DOD Personnel Clearances
New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel Gao ID: GAO-06-748T May 17, 2006The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for about 2 million active personnel security clearances. About one-third of the clearances are for industry personnel working on contracts for DOD and more than 20 other executive agencies. Delays in determining eligibility for a clearance can heighten the risk that classified information will be disclosed to unauthorized sources and increase contract costs and problems attracting and retaining qualified personnel. Long-standing delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance requests and numerous impediments that hinder DOD's ability to accurately estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog led GAO to declare DOD's personnel security clearance program a high-risk area in January 2005. This testimony presents GAO's (1) preliminary observations from its ongoing review of the timeliness and completeness of clearances, (2) concerns about the upcoming expiration of an executive order that has resulted in high level commitment to improving the governmentwide clearance process, and (3) views on factors underlying DOD's decision to stop accepting clearance requests for industry personnel.
GAO's ongoing review of the timeliness and completeness of security clearance processes for industry personnel has provided three preliminary observations. First, communication problems between DOD and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may be limiting governmentwide efforts to improve the personnel security clearance process. Second, OPM faces performance problems due to the inexperience of its domestic investigative workforce, and it is still in the process of developing a foreign presence to investigate leads overseas. Third, some DOD adjudication facilities have stopped accepting closed pending cases--that is, investigations formerly forwarded to DOD adjudicators from OPM--even though some required investigative information was not included. In addition, the expiration of Executive Order 13381 could slow improvements in the security clearance processes governmentwide, as well as for DOD in particular. The executive order, which among other things delegated responsibility for improving the clearance process to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is set to expire on July 1, 2006. GAO has been encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB has demonstrated in the development of a plan to address clearance-related problems. Because there has been no indication that the executive order will be extended, GAO is concerned about whether the progress that has resulted from OMB's high-level management involvement will continue. Issues such as OPM's need to establish an overseas presence are discussed as potential reasons why OPM may not be in a position to assume an additional high-level commitment if OMB does not continue in its current role. Finally, inaccurate projections of clearance requests and funding constraints are delaying the processing of security clearance requests for industry personnel. DOD stopped processing new applications for clearance investigations for industry personnel on April 28, 2006. DOD attributed its actions, in part, to an overwhelming volume of requests for industry personnel security investigations. DOD's long-standing inability to accurately project its security clearance workload makes it difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. The funding constraints that also underlie the stoppage are related to the transfer of DOD's personnel security investigations functions to OPM. DOD has questioned some of the costs being charged by OPM and has asked OMB to mediate the DOD-OPM dispute. Information from the two agencies indicates that OMB has directed the agencies to continue to work together to resolve the matter. According to officials in the DOD and OPM inspector general offices, they are investigating the billing dispute and expect to report on the results of their investigations this summer.
GAO-06-748T, DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
DOD Personnel Clearances:
New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel:
Statement of Derek B. Stewart:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-06-748T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-748T a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for about 2 million
active personnel security clearances. About one-third of the clearances
are for industry personnel working on contracts for DOD and more than
20 other executive agencies. Delays in determining eligibility for a
clearance can heighten the risk that classified information will be
disclosed to unauthorized sources and increase contract costs and
problems attracting and retaining qualified personnel. Long-standing
delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance requests and
numerous impediments that hinder DOD‘s ability to accurately estimate
and eliminate its clearance backlog led GAO to declare DOD‘s personnel
security clearance program a high-risk area in January 2005.
This testimony presents GAO‘s (1) preliminary observations from its
ongoing review of the timeliness and completeness of clearances, (2)
concerns about the upcoming expiration of an executive order that has
resulted in high level commitment to improving the governmentwide
clearance process, and (3) views on factors underlying DOD‘s decision
to stop accepting clearance requests for industry personnel.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s ongoing review of the timeliness and completeness of security
clearance processes for industry personnel has provided three
preliminary observations. First, communication problems between DOD and
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may be limiting governmentwide
efforts to improve the personnel security clearance process. Second,
OPM faces performance problems due to the inexperience of its domestic
investigative workforce, and it is still in the process of developing a
foreign presence to investigate leads overseas. Third, some DOD
adjudication facilities have stopped accepting closed pending
cases”that is, investigations formerly forwarded to DOD adjudicators
from OPM”even though some required investigative information was not
included.
