DOD Excess Property
Control Breakdowns Present Significant Security Risk and Continuing Waste and Inefficiency Gao ID: GAO-06-943 July 25, 2006GAO's previous work found problems in security controls over sensitive excess military equipment that resulted in lost and stolen items, some of which were sold to the public, and significant waste and inefficiency in the Department of Defense (DOD) excess property reutilization program. GAO was asked to perform follow-up investigations to determine whether (1) unauthorized parties could obtain sensitive excess military equipment that requires demilitarization (destruction) when no longer needed by DOD and (2) system and process improvements are adequate to prevent sales of new, unused excess items that DOD continues to buy or that are in demand by the military services.
GAO investigators posing as private citizens to disguise their identity purchased several sensitive military equipment items from DOD's liquidation sales contractor, indicating that DOD has not enforced security controls for preventing sensitive excess military equipment from release to the public. GAO investigators at liquidation sales purchased ceramic body armor inserts currently used by deployed troops, a cesium technology timing unit with global positioning capabilities, a universal frequency counter, 2 guided missile radar test sets, 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft, and numerous other items. GAO was able to purchase these items because controls broke down at virtually every step in the excess property turn-in and disposal process. GAO determined that thousands of military items that should have been demilitarized (destroyed) were sold to the public. Further, in June 2006, GAO undercover investigators posing as DOD contractor employees entered two excess property warehouses and obtained about $1.1 million in sensitive military equipment items, including 2 launcher mounts for shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a digital signal converter used in naval surveillance, an all-band antenna used to track aircraft, and 6 circuit cards used in computerized Navy systems. At no point during GAO's warehouse security penetration were its investigators challenged on their identity and authority to obtain DOD military property. The table below shows examples of sensitive military equipment obtained during GAO's undercover operations. GAO investigators posing as private citizens also bought several new, unused items currently being purchased or in demand by the military services from DOD's excess property liquidation sales contractor. Although military units paid full price for these items when they ordered them from supply inventory, GAO paid a fraction of this cost to purchase the same items, demonstrating continuing waste and inefficiency.
GAO-06-943, DOD Excess Property: Control Breakdowns Present Significant Security Risk and Continuing Waste and Inefficiency
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
July 2006:
DOD Excess Property:
Control Breakdowns Present Significant Security Risk and Continuing
Waste and Inefficiency:
GAO-06-943:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-943, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
GAO‘s previous work found problems in security controls over sensitive
excess military equipment that resulted in lost and stolen items, some
of which were sold to the public, and significant waste and
inefficiency in the Department of Defense (DOD) excess property
reutilization program. GAO was asked to perform follow-up
investigations to determine whether (1) unauthorized parties could
obtain sensitive excess military equipment that requires
demilitarization (destruction) when no longer needed by DOD and (2)
system and process improvements are adequate to prevent sales of new,
unused excess items that DOD continues to buy or that are in demand by
the military services.
What GAO Found:
GAO investigators posing as private citizens to disguise their identity
purchased several sensitive military equipment items from DOD‘s
liquidation sales contractor, indicating that DOD has not enforced
security controls for preventing sensitive excess military equipment
from release to the public. GAO investigators at liquidation sales
purchased ceramic body armor inserts currently used by deployed troops,
a cesium technology timing unit with global positioning capabilities, a
universal frequency counter, 2 guided missile radar test sets, 12
digital microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft, and numerous other
items. GAO was able to purchase these items because controls broke down
at virtually every step in the excess property turn-in and disposal
process. GAO determined that thousands of military items that should
have been demilitarized (destroyed) were sold to the public. Further,
in June 2006, GAO undercover investigators posing as DOD contractor
employees entered two excess property warehouses and obtained about
$1.1 million in sensitive military equipment items, including 2
launcher mounts for shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of
body armor, a digital signal converter used in naval surveillance, an
all-band antenna used to track aircraft, and 6 circuit cards used in
computerized Navy systems. At no point during GAO‘s warehouse security
penetration were its investigators challenged on their identity and
authority to obtain DOD military property. The table below shows
examples of sensitive military equipment obtained during GAO‘s
undercover operations.
Figures: Sensitive Military Equipment Obtained during GAO's Undercover
Tests:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO, Moog Corporation for antenna.
