Space Acquisitions
DOD Needs Additional Knowledge as it Embarks on a New Approach for Transformational Satellite Communications System Gao ID: GAO-06-537 May 24, 2006The Department of Defense (DOD) wants to create a networked force where soldiers and systems are able to operate together seamlessly. To help facilitate this transformation, DOD began the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) program in January 2004. We reported in 2003 that TSAT was about to begin without sufficiently mature technology. In this report, at your request, we followed up with an assessment of (1) how the TSAT program is progressing, and (2) whether the program is using an acquisition approach that will provide the knowledge needed to enter product development.
The Department of Defense is not meeting original cost, schedule, and performance goals established for the TSAT program. When the program was initiated in 2004, DOD estimated TSAT's total acquisition cost to be $15.5 billion and that it would launch the first satellite in April 2011. TSAT's current formal cost estimate is nearly $16 billion and the initial launch date has slipped to September 2014--a delay of over three years. Furthermore, while the performance goal of the full five-satellite constellation has not changed, the initial delivery of capability will be less than what DOD originally planned. After DOD established initial goals for TSAT, Congress twice reduced the program's funding due to concerns about technology maturity and the aggressiveness of the acquisition schedule. DOD developed the initial goals before it had sufficient knowledge about critical TSAT technologies. DOD is taking positive steps to lower risk in the TSAT program so it can enter the product development phase with greater chance of success. However, as DOD prepares to implement a new incremental development approach for the program, it faces gaps in knowledge that could hamper its success. An incremental development will mean reduced capabilities in the initial satellites and more advanced capabilities in the remaining satellites. Given this change, it will be important for DOD to update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user community. While senior DOD officials have agreed to these reduced capabilities to get the first satellite launched in 2014, DOD has yet to reevaluate its investment in TSAT in light of other DOD investments using the knowledge it has now gained. Using this new knowledge, DOD could be in a better position to set more realistic goals, before entering product development.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-537, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs Additional Knowledge as it Embarks on a New Approach for Transformational Satellite Communications System
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2006:
Space Acquisitions:
DOD Needs Additional Knowledge as it Embarks on a New Approach for
Transformational Satellite Communications System:
Transformational Satellite Communications System:
GAO-06-537:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-537, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) wants to create a networked force where
soldiers and systems are able to operate together seamlessly. To help
facilitate this transformation, DOD began the Transformational
Satellite Communications System (TSAT) program in January 2004. We
reported in 2003 that TSAT was about to begin without sufficiently
mature technology. In this report, at your request, we followed up with
an assessment of (1) how the TSAT program is progressing, and (2)
whether the program is using an acquisition approach that will provide
the knowledge needed to enter product development.
What GAO Found:
The Department of Defense is not meeting original cost, schedule, and
performance goals established for the TSAT program. When the program
was initiated in 2004, DOD estimated TSAT‘s total acquisition cost to
be $15.5 billion and that it would launch the first satellite in April
2011. TSAT‘s current formal cost estimate is nearly $16 billion and the
initial launch date has slipped to September 2014”a delay of over three
years. Furthermore, while the performance goal of the full five-
satellite constellation has not changed, the initial delivery of
capability will be less than what DOD originally planned. After DOD
established initial goals for TSAT, Congress twice reduced the
program‘s funding due to concerns about technology maturity and the
aggressiveness of the acquisition schedule. DOD developed the initial
goals before it had sufficient knowledge about critical TSAT
technologies.
DOD is taking positive steps to lower risk in the TSAT program so it
can enter the product development phase with greater chance of success.
However, as DOD prepares to implement a new incremental development
approach for the program, it faces gaps in knowledge that could hamper
its success. An incremental development will mean reduced capabilities
in the initial satellites and more advanced capabilities in the
remaining satellites. Given this change, it will be important for DOD
to update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user community.
While senior DOD officials have agreed to these reduced capabilities to
get the first satellite launched in 2014, DOD has yet to reevaluate its
investment in TSAT in light of other DOD investments using the
knowledge it has now gained. Using this new knowledge, DOD could be in
a better position to set more realistic goals, before entering product
development.
What GAO Recommends:
We are recommending that, before entering product development, DOD: (1)
reassess the value of TSAT in broader context of other DOD investments,
using updated knowledge on likely cost, schedule, technology, and
initial capability; (2) update requirements in coordination with the
TSAT user community; (3) demonstrate the maturity of all critical
technologies; and (4) establish new cost, schedule, and performance
goals. In commenting on the report, DOD agreed with the
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-537].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Mike Sullivan at (202)
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Not Meeting Original TSAT Goals:
DOD Taking Steps to Lower Program Risk but Additional Knowledge Needed
Before Product Development:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Onboard Signal Processing Technology Heritage:
Appendix IV: Networking Technology Heritage:
Appendix V: Lasercom Technology Heritage:
Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels:
Tables:
Table 1: Technology Readiness Levels of TSAT Critical Technologies:
Table 2: TSAT Critical Technologies and Their Purposes:
Figures:
Figure 1: TSAT System Elements:
Figure 2: Changes to Key Milestones in TSAT's Acquisition Schedule:
Abbreviations:
ABL: Airborne Laser:
ACTS: Advanced Communications Technology Satellite:
AEHF: Advanced Extremely High Frequency:
AISR: airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
ALEX: Airborne Lasercom Experiment:
CDR: critical design review:
DBRA: dynamic bandwidth and resource allocation:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DT&E: developmental test and evaluation:
EHF: extremely high frequency:
GIG: Global Information Grid:
HAIPE: High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor:
IP: Internet protocol:
LES: Lincoln Experimental Satellite:
LITE: Laser Intersatellite Transmission Experiment:
MDR: medium data rate:
MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NGPR: next generation processor router:
OSVS: Optical Standards Validations Suite:
RF: radio frequency:
SHF: super high frequency:
SISR: space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
TCA: Transformational Communications Architecture:
TMOS: TSAT Mission Operations System:
TRANSEC: transmission security:
TRL: technology readiness level:
TSAT: Transformation Satellite Communications System:
TSOC: TSAT Satellite Operations Center:
TSOE: TSAT Satellite Operations Element:
XDR+: extended data rate plus:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 24, 2006:
The Honorable Jeff Sessions Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking to transform its
communication systems to achieve a networked force where soldiers and
systems are able to operate together seamlessly. To help facilitate
this transformation, DOD started a new program in January 2004--the
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT)--with an
estimated cost of $15.5 billion. Plans call for TSAT to serve as the
backbone for DOD's future communications system and to provide critical
support to weapons systems. A key role envisioned for TSAT is to
transfer information from DOD's planned ground-based Global Information
Grid (GIG), a complex set of programs and initiatives intended to
provide users with an Internet-like capability for sharing information
among military and national security users around the world. Through
the use of advanced technologies, TSAT is slated to transfer higher
volumes of information to users at a faster rate than current systems,
and allow interface with other U.S. national security agencies'
satellite-based communications.
