Managing Sensitive Information
DOD Can More Effectively Reduce the Risk of Classification Errors Gao ID: GAO-06-706 June 30, 2006Misclassification of national security information impedes effective information sharing, can provide adversaries with information to harm the United States and its allies, and incurs millions of dollars in avoidable administrative costs. As requested, GAO examined (1) whether the implementation of the Department of Defense's (DOD) information security management program, effectively minimizes the risk of misclassification; (2) the extent to which DOD personnel follow established procedures for classifying information, to include correctly marking classified information; (3) the reliability of DOD's annual estimate of its number of classification decisions; and (4) the likelihood of DOD's meeting automatic declassification deadlines.
A lack of oversight and inconsistent implementation of DOD's information security program are increasing the risk of misclassification. DOD's information security program is decentralized to the DOD component level, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), the DOD office responsible for DOD's information security program, has limited involvement with, or oversight of, components' information security programs. While some DOD components and their subordinate commands appear to manage effective programs, GAO identified weaknesses in others in the areas of classification management training, self-inspections, and classification guides. For example, training at 9 of the 19 components and subordinate commands reviewed did not cover fundamental classification management principles, such as how to properly mark classified information or the process for determining the duration of classification. Also, OUSD(I) does not have a process to confirm whether self-inspections have been performed or to evaluate their quality. Only 8 of the 19 components performed self-inspections. GAO also found that some of the DOD components and subordinate commands that were examined routinely do not submit copies of their security classification guides, documentation that identifies which information needs protection and the reason for classification, to a central library as required. Some did not track their classification guides to ensure they were reviewed at least every 5 years for currency as required. Because of the lack of oversight and weaknesses in training, self-inspection, and security classification guide management, the Secretary of Defense cannot be assured that the information security program is effectively limiting the risk of misclassification across the department. GAO's review of a nonprobability sample of 111 classified documents from five offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense shows that, within these offices, DOD personnel are not uniformly following established procedures for classifying information, to include mismarking. In a document review, GAO questioned DOD officials' classification decisions for 29--that is, 26 percent of the sample. GAO also found that 92 of the 111 documents examined (83 percent) had at least one marking error, and more than half had multiple marking errors. While the results from this review cannot be generalized across DOD, they are consistent with the weaknesses GAO found in the way DOD implements its information security program. The accuracy of DOD's classification decision estimates is questionable because of the considerable variance in how these estimates are derived across the department, and from year to year. However, beginning with the fiscal year 2005 estimates, OUSD(I) will review estimates of DOD components. This additional review could improve the accuracy of DOD's classification decision estimates if methodological inconsistencies also are reduced.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-706, Managing Sensitive Information: DOD Can More Effectively Reduce the Risk of Classification Errors
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2006:
Managing Sensitive Information:
DOD Can More Effectively Reduce the Risk of Classification Errors:
GAO-06-706:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-706, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Misclassification of national security information impedes effective
information sharing, can provide adversaries with information to harm
the United States and its allies, and incurs millions of dollars in
avoidable administrative costs. As requested, GAO examined (1) whether
the implementation of the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) information
security management program, effectively minimizes the risk of
misclassification; (2) the extent to which DOD personnel follow
established procedures for classifying information, to include
correctly marking classified information; (3) the reliability of DOD‘s
annual estimate of its number of classification decisions; and (4) the
likelihood of DOD‘s meeting automatic declassification deadlines.
What GAO Found:
A lack of oversight and inconsistent implementation of DOD‘s
information security program are increasing the risk of
misclassification. DOD‘s information security program is decentralized
to the DOD component level, and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), the DOD office responsible for
DOD‘s information security program, has limited involvement with, or
oversight of, components‘ information security programs. While some DOD
components and their subordinate commands appear to manage effective
programs, GAO identified weaknesses in others in the areas of
classification management training, self-inspections, and
classification guides. For example, training at 9 of the 19 components
and subordinate commands reviewed did not cover fundamental
classification management principles, such as how to properly mark
classified information or the process for determining the duration of
classification. Also, OUSD(I) does not have a process to confirm
whether self-inspections have been performed or to evaluate their
quality. Only 8 of the 19 components performed self-inspections. GAO
also found that some of the DOD components and subordinate commands
that were examined routinely do not submit copies of their security
classification guides, documentation that identifies which information
needs protection and the reason for classification, to a central
library as required. Some did not track their classification guides to
ensure they were reviewed at least every 5 years for currency as
required. Because of the lack of oversight and weaknesses in training,
self-inspection, and security classification guide management, the
Secretary of Defense cannot be assured that the information security
program is effectively limiting the risk of misclassification across
the department.
GAO‘s review of a nonprobability sample of 111 classified documents
from five offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense shows
that, within these offices, DOD personnel are not uniformly following
established procedures for classifying information, to include
mismarking. In a document review, GAO questioned DOD officials‘
classification decisions for 29”that is, 26 percent of the sample. GAO
also found that 92 of the 111 documents examined (83 percent) had at
least one marking error, and more than half had multiple marking
errors. While the results from this review cannot be generalized across
DOD, they are consistent with the weaknesses GAO found in the way DOD
implements its information security program.
The accuracy of DOD‘s classification decision estimates is questionable
because of the considerable variance in how these estimates are derived
across the department, and from year to year. However, beginning with
the fiscal year 2005 estimates, OUSD(I) will review estimates of DOD
components. This additional review could improve the accuracy of DOD‘s
classification decision estimates if methodological inconsistencies
also are reduced.
GAO also found that, without the involvement of other federal agencies,
DOD was unlikely to fully meet automatic declassification deadlines set
in Executive Order 12958, as amended. If DOD fails to complete its
review by the declassification deadlines, it risks inappropriately
declassifying information that should remain classified.
What GAO Recommends:
To reduce the risk of misclassification and improve DOD‘s information
security operations, GAO is recommending six actions, including several
to increase program oversight and accountability. In reviewing a draft
of this report, DOD concurred with GAO‘s recommendations. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we have included as appropriate.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-706].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at
(202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD'S Information Security Program Lacks Oversight and Consistent
Implementation:
Results of OSD Document Review Show Some Questionable Classification
Decisions and Numerous Marking Errors:
The Accuracy of DOD's Classification Decisions Estimate Is
Questionable:
DOD's Ability to Meet All of the Executive Order's Automatic
Declassification Deadlines Depends on the Actions of Other Federal
Agencies:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Classification Level and the Expected Impact of Unauthorized
Disclosure:
Table 2: DOD Component Training Programs for Derivative Classifiers:
Table 3: Tracking of Security Classification Guides Varies among DOD
Components:
Table 4: Required Markings on Classified Records:
Table 5: Examples of Common Marking Errors in OSD Document Sample:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD's Number of Classification Decisions Compared to Those of
Other Federal Agencies:
Figure 2: Distribution of Marking Errors Detected in OSD Document
Sample (n = 213 errors):
Figure 3: DOD Automatic Declassification Activity in Fiscal Year 2004,
as Measured by the Number of Pages Declassified:
Figure 4: Locations of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
Automatic Declassification Sites:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
ISOO: Information Security Oversight Office:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
OUSD(I): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 30, 2006:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The U. S. Government classifies information as Confidential, Secret, or
Top Secret if its unauthorized disclosure could damage the national
security of the United States.[Footnote 1] Since 1940, the
classification, safeguarding, and declassification of national security
information have been prescribed in a series of presidential executive
orders. The current order in effect, Executive Order 12958, Classified
National Security Information, as amended, defines the different
security classification levels, lists the types of information that can
be protected, and describes how to identify and mark classified
information.[Footnote 2]
According to data compiled by the Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO), the office responsible for overseeing the government's
information security program, the number of classified records in
existence is unknown because there is no requirement to account for the
majority of these records. However; during the last 5 fiscal years that
data are available (2000 through 2004), federal agencies reported that
they created about 110 million new classified records, of which the
Department of Defense (DOD) was responsible for more than half (66.8
million).[Footnote 3] The former DOD Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Counterintelligence and Security testified in 2004 in a
congressional hearing that she believed the department overclassified
information, and she estimated that 50 percent of information may be
overclassified, to include overclassification between the
classification levels. An example would be the classifying of
information as Top Secret instead of Secret. The Director of ISOO in
the same hearing testified that information that should not be
classified is increasing, in violation of the Executive Order.
According to the Director, too much classification impedes effective
information sharing, too little classification can provide adversaries
with information to harm the United States and its allies; and
misclassification in general causes the department to incur millions of
dollars in avoidable administrative costs.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the senior DOD
official responsible for the direction, administration, and oversight
of DOD's information security program.[Footnote 4] DOD's current
implementing regulation, Information Security Program, was issued in
January 1997 and augmented with interim guidance in April 2004 to
reflect changes required by Executive Order 12958, as amended. The
regulation has decentralized the management of the program to the heads
of the various DOD components.[Footnote 5] Officials from the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) told us that
they expect to publish an updated version of the Information Security
Program in 2007 to replace the 1997 edition and the interim guidance.