[End of Figures]
GAO investigators posing as private citizens also bought several new,
unused items currently being purchased or in demand by the military
services from DOD‘s excess property liquidation sales contractor.
Although military units paid full price for these items when they
ordered them from supply inventory, GAO paid a fraction of this cost to
purchase the same items, demonstrating continuing waste and
inefficiency.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO briefed DOD and military service management on the results of its
investigations and provided perspectives on ways to resolve the control
breakdowns that resulted in public sales of sensitive excess military
equipment and new, unused excess items that the military services are
continuing to use. In addition, GAO asked DOD to comment on a draft of
its report. In its comments, DOD stated that given the time allotted to
comment, the department was not able to do a detailed review and has no
comments at this time. DOD also commented that it continues to
implement changes to procedures based on GAO‘s May 2005 report (GAO-05-
277).
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-943].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202)
512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Summary of Investigation:
Background:
Undercover Acquisitions of Sensitive Excess Military Items Identifies
National Security Risk:
Waste Associated with Sales of A-Condition Excess Items that Military
Services Are Continuing to Use in Operations:
Corrective Action Briefing:
Conclusions:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: DOD Excess Property Demilitarization Codes
Appendix II: Excess Property Condition Codes:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD Excess Property Demilitarization Codes:
Table 2: Excess Property Condition Codes:
Figures:
Figure 1: Example of Small Arms Protective Inserts Purchased in March
2006:
Figure 2: Excess DOD Time Selector Unit Purchased in March 2006:
Figure 3: Enlarged Photograph of One of the Excess DOD Microcircuits
Purchased in April 2006:
Figure 4: Guided Weapon Radar Test Sets Purchased in April 2006:
Figure 5: Example of the Universal Frequency Counter Purchased in April
2006:
Figure 6: Optical Instrument Lenses Used in Fire Control Technology on
the M-901A Anti-tank Vehicle Sold to the Public in January 2006:
Figure 7: Example of Excess Body Armor Vest Sold to the Public in March
2006:
Figure 8: Guided Missile Mount Obtained from DRMO A during the June
2006 Undercover Penetration:
Figure 9: One of the Kevlar Body Armor Fragmentation Vests Obtained
from DRMO A during the June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
Figure 10: Digital Signal Converter Obtained from DRMO A during the
June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
Figure 11: All-band Antenna Obtained from DRMO A during the June 2006
Undercover Penetration:
Figure 12: Body Armor Fragmentation Vest Obtained from DRMO B during
the June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
Figure 13: Throat and Groin Protection Armor Obtained from DRMO B
during the June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
Figure 14: Circuit Card Assemblies Obtained from DRMO B during the June
2006 Undercover Penetration:
Figure 15: Example of Excess DOD Palm V Organizers and Accessories
Obtained from DRMO B during the June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
Figure 16: Example of New, Unused Wet-Weather Parkas Purchased in March
2006:
Figure 17: New, Unused Cold-Weather Parka Purchased by GAO in May 2006:
Figure 18: New, Unused Portable Field X-ray Processing Enclosure
Purchased in April 2006:
Figure 19: New, Unused DOD High-Security Lock Purchased in April 2006:
Figure 20: New, Unused DOD Gasoline Engine Purchased in March 2006:
Figure 21: New, Unused Refrigerant Recovery System Purchased in April
2006:
Abbreviations:
CCLI: Commerce Control List Item:
C.F.R.: Code of Federal Regulations:
DAISY: DRMS Automated Information System:
DLA: Defense Logistics Agency:
DLIS: Defense Logistics Information System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DRMO: Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office:
DRMS: Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service:
EUC: End-Use Certificate:
FedLog: Federal Logistics System:
GSA: General Services Administration:
IT: Information Technology:
JSLIST: Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology:
MLI: Military List Item:
NSN: National stock number:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
PDA: Personal Digital Assistant:
SAPI: Small Arms Protective Inserts:
U.S.C. : United States Code:
July 25, 2006:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Our May 2005 report[Footnote 1] stated that the Department of Defense
(DOD) reported $466 million in lost, damaged, and missing excess
property from fiscal years 2002 through 2004, including property with
demilitarization restrictions,[Footnote 2] such as chemical and
biological protective suits, body armor, and guided missile warheads.