In addition, the expiration of Executive Order 13381 could slow
improvements in the security clearance processes governmentwide, as
well as for DOD in particular. The executive order, which among other
things delegated responsibility for improving the clearance process to
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is set to expire on July 1,
2006. GAO has been encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB
has demonstrated in the development of a plan to address clearance-
related problems. Because there has been no indication that the
executive order will be extended, GAO is concerned about whether the
progress that has resulted from OMB‘s high-level management involvement
will continue. Issues such as OPM‘s need to establish an overseas
presence are discussed as potential reasons why OPM may not be in a
position to assume an additional high-level commitment if OMB does not
continue in its current role.
Finally, inaccurate projections of clearance requests and funding
constraints are delaying the processing of security clearance requests
for industry personnel. DOD stopped processing new applications for
clearance investigations for industry personnel on April 28, 2006. DOD
attributed its actions, in part, to an overwhelming volume of requests
for industry personnel security investigations. DOD‘s long-standing
inability to accurately project its security clearance workload makes
it difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing
requirements. The funding constraints that also underlie the stoppage
are related to the transfer of DOD‘s personnel security investigations
functions to OPM. DOD has questioned some of the costs being charged by
OPM and has asked OMB to mediate the DOD-OPM dispute. Information from
the two agencies indicates that OMB has directed the agencies to
continue to work together to resolve the matter. According to officials
in the DOD and OPM inspector general offices, they are investigating
the billing dispute and expect to report on the results of their
investigations this summer.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-748T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at
(202) 512-5559 or StewartD@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's
(DOD) personnel security clearance program and problems related to
clearances for industry personnel. Since declaring DOD's program a high-
risk area in January 2005, we have testified before this Subcommittee
three times on security clearance-related issues. Before providing my
observations about the current problems in the security clearance
process, I would like to provide some background to (1) give a general
context for understanding clearances and describe the importance of
industry personnel to our national security, (2) discuss how clearance
problems can negatively affect national security, and (3) provide
information about several recent events affecting the overall status of
DOD's personnel security clearance program.
Background:
For over 2 decades, we have reported on problems with DOD's personnel
security clearance program as well as the financial costs and risks to
national security resulting from these problems (see Related GAO
Reports at the end of this statement). For example, at the turn of the
century, we documented problems such as incomplete investigations,
inconsistency in determining eligibility for clearances, and a backlog
of overdue clearance reinvestigations that exceeded 500,000
cases.[Footnote 1] More recently in 2004, we identified continuing and
new impediments hampering DOD's clearance program and made
recommendations for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the
program.[Footnote 2] Also in September 2004 and June and November 2005,
we testified before this Subcommittee on clearance-related problems
faced governmentwide, DOD-wide, and for industry personnel in
particular.[Footnote 3]
A critical step in the federal government's efforts to protect national
security is to determine whether an individual is eligible for a
personnel security clearance. Specifically, an individual whose job
requires access to classified information must undergo a background
investigation and adjudication (determination of eligibility) in order
to obtain a clearance. As with federal government workers, the demand
for personnel security clearances for industry personnel has increased
during recent years. Additional awareness of threats to our national
security since September 11, 2001, and efforts to privatize federal
jobs during the last decade are but two of the reasons for the greater
number of industry personnel needing clearances today. As of September
30, 2003, industry personnel held about one-third of the approximately
2 million DOD-issued clearances. DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence has overall responsibility for DOD clearances,
and its responsibilities also extend beyond DOD. Specifically, that
office's responsibilities include obtaining background investigations
and adjudicating clearance eligibility for industry personnel in more
than 20 other federal agencies,[Footnote 4] as well as the clearances
of staff in the federal government's legislative branch.
Problems in the clearance program can negatively affect national
security. For example, delays reviewing security clearances for
personnel who are already doing classified work can lead to a
heightened risk of disclosure of classified information. In contrast,
delays in providing initial security clearances for previously non
cleared personnel can result in other negative consequences, such as
additional costs and delays in completing national security-related
contracts, lost-opportunity costs, and problems retaining the best
qualified personnel.
