DOD Personnel Clearances
Questions and Answers for the Record Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security Clearance Process
Gao ID: GAO-06-693R June 14, 2006
On November 9, 2005, GAO testified before Congress at a hearing on "Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process, Part II." This letter responds to three questions for the record posed by Congress.
We will continue to assess and monitor the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program, including DOD's progress in meeting the goals and objectives outlined in the governmentwide plan. At this time, we have no ongoing or future work that would assess whether the federal intelligence community is meeting the goals and objectives of the government's plan. We are currently reviewing the timeliness and completeness of DOD's and the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) processes used to determine whether industry personnel are eligible to hold a top secret clearance. We will report that information to Congress this fall. Also, our standard steps of monitoring programs on our high-risk list require that we evaluate the progress that agencies make toward being removed from GAO's high-risk list. Finally, we continuously monitor our recommendations to agencies to determine whether active steps are being taken to overcome program deficiencies. We have been encouraged by the commitment that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and OPM have demonstrated in the development of a governmentwide plan to address clearance-related problems. Also, the OMB Deputy Director met with GAO officials to discuss OMB's general strategy for addressing the problems that led to our high-risk designation for DOD's clearance program. We are concerned about whether such progress will continue since Executive Order No. 13381 has not been extended and no other office has begun to assume that leadership role for the period after the order expires on July 1, 2006. While OPM has provided some leadership in assisting OMB with the development of the governmentwide plan, OPM may not be in a position to assume OMB's leadership role for a variety of reasons. OMB and OPM could enhance the transparency and likelihood that the initiatives would be continued by improving communications with clearance-process stakeholders and correcting deficiencies in the governmentwide plan. Communication problems may be limiting governmentwide efforts to improve the personnel security clearance process. Similarly, the transparency of the initiatives may be limited if the governmentwide plan is not communicated and available to all stakeholders, including investigators, adjudicators, agency and company officials needing personnel with clearances, and those seeking clearances. Also, another step in increasing the probability that the initiatives will continue into the future would be to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the initiatives by correcting previously identified deficiencies. Perseverance by the administration in implementing our recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential elements to removing DOD's program from our high-risk list and improving clearance processes governmentwide. The plan represents an important step toward addressing some long-standing concerns GAO has raised about DOD's personnel security clearance process, but much remains to be done to develop a more comprehensive plan for improving the timeliness and quality of the security clearance process. The plan did not contain details on some elements that should be in a comprehensive strategic plan. Also, while the plan establishes a wide variety of metrics to address timeliness for the investigations phase of the process, it does little to address timeliness in the adjudication phase of the process. Third, although the plan acknowledges that agencies have concerns about the quality of investigations and adjudications, the government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel security clearance process. Developing specific steps to address the general concerns that I identified in my testimony should move OMB and the executive branch agencies closer to their goal of improving the personnel security clearance process.
GAO-06-693R, DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security Clearance Process
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entitled 'DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the
Record Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the
Security Clearance Process' which was released on June 14, 2006.
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June 14, 2006:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Subject: DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record
Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security
Clearance Process:
On November 9, 2005, I testified before your subcommittee at a hearing
on "Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process, Part II."
This letter responds to three questions for the record that you posed.
The questions and my responses follow.
1. What steps will GAO take to ensure that OPM, OMB, and the federal
Intelligence Community are meeting the goals and objectives outlined in
the OPM security clearance strategic plan?
We will continue to assess and monitor the Department of Defense's
(DOD) personnel security clearance program, including DOD's progress in
meeting the goals and objectives outlined in the governmentwide plan.
At this time, we have no ongoing or future work that would assess
whether the federal intelligence community is meeting the goals and
objectives of the government's plan [Footnote 1]. We are currently
reviewing the timeliness and completeness of DOD's and the Office of
Personnel Management's (OPM) processes used to determine whether
industry personnel are eligible to hold a top secret clearance. We will
report that information to your subcommittee this fall. Also, our
standard steps of monitoring programs on our high-risk list require
that we evaluate the progress that agencies make toward being removed
from GAO's high-risk list. Finally, we continuously monitor our
recommendations to agencies to determine whether active steps are being
taken to overcome program deficiencies.