Some of the restricted items had been sold to the public. Further, our
May 2005 report noted that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the
military services needlessly spent at least $400 million to purchase
new items instead of reusing identical excess items in new and unused
condition (A-condition).[Footnote 3] As a result, the new, unused
excess items were sold for pennies on the dollar. In response to our
May 2005 report, at the June 2005 oversight hearing by the Subcommittee
on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, DOD
officials stated that controls were adequate to prevent items requiring
demilitarization from being released to unauthorized parties. In
addition, DOD officials promised to have system enhancements in place
in January 2006 to assure that excess items in new and unused condition
that the military services are continuing to use are returned to
inventory and reutilized within DOD to avoid unnecessary purchases.
This report responds to your request that we perform follow-up
investigations to determine whether (1) unauthorized parties could
obtain sensitive excess military equipment that requires
demilitarization when no longer needed by DOD and (2) systems and
process improvements are adequate to prevent liquidation sales of A-
condition items that DOD is continuing to buy or that are in demand by
the military services.
Using investigative techniques and acting in an undercover capacity to
disguise our identity, we tested DOD systems and controls to see if we
could obtain sensitive excess military equipment and technology items
that require demilitarization and should not be available to the
public. We used DOD's Federal Logistics (FedLog) system information to
identify and validate the population of military equipment and
technology items that require demilitarization. We then identified
public sales of excess military items that required demilitarization by
total destruction when no longer needed by DOD to prevent these items
from falling into the wrong hands. Next, we tested the systems and
controls by making undercover purchases of military equipment and
technology items from DOD's liquidation sales contractor.[Footnote 4]
In making these purchases we used a fictitious identity to obtain End-
Use Certificates (EUC)[Footnote 5] where this documentation was
required as a condition of sale. For sales where we were outbid, we
tracked the bid activity to identify the winning bidders. We are
referring these purchases and numerous other public purchases of items
that should have been demilitarized to federal law enforcement agencies
for further investigation. In addition, we used publicly available
information to develop undercover techniques to penetrate Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) excess property warehouses.
To determine whether DOD was continuing to sell A-condition items that
were still being purchased or were in demand by the military services,
we monitored DOD's liquidation contractor sales to identify new, unused
items. We targeted items for undercover purchases where our research
identified ongoing or recent procurements and active supply inventory
status of these items. We also monitored DOD actions to implement
improvements in excess property systems, processes, and controls in
response to our May 2005 audit recommendations. We analyzed Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) data to determine if
reutilization rates of A-condition excess property increased during the
first three quarters of fiscal year 2006. We conducted our
investigations from November 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with
quality standards for investigators as set forth by the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Summary of Investigation:
We used a fictitious identity posing as a private citizen to purchase
numerous sensitive excess DOD military technology items that should
have been demilitarized instead of being sold to the public. Sensitive
excess military equipment purchased by our investigator at DOD
liquidation sales auctions included ceramic body armor inserts
currently used by deployed troops; a time selector unit used to ensure
the accuracy of computer-based equipment, such as global positioning
systems and system-level clocks; a universal frequency counter used to
ensure that the frequency of communication gear is running at the
expected rate; 2 guided missile radar test sets, at least 12 digital
microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft; and numerous other
sensitive electronic parts. We were able to purchase these items
because controls broke down at virtually every step in the excess
property turn-in and disposal process.
In addition, posing as DOD contractor employees[Footnote 6] our
undercover investigators were able to easily penetrate security at two
separate excess property warehouses in June 2006. There, they were able
to obtain, at no cost, numerous sensitive military equipment items
valued at about $1.1 million that should not have been released outside
of DOD. The items we obtained included two launcher mounts for shoulder-
fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a digital signal
converter used in naval electronic surveillance, an all-band antenna
used to track aircraft, six circuit cards used in computerized Navy
systems, and several other items in use by the military services. The
body armor could be used in terrorist or other criminal activity. Many
of the other military items have weapons applications that also would
be useful to terrorists. Our undercover investigators were able to
obtain these items because DRMO personnel did not confirm their
identity and authorization to requisition excess DOD property items.
