009: * 3 Aegis Engagement Cruisers;
* 15 Aegis Engagement Destroyers;
* 54 Standard Missile-3s;
* 24 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Missiles;
* 734 Patriot PAC-3 missiles;
December 2011: * 3 Aegis Engagement Cruisers;
* 15 Aegis Engagement Destroyers;
* 81 Standard Missile-3s;
* 48 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Missiles;
* 862 Patriot PAC-3 missiles.
Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communication (C2BMC);
December 2005: * C2BMC Suites at U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern
Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and the Joint National Integration
Center;
December 2007: * C2BMC Suites at U.S. Central Command, U.S. European
Command, other locations to be determined;
* Upgraded C2BMC Suites at U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Pacific
Command, U. S. Northern Command (Incorporate new situational
awareness);
December 2009: * 2 C2BMC Suites at locations to be determined;
* Upgraded C2BMC Suites at U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command,
and other locations to be determined (incorporate new situational
awareness);
December 2011: * C2BMC Suites at 2 locations to be determined;
* Upgraded C2BMC Suites at 3 locations to be determined.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
Note: Aegis Engagement cruisers and destroyers can perform the search
and track function as well as fire standard missiles at incoming
targets.
[End of table]
DOD's framework for BMDS ground and flight testing through block 2006
(December 2007) is established in the Integrated Master Test Plan. This
plan defines the test plans for the BMDS and its elements and
identifies test objectives. In 2006, the Missile Defense Agency plans
to conduct 10 flight tests--3 for the Aegis ballistic missile defense
element, 4 for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense element, and 3
for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element. We reported last year
that the Missile Defense Agency has conducted a variety of tests that
provide some degree of confidence that the limited defensive operations
will operate as intended. However, we also pointed out that some
elements have not been fully tested and that performance of the system
remains uncertain because the Missile Defense Agency has not conducted
an end-to-end flight test using operationally representative hardware
and software.[Footnote 9] In addition, DOD's fiscal year 2005 annual
test report states that "—there is insufficient evidence to support a
confident assessment of Limited Defensive Operations—"
Whereas the Missile Defense Agency is the developer of BMDS, the U.S.
Strategic Command is responsible for coordinating ballistic missile
defense operations that will be conducted by multiple commands, such as
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command. Strategic Command
developed an overall strategic concept of operations for ballistic
missile defense in November 2003 that explains how all aspects of the
system are to be integrated. Strategic Command is also tasked with
directing, coordinating, and reporting Military Utility Assessments of
the ballistic missile defense system. Military Utility Assessments are
iterative, event-driven assessments that document the combatant
commanders' views on the expected military utility of the system. These
assessments are intended to independently examine the degree to which
delivered capabilities support the warfighter's ability to execute the
missile defense mission, record all data and results from flight tests,
ground tests, and wargame/exercises, and focus on the overall ballistic
missile defense system rather than the individual elements. As of
January 2006, one assessment had been completed (April 2005) and the
scope was limited due to the system's immaturity at that time.
Weapon System Operational Costs:
Operations and support costs (hereafter called operational costs) are
the resources required to operate and support a weapon system and
include maintenance of equipment/infrastructure, operations of forces,
training and readiness, base operations, personnel, and logistics.
Operational costs for weapons systems typically account for 72 percent
of a weapon system's total life-cycle cost and can generally be found
in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FYDP is a DOD
centralized report consisting of thousands of program elements[Footnote
10] that provides information on DOD's current and planned budget
requests. It is one of DOD's principal tools to manage the spending for
its capabilities and is available to help inform DOD and Congress about
spending plans for the next 5 years and to make resource decisions in
light of competing priorities. The FYDP is a report that resides in an
automated database, which is updated and published to coincide with
DOD's annual budget submission to Congress. It provides projections of
DOD's near and midterm funding needs and reflects the total resources
programmed by DOD, by fiscal year.
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate BDMS but Planning Is
Incomplete:
DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS, but aside from
testing issues we have previously reported on, planning is incomplete
in that it lacks several critical elements such as establishing
operational criteria, resolving security issues, and completing
training plans. DOD has developed procedures and guidance, created an
organization to integrate contingency plans, and planned and conducted
some training and exercises. However, this planning lacks critical
elements such as development of operational criteria, resolution of
security issues, completion of training plans, and approval of dual
status for the commanders of the National Guard units responsible for
operating the ground-based element. DOD's operational planning is
incomplete because it is developing BMDS in a unique way and exempted
BMDS from the department's traditional requirements guidance. DOD
officials agreed that planning for new weapon systems generally
includes critical planning elements such as development of training
plans, assessment of military specialties, identifying support
requirements, and successful operational testing. U.S. Strategic
Command officials agreed that this level of detailed planning is
necessary but has not been done because BMDS is being developed in a
nontraditional way, and further stated that warfighters are ready to
use the system on an emergency basis. However, without a comprehensive
plan establishing what needs to be accomplished before declaring BMDS
operational and assigning responsibility for doing such planning, the
Secretary of Defense may not have a transparent basis for declaring
BMDS operational, which will become more important as capabilities are
added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests to fund
operations. Moreover, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and
prioritize actions and determine whether the return on its significant
development investment can be realized.
DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile
Defense System:
DOD has taken positive steps in planning to operate the BMDS. For
example, some operating plans and guidance are either in development or
in place. In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command has created a
subcommand, the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense, to integrate planning and operational support for
missile defense.[Footnote 11] The Missile Defense Agency and the
combatant commands have also been actively planning and conducting
training and exercises.
Some Operational Planning Has Taken Place:
DOD has developed some operational plans, established guidance, and
conducted capability demonstrations to refine operating procedures. In
2003, the U.S. Strategic Command was assigned responsibility for
planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense
operations including developing a concept of operations. Since then,
U.S. Strategic Command has coordinated development of plans and orders
that explain how the ballistic missile defense mission will be
conducted, including command relationships, who authorizes missile
launches, and other policies. For example, some combatant commands have
developed plans that specify how they will defend against incoming
ballistic missiles and how they will support other combatant commands
in doing so. DOD has also developed tactics, techniques, and procedures
for how the ballistic missile defense mission would be conducted.
Strategic Command's subcommand for missile defense is working with the
combatant commands to ensure these plans are integrated. The services
have also published service doctrine and DOD is currently developing
joint doctrine that will explain concepts for planning, coordinating,
and conducting the ballistic missile defense mission. The doctrine will
be revised as BMDS capabilities increase and as procedures for
conducting the mission evolve.
In addition to developing plans, DOD has established some policy
guidance clarifying command and control for the ballistic missile
defense mission. The Joint Staff has issued several orders providing
guidance for ballistic missile defense mission planning which reflect
policy decisions made by senior DOD leadership. For example, orders
issued in fall 2005 resolved policy issues regarding weapons release
authority, defined various system readiness conditions and defense
priorities, and explained the rules of engagement and the relationships
between combatant commands.
Since the fall of 2004, DOD has been in a transitional period (called
"shakedown") to move from development to operations. As part of this
process, the Missile Defense Agency, in conjunction with operational
commanders and contractors, has completed 11 capability demonstrations
and U.S. Strategic Command's subcommand for missile defense is planning
the twelfth for March 2006. The capability demonstrations are being
conducted to practice and refine procedures for transitioning BMDS from
a developmental configuration to an operational configuration and
maintain the system in the operational configuration for a specific
time period. The purpose behind these demonstrations is to reduce
operational risks by demonstrating capabilities prior to combat use,
using trained military personnel to exercise procedures in an
operational environment. According to officials, there is no plan to
conduct a specific number of these capability demonstrations; rather,
they will be conducted as needed. In addition, U.S. Strategic Command
officials said that the subcommand for missile defense will conduct
readiness exercises to practice and refine warfighter tactics and
procedures.