2. As you mentioned in your statement, a commitment from leadership is
a key indicator for successful implementation of any strategic plan. At
this point, do you believe that OMB and OPM have made the necessary
commitment to improve the security clearance process? What steps should
the Administration take to ensure that their security clearance
initiatives are transparent and will continue past the Bush
Administration?
We have been encouraged by the commitment that the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and OPM have demonstrated in the development of a
governmentwide plan to address clearance-related problems. Also, the
OMB Deputy Director met with GAO officials to discuss OMB's general
strategy for addressing the problems that led to our high-risk
designation for DOD's clearance program. Demonstrating strong
management commitment and top leadership support to address a known
risk is one of the requirements for removing DOD's clearance program
from GAO's high-risk list. We are concerned about whether such progress
will continue since Executive Order No. 13381 has not been extended and
no other office has begun to assume that leadership role for the period
after the order expires on July 1, 2006. While OPM has provided some
leadership in assisting OMB with the development of the governmentwide
plan, OPM may not be in a position to assume OMB's leadership role for
a variety of reasons. These reasons include (1) the governmentwide plan
lists many management challenges facing OPM and the Associate Director
of its investigation unit, such as establishing a presence to conduct
overseas investigations and adjusting the investigative workforce to
the increasing demand for clearances; (2) adjudication of personnel
security clearances and determination of which organizational positions
require such clearances are outside the current emphases for OPM; and
(3) agencies' disputes with OPM may require a high-level third party to
mediate a resolution that is perceived to be impartial.
OMB and OPM could enhance the transparency and likelihood that the
initiatives would be continued by improving communications with
clearance-process stakeholders and correcting the deficiencies in the
governmentwide plan that I outlined in my November testimony and
mention later in this correspondence. Communication problems may be
limiting governmentwide efforts to improve the personnel security
clearance process. For example, until recently, OPM had not officially
shared its investigator's handbook with DOD adjudicators. Adjudicators
raised concerns that without knowing what was required by the
investigator's handbook, they could not fully understand how
investigations were conducted and the investigative reports that form
the basis for their adjudicative decisions. Similarly, the transparency
of the initiatives may be limited if the governmentwide plan is not
communicated and available to all stakeholders, including
investigators, adjudicators, agency and company officials needing
personnel with clearances, and those seeking clearances. Also, another
step in increasing the probability that the initiatives will continue
into the future would be to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of
the initiatives by correcting previously identified deficiencies.
Perseverance by the administration in implementing our recommended
solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential
elements to removing DOD's program from our high-risk list and
improving clearance processes governmentwide.
3. Do you think that OPM's plan includes the necessary performance
goals and milestones to streamline the security clearance process in
order to get this removed from the high-risk list?
As I said in my November testimony, the plan represents an important
step toward addressing some long-standing concerns GAO has raised about
DOD's personnel security clearance process, but much remains to be done
to develop a more comprehensive plan for improving the timeliness and
quality of the security clearance process. My testimony noted that the
plan did not contain details on some elements that should be in a
comprehensive strategic plan. For example, the plan provided few
details on the discrete actions the government would take to address
problems, projected completion dates for the actions, the resources
required to accomplish the plan's objectives, or potential risks or
mitigation plans to address the risks. Also, while the plan establishes
a wide variety of metrics to address timeliness for the investigations
phase of the process, it does little to address timeliness in the
adjudication phase of the process. Third, although the plan
acknowledges that agencies have concerns about the quality of
investigations and adjudications, the government plan devotes little
attention to monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel
security clearance process. Developing specific steps to address the
general concerns that I identified in my testimony should move OMB and
the executive branch agencies closer to their goal of improving the
personnel security clearance process.
If you or other members of the subcommittee have any additional
questions about DOD's personnel security program, please contact me at
(202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this correspondence. GAO staff who made major contributions to
the correspondence are listed in the enclosure.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosure:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director;
Jerome Brown; Kurt A. Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; David Epstein; Sara
Hackley; and James P. Klein made key contributions to this
correspondence.
(350856):
Footnotes:
[1] For us to undertake such work would require the sponsorship of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. While we have the authority to do such work,
we lack the cooperation we need to get our job done in that area. As a
result, unless and until we receive such cooperation, and given GAO‘s
limited recourse, we will continue our long-standing policy of not
doing work that relates directly to intelligence matters unless
requested to do so by one of the select intelligence committees.
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