The DRMO personnel even helped our undercover investigators load the
items into our van.
We also made several undercover purchases of new, unused A-condition
excess DOD items, including wet-weather parkas, cold-weather desert
camouflage parkas, a portable field x-ray processing enclosure, high-
security locks used to secure the back bay of trucks, a gasoline
engine, and a refrigerant recovery system used for servicing automotive
vehicles. The items we purchased at DOD liquidation sales were being
ordered from supply inventory by military units at or near the time of
our purchases. In the case of one supply-depot-stocked item--the
portable x-ray enclosure--no items were in stock at the time of our
purchase. At the time we made our purchase, DOD's liquidation
contractor sold 40 of these x-ray enclosures with a total reported
acquisition cost of $289,400 for a liquidation sales price of $2,914--
about a penny on the dollar. In another example, we purchased a
gasoline engine in March 2006 for $355. The Marine Corps ordered 4 of
these gas engines from Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supply inventory
in June 2006 and paid $3,119 each for them. At the time of our
undercover purchase, 20 identical gasoline engines with a reported
acquisition cost of $62,380 were sold to the public for a total
liquidation sales price of $6,221. Our investigation demonstrated that
the problems we reported in May 2005 have not been fully resolved and
that there is continuing waste and inefficiency in DOD's excess
property reutilization program.
Our May 2005 report included 13 recommendations to address problems in
accountability over sensitive military items and the economy and
efficiency of DOD's excess property reutilization program. Thus, we are
making no new recommendations in this report. We provided a corrective
action briefing to DOD on June 28, 2006, and we provided a draft of our
report to DOD for comment on July 10, 2006. The Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness responded that given
the time allotted to comment, the Department was not able to do a
detailed review and has no comments at this time. DOD's comment letter
is reprinted in appendix III.
Background:
Over the past several years, we reported[Footnote 7] that serious
breakdowns in management processes, systems, and controls have resulted
in substantial waste and inefficiency in DOD's excess property
reutilization program. Our June 2002 testimony and our November 2003
report documented instances where DOD sold to the public items such as
Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)[Footnote
8] and other chemical and biological protective suits and related gear
that should have been restricted to DOD use only. Our November 2003
report also identified several examples that showed that at the same
time DOD excessed biological equipment items in good or excellent
condition and sold many of them to the public for pennies on the
dollar, it was purchasing the same or similar items. Our May 2005
report stated that DOD reported $466 million in lost, damaged, and
missing excess property from fiscal years 2002 through 2004, including
property with demilitarization restrictions, such as chemical and
biological protective suits, body armor, and guided missile warheads.
Some of the restricted items had been sold to the public. We also
reported that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the military services
purchased at least $400 million of identical items instead of using
available excess items in new and unused condition.
At the time of our May 2005 report, waste and inefficiency occurred
because condition codes were assigned to excess property that
incorrectly identified it as unusable and DOD lacked adequate systems
and processes for assuring that excess items in A-condition were reused
to avoid unnecessary purchases. We also found that DOD lacked adequate
security over excess items requiring demilitarization, resulting in
losses reported by DRMOs of nearly 150 chemical and biological
protective suits, over 70 units of body armor, and 5 guided missile
warheads. Losses reported by DLA supply depots included thousands of
sensitive military items, such as weapons system components and
aircraft parts.
Undercover Acquisitions of Sensitive Excess Military Items Identifies
National Security Risk:
Our undercover investigators purchased several sensitive excess
military equipment items that were improperly sold to the public at DOD
liquidation sales. These items included 3 ceramic body armor inserts
identified as small arms protective inserts (SAPI), which are the
ceramic inserts currently in demand by soldiers in Iraq and
Afghanistan; a time selector unit used to ensure the accuracy of
computer-based equipment, such as global positioning systems and system-
level clocks; 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 Tomcat fighter
aircraft; guided missile radar test sets used to check the operation of
the data link antenna on the Navy's Walleye (AGM-62) air- to-ground
guided missile; and numerous other electronic items. In instances where
DOD required an EUC as a condition of sale, our undercover investigator
was able to successfully defeat the screening process by submitting
bogus documentation and providing plausible explanations for
discrepancies in his documentation. We identified at least 79 buyers
for 216 sales transactions involving 2,669 sensitive military items
that DOD's liquidation contractor sold to the public between November
2005 and June 2006. We are referring information on these sales to the
appropriate federal law enforcement agencies for further investigation.