U.S. Strategic Command Created a Subcommand to Plan and Integrate
Ballistic Missile Defense Operations:
Because U.S. Strategic Command has several other broad missions in
addition to missile defense, it created a subcommand to integrate
planning and operational support for ballistic missile defense. This
subcommand, called the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense, was created in early 2005 for the purpose
of integrating and globally synchronizing missile defense plans to meet
strategic objectives. This subcommand is drafting a global concept of
operations for ballistic missile defense and is working with other
combatant commands to integrate their ballistic missile defense
operating plans. The subcommand is also operating the BMDS asset
management process, which is a tool for scheduling and tracking the
status of each ballistic missile defense element. This process uses a
real-time database that shows when each BMDS element is being used for
testing, exercises, maintenance, development, or operations. The asset
management process schedules activities for the coming fiscal year and
is updated throughout the year.
Missile Defense Agency and Combatant Commands Have Planned and
Conducted Some Training and Exercises:
The Missile Defense Agency and combatant commands have planned and
conducted some training and exercises for ballistic missile defense to
practice and refine command and control, tactics, procedures, and
firing doctrine specified in the contingency and supporting plans. The
Missile Defense Agency works with the combatant commands to incorporate
ballistic missile defense training into each other's exercises. For
example, the combatant commands will include training on their mission-
essential tasks during the Missile Defense Agency's exercise and
wargame program, and the Missile Defense Agency will try to incorporate
ballistic missile defense training into the exercises scheduled by the
combatant commands. For example, U.S. Strategic Command integrated
ballistic missile defense with all of its other missions in its fall
2005 command exercise and will include ballistic missile defense to a
limited extent in the command's upcoming spring exercise for the first
time.
The Missile Defense Agency also provides some ballistic missile defense
training programs and course development for individuals, units, and
combatant command staffs. The Missile Defense Agency provides initial
operator training on specific elements and the crews are subsequently
certified by their unit commanders. The agency also provides training
to combatant command staffs on BMDS policy and procedures and command
and control. For example, during an exercise we observed at the
training center in Colorado, the Northern Command staff, Army crews
from the battalion in Alaska, and Navy crews from the Aegis training
center in Virginia were linked electronically. In the future, this type
of training will be enhanced via the Distributed Multi-echelon Training
System, which will enable warfighters to participate in live, virtual,
and integrated training from their duty station. The Missile Defense
Agency also cochairs the Integrated Training Working Group with U.S.
Strategic Command to address training and education goals, objectives,
roles, missions, and policy decisions among the combatant commands and
services.
Some Aspects of Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile Defense
System Are Incomplete:
Despite the progress made since 2002, DOD's planning to operate BMDS is
incomplete and lacks several critical elements. DOD officials agreed
that planning for new weapon systems articulated in requirements
guidance generally includes critical planning elements such as
establishing operational criteria, identifying personnel requirements,
developing training programs, completing successful testing, and
establishing readiness reporting. However, DOD's BMDS planning is
missing several of these critical elements, such as specific
operational criteria for the overall BMDS and most of the system's
elements that must be met before declaring that either limited
defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability are
operational. Furthermore, security issues involving responsibility for
and funding of necessary security remain unresolved and training plans
are still evolving. In addition, DOD has not approved dual status for
the commanders of the National Guard units responsible for operating
the ground-based element. U.S. Strategic Command officials agreed that
this level of detailed planning is necessary but has not been done
because BMDS is being developed in a nontraditional way and further
stated that warfighters are ready to use the system. However, without
comprehensive planning laying out steps that need to be completed
before declaring the system operational, development of operational
criteria, and assigning responsibility for doing such planning, DOD may
face uncertainty about the basis that will be used to declare BMDS
operational. This, in turn, may make it difficult for DOD to identify
and prioritize actions needed to achieve this end effectively and
efficiently. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and Congress may not
have a sound basis for assessing the system's status and progress
toward an operational capability.
Planning for New Weapon Systems Generally Includes Identifying Specific
Actions and Criteria:
Prior to initially employing a new weapon system, DOD customarily
prepares planning documents that identify actions that must be taken
and criteria that must be met before the system can be declared
operational. DOD officials agree that requirements guidance states that
these planning documents identify any changes needed to doctrine,
organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities. Our prior work on successful management of complex
defense programs shows that such planning provides a basis for knowing
what steps need to be completed before a weapon system can be declared
operational.
As part of the planning for new weapon systems, DOD guidance, as well
as DOD practices based on discussions with defense officials, requires
initial operating capability criteria (hereafter called operational
criteria) to be met to ensure that necessary planning has been
completed to initially employ a new weapon system. These operational
criteria[Footnote 12] include critical elements such as:
* an assessment of the military specialties needed;
* identification of personnel requirements;
* development of individual, unit, and joint training programs;
* system supportability, including identifying logistics and
maintenance requirements;
* successful operational testing; and:
* the ability to report system and unit readiness.
If the new system is a part of a system of systems, then these
operational criteria are to be integrated with those of the related
system elements. DOD officials told us that these operational criteria
also describe actions that the services typically take to prepare to
operate a new system.
Likewise, the services have developed instructions that embody these
principles for new systems. For example, an Air Force instruction
states that an initial operating capability can be declared for a
system when it has successfully completed operational testing, key
logistics support is in place, and the personnel necessary to operate,
maintain, and support the system are trained. This instruction further
states that the following items should be met before declaring that
operational capability has been achieved: concept of operations, system
training plan, personnel plan, operational protection guide, logistics
support plan, system security design, successful operational testing
and completion of a successful trial period, and the ability to report
readiness at a certain level. Army and Navy regulations also specify
operational criteria. For example, new Army weapon systems must have
adequately trained operators who are equipped and supported to execute
the mission before the system can be declared operational. Furthermore,
a Navy instruction states that a logistic support strategy,
identification of personnel requirements, manpower estimates, and a
plan for training shall be developed for new weapon systems.
DOD Has Not Developed Operational Criteria for the Overall BMDS:
As of February 2006, according to DOD officials, DOD had not yet
developed any overarching operational criteria to be met before
declaring the overall BMDS operational either for limited defensive
operations or subsequent blocks of capability. Instead, officials
stated that the Secretary of Defense will declare BMDS operational
based on test results, confidence in the system, threat, and
recommendations from the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the
Commander of the subcommand for missile defense, commanders of other
combatant commands, and the Director, Missile Defense Agency.
Additionally, the Missile Defense Support Group, which was formed to
advise senior DOD leaders on policy, operations, acquisition, and
resources for BMDS, has not defined any criteria with which to make
recommendations about operational capability. DOD officials have told
us that while operational criteria describe actions that services
customarily take to prepare to operate a new system, these actions have
not been taken for BMDS. Some DOD officials have suggested that DOD
should not have to meet operational criteria due to the urgency of
emplacing a ballistic missile capability as soon as possible.
