Defense Acquisitions
Further Management and Oversight Changes Needed for Efforts to Modernize Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning Systems Gao ID: GAO-06-666 July 6, 2006The Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center houses numerous complex computer systems for tracking air, missile, and space events that could threaten homeland security or undermine military operations in theater. To ensure this mission can be met, the systems require ongoing upgrades. The most recent upgrade program--the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System (CCIC2S)--was initiated in 2000. Given the critical missions supported by Cheyenne Mountain systems, GAO initiated a review to (1) determine the status of the CCIC2S program in terms of meeting its cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) gauge the extent to which DOD has followed best practices in managing program requirements; and (3) assess DOD's control and oversight mechanisms for CCIC2S.
Like its predecessor, the Department of Defense's (DOD) CCIC2S program is over cost, behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred indefinitely which could pose risks to performing some future operations. The Air Force, which has overall responsibility for the program, currently estimates program costs will total about $707 million through fiscal year 2006--about a 51 percent increase over initial estimates. Schedules have also expanded significantly, and most critical mission capabilities will not be delivered in fiscal year 2006, as initially planned. The deferral of capabilities and performance shortfalls has significant implications for future missions--especially if program dollars are needed to maintain legacy systems longer than expected. The tracking of space objects could be particularly affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S's critical space mission capabilities has been completed, and estimated completion dates for this work have yet to be determined. Unstable program requirements and the failure to match requirements to available resources have contributed to the program's cost and schedule overruns. Since the program began in 2000, the Air Force has added, deleted, and modified requirements without adequately determining the effect of these changes on resources. To control cost growth, the Air Force has frequently deferred work to later years and has yet to determine when and at what cost development is to be completed. Several key controls needed to mitigate the CCIC2S program's cost and schedule problems are not in place. First, DOD did not designate the CCIC2S program as a major automated information system acquisition--a designation that would have required high-level oversight other than that provided by the Air Force, which has been ineffective. In addition, the Air Force's contracting approach has limited the program's ability to thoroughly assess the reliability of the contractor's cost and schedule performance information and the impact of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities. Despite this risky approach, the Defense Contract Management Agency did not independently monitor contractor performance. According to DOD officials, actions are being taken to implement better controls and to determine whether the CCIC2S program should be categorized as a major automated information system acquisition.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-666, Defense Acquisitions: Further Management and Oversight Changes Needed for Efforts to Modernize Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning Systems
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2006:
Defense Acquisitions:
Further Management and Oversight Changes Needed for Efforts to
Modernize Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning Systems:
GAO-06-666:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-666, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center houses numerous complex
computer systems for tracking air, missile, and space events that could
threaten homeland security or undermine military operations in theater.
To ensure this mission can be met, the systems require ongoing
upgrades.
The most recent upgrade program ”the Combatant Commanders‘ Integrated
Command and Control System (CCIC2S)”was initiated in 2000. Given the
critical missions supported by Cheyenne Mountain systems, GAO initiated
a review to (1) determine the status of the CCIC2S program in terms of
meeting its cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) gauge the extent
to which DOD has followed best practices in managing program
requirements; and (3) assess DOD‘s control and oversight mechanisms for
CCIC2S.
What GAO Found:
Like its predecessor, the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) CCIC2S program
is over cost, behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred
indefinitely which could pose risks to performing some future
operations. The Air Force, which has overall responsibility for the
program, currently estimates program costs will total about $707
million through fiscal year 2006”about a 51 percent increase over
initial estimates. Schedules have also expanded significantly, and most
critical mission capabilities will not be delivered in fiscal year
2006, as initially planned. The deferral of capabilities and
performance shortfalls has significant implications for future
missions”especially if program dollars are needed to maintain legacy
systems longer than expected. The tracking of space objects could be
particularly affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S‘s critical
space mission capabilities has been completed, and estimated completion
dates for this work have yet to be determined.
Figure: Comparison of Initial and Current Estimates of CCIC2S Program
Costs from Inception through Fiscal Year 2006 (Then-Year Dollars in
Millions):
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Air Force data, GAO analysis.
[End of Figure]
Unstable program requirements and the failure to match requirements to
available resources have contributed to the program‘s cost and schedule
overruns. Since the program began in 2000, the Air Force has added,
deleted, and modified requirements without adequately determining the
effect of these changes on resources. To control cost growth, the Air
Force has frequently deferred work to later years and has yet to
determine when and at what cost development is to be completed.
Several key controls needed to mitigate the CCIC2S program‘s cost and
schedule problems are not in place. First, DOD did not designate the
CCIC2S program as a major automated information system acquisition”a
designation that would have required high-level oversight other than
that provided by the Air Force, which has been ineffective. In
addition, the Air Force‘s contracting approach has limited the
program‘s ability to thoroughly assess the reliability of the
contractor‘s cost and schedule performance information and the impact
of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities. Despite this risky
approach, the Defense Contract Management Agency did not independently
monitor contractor performance. According to DOD officials, actions are
being taken to implement better controls and to determine whether the
CCIC2S program should be categorized as a major automated information
system acquisition.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD designate CCIC2S as a major acquisition
program; establish effective management controls; and conduct an
affordability assessment, economic analysis, and independent estimate
of life- cycle costs. DOD agreed to designate CCIC2S as a major
acquisition program and establish management controls. In addition, DOD
stated that it will conduct the affordability assessment and other
analyses on future CCIC2S development activities.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-666].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Lisa Shames at (202) 512-
4841 or shamesl@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
CCIC2S Program Has Experienced Cost and Schedule Overruns and
Performance Shortfalls:
Cost and Schedule Overruns Caused by Not Adhering to Best Practices for
Managing Program Requirements:
CCIC2S Program Oversight and Controls Have Been Ineffective:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Software Development Capability Maturity Model:
Appendix IV: DOD Acquisition Categories, Thresholds, and Oversight:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Cheyenne Mountain Mission Centers, Operations, and Systems:
Table 2: Comparison of Initial and Current Estimates of CCIC2S Program
Costs from Inception through Fiscal Year 2006 (Then-Year Dollars in
Millions):
Table 3: Air Force Cost Estimate for CCIC2S through Fiscal Year 2007
Before Program Initiation and Designation of Acquisition Category Level
(Fiscal Year 1996 Constant Dollars in Millions):
Table 4: Software Capability Maturity ModelŽ Scale:
Table 5: DOD Acquisition Categories and Decision Authorities (as of
March 15, 1996, When the Air Force Initiated the CCIC2S Program):
Figures:
Figure 1: Cheyenne Mountain Systems Time Line of Upgrade Efforts:
Figure 2: Status of Critical Capabilities to Be Delivered:
Figure 3: CCIC2S Program Rebaselines and Their Impacts on Program
Schedule:
Abbreviations:
ACAT: acquisition category:
CMU: Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade:
DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EVM: earned value management:
MAIS: Major Automated Information System:
MDAPS: Major Defense Acquisition Programs:
NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command:
RAIDRS: Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System:
RDT&E: research, development, test, and evaluation:
SPADOC: Space Defense Operations Center:
TSPR: Total System Performance Responsibility:
USNORTHCOM: United States Northern Command:
USSTRATCOM: United States Strategic Command:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 6, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center,
built in the early 1960s, currently houses numerous complex computer
systems intended to help monitor, process, and interpret air, missile,
and space events that could threaten North America or have operational
impacts on U.S. forces or capabilities. New threats have emerged over
time that have necessitated improved capabilities from Cheyenne
Mountain systems. Examples of these evolving threats include events
such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. and
attacks on space assets that could negatively impact military
operations as well as the economy.
These systems--which are housed in three major centers: Air Warning,
Missile Correlation, and Space Control--require ongoing upgrades in
order to incorporate new mission capabilities and technologies and
reduce the cost of maintaining older systems. However, our reviews over
the past 2 decades have found that DOD's efforts to modernize and
integrate Cheyenne Mountain systems have been fraught with cost
increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls due, in large
part, to poor program management and oversight. For example, in
September 1994, we reported that upgrade efforts were 8 years behind
schedule and $792 million over budget, due to development and
integration problems stemming from management shortfalls.[Footnote 1]
While DOD declared the most recent Cheyenne Mountain upgrades to be
operational in 1998, that same year, it determined that some of the
systems' components were not well integrated, were becoming
unsupportable because they were no longer produced, and would be
unresponsive to future mission needs. Subsequently, DOD initiated a
program in 2000 to modernize and integrate Cheyenne Mountain systems
under a program called the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and
Control System, or CCIC2S, and assigned overall responsibility for the
program to the Air Force.