Posing as DOD contractor employees, our investigators also entered
DRMOs in two east coast states, and obtained about $1.1 million in
excess military items that required demilitarization as well several
other items that are currently in use by the military services. DRMO
personnel even helped us load the items into our van. These items
included 2 launcher mounts for shoulder-fired guided missiles, an all-
band antenna used to track aircraft, 16 body armor vests, body armor
throat and groin protectors, 6 circuit card assemblies used in
computerized Navy systems, and 2 Palm V personal data assistant (PDA)
organizers.
Sensitive Excess Military Items Purchased at DOD Excess Property
Liquidation Sales:
Using a fictitious identity as a private citizen, our undercover
investigator applied for and received an account with DOD's liquidation
sales contractor. The undercover investigator was then able to purchase
several sensitive excess military items that were being improperly sold
to the public. During our undercover purchases, our investigator
engaged in numerous conversations with liquidation sales contractor
staff during warehouse inspections of items advertised for sale and
DRMS and DLA Criminal Investigative Activity (DCIA) staff during the
processing of our EUCs. On one occasion our undercover investigator was
told by a DCIA official that information provided on his EUC
application had no match to official data and that he had no credit
history. Our investigator responded with a plausible story and
submitted a bogus utility bill to confirm his mailing address.
Following these screening procedures, the EUC was approved by DCIA and
our undercover investigator was able to purchase targeted excess
military items. Once our initial EUC was approved, our subsequent EUC
applications were approved based on the information on file. The
following discussion presents the case study details of our undercover
purchases of sensitive excess military items that should have been
destroyed when no longer needed by DOD and should not have been sold to
the public. Although these items had a reported acquisition cost of
$461,427, we paid a liquidation sales price of $914 for them--less than
a penny on the dollar.
Small arms protective insert. In March 2006, our undercover
investigator purchased 3 ceramic body armor inserts identified as small
arms protective inserts (SAPI), which are the ceramic inserts currently
in demand by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. SAPI are designed to
slide into pockets sewn into the front and back of military vests in
order to protect the warfighter's chest and back from small arms fire.
The SAPI had been improperly included in a batch lot of items that did
not require demilitarization. The batch lot reportedly contained 609
items, including shelter half-tents, canteens and canteen covers, small
tools, first aid pouches, insect nets, barracks bags and waterproof
bags, small arms cases, miscellaneous field gear, and the SAPI. We paid
$129 for the batch lot, which had a reported acquisition cost of
$1,471. The SAPI have a demilitarization code of D, which requires them
to be destroyed when no longer needed by DOD rather than being sold to
the public. Figure 1 shows a photograph of one of the SAPI that we
purchased.
Figure 1: Example of Small Arms Protective Inserts Purchased in March
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Time selector unit. In March 2006, our undercover investigator
purchased an excess DOD time selector unit used to ensure the accuracy
of computer-based equipment, such as global positioning systems and
system-level clocks. According to our Chief Technologist, this
technology is important because it prevents users in the battlefield
from exposing their position to get timing signals from outside
sources. We paid $65 for the time selector unit, which had an original
acquisition cost of $343,695. Also, although the unit was listed as
being in F7 condition (unserviceable, reparable condition), it appeared
to be in working order.
The time selector unit had a demilitarization code of D, which required
it to be destroyed when no longer needed by DOD. The unit also had a
FedLog controlled inventory item code (CIIC) of 7, which indicates it
is a classified item that requires protection in the interest of
national security, in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information
Security Program.[Footnote 9]
Although the link on the national stock number (NSN)[Footnote 10]
included on DOD's liquidation contractor's Internet sale Web site
showed this item was assigned a demilitarization code of D, it was sold
to the public as a trade security controlled item--demilitarization
code B. As such, we were required to complete an application and obtain
an approved EUC. Our undercover investigator submitted bogus
information on his EUC application. A DCIA official contacted our
undercover investigator and told him that the information on his
application did not match official data and he had no credit history.