DOD has done some assessments in which warfighters raised issues in
areas that the operational criteria are intended to address. For
example, combatant commanders have raised concerns about security and
personnel. Recognizing that there may be planning gaps, the Army Space
and Missile Defense Command[Footnote 13] has begun to identify what
actions need to be taken--such as security planning, force design
analysis, personnel requirements, training sustainment program, and
system training plan--for the warfighter to use the BMDS and some of
the elements. The officials acknowledged that, ideally, a master plan
should be developed to track these actions. However, even though the
Army Space and Missile Defense Command's preliminary analysis and the
other DOD assessments may provide a foundation for developing
operational criteria, the Command officials stated they are not
responsible for doing so and have not been tasked with ensuring that
the services do so when an element is transitioned to the service.
In August 2005, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command recognized that
as BMDS approached operational status, DOD needed to take necessary
actions to put the ballistic missile defense elements in the hands of
the warfighters that would address base operations, manning, force
protection, and other aspects of military support. The Commander
recommended a lead service be named for each BMDS element. This lead
service would be responsible for developing doctrine, training,
organizations, and personnel. This concept was briefed to the Joint
Staff in November 2005 and in January 2006. The Joint Staff recommended
that the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics name a lead service for only two elements--
Army was recommended to be lead service for the forward-based radar and
the Air Force was recommended to be lead service for the ballistic
missile defense mission of the Cobra Dane radar. On February 11, 2006,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved this recommendation.
DOD Has Not Developed Operational Criteria for Most Ballistic Missile
Defense System Elements:
According to DOD officials, operational criteria also have not been
developed for most BMDS elements. As shown in table 3, DOD has not
developed any operational criteria for five of eight ballistic missile
defense elements and criteria for two more are being drafted.
Table 3: Status of Operational Criteria Development for Ballistic
Missile Defense Elements:
BMDS element: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense;
Without operational criteria: X;
Operational criteria in development: [Empty];
With operational criteria: [Empty].
BMDS element: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications;
Without operational criteria: X;
Operational criteria in development: [Empty];
With operational criteria: [Empty].
BMDS element: Forward-based X-Band Radar Transportable;
Without operational criteria: X;
Operational criteria in development: [Empty];
With operational criteria: [Empty].
BMDS element: Ground-based Midcourse Defense;
Without operational criteria: X;
Operational criteria in development: [Empty];
With operational criteria: [Empty].
BMDS element: Sea-based X-Band Radar;
Without operational criteria: X;
Operational criteria in development: [Empty];
With operational criteria: [Empty].
BMDS element: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense;
Without operational criteria: [Empty];
Operational criteria in development: X;
With operational criteria: [Empty].
BMDS element: Upgraded Early Warning Radars;
Without operational criteria: [Empty];
Operational criteria in development: X;
With operational criteria: [Empty].
BMDS element: Patriot Advanced Capability - 3;
Without operational criteria: [Empty];
Operational criteria in development: [Empty];
With operational criteria: X.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Table includes only those elements expected to be fielded by
2011.
[End of table]
DOD has developed and approved operational criteria for only one BMDS
element, the Patriot PAC-3 Missile System. The Army developed
operational criteria to ensure the Army was prepared to operate Patriot
and specified these criteria in two capabilities documents (dated
November 2000 and July 2003).[Footnote 14] These documents included
criteria in areas such as support equipment, training and training
support for system users, a logistics support concept and logistics
standards, security, maintenance planning, and personnel. The Army
determined these criteria were met and declared operational
capability[Footnote 15] was achieved in June 2004 after the system
transferred to the Army from the Missile Defense Agency in 2003.
Although DOD is developing plans to transition some BMDS elements to
the services,[Footnote 16] these plans, according to DOD officials, are
not required to include operational criteria. However, the Air Force
and the Army have elected to develop operational criteria for two BMDS
elements as part of the transition plans. For example, Air Force Space
Command officials stated they have drafted operational criteria for the
Upgraded Early Warning Radar that include:
* testing to demonstrate the radar meets required performance standards
for existing missions and the ballistic missile defense mission;
* training for operators, maintainers, and logistics support personnel;
* a successful trial period to validate system performance; and:
* adequate support capability and sufficient spare parts.
The draft plan to transition the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
element to the Army is also supposed to include operational criteria
such as:
* system training plan and identification of leader development
courses;
* system security requirements;
* supportability strategy;
* manpower estimate; and:
* development of a Capabilities Development Document which, according
to DOD guidance, typically includes operational criteria.
DOD officials stated that operational criteria--such as the criteria in
DOD guidance required to be met before initially employing a new weapon
system--for some elements may not be developed. For example,
operational criteria will probably not be developed for elements that
either are not likely to transition from the Missile Defense Agency to
a service or are expected to be contractor operated, such as the sea-
based radar and the forward-based radar.[Footnote 17] Moreover, the
Navy has not developed operational criteria for the Aegis ballistic
missile defense element. Navy officials stated that they would only
develop operational criteria and establish a timeline for achieving an
initial capability if the Navy decides to buy ballistic missile defense
capability for more ships than the Missile Defense Agency currently
plans to buy.
DOD Has Unresolved Security Issues:
Although DOD has developed security policies specifically for BMDS,
unresolved security issues remain and it is not clear when these issues
will be resolved. Specifically, DOD has not resolved issues of who is
responsible for security of BMDS elements and which organization is
financially responsible for funding required security. In addition, DOD
may have difficulty meeting security requirements at some locations
because not all the funding has been allocated. Despite this situation,
Joint Staff and combatant command officials stated that a decision to
declare BMDS operational does not necessarily depend on resolving these
issues.
In July 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the highest
security level for BMDS when it is operational because damage to this
system would harm the strategic capability of the United
States.[Footnote 18] The Deputy Secretary also designated U.S.
Strategic Command as the oversight authority responsible for
coordinating security issues with other combatant commands, the
services, and the Missile Defense Agency. This was done, in part, to
identify budget requirements. This policy was further clarified in a
May 2005 memo stating that the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command has
the authority to designate the security level for each BMDS element and
is responsible for developing security standards, policies, and
procedures for BMDS. In October 2005, U.S. Strategic Command issued a
directive specifying the standards for BMDS security and setting the
security level for each BMDS element.
Despite these directives, however, combatant commands have expressed
concerns about which DOD commands are responsible for actually
providing and paying for BMDS security, particularly for those elements
that will be contractor operated and are expected to be available to
the warfighter in fiscal year 2006. According to U.S. Strategic Command
officials, BMDS elements at the highest security level require, for
example, two lines of defensive security, including sensor fences and
sufficient personnel to achieve a specific response rate; integrated
electronic security systems; entry control; and access delay and denial
systems. These measures are expensive--the Missile Defense Agency
estimated that security measures for three BMDS elements will cost
about $350 million over fiscal years 2006-2011.[Footnote 19] However,
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Joint Staff, and other DOD officials said that service
estimates of security requirements (personnel and costs) are generally
higher and that some of these costs are not budgeted by either the
services or the Missile Defense Agency. Furthermore, although U.S.
Strategic Command has oversight responsibility and has conducted some
security inspections, Command officials told us that ensuring security
requirements are met will actually be done by a service or the
combatant command where the element is located.
As discussed above, the U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint Staff
recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics assign a "lead service" for each
BMDS element that would be responsible for providing security, ensuring
security standards are met, and budgeting for any associated costs in
the next Future Years Defense Program (which will be for fiscal years
2008-13). Although negotiations on this issue are ongoing, the Missile
Defense Agency agreed in December 2005 to fund the sea-based radar and
forward-based radar costs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, Air Force
Cobra Dane radar costs for fiscal year 2007, and contractor logistic
support through fiscal year 2013. However, DOD officials stated that
there are significant disagreements between the services and the
Missile Defense Agency over the levels of support and force protection
required. Further, the services and the Missile Defense Agency have not
resolved disagreements over which organization will fund operational
costs or which organization will provide and fund force protection
beyond fiscal year 2007. It is not clear whether the recent designation
of lead service for only two BMDS elements will help resolve these
issues in time to be reflected in the development of the fiscal years
2008-13 Future Years Defense Program.