At your request, we followed up our earlier work and assessed (1) the
TSAT program's progress toward its cost, schedule, and performance
goals, and (2) whether the program's acquisition approach will provide
the knowledge needed to enter product development.
To conduct our work, we interviewed DOD officials in the National
Security Space Office, Office of the Director for Program Analysis and
Evaluation, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Space and
Missile Systems Center, and officials from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory and the Aerospace Corporation.
We reviewed and analyzed DOD documents related to capabilities,
schedule, funding, and technology development efforts, and GAO studies
that discuss acquisition problems and associated challenges, including
our decade long body of work on best practices in weapon system
development. We conducted our review from August 2005 to March 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. For
more on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD is not meeting original cost, schedule, and performance goals
established for the TSAT program. When the program was initiated in
2004, DOD estimated TSAT's total acquisition cost to be $15.5 billion
and that it would launch the first satellite in April 2011. TSAT's
current official cost estimate is nearly $16 billion, and the initial
launch date has slipped to September 2014--a delay of over 3 years.
Furthermore, DOD has changed the TSAT program to an incremental
development approach and under this approach, the initial delivery of
capability will be less than what DOD originally planned but the
performance goal of the full five-satellite constellation has not
changed. After DOD established initial goals for TSAT, Congress reduced
the program's funding in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 because of concerns
about the maturity of critical technologies and an aggressive
acquisition schedule. DOD developed the original goals before it had
sufficient knowledge about critical TSAT technologies, rendering the
goals unreliable. In early 2004, when DOD initiated the TSAT
acquisition, only one of seven critical technologies was mature.
* DOD is taking positive steps to lower risk in the TSAT program before
entering the product development phase but as DOD prepares to implement
a new incremental development approach for the program, it faces gaps
in knowledge that could hamper the program's success. To lower risk,
DOD has separated technology development efforts from product
development and is conducting detailed reviews of the TSAT program at
critical milestones. Second, DOD has reduced program complexity and is
incorporating software development best practices for the software-
intensive ground network that is to interface with DOD's other planned
ground networks, such as GIG, to deliver enhanced capabilities. Third,
DOD plans to demonstrate critical technologies' maturity during key
integration tests in fiscal year 2007, before initiating product
development. Despite these efforts, DOD could improve the likelihood of
program success by gaining additional knowledge. In 2006, DOD directed
the TSAT program to follow an incremental development approach--a
strategy that calls for reduced capabilities in the initial satellites
and more advanced capabilities in the remaining satellites. This
approach will likely reduce risks by introducing less new content and
technology in the first two satellites. In light of this change, it
will be important for DOD to update requirements in coordination with
the TSAT user community. While senior DOD officials have agreed to
reduced capabilities up front to increase the confidence in launching
the first satellite in 2014, DOD has yet to justify the TSAT investment
in light of other DOD investments using the knowledge it has now
gained. Using this new knowledge, DOD could be in a better position to
establish realistic goals for the TSAT program before initiating
product development.
* To improve DOD's transition to transformational communications and
gain the additional knowledge needed before initiating TSAT product
development efforts, we are recommending that DOD (1) reassess the
value of TSAT in the broader context of other DOD investments, using
updated knowledge on likely cost, schedule, technology, and initial
capability; (2) update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user
community; (3) demonstrate the maturity of all critical technologies;
and (4) establish new cost, schedule, and performance goals. In written
comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations, and we have incorporated detailed comments where
appropriate (DOD's letter is reprinted in app. II).
Background:
Present and evolving threats highlight the need to design, operate, and
defend military communication networks to ensure continuity of joint
operations. However, current systems lack the connectivity, capacity,
interoperability, control, adaptability, availability, and coverage to
support military action. To address these shortcomings, DOD is moving
toward network-centric communication systems to facilitate critical
communication. A key system in this concept is TSAT--one of DOD's most
complex and expensive space programs involving the integration of
multiple, complex technologies never before integrated in a single
space system.
As early as 2001, DOD had developed a new Transformation Communications
Architecture (TCA) to guide the implementation of emerging
communications technologies. The TCA is an element of a broader global
information network or grid, DOD's overarching vision to provide
authorized users with a secure and interconnected information
environment. The performance parameters for the GIG define the
fundamental requirements for the systems to be interconnected through
the TCA. The TCA is designed to realize the benefits of an Internet
protocol (IP) environment, as it will provide instant accessibility to
the military and intelligence communities. The goal of the TCA is to
provide accessibility to all users while removing communications
constraints related to capacity, control, and responsiveness. It is
composed of elements in ground stations, aboard tactical vehicles, and
in space.
TSAT is the space-based network component of the TCA that is expected
to provide survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general
purpose radio frequency and laser cross-links with air and other space
systems. Some of the satellite technologies TSAT will employ have been
evolving for over 25 years. TSAT is building on these heritage
technologies in three primary areas: onboard signal processing for
protection and connectivity, networking, and space laser communication.
Through these advanced technologies, TSAT will improve communications
to DOD, intelligence community, and homeland defense users by
transmitting large amounts of data at a faster rate. Further, TSAT is
designed to vastly improve satellite communications by extending the
GIG to users without ground connections and making it possible for
users to travel with small terminals and communicate while on the move.
The TSAT system will consist of a five-satellite constellation (with a
sixth satellite for backup), the TSAT satellite operations element
(TSOE) which includes a primary TSAT satellite operations center (TSOC)
for on-orbit satellite control, a backup TSOC, and a set of
transportable units, a TSAT Mission Operations System (TMOS) to provide
network management, and ground gateways (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: TSAT System Elements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOD has awarded four TSAT contracts through separate bidding processes.
In 2003 DOD awarded a contract to Booz Allen Hamilton for overall
systems engineering and integration. DOD also awarded two separate
contracts to competing contractor teams--Lockheed Martin Space Systems/
Northrop Grumman Space Technology and Boeing Satellite Systems--to
conduct risk reduction efforts and present development plans for the
TSAT satellites. DOD expects to award a contract to one of these
contractor teams in 2007 to design and build the satellites. Finally,
in January 2006 DOD awarded a $2 billion contract to Lockheed Martin
Integrated Systems and Solutions to develop TMOS and the overall
network architecture. This network development contractor is
responsible for negotiating the interfaces between the TSAT network and
the space segment, user terminals, and other external networks.