As requested, we examined (1) whether the implementation of DOD's
information security management program effectively minimizes the risk
of misclassification; (2) the extent to which DOD personnel follow
established procedures for classifying information, to include
correctly marking classified information; (3) the reliability of DOD's
annual estimate of its number of classification decisions; and (4) the
likelihood of DOD's meeting automatic declassification deadlines. As
part of your request that we report on DOD's information security
program, we also reported in March 2006 on the Department of Defense
and Department of Energy programs to safeguard unclassified yet
sensitive information and we will report on the status of the
Department of Energy's information security program later this
year.[Footnote 6] In similar work, we recently issued a report on the
designation of sensitive security information at the Transportation
Security Administration[Footnote 7] and a report on the executive
branch agencies' current efforts to share sensitive homeland security
information among federal and nonfederal entities, and the challenges
posed by such information sharing.[Footnote 8] Finally, we are
currently reviewing the management of both unclassified yet sensitive
information and national security information within the Department of
Justice.
To evaluate whether DOD's information security program effectively
minimizes the risk of misclassification, the reliability of DOD's
annual classification decision estimate, and the likelihood of DOD's
meeting automatic declassification deadlines, we reviewed documentation
and met with officials responsible for setting information security
policy and implementation (such as training and oversight) from the
OUSD(I) and nine DOD components and 10 of their subordinate commands.
Collectively, these nine components are responsible for about 83
percent of the department's classification decisions. We compared the
DOD components' and subordinate commands' information security policies
and practices with the Executive Order 12958, as amended; the ISOO
directive, Classified National Security Information Directive No. 1;
the DOD regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program; and other
DOD implementing guidance.
To assess adherence to procedures in the Executive Order for
classifying information, we reviewed a nonprobability sample of 111
recently classified documents prepared by five offices within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Because the total number of
classified documents held by DOD is unknown, we did not pursue a
probability sampling methodology to produce results that could be
generalized to OSD or DOD. [Footnote 9]
We conducted our work between March 2005 and February 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
more thorough description of our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
A lack of oversight and inconsistent implementation of DOD's
information security program increase the risk of misclassification.
DOD's information security program is decentralized to the DOD
component level, and the OUSD(I) has limited involvement in, and
oversight of, components' information security programs. This office
does little monitoring or evaluating of the DOD components' information
security actions. Also, while some DOD components and subordinate
commands appear to manage their programs effectively, we identified
weaknesses in other components' and subordinate commands' training,
self-inspection, and security classification guide management. For
example, all of the DOD components and subordinate commands that we
reviewed offered the compulsory initial and annual refresher training
for personnel eligible to classify documents. However, classification
management training at 8 of the 19 components and subordinate commands
we reviewed did not cover fundamental classification management
principles, such as the markings that must appear on classified
information and the process for determining the duration of
classification. Also, the OUSD(I) did not have a process to confirm
whether required self-inspections had been performed or to evaluate
their quality, and did not prescribe in detail what self-inspections
should cover. We found that only 8 of the 19 DOD components and
subordinate commands performed these required self-inspections.
Instead, more than half of the 19 performed less rigorous staff
assistance visits. We also found that some of the DOD components and
subordinate commands that we examined did not routinely submit copies
of their security classification guides, documentation which identifies
what information needs protection and the reason for classification, to
a central library as required. Some did not track their security
classification guides to ensure they were current and reviewed every 5
years as required. As a result, DOD personnel cannot be assured that
they are using the most current information to derivatively classify
documents. DOD is studying ways to improve its current approach to
making security classification guides readily available,
departmentwide. Because of the lack of oversight and weaknesses in
training, self-inspections, and classification guide management, the
Secretary of Defense cannot be assured that the information security
program is effectively limiting the risk of misclassification across
the department.
Our review of a nonprobability sample of 111 classified DOD documents
from five OSD offices shows that, within these offices, DOD personnel
are not uniformly following established procedures for classifying
information, to include correctly marking classified information.
Executive Order 12958, as amended, lists criteria for what information
can be classified, and which markings are required on classified
records. In our review of the OSD documents, we questioned DOD
officials' classification decisions for 29 documents--that is, 26
percent of the sample. The majority of our questions centered around
two problems: the inconsistent treatment of similar information within
the same document, and whether all of the information marked as
classified met established criteria for classification. We also found
that 93 of the 111 documents we examined (84 percent) had at least one
marking error, and about half had multiple marking errors. For example,
we found that 25 percent of the 111 documents had improper
declassification instructions, and 42 percent of the documents failed
to provide information about their data sources--such as the names and
dates--as required. While the results from this review cannot be
generalized across DOD, they are indications of the lack of oversight
and inconsistency that we found in DOD's implementation of its
information security program.
The accuracy of DOD's annual estimate of its number of classification
decisions is questionable. Although ISOO issues guidance on how
components should calculate their classification decisions estimate, we
found considerable variance across the department and from year to year
in how this guidance was implemented. For example, DOD components
differed in the types of information they included in the count, the
number and types of lower echelon units included in the count, and
decisions as to when to count and for how long. In fiscal year 2005,
OUSD(I) began scrutinizing the estimates of its components before
consolidating and submitting them to ISOO for inclusion in its annual
report to the President.
DOD's ability to meet all of the automatic declassification deadlines
in Executive Order 12958, as amended, depends on the actions of other
federal agencies. DOD components reported being on pace to review their
documents of permanent historical value by December 31, 2006; however,
they told us that they are unlikely to review all of the documents
referred to them by other DOD components and non-DOD agencies before
2010, and special media (such as audio and video recordings) before
2012, the dates on which these records are scheduled to be
automatically declassified. DOD's progress in reviewing records that
contain classified information belonging to other federal agencies is
hampered by the absence of a federal government standard for annotating
these records, a centralized location within DOD or the federal
government to store these records, and, a common database that federal
agencies can use to track the status of these records. DOD's ability to
remove these impediments without the involvement of other federal
agencies is limited. If DOD fails to complete its review by the
declassification deadlines, it risks inappropriately declassifying
information that should remain classified.
To reduce the risk of misclassification and improve DOD's information
security operations, we are recommending six actions, including several
to increase program oversight and accountability. In commenting on our
draft, DOD agreed with all of our recommendations. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have included as appropriate. The
department's response is reprinted in appendix II.
Background:
Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, as
amended, specifies three incremental levels of classification--
Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret--to safeguard information
pertaining to the following:
* military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
* foreign government information;
* intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence
sources/methods, cryptology;
* foreign relations/activities of the United States, including
confidential sources;
* scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national
security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
* United States government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials
or facilities;
* vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to
the national security, which includes defense against transnational
terrorism; or:
* weapons of mass destruction.
The requisite level of protection is determined by assessing the damage
to national security that could be expected if the information were
compromised (see table 1).
Table 1: Classification Level and the Expected Impact of Unauthorized
Disclosure:
Classification levels: Confidential;
Expected impact of unauthorized disclosure: Damage.
Classification levels: Secret;
Expected impact of unauthorized disclosure: Serious damage.
Classification levels: Top Secret;
Expected impact of unauthorized disclosure: Exceptionally grave
damage.
Source: Executive Order 12958, §1.2, as amended.
[End of table]
Executive Order 12958, as amended, prohibits classifying information so
as to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;
prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; restrain
competition; or prevent or delay the release of information, which does
not require protection in the interest of national security.
Classification decisions can be either original or derivative. Original
classification is the initial determination that information requires
protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national
security. An original classification decision typically results in the
creation of a security classification guide, which is used by
derivative classifiers and identifies what information should be
protected, at what level, and for how long. Derivative classification
is the incorporation, paraphrasing, or generation of information in new
form that is already classified, and marking it accordingly.[Footnote
10] In 2004, 1,059 senior-level officials in DOD were designated
original classification authorities, and as such, they were the only
individuals permitted to classify information in the first
instance.[Footnote 11] But any of the more than 1.8 million DOD
personnel who possess security clearances potentially have the
authority to classify derivatively. According to DOD, less than 1
percent of the estimated 63.8 million classification decisions the
department made during fiscal years 2000 through 2004 were original;
however, ultimately, original classification decisions are the basis
for 100 percent of derivative classification decisions.
Executive Order 12958, as amended, assigns ISOO the responsibility for
overseeing agencies' compliance with the provisions of the Executive
Order.[Footnote 12] In this capacity, ISOO (1) performs on-site
inspections of agency information security operations, (2) conducts
document reviews, (3) monitors security education and training
programs, and (4) reports at least annually to the President on the
degree to which federal agencies are complying with the Executive
Order. ISOO also issued Classified National Security Information
Directive No. 1 to implement the Executive Order.[Footnote 13] The
Executive Order and the ISOO directive stipulate a number of specific
responsibilities expected of federal agencies, including DOD. Examples
of responsibilities are promulgating internal regulations; establishing
and maintaining security education and self-inspection programs;
conducting periodic declassification reviews; and committing sufficient
resources to facilitate effective information security operations. The
Executive Order and the ISOO directive also require classifiers to
apply standard markings to classified information. For example,
originally classified records must include the overall classification
as well as portion or paragraph marking, a "Classified by" line to
identify the original classifier, a reason for classification, and a
"Declassify on" date line.