Long-standing delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance
requests for servicemembers, federal employees, and industry personnel
as well as numerous impediments that hinder DOD's ability to accurately
estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog led us to declare the
program a high-risk area in January 2005. The 25 areas on our high-risk
list at that time received their designation because they are major
programs and operations that need urgent attention and transformation
in order to ensure that our national government functions in the most
economical, efficient, and effective manner possible.[Footnote 5]
Shortly after we placed DOD's clearance program on our high-risk list,
a major change in DOD's program occurred. In February 2005, DOD
transferred its personnel security investigations functions and about
1,800 investigative positions to the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM). Now, DOD obtains nearly all of its clearance investigations from
OPM,[Footnote 6] which is currently responsible for 90 percent of the
personnel security clearance investigations in the federal
government.[Footnote 7] DOD retained responsibility for adjudication of
military personnel, DOD civilians, and industry personnel.
Other recent significant events affecting DOD's clearance program have
been the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 and the issuance of the June 2005 Executive Order 13381,
"Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access
to Classified National Security Information." The act included
milestones for reducing the time to complete clearances, general
specifications for a database on security clearances, and requirements
for greater reciprocity of clearances (the acceptance of a clearance
and access granted by another department, agency, or military service).
Among other things, the executive order resulted in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) taking a lead role in preparing a strategic
plan to improve personnel security clearance processes governmentwide.
Using the context that I have laid out for understanding the interplay
between DOD and OPM in DOD's personnel security clearance processes, I
will address three issues. First, I will provide a status update and
preliminary observations from our ongoing audit on the timeliness and
completeness of the processes used to determine whether industry
personnel are eligible to hold a top secret clearance--an audit that
this Subcommittee requested. Second, I will discuss potential adverse
effects that might result from the July 1, 2006, expiration of
Executive Order 13381. Finally, I will discuss DOD's recent action to
suspend the processing of clearance requests for industry personnel.
With the exception of the update and preliminary observations on our
current audit, my comments today are based primarily on our completed
work and our institutional knowledge from our prior reviews of the
clearance processes used by DOD and, to a lesser extent, other
agencies. In addition, we used information from the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, executive orders, and other
documents such as a memorandum of agreement between DOD and OPM. We
conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards in May 2006.
Summary:
Although our audit of DOD's clearance processes for industry personnel
is ongoing, we have three preliminary observations. First,
communication problems between DOD and OPM may be limiting
governmentwide efforts to improve personnel security clearance
processes. For example, until recently, OPM had not officially shared
its investigator's handbook with DOD adjudicators. Adjudicators raised
concerns that without knowing what was required for an investigation by
the investigator's handbook, they could not fully understand how
investigations were conducted and the investigative reports that form
the basis for their adjudicative decisions. OPM indicates that it is
revising the investigator's handbook and is obtaining comments from DOD
and other customers. Second, OPM faces performance problems due to the
inexperience of its domestic investigative workforce, and it is still
in the process of developing a foreign presence to investigate leads
overseas. OPM reports that it is making progress in establishing an
overseas presence, but that it will take time to fully meet the demand
for overseas investigative coverage. Third, some DOD adjudication
facilities have stopped accepting closed pending cases--that is,
investigations formerly forwarded to DOD adjudicators from OPM--even
though some required investigative information is not included.
The expiration of Executive Order 13381 could slow improvements in the
security clearance processes governmentwide, as well as for DOD in
particular. The executive order, which among other things delegated
responsibility for improving the clearance process to the Director of
OMB, is set to expire on July 1, 2006. We have been encouraged by the
high level of commitment that OMB demonstrated in the development of a
plan to address clearance-related problems. Because there has been no
indication that the executive order will be extended, we are concerned
about whether such progress will continue without OMB's high-level
management involvement. If OMB does not continue in its current role,
OPM may not be in a position to assume additional high-level commitment
for several reasons, including its inability to resolve disputes with
other agencies.