We have recently testified that DOD's costly current and planned
acquisitions are running head-on into the nation's unsustainable fiscal
path.[Footnote 2] DOD starts more programs than it can afford and
sustain, and in the past 5 years, it has doubled its planned
investments in programs. However, these programs continue to experience
recurring problems with cost overruns, missed deadlines, and
performance shortfalls. Our work has shown that DOD will continue to
experience such problems until it is able to make oversight and
management control improvements, including making sure programs are
executable, locking in requirements before programs are initiated, and
making clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable
when these responsibilities are not fulfilled. Additionally, our work
has shown that once a program is initiated, inevitable changes to the
requirements baseline need to be controlled in terms of assessing the
cost, schedule, and performance implications of the changes. As part of
these assessments, the risks associated with these factors need to be
identified and mitigated.[Footnote 3]
Within this context, we initiated this engagement under the authority
of the Comptroller General of the United States to (1) determine the
status of the CCIC2S program in terms of meeting its cost, schedule,
and performance goals; (2) gauge the extent to which DOD has followed
best practices with regard to managing program requirements, including
matching requirements to available resources; and (3) assess DOD's
oversight and control mechanisms for Cheyenne Mountain systems
modernization and integration efforts under way and planned. We are
addressing this report to you because of your committees' and
subcommittees' jurisdictions.
In conducting our work, we spoke with officials from appropriate DOD,
Air Force, and contractor offices. We also reviewed DOD and Air Force
acquisition policies; planning documents; and program requirements,
cost, and schedule data. Additional information on our scope and
methodology is in appendix I. We conducted our work from July 2005 to
April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
As with previous Cheyenne Mountain upgrade efforts, the CCIC2S program
is over cost, behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred
indefinitely. This deferral could pose risks to performing some future
operations. The Air Force initially estimated the CCIC2S program would
complete upgrades of critical air, missile, and space warning
capabilities in fiscal year 2006 at a program cost (including
sustainment activities) of approximately $467 million. However, the Air
Force currently expects the program to cost about $707 million through
the same year--about a 51 percent increase--with no estimated
completion date and without delivering most mission critical
capabilities. The deferral of capabilities has significant implications
for future missions--especially if program dollars are needed to
maintain legacy systems longer than expected or to modify these
systems. Operations to track man-made space objects could be
particularly affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S's space
mission critical requirements has been completed and that estimated
completion dates for this work have yet to be determined. Deferring
expected capabilities may also affect programs that rely on CCIC2S for
their implementation, such as a defensive counterspace system that the
Air Force is developing, which is expected to use Cheyenne Mountain
systems information to help thwart attacks against valuable DOD space
assets.
The ineffective management of CCIC2S's requirements has contributed to
the program's cost and schedule overruns. In contrast to best
practices, which call for stabilizing requirements and matching them to
available resources, CCIC2S's requirements were not established until
2004, more than 3 years after the program began. The Air Force--which
was responsible for managing CCIC2S--did not effectively assess the
appropriateness of the program's requirements prior to initiating the
program. Since the program began in 2000, the Air Force has made
significant additions, deletions, and modifications to the initial
requirements. At the same time, the Air Force did not determine the
effect of these changes on resources. Consequently, the Air Force has
rebaselined CCIC2S's cost and schedule goals annually; currently, the
program is undergoing its fifth rebaselining. While rebaselining can
provide an important perspective on a program's current status, it can
also obscure how programs perform over time because a rebaseline
shortens the period of reported performance and, more importantly,
resets the measurement of cost and schedule growth to zero. With each
rebaseline of the CCIC2S program, significant amounts of work have been
deferred to address cost increases. As a result, the Air Force has
implemented the program without reliable expectations of what
capabilities are to be delivered, when, and at what cost.
The oversight and control mechanisms of the CCIC2S program have been
inadequate to mitigate many of the problems it has experienced.
Specifically, (1) DOD did not designate the CCIC2S program as a major
automated information system acquisition, which would have required
high-level oversight and comprehensive and independent assessments of
the program; (2) the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition--the CCIC2S milestone decision authority with overall
responsibility for the program--did not provide effective oversight;
and (3) the Air Force's contract management approach limited the
program office's ability to thoroughly assess the reliability of the
contractor's cost and schedule performance information and the impact
of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities. Additionally, the
Defense Contract Management Agency did not independently monitor
contractor performance, although it signed a memorandum of agreement
with the program to do so in 2003. According to DOD officials, actions-
-such as initiating a formal system-level technical review process--are
being taken to implement better controls and DOD is in the process of
determining whether to categorize the CCIC2S program as a major
automated information system acquisition.
To ensure the program addresses current shortcomings and proceeds on a
successful path, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to maintain Cheyenne Mountain's
essential operation and maintenance activities and limit future CCIC2S
development activities to those deemed critical to national security
until DOD (1) approves an acquisition approach that designates the
program as a major automated information system acquisition and
delineates oversight and accountability responsibilities, and (2)
conducts an affordability assessment, economic analysis, and
independent estimate of life-cycle costs. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish and
implement effective management controls for the program by implementing
an approach to manage requirements and resource changes and ensure
program cost and performance data are reliable.
DOD agreed with designating the program as a major automated
information system acquisition, delineating responsibilities, and
establishing and implementing effective management controls for the
program. In addition, DOD agreed with conducting an affordability
assessment, economic analysis, and independent estimate of life-cycle
costs on future development activities but not with the current
activities due to potential mission impacts. We do not disagree with
this approach to the extent that continuing these development
activities is critical to national security. However, continuing CCIC2S
development without establishing a match between requirements and
available resources may also hinder DOD's ability to satisfy national
security needs because of the increased risk that the program fails to
achieve its promised capability. DOD comments on a draft of this report
appear in appendix II.
Background:
DOD built the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center in the early 1960s at
Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colorado. Throughout its history,
its mission has continually evolved to adapt to changing threats--which
have ranged from a perceived Soviet nuclear threat after the 1957
launch of Sputnik, the first man-made satellite successfully placed in
orbit, to theater ballistic missiles in the Persian Gulf during
Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s. Currently, Cheyenne
Mountain's mission is to help monitor, process, and interpret air,
missile, and space events that could threaten North America or have
operational impacts on U.S. forces or capabilities, using air, ground,
and space-based sensors that link to the complex's computer systems
located more than 2,000 feet under ground. The President, Secretary of
Defense, combatant commanders, and the Prime Minister of Canada rely on
Cheyenne Mountain systems to provide accurate, timely, and unambiguous
information essential for determining courses of actions warfighters
are to carry out. Air Force Space Command is responsible for operating,
funding, and setting requirements for the systems, and Air Force
Materiel Command's Electronic Systems Center is responsible for
maintaining the systems and for acquiring new systems and capabilities.
Table 1 provides a summary of Cheyenne Mountain's three mission
centers, operations, and systems.
Table 1: Cheyenne Mountain Mission Centers, Operations, and Systems:
Mission centers: Air warning.
Mission centers: Air Warning: Supports the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
in their missions to monitor and secure North American airspace;
Operations:
OPerations: Monitors North America's airspace to detect aircraft or
cruise missiles that might violate airspace or represent a threat,
which now includes warning of events such as the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks;
Systems: Air and ground-based radars inside and along the periphery of
North America.
Mission centers: Missile correlation: Supports NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in their strategic and
theater missions to protect U.S. and Canadian interests from ballistic
missile attacks;
Operations: Provides warning of missile attacks launched against the
United States and its territories, possessions, and forces overseas and
supports USSTRATCOM in its mission to defend against strategic and
theater missile attacks.[A];
Systems: A worldwide communications and ground-and space-based sensor
network.
Mission centers: Space control: Supports USSTRATCOM in its mission to
protect U.S. space assets[B];
Operations: Detects, tracks, identifies, and catalogs all man-made
space objects orbiting the Earth that are larger than about 4 inches in
size;
Systems: A network of ground-based radars and optical sensors as well
as a space-based sensor.
Source: DOD.
[A] Missile attacks can be characterized as strategic (long-range),
such as intercontinental ballistic missiles launched against the United
States as well as theater (short-and medium-range), such as the Scud
missiles used by Iraq during the Gulf War.
[B] A key element of this mission is space situational awareness, which
involves identifying man-made objects orbiting the Earth and
determining whom they belong to and their purposes.
[End of table]
Previous Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Efforts:
In 1981, the Air Force began efforts to modernize its Cheyenne Mountain
systems under five separate programs scheduled to be completed in 1987
at a total estimated cost of $968 million. Subsequently, the Air Force
consolidated the five separate Cheyenne Mountain upgrade programs into
a single Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade (CMU) program. Beginning in the late
1980s, we issued a dozen reports on the program's cost, schedule, and
performance problems. For example, we reported that the Air Force did
not adequately define program requirements which resulted in an
underestimation of the upgrade efforts' cost and schedule goals. In its
attempts to maintain short-term cost and schedule goals, the Air Force
continually deferred requirements and problem resolution to the future,
as well as relaxed performance requirements. (See Related GAO Products
at the end of this report.)
Despite not meeting original performance expectations for the program,
in 1998, the Air Force declared the Cheyenne Mountain upgrades to be
operational--almost $1 billion over cost and 11 years late. That same
year, DOD determined that some of the systems were not well integrated,
would be unresponsive to future mission needs, and some components were
becoming unsupportable. As a result, in 2000, the Air Force initiated
the CCIC2S program to modernize and integrate Cheyenne Mountain
systems.[Footnote 4] Figure 1 depicts the timeline of Cheyenne Mountain
upgrades.