Recently, DOD changed the TSAT acquisition strategy to an incremental
development approach. This approach establishes time-phased development
of new products in increments. The first increment incorporates
technology that is already mature or can be matured quickly. As new
technologies become mature, they are incorporated into subsequent
increments so that the product's capability evolves over time. This
approach also reduces risks by introducing less new content and
technology into a design and development effort, an approach intended
to enable developers to deliver a series of interim capabilities to the
customer more quickly. As such, incremental development is considered a
best practice for successful DOD and commercial development programs
because it allows these programs to make cost and schedule estimates
that are based on mature technologies. Recognizing the benefits of
evolving space systems, DOD included the incremental development of
space systems in its revised National Security Space acquisition
policy.
DOD Not Meeting Original TSAT Goals:
DOD is not meeting its original cost, schedule, and performance goals
for the TSAT program. TSAT's cost has increased by over $420 million,
the planned launch date for the first satellite has slipped more than 3
years, and the satellites will be less capable than originally planned.
Since DOD established initial goals for the program, Congress has twice
reduced the program's annual budget and directed DOD to spend more time
developing and proving critical technologies. DOD developed the initial
goals with limited knowledge, when almost all of the critical
technologies had yet to be proven to work as intended. As a result, the
goals were developed without a high level of reliability.
Initial Goals for TSAT Were Based on Limited Knowledge:
When DOD started the TSAT program in January 2004, it estimated the
total acquisition cost to be about $15.5 billion. TSAT's acquisition
cost had increased to nearly $16 billion by the end of 2004.[Footnote
1] DOD also originally scheduled critical design review (CDR) for April
2008 and the first TSAT satellite launch in April 2011. CDR is now
scheduled for September 2010 and the first launch in September 2014--
delays of approximately 29 and 41 months, respectively. In addition,
DOD recently changed its TSAT acquisition strategy to an incremental
approach by deciding to build the first two satellites with fewer
capabilities and delaying the more advanced capabilities for the later
satellites in the program. While the initial two satellites will not
perform as originally planned, the full five-satellite system will
still meet the original user requirements, according to program
officials.
According to program officials, the original goals for TSAT have been
revised several times as a result of reductions in program funding.
After DOD set its initial goals for TSAT, Congress twice funded the
program at levels below DOD's request (in fiscal years 2005 and 2006)
because of concerns about the state of technical maturity for key
subsystems and an aggressive schedule for acquisition. During this
time, Congress also directed the program to focus on the challenges of
integrating the technologies needed for the system. Figure 2 shows the
changes to key milestones dates in TSAT's acquisition schedules. The
program recently was directed to develop a new total acquisition cost
estimate at a higher level of confidence--which could further increase
the amount of funding requested in the near term for the
program[Footnote 2]. However, as of April 2006, DOD had yet to develop
this new estimate.
Figure 2: Changes to Key Milestones in TSAT's Acquisition Schedule:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
When DOD established initial goals for the TSAT program, it lacked
sufficient knowledge about key critical technologies. Our past work has
shown that a knowledge-based model leads to better acquisition
outcomes.[Footnote 3] This model can be broken down into three
cumulative knowledge points for technology maturity, design maturity,
and production maturity. At the first knowledge point, a match is made
between a customer's requirements and the product developer's available
resources in terms of technical knowledge, time, money, and capacity.
We have also reported that starting a complex program like TSAT with
immature technologies can lead to poor program performance and
outcomes.
In early December 2003, we reported that the Air Force would have
difficulty establishing goals when starting the TSAT program because
critical technologies were underdeveloped and early design studies had
not been started.[Footnote 4] At that time, we recommended that the Air
Force delay the start of the TSAT program until technologies had been
demonstrated to be at an acceptable level of maturity and to consider
alternative investments to TSAT. One month later DOD started the
program with only one of the seven critical technologies mature, and
could not have known with any certainty what resources would be needed
to eventually meet users' requirements, despite having confidence in
its technology development schedule.
For the TSAT program, the Next Generation Processor Router (NGPR) and
laser communications are the highest-risk areas. Program officials
reported that three of the critical technologies in the NGPR are
involved with the transmission of data: (1) packet processing payloads,
(2) dynamic bandwidth and resource allocation (DBRA), and (3) protected
bandwidth efficient modulation using high data rates. The use of these
Internet-like processes will provide unprecedented connectivity for all
TSAT users by moving from an older circuit-based network (similar to
telephone) to the newer IP-based network (similar to the Internet).
Additionally, DOD continues to develop the technologies that are needed
for laser communications. Table 1 identifies the level of maturity of
TSAT critical technologies at program start and their expected maturity
dates.
Table 1: Technology Readiness Levels of TSAT Critical Technologies:
Critical technology: Communication-on-the move antenna;
TRL level at development start[A]: 4;
TRL level as of March 2006: 6;
Expected maturity date[B]: N/A.
Critical technology: Packet Processing Payload;
TRL level at development start[A]: 6;
TRL level as of March 2006: 6;
Expected maturity date[B]: N/A.
Critical technology: Bandwidth Efficient Modulation (XDR+);
TRL level at development start[A]: 3;
TRL level as of March 2006: 5;
Expected maturity date[B]: 2007.
Critical technology: Dynamic Bandwidth Resource Allocation (DBRA);
TRL level at development start[A]: 3;
TRL level as of March 2006: 5;
Expected maturity date[B]: 2007.
Critical technology: Information Assurance - TRANSEC;
TRL level at development start[A]: 3;
TRL level as of March 2006: 6;
Expected maturity date[B]: N/A.
Critical technology: Information Assurance - HAIPE;
TRL level at development start[A]: 4;
TRL level as of March 2006: 6;
Expected maturity date[B]: N/A.
Critical technology: Single-Access Lasercom;
TRL level at development start[A]: 5;
TRL level as of March 2006: 5;
Expected maturity date[B]: 2007.
Critical technology: Multi-Access Lasercom[C];
Narrow field of view;
Wide field of view;
TRL level at development start[A]: 2;
TRL level as of March 2006: 2;
Expected maturity date[B]: to be determined.
Source: Air Force (data); GAO (analysis).
N/A: not applicable:
[A] TRL levels might vary in maturity among the viable suppliers.
[B] These dates might vary depending on the viable supplier and refer
to the original acquisition approach; they could be different for an
incremental approach, as resources are restructured.
[C] Multi-Access Lasercom is shown here for context only. The TSAT
program is being restructured and this technology is no longer part of
the baseline TSAT program.