After responding with a plausible story and submitting a bogus utility
bill to document our mailing address, our EUC for the time selector
unit was approved in April 2006. Figure 2 shows a photograph of the
excess DOD time selector unit we purchased.
Figure 2: Excess DOD Time Selector Unit Purchased in March 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Digital microcircuits. Our undercover investigator purchased a total of
82 excess DOD digital microcircuits, including 12 microcircuits used on
the F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft. Because of their sensitive
technology, the microcircuits had a demilitarization code of D, which
requires their total destruction when they are no longer needed by DOD.
The 12 microcircuits also had a CIIC of 7, which indicates they are
classified items that require protection in the interest of national
security, in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R. In violation of DOD
demilitarization policy for D coded items, the microcircuits were
improperly included in a batch lot with several other electronic items
that did not require demilitarization. Further, only 12 of the 82
demilitarization code D microcircuits that we purchased were listed on
the liquidation sale advertisement. We paid approximately $58 for the
entire batch lot, which included a total of 591 items with a reported
acquisition cost of $112,700. Because several items in the batch lot
had demilitarization codes that designated them as trade security
control items restricted by the U.S. Munitions List or the Commerce
Control List of the U.S. Department of Commerce, an EUC was required
for approval of our purchase. Our EUC for the digital microcircuits was
approved in May 2006 based on our bogus information already on file.
Figure 3 shows an enlarged photograph of one of the microcircuits that
were improperly sold to our undercover investigator.
Figure 3: Enlarged Photograph of One of the Excess DOD Microcircuits
Purchased in April 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Guided weapon radar test sets. Two guided weapon radar test sets were
included in the batch lot with the digital microcircuits that our
undercover investigator purchased from DOD's liquidation sales
contractor in April 2006. The test sets, which were advertised for sale
as radar test sets, are used to check the operation of the data link
antenna on the Navy's Walleye (AGM-62) air-to-ground guided missile
delivered by the F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft. The Walleye is
designed to deliver a self-guided high-explosive weapon from an attack
aircraft to a surface target. Because of their sensitive technology the
test sets have a demilitarization code of B, which requires an EUC for
trade security purposes. Figure 4 shows a photograph of the guided
weapon test sets that we purchased and obtained using bogus EUC
documentation.
Figure 4: Guided Weapon Radar Test Sets Purchased in April 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Universal frequency counter. The new, unused universal frequency
counter purchased by our undercover investigator was manufactured
(initially calibrated) in February 2003. DOD awarded a contract to
Fluke Corporation in 2002 for 67 of these items, which are designed to
count the speed at which an electrical system fluctuates. According to
a manufacturer official, this item's military application is to ensure
the frequency of communication gear is running at the expected rate.
The universal frequency counter has a demilitarization code of B, which
requires trade security control under the U.S. Munitions List. We paid
a total of $475 for this item, which had a reported acquisition cost of
$1,685. In April 2006, when we purchased the universal frequency
counter, DOD's liquidation sales contractor sold a total of 15 of these
items for $5,506, or about $367 per unit. The 15 items had a reported
total acquisition value of $25,275, or $1,685 per unit. The bogus
paperwork that we submitted with our EUC application was approved by
DCIA in May 2006. Figure 5 shows a photograph of the unit that we
purchased.
Figure 5: Example of the Universal Frequency Counter Purchased in April
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Directional coupler. In March 2006, our undercover investigator
purchased an excess military item advertised as a directional coupler
from DOD's liquidation sales contractor. We paid $186 for the sales
lot, which contained a total of 8 electronic equipment and supply items
with a listed acquisition cost of $1,200. According to FedLog, the
directional coupler advertised had an actual acquisition cost of
$1,876. This directional coupler is used in the F-14 Tomcat fighter
aircraft to monitor, measure, isolate, or combine electronic signals.