Figure 1: Cheyenne Mountain Systems Time Line of Upgrade Efforts:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
On September 19, 2000, the Air Force awarded a cost-plus award fee
contract[Footnote 5] to Lockheed Martin Mission Systems[Footnote 6] to
begin work on the CCIC2S program. The initial period of performance was
for 6 years, with annual options for operations and maintenance
activities for an additional 9 years.
CCIC2S Program Has Experienced Cost and Schedule Overruns and
Performance Shortfalls:
Like its predecessor, the CMU program, the CCIC2S program is over cost,
behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred indefinitely.
This deferral could pose risks to performing some future operations.
The Air Force's current program cost estimates through fiscal year 2006
represent about a 51 percent increase over its initial estimate.
Additionally, while the Air Force initially estimated CCIC2S upgrades
to be completed in fiscal year 2006, most critical mission capabilities
will not be delivered by this time, and for some of these capabilities,
the Air Force has yet to estimate a completion date. The deferrals of
capabilities and performance shortfalls could have implications for
future missions.
The CCIC2S Program Is Over Cost and Behind Schedule:
As shown in table 2, the Air Force initially estimated the CCIC2S
program to complete upgrades in fiscal year 2006 at an estimated cost
of about $467 million.[Footnote 7] However, program cost estimates
through the same year have increased about 51 percent to nearly $707
million. Air Force officials said they never estimated the life-cycle
cost of delivering all CCIC2S validated requirements.
Table 2: Comparison of Initial and Current Estimates of CCIC2S Program
Costs from Inception through Fiscal Year 2006 (Then-Year Dollars in
Millions):
Time frame of cost estimate: Initial (July 2000);
Fiscal year: 2000: $4.7;
Fiscal year: 2001: $77.5;
Fiscal year: 2002: $78.4;
Fiscal year: 2003: $76.1;
Fiscal year: 2004: $78.6;
Fiscal year: 2005: $75.7;
Fiscal year: 2006: $76.0;
Total: $467.0.
Time frame of cost estimate: Current (February 2006);
Fiscal year: 2000: 4.7[A];
Fiscal year: 2001: 102.0[A];
Fiscal year: 2002: 107.0[A];
Fiscal year: 2003: 94.4[A];
Fiscal year: 2004: 133.4[A];
Fiscal year: 2005: 132.7;
Fiscal year: 2006: 132.7;
Total: 706.9.
Source: Air Force data, GAO analysis.
[A] Actual expenditures.
[End of Table]
Along with the increases in estimated program costs, schedules have
expanded significantly. The Air Force initially estimated development
activities to be completed in fiscal year 2006, but only a fraction of
the expected capabilities have been delivered (see fig. 2). Of the
three mission areas--air, missile, and space--the Air Force has
delivered only initial air and some initial missile mission critical
capabilities. DOD considers these critical capabilities to be the most
essential for the program--failure to provide these capabilities can be
cause for a program to be reassessed or terminated. The remaining
missile warning critical capabilities are now expected to be delivered
in fiscal year 2007--over 3 years later than initially estimated. The
Air Force has postponed the delivery of all critical space mission
capabilities to some undetermined point in the future. According to Air
Force officials, the space mission capability deliveries will not be
scheduled until future investment decisions are made.
Figure 11: Status of Critical Capabilities to Be Delivered:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Air Force data, GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
According to the CCIC2S program office and other DOD officials, one of
the reasons the program's initial cost and schedule estimates differ
from current estimates is that work that was not included in the
original estimates was added to the program. Examples of work added to
the program include replacing an aging missile warning processing and
display system as well as developing a computer operational status
monitoring system. We did not assess the cost and schedule impacts of
these added capabilities. Also, as a result of the September 11, 2001,
attacks on the U.S., the Air Force diverted a portion of CCIC2S funding
and personnel to make improvements to other Cheyenne Mountain systems
so that aircraft traffic within the U.S. could be monitored by the air
warning center. However, according to DOD officials, the impacts of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the CCIC2S program were not
significant because monitoring aircraft traffic within the U.S. is not
a required upgrade under the CCIC2S program. Prior to these
improvements, the focus of the air warning system was to monitor
aircraft traffic outside the North American border.
Deferral of Capabilities and Performance Shortfalls Have Implications
for Future Missions:
The deferral of capabilities and performance shortfalls that have
resulted from cost and schedule overruns in the CCIC2S program could
significantly impact future missions--especially if program dollars are
needed to maintain legacy systems longer than expected. USSTRATCOM--
responsible for protecting U.S. space assets--could be particularly
affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S's critical space
mission capabilities has been completed and that estimated completion
dates for this work have yet to be determined.
DOD has been counting on CCIC2S to replace the Space Defense Operations
Center (SPADOC)--Cheyenne Mountain's current space object tracking
system--and provide a system capable of processing larger volumes of
data. Some DOD officials have stated that CCIC2S is to be the
foundation for carrying out future space awareness functions. SPADOC's
capabilities are currently overtaxed. It currently handles about
400,000 space object observations per day from sensors--about 167
percent more than it was designed to handle. The Air Force has
implemented an inefficient workaround to address SPADOC's limited
processing capabilities. Specifically, the Space Control Center is
using CaveNet, an off-line tool, to assist with analyzing and
processing space object observations. However, to analyze and process
the information in CaveNet, Space Control Center operators must first
download information from SPADOC and then manually type the processed
information back into SPADOC. Air Force officials stated that manually
typing CaveNet information back into SPADOC has recently become
significant enough to request an automated interface.
According to Air Force officials, efforts are on-going to assess the
mission impact of SPADOC performing beyond design specifications. With
other programs to improve data collection sensors that feed data into
CCIC2S--such as the Space Fence and Space Based Space Surveillance
system[Footnote 8]--the number of observations and processing
requirements will increase significantly in the future, taxing the
current system further. In a 2005 study, the CCIC2S contractor
determined that SPADOC's processing capacity will not be able to handle
the increased number of observations predicted beginning in 2012. For
the near term, according to Air Force officials, the CCIC2S contractor
has identified operations and maintenance changes for SPADOC to handle
increases in the number of observations. However, DOD has not made a
decision on when to pursue upgrades for SPADOC and cost estimates for
upgrading SPADOC have not been finalized. With the delay of CCIC2S
space capabilities and no decision on when SPADOC will be replaced,
USSTRATCOM will have to continue relying on pushing SPADOC to its
limits.
Delays in the delivery of expected CCIC2S capabilities also affect
programs that are not directly part of the program but are relying on
CCIC2S for their implementation. For example, the Air Force's Rapid
Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS)--a
defensive counterspace system--is expected to use information provided
by Cheyenne Mountain systems to aid in the detection, reporting,
identification, location, and classification of attacks against
valuable space assets. However, according to a DOD official, the CCIC2S
space capability delays have presented a serious acquisition dilemma
for the RAIDRS program because it is dependent on the CCIC2S space
segment. Funding has not been made available for the CCIC2S space
segment that is to support RAIDRS, according to Air Force Space
Command. Furthermore, other programs will experience the same
acquisition dilemma because Air Force Space Command has instructed all
of its sensor, satellite, and weapon programs to be able to integrate
with CCIC2S.
Cost and Schedule Overruns Caused by Not Adhering to Best Practices for
Managing Program Requirements:
The CCIC2S program's failure to match requirements and resources before
its start has contributed to the cost and schedule overruns that have
forced the program to defer delivery of CCIC2S capabilities. For each
year since the program's inception, the Air Force has rebaselined
CCIC2S's cost and schedule goals. The unreliable cost and schedule
estimates that resulted have forced the program to frequently defer
work to later years to control cost growth. The Air Force has yet to
determine when and at what cost development is to be completed.
Match Not Made between Program Requirements and Available Resources:
Our body of work on best practices has shown that matching program
requirements to resources--that is, time, funding, technology, and
personnel--is key to successful outcomes.[Footnote 9] We have also
reported that the requirements-setting phase is one of the most
important for software-intensive acquisitions.[Footnote 10] Missing,
vague, or changing requirements tend to be a major cause of poor
outcomes in these programs. For example, according to Air Force
officials, the major causes for the delay in the Air Mission Evolution
system[Footnote 11]--a CCIC2S system that was delivered in January
2004, over 2 years behind schedule--included problems with software
development and integration. Additionally, the contractor stated that
changing priorities within the program as well as added requirements
contributed to the delay.[Footnote 12]
Without a stable set of requirements, the Air Force could not
appropriately estimate program costs and in hindsight, the resources
needed to satisfy program requirements were severely underestimated. To
better ensure programs are affordable and fully funded before they are
initiated, DOD guidance calls for every acquisition program to
stabilize requirements and determine the program's total costs before
program start.[Footnote 13] Despite best practices and DOD policy, the
Air Force initiated the CCIC2S program without establishing a stable
set of program-specific requirements and did not do so until January
2004--more than 3 years after program start. In that time, the Air
Force made numerous additions, deletions, and modifications to CCIC2S's
requirements. For example, the Air Force deleted, added back, and then
modified a requirement for multiple security levels. According to an
Air Force review of program requirements, some deleted requirements
were duplicative or conflicting.