[End of table]
To minimize the potential for technology development problems after the
start of product development, DOD uses an analytical tool to assess
technology maturity. This tool associates technology readiness levels
(TRL) with different levels of demonstrated performance, ranging from
paper studies to actual application of the technology in its final
form. For TSAT, the space segment contractors are using a series of
events to demonstrate and integrate the critical technologies into
subsystems and then testing to determine the extent the components
function properly together. The maturity levels of the critical
technologies for TSAT currently range from TRL 5 to 6, with the
remaining technologies needing integration testing to demonstrate
maturity. (See app. VI for a description of the TRL levels.)
According to program officials, these technologies will be demonstrated
at TRL 6 when key integration tests are completed in fiscal year 2007.
The two main tests facing the program are the second series of
integration testing on the Next Generation Processor Router and Optical
Standards Validation Suite (NGPR-2 and OSVS-2). Program officials said
that the program is using these independent tests to reduce risk by
uncovering technical problems before awarding the space segment
contract for the design and assembly of the satellites. The results of
the tests are to be assessed at the second interim program review
before DOD makes a decision to enter the product development phase of
the program. At the time of this report, results from the first series
of integration tests were unavailable.
DOD Taking Steps to Lower Program Risk but Additional Knowledge Needed
Before Product Development:
DOD is taking positive steps to lower TSAT program risk, but additional
knowledge is needed before entering product development. DOD is
separating its technology development efforts from product development,
continuing to conduct program reviews before making key decisions,
reducing program complexity by staggering the awards on its ground and
space segment contracts, and incorporating knowledge-based metrics in
software development. Additionally, DOD is reducing risks in technology
development efforts by leveraging decades of knowledge on heritage
systems and using independent integration tests to demonstrate the
maturity of critical technologies. Despite these efforts, DOD faces
gaps in knowledge that could hamper successful outcomes. As DOD
implements an incremental approach for the TSAT program, it has yet to
justify the TSAT investment in light of other DOD investments using the
knowledge it has now gained.
Efforts Under-Way Reduce Program Risk:
DOD is reducing TSAT program risk in the following ways:
* Separating technology and product development--DOD is separating
technology development from product development and plans to prove that
all critical technologies will work as intended before the TSAT program
enters product development in 2007. In the past, DOD has not
successfully implemented acquisition best practices in its space
programs to reduce risks and increase the likelihood of better
outcomes, particularly in some of its larger and more complex programs.
We previously reported that DOD could curb its tendency to over-promise
the capabilities of a new system and to rely on immature technologies
in part by separating technology development from product development
(system integration and system demonstration).[Footnote 5] According to
program officials, the TSAT program will not start building the TSAT
system until all critical technologies needed for the system to satisfy
user requirements are mature, ensuring a clear demarcation between the
two phases of system development. This approach better enables decision
makers to determine if a match exists between TSAT requirements and
available resources (time, technology, capacity, and funding).
* Conducting program reviews--DOD plans to continue conducting reviews
of the TSAT program at key milestones to reduce program risk. DOD's
space acquisition policy requires that program managers hold milestone
reviews or independent program assessments as a program is nearing key
decision points. Following this guidance, the TSAT program's
acquisition schedule requires the program manager to assess program
knowledge at specific points. The next major milestone is scheduled for
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007, when the program will hold an
interim program review to assess the program's readiness to proceed
into the product development phase. Importantly, this review will
include an assessment of the maturity levels of the critical
technologies. Part of this review will involve the use of independent
cost estimators as a way to develop an unbiased, consistent, and
objective total cost estimate for the program.
* Reducing ground and space segment complexity--DOD has lessened the
likelihood of problems in development by reducing the complexity of the
program. Specifically, according to program officials, the contract for
ground-based network operations was awarded before the space segment
contract so that the competing space segment contractors could work
toward a stable and more mature network design. In January 2006, DOD
awarded a TMOS contract worth $2 billion to Lockheed Martin Integrated
Systems and Solutions to start developing the overall network
architecture and TMOS. Awarding this contract first will allow the
competing space contractors to focus their satellite designs on a
single architecture and mission operations system, thereby reducing
program complexity.
* Incorporating software best-practices--Our review of the development
plans for the software-intensive TMOS segment that is to interface with
other networks like the GIG shows that DOD is also incorporating best
practices in this area to mitigate program risks. Our previous work has
identified and reported on three fundamental management strategies that
are best practices for software development: (1) implementing an
evolutionary approach, (2) following disciplined development processes,
and (3) collecting and analyzing meaningful metrics to measure
progress.[Footnote 6] First, the evolutionary approach includes setting
requirements, establishing a stable design, writing code, and testing.
Second, successful acquisitions require that developers demonstrate
they have acquired the right knowledge before proceeding to the next
development phase. Finally, metrics such as costs, schedule, size of a
project, performance requirements, testing, defects, and quality
provide evidence that the developer has acquired appropriate knowledge
in moving from one phase to another. Although DOD's software
acquisition plans may incorporate these best practices, the potential
for cost and schedule increases because of unforeseen software
complexity is inherent in the development of a large quantity of
software, as is needed for TSAT. To manage this risk, program officials
stated that extensive and fully funded mitigation plans are in place
and that the network contractor will be held to the best practices
through program oversight and reporting.
Heritage Technologies and Independent Tests Reduce Program Risk:
To reduce risk while developing the critical technologies for TSAT, DOD
is leveraging decades of existing knowledge from heritage systems. For
TSAT to be successful, DOD will have to integrate technologies that
have been proven to work in other space systems, but now must be
integrated into a single communication system. Officials at MIT's
Lincoln Laboratory, who are responsible for the independent testing and
verification of TSAT technologies, stated that there are no fundamental
discoveries or breakthroughs involved with developing TSAT. Rather, the
enabling technologies build upon architectures and technologies
developed across decades of space programs or experiments. However,
officials at the Aerospace Corporation who are working closely with the
TSAT program stated that there are risks involved in using heritage
technologies--primarily integration risks--because the technologies
must still be tested and evaluated to determine if they will work
together as intended. The three main TSAT enabling technologies are
onboard signal processing, networking, and laser communications. See
table 2 below for a list of the critical technologies and a description
of their purposes.
Table 2: TSAT Critical Technologies and Their Purposes:
Critical technology: Communication-on-the move antenna;
Purpose: Provide satellite to ground link using a 1-foot antenna for
mobile assets.
Critical technology: Packet Processing Payload;
Purpose: Convert incoming analog radio signals into an Internet-like
packet of digital data and then interpret the header on the data and
pick the correct Internet-like address that is to receive the data
packet.
Critical technology: Bandwidth Efficient Modulation (extended data rate
plus: XDR+);
Purpose: Provide a set of radio frequency waveforms to transfer data
from the satellite.