Because of its technology, this directional coupler has a
demilitarization designation code of D, which required it to be
destroyed when no longer needed by DOD. The directional coupler also
had a CIIC of 7, which indicates it is a classified item that requires
protection in the interest of national security, in accordance with DOD
5200.1-R. However, after receiving the item, we discovered that it was
not the item identified by the national stock number in the sales
advertisement. As a result, it appears that DOD not only lost
accountability over the actual item identified in its excess property
inventory, but advertised and recorded a public sale of a sensitive
military item on the U.S. Munitions List, which was required to be
disposed of by destruction in accordance with DOD demilitarization
policy.[Footnote 11]
Additional Sales of Sensitive Excess Military Items Targeted for
Undercover Purchase:
We observed numerous sales of additional excess sensitive military
items that were improperly advertised for sale or sold to the public,
including fire control components for weapon systems, body armor, and
weapon system components. The demilitarization codes for these items
required either key point or total destruction rather than disposal
through public sale. Although we placed bids to purchase some of these
items, we lost to higher bidders. We identified at least 79 buyers for
216 public liquidation sales transactions involving 2,669 sensitive
military items. We are referring these sales to federal law enforcement
agencies for further investigation and recovery of the sensitive
military equipment. The following discussion highlights the details of
sales of sensitive military equipment items that we observed or
targeted for purchase but did not obtain because we were outbid during
the respective sales auctions.
Optical fire control items. Our investigative team identified a January
2006 sale of excess U.S. Army Armament Command optical instrument
prisms and optical lenses. DOD data showed that these optical
instruments are components of the fire control sighting mechanism used
in the M-901A Improved Armored Anti-tank vehicle. The M-901A fires the
TOW 2 series missiles. Our Chief Technologist advised us that both the
prisms and lenses are high-quality optical sighting equipment used in
the fire control system of the M-901A. We made an undercover visit to
one of DOD's liquidation contractor sales facilities to inspect the
prisms in January 2006. Our inspection of the items listed for sale
disclosed that the property label on the boxes listed 11 optical
instrument prisms with an acquisition cost of $93,093. Although the
demilitarization code of Q listed on the property label for the prisms
identified them as requiring trade security control as an item on the
Commerce Control List, the NSN listed for the prisms in fact related to
a demilitarization code of D, which required their total destruction
when no longer needed by DOD. Upon further inspection, we found that
the items labeled as prisms were in sealed manufacturer packages that
listed them as optical instrument lenses, not prisms. The NSN
associated with the 11 lenses indicated that they had a total
acquisition cost of $1,859 and a demilitarization code of D, requiring
their total destruction rather than disposal by public sale. The
mislabeling of these items indicates that DOD may have lost
accountability over both the prisms and the lenses. Both the prisms and
the lenses have a controlled CIIC code of 7, which indicates they are
classified items that require protection in the interest of national
security, in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R. We bid $550 for the lenses
and lost to a higher bidder, who paid $909 for them. Figure 6 is a
photograph of one of the boxes labeled as containing prisms that
actually contained lenses.
Figure 6: Optical Instrument Lenses Used in Fire Control Technology on
the M-901A Anti-tank Vehicle Sold to the Public in January 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Body armor. Our investigative team also identified a March 2006
liquidation sale of body armor fragmentation vests. Upon our visit to
the sales warehouse, we identified a total of four body armor
fragmentation protective vests in two separate sales lots. According to
the NSN, all of the items sold had a demilitarization code of E, which
required either key point or total destruction of the item when no
longer needed by DOD. We did not bid on this sale, but have included it
in our referrals to federal law enforcement agencies for follow-up
investigations. Figure 7 shows a photograph of the actual body armor
vest that that we observed for sale in March 2006.
Figure 7: Example of Excess Body Armor Vest Sold to the Public in March
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
During our undercover operations, we also noted 13 advertised sales
events, including 179 items that were subject to demilitarization
controls, where the items were not sold. In 5 of these sales involving
113 sensitive military parts, it appears that DOD or its liquidation
sales contractor caught the error in demilitarization codes and pulled
the items from sale. One of these instances involved an F-14 fin panel
assembly that we had targeted for an undercover purchase. During our
undercover inspection of this item prior to sale, a contractor official
told our investigator that the government was in the process of
changing demilitarization codes on all F-14 parts and it was likely
that the fin panel assembly would be removed from sale. Of the
remaining 8 sales lots containing 66 sensitive military parts, we could
not determine whether the items were not sold because DOD or its
contractor caught the demilitarization coding errors or because minimum
bids were not received during the respective sales events.