Assessments of available resources were also inadequate. According to
DOD guidance, every acquisition program should rigorously address
issues such as the program's life-cycle costs and whether it is
affordable and fully funded.[Footnote 14] By not conducting these
rigorous assessments, DOD and the Air Force did not have the
information needed to commit to the program over its life cycle.
Although the CCIC2S program acquisition plan refers to the development
of a life-cycle cost estimate before the program was initiated, it did
not include the operations and maintenance costs of sustaining existing
systems through the program's entire life cycle.[Footnote 15]
Additionally, software development capabilities of the contractor
should also be assessed. The contract for CCIC2S development specifies
that the contractor be rated at the highest level (level 5) using the
Capability Maturity ModelŽ for Software developed by Carnegie Mellon
University's Systems Engineering Institute.[Footnote 16] At this most
mature level, quantitative feedback about performance and innovative
ideas and technologies contribute to continuous process improvements. A
senior program official stated that the CCIC2S contractor was rated at
a level 5 for software development. According to DOD documentation,
Capability Maturity ModelŽ assessments are typically performed at an
organization wide level and may not necessarily apply to a project team
associated with any given acquisition program. We did not examine the
program's software development efforts and the capabilities of the
contractor. For more information on this model, see appendix III.
Furthermore, DOD has not funded the program at requested levels since
the program began due to other priorities. We have previously reported
that program funding instability often occurs because DOD starts too
many programs, creating severe budget constraints. Another factor we
have reported that contributes to funding instability is that DOD's
programs are funded annually, requiring competition among other
programs for limited available funding.[Footnote 17] The CCIC2S program
has not been an exception to these factors. For example, prior to
initiating the CCIC2S program in 2000, DOD reduced the program's
initial estimated resource requirements by a total of $75 million. In
2002, DOD decided not to increase requested program funding. According
to DOD, funding was limited to program baseline levels because the
program was a lesser priority. Furthermore, in 2005, DOD and Congress
reduced CCIC2S program funding estimates over the next 6 years by about
$135 million, citing higher priority funding needs and poor program
performance.
The Air Force Has Implemented the CCIC2S Program without Solid
Expectations of What Capabilities Are To Be Delivered, When, and at
What Cost:
According to the acquisition strategy for the CCIC2S program, annual
rebaselines[Footnote 18] were to be conducted on the program to review
and approve program implementation plans, including cost and schedule
baselines. However, because the Air Force failed to make a match
between requirements and resources, including not effectively assessing
the impacts of adding unanticipated work to the program, the result of
CCIC2S's annual rebaselines has been to defer significant amounts of
work to the future in order to address cost increases. As a result, the
Air Force has implemented the program as a "level of effort"--that is,
without solid expectations of what capabilities are to be delivered,
when, and at what cost. Currently, the CCIC2S program is undergoing its
fifth rebaseline. According to program officials, after this fifth
rebaseline, CCIC2S will no longer plan for annual rebaselinings, but
would only rebaseline the program when necessary. Figure 3 depicts the
effects of each of the rebaselines on the program.
Figure 3: CCIC2S Program Rebaselines and Their Impacts on Program
Schedule:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Air Force data, GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
The fifth and current rebaseline was prompted by efforts to complete
development of the program's critical missile warning mission
capabilities. To free up resources for the missile warning development
efforts, the Air Force stopped work on many other aspects of the CCIC2S
program in late 2004 and subsequently began rebaselining the program in
early 2005. Air Force officials stated the rebaseline was to be
finalized by August 2005; however, it has yet to be approved as of June
2006. According to Air Force officials, pending changes in program
oversight as well as recent DOD and congressional funding estimate
reductions are reasons for the delay in approving the rebaseline. As
currently structured, the rebaseline would again significantly defer
the amount of capability scheduled to be delivered. Specifically,
missile warning critical requirements would not be delivered until
fiscal year 2007, and the schedule for the work on the space portion is
undetermined.
CCIC2S Program Oversight and Controls Have Been Ineffective:
The oversight and control mechanisms of the CCIC2S program have been
inadequate to prevent or mitigate many of the problems it has
experienced. Additionally, the Air Force's contract management approach
limited the program office's ability to thoroughly assess the
reliability of the contractor's cost and schedule performance
information and the impact of defining, prioritizing, and adding
capabilities. Furthermore, the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) did not independently monitor contractor performance. According
to DOD officials, actions are being taken to implement better controls.
DOD Did Not Designate CCIC2S as a Major Acquisition:
Placement into a specific acquisition category (ACAT) determines the
accountability level and analysis requirements of a program. DOD policy
requires major automated information system acquisitions to have high-
level oversight and comprehensive and independent assessments of life-
cycle cost estimates and benefits to ensure they are reasonable and
built on realistic program and schedule assumptions.[Footnote 19] In
determining whether an automated information system acquisition program
warrants a "major" designation, DOD applies dollar value thresholds. If
a program does not meet these thresholds, it can be designated as a
major acquisition based on other factors such as technical complexity.
(See appendix IV for more detail on the designation criteria for
acquisition programs that were in place when the Air Force initiated
the CCIC2S program.)
The CCIC2S program met the dollar threshold criteria for designation as
a major automated information system acquisition program. However, DOD
did not designate the program as a major automated information system
acquisition. According to a senior Air Force Space Command official,
the program was initially considered to be a weapon system acquisition
and therefore below the threshold criteria for designating the program
as a major defense acquisition program. At this lower acquisition
category, oversight for the program was assigned to Air Force
headquarters.
Initial cost estimates for CCIC2S indicated that it should have been
designated as a major automated information system acquisition.
Specifically, at program initiation, CCIC2S's program cost estimate of
about $463 million well exceeded DOD's threshold of $360 million
(fiscal year 1996 constant dollars)--DOD's then-threshold for total
life-cycle costs--for designation as a major automated information
system program (see table 3).[Footnote 20]
Table 3: Air Force Cost Estimate for CCIC2S through Fiscal Year 2007
Before Program Initiation and Designation of Acquisition Category Level
(Fiscal Year 1996 Constant Dollars in Millions):
Funding Type: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation;
Fiscal Year: 2000: $0.4;
Fiscal Year: 2001: $13.0;
Fiscal Year: 2002: $10.4;
Fiscal Year: 2003: $10.2;
Fiscal Year: 2004: $11.9;
Fiscal Year: 2005: $11.5;
Fiscal Year: 2006: $10.6;
Fiscal Year: 2007: $10.7;
Total: $78.7.
Funding Type: Procurement;
Fiscal Year: 2000: 0.9;
Fiscal Year: 2001: 15.3;
Fiscal Year: 2002: 13.6;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 12.4;
Fiscal Year: 2004: 12.4;
Fiscal Year: 2005: 12.4;
Fiscal Year: 2006: 12.4;
Fiscal Year: 2007: 12.4;
Total: 91.8.
Funding Type: Operations and Maintenance;
Fiscal Year: 2000: 3.1;
Fiscal Year: 2001: 42.4;
Fiscal Year: 2002: 45.9;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 43.6;
Fiscal Year: 2004: 42.5;
Fiscal Year: 2005: 38.8;
Fiscal Year: 2006: 38.4;
Fiscal Year: 2007: 38.1;
Total: 292.8.
Funding Type: Total;
Fiscal Year: 2000: 4.4;
Fiscal Year: 2001: 70.7;
Fiscal Year: 2002: 69.8;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 66.2;
Fiscal Year: 2004: 66.7;
Fiscal Year: 2005: 62.8;
Fiscal Year: 2006: 61.4;
Fiscal Year: 2007: 61.2;
Total: 463.2.
Source: Air Force and modified by GAO to fiscal year 1996 constant
dollars.
[End of table]
Additionally, the CCIC2S program is a technically challenging and
complex acquisition. For example, one of the primary goals of the
program is to integrate 40 stovepiped systems into a single common
architecture. The complexity of the CCIC2S effort is further
illustrated by our previous work which showed that the CMU program had
experienced long-standing, serious integration problems, as well as
software development problems with incorporating new
technologies.[Footnote 21]
DOD and Office of Management and Budget have issued guidance[Footnote
22] on conducting analyses that can help decision making on major
automated information system acquisitions. These analyses include:
* an affordability assessment to demonstrate that the program's
resources (including projected funding and manpower requirements) are
realistic and achievable in the context of the DOD component's overall
long-range modernization plan to ensure full funding and funding
stability for the program;
* an economic analysis to determine the best program acquisition
alternative by assessing the net life-cycle costs and benefits of the
proposed program; and:
* an independent estimate of program life-cycle costs.
Taken together, such reviews can give DOD the knowledge it needs to
prevent or mitigate many of the types of problems the CCIC2S program
has experienced.
We have consistently reported that the decision to invest in any system
should be based on reliable analyses of estimated system costs and
expected benefits over the life of the program.[Footnote 23] Without
designation as a major acquisition, the CCIC2S program lacked the high-
level oversight and independent analyses and review that could have
identified key program weaknesses, including:
* funding instability;
* program cost, schedule, and performance problems;
[See PDF for image]
* the mismatch between requirements and available resources; and:
* the inability to prioritize and commit to the program within the
context of other acquisition programs and long-range investment plans.