Critical technology: Dynamic Bandwidth and Resource Allocation;
Purpose: Algorithm used to choose which radio frequency waveform (XDR+)
to use, depending on what speed the data need to be sent;
determined by such factors as environmental conditions on the ground
(e.g., urban, desert, trees, etc.)
Critical technology: Information Assurance (transmission security:
TRANSEC);
Purpose: TRANSEC algorithms and keys that provide transmitted signal
cover to avoid detection, identification, and exploitation (such as
traffic analyses.)
Critical technology: Information Assurance (high-assurance IP
encryptor: HAIPE);
Purpose: Inline Network Encryptor devices to protect user data.
Critical technology: Single-access lasercom;
Purpose: Use of a single telescope, optical module, high-power optical
power amplifier, and modem to transport data along a laser carrier from
one location to another.
Source: Air Force (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
TSAT is building upon the onboard signal processing developments in
military satellite communications that started in the mid-1970s. These
developments initially focused on providing highly robust
communications, but over time have evolved to increased capacity and
bandwidth, as well as enhanced efficiency. For example, the Lincoln
Experimental Satellites (LES) 8 and 9, Milstar I and II, and Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system have verified the onboard
processing capabilities that will be used in TSAT.
According to officials at the Lincoln Laboratory, much of the required
technology for the network services for TSAT comes directly from the
ground-based Internet. Further, TSAT is building on the successful
achievements of previous space programs like DOD's Milstar and AEHF
satellites, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)
Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS), and the Spaceway
and Astrolink satellites from the commercial sector.[Footnote 7] In
addition to space-based signal processing, the TSAT satellites will use
packet routing in space, faster data transmission, and Internet-like
data transmission formats to produce the networking capability to
extend worldwide network services to the user.
TSAT will use high-rate laser communications to connect TSAT satellites
into a global network and to provide readout from other space-and air-
borne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (SISR/AISR)
assets. According to Lincoln Laboratory officials, many of the needed
components for TSAT's laser communications are versions from commercial
optical networking. A series of three systems developed by Lincoln
Laboratory (Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES) 8 and 9, Laser
Intersatellite Transmission Experiment (LITE) and LITE-2, and GeoLITE)
have and continue to demonstrate laser capabilities needed for TSAT.
Moreover, recent programs like Lincoln Laboratory's Airborne Lasercom
Experiment (ALEX) are providing knowledge about how TSAT's laser
communications can be used to support AISR assets, and DOD's Airborne
Laser (ABL) is helping scientist to characterize certain limits of
laser capabilities in atmospheric conditions, according to the
officials. Appendixes III through V further highlight the history of
the technology heritage being applied to TSAT.
Remaining Gaps in Knowledge Could Hamper Successful Outcomes:
Despite these positive steps to lower program risks, DOD faces gaps in
knowledge, as it begins to implement its new development approach, that
could impede TSAT's success. In 2006, DOD directed the program to
follow an incremental development approach, changing the contents of
the program. Under this approach, the program will deliver less
capability in the first two satellites, and then more advanced
capabilities as technologies mature and are incorporated into the
remaining satellites. DOD has not fully assessed the value of the TSAT
investment in light of major changes to the program.
Historically, many new development programs in DOD have sought to
quickly gain the latest capabilities,[Footnote 8] but because the
technologies were not mature enough to make such leaps, programs were
often in development for years while engineers continued to develop and
mature the needed technologies. This increased both the time and cost
required to develop the systems. An incremental approach, on the other
hand, reduces risks by introducing less new content and technology into
a design and development effort. The incremental approach for TSAT
allows more time for the development of higher-performing capabilities,
thereby potentially increasing the level of confidence in the launch
date of the first satellite, planned for 2014. High-level DOD officials
have agreed to these reduced capabilities up front, so the TSAT program
now plans to deliver satellites that meet user requirements in an
evolutionary manner.
Notwithstanding the approval for the revised TSAT program from senior
DOD officials, DOD has yet to justify the TSAT investment in light of
other DOD investments using the knowledge it has now gained on cost,
schedule, and initial capabilities to be delivered. For example, TSAT's
cost estimate has increased and the initial satellites will be less
capable than originally expected. Furthermore, it is imperative, given
the recent changes to the program, that DOD work with the TSAT user
community to update requirements to ensure the timely delivery of
promised capabilities. Finally, it does not appear that DOD has
completely addressed all the unknowns concerning the relationship
between TSAT and two of DOD's other expensive and complex systems,
namely the GIG and Space Radar. For example, work still remains in
finalizing the requirements for these systems and understanding how the
incrementally developed TSAT will satisfy the needs.
Conclusions:
DOD has taken action to put itself in position to prove out critical
technologies before initiating satellite development--an approach not
typically seen in DOD's space programs. DOD has taken further action to
reduce program risk by changing to an incremental development approach.
While this approach will reduce the capability of the first two
satellites, it is a positive step in reducing program risk because the
program will gain additional technical knowledge before integrating the
more advanced technologies into the satellites. Even though DOD is
taking such positive steps, TSAT is still expected to be one of the
most ambitious, expensive, and complex space systems ever built. TSAT
is being designed to transform military communication using Internet-
like and laser capabilities--key integrations risks. Other weapon
systems are to interface with it and will be highly dependent on it for
their own success. While DOD is planning to undertake new systems, such
as TSAT, broader analyses of the nation's fiscal future indicate that
spending for weapon systems may need to be reduced, rather than
increased, given the constrained fiscal environment. Given these
challenges and fiscal realities, it is prudent for DOD to reexamine the
value and progress of TSAT before committing to building the full
constellation of communication satellites.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
* To improve DOD's transition to transformational communications by
gaining the additional knowledge it needs before TSAT enters product
development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of the Air Force to take the following four actions:
* Reassess the value of TSAT in the broader context of other DOD
investments, using updated knowledge on likely cost, schedule,
technology, and initial capability;
* Update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user community;
* Prove that all critical technologies will work as intended; and:
* Establish new cost, schedule, and performance goals for the program
once the above knowledge has been gained.
Agency Comments:
* We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD
concurred with our recommendations and provided detail comments, which
we have incorporated where appropriate. DOD's letter is reprinted as
appendix II.
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of the Air Force, and interested congressional
committees. We will also provide copies to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available on the GAO website at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to the report are
Arthur Gallegos, Assistant Director, Tony Beckham, Noah B. Bleicher, G.