Funding issues could prevent DOD from meeting security requirements at
some locations before the system is declared operational. For example,
both Vandenberg and Schreiver Air Force Bases require a combination of
additional security personnel and technology improvements to meet
security requirements. Although some personnel were recently added and
the Air Force has requested funding for the technology improvements, as
of February 8, 2006, not all the required personnel and technology were
in place. The Army also had to increase the military police unit to
protect the missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the cost for
snow removal is nearly a million dollars a year. Security will become
increasingly important and costly as additional BMDS elements are
placed in more locations, particularly those outside the continental
United States (see table 2). For example, DOD is planning a third site
for the ground-based element and is planning for four forward-based
radars, and officials have noted that the estimated cost for protecting
the forward-based radar could double for austere locations.
Combatant Commands' Training Plans and Readiness Assessments for BMDS
Are Evolving:
Although DOD has made progress in developing some training, the
training plans prepared by the combatant commands under the Joint
Training System are evolving as are readiness assessments for BMDS. The
Joint Training System[Footnote 20] is DOD's authoritative process for
combatant commands and others to develop training plans, conduct
training, and assess proficiency. This system requires combatant
commands to develop annual training plans based on the mission-
essential tasks required to perform assigned missions. The Joint
Training System also includes an automated, Web-based system to track
progress. The mission-essential tasks are also the basis for DOD
readiness assessments such as the Defense Readiness Reporting System
and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review.
DOD has not yet completed all the planning as part of the Joint
Training System for ballistic missile defense. For example, the U.S.
Strategic Command subcommand for missile defense is developing but has
not yet completed an annual training plan and a list of mission-
essential tasks under the Joint Training System. Although some
combatant commands have individually drafted some mission-essential
tasks for ballistic missile defense, the subcommand's efforts are
intended to develop a list that will be standardized and integrated
across combatant commands. Once developed, these mission-essential
tasks need to be entered into the Joint Training System's Web-based
tracking system, which currently does not include ballistic missile
defense tasks.
The roles of organizations involved in ballistic mission defense
training are evolving and DOD is still developing some important
aspects of its training program. The Missile Defense Agency has done a
lot of work to develop BMDS element and command training as well as
develop and conduct exercises for the combatant commands and services.
However, the U.S. Strategic Command's subcommand is beginning to assume
more responsibilities for training, such as developing the annual
training plan and mission-essential tasks. The two organizations are
negotiating which organization will assume which training functions,
but, as of November 2005, according to DOD officials, no final
decisions had been made. The subcommand, with a supporting working
group, is working on several important aspects of ballistic missile
defense training that are not yet complete even though additional
elements, such as the forward-based radar and the sea-based radar, are
expected to be made available to the warfighter in 2006. The subcommand
and working group are also developing:
* an overarching training vision,
* a global BMDS employment guide for how to "fight the system" with
more elements than just the ground-based element,
* a method to systematically integrate ballistic missile defense into
the Joint Staff's exercise program and crosswalk these exercises with
the ballistic missile defense annual training plan, and:
* a training and certification program for nonservice-owned elements
such as the sea-based radar and the forward-based radar.
Development of a standardized list of joint mission-essential tasks
will form the basis for DOD readiness assessments such as the Defense
Readiness Reporting System and the Joint Quarterly Readiness
Review.[Footnote 21] Joint Staff officials told us that in some of the
recent quarterly reviews, U.S. Strategic Command submitted a subjective
evaluation of ballistic missile defense as part of the review. However,
the officials said that the Joint Staff could not assess the Command's
input during the review because there is not yet an approved, common
list of mission tasks and the system has not been declared operational;
thus, there was no "yardstick" for them to use to assess the readiness
to conduct the ballistic missile defense mission. Regarding input into
the Defense Readiness Reporting System, U.S. Strategic Command
officials stated that inputs are usually based on the mission-essential
tasks, which are assessed using objective effectiveness measures and
some subjective commander's judgment. However, since the mission-
essential tasks are evolving and the combatant commands are just
beginning to develop measures of effectiveness, the inputs into this
system are currently limited and predominantly subjective.
DOD Has Not Approved Dual Status for National Guard Unit Commanders:
Although the Secretary of the Army recently approved the model for
using National Guard units to operate the ground-based BMDS element,
DOD has not approved dual status for the commanders of these units,
according to DOD officials.[Footnote 22] The Army decided in 1999 to
establish National Guard units to perform the ballistic missile defense
mission. In 2003, the Army assigned National Guard soldiers to the
Colorado Army National Guard 100th Missile Defense Brigade and the
Alaska Army National Guard 49th Missile Defense Battalion.[Footnote 23]
The model for using these National Guard units and roles/
responsibilities of all parties involved are specified in a memorandum
of agreement between the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command,
National Guard Bureau, and the Colorado and Alaska State Adjutants
General, which was signed in December 2005. The model states that once
BMDS is declared operational, the National Guard soldiers will serve in
a federal status when performing ballistic missile defense mission
duties, including controlling, operating, maintaining, securing, or
defending the ground-based element or site. Otherwise, the soldiers
will serve in a state status and be responsible for performing National
Guard duties, such as organizing, administering, recruiting,
instructing, or training reserve components. Until BMDS is declared
operational, the National Guard soldiers are in a state status all of
the time.[Footnote 24] The Secretary of the Army approved this model on
March 3, 2006.
The model states that the commanders of these National Guard units will
serve in a dual status--meaning they can command soldiers in either a
federal or state status. According to an official in the Secretary of
the Army's office, the governors of Colorado and Alaska have signed the
document authorizing dual status of the unit commanders. However,
according to Army officials, either the Secretary of Defense or the
President must sign approval for dual-status authority. As of March 3,
2006, this had not been done. However, DOD officials stressed that
these National Guard soldiers are trained and certified by their unit
commanders and are thus prepared to operate the ground-based BMDS
element whenever the system is declared operational.
Incomplete Planning Creates Uncertainty About the Basis for Declaring
the BMDS Operational:
DOD's incomplete planning to operate BMDS has created uncertainty about
the basis that will be used to declare the system operational. DOD does
not have a comprehensive plan laying out steps that need to be taken
and criteria that should be met before declaring that either the
limited defensive operations or subsequent system blocks are
operational. DOD officials agreed that planning for new weapon systems
articulated in requirements guidance generally includes critical
planning elements such as development of operational criteria, a plan
to adequately staff units, provide security, and complete training and
personnel plans. However, no organization has been officially assigned
responsibility for developing a comprehensive plan--to include
operational criteria--specifying what needs to be accomplished before
declaring that BMDS is operational either for limited defensive
operations or subsequent blocks of capability. Although DOD has
conducted some assessments that could be used to form the basis for
developing operational criteria, no organization is clearly in charge
of developing such criteria and ensuring they are met. Some DOD
officials have suggested that the "lead service" could do this
planning, but DOD has not clearly defined lead service responsibilities
and has not fully implemented this proposal.