CCIC2S Milestone Decision Authority Did Not Provide Effective
Oversight:
DOD acquisition policy states that overall program responsibility rests
with the milestone decision authority. In this role, the milestone
decision authority is responsible for ensuring accountability and
maximizing credibility in program cost, schedule, and performance
reporting by reviewing the program throughout its acquisition life
cycle, including (1) whenever the program reaches a milestone decision
point;[Footnote 24] (2) whenever costs, schedule, or performance goals
are baselined or must be changed; and (3) periodically through review
of program status reports.
While the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition--the
designated milestone decision authority for the CCIC2S program--played
an active oversight role from 2000 to 2001, its program oversight
thereafter was minimal, including during the numerous program
rebaselines and attempts to address cost, schedule, and performance
shortfalls. The Assistant Secretary's oversight appears to have been
limited to brief program status updates provided by the program
executive officer as part of a weekly reporting on all programs under
the program executive officer's purview, and, according to DOD
officials, annual and semi-annual program execution and budget reviews.
According to Air Force officials, the Assistant Secretary delegated its
milestone decision authority responsibilities for the program to the
program executive officer level. However, officials from the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and the Office
of the Program Executive Officer were unable to provide us
documentation of a formal delegation of these responsibilities, or
explain why this delegation took place.
Program Lacked Sufficient Management Controls over the Contractor:
In addition to matching requirements to resources, our best practices
work has shown that to better ensure programs deliver capabilities
within expected costs and schedules, program offices must have in place
certain controls, including: (1) assessments of the effects of any
changes in requirements on cost, schedule, and performance goals and
(2) insights into contractor activities and progress to ensure
commitments are implemented.[Footnote 25] The contract to develop
CCIC2S was awarded under a Total System Performance Responsibility
(TSPR) approach, which transfers certain government management
responsibilities from the program office to the contractor.
In the mid-1990s, DOD began making sweeping changes to its acquisition
policy and procedures to streamline its acquisition infrastructure. One
of these reforms was the introduction of the TSPR concept, which gave a
contractor total responsibility for the integration of an entire weapon
system and for meeting DOD's requirements. According to DOD officials,
the Air Force no longer uses TSPR for its acquisition programs due to
the shortcomings resulting from using this management concept. We have
previously reported that TSPR contracts often result in the
government's lacking accurate cost, schedule, and performance
information needed to adequately manage programs because it had to rely
on unverified contractor data.[Footnote 26]
For CCIC2S, the risks inherent in a TSPR approach were exacerbated by
the program office's lack of sufficient staffing to oversee the
definition and prioritization of needed capabilities. Because the Air
Force reduced the number of personnel in the program office from 200 to
between 15 and 30 in an effort to achieve efficiencies, it lacked the
personnel to assess the cost and schedule impacts of defining and
prioritizing requirements on the program. Without such information, the
program office was not in a position to make trade-off decisions
between different types of needed capabilities. According to the
program office, as a result of its inability to manage the requirements
definition and prioritization process, the contractor ended up
communicating directly with the users to help define and prioritize
requirements, sometimes without the knowledge of the program office.
Program officials also noted that they lacked sufficient staff with the
technical knowledge to determine whether contractor cost, schedule, and
performance data were reliable. For example, according to the program
office and the CCIC2S contractor, the program initially called for a
contractor outside of the CCIC2S program to develop air mission
software and provide it to the CCIC2S contractor for integration into
the program. However, shortly after the Air Force initiated the CCIC2S
program, it terminated the air mission software development contract
due to unsatisfactory performance. Subsequently, the users recommended,
and the program office added, the unfinished work to the CCIC2S program
as part of the re-baseline process in January 2001. However, according
to the program office, it was not able to effectively assess the cost
and schedule impacts of this change on the program.
TSPR does not relieve the government of its oversight responsibilities.
Also, according to DCMA officials, the government should conduct
contract surveillance and gauge contractor performance using specific
performance metrics. However, the CCIC2S program office was not always
aware of the contractor's decisions or performance. For example,
program office officials acknowledged that they were not aware of some
re-prioritization of work done by the contractor to meet the users'
needs.
Program Lacked Independent Contractor Performance Assessment:
Acquisition programs commonly use DCMA to monitor higher risk
contracts. Typically, after DOD awards a contract, DCMA can monitor
contractors' information systems to ensure that cost, performance, and
delivery schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of
the contract. According to DCMA officials, however, their involvement
in the CCIC2S program from inception through 2004 was minimal because
DCMA lacked resources and the CCIC2S program office did not request
DCMA assistance until that time. This is despite the fact that in
January 2003, the Air Force and DCMA signed a memorandum of agreement
calling for DCMA assistance on the contract for the CCIC2S program.
The agreement called for DCMA to analyze the contractor's earned value
management (EVM) systems to verify that monthly cost performance
reports and related documents present a valid picture of contract cost
and schedule progress. This type of analysis could have identified
problems with the EVM system and led to corrective actions sooner.
Since 2004, DCMA has been working with the program office and Air Force
systems engineering officials to improve the quality of metrics to
assess cost, technical performance, and risk, as well as to make
improvements to the contractor's EVM system.
Needed Management Controls and Redesignation of CCIC2S Program Are
Being Considered:
DOD is reconsidering CCIC2S's current designation as a non- major
automated information system program. In September 2005, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration notified
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition that it
intended to recategorize the CCIC2S program as a major automated
information system acquisition because of increased funding levels,
national interest in the program, and our review of the program.
Designating the CCIC2S program as a major automated information system
acquisition would put in place the high-level oversight and rigorous
analyses needed to help ensure (1) the program has top-level
accountability and support for the program, (2) DOD has the knowledge
necessary for making trade-offs in program requirements so that they
match available resources, and (3) DOD has the ability to prioritize
and commit to the program within the context of its other acquisition
programs and long-range investment plans. As of June 2006, however, the
office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration has yet to formally make a decision on whether
to designate the program as a major automated information system
acquisition.
According to Air Force and DCMA officials, the program office has taken
several steps, which we did not assess, to address some management
control problems, including the following actions:
* Prohibited direct contact between the contractor and users-
-which they acknowledge had a direct impact on program cost and
schedule performance--to keep the contractor from reprioritizing work
to meet the immediate needs of the users, in 2004. Additionally, the
program office and the contractor implemented an engineering review
board process to evaluate any proposed change in terms of its validity
in relation to validated requirements as well as its impact to program
cost and schedule estimates.
* Initiated a User Feedback Control Board process to identify where
deliverables are not meeting users' needs and assess identified
solutions in terms of their relationship to validated requirements as
well as program cost and schedule implications, beginning in the spring
of 2005.
* Adopted a planning approach that is to more realistically account for
program risks through a consideration of limiting factors such as test
resources and the complexities surrounding installing and testing
hardware and software in Cheyenne Mountain's operational environment.
* Took steps to add technical staff to assess the effects of changes in
requirements on cost, schedule, and performance goals and provide
additional insight into contractor activities.
* Implemented a formal system-level technical review process consisting
of milestones, or gates, each of which have entrance and exit criteria.
For example, deficiencies identified under the formal review must be
addressed prior to proceeding into the next development phase.
Conclusions:
Cheyenne Mountain systems--which are to warn the U.S. and Canada of
air, missile, and space attacks--are critical to national security.
However, since the 1980s, DOD's efforts to modernize these systems have
been fraught with cost increases, schedule delays, and performance
shortfalls. Under the current development effort, the Air Force
continues to defer the completion of key critical space requirements,
placing the DOD's ability to perform air and missile defense and space
situational awareness missions at risk. Without matching requirements
to available resources, the CCIC2S program will continue to flounder.
Failing to conduct this match at the onset of this complex effort led
DOD to develop unrealistic cost and schedule estimates as well as to
over-promise capability. Specifically, the Air Force did not ensure
that the program had stable requirements and a sound process for
clarifying and controlling them, and thus the resources to satisfy the
requirements were severely underestimated. The minimal top-level and
external oversight and accountability of the program contributed to the
problems. Failure to make course corrections now without correcting the
shortfalls will put the program at risk of failing to achieve promised
capability.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Air Force to maintain Cheyenne Mountain's essential operation and
maintenance activities and to limit future development activities to
those deemed critical to national security needs until the Department
takes the following five actions:
* Designate the program as a major automated information system
acquisition.
* Conduct an affordability assessment to demonstrate that the program's
resource estimates are realistic and achievable in terms of DOD's
overall long-range modernization priorities and investment plans for
Cheyenne Mountain. Such an assessment would require ensuring the
requirements baseline is verified and validated and making a match
between these requirements and available resources.
* Conduct an economic analysis to assess the life-cycle costs and
benefits of the program.
* Conduct an independent estimate of program life-cycle costs, to
provide a basis for relying on the cost estimates.
* Determine and clearly delineate oversight responsibilities and
accountability for the successful implementation of CCIC2S.
Additionally, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of
the Air Force to take the following three actions:
* Develop and implement an approach that requires a rigorous analysis
of resource impacts of any change in requirements for continuously
making trade-offs between requirements and resources to ensure a match
is maintained.
* Ensure management controls are in place so that changes to
requirements are decided on the basis of costs, benefits, risks, and
affordability.