Martin Campbell, Sharron Candon, Claire Cyrnak, Maria Durant, and Hai
V. Tran.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) progress toward achieving
cost, schedule and performance goals for the Transformational Satellite
Communications System (TSAT), we collected and reviewed (1) budget and
expenditure plans, (2) acquisition planning documents, and (3)
technology and readiness information to determine if the program was
meeting its original goals. We compared changes in cost and schedule to
original estimates and evaluated DOD's plans for maturing the critical
technologies against best practice standards to determine if they will
sufficiently mature when DOD plans to start product development. We
discussed this information with DOD officials in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Crystal City,
Virginia; National Security Space Office, Chantilly, Virginia; Space
and Missiles Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California;
and with officials at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Lincoln Laboratory, Boston, Massachusetts; and the Aerospace
Corporation, El Segundo, California.
To determine if the TSAT program is using an acquisition approach that
will provide the knowledge it needs to proceed to product development,
we collected and reviewed documents that described the TSAT program's
plans to build knowledge and to mitigate risks. We reviewed detailed
documents related to capabilities, schedule, funding, and technology
development for the revised acquisition strategy. We considered DOD's
current knowledge-building activities against DOD and GAO studies that
discuss acquisition problems and associated challenges with acquisition
programs--including work on best practices in weapon system development
that we have conducted over the past decade. We analyzed the extent to
which the TSAT program is using a knowledge-based approach to
technology and product development. To do this, we focused on the
whether the new acquisition approach will meet user requirements and
match those needs to resources. We discussed DOD plans and efforts to
meet user's needs with DOD officials in the Military Satellite
Communication Joint Program Office, Los Angeles Air Force Base,
California; Directorate of Space Acquisition, Office of the Under
Secretary of the Air Force, Arlington, Virginia; and Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration),
Arlington, Virginia.
We performed our work from August 2005 through March 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
6000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-6000:
May 16, 2006:
Networks And Information Integration:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan,
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-06-537, "DOD Needs
Additional Knowledge as it Embarks on a New Approach for
Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) System," dated April
24, 2006 (GAO Code 120478). The attached enclosure addresses some
specific comments and observations made in the report. Below is our
response to the GAO recommendations.
The Department agrees with all four GAO recommendations. The GAO report
and recommendations are consistent with the measures taken by the
Department to restructure the TSAT Program subsequent to the department-
wide review during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The lower
risk Block strategy that resulted from the QDR assessment and close
scrutiny of TSAT is consistent with the GAO review and recommendations,
and in a broad sense, uses the GAO knowledge point model continually
along the life of a program.
As part of the TSAT program requirements and acquisition oversight, and
in preparation for the next acquisition Key Decision Point (KDP), the
DOD will update requirements in coordination with the TSAT user
community, demonstrate the maturity of all critical technologies, and
establish new cost, schedule, and performance goals-GAO recommendations
two, three and four respectively. These measures are an inherent part
of the requirements of National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-
01.
With regards to GAO's first recommendation, to "reassess the value of
TSAT using updated knowledge on likely cost, schedule, technology and
initial capability," the Department completed a thorough assessment as
part of 2005 QDR. The QDR deliberative processes that resulted in the
TSAT Block Build approach reasserted the value of TSAT. The block
strategy was vetted through and ultimately approved by all DOD
stakeholders including all Services, the Combatant Commanders, and the
Intelligence Community. It included a thorough review of military
satellite communications capability with particular emphasis on the
TSAT program and leveraged:
multiple, independent, in-depth reviews. The QDR assessed the TSAT
program in terms of cost, schedule, risk and capabilities and validated
the restructured program as the best way to meet warfighter
requirements. Another in-depth review will be accomplished prior to KDP-
B, currently scheduled for September 2007. In addition to the in- depth
program assessment, the KDP-B decision will incorporate the knowledge
gained from the System Design Review, completion of technology
maturity, and incorporate any other new knowledge gained post-QDR
before establishing the program baseline.
One of the findings during QDR and a key element of the Block strategy
included rescinding the January 2004 KDP decision to enter into the
Preliminary Design Phase (Phase B). Although the TSAT program continues
to proceed according to plan, when viewed in conjunction with the 2004
revised space acquisition framework, which is consistent with the GAO
knowledge point model, TSAT's current activities fall squarely within
the Concept Development phase (Phase A). This adjustment included
rescinding the previously established baseline. The new baseline will
be established once the appropriate knowledge is gained per space
acquisition policy.
A final comment regarding the GAO report merits visibility. The overall
system performance goals of TSAT were not changed during the
restructure and new block strategy. Although the initial two satellites
(Block 1) may have less capability, the latter satellites (Block 2)
will have more capability, for an overall constellation that meets the
original warfighter requirements. Block 1 should not be viewed as a
stand alone system; Block 1 is a stepping stone to the full TSAT
capability that reduces program risk while increasing delivery schedule
confidence. TSAT is still meeting the performance goals as originally
set, and the Block strategy will include continual involvement of the
user community.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report. We
look forward to working with you again.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Ronald C. Jost:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
(C3, Space and Spectrum):
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report 06-537:
"DOD Needs Additional Knowledge as it Embarks on a New Approach for
Transformational Satellite Communications System" (U):
Department Of Defense Detailed Comments (U):
(U) The following is a detailed review of the GAO report on TSAT, with
specific explanations of DoD's concerns.
1. (U) Highlights, paragraph l, and Results in Brief, paragraph 3,
state: "We are recommending that DOD: (I) reassess the value of TSAT
using updated knowledge on likely cost, schedule, technology, and
initial capability. " And Recommendations, paragraph 1, states: ".we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of
the Air Force to: Reassess the value of TSAT using updated knowledge on
likely cost, schedule, technology, and initial capability,-. "
(U) DOD seniors scrutinized the TSAT program during the 2005
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). They reassessed TSAT's value using
the latest cost, schedule, and technology data. QDR membership included
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Service Vice Chiefs (who also serve
on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council). Additionally, the TSAT
Users Forum, with all COCOMS and Services represented, accepted the
block TSAT acquisition approach. The TSAT Program Office and the TSAT
Users Forum are now performing detailed trades to settle on the
specific performance capabilities of the block TSATs.
2. (U) What GAO Found, paragraph l, and Results in Brief, page 2,
paragraph 1, both state: "The Department is not meeting original cost,
schedule and performance goals. " and DOD Not Meeting Original TSAT
Goals, page 5, paragraph 1, states, "DOD is not meeting its original
cost, schedule, and performance goals for the TSAT program. "
(U) As noted on Page 6, "After DOD set its initial goals for TSAT,
Congress twice funded the program at levels below DOD's request .
because ofconcerns about the state oftechnical maturity for key
subsystems and an aggressive schedule for acquisition." Per
Congressional direction, the TSAT Program Office lengthened the TSAT
schedule. As a direct result, program completion costs increased. The
Program Office also completed studies on cost, schedule, and
performance goals during the fall of 2005. Mr. Thomas Young and Gen
(ret) Tom Moorman, who served on the 2003 Young Panel to assess the
"Acquisition of National Security Space Programs" also completed an
independent assessment of the program and provided constructive
feedback. Congressional guidance and these analyses led the Program
Office to baseline the QDR-approved block build cost, schedule, and
incremental performance goals. With respect to the performance goals,
the full, five-satellite constellation's goals have not changed; they
remain the same as originally captured in the warfighter's Key
Performance Parameters.