Finally, a billing dispute between DOD and OPM may cause further delays
in processing security clearances for industry personnel. DOD stopped
processing applications for clearance investigations for industry
personnel on April 28, 2006, and attributed its actions to an
overwhelming volume of requests for industry personnel security
investigations and funding constraints. DOD's inability to accurately
project its security clearance workload makes it difficult to determine
clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. The funding
constraints that contributed to the stoppage are related to the costs
resulting from the agreement that transferred DOD's clearance
investigations function to OPM. DOD has asked OMB to mediate the
dispute; however, information from DOD and OPM indicates that OMB has
directed the two agencies to continue to work together to resolve the
matter. According to representatives from DOD and OPM inspector general
offices, they are currently investigating all of the issues raised in
the Under Secretary's and Associate Director's correspondences and have
indicated that they intend to issue reports on their reviews during the
summer.
Preliminary Observations from GAO's Ongoing Audit Suggests Additional
Problems:
Mr. Chairman, at your and other congressional members request, we
continue to examine the timeliness and completeness of the processes
used to determine whether industry personnel are eligible to hold a top
secret clearance. Two key elements of the security clearance process
are investigation and adjudication. In the investigation portion of the
security clearance process, the investigator seeks to obtain
information pertaining to the security clearance applicant's loyalty,
character, reliability, trustworthiness, honesty, and financial
responsibility. For top secret security clearances, the types or
sources of information include an interview with the subject of the
investigation, national agency checks (e.g., Federal Bureau of
Investigations and immigration records), local agency checks (e.g.,
municipal police and court records), financial checks, birth date and
place, citizenship, education, employment, public records for
information such as bankruptcy or divorce, and interviews with
references. In the adjudication portion of the security clearance
process, government employees in 10 DOD adjudication facilities--2 of
which serve industry--use the information gathered at the investigation
stage to approve, deny, or revoke eligibility to access classified
information. Once adjudicated, the security clearance is then issued up
to the appropriate eligibility level, or alternative actions are taken
if eligibility is denied or revoked. A major part of our audit is
reviewing fully adjudicated industry cases to determine the
completeness of both the investigations and the adjudications for top
secret clearances. We will complete this audit and issue a report to
your Subcommittee and other congressional requesters this fall.
I will briefly mention three of the preliminary observations that we
have been able to derive thus far from our audit.
* Communication problems may be limiting governmentwide efforts to
improve the personnel security clearance process. The billing dispute
that I discuss later in this testimony is one example of a
communication breakdown. In addition, until recently, OPM had not
officially shared its investigator's handbook with DOD adjudicators.
Adjudicators raised concerns that without knowing what was required for
an investigation by the investigator's handbook, they could not fully
understand how investigations were conducted and the investigative
reports that form the basis for their adjudicative decisions. OPM
indicates that it is revising the investigator's handbook and is
obtaining comments from DOD and other customers.
* OPM acknowledges that despite its significant effort to develop a
domestic investigative workforce, performance problems remain because
of the workforce's inexperience. OPM reports that they are making
progress in hiring and training new investigators, however, they have
also noted that it will take a couple of years for the investigative
workforce to reach desired performance levels. In addition, OPM is
still in the process of developing a foreign presence to investigate
leads overseas. OPM also reports that it is making progress in
establishing an overseas presence, but that it will take time to fully
meet the demand for overseas investigative coverage.
* Some DOD adjudication facilities have stopped accepting closed
pending cases--investigations forwarded to adjudicators even though
some required information is not included--from OPM. DOD adjudication
officials need all of the required investigative information in order
to determine clearance eligibility. Without complete investigative
information, DOD adjudication facilities must store the hard-copy
closed pending case files until the required additional information is
provided by OPM. According to DOD officials, this has created a
significant administrative burden.