* Develop and implement an approach for ensuring program cost and
performance data are reliable.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report.
DOD agreed that the CCIC2S program be designated as a major automated
information system with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks
and Information Integration as the milestone decision authority with
oversight responsibility and accountability for its successful
implementation. In addition, DOD agreed with conducting an
affordability assessment, economic analysis, and independent estimate
of life-cycle costs on future development activities but not with the
current activities due to potential mission impacts. Specifically, DOD
stated these assessments should be conducted on future delivery blocks
of the CCIC2S program, but not on the current block.[Footnote 27] DOD
asserted that its recent $127 million CCIC2S funding reduction across
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)[Footnote 28] pared down CCIC2S
development activities to those essential to national security needs.
We do not disagree with this approach to the extent that continuing
these development activities is critical to national security. However,
continuing CCIC2S development without establishing a match between
requirements and available resources may also hinder DOD's ability to
satisfy national security needs because of the increased risk that the
program fails to achieve its promised capability. While DOD raises the
issue of the cost of delaying the program, it does not address the cost
of proceeding as planned. Our work has shown that in numerous programs,
continuing to spend money on development programs without sufficient
knowledge or clear direction results in cost overruns and schedule
delays. Further, given recent congressional concerns over DOD's
management of CCIC2S,[Footnote 29] demonstrating on a timely basis how
requirements and available resources are to be matched while protecting
national security is especially important. Since an assessment of
CCIC2S's specific operational risks to national security was beyond the
scope of our review, we clarified our recommendation to read that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to limit
future development activities to those deemed critical to national
security needs until the Department takes the actions discussed above.
DOD agreed to take actions relating to establishing and implementing
management controls and approaches to analyze the resource impacts of
changes in requirements and to ensure reliable program data. DOD stated
that these changes had already been implemented or are being planned.
During our review, program and DCMA officials told us that some
changes--such as prohibiting the contractor from reprioritizing work
without Air Force approval and implementing an engineering review board
to assess requirements changes--had been made. However, they also noted
that other measures to manage requirements and institute better
management controls--such as increasing program office management
staffing and capabilities, modifying the work breakdown structure and
earned value management system, and implementing a new approach and
metrics to track program progress--were under way or planned. Given DOD
has not fully demonstrated the effectiveness of the changes it has made
or is making, and that it is planning to make other changes, we are
retaining our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force. We will
also provide copies to others on request. In addition, this report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report or need additional
information, please call me at (202) 512-4841 (shamesl@gao.gov).
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Lisa Shames:
Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
[End of section]
To determine the status of the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command
and Control System, or CCIC2S, in terms of meeting its cost, schedule,
and performance goals, we reviewed our past work to determine whether
the CCIC2S program has continued to experience the problems previous
Cheyenne Mountain upgrade efforts had experienced. We also reviewed
program status reports and budget data and spoke with Department of
Defense (DOD) and contractor officials to assess program cost,
schedule, and performance progress to date. Additionally, we spoke with
CCIC2S users to determine their level of satisfaction with CCIC2S
program performance. Specifically, we reviewed documentation from and
interviewed officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Networks and Information Integration; National Security
Space Office; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis
Improvement Group; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis
and Evaluation; Office of the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Defense Contract
Management Agency's CCIC2S Program Support Team; Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Space
Command; Air Force Air Combat Command; Office of the Air Force Program
Executive Officer for Command and Control and Combat Support; Air Force
Electronic Systems Center; Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
Center; United States Strategic Command; United States Northern
Command; North American Aerospace Defense Command; and Lockheed Martin
Integrated Systems & Solutions.
To gauge the extent to which DOD has followed best practices with
regard to managing program requirements, including matching
requirements to available resources, we reviewed DOD, Office of
Management and Budget, and Air Force acquisition guidance, as well as
our previous best practices work, to determine criteria for managing
requirements. We also reviewed program requirements documentation and
spoke with DOD officials on how DOD developed requirements for the
CCIC2S program. Furthermore, we reviewed requirements management
documentation and spoke with DOD and contractor officials to assess how
the Air Force managed its requirements, including the process it used
for defining and prioritizing the requirements. Specifically, we
reviewed documentation from and conducted interviews with officials in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement
Group; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and
Evaluation; Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation;
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Defense Contract Management
Agency's CCIC2S Program Support Team; Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Space Command; Office of
the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Command and Control and
Combat Support; Air Force Electronic Systems Center; Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center; United States Strategic
Command; United States Northern Command; North American Aerospace
Defense Command; and Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems & Solutions.
To assess DOD's oversight and control mechanisms for Cheyenne Mountain
systems modernization and integration efforts underway and planned, we
reviewed DOD and Air Force acquisition guidance and interviewed
officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group; Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation; Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation; Defense Contract Management Agency's
CCIC2S Program Support Team; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Space Command; Office of the Air
Force Program Executive Officer for Command and Control and Combat
Support; Air Force Electronic Systems Center; Air Force Operational
Test and Evaluation Center; United States Strategic Command; United
States Northern Command; North American Aerospace Defense Command; and
Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems & Solutions.
We conducted our work from July 2005 through April 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Networks And Information Integration:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
6000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-6000:
JUN 23 2006:
Ms. Lisa Shames:
Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Shames:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to GAO draft report 06-
666 "Defense Acquisitions: Further Management and Oversight Changes
Needed for Efforts to Modernize Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning
Systems," dated May 12, 2006 GAO Code 120473). The GAO assessment of
the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System
(CCIC2S) was informative and certainly provided additional insight into
issues the Department was addressing with the Air Force since January
2004. The Department non concurs with the GAO's first recommendation
and concurs with the GAO's second recommendation as reflected in
attachment. The processes and activities described during the GAO fact
finding visits and in the attached response meet the spirit and intent
of the GAO's second recommendation. Therefore the Department considers
GAO's second recommendation as satisfied and this set of actions
closed.
Additionally, the Department conducted a security review of the draft
GAO report and declares it cleared for open publication. The Principal
Action Officer for this effort is Lt Col Martin Edwards and he can be
contacted at (703) 607-0661 or by email at martin.edwards@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John G. Grimes
Attachment:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated May 12, 2006 GAO-06-666 (GAO CODE 120473):
"Defense Acquisitions: Further Management And Oversight Changes Needed
For Efforts To Modernize Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning Systems"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Gao Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that, the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to maintain Cheyenne Mountain's
essential operation and maintenance activities and halt the Combatant
Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System (CCIC2S) development
activities until the Department takes the following five actions:
a) Designate the program as a major automated information system
acquisition;
b) Conduct an affordability assessment to demonstrate that the
program's resource estimates are realistic and achievable in terms of
DOD's overall long-range modernization priorities and investment plans
for Cheyenne Mountain. Such an assessment would require ensuring the
requirements baseline is verified and validated and making a match
between these requirements and available resources;
c) Conduct an economic analysis to assess the life-cycle costs and
benefits of the program;
d) Conduct an independent estimate of program life-cycle costs, to
provide a basis for relying on the cost estimates;
e) Determine and clearly delineate oversight responsibilities and
accountability for the successful implementation of CCIC2S. (p. 23/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD Response:
Recommendation 1: DoD non concurs with the recommendation to halt the
Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System (CCIC2S)
development activities due to mission impacts. Such a delay or halt of
the delivery to replace legacy systems which are plagued with end of
life sustainment problems could severely curtail or impact the
operations of the Command and Control Center.
Rationale:
Halting CCIC2S Spiral 2 will curtail the delivery of the Missile
Warning Release even though the program's developmental testing is
completed and just prior to fielding. Additionally, it delays the
Communications System Upgrade and critical Core Command and Control
(C2) infrastructure replacement by approximately one year (six months
to complete GAO recommended tasks plus six months to reconstitute
development workforce). During the FY07 PB build, DoD reduced the
CCIC2S program by $127M in RDT&E funding across the FYDP, which
significantly pared down the program's development efforts to those
deemed essential to national security needs. Planned CCIC2S Spiral 2
deliveries are key to decommissioning of several increasingly
unsupportable legacy systems. Each of the affected areas is discussed
below:
Missile Analysis and Reporting System (replaces Correlation Center
Processing_ and Display stem - Replace): Halting CCIC2S puts the
ability to support National Decision Authorities with Strategic Missile
Warning at extreme risk. Current plans complete CCIC2S Spiral 2 Missile
Analysis and Reporting System's operational acceptance (OA) in April
2007. This delivery allows decommissioning of the current strategic
missile warning system known as Correlation Center Processing and
Display System - Replace (CCPDS-R) at Cheyenne Mountain and Offutt AFB.
The CCPDS-R is considered obsolete due to end of life sustainment
issues and is expected to be unsupportable by mid-FY09. Halting the
Missile Analysis and Reporting System portion of the program would
impact DoD's ability to support CCIC2S Spiral 2's planned operational
test and fielding and increase operational risk of supporting strategic
missile warning in the near-term.