3. (U) What GAO Found, paragraph 2, states: ".DOD has yet to reevaluate
its investment in light of the knowledge it has now gained. " Results
in Brief, paragraph 2, states: ".DOD has yet to justify the TSAT
investment in light of the knowledge it has now gained. " And DOD
Taking Steps to Lower Program Risk but Additional Knowledge Needed
Before Product Development, page 9, paragraph 1, states: "As DOD
implements an incremental approach for the TSAT program, it has yet to
justify the TSAT investment in light of the knowledge it has now
gained." And Remaining Gaps in Knowledge Could Hamper Successful
Outcomes, page 13, paragraph 3, states: "DOD has not fully assessed the
value of the TSAT investment in light of major changes to the program."
(U) As stated in (1) above, DOD reevaluated its investment in TSAT
during the fall 2005 QDR process. That said, we acknowledge we will
incorporate additional knowledge gained through continued technology
development. For example, this will include the findings collected
during the Optical Standards Validation Suite Demonstration 2 (OSVS-2)
and Next Generation Processor Router Demonstration 2 (NGPR-2),
scheduled to run from November 2006 through February 2007.
4. (U) DOD Not Meeting Original TSAT Goals, page 5, paragraph 1,
states: "DOD developed the initial goals with limited knowledge, when
almost all of the critical technologies had yet to be proven to work as
intended. As a result, the goals were unreliable." And Initial Goals
for TSAT Were Based on Limited Knowledge, page 7, paragraph 2, states:
".DOD started the program with only one of the seven critical
technologies mature."
(U) The original TSAT goals were not unreliable; they were developed
based on the confident expectation that the critical technologies would
mature on a reasonable schedule. As previously noted, Page 6 of the GAO
report states, "After DOD set its initial goals for TSAT, Congress
twice funded the program at levels below DOD's request. because of
concerns about the state of technical maturity for key subsystems and
an aggressive schedule for acquisition." Within the program's
Congressionally-directed budget reductions, the driving TSAT
technologies continue to make solid progress. In traditional space
acquisitions, critical technologies are expected to achieve Technical
Readiness Level (TRL) 6 by system preliminary design review (FY09 for
TSAT). For the TSAT program, all critical technologies are currently at
no less than TRL 5, and all are projected to be at TRL 6 by system
design review in FY07, nearly two years ahead of typical programs.
5. (U) Initial Goals for TSAT Were Based on Limited Knowledge, page 6,
paragraph 1, states: "The program recently was directed to develop a
new total acquisition cost estimate at a higher level of confidence-
which could further increase the estimated cost to complete the
program."
(U) While the use of a higher confidence cost estimate does increase
the estimated cost of a program, it is important to note that use of
such an estimate has no negative impact on actual cost of the program.
In fact, use of a. higher confidence cost estimate, as recommended to
Congress by the Young Panel, is aimed at decreasing actual program
cost, risk, and schedule by affording DOD the flexibility to
proactively address potential and incipient problems through a priori
planning for the timely application of management reserve.
6. (U) Remaining Gaps in Knowledge Could Hamper Successful Outcomes,
page 14, paragraph 2, states: "Finally, it does not appear that DOD has
completely addressed important questions about how DoD's other systems
and programs, including such expensive and complex systems as the GIG
and Space Radar, will be affected by an initially less capable TSAT
system.
(U) The TSAT block build approach still meets all user Key Performance
Parameters. It is true that there are unknowns concerning the
relationship between TSAT and the terrestrial portion of the GIG and
TSAT and Space Radar; as one would expect with programs at the early
stages of development. However, the issues that exist now are the same
ones that existed prior to the TSAT block build restructure. Both the
GIG and Space Radar are still working through their requirements, to
better establish their communications needs. In each program, the TSAT
community is completely engaged, participating in forums such as the
GIG Net Centric Implementation Documents development activities, the
Transformational Communications Architecture version 2.0 update, and a
National Security Space Office (LASSO)-led study of Space Radar
communications solutions. Work remains in fleshing out the requirements
and understanding how the TSAT block build contributes towards their
satisfaction. The:
TSAT MJPO remains committed to supporting these efforts, and OASD/NII
is engaged to ensure this cross program communication remains robust.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Onboard Signal Processing Technology Heritage:
Time frame: Mid-1970s;
Program title: Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES) 8 and 9;
Purpose/mission: First satellites to use onboard signal processing,
spread spectrum techniques (frequency hopping) to demonstrate protected
military satellite communications, and radio frequency (RF) crosslink
capability;
Relevance to TSAT: Onboard signal processing; spread spectrum satellite
communications; and satellite- to-satellite crosslinks.
Time frame: Mid-Late 1980s;
Program title: Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM) EHF
Packages: FEP;
Purpose/mission: Built by MIT Lincoln Laboratory and hosted on the
operational FLTSATCOM satellites 7 and 8 (built by TRW). These packages
provided the first satellite communications at extremely high frequency
(EHF) on the uplink and super high frequency (SHF) on the downlink;
Relevance to TSAT: Multichannel onboard signal processing; EHF/SHF
spread spectrum satellite communications; and onboard control for
circuit switching.
Time frame: Early 1990s;
Program title: Milstar I;
Purpose/mission: Satellites provided the first strategic/tactical
operational satellite using the EHF/SHF. Satellites also provided
narrower spot beam coverage and electronically agile beam coverage to
provide enhanced service to small, dispersed user terminals;
Relevance to TSAT: Combined strategic/tactical service at EHF, narrow
beam antenna coverage, electronically steered antenna coverage;
and intersatellite crosslinks.
Time frame: Late 1990s;
Program title: Milstar II;
Purpose/mission: Satellites provided enhanced capacity and protection
through the addition of a medium data rate (MDR) payload through narrow
spot beam antennas. Satellite capacity was more than 10 times greater
than Milstar I;
Relevance to TSAT: Extension of EHF waveform to higher rates. improved
protection via active antenna discrimination (nulling).