Without comprehensive planning, the services and the combatant commands
may not be as well prepared to operate the complex, integrated BMDS as
they are for other new weapon systems for which DOD establishes
criteria for achieving operational capability. Without operational
criteria, it may be difficult for the Secretary of Defense to
objectively assess combatant commands' and services' preparations to
conduct BMDS operations, and the Secretary may not have a transparent
basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important
as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks. Further, operational
criteria are important because they specify actions that need to be
completed for users to be prepared to use the system, such as security,
training, and personnel. Without resolving the outstanding security
issues, there is uncertainty about personnel requirements, and which
organization will provide security for each element and pay the related
costs. Without complete training plans, it is unknown how training for
the integrated BMDS and some elements will be conducted, particularly
the radars that will be fielded in 2006. Furthermore, it is not clear
which mission-essential tasks will be used in DOD readiness
assessments. The absence of comprehensive planning to operate BMDS may
result in uncertainty about the basis that will be used to declare the
system operational for limited defensive operation and subsequent
blocks of capability. Thus, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and
prioritize actions across the department needed to achieve this end
effectively and efficiently and identify specific DOD organizations
responsible and accountable for making this happen. As a result, the
Secretary of Defense and Congress may not have the information to
assess the system's status and progress toward an operational
capability as they consider funding requests from DOD.
The Future Years Defense Program Does Not Provide Complete and
Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs:
The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) does not provide complete and
transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs for use by
either DOD or Congress. The FYDP is a major source of budget
information that reports projected spending for the current budget year
and at least 4 succeeding years.[Footnote 25] We and DOD have
repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to
facilitate DOD's decision making and congressional oversight. However,
complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs
are not visible in the FYDP because the FYDP's structure does not
provide a way to identify and aggregate these costs, even though DOD
plans to field an increasing number of elements between fiscal years
2006-2011. Several factors impair the visibility of ballistic missile
defense operational costs. For example, we have reported that although
expected operational costs for fiscal years 2005-2011 total $1.7
billion, DOD has not included all known operational costs in its
budget.[Footnote 26] Also, these operational costs are contained in
many program elements throughout the FYDP and are not linked in any
way, making it difficult to compile these costs. Without the ability to
clearly identify and assess the total ballistic missile defense
operational costs, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress has
complete information to use when making funding and trade-off decisions
among competing priorities; provide assurance that DOD's plans to field
ballistic missile defense capabilities are affordable over time; and
assess the costs of operating the New Triad.
Complete and Transparent Budget Information Facilitates Decision Making
and Oversight:
Complete and transparent budget information facilitates the ability of
DOD officials to make informed resource decisions, which is
increasingly important given the current strategic environment and
growing demand for resources at a time when the department is facing
significant affordability challenges. DOD acknowledged in its fiscal
year 2004 Performance and Accountability Report that transparent budget
submissions will facilitate DOD leaders' ability to make better-
informed resource decisions. In addition, DOD has acknowledged that
defense decision making requires accurate, consistent computation of
costs for each type of military capability and thus has modified the
FYDP over time to capture the resources associated with particular
areas of interest, such as space activities. Moreover, we have
previously recommended DOD take actions designed to provide greater
visibility of projected spending and future investments. For example,
our report on DOD's New Triad explained that ballistic missile defense
is an important element of the New Triad and the current FYDP structure
does not readily identify and aggregate New Triad-related costs. We
recommended in June 2005 that DOD establish a virtual major force
program to identify New Triad costs.[Footnote 27] Subsequently, because
DOD disagreed with our recommendation in its comments on our report, we
also recommended that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of
Defense to establish a virtual major force program to identify New
Triad costs and report annually on these funding levels.[Footnote 28]
Complete and transparent budget information also facilitates
congressional oversight of DOD programs. To this end, we recommended in
2004 that DOD enhance its FYDP report to provide better information for
congressional decision makers' use during budget
deliberations.[Footnote 29] Also, a congressional committee has
expressed specific interest in obtaining ballistic missile defense cost
data. For example, in the Report of the House Committee on
Appropriations on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for
Fiscal Year 2006, congressional committee members noted that the large
level of funding in individual program elements "obscures funding
details and creates significant oversight issues." Another committee
also expressed frustration with the lack of transparency in budgeting
and, in the Conference Report on the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 (December 18, 2005) directed the Comptroller
General to conduct a study of the current program element structure
(for research, development, test, and evaluation projects),
particularly those that employ the system of systems concept.
Complete and Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs
Are Not Visible in DOD's FYDP:
Complete costs to operate ballistic missile defense elements that will
be fielded between fiscal years 2006-2011 are not visible to DOD or
Congress in the FYDP because the current FYDP structure does not
provide a way to identify and aggregate all ballistic missile defense
system operational costs. Officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense Comptroller and Program, Analysis, and Evaluation agreed that
such data are necessary in making fully informed resource decisions and
will become more important as more ballistic missile defense elements
are fielded over time; however, these officials also agreed that these
data are not transparent in the FYDP and that they have not developed a
new structure for capturing these costs.
We analyzed the fiscal year 2006 FYDP[Footnote 30] to determine whether
the program elements related to ballistic missile defense operations
could be identified. In 1995, DOD's Office of Program, Analysis, and
Evaluation created a defense mission category structure in the FYDP to
identify resources devoted to different military missions, because this
type of data was not available from the FYDP. This defense mission
category structure can be used to identify the program elements and
costs for various missions such as suppression of enemy air defenses
because they are linked to related program elements in the FYDP. Our
analysis showed, and a Program, Analysis, and Evaluation official
agreed, that neither the current FYDP structure nor its associated
defense mission categories provides a way to effectively identify and
aggregate ballistic missile defense operational costs.
In our analysis, we identified eight defense mission categories related
to ballistic missile defense such as "ballistic missile defense forces"
and "theater missile defense". Even though our analysis identified 135
ballistic missile defense program elements that were linked to these
ballistic missile defense mission categories, our analysis also showed
that these program elements did not provide a complete and accurate
list for identifying and aggregating ballistic missile defense
operational costs. For example, 88 of the 135 (65 percent) program
elements linked to ballistic missile defense mission categories were
not related to the current BMDS--for example, one of these was for
Special Operations Command. Also, the 135 program elements identified
did not include some programs that are part of the BMDS such as the
upgraded early warning radar. In addition, the 135 program elements did
not include many program elements that service officials said contain
BMDS operational costs. Specifically, we documented 28 BMDS-related
program elements from the services, such as those for sensors and
radars supported by the Air Force, ground-based missile defense
supported by the Army, and the Aegis ballistic missile defense radar
supported by the Navy. When we compared this list of program elements
to the 135 we identified using the FYDP defense mission categories, we
found that 24 of the 28 service-provided program elements did not match
any of the 135 identified via our analysis of FYDP defense mission
categories for ballistic missile defense.
We discussed the results of our analysis with officials from the Office
of Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis and
Evaluation, and they agreed that our methodology was reasonable. They
also agreed that our analysis showed that complete and transparent
ballistic missile defense operational costs are not visible in the
FYDP. Since there is no structure in the FYDP to accurately identify
and aggregate ballistic missile defense operational costs, the
Comptroller's office must request these data from each service and the
Missile Defense Agency. The data are added together to determine an
estimate of the total operational cost for the ballistic missile
defense system. The Comptroller's office estimated that the services'
operational costs for fiscal years 2004-2006 totaled $259 million.
However, the officials acknowledged that these data may not have been
gathered consistently across all these organizations, because there is
no standardized methodology specifying which costs to include.
Several Factors Impair the Completeness and Transparency of Ballistic
Missile Defense Operational Costs:
The completeness and transparency of operational costs for ballistic
missile defense system elements are impaired by four primary factors:
(1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there
is no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile
Defense Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to
pay for operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known
operational costs in its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not yet
identified all costs associated with the New Triad, of which the
ballistic missile defense system is an important part. Officials from
the Office of Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis
and Evaluation agreed that complete and transparent ballistic missile
defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP for the reasons
cited above.