Communications Processing System - III (replaces Communication System
Segment - Replace : The currently operational Communication System
Segment-Replace (CSSR) capability suffers from very high failure rates
consuming over 270 spare system level components in FY05. Additionally,
the support base is fragile as only three vendors remain that can
sustain the system, which is primarily done through cannibalization of
other sites. The CCIC2S Program Office estimates CSSR will go critical
because of the inability to sustain the system by mid-FY09. If the
system should suffer a major failure prior to being replaced,
STRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC) cannot produce
satellite positional data for Space Order of Battle or provide support
to satellite operations. Space C2 will lack awareness of adversary
satellite position and be unable to correlate events (launch,
maneuvers, breakups, re-entries). It will degrade ability to confirm
adversary actions and provide overflight warning. Additionally,
notification of potential satellite collision/deconfliction will not be
based on best-available data--orbital safety likely degraded. The
Communications Processing System - III upgrade is required prior to
CSSR decommissioning. Halting CCIC2S now would impact ability to
support all activity leading to integration and development testing to
support a planned April 2008 OA.
Space Data Server - Replace (replaces Space Data Server): The Space
Data Server - Replace (SDS-R) replaces the currently operational Space
Data Server. Although the SDS system has logistics support until mid-FY
13, it lost its security accreditation and has the potential to be
removed from the network by the local Designated Approval Authority.
The lack of accreditation of the SDS guarding solution is driving the
need to continue the CCIC2S development and deliver the SDS-R system.
The SDS is operating at an increased security risk because the current
guarding solution, the ISSE guard, is no longer supported by the
developer. This presents an increased vulnerability to attack by
hackers. The SDS system is required to operate under a recurring 90 day
interim authority to operate until such time as the IS SE guard is
replaced. The delivery of the SDS-R will replace the legacy IS SE guard
with the supported Radiant Mercury guard. Removal of the SDS prior to
replacement by SDS-R will have the following affect on the Cheyenne
Mountain Complex mission: satellite positional data cannot be sent to
users outside of Cheyenne Mountain, such as Combatant Commanders,
theater warfighters, national agencies, NASA, civilian space
organizations, and others. The impacts include degraded navigational
accuracy for GPS-guided munitions, limited satellite area overflight
information, decreased space support to special operations forces, and
increased risk to manned space flight safety (International Space
Station & Space Shuttle). Finally, without technical hardware and
software refresh efforts there will be a significant increase in life
cycle O&M costs.
Recommendation la: DoD concurs with the recommendation to designate the
CCIC2S as a major automated information system (MAIS) acquisition. The
program office began the process of establishing a CCIC2S Acquisition
Program Baseline (APB) as an ACAT IAM program. Last fall, CCIC2S
prepared an APB based on Spring 05 Program Executive Officer (PEO) re-
baseline and was prepared to brief the APB to OSD/NII. A $127M RDT&E
funding reduction drove a major restructure of the CCIC2S effort. In
January 2006, the program office worked with the user to reprioritize
program requirements and reestablish a baseline as the CCIC2S program
was significantly restructured. A new APB was established and is in the
coordination process. It is anticipated that OSD NII, the Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA), will approve the new CCIC2S APB in August
2006. CCIC2S will submit their first Defense Acquisition Executive
Summary (DAES) when the APB is approved.
Recommendation lb: DoD partially concurs with the recommendation to
conduct an affordability assessment to demonstrate the program's
resource estimates are realistic and achievable in terms of DOD's
overall long-range modernization priorities and investment plans for
Cheyenne Mountain. An affordability assessment should be accomplished
to ensure overall CCIC2S program can meet all documented requirements
and is affordable; however, DoD non-concurs on halting completion of
CCIC2S Block 1 consisting of Missile Warning, Communications System
Upgrade, and critical Core C2 infrastructure replacement, while the
affordability assessment is conducted. Halting the CCIC2S Block 1
effort has the potential to impact the Cheyenne Mountain's Integrated
Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission. During the CCIC2S
Block 1 APB development the program was rigorously evaluated and found
to be executable within current baseline funding. As part of future
CCIC2S Milestone B preparations an affordability assessment will be
conducted.
Recommendation lc: DoD partially concurs with the recommendation to
conduct an economic analysis to assess the life-cycle costs and
benefits of the program. For the concluding elements of CCIC2S Block 1
it's more appropriate to establish the current "cost estimate" to
complete at this phase of the program. However, for future CCIC2S
Blocks, DoD concurs with the recommendation to conduct an economic
analysis in support of CCIC2S milestone decisions.
Recommendation 1 d: DoD partially concurs with the recommendation to
conduct an independent estimate of program life-cycle costs, to provide
a basis for relying on the cost estimates. Similar to the response to
"RECOMMENDATION 1 c.", DoD concurs with the recommendation for effort
beginning with CCIC2S Block 2 and beyond.
Recommendation le: DoD concurs with the recommendation and CCIC2S is
being addressed as an ACAT IAM program with OSD/NII established as the
Milestone Decision Authority.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that, the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following three
actions:
a) Develop and implement an approach that requires a rigorous analysis
of resource impacts of any change in requirements for continuously
making trade-offs between requirements and resources to ensure a match
is maintained;
b) Ensure management controls are in place so that changes to
requirements are decided on the basis of costs, benefits, risks, and
affordability;
c) Develop and implement an approach for ensuring program cost and
performance data are reliable. (p. 23/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response:
Recommendation 2a: DoD concurs with the recommendation to implement an
approach requiring a rigorous analysis of resource impacts of any
change in requirements for continuously making trade-offs between
requirements and resources to ensure a match is maintained. As briefed
to the GAO auditors during their fact-finding visits in 2005, AFSPACE
established a process where a Joint Requirements Integrated Process
Team (JRIPT) adjudicates user requirements. The prioritized list of
requirements is sent to the CCIC2S Program Management Office to
determine the cost and schedule impacts of implementing these
requirements. Once costs and schedule impacts are known the JRIPT will
then determine if the benefits are significant enough to send the
requirements to the operational approval authority. This enhancement of
the process as well as others planned will ensure that new user
requirements are not incorporated unless they provide operational
benefit that outweighs impacts to cost and schedule.
Recommendation 2b: DoD concurs with the recommendation to ensure
management controls are in place so that changes to requirements are
decided on the basis of costs, benefits, risks, and affordability. As
briefed to the GAO auditors during their fact-finding visits, the
program office re-invigorated their configuration control board (CCB)
to review all proposed changes (i.e. Engineering Change Proposals,
Contract Change Proposals, etc). The CCB is the official forum
authorized to act on proposed changes, not affecting the APB, and
provides information necessary to make changes based on costs,
benefits, risks, and affordability. It is also the entry point for
those items affecting the APB that will require MDA approval before
implementing. The energizing of the CCB is the start of the CCIC2S
Program Office's plan to ensure that requirements are addressed in a
consistent way to minimize impact on the CCIC2S program.
Recommendation 2c: DoD concurs with the recommendation to implement an
approach for ensuring program cost and performance data are reliable.
In FY04, USAF stopped the annual re-evaluation of the CCIC2S baseline
and established a program baseline that affects multi-year efforts for
each of the major CCIC2S Blocks. This change in procedure enables the
CCIC2S Program to provide reliable expectations of capabilities to be
delivered within reasonable costs and schedule projections.
Additionally, the CCIC2S Program Office worked with the contractor to
implement significant changes to improve the Earned Value Management
Reports. Specifically the Work Breakdown Structure was changed to
provide more insight on product deliveries. The percentage of work
packages managed as level-of-effort (LOE) projects vice discrete
efforts was significantly reduced.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Software Development Capability Maturity Model:
Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute, a
federally funded research and development center, has identified
specific processes and practices that have proven successful in
fostering quality software development. The Software Capability
Maturity ModelŽA rates maturity according to the following five levels
of maturity. See table 4 for a description of these maturity levels.
Table 4: Software Capability Maturity ModelŽ Scale:
Level of Maturity: Level 1 (Initial);
Description: The software process is characterized as ad hoc. Success
depends on individual effort.
Level of Maturity: Level 2 (Repeatable);
Description: The basic process is in place to track cost, schedule, and
functionality. Some aspects of the process can be applied to projects
with similar applications.
Level of Maturity: Level 3 (Defined);
Description: There is a standardized software process for the
organization. All projects use some approved version of this process to
develop and maintain software.
Level of Maturity: Level 4 (Managed);
Description: The organization uses and collects detailed data to manage
and evaluate progress and quality.
Level of Maturity: Level 5 (Optimizing);
Description: Quantitative feedback about performance and innovative
ideas and technologies contribute to continuous process improvement.
Source: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University.
[A] Capability Maturity Model is registered in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office by Carnegie Mellon University.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: DOD Acquisition Categories, Thresholds, and Oversight:
Placement into a specific acquisition category (ACAT) determines the
accountability level and analysis requirements of a program. As shown
in table 5, for a major automated information system acquisition, the
milestone decision authority is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration, who is also the DOD Chief
Information Officer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks
and Information Integration may delegate the authority to the DOD
component acquisition executive (such as the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition). For non-major automated information system
acquisitions, the milestone decision authority is the component
acquisition executive or his or her designee.