Time frame: 2005;
Program title: Advanced EHF (AEHF);
Purpose/mission: The Advanced EHF (AEHF) system provides a further
increase in the capability of EHF satellite communications by
increasing both the total satellite throughput by another factor of 10
and by increasing the data rate available to individual terminals. The
extended data rate (XDR) waveform supports data rates from 75 to
8,192,000 bytes per second for individual terminals;
Relevance to TSAT: Binary bandwidth efficient waveforms for EHF,
improved support for small terminals, and onboard processing
technologies for increased satellite throughput.
Source: MIT Lincoln Laboratory.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Networking Technology Heritage:
Time frame: 1980s;
Program title: Milstar and AEHF;
Purpose/mission: The Milstar satellites were the first satellite
payloads to use onboard processing and onboard switching of user
signals. The AEHF system further developed space-based signal
processing technology, providing more capacity and higher data rates;
Relevance to TSAT: Space-based signal processing;
quickly reconfigurable circuit setup, teardown, and switching;
packet-over-circuit transmission to/from geosynchronous orbit.
Time frame: 1990s;
Program title: NASA Advanced Communications Technology Satellite
(ACTS);
Purpose/mission: This satellite produced many important studies of
networking protocol behavior (such as Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol: TCP/IP) in a combined space and terrestrial
environment;
Relevance to TSAT: Provided performance measurements for IP, and
increased the class payload processing rate to more than 100 megabytes
per second.
Time frame: 2000s;
Program title: Spaceway and Astrolink;
Purpose/ mission: These are the first satellites designed to perform
packet switching in space. The Astrolink system was never launched
because of a sudden market downturn in the telecommunications industry.
However, the first payload was essentially completed before market
conditions caused cancellation of the deployment. The first Spaceway
satellite is now onorbit and operational, and launch of the second is
planned in the near future;
Relevance to TSAT: Lessons include how to build packet processing and
routing hardware and software for use in space in the gigabytes per
second data rate class.
Source: MIT Lincoln Laboratory.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Lasercom Technology Heritage:
Time frame: 1975;
Program title: Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES) 8 and 9;
Purpose/mission: The LES-8/9 satellites built by Lincoln Laboratory in
the mid-1970's were originally slated to use lasercom crosslinks. The
development of these crosslinks was impaired by the lack of an industry
base for the necessary optical components and was abandoned in favor of
RF links;
Relevance to TSAT: Development of a fiber-based architecture, and use
of space-qualified commercial fiber- optic components.
Time frame: 1980s-1990s;
Program title: LITE and LITE-2;
Purpose/ mission: The LITE lasercom terminal developed by Lincoln
Laboratory was able to capitalize on commercial parts to leverage its
large-scale production processes. In the early 1990s, as commercial
fiber optic components became available, the LITE-2 terminal was
developed. It used a new fiber-based architecture with remote optics.
The ability to remote the telescope and other free space optics from
the High Power Optical Amplifier and modem dramatically simplifies
spacecraft integration;
Relevance to TSAT: Telescope, optical module, fiber-based high power
optical amplifier, modem, and high-rate lasercom.
Time frame: Late 1990s;
Program title: GeoLITE;
Purpose/mission: Built in the late 1990's by Lincoln Laboratory and
flown aboard a Northrop- Grumman (TRW) satellite. The GeoLITE
experiment (launched in 2001) used the fiber-based architecture
developed under the LITE-2 program. The lasercom payload continues to
send telemetry from critical subsystems that provide insight into the
lifetime of optical components in space;
Relevance to TSAT: Same as in LITE and LITE-2, demonstrating all of the
capabilities needed for the TSAT mission.
Time frame: 2000s;
Program title: Airborne Lasercom Experiment (ALEX);
Purpose/mission: ALEX, built by Lincoln Laboratory, successfully
demonstrated the capabilities necessary for air-space lasercom;
Relevance to TSAT: While ALEX focused on the airborne terminal, it
demonstrated an understanding of the channel that is relevant to TSAT
lasercom AISR support.
Time frame: 2000s;
Program title: Airborne Laser (ABL) program;
Purpose/mission: The ABL program has performed numerous experiments
characterizing the propagation of optical wavefronts through various
airborne environments. These data are relevant to the TSAT Air-Space
link;
Relevance to TSAT: Atmospheric and airborne platform boundary
characterizations.
Source: MIT Lincoln Laboratory.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology Readiness Level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware/Software: None (Paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration Environment: None.
Technology Readiness Level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware/ Software: None (Paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration Environment: None.
Technology Readiness Level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/ or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware/Software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale
individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration Environment: Lab.
Technology Readiness Level: 4. Component and/ or breadboard. Validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware/Software: Low fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach
suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration Environment: Lab.
Technology Readiness Level: 5. Component and/ or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic Technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
integration of components;
Hardware/Software: High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc.)
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of
several components with reasonably realistic support elements/
subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration Environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology Readiness Level: 6. System/ subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational;
environment;
Hardware/Software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit and
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and;
realistic supporting; elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full
functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration Environment: High-fidelity lab; demonstration or limited/
restricted flight; demonstration for a relevant environment;
Integration of technology is well defined.
Technology Readiness Level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an
operational environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a
test bed aircraft;
Hardware/Software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/ subsystems to
demonstrate full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration Environment: Flight demonstration in representative
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology Readiness Level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware/Software: Flight qualified hardware;
Demonstration Environment: DT&E in the actual system application.
Technology Readiness Level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware/Software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration Environment: OT&E in operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration data.
[End of table]
FOOTNOTES
[1] At the time of this report, the 2005 end-of-year cost data and a
new program baseline were unavailable.
[2] DOD originally estimated the TSAT program cost using a 50 percent
confidence level, which meant that the program had a 50 percent chance
of being completed under or over budget. DOD is changing to an 80
percent confidence level in its next estimate which should result in a
higher, more accurate, program cost estimate.
[3] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Radar Effort Needs
Additional Knowledge before Starting Development, GAO-04-759
(Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004).
[4] See GAO, Space Acquisitions: Committing Prematurely to the
Transformational Satellite Program Elevates Risks for Poor Cost,
Schedule, and Performance Outcomes, GAO-04-71R (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
4, 2003).
[5] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed In Space Systems
Acquisition Policy to Optimize Growing Investment in Space, GAO-04-253T
(Washington D.C.: July 12, 2005); and GAO, Military Space Operations:
Planning, Funding, and Acquisition Challenges Facing Efforts to
Strengthen Space Control, GAO-02-738 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,
2002).
[6] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are
Needed to Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions, GAO-04-
393 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004).
[7] Although the Astrolink system was never launched, the first payload
was essentially complete before the launch was canceled.
[8] See GAO, Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being
Adopted, but Risks Remain, GAO-03-441 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2003).
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