Executive Order 12958, as amended, states that information shall be
declassified when it no longer meets the standards for
classification.[Footnote 14] The point at which information generally
becomes declassified is set when the decision is made to classify, and
it is either linked to the occurrence of an event, such as the
completion of a mission, or to the passage of time. Classified records
that are more than 25 years old and have permanent historical value are
automatically declassified unless an exemption is granted because their
contents could cause adverse national security repercussions.[Footnote
15]
The Defense Security Service Academy is responsible for providing
security training, education, and awareness to DOD components, DOD
contractors, and employees of other federal agencies and selected
foreign governments. The academy's 2005 course catalog includes more
than 40 courses in general security and in specific disciplines of
information, information systems, personnel, and industrial security,
and special access program security. These courses are free for DOD
employees and are delivered by subject matter experts at the academy's
facilities in Linthicum, Maryland, and at student sites worldwide via
mobile training teams. Some courses are available through video
teleconferencing and the Internet. In fiscal year 2004, more than
16,000 students completed academy courses, continuing an upward trend
over the past 4 years.[Footnote 16]
According to ISOO, DOD is one of the most prolific classifiers
(original and derivative combined) among federal government agencies.
From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004, DOD and the Central
Intelligence Agency had individual classification activity that were
each more than all other federal agencies combined. In 3 of these 5
years, DOD's classification activity was higher than that of the
Central Intelligence Agency's (see figure 1).
Figure 1: DOD's Number of Classification Decisions Compared to Those of
Other Federal Agencies:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO's analysis of ISOO data.
[End of figure]
During these same 5 years, DOD declassified more information than any
other federal agency, and it was responsible for more than three-
quarters of all declassification activity in the federal government.
DOD's Information Security Program Lacks Oversight and Consistent
Implementation:
A lack of oversight and inconsistent implementation of DOD's
information security program are increasing the risk of
misclassification. DOD's information security program is decentralized
to the DOD component level, and OUSD(I) involvement in, and oversight
of, components' information security programs is limited. Also, while
some DOD components and subordinate commands appear to manage their
programs effectively, we identified weaknesses in others' training,
self-inspections, and security classification guide management. As a
result, we found that many of the organizations we reviewed do not
fully satisfy federal and DOD classification management requirements,
which contributes to an increased risk of misclassification.
Specifically, most of the components and subordinate commands we
examined did not establish procedures to ensure that personnel
authorized to and actually performing classification actions are
adequately trained to do so, did not conduct rigorous self-inspections,
and did not take required actions to ensure that derivative
classification decisions are based on current, readily available
documentation. According to the ISOO Director, adequate training, self-
inspections, and documentation are essential elements of a robust
information security program and their absence can impede effective
information sharing and possibly endanger national security.[Footnote
17]
OUSD(I) Oversight of DOD Classification Management Program Is Limited:
As required by Executive Order 12958, OUSD(I) issued a regulation in
January 1997, Information Security Program, outlining DOD's information
security program. This regulation does not specifically identify
oversight responsibilities for OUSD(I), but instead decentralizes the
management of the information security program to the heads of DOD
components. Consequently, according to the DOD regulation, each DOD
component is responsible for establishing and maintaining security
training, conducting self-inspections, and issuing documentation to
implement OUSD(I) guidance and security classification guides. OUSD(I)
exercises little oversight over how the components manage their
programs. As a result, OUSD(I) does not directly monitor components'
compliance with federal and DOD training, self-inspection, and
documentation requirements stipulated in Executive Order 12958, as
amended; the ISOO directive; and the DOD regulation. For example,
OUSD(I) does not require components to report on any aspects of the
security management program. Also, OUSD(I) does not conduct or oversee
self-inspections, nor does it confirm whether self-inspections have
been performed or review self-inspection findings. At the time of our
review, OUSD(I)'s involvement consisted of accompanying ISOO on
periodic inspections of select DOD components and subordinate commands
that are not under the four military services. Additionally the DOD
implementing regulation does not describe what self-inspections should
cover, such as the recommended standards in the ISOO directive.
Based on our analysis, we believe that OUSD(I)'s decentralized
approach, coupled with the lack of specificity in the department's
implementing regulation on what components must do to satisfy the
Executive Order and ISOO directive self-inspection requirement, has
resulted in wide variance in the quality of components' information
security programs.
Classification Management Training Is Inadequate to Substantially
Reduce Improper Classification Practices:
Because all cleared personnel have the authority to derivatively
classify information, they are required to have annual refresher
training, whether or not they engaged in derivative classification
actions. All of the 19 DOD components and subordinate commands we
reviewed offer initial and annual refresher training for their
personnel who are involved with derivative classification activities,
and most track attendance to ensure that the training is received, as
required by the ISOO directive and the DOD regulation (see table 2).
However, from our analysis of the components' and subordinate commands'
initial and annual refresher training, we determined that only 11 of
the 19 components and subordinate commands cover the fundamental
classification principles cited in the ISOO directive, the DOD
regulation, and specifically defined as the minimum training that
classifiers must have in a November 2004 memorandum signed by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.[Footnote 18] That is, the
training offered by 8 of the components and subordinate commands does
not describe the basic markings that must appear on classified
information, the difference between original and derivative
classification, the criteria that must be met to classify information,
and the process for determining the duration of classification.
Consequently, this training will not provide DOD with assurance that it
will reduce improper classification practices, as called for in the
ISOO directive. We also noted that 14 of the DOD components and
subordinate commands do not assess whether participants understand the
course material by administering a proficiency test.
Table 2: DOD Component Training Programs for Derivative Classifiers:
DOD components and subordinate commands: Department of the Army;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Department of the Army: Army
Intelligence and Security Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Department of the Army: Army
Materiel Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Department of the Army: Army
Research, Development, and Engineering Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: [Empty];
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Chief of Naval Operations;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: [Empty];
Classification principles adequately covered: [Empty];
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Chief of Naval Operations:
Naval Sea Systems Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: [Empty];
Classification principles adequately covered: [Empty];
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Chief of Naval Operations:
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: check.
DOD components and subordinate commands: Chief of Naval Operations:
Naval Air Systems Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: [Empty];
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Department of the Air Force;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: [Empty];
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Department of the Air Force:
Air Combat Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Department of the Air Force:
Air Force Materiel Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: [Empty];
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Department of the Air Force:
88th Air Base Wing;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: check.
DOD components and subordinate commands: Headquarters, Marine Corps;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: [Empty];
Classification principles adequately covered: [Empty];
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Headquarters, Marine Corps:
Marine Forces Atlantic;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: [Empty];
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Central Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: [Empty];
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
DOD components and subordinate commands: Special Operations Command;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: check.
DOD components and subordinate commands: National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: check.
DOD components and subordinate commands: Defense Intelligence Agency;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: check;
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: check.
DOD components and subordinate commands: National Security Agency;
Initial and annual refresher training: check;
Participant attendance tracked: [Empty];
Classification principles adequately covered: check;
Proficiency tested: [Empty].
Source: GAO's analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Components and subordinate commands that cover the classification
principles cited in the ISOO directive and the DOD regulation include:
* the Army Intelligence and Security Command, which issues the
Command's A Users Guide to the Classification and Marking of Documents
to personnel;
* the Army Materiel Command, which uses information obtained from the
Defense Security Service Academy to develop its refresher training on
marking classified records;
* the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, which requires
personnel to complete an online refresher course and pass a proficiency
test before they can print out a certificate indicating a passing
score;
* the 88th Air Base Wing, which requires personnel to attend four
quarterly briefings each year on relevant classification management
topics;
* the Special Operations Command, which developed an online refresher
course, complete with a proficiency test that must be passed to receive
credit for attending;
* the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which requires personnel
to sign an attendance card indicating that they completed initial and
annual refresher training, and issues them the agency's Guide to
Marking Documents; and:
* the Defense Intelligence Agency, which provides personnel a 13-page
reference guide that explains how to comply with Executive Order 12958,
as amended.
All of the components and subordinate commands that we examined provide
their original classification authorities with initial training,
frequently in one-on-one sessions with a security manager. However,
only about half of the components and subordinate commands we examined
provide the required annual refresher training to original
classification authorities.
DOD personnel could take better advantage of the information security
curriculum offered by the Defense Security Service Academy, including
Basic Information Security, Information Security Orientation,
Information Security Management, and Marking Classified Information.