Expiration of Executive Order Could Slow Improvements in Clearance
Processes:
The July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order 13381 could slow
improvements in personnel security clearance processes governmentwide
as well as for DOD in particular. Among other things, this new
executive order delegated responsibility for improving the clearance
process to the OMB Director from June 30, 2005, to July 1, 2006. We
have been encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB
demonstrated in the development of a plan to improve the personnel
security clearance process governmentwide. Also, the OMB Deputy
Director met with GAO officials to discuss OMB's general strategy for
addressing the problems that led to our high-risk designation for DOD's
clearance program. Demonstrating strong management commitment and top
leadership support to address a known risk is one of the requirements
for removing DOD's clearance program from GAO's high-risk list.
Because there has been no indication that the executive order will be
extended, we are concerned about whether such progress will continue
without OMB's high-level management involvement. While OPM has provided
some leadership in assisting OMB with the development of the
governmentwide plan, OPM may not be in a position to assume additional
high-level commitment for a variety of reasons if OMB does not continue
in its current role. These reasons include: (1) the governmentwide plan
lists many management challenges facing OPM and the Associate Director
of its investigations unit, such as establishing a presence to conduct
overseas investigations and adjusting its investigative workforce to
the increasing demand for clearances; (2) adjudication of personnel
security clearances and determination of which organizational positions
require such clearances is not an OPM responsibility; and (3) agencies'
disputes with OPM--such as the current billing dispute with DOD--may
need a high-level, impartial third party to mediate a resolution.
Unexpected Volume of Clearance Requests and Funding Constraints Delay
Security Clearances for Industry Personnel Further:
DOD stopped processing applications for clearances for industry
personnel on April 28, 2006. DOD attributed its actions to an
overwhelming volume of requests for industry personnel security
investigations and funding constraints.
The unexpected volume of security clearance requests resulted in DOD
having to halt the processing of industry security clearances. We have
testified repeatedly that a major impediment to providing timely
clearances is DOD's inaccurately projected number of requests for
security clearances DOD-wide and for industry personnel specifically.
DOD's inability to accurately project clearance requirements makes it
difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing. In
fiscal year 2001, DOD received 18 percent fewer requests than it
projected (about 150,000); and in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, it
received 19 and 13 percent (about 135,000 and 90,000), respectively,
more requests than projected. In 2005, DOD was again uncertain about
the number and level of clearances that it required, but the department
reported plans and efforts to identify clearance requirements for
servicemembers, civilian employees, and contractors. For example, in
response to our May 2004 recommendation to improve the projection of
clearance requests for industry personnel, DOD indicated that it is
developing a plan and computer software to have the government's
contracting officers (1) authorize the number of industry personnel
clearance investigations required to perform the classified work on a
given contract and (2) link the clearance investigations to the
contract number.
An important consideration in understanding the funding constraints
that contributed to the stoppage is a DOD-OPM billing dispute, which
has resulted in the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
requesting OMB mediation. The dispute stems from the February 2005
transfer of DOD's personnel security investigations function to OPM.
The memorandum of agreement signed by the OPM Director and the DOD
Deputy Secretary prior to the transfer lists many types of costs that
DOD may incur for up to 3 years after the transfer of the
investigations function to OPM. One cost, an adjustment to the rates
charged to agencies for clearance investigations, provides that "OPM
may charge DOD for investigations at DOD's current rates plus annual
price adjustments plus a 25 percent premium to offset potential
operating losses. OPM will be able to adjust, at any point of time
during the first three year period after the start of transfer, the
premium as necessary to cover estimated future costs or operating
losses, if any, or offset gains, if any."
The Under Secretary's memorandum says that OPM has collected
approximately $50 million in premiums in addition to approximately $144
million for other costs associated with the transfer. The OPM Associate
Director subsequently listed costs that OPM has incurred. To help
resolve this billing matter, DOD requested mediation from OMB, in
accordance with the memorandum of agreement between DOD and OPM.
Information from DOD and OPM indicates that OMB subsequently directed
the two agencies to continue to work together to resolve the matter on
their own. According to representatives from DOD and OPM inspector
general offices, they are currently investigating all of the issues
raised in the Under Secretary's and Associate Director's
correspondences and have indicated that they intend to issue reports on
their reviews during the summer.