First, operational costs are included in many program elements
throughout the FYDP and there is no mechanism to link the FYDP program
elements together so that total operational costs can be compiled. A
further complication is that some of these program elements also
include costs for items that are not related to ballistic missile
defense. For example, one program element entitled Theater Missile
Defense is defined as including costs for theater missiles of all
classes, including tactical, cruise, and air-to-surface missiles.
Another program element includes all costs for all the Navy's
destroyers, and does not distinguish the 15 destroyers that DOD will
operate to perform the ballistic missile defense mission. Even though
there is no FYDP structure to identify and aggregate ballistic missile
defense operational costs, there is no plan to modify the FYDP
structure to allow identification of ballistic missile defense program
elements, according to an official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, because they have not
received direction to do so.
Second, the Missile Defense Agency is authorized by statute to use
research and development funds to pay for some operational
costs.[Footnote 31] However, officials we spoke with from the Office of
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and Program, Analysis, and Evaluation
said that this practice makes it much more difficult to derive an
accurate estimate of operational costs, because the research and
development funds come from a different appropriation and are not
typically used to pay operational costs. These officials told us that
operational costs are usually paid from the operations and maintenance
appropriation, not the research and development appropriation.
Third, we reported in September 2005 that operational costs for fiscal
years 2005-2011 totaled $1.7 billion but that DOD has not included all
known operational costs for BMDS in its budget. Further, we reported
that the Missile Defense Agency and the services disagreed as to which
organization should pay operational costs for developmental assets,
even though these assets may be available for operational use.[Footnote
32] In discussing our analysis with officials in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and Program, Analysis, and
Evaluation, the officials noted that DOD's estimate of ballistic
missile defense operational costs does not reflect total costs, because
it does not include combatant commanders costs such as the costs for
the new Strategic Command subcommand for missile defense. In addition,
an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
stated that their estimate of operational costs over fiscal years 2006-
2011 is not complete because the services and the Missile Defense
Agency are negotiating who will pay operational costs in the future.
Fourth, as we previously reported, DOD has not identified all costs
associated with the New Triad, of which ballistic missile defense is an
important part. We reported that the current FYDP structure does not
expressly identify and aggregate New Triad program elements that would
allow identification of New Triad spending. Since ballistic missile
defense is a part of the New Triad, DOD would need to be able to
identify these costs as part of the New Triad. In fact, the Commander
of the U.S. Strategic Command suggested that creating a virtual major
force program could be necessary for each of the New Triad legs because
of the diversity and scope of New Triad capabilities.[Footnote 33]
Lack of Complete and Transparent Budget Information Impairs Decision
Making:
The lack of complete and transparent budget information about ballistic
missile defense operational costs impairs the ability of DOD officials
to make informed resource decisions. DOD officials agreed that complete
and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs are
necessary to make informed funding and trade-off decisions among
competing priorities. Without the ability to identify and assess total
BMDS operational costs, neither DOD nor Congress has complete
information to know whether DOD's plans to field ballistic missile
defense capabilities are affordable over time. Furthermore, if the
funds budgeted for BMDS support turn out to be insufficient since not
all costs are included, DOD will either have to take funds from other
programs or spend less on missile defense and potentially accept risks
in security, training, personnel, or other areas. This is particularly
important when considering the Missile Defense Agency's plans to
deliver an increasing number of systems and units over fiscal years
2006 -2011. The Missile Defense Agency may face increasing budget
pressure because, although it will be supporting more BMDS elements,
the agency's budget for contractor logistic support is expected to
remain relatively constant. Finally, we reported in 2005 that decision
makers need complete data about the resources being allocated to the
New Triad--of which ballistic missile defense is a part--in making
trade-offs among efforts to develop capabilities. Without these cost
data, DOD will be limited in its ability to guide and direct its
efforts to integrate New Triad capabilities and Congress will not have
full visibility of the resources being allocated to these
efforts.[Footnote 34]
Conclusions:
Preparing to perform the ballistic missile defense mission is highly
complex, involves many different DOD organizations, and requires
seamless integration across multiple combatant commands. At the same
time that the warfighters are developing and refining their training,
operations, and security plans, the Missile Defense Agency continues to
develop blocks of BMDS capabilities. Although DOD faces the twin
challenges of simultaneously developing the system and beginning
operations, comprehensive planning could alleviate users' concerns
before declaring that either limited operations or each subsequent
block of capability is operational. Although DOD has plans for
additional tests that are designed to resolve technical performance
issues, the absence of a comprehensive plan for operational issues
creates uncertainty across DOD on what remains to be done and how
remaining actions should be prioritized before the department declares
BMDS operational. Without operational criteria, it may be difficult for
the Secretary of Defense to objectively assess combatant commands' and
services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations and the Secretary may
not have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will
become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks
and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Until an
organization is assigned responsibility for developing a comprehensive
plan that includes operational criteria, DOD may be hindered in its
ability to identify and prioritize actions across the department
effectively and efficiently. Considering that DOD guidance generally
includes this type of planning and operational criteria to be developed
for new weapon systems such as radars or fighter aircraft, it is even
more important to bring discipline into the process for the highly
complex and integrated BMDS. Considering the significant changes DOD
plans for each block of BMDS, this disciplined approach is important to
apply not only to the initial capabilities, but to each subsequent
block. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and identifying
responsibility for ensuring necessary actions, it may be difficult for
DOD to identify and prioritize actions and assure itself or Congress
that all of the necessary pieces will be in place before declaring
either limited defense operations or subsequent blocks of capability
operational. In addition, it will be difficult for DOD to determine
whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS
can be realized.
Complete and transparent information on expected costs for important
missions (such as ballistic missile defense) and investment efforts
(such as the New Triad) facilitates DOD and congressional decision
making when allocating resources. Complete and reliable data are needed
to assess and understand cost trends over time, which is particularly
important as warfighters begin to use ballistic missile defense
elements and as an increasing number of elements are fielded over
fiscal years 2006-2011. However, because the FYDP is currently not
structured to transparently identify and aggregate ballistic missile
defense operational costs, DOD's ability to make strategic investment
decisions based on knowledge of complete BMDS operational costs is
impaired. In addition, the consequences of not having this information
means that neither DOD nor Congress has the benefit of complete and
adequate data to make fully informed trade-off decisions in a resource-
constrained environment. As a result, the investment decisions made may
not truly reflect the desired relative priority of ballistic missile
defense within DOD's overall defense strategy.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making the following two recommendations for executive action.
First, to help DOD identify and prioritize actions across the
department needed to declare limited defensive operations as well as
each subsequent block of capability operational, and to dispel
uncertainty and bring needed discipline to the process, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions in
consultation with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the services,
and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* Develop operational criteria for each ballistic missile defense
element and the overall BMDS system for limited defensive operations
and each subsequent block of capability. These criteria should be
comparable to the operational criteria that are currently developed for
new weapon systems.
* Assign responsibility to specific organizations and hold these
organizations accountable for developing the criteria and ensuring
these criteria are met before operational capability is declared.
* Develop a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be
completed with completion deadlines. The plan should cover the range of
doctrine, organization, training, personnel, and facilities actions
that are normally required to be developed and in place for new weapon
systems, should integrate these actions across elements, and should
address actions needed for the overall, integrated BMDS.