For example, Marking Classified Information is a 2-3 hour no-cost,
online course that explains how to mark classified information in
accordance with Executive Order 12958, as amended, and requires the
person taking the course to complete and pass a proficiency test at the
end of the course. The Under Secretary's memorandum specifically
mentioned the academy and its courses as a way for the components to
facilitate their training. Our analysis of academy attendance data for
fiscal years 2003 through 2004 indicates that of the more than 1.8
million DOD personnel who possessed security clearances and potentially
had the authority to classify documents derivatively, 4,775 DOD
personnel completed an information security course, and 2,090 DOD
personnel completed the Marking Classified Information course.[Footnote
19],[Footnote 20]
Self-Inspections Lack Rigor:
Eleven of the 19 DOD components and subordinate commands we reviewed do
not perform required self-inspections as part of the oversight of their
information security programs. The ISOO directive requires agencies to
perform self-inspections at all organizational levels that originate or
handle classified information. Agencies have flexibility in determining
what to cover in their self-inspections, although ISOO lays out several
standards that it recommends DOD and other agencies consider including,
such as:
* reviewing a sample of records for appropriate classification and
proper markings;
* assessing familiarity with the use of security classification guides;
* reviewing the declassification program;
* evaluating the effectiveness of security training; and:
* assessing senior management's commitment to the success of the
program.
In its Information Security Program regulation, DOD components are
directed to conduct self-inspections based on program needs and the
degree of involvement with classified information; components and
subordinate commands that generate significant amounts of classified
information should be inspected at least annually. "Program needs,"
"degree of involvement," and "significant amounts" are not quantified,
and components and subordinate commands have interpreted these phrases
differently. For example, the Marine Corps performs self-inspections
annually; the Naval Sea Systems Command performs self-inspections every
3 years; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, does not perform
them. Navy and Army officials with whom we spoke cited resource
constraints, and, in particular, staffing shortages, as the reason why
inspections were not performed more often.
The DOD regulation's chapter on training requires DOD components to
evaluate the quality and effectiveness of security training during self-
inspections; however, none of the 19 components and subordinate
commands we examined does so. Evaluating the quality of training during
self-inspections can identify gaps in personnel's skill and
competencies, and focus efforts to improve existing training.[Footnote
21]
Ten of the 19 DOD components and subordinate commands we reviewed
perform staff assistance visits of their lower echelon units in lieu of
more rigorous self-inspections. Staff assistance visits, which
typically are not staffed by inspectors, train the visited organization
on how to meet inspection requirements, and any noted deficiencies are
informally briefed to the local command staff. However, no official
report is created for tracking and resolving deficiencies. According to
ISOO officials, staff assistance visits do not fulfill the inspection
requirement specified in Executive Order 12958, as amended. However, in
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials stated that they
were unaware of ISOO's position on staff assistance visits.
Of the 19 DOD components and subordinate commands we reviewed, only 7
conduct periodic document reviews as part of their self-inspections,
although they are required to do so. In addition to revealing the types
and extent of classification and marking errors, a document review can
offer insight into the effectiveness of annual refresher training.
DOD Has Not Taken Sufficient Action to Ensure That Derivative
Classification Decisions Are Based on Current Documentation:
DOD has no assurance that personnel who derivatively classify
information are using up-to-date security classification guides;
however, our review showed that more than half of the estimated number
of guides at the 17 organizations that could identify the number of
guides they had were tracked for currency and updated at least every 5
years. DOD's approach to providing personnel access to up-to-date
classification guides through a central library at its Defense
Technical Information Center has been ineffective. OUSD(I) is studying
ways to improve the centralized availability of up-to-date
classification guides.
Executive Order 12958, as amended, directs agencies with original
classification authority, such as DOD, to prepare security
classification guides to facilitate accurate and consistent derivative
classification decisions. Security classification guides identify what
information needs protection and the level of classification; the
reason for classification, to include citing the applicable categories
in the Executive Order; and the duration of classification. The ISOO
directive and DOD regulation also require agencies to review their
classification guides for currency and accuracy at least once every 5
years, and to update them as necessary. As table 3 shows, some DOD
components and subordinate commands did not manage their classification
guides to facilitate accurate derivative classification decisions.
Since 2 of the 19 organizations were unable to provide us with the
number of classification guides that they are responsible for, we could
not determine the total number of classification guides belonging to
the components and subordinate commands we reviewed. However, the
remaining 17 organizations estimated their combined total to be 2,243
classification guides.
Table 3: Tracking of Security Classification Guides Varies among DOD
Components:
DOD component and subordinate commands: Army;
Estimated number of guides: Unknown;
Process to track guides: Not tracked at this organizational level.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Army: Intelligence and Security
Command;
Estimated number of guides: 3;
Process to track guides: Currency of guides is tracked centrally.
Centralized library has paper and electronic copies.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Army: Army Materiel Command;
Estimated number of guides: Unknown;
Process to track guides: Not tracked at this organizational level.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Army: Research, Development,
and Engineering Command;
Estimated number of guides: 65;
Process to track guides: Currency of guides is tracked centrally in an
automated database. Some guides are available online to authorized
users.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Navy/Marine Corps[A]; Estimated
number of guides: 1,100; Process to track guides: Centralized library
has a paper copy of each guide. Currency of guides is not tracked
centrally. Automated database is under development.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Naval Sea Systems Command;
Estimated number of guides: 300;
Process to track guides: Centralized library has a paper copy of each
guide. Currency of guides is not tracked centrally. Automated database
is under development.
DOD component and subordinate commands:Navy/Marine Corps[A]: Naval
Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division;
Estimated number of guides: 0;
Process to track guides: Not applicable.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Navy/Marine Corps[A]: Naval Air
Systems Command;
Estimated number of guides: 200;
Process to track guides: Currency of guides is tracked centrally in an
automated database. Centralized library has a paper copy of each guide.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Navy/Marine Corps[A]: Marine
Forces, Atlantic;
Estimated number of guides: 0;
Process to track guides: Not applicable.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Air Force;
Estimated number of guides: 525;
Process to track guides: Effort to create electronic versions of guides
that will allow authorized users' access is ongoing. Currency of guides
is tracked centrally.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Air Force: Air Combat Command;
Estimated number of guides: 0;
Process to track guides: Not applicable.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Air Force: Air Force Materiel
Command;
Estimated number of guides: 416;
Process to track guides: Centralized library has a paper copy of each
guide. Guides are tracked centrally in an automated database. Currency
of guides not tracked.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Air Force: 88th Air Base Wing;
Estimated number of guides: 36;
Process to track guides: Currency of guides is tracked centrally in an
automated database. Centralized library has a paper or electronic copy
of each guide.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Central Command;
Estimated number of guides: 1;
Process to track guides: Electronic version of guide available to
authorized users. Currency of guide is tracked centrally.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Special Operations Command;
Estimated number of guides: 30;
Process to track guides: Centralized library has a paper copy of each
guide. Automated database is under development that will allow
authorized users to access electronic version of guides. Currency of
guides tracked centrally.
DOD component and subordinate commands: National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency;
Estimated number of guides: 10;
Process to track guides: Currency of guides is tracked, many of which
are program specific and require less frequent updating.
DOD component and subordinate commands: Defense Intelligence Agency;
Estimated number of guides: 9;
Process to track guides: Currency of guides is tracked centrally. Plan
is to create electronic version of each guide for authorized users to
access.
DOD component and subordinate commands: National Security Agency;
Estimated number of guides: 500;
Process to track guides: Currency of guides is tracked centrally. Paper
index of guides maintained.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Marine Corps security classification guides are managed by the
Navy.
[End of table]
Of the 13 components and subordinate commands we reviewed that possess
multiple classification guides:
* 10 maintain paper or electronic copies of classification guides in a
central location, or are in the process of doing so;
* 8 track the currency of more than half of their combined
classification guides to facilitate their review, to ensure that they
are updated at least every 5 years, in accordance with the ISOO
directive; and:
* 8 either have made or are in the process of making their
classification guides available to authorized users electronically.
These 8 components and subordinate commands represent over 1,700--more
than 75 percent--of the classification guides belonging to the DOD
organizations that we reviewed.
DOD's strategy for providing personnel ready access to up-to-date
security classification guides to use in making derivative
classification decisions has been ineffective for two reasons.
Officials at some of the DOD components and subordinate commands we
examined told us that they routinely submit copies of their
classification guides to the Defense Technical Information Center, as
required, while others told us they do not.[Footnote 22] However,
because of the way in which the Defense Technical Information Center
catalogs its classification guide holdings, center officials could not
tell us the names and the number of classification guides it possesses
or is missing. In addition, center officials told us that they cannot
compel original classification authorities to submit updated versions
of their classification guides or report a change in status, such as a
classification guide's cancellation. When the center receives a new
classification guide, it enters up to three independent search terms in
an electronic database to create a security classification guide index.