Concluding Observations:
Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that we will continue taking
multiple steps to assess and monitor DOD's personnel security clearance
program. As I have discussed, we are currently reviewing the timeliness
and completeness of the processes used to determine whether industry
personnel are eligible to hold a top secret clearance. We will report
that information to your Subcommittee this fall. Also, our standard
steps of monitoring programs on our high-risk list require that we
evaluate the progress that agencies make toward being removed from
GAO's high-risk list.[Footnote 8] Finally, we continuously monitor our
recommendations to agencies to determine whether active steps are being
taken to overcome program deficiencies.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Staff Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at
202-512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions
to this testimony include Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Jerome
Brown; Kurt A. Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; David Epstein; Sara Hackley;
James Klein; and Kenneth E. Patton.
[End of section]
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Managing Sensitive Information: DOE and DOD Could Improve Their
Policies and Oversight. GAO-06-531T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.
GAO's High-Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.
GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T.
Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues
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Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed for
DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed. GAO-06-113T. Washington, D.C.:
October 6, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors
under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD
Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
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DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
GAO's 2005 High-Risk Update. GAO-05-350T. Washington, D.C.: February
17, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce
Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for
Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry
Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local
Law Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington,
D.C.: February 9, 2004.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges
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GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
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2001.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.
GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for
Top Secret Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance
Reinvestigations Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security
Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: August
24, 2000.
Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of
Executive Branch Officials. GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177. Washington, D.C.:
July 27, 2000.
Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of
Executive Branch Officials. GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139. Washington, D.C.: July
11, 2000.
Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But Further
Action Is Required. GAO/AIMD-00-169. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being
Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February
16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 27,
1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to
Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE
Facilities. GAO/T-RCED-99-159. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1999.
Performance Budgeting: Initial Experiences Under the Results Act in
Linking Plans With Budgets. GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67. Washington, D.C.: April
12, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History
Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to
and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245.
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998.
Inspectors General: Joint Investigation of Personnel Actions Regarding
a Former Defense Employee. GAO/AIMD/OSI-97-81R. Washington, D.C.: July
10, 1997.
Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.
Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive
Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: October 19,
1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Implementation Issues. GAO/T-GGD-95-
186. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM's Role in
Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the
Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations
and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March
24, 1995.
Managing DOE: Further Review Needed of Suspensions of Security
Clearances for Minority Employees. GAO/RCED-95-15. Washington, D.C.:
December 8, 1994.
Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R. Washington, D.C.:
March 4, 1994.
Classified Information: Costs of Protection Are Integrated With Other
Security Costs. GAO/NSIAD-94-55. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1993.
Nuclear Security: DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance
Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative
Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security
Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided
When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 1993.
Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by
Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.: May 6,
1992.
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security
Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.
Weaknesses in NRC's Security Clearance Program. GAO/T-RCED-89-14.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1989.
Nuclear Regulation: NRC's Security Clearance Program Can Be
Strengthened. GAO/RCED-89-41. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1988.
Nuclear Security: DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel Clearance
Program. GAO/RCED-89-34. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 1988.
Nuclear Security: DOE Needs a More Accurate and Efficient Security
Clearance Program. GAO/RCED-88-28. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 1987.
National Security: DOD Clearance Reduction and Related Issues. GAO/
NSIAD-87-170BR. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 1987.
Oil Reserves: Proposed DOE Legislation for Firearm and Arrest Authority
Has Merit. GAO/RCED-87-178. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 1987.
Embassy Blueprints: Controlling Blueprints and Selecting Contractors
for Construction Abroad. GAO/NSIAD-87-83. Washington, D.C.: April 14,
1987.
Security Clearance Reinvestigations of Employees Has Not Been Timely at
the Department of Energy. GAO/T-RCED-87-14. Washington, D.C.: April 9,
1987.
Improvements Needed in the Government's Personnel Security Clearance
Program. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1985.
Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy
Personnel. GAO/GGD-83-66. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1983.
Effect of National Security Decision Directive 84, Safeguarding
National Security Information. GAO/NSIAD-84-26. Washington, D.C.:
October 18, 1983.
Faster Processing of DOD Personnel Security Clearances Could Avoid
Millions in Losses. GAO/GGD-81-105. Washington, D.C.: September 15,
1981.