Second, to provide decision makers in Congress and DOD with complete,
transparent data on the resources required to operate the ballistic
missile defense system and to clearly identify costs for an important
piece of the New Triad, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation, in consultation
with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the services, to
develop a structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile
defense operational costs, which can be included as part of an annual
report on the funding levels for New Triad activities that GAO
recommended DOD provide annually to Congress.[Footnote 35]
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Given the significance of BMDS to national defense and the billions of
dollars spent in developing this system, Congress should consider
requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop:
* A comprehensive plan (including operational criteria) specifying
actions that must be completed by the services and combatant commands
before declaring BMDS operational for limited defensive operations or
subsequent blocks of capability.
* A structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense
operational costs which can be included as part of an annual report on
the funding levels for New Triad activities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations. The
department's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III.
The department also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendations to develop operational
criteria and a comprehensive plan specifying actions that must be
completed before declaring BMDS operational and also agreed with our
recommendation to assign responsibility for doing so to a specific
organization which would be held accountable for completing these
tasks. However, while DOD's response addressed the warfighters' role in
providing input to the Missile Defense Agency to guide the system's
technical development, it did not address the need for operational
criteria prior to declaring the BMDS or elements of the system
operational. Moreover, DOD's comments do not indicate what, if any,
process it plans to use to develop operational criteria for assessing
combatant commands' and services' preparedness to conduct BMDS
operations or whether it plans to assign responsibility. We continue to
believe that the warfighters, specifically the combatant commands and
services under the leadership of U.S. Strategic Command, should have
the lead in developing and ensuring operational criteria are met as
opposed to the developers--the Missile Defense Agency and system
development program offices. Without comprehensive planning and
objective operational criteria, the services and the combatant commands
may not be as well prepared to operate the complex, integrated BMDS as
they are for other new weapon systems. Furthermore, such planning and
criteria would provide an objective basis for assessing combatant
commands' and services' preparedness to conduct BMDS operations and
provide a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational. In
addition, without an organization assigned responsibility for
developing a comprehensive plan which includes operational criteria,
DOD may be hindered in its ability to identify and prioritize actions
across the department effectively and efficiently.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a
structure within the FYDP to identify all ballistic missile defense
operational costs that could be included as part of an annual report on
New Triad funding that we had previously recommended DOD provide
annually to Congress. Considering that there is no common methodology
to identify and aggregate BMDS operational costs, we continue to
believe that corrective action is needed so that Congress and DOD have
adequate information to assess whether DOD's plans to field ballistic
missile defense capabilities are affordable. Complete and transparent
BMDS operational cost information is important to assess cost trends
over time, particularly as an increasing number of BMDS elements are
fielded during the next several years. Without this information,
neither DOD nor Congress will have the benefit of complete and adequate
data to make fully informed trade-off decisions within projected
defense spending levels. With respect to DOD's nonconcurrence on our
previous recommendation to account for New Triad costs in the FYDP, we
note that the Report of the House Armed Services Committee on the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed the
Secretary of Defense to modify the FYDP to identify and aggregate
program elements associated with the New Triad which, as we state in
this report, includes ballistic missile defense.
We continue to believe that the specific actions we recommended are
needed for DOD to prepare for conducting BMDS operations and to assist
in DOD and congressional oversight of ballistic missile defense
operational costs. Because DOD did not indicate that it plans to
implement our recommendations, we have added a matter for Congress to
consider directing DOD to develop a comprehensive plan which includes
operational criteria and to develop a structure within the FYDP to
identify all ballistic missile defense operational costs.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; the Commander, U.S. Northern
Command; and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-
4402. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff
members who made key contributions to this report are listed in
appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
made progress in planning to operate the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS), and to determine whether the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on total
ballistic missile defense operational costs, we conducted various
analyses, reviewed key documentation, and interviewed relevant DOD
officials. During this review, we focused on assessing issues DOD faces
in planning to operate the BMDS such as operational criteria, training,
security, and cost transparency. We did not evaluate DOD's testing
plans, research and development programs, or the technical
effectiveness of individual elements as we have addressed these issues
in other reports. Specifically, we have issued two reports on the
status of BMDS that included assessments of program goals, testing
plans, and progress in developing each element.[Footnote 36] Our March
2005 report found that system performance remains uncertain and
unverified because DOD has not successfully conducted an end-to-end
flight test using operationally representative hardware and software.
To assess DOD's progress in planning to operate the BMDS, we obtained
and reviewed relevant documents on ballistic missile defense operations
such as the National Security Presidential Directive 23 dated December
16, 2002; the Unified Command Plan dated January 10, 2003; various
combatant command contingency plans; BMDS Tactical Handbook; various
Joint Staff orders; DOD, Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and
service instructions and regulations; DOD memoranda providing guidance
for implementing the ballistic missile defense program; Integrated
Training Working Group briefings; Missile Defense Agency briefings and
documents explaining program status and plans; and briefings by DOD
officials. We also observed an exercise that involved the services and
combatant commands.
To identify areas where planning was incomplete, we compared what DOD
had done with the planning principles for new weapon systems embodied:
in DOD acquisition and requirements guidance[Footnote 37] and service
instructions[Footnote 38] and training plans explained in DOD's Joint
Training System.[Footnote 39] We then discussed the results of our
comparisons with officials in the U.S. Strategic Command; the Army's
Space and Missile Defense Command; Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Joint Staff; and Missile
Defense Agency.
To determine the extent to which the FYDP provides complete and
transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs, we
analyzed the FYDP structure to determine whether it was designed to
readily identify the program elements that contain ballistic missile
defense operational costs and assessed whether these FYDP program
elements included all BMDS elements. In addition, we obtained and
reviewed documentation at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
the Army, Navy, and Air Force to identify program elements that would
include ballistic missile defense operational costs. We met with DOD
officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), Office of the Director, Program, Analysis, and
Evaluation, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to discuss our approach and they
agreed it was reasonable. We assessed the reliability of the data by
corroborating our list of defense mission categories and some program
elements with knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
In addition, other organizations we visited to gain an understanding of
their roles in operating elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System included the Joint Staff, U.S. Army Headquarters and Space and
Missile Defense Command, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations'
Surface Warfare division, Air Force Headquarters and Space Command, the
office of the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and the
Air National Guard. To document how various commands would employ BMDS
in performing the ballistic missile defense mission, we met with
officials from the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and the
U.S. Northern Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and observed an
exercise.
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for their review and
incorporated their comments where appropriate. Our review was conducted
between January 2005 and February 2006 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon Washington, Dc 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U. S. Government
Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
April 25 2006:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-06-473, "DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Actions Needed to Improve
Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile
Defense," dated March 24, 2006, (GAO Code 350624).
The DOD concurs with recommendation two and partially concurs with the
draft report's other recommendations. The rationale for our position is
included in the enclosure. I submitted separately a list of technical
and factual errors for your consideration.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. For
further questions concerning this report, please contact COL Fred
Coppola, (703) 695-7329, fred.coppola osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mark D. Schaefer:
Acting Director Defense Systems:
Enclosures:
As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED March 24 2006 GAO CODE 350624/GAO-06-473:
"DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and
Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Services,
and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff develop operational criteria
for each ballistic missile defense element and the overall Ballistic
Missile Defense System for limited defensive operations and each
subsequent block of capability. These criteria should be comparable to
the operational criteria that are currently developed for new weapon
systems.