As of October 2005, the center had in excess of 4,000 index citations
for an estimated 1,400 classification guides, which is considerably
fewer than the estimated 2,234 classification guides that 17 of the 19
components and subordinate commands reported possessing.
The absence of a comprehensive central library of up-to-date
classification guides increases the potential for misclassification,
because DOD personnel may be relying on insufficient, outdated
reference material to make derivative classification decisions. Navy
and Air Force officials showed us evidence of classification guides
that had not been reviewed in more than five years, as the ISOO
directive and DOD regulation require. As table 3 shows, several
components and subordinate commands have taken or are taking action to
improve derivative classifiers' access to security classification
guides; however, except for the Air Force, there is no coordination
among these initiatives, and neither the Defense Technical Information
Center nor the OUSD(I) is involved. During our review, OUSD(I)
officials told us that the department is studying how to improve its
current approach to making up-to-date classification guides readily
available, departmentwide.
Results of OSD Document Review Show Some Questionable Classification
Decisions and Numerous Marking Errors:
In our review of a nonprobability sample of 111 classified OSD
documents we questioned DOD officials' classification decisions for 29
documents--that is, 26 percent of the sample. We also found that 93 of
the 111 documents we examined (84 percent) had at least one marking
error, and about half had multiple marking errors. Executive Order
12958, as amended, lists criteria for what information can be
classified, and for markings that are required to be placed on
classified records. While the results from this review cannot be
generalized across DOD, they are indications of the lack of oversight
and inconsistency that we found in DOD's implementation of its
information security program.
To determine the extent to which personnel in five OSD offices followed
established procedures for classifying information, we reviewed 111
documents recently classified by OSD, which revealed several
questionable classification decisions and a large number of marking
errors. In all, we questioned the classification decisions in 29,
comprising 26 percent of the documents in the OSD sample. The majority
of our questions pertained to whether all of the information marked as
classified met established criteria for classification (16
occurrences), the seemingly inconsistent treatment of similar
information within the same document (10 occurrences), and the apparent
mismatch between the reason for classification and the document's
content (5 occurrences). We gave the OSD offices that classified the
documents an opportunity to respond to our questions, and we received
written responses from the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense
for Policy; Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer; and for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics; regarding 17 of the 29 documents. In
general, they agreed that several of the documents in question
contained errors of misclassification. For example, we questioned the
need to classify all of the information marked Confidential or Secret
in 13 of the 17 documents. In their written responses, the three OSD
offices agreed that, in 5 of the 13 documents, the information was
unclassified, and in a sixth document the information should be
downgraded from Secret to Confidential. The OSD offices did not state
an opinion on 3 documents. We did not receive responses to our
questions from the other two OSD offices on the remaining 12 documents.
The Executive Order, ISOO directive, and DOD's regulation together
establish criteria for the markings that are required on classified
records (see table 4).
Table 4: Required Markings on Classified Records:
Marking requirement: Overall classification level of record cited;
Originally classified record: x;
Derivatively classified record: x.
Marking requirement: Portion markings present;
Originally classified record: x;
Derivatively classified record: x.
Marking requirement: "Declassify on" line completed;
Originally classified record: x;
Derivatively classified record: x.
Marking requirement: "Classified by" line completed;
Originally classified record: x;
Derivatively classified record: [Empty].
Marking requirement: Executive Order authorized "reason for"
classification cited;
Originally classified record: ; x;
Derivatively classified record: [Empty].
Marking requirement: "Derived from" line completed;
Originally classified record: [Empty];
Derivatively classified record: x.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
The documents included in our document review were created after
September 22, 2003, which is the effective date of ISOO's Classified
National Security Information Directive No. 1 and almost 6 months after
Executive Order 12958 was last amended. The ISOO directive prescribes a
standardized format for marking classified information that, according
to the directive, is binding except in extraordinary circumstances or
as approved by the ISOO Director.[Footnote 23] To implement
classification marking changes that resulted from the Executive Order
and directive, DOD issued its own interim guidance on April 16, 2004.
Our review revealed that 93 of the 111 OSD documents (84 percent) had
at least one marking error and about half of the documents had multiple
marking errors, resulting in 1.9 errors per document we reviewed. As
figure 2 shows, the marking errors that occurred most frequently
pertained to declassification, the sources used in derivative
classification decisions, and portion marking.
Figure 2: Distribution of Marking Errors Detected in OSD Document
Sample (n = 213 errors):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
The most common marking errors that we found in the OSD document
sample, by type of marking error, are listed in table 5.
Table 5: Examples of Common Marking Errors in OSD Document Sample:
Types of marking errors: Inaccurate or incomplete declassification
instructions;
Examples of marking errors:
* source not provided; therefore, unable to determine;
* discontinued exemption codes;
* formerly restricted data exempt;
* originating agency's determination required.
Types of marking errors: Inaccurate or incomplete "derived from" line;
Examples of marking errors:
* title of source document omitted;
* date of source document omitted;
* "classified by" line incorrectly inserted.
Types of marking errors: Inaccurate or incomplete portion marking;
Examples of marking errors:
* entire pages not marked;
* individual paragraphs not marked;
* section titles not marked;
* subject line not marked.
Types of marking errors: Inaccurate "reason for" classification cited;
Examples of marking errors:
* section 1.6., not section 1.4. of Executive Order cited;
* section 1.6. without a subsection cited.
Types of marking errors: Inaccurate overall classification level;
Examples of marking errors:
* not releasable to foreign nationals caveat not included in portion
markings;
* releasable to the United States of America, Canada, and the United
Kingdom caveat present in portion marking, but not included in page
marking.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Since ISOO issued its directive in September 2003, it has completed 19
classified document reviews of DOD components and subordinate
commands.[Footnote 24] The types of marking errors that ISOO reported
finding were similar to what we found among the OSD documents.
Specifically, marking errors associated with declassification, source,
and portion marking represented more than 60 percent of the errors in
both document samples.
The Accuracy Of DOD's Classification Decisions Estimate Is
Questionable:
DOD's estimate of how many classification decisions it makes each year
is of questionable accuracy. Although ISOO provides DOD components with
guidance as to how they should calculate classification decisions, we
found considerable variance within the department in how this guidance
was implemented. For example, there was inconsistency regarding which
records are included in the estimate, the number and types of lower
echelon units that are included, when to estimate, and for how long to
estimate.
ISOO requires federal agencies to estimate the number of original and
derivative classification decisions they made during the previous
fiscal year, which ISOO includes in its annual report to the President.
Agency estimates are based on counting the number of Confidential,
Secret, and Top Secret original and derivative classification decisions
during a designated time period and extrapolating an annual rate from
them. According to ISOO guidance, agencies typically count their
classification decisions during a consecutive 2-week period in each of
the four quarters of the fiscal year, for a combined total of 8 weeks.
OUSD(I) officials told us that two highly classified categories of
information, sensitive compartmented information and special access
programs, are included in the count; however, several components and
subordinate commands we examined omit these categories from their
totals. In addition, some components and subordinate commands--such as
the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering Command and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency--include e-mails in their
count, while others--such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Central Command--do not. Whether or not to include e-mails can
dramatically affect counts. For example, the National Security Agency's
classification estimate declined from 12.5 million in fiscal year 2002
to only 7 in fiscal year 2003. Agency officials attributed this
dramatic drop to e-mails being included in the totals for fiscal year
2002 and not for fiscal year 2003.
Some DOD components and subordinate commands do not query their entire
organization, to encompass all personnel who may be classifying
information. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency randomly
selects four of its eight directorates to participate, and the National
Security Agency and the Naval Air Systems Command selects only lower
echelon organizations that have an original classification authority.
As a result, these locations omit an unknown number of derivative
classification decisions. The Navy bases its annual estimate on data
covering a 2-week period from each of its major commands once per year
rather than from all of its commands, four times per year as suggested
in ISOO guidance. For example, during the first quarter, the Marine
Corps is queried, and during the second quarter, the fleet commands are
queried. Also, some of the combatant commands' service components are
not queried at all, such as the Army's component to the European
Command, the Navy's component to the Transportation Command, the Air
Force's component to the Southern Command, and the Marine Corps'
component to the Central Command. In commenting on a draft of this
report, the department correctly points out that guidance issued by
ISOO allows each component to decide who to include in its
classification decisions estimate.
The Special Operations Command and the Central Command both schedule
their counts at the end of the fiscal year; 4 consecutive weeks at the
former, and 8 consecutive weeks at the latter. Special Operations
Command officials told us that the end of the fiscal year tends to be a
slower operational period, thereby allowing more time to conduct the
data collection.