(350866):
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining
Eligibility for Top Secret Security Clearances, GAO-01-465 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001); GAO, DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to
Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations, GAO/NSIAD-00-
215 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2000); and GAO, DOD Personnel:
Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security
Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).
[2] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to
Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance
Eligibility for Industry Personnel, GAO-04-632 (Washington, D.C.: May
26, 2004); and GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome
Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[3] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some
Longstanding Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain, GAO-06-
233T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2005); GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances:
Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the
Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk Designation, GAO-05-842T
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005); and GAO, Intelligence Reform: Human
Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission's Proposed Reforms,
GAO-04-1084T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2004).
[4] We identified 22 other agencies in GAO-04-632. Executive Order No.
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, Feb. 20,
1960, which was amended by Executive Order No. 12829, National
Industrial Security Program, Jan. 6, 1993, authorizes DOD to reach
agreement with other federal departments and agencies to extend its
regulations concerning authorizations for access to classified
information by industry. The agencies that have entered into agreements
with DOD for security services under the National Industrial Security
Program are the (1) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (2)
Department of Commerce, (3) General Services Administration, (4)
Department of State, (5) Small Business Administration, (6) National
Science Foundation, (7) Department of Treasury, (8) Department of
Transportation, (9) Department of the Interior, (10) Department of
Agriculture, (11) Department of Labor, (12) Environmental Protection
Agency, (13) Department of Justice, (14) Federal Reserve System, (15)
U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly U.S. General Accounting
Office), (16) U.S. Trade Representative, (17) U.S. International Trade
Commission, (18) U.S. Agency for International Development, (19)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (20) Department of Health and Human
Services, (21) Department of Homeland Security, and (22) Department of
Education. The Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency
are signatories of the National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual and thus have reciprocity with DOD under provisions of the
manual. Three federal agencies (the Department of Energy, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission) also may grant
security clearances to industry personnel who work on national security-
related programs.
[5] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[6] Currently the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and National Reconnaissance Office each have a waiver that
allows them to contract for their own personnel security clearance
investigations.
[7] In GAO-05-842T, we listed the departments/agencies having statutory
or delegated authority to conduct background investigations, as
identified by the then Deputy Associate Director of OPM's Center for
Investigations Services. Those departments/agencies are Central
Intelligence Agency; Department of State; Department of the Treasury;
Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Engraving and Printing; Federal
Bureau of Investigation; National Security Agency; U.S. Agency for
International Development; Department of Homeland Security; Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Secret Service; Small Business
Administration; Broadcasting Board of Governors; Department of Justice-
-Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. Postal
Service; Tennessee Valley Authority; National Reconnaissance Office;
and Peace Corps. Even though these agencies have authority to conduct
their own investigations, some of them request OPM to conduct all or
part of their investigations.
[8] The general steps required to remove DOD's personnel security
clearance program from the high-risk list are summarized in GAO-06-
233T.
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We identified 22 other agencies in GAO-04-632. Executive Order No.
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, Feb. 20,
1960, which was amended by Executive Order No. 12829, National
Industrial Security Program, Jan. 6, 1993, authorizes DOD to reach
agreement with other federal departments and agencies to extend its
regulations concerning authorizations for access to classified
information by industry. The agencies that have entered into agreements
with DOD for security services under the National Industrial Security
Program are the (1) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (2)
Department of Commerce, (3) General Services Administration, (4)
Department of State, (5) Small Business Administration, (6) National
Science Foundation, (7) Department of Treasury, (8) Department of
Transportation, (9) Department of the Interior, (10) Department of
Agriculture, (11) Department of Labor, (12) Environmental Protection
Agency, (13) Department of Justice, (14) Federal Reserve System, (15)
U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly U.S. General Accounting
Office), (16) U.S. Trade Representative, (17) U.S. International Trade
Commission, (18) U.S. Agency for International Development, (19)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (20) Department of Health and Human
Services, (21) Department of Homeland Security, and (22) Department of
Education. The Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency
are signatories of the National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual and thus have reciprocity with DOD under provisions of the
manual. Three federal agencies (the Department of Energy, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission) also may grant
security clearances to industry personnel who work on national security-
related programs.