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. Traditionally, the Department and the
Services do not develop overall mission area criteria for joint
capabilities-doctrine, Tactics Techniques and Procedures, operational
criteria, etc. are developed for individual elements. The Missile
Defense Agency's (MDA) acquisition process is not comparable to the
traditional acquisition process. MDA is delivering technical capability
in blocks and the warfighter provides operational input for the
integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). MDA works closely
with Combatant Commanders, Services and the Joint Staff throughout
development to meet desired block capability goals and ensure
supportability.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Services,
and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff assign responsibility to
specific organizations and hold these organizations accountable for
developing the criteria and ensuring these criteria are met before
operational capability is declared.
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. While the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is
assigned the mission to plan, integrate and coordinate missile defense
operations and the Geographic Combatant Commanders are assigned the
mission of executing the operations, the Services normally provide
operational criteria. USSTRATCOM, in coordination with other Combatant
Commands, would assess overall system operating capability. Respective
Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System element
Program Offices and Lead Services identified in the Ballistic Missile
Defense System Transition and Transfer Plan should develop and ensure
operational criteria are met to support declaration of an operational
capability.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Services,
and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a comprehensive plan
specifying actions that must be completed with completion deadlines.
The plan should cover the range of doctrine, organization, training,
personnel, and facilities actions that are normally required to be
developed and in place for new weapons systems, should integrate these
actions across elements, and should address actions needed for the
overall, integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System.
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The program plan should follow the
block capability model developed by Missile Defense Agency (MDA). MDA
is delivering technical capability in blocks, and the warfighter is
providing operational input for the integrated Ballistic Missile
Defense System. MDA works closely with Combatant Commanders, Services,
and the Joint Staff throughout development to meet desired block
capability goals and ensure supportability across doctrine,
organization, training, personnel and facilities.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, in consultation
with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Services, to
develop a structure within the Future Years Defense Program to identify
all ballistic missile defense operational costs, which can be included
as part of an annual report on the funding levels for New Triad
activities that the GAO recommended DOD provide annually to Congress.
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The phrase "for the New Triad
activities that the GAO recommended DOD provide annually to Congress,"
should be deleted. In the GAO report previously referenced, DOD non-
concurred with the recommendation for a separate virtual funding line
for the New Triad.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe,
Assistant Director, Brenda M. Waterfield, Pat L. Bohan, Amy J.
Anderson, Jeffrey R. Hubbard, John E. Trubey, and Renee S. Brown made
key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Actions needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. GAO-
05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify
New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach. GAO-05-
962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify
New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach. GAO-05-
540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in
2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency of
DOD's Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514. Washington, D.C.: May 7,
2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254. Washington,
D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for
Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.: August
21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,
D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks
Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce Risks
in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National
Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New
Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29,
2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be
Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-131. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2000.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was required by the Floyd D.
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub.L.
No. 106-398, § 1041. (2000)), which directed the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to "conduct a
comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for
the next 5 to 10 years." The result of this review was DOD's proposal
for the New Triad, which significantly expanded the range of strategic
capabilities.
[2] Secretary of Defense Memorandum re: Missile Defense Program
Direction (Jan. 2, 2002).
[3] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004); GAO,
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in
2004, GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions needed to Ensure Adequate
Funding for Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System, GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
[5] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.L.No.
108-375, § 231 (2004); and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.L.No. 109-163, § 233.
[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate
Funding for Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System, GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
[7] The boost phase is from launch until the missile stops accelerating
under its own power, and typically lasts 3-5 minutes for
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The midcourse phase, lasting for
about 20 minutes, begins after the missile has stopped accelerating and
the warhead travels through space on a predictable path. The final or
terminal phase begins when the warhead reenters the atmosphere and
lasts approximately a minute or less.
[8] In viewing the parts of BMDS from a technical and engineering
viewpoint, the Missile Defense Agency has identified certain parts as
"elements". However, in discussing warfighters' operating BMDS and lead
service roles, the Joint Staff refers to the following as BMDS
elements: the space-based sensor; early warning radars; Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense; C2BMC; Ground-based Midcourse Defense; Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense; the forward-based radar; and the sea-based
radar. We continue this practice throughout this report.
[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense
Program in 2004, GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[10] Program elements are the primary data elements in the FYDP that
represent organizational entities, their related resources, and
descriptions of various DOD missions. Program elements may be
aggregated in different ways, such as to show total resources assigned
to a specific program or to identify selected functional groupings of
resources.
[11] U.S. Strategic Command established several subcommands, each
responsible for a specific mission area. In this report, the term
subcommand refers specifically to the Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense.
[12] These criteria are generally contained in specific documents
required by DOD's traditional requirements and acquisition processes.
[13] The Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command is also the
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense. Staff in both organizations are
working together to identify actions that need to be taken for the
warfighter to use BMDS elements.
[14] The Missile Defense Agency was not involved in developing or
approving these Army capabilities documents.
[15] The DOD dictionary defines initial operational capability as the
first attainment of the capability to employ effectively a weapon, item
of equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics, and which
is manned and operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and
supported military force or unit.
[16] As discussed in the Background section, the transfer plans are
being negotiated between the Missile Defense Agency and one of the
services for each BMDS element and will specify tasks and milestones,
funding requirements, and identify how the service, combatant
commander, and the Missile Defense Agency will share responsibilities.
[17] DOD plans to operate these elements using contractor personnel.
[18] According to U.S. Strategic Command officials, the command is not
recommending protecting the BMDS sites to the same degree as nuclear
sites.
[19] These three elements are the sea-based radar, the forward-based
radar, and the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska.
[20] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01B, Joint
Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States (Dec. 31,
1999).
[21] The Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System measures and
reports on the readiness of military forces to execute the National
Military Strategy as assigned by the Secretary of Defense. This system
is supported by the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review, a scenario-based
assessment to identify capability shortfalls and risks in executing
missions assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
[22] The ground-based element, known as Ground-based Midcourse Defense,
consists of interceptors and a fire control system. The ground-based
element relies on other sensors and radars for tracking data.
[23] The brigade is an approved Army Multiple Component Unit with
active Army and Colorado National Guard soldiers, while the battalion
is solely comprised of Alaska National Guard Soldiers. Soldiers
performing the ballistic missile defense mission are on full-time
National Guard duty through the Active Guard/Reserve program. When the
proposed model is approved, the National Guard soldiers are expected to
alternate between federal status (Title 10) and state status (Title
32).
[24] According to Army officials, these National Guard soldiers would
be federalized if an emergency occurred before the manning model is
approved.
[25] The FYDP submitted with DOD's fiscal year 2006 budget includes
data through fiscal year 2011.
[26] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate
Funding for Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System, GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
[27] GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More
Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach, GAO-05-540 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).
[28] GAO, Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve
Transparency of DOD's Projected Resource Needs, GAO-04-514 (Washington,
D.C.: May 7, 2004).
[29] The FYDP submitted with DOD's fiscal year 2006 budget includes
data through fiscal year 2011. The FYDP contains thousands of program
elements that are intended to capture the total cost of a program.
[30] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.L.
No. 108-375, § 231 (2004); and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-163, § 233.
[31] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate
Funding for Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System, GAO-05-817 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
[32] GAO-05-540.
[33] GAO-05-540.
[34] GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More
Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach, GAO-05-540 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).
[35] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: April 2004); GAO, Defense
Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004, GAO-
05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[36] DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System, May 12, 2003; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Staff Manual
3170.01B, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System, May 11, 2005.
[37] Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-601, Declaration of Initial
Operating Capability and Full Operational Capability, Dec. 2, 1997.
[38] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01B, Joint
Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, Dec. 31,
1999.
[39]
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