DOD components and subordinate commands convert their estimates in
different ways to project an entire year. Those that conform to the
suggested ISOO format of four 2-week counting periods a year (that is,
8 weeks) multiply their counts by 6.5 (that is, 8 weeks x 6.5 = 52
weeks). The Navy, however, multiplies each of its four separate counts
by 429 to account for all of the lower echelon units not represented in
the estimate.[Footnote 25]
Our review of DOD's submissions to ISOO of its estimated number of
classification decisions for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, revealed
several anomalies. For example, the National Reconnaissance Office
reported making more than 6 million derivative and zero original
classification decisions during this 5-year period, and the Marine
Forces, Atlantic, reported zero derivative and zero original
classification decisions during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Subsequent
conversations with Marine Forces, Atlantic, officials indicated that a
misunderstanding as to what constitutes a derivative classification
decision resulted in an underreporting for those 2 years.
Other examples of DOD component data submissions during this 5-year
time period that had either a disproportionate reporting of original
versus derivative classification decisions or a significant change in
counts from 1 year to the next include:
* DOD reported in fiscal year 2004 that, departmentwide, about 4
percent of its classification decisions were original, yet the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Joint Forces Command both
reported that more than 70 percent of their classification decisions
were original.
* DOD reported in fiscal year 2003, that departmentwide, less than 2
percent of its classification decisions were original, yet the Joint
Staff and the European Command both reported more than 50 percent of
their classification decisions were original.
* DOD reported in fiscal year 2002 that, departmentwide, less than 1
percent of its classification decisions were original, yet the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Southern Command both reported more
than 20 percent of their classification decisions were original.
* DOD reported an increase in the number of original classification
decisions during the fiscal year 2002 through 2004 period, from 37,320
to 47,238 (about a 27 percent increase), to 198,354 (about a 300
percent increase). However, during this same 3-year period, the Navy's
trend for original classification decisions was from 1,628 to 16,938
(about a 900 percent increase) to 1,898 (about a 90 percent decrease);
and the Army's trend was from 10,417 to 2,056 (about an 80 percent
decrease) to 133,791 (about a 6,400 percent increase).
DOD reported a 75 percent decrease in the total number of
classification decisions (that is, original and derivative) from fiscal
year 2002 to fiscal year 2004, yet several DOD components reported a
significant increase in overall classification decisions during this
same time period, including the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (a
20,107 percent increase), the Southern Command (1,998 percent
increase), Defense Intelligence Agency (a 1,202 percent increase), and
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (a 354 percent increase).
OUSD(I) has decided to discontinue the practice of DOD components
submitting their classification decisions estimates directly to ISOO.
Beginning with the fiscal year 2005 estimates, OUSD(I) will scrutinize
the classification decision estimates of its components before
consolidating and submitting them to ISOO. Properly conducted,
OUSD(I)'s review could improve the accuracy of these estimates, if
methodological inconsistencies are reduced.
DOD's Ability to Meet All of the Executive Order's Automatic
Declassification Deadlines Depends on the Actions of Other Federal
Agencies:
Army, Navy, and Air Force classification officials told us that the
military services are on pace to meet the target date of 2006 for
reviewing their own classified documents that qualify for automatic
declassification, and for referring records that contain classified
information belonging to other agencies to those agencies--an assertion
endorsed by ISOO in its 2004 report to the President. However, these
officials told us that they are less likely to meet the target date of
2009 for reviewing records referred to them, and of 2011 for reviewing
special media (such as audio and video recordings). DOD's ability to
satisfy the 2009 and 2011 target dates depends, to a great extent, on
the actions of other federal agencies.
We limited our review of DOD's automatic declassification program to
the four military services because, as figure 3 shows, they performed
85 percent of all the declassification within DOD in fiscal year 2004.
Figure 3: DOD Automatic Declassification Activity in Fiscal Year 2004,
as Measured by the Number of Pages Declassified:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO's analysis of ISOO data.
[End of figure]
Executive Order 12958, as amended, stipulates that on December 31,
2006, and on December 31 of every year thereafter, classified records
that are (1) at least 25 years old and (2) of permanent historical
value shall in general be automatically declassified, whether or not
they have been reviewed. The Executive Order sets a record's date of
origination as the time of original classification, and it also exempts
certain types of information from automatic declassification, such as
information related to the application of intelligence sources and
methods. The automatic declassification deadline for records containing
information classified by more than one agency, such as the Army and
the Air Force or the Army and the Central Intelligence Agency, is
December 31, 2009, and for special media it is December 31, 2011. For
the most part, only the originating agency can declassify its own
information. Consequently, if the Army discovers classified information
that was originated by the U.S. State Department, the Army must alert
the State Department and refer the information to the State Department
for resolution. The Executive Order describes special media as
microforms, motion pictures, audiotapes, videotapes, or comparable
media that make its review for possible declassification exemptions
"more difficult or costly."[Footnote 26] The ISOO directive mirrors
these requirements and directs ISOO, in conjunction with its parent
organization, the National Archives and Records Administration, and
other concerned agencies to develop a standardized process for
referring records containing information classified by more than one
agency across the federal government.
Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force classification officials told us
that they face a variety of challenges impacting their ability to meet
the target dates of 2009 for reviewing records referred to them, and of
2011 for reviewing special media. Based on information provided by
officials from the military services and the National Archives and
Records Administration who are responsible for the automatic
declassification effort, it appears that three obstacles hinder their
progress toward meeting these deadlines. DOD's ability to remove these
obstacles without the involvement of other federal agencies is limited.
First, there is no federal government standard for annotating
classified records that contain information classified by more than one
agency. For example, two non-DOD agencies both annotate their records
with a "D" and an "R," but for opposite purposes. That is, one of the
agencies uses a "D" to denote "deny automatic declassification" and an
"R" to denote "release," while the other agency uses a "D" to denote
"declassify" and an "R" to denote "retain." The National Archives and
Records Administration and various interagency working groups and task
forces have sought a federal government standard, but National Archives
officials told us that they were not optimistic that agencies would
reach agreement soon. According to these officials, the lack of a
federal government standard has contributed to the inadvertent release
of classified information.
Second, there is no central location within DOD or the federal
government for storing records eligible for automatic declassification
that contain information classified by multiple DOD components or non-
DOD agencies. To review records originated by the four military
services, agencies must send personnel trained to evaluate information
for declassification suitability to as many as 14 different sites where
the records are stored. For example, the Air Force has records eligible
for automatic declassification at storage sites located in Ohio,
Alabama, and Texas (see figure 4). National Archives officials pointed
out that consolidating the records at fewer sites may be more
efficient, and likely more cost-effective.
Figure 4: Locations of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
Automatic Declassification Sites:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: DOD; Copyright Corel Corp. All rights reserved (map).
[End of figure]
A third factor that may cause DOD to miss meeting the Executive Order
deadlines is the lack of a common database that federal government
agencies can use to track the status of records containing information
classified by more than one agency. The ISOO directive allows federal
government agencies to utilize electronic databases to notify other
agencies of their referrals; however, agencies have created their own
databases that operate independently of one another. In commenting on a
draft of this report, DOD officials stated that, despite the lack of
federal government standards, the department has been a leading
proponent of working collaboratively with other federal agencies to
meet automatic declassification deadlines. We cannot confirm the
accuracy of DOD's characterization because DOD's relationship with
other agencies involved in automatic declassification was not part of
our review.
Conclusions:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has delegated the
execution and oversight of information security to the DOD component
level. This decentralized approach, coupled with inconsistency in the
implementation of components' information security programs, has
resulted in wide variance in the quality of these programs. For
example, the OUSD(I) does not directly monitor components' compliance
with federal and DOD training, self-inspection, and documentation
requirements stipulated in Executive Order 12958, as amended; the ISOO
directive; and the DOD regulation. Inadequate classification management
training, self-inspections, and security classification guide
documentation among the various DOD components increase the risk of (1)
poor classification decisions and marking errors, similar to what we
observed in our OSD document review; (2) restricting access to
information that does not pose a threat to national security; and (3)
releasing information to the general public that should still be
safeguarded.
OUSD(I) oversight could reduce the likelihood of classification errors.
For example, if OUSD(I) ensured that components evaluated the quality
and effectiveness of training and periodically included document
reviews in their self-inspections, prevalent classification errors
could be addressed through annual refresher training that derivative
classifiers complete. Evaluating the quality of training can assist
components in targeting scarce resources on coursework that promotes
learning and reduces misclassification. Although the results of our
review of a sample of OSD documents cannot be generalized
departmentwide, we believe these results coupled with the weaknesses in
training, self-inspections, and documentation that we found at numerous
components and subordinate commands increases the likelihood that
documents are not being classified in accordance with established
procedures.
DOD's estimate of how many original and derivative classification
decisions it makes annually is unreliable because it is based on data
from the DOD components that were derived using different assumptions
about what should be included and about data collection and estimating
techniques. Still, this estimate is reported to the President and to
the public, and it is routinely cited in congressional testimony by DOD
officials and freedom of information advocates as authoritative. During
our review, OUSD(I) decided to resume its practice of reviewing
components' classification estimates before they are submitted to ISOO.