Table 5: DOD Acquisition Categories and Decision Authorities (as of
March 15, 1996, When the Air Force Initiated the CCIC2S Program):
Acquisition category (ACAT): ACAT I; For major defense acquisition
programs (not for automated information system acquisition programs);
Dollar value (fiscal year 1996 constant dollars)[A]:
* Total expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) of more than $355 million, or for procurement of more than
$2.135 billion;
Milestone decision authority: The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology[B] designates ACAT I programs as ACAT ID or
IC;
* Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT ID: Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology;
* Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IC: Head of DOD Component (such
as the Secretary of the Air Force), or, if delegated, the DOD Component
Acquisition Executive (such as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition).
Acquisition category (ACAT): ACAT IA; For major automated information
system acquisition programs;
Dollar value (fiscal year 1996 constant dollars)[A]:
* Program costs in any single year in excess of $30 million;
* Total program costs in excess of $120 million;
* Total life- cycle costs in excess of $360 million;
Milestone decision authority: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence designates ACAT IA
programs as ACAT IAM or ACAT IAC;
* Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IAM[C] Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence;
* Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IAC: DOD Component Chief
Information Officer (such as the Air Force Chief of Warfighting
Integration and Chief Information Officer, within the office of the
Secretary of the Air Force).
Acquisition category (ACAT): ACAT II; For weapon system acquisition
programs (not for automated information system acquisition programs);
Dollar value (fiscal year 1996 constant dollars)[A]: Does not meet ACAT
I criteria; Total expenditure for research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $140 million, or for procurement of
more than $645 million;
Milestone decision authority: Component Acquisition Executive.
Acquisition category (ACAT): ACAT III;
Dollar value (fiscal year 1996 constant dollars)[A]: Does not meet
criteria for ACAT I, ACAT IA, or ACAT II;
Milestone decision authority: Designee of the DOD Component Acquisition
Executive at the lowest level appropriate.
Source: DOD.
[A] If a program does not meet a dollar threshold, a program can be
designated as a major acquisition based on other factors such as
technical complexity.
[B] The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology is
now the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics.
[C] Currently, the Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IAM programs
is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration--this Assistant Secretary is also the DOD Chief Information
Officer.
Note: These criteria have since been superseded with updated criteria.
This table is drawn from Department of Defense Regulation Number 5000.2-
R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS)
and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs
(Mar. 15, 1996).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Lisa Shames (202) 512-4841:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Art Gallegos, Peter Grana,
Randolph C. Hite, Arturo Holguin, Rich Horiuchi, Gary Mountjoy, Karl
Seifert, Karen Sloan, and Rona B. Stillman made key contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Attack Warning: NORAD's Communications System Segment Replacement
Program Should Be Reassessed. GAO/IMTEC-89-1. Washington, D.C.:
November 30, 1988.
Space Defense: Management and Technical Problems Delay Operations
Center Acquisition. GAO/IMTEC-89-18. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1989.
Attack Warning: Better Management Required to Resolve NORAD Integration
Deficiencies. GAO/IMTEC-89-26. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 1989.
Attack Warning: Defense Acquisition Board Should Address NORAD's
Computer Deficiencies. GAO/IMTEC-89-74. Washington, D.C.: September 13,
1989.
Defense Acquisition: Air Force Prematurely Recommends ADP Acquisitions.
GAO/IMTEC-90-7. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 1990.
Attack Warning: Costs to Modernize NORAD's Computer System
Significantly Understated. GAO/IMTEC-91-23. Washington, D.C.: April 10,
1991.
Computer Technology: Air Attack Warning System Cannot Process All Radar
Track Data. GAO/IMTEC-91-15. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1991.
Attack Warning: Lack of System Architecture Contributes to Major
Development Problems. GAO/IMTEC-92-52. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1992.
Attack Warning: Status of the Survivable Communications Integration
System. GAO/IMTEC-92-61BR. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 1992.
Granite Sentry. GAO/IMTEC-92-84R. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 1992.
Attack Warning: Status of the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program. GAO/
AIMD-94-175. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1994.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Strategic C4 System Modernization and
Plans To Integrate Additional Mission Capabilities. GAO/NSIAD-00-212R.
Washington, D.C.: August 25, 2000.
(120473):
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Attack Warning: Status of Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program,
GAO/AIMD-94-175 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1, 1994).
[2] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on
Weapons Systems Investments, GAO-06-585T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5,
2006).
[3] GAO, Information Technology: DOD's Acquisition Policies and
Guidance Need to Incorporate Additional Best Practices and Controls,
GAO-04-722 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004).
[4] The program was initially known as the North American Aerospace
Defense Command/United States Space Command Warfighting Support System.
The Air Force changed the name of the program to CCIC2S in 2002. Also,
in that same year, DOD merged the responsibilities of the United States
Space Command into the United States Strategic Command.
[5] A cost-plus award fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract
that provides for a fee consisting of a base amount fixed at inception
of the contract and an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation
by the government, sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in
contract performance.
[6] Lockheed Martin Mission Systems is now Lockheed Martin Integrated
Systems & Solutions.
[7] This figure includes the development cost for the system as well as
sustainment activities through this period.
[8] The Space Fence is to replace the aging Air Force Space
Surveillance System, a ground-based radar, that currently performs
detection and tracking of orbiting space objects. The Space Based Space
Surveillance project is developing a constellation of optical sensing
satellites to find, fix, and track objects in Earth orbit.
[9] GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program
Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
30, 2005).
[10] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are
Needed to Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions, GAO-04-
393 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004).
[11] The Air Mission Evolution system was to replace the legacy air
warning system, called Granite Sentry, and provide new communications
systems and processing capability. The Air Mission Evolution system has
not been tested for interoperability with other CCIC2S systems;
interoperability was cited as one of the key shortcomings of the
Granite Sentry legacy system.
[12] Other aspects of requirements management which could contribute to
cost and schedule problems, include, for example, validating the
completeness and correctness of requirements, tracing and verifying
contractual requirements to higher-order program requirements, and
delineating mandatory versus optional requirements in deciding what
requirements can be eliminated or postponed to meet other project
goals. We did not assess these other aspects of requirements management
and their impacts on program execution.
[13] Memorandum for the Defense Acquisition Community, Subject: Update
of the DOD 5000 Documents, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March
15, 1996. Currently, this guidance is located in DOD, Department of
Defense Instruction Number 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System (May 12, 2003).
[14] Memorandum for the Defense Acquisition Community, Subject: Update
of the DOD 5000 Documents, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March
15, 1996. Currently, this guidance is located in DOD, Department of
Defense Instruction Number 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System (May 12, 2003).
[15] Air Force, Single Acquisition Management Plan for the NORAD/
USSPACECOM Warfighting Support System (N/UWSS) Program (July 28, 2000).
[16] Capability Maturity Model is registered in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office by Carnegie Mellon University.
[17] GAO, DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change, GAO-06-257T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005).
[18] Rebaselining can occur at any time and cover any phase of a
defense acquisition program. All rebaselines must be approved by the
milestone decision authority, which has overall responsibility for the
program.
[19] Independent reviews are typically conducted by offices such as the
Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation and its Cost
Analysis Improvement Group.
[20] Department of Defense Regulation Number 5000.2-R, Mandatory
Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major
Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs (Mar. 15,
1996).
[21] GAO, Attack Warning: Lack of System Architecture Contributes to
Major Development Problems, GAO/IMTEC-92-52 (Washington, D.C.: June 11,
1992) and Attack Warning: Better Management Required to Resolve NORAD
Integration Deficiencies, GAO/IMTEC-89-26 (Washington, D.C.: July 7,
1989).
[22] DOD, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0 (Oct.17, 2004);
DOD, Department of Defense Instruction Number 5000.2, Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003); and Office of Management and
Budget, Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition and
Management of Capital Assets (June 21, 2005) and Circular No. A-94:
Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal
Programs (Oct. 29, 1992).
[23] For example, see GAO, DOD Systems Modernization: Planned
Investment in the Naval Tactical Command Support System Needs to Be
Reassessed, GAO-06-215 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2005) and DOD Systems
Modernization: Continued Investment in the Standard Procurement System
Has Not Been Justified, GAO-01-682 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001).
[24] According to DOD guidance, a milestone is a point at which a
recommendation is made and approval sought regarding starting or
continuing an acquisition program.
[25] GAO, Information Technology: DOD's Acquisition Policies and
Guidance Need to Incorporate Best Practices and Controls, GAO-04-722
(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004).
[26] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Demonstrate That Performance-
Based Logistics Contracts Are Achieving Expected Benefits, GAO-05-966
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005).
[27] Under the draft rebaseline plan, the current development block is
to deliver critical missile warning capabilities in fiscal 2007 as well
as communications and space command and control infrastructure upgrades
by the end of fiscal year 2008.
[28] The FYDP is a DOD centralized report consisting of thousands of
program elements that provides information on DOD's current and planned
out-year budget requests and is one of DOD's principal tools to manage
the spending for its transformation of strategic capabilities. The FYDP
provides visibility over DOD's projected spending and helps inform DOD
and Congress about resource data relating to identifying priorities and
trade-offs.
[29] House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations
Bill, 2007: Report of the Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 109-
504 (June 16, 2006) and House of Representatives, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007: Report of the Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives on H.R. 5122, Report No. 109-
452 (May 5, 2006).
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