If properly implemented, this review could improve data reliability to
some extent, but only if it addresses the underlying lack of uniformity
in how the individual DOD components are collecting and manipulating
their data to arrive at their estimates.
The automatic declassification provision in Executive Order 12958, as
amended, requires agencies generally to declassify records that are 25
years old or more and that no longer require protection. The Army,
Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force reported they are on track to review
all of the documents they classified before the deadline; however, they
are less likely to complete their review of the untold number of
records containing information classified by other DOD components and
non-DOD agencies by the deadlines set in the Executive Order. As the
deadlines pass and these records are automatically declassified,
information that could still contain national security information
becomes more vulnerable to disclosure. DOD's ability to meet these
deadlines is jeopardized both by conditions beyond and conditions
within its direct control. For example, DOD cannot require non-DOD
agencies to adopt a national standard for annotating classified
records, but it can take action to streamline the process of reviewing
records containing information classified by more than one DOD
component.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To reduce the risk of misclassification and create greater
accountability across the department, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to:
* establish a centralized oversight process for monitoring components'
information security programs to ensure that they satisfy federal and
DOD requirements. This oversight could include requiring components to
report on the results of self-inspections or other actions, targeted
document reviews, and/or reviews by the DOD Inspector General and
component audit agencies.
* to issue a revised Information Security Program regulation to ensure
that:
- those personnel who are authorized to and who actually perform
classification actions, receive training that covers the fundamental
classification principles as defined in the Under Secretary's
memorandum of November 30, 2004 and that completion of such training is
a prerequisite for these personnel to exercise this authority;
- the frequency, applicability, and coverage of self-inspections, and
the reporting of inspection results are based on explicit criteria;
and:
- authorized individuals can access up-to-date security classification
guides necessary to derivatively classify information accurately.
To support informed decision making with regard to information
security, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to institute quality assurance
measures to ensure that components implement consistently the DOD
guidance on estimating the number of classification decisions, thereby
increasing the accuracy and reliability of these estimates.
To assist DOD in its efforts to meet automatic declassification
deadlines, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to evaluate the merits of
consolidating records eligible for automatic declassification that
contain information classified by multiple DOD components at fewer than
the current 14 geographically dispersed sites.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all six
recommendations; however, the department expressed concern that we did
not accurately portray the Navy's program for managing its security
classification guides. Upon further review, we modified table 3 in the
report and accompanying narrative to indicate that the Navy (1) does
have a centralized library containing paper copies of its security
classification guides, and (2) is developing an automated database to
make its classification guides available to authorized users
electronically. We disagree with the department's assertion that the
Navy is tracking its classification guides to ensure that they are
reviewed at least once every 5 years for currency and are updated
accordingly. Based on our discussions with Navy information security
officials, including the Retrieval and Analysis of Navy (K)lassified
Information (RANKIN) Program Manager, and observing a demonstration of
the spreadsheet used to catalog security classification guide holdings,
we saw no evidence to suggest that currency of guides is being
systematically tracked. With respect to our fifth recommendation that
focuses on how DOD estimates the number of classification decisions it
makes each year, we endorsed the department's decision to continue
scrutinizing its components' estimates before consolidating and
submitting them to ISOO. However, we continue to believe that OUSD(I)
should augment its after-the-fact review with measures to ensure that
components follow a similar process to derive their classification
decisions estimates, such as standardizing the types of records to be
included. Adopting a consistent methodology across the department and
from year to year should improve the reliability and accuracy of this
estimate that is reported to the President.
DOD also provided technical comments for our consideration in the final
report, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD's formal comments are
reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
and the Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431
or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our review of the Department of Defense's (DOD's)
information security program, we met with officials and obtained
relevant documentation from the following DOD components and
subordinate commands:
* Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Arlington, Virginia;
- U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
- U.S. Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
- U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland;
* Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Arlington, Virginia;
- Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C;
- Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, Dahlgren, Virginia;
- Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland;
* Department of the Air Force Air and Space Operations, Directorate of
Security Forces, Information Security Division, Rosslyn, Virginia;
- Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;
- Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
- 88th Security Forces Squadron, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
* Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Arlington, Virginia;
- U.S. Marine Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia;
* Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;
* Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force
Base, Florida;
* National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, multiple sites in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area;
* Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C;
* National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland; and:
* Headquarters, Defense Technical Information Center, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia.
The information security programs of these nine components,
collectively, were responsible for about 83 percent of the department's
classification decisions each of the last 3 fiscal years that data are
available (2002 through 2004). We selected the information security
programs of three Army, three Navy, three Air Force, and one Marine
Corps subordinate command because they had among the largest number of
classification decisions for their component during the fiscal year
2002 through 2004 time period.
To examine whether DOD's implementation of its information security
management program in the areas of training, self-inspections, and
security classification guide management effectively minimizes the risk
of misclassification, we compared the DOD components' and subordinate
commands' policies and practices with federal and DOD requirements,
including Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security
Information, as amended; Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)
Directive 1, Classified National Security Information; and DOD
Information Security Program regulation 5200.1-R. Additionally, we
visited the Defense Security Service Academy in Linthicum, Maryland, to
discuss DOD training issues, and the Defense Technical Information
Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to discuss the availability of
current security classification guides. We also met with officials from
the Congressional Research Service, the Federation of American
Scientists, and the National Classification Management Society to
obtain their perspectives on DOD's information security program and on
misclassification of information in general.
To assess the extent to which DOD personnel in five offices of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) followed established
procedures for classifying information, to include correctly marking
classified information, we examined 111 documents classified from
September 22, 2003 to June 30, 2005. Because the total number of
classified documents held by DOD is unknown, we could not pursue a
probability sampling methodology to produce results that could be
generalized to either OSD or DOD. The September 22, 2003 start date was
selected because it coincides with when the ISOO directive that
implements the Executive Order went into effect. OSD was selected among
the DOD components because it has been the recipient of fewer ISOO
inspections than most of the other DOD components, and we expected
comparatively greater compliance with the Executive Order since DOD's
implementing regulation, DOD 5200.1-R, was published by an OSD office.
We selected the following five OSD offices located in Washington, D.C.
to sample:
* Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation;
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics;
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration/Chief Information Officer; and:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial
Officer.
These five offices were responsible for 84 percent of OSD's reported
classification decisions (original and derivative combined) during
fiscal year 2004. According to the Pentagon Force Protection Agency,
the office responsible for collecting data on classification activity
for OSD, we obtained 100 percent of these five office's classification
decisions during the 21-month time period. Two GAO analysts
independently reviewed each document using a 16-item checklist that we
developed based on information in the Executive Order, and feedback
from ISOO classification management experts. [Footnote 27] GAO analysts
who participated in the document review completed the Defense Security
Service Academy's online Marking Classified Information course and
passed the embedded proficiency test.
Each document was examined for compliance with classification
procedures and marking requirements in the Executive Order. The two
analysts' responses matched in more than 90 percent of the checklist
items. On those infrequent occasions where the analysts' responses were
dissimilar, a third GAO analyst conducted a final review. We examined
the rationale cited by the classifier for classifying the information,
and whether similar information within the same document and across
multiple documents was marked in the same manner. We also performed
Internet searches on official U.S. Government Web sites to determine if
the information had been treated as unclassified. For those documents
that we identified as containing questionable classification decisions,
we met with security officials from the applicable OSD offices to
obtain additional information and documentation.
To assess the reliability of DOD's annual classification decisions
estimate and the existence of material inconsistencies, we compared the
guidance issued by ISOO and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence on methods to derive this estimate with how
DOD components and subordinate commands implemented this guidance. We
also scrutinized the data to look for substantial changes in the data
estimates reported by DOD components during fiscal years 2002 through
2004.
To determine the likelihood of DOD's meeting automatic declassification
deadlines contained in Executive Order 12958, as amended, we met with
officials from the Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force
declassification offices. We decided to focus exclusively on the four
military services, because, collectively they were responsible for more
than 85 percent of the department's declassification activity during
fiscal year 2004. We also met with ISOO officials to discuss their
evaluation of DOD's progress towards meeting the Executive Order
deadlines. To increase our understanding of the impediments that
federal agencies in general, and DOD in particular, face with regard to
satisfying automatic declassification deadlines, we met with
declassification officials from the National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, Maryland.
We met with ISOO officials to discuss the assignment's objectives and
methodology, and received documents on relevant information security
topics, including inspection reports.
We conducted our work from March 2005 through February 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense 5000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-5000:
JUN 12 2006:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: U.S. Government
Accountability Office: 441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino,
Enclosed is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Managing Sensitive Information: DoD Can More Effectively
Reduce the Risk of Classification Errors," dated May 11, 2006, (GAO
Code 350684/GAO-06-706).
The Department concurs with the GAO recommendations and has provided
comments pertaining to the technical aspects discussed in the report.
We appreciate the courtesies extended by your staff during this audit
and their willingness to work with the Department on these matters. If
you have any questions, please contact Mrs. Debbie Ross, Acting Deputy
Director for Information Security Policy, at 703-571-0261.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Robert Andrews:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: (Counterintelligence and Security):
Enclosure:
As stated:
cc:
DoD OIG:
GAO Draft Report - Dated May 11, 2006 GAO CODE 350684/GAO-06-706:
"Managing Sensitive Information: DoD Can More Effectively Reduce the
Risk of Classification Errors"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to establish a centralized
oversight process for monitoring components' information security
programs to ensure that they satisfy federal and DoD requirements. This
oversight could include requiring components to report on the results
of self-inspections or other actions, targeted document reviews, and/or
reviews by the DoD Inspector General and component audit agencies.
DOD Response: Concur based on the findings of the GAO audit and the
Department's own observations on these matters when accompanying the
Information Security Oversight Office on oversight visits to some of
the Defense components.
Recommendations 2-4: We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to issue a revised
Information Security Program regulation to ensure that:
* Those personnel who are authorized to and who actually perform
classification actions, receive training that covers the fundamental
classification principles as defined in the Under Secretary's
memorandum of November 30, 2004 and that completion of such training is
a prerequisite for these personnel to exercise this authority;
* The frequency, applicability, and coverage of self-inspections, and
the reporting of inspection results are based on explicit criteria;
and,
* Authorized individuals can access up-to-date security classification
guides necessary to derivatively classify information accurately.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department has a requirement for all
classifiers to receive training prior to exercising classification
authority. However, we are concerned that the report does not
accurately portray the overall Navy program for managing security
classification guidance. The report only indicates the results of how
some Department of Navy (DON) commands maintain their Security
Classification Guides (SCGs). It does not address the DON's centralized
repository of SCGs, which is maintained by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO (N09N2)), Retrieval and Analysis of Navy (K)lassified
Information (RANKIN) Program Manager. The RANKIN Program Manager also
tracks SCGs for currency. Technical accuracy is the responsibility of
the Original Classification Authority (OCA). The DON issues SCGs via
the OPNAVINST 5513 series. This program was described in detail to the
GAO Auditor team, by the RANKIN Program Manager and the recently
departed CNO (N09N2), Information Security Policy Branch Head, yet
there is no mention of it in the report. Also, the RANKIN Program
Manager is working on an automated solution, to post the DON's SCGs on
a secure network. This site will be restricted to those personnel with
a valid need-to-know, and will be centrally managed by the RANKIN
Program Manager. The benefit of automating the SCGs is to reduce the
amount of time spent by derivative classifiers to obtain current SCGs,
better facilitate currency of SCGs via the OCA, increase protection of
information, and aid derivative classifiers in the proper
classification of information. It is appropriate and necessary to
include this information in the report as well.
Recommendation 5: We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence to institute quality
assurance measures to ensure that components implement the DoD guidance
consistently, thereby increasing the accuracy and reliability of these
estimates.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department is already doing it with this
iteration of data collection.
Recommendation 6: We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to evaluate the merits of
consolidating records eligible for automatic declassification that
contain information classified by multiple DoD components at fewer than
the current I4 geographically dispersed sites.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department has advised the Information
Security Oversight Office that we agree with this concept in theory at
the national level. Also, the Military Departments are looking into the
feasibility of setting up a DoD Declassification Referral Center to
facilitate declassification reviews of records containing multiple DoD
component equities.
Technical Comments:
GAO Highlights Page, 3rd Para. Replace everything after the first line
with "of the considerable variance in how ISOO's guidance is
implemented across the Department, and from year to year. Since 2002,
responsibility for monitoring and assessing DoD component's data
submission has passed between DoD and ISOO. OUSD(I) resumed
consolidating the DoD response in 2005 to aid in identifying potential
oversight issues. Reason: Provides correct background on this issue.
Also, the data is not used by DoD to make resource decisions because
DoD does not think the report provides sufficient information to do so.
Page 6, 2nd Para, 3rd Sentence. Delete 3rd sentence and replace
everything after the 5th sentence with "However, it has been DoD's
practice to implement ISOO's guidance which allows each DoD component
to determine who they should sample within their organization. This was
also ISOO's practice when they were collecting data direct from DoD
components during Fiscal Years 2002-2004. In fiscal year 2005, OUSD(I)
resumed responsibility for scrutinizing the estimates of its components
before consolidating and submitting them to ISOO for inclusion in its
annual report to the President. Reason: Correctness.
Page 7, 1st Para, 2nd Sentence. Add before last sentence, "It was noted
that DoD has been one of the leading proponents in working
collaboratively with other federal agencies to facilitate this process
inspite of the lack of federal standards." Reason: Correct.
Page 16, 1st Para, Last 2 Sentences. Delete. Reason: This information
is irrelevant since these DoD components have their own training which
may be just as adequate as the DSSA training.
Page 20, Table 3. Last Column. For the Naval Sea Systems Command entry,
change to "Currency of guides tracked centrally. Centralized paper
index of paper guides maintained. Automated database being implemented
by CNO." Reason: While they maybe behind in tracking the guides, they
still have a system in place for central tracking and are working to
get it current.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
Ann Borseth, Mattias Fenton, Adam Hatton, Barbara Hills, David Keefer,
David Mayfield, Jim Reid, Terry Richardson, Marc Schwartz, Cheryl
Weissman, and Jena Whitley made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] National security signifies the national defense or foreign
relations of the United States.
[2] Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information
(1995) with its last amendment, Executive Order 13292, Further
Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, Classified National
Security Information (2003).
[3] See title 44 United States Code, which generally defines a record
as a book, paper, map, photograph, sound or video recording, machine
readable material, computerized, digitized, or electronic information,
regardless of the medium on which it is stored, or other documentary
material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics.
[4] The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence position was
established by the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 (Pub. L. No. 107-314 §901 (Dec. 2, 2002)).
[5] DOD components include the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General, the Defense
Agencies, the DOD Field Activities, and all other organizational
entities within DOD.
[6] Managing Sensitive Information: Departments of Energy and Defense
Policies and Oversight Could Be Improved, GAO-06-369 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 7, 2006); Managing Sensitive Information: DOE and DOD Could
Improve Their Policies and Oversight, GAO-06-531T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 14, 2006).
[7] Transportation Security Administration: Clear Policies and
Oversight Needed for Designation of Sensitive Security Information, GAO-
05-677 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2005).
[8] Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but
Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006).
[9] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because the chance of being selected as
part of a nonprobability sample cannot be predicted.
[10] The duplication or reproduction of existing classified information
is not derivative classification.
[11] Information may be originally classified only by the Secretary of
Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, and other
officials who have been specifically designated this authority in
writing. By DOD regulation, delegation of original classification
authority shall be limited to the minimum required for DOD to operate
effectively, and to those officials who have a demonstrable and
continuing need to exercise it.
[12] ISOO is a component of the National Archives and Records
Administration and receives its policy and program guidance from the
National Security Council.
[13] 32 C.F.R. Part 2001 (2003).
[14] Executive Order 12958, as amended, defines declassification as the
authorized change in the status of information from classified to
unclassified.
[15] Records of permanent historical value are Presidential records and
agency records that the U.S. Archivist determines should be maintained
permanently in accordance with title 44 United States Code.
[16] The actual number of students completing academy courses in fiscal
year 2004 is less than 16,000 because some students completed multiple
courses.
[17] J. William Leonard, Director, ISOO. "The Importance of Basics,"
remarks delivered at the National Classification Management Society's
Annual Training Seminar, Reno, Nevada, June 15, 2004.
[18] Memorandum from Stephen A. Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, "Minimum Training Requirements for Original
Classification Authorities and Derivative Classifiers," Nov. 30, 2004.
[19] Based on information provided by OUSD(I) for end of fiscal year
2003.
[20] The actual number of DOD personnel who completed an academy
information security course in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 is less than
4,775 because some personnel completed multiple courses.
[21] GAO Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004).
[22] Section C2.5.3.4 of DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program,
January 1997 requires original classification authorities to submit two
copies of each approved security classification guide to the center,
except for guides containing highly sensitive information. According to
DOD declassification officials, less than 5 percent of the department's
classification guides are classified at the Top Secret level, or
contain Sensitive Compartmented Information or Special Access Program
information.
[23] 32 C.F.R. §2001.20 (2003).
[24] The five OSD offices that participated in our document review did
not participate in any of the ISOO document reviews.
[25] 429 is derived from the formula 26 x 33 ÷ 2 = 429, where 26
represents the number of 2-week counting periods in a year, 33 is a
multiplier to account for those commands among the Navy's 3,960
commands that are not counted, and 2 is a divisor to account for those
commands that have no classification activity, such as dental clinics
and commissaries.
[26] Executive Order 12958, as amended, §3.3.(e)(2).
[27] 12 of the 16 checklist items applied to originally classified
documents, and 13 of the 16 checklist items applied to derivatively
classified documents.
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