Sensitive Military Items Obtained Through Inside Penetrations of DRMO
Security:
Our investigators used publicly available information to develop
fictitious identities as DOD contractor personnel and enter DRMO
warehouses (referred to as DRMO A and DRMO B) in two east coast states
on separate occasions in June 2006, to requisition excess sensitive
military parts and equipment valued at about $1.1 million. Our
investigators were able to search for and identify excess items without
supervision. In addition, DRMO personnel assisted our investigators in
locating other targeted items in the warehouse and loading these items
into our van. At no point during either visit did DRMO personnel
attempt to verify with the actual contractor that our investigators
were, in fact, contractor employees.
During the undercover penetration, our investigators obtained numerous
sensitive military items that were required to be destroyed when no
longer needed by DOD to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.
These items included two guided missile launcher mounts for shoulder-
fired missiles, several types of body armor, an all-band antenna used
to track aircraft, six circuit card assemblies used in Navy
computerized systems, a digital signal converter used in naval
electronic surveillance, and two Palm V personal digital assistants
(PDA) that were certified as having their hard drives removed.
Shortly after leaving the second DRMO, our investigators received a
call from a contractor official whose employees they had impersonated.
The official had been monitoring his company's requisitions of excess
DOD property and noticed transactions that did not appear to represent
activity by his company. He contacted personnel at DRMO A, obtained the
phone number on our excess property screening letter, and called us.
Upon receiving the call from the contractor official, our lead
investigative agent explained that he was with GAO and we had performed
a government test.
DRMO A Penetration:
The following discussion presents the details of our case study
requisitions of sensitive military items we obtained during our
penetration of the first east coast DRMO.
Guided missile launcher mounts. Posing as DOD contractor employees, our
undercover investigators entered DRMO A in June 2006 and requisitioned
two excess DOD shoulder-fired guided missile launcher mounts with a
total reported acquisition cost of $6,246. The missile launcher mounts
provide the electrical connection between the round and the tracker and
contain a remote firing mechanism for the wire-guided Dragon missiles.
While the Dragon has been replaced by newer technology missiles, it is
a man-portable, shoulder-fired, medium antitank weapon system that can
defeat armored vehicles, fortified bunkers, concrete gun emplacements,
and other hardened targets. Under department demilitarization policy,
missile launcher mounts have a demilitarization code of C, which
requires removal and/or demilitarization of installed key point(s) or
lethal parts, components, and accessories to prevent them from falling
into the wrong hands. The missile launcher mounts also have a CIIC code
of 7, which indicates they are classified items that require protection
in the interest of national security, in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R.
Figure 8 shows a photograph of one of the guided missile launcher
mounts obtained by GAO.
Figure 8: Guided Missile Mount Obtained from DRMO A during the June
2006 Undercover Penetration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Kevlar body armor fragmentation vests. Our undercover investigators
obtained six Kevlar body armor fragmentation vests with a total
reported acquisition cost of $2,049 from DRMO A during our June 2006
security penetration. This body armor has a woodland camouflage pattern
and was designed for use by ground troops and parachutists. Although
the Kevlar fragmentation vest has been replaced by newer technology, it
is still considered a sensitive military item and has a
demilitarization code of E, which identifies it as critical items/
materiel determined to require demilitarization, either key point or
total destruction. The Kevlar fragmentation vests also have a CIIC code
of 7, which indicates they are classified items that require protection
in the interest of national security, in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R.
Figure 9 shows a photograph of one of the fragmentation vests obtained
during our undercover penetration.
Figure 9: One of the Kevlar Body Armor Fragmentation Vests Obtained
from DRMO A during the June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Digital signal converter. During the undercover penetration at DRMO A,
our investigators also obtained a DOD digital signal converter with a
reported acquisition cost of $882,586. The digital signal converter is
used as part of a larger surveillance system on the Navy's E2C Hawkeye
early warning and control aircraft. Under department demilitarization
policy, this digital signal converter has a demilitarization code of D
that requires it to be destroyed when no longer needed by DOD. This
signal converter also has a CIIC code of 7, which indicates it is a
classified item that requires protection in the interest of national
security, in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R. Figure 10 shows a photograph
of the digital signal converter our investigators obtained from DRMO A.
Figure 10: Digital Signal Converter Obtained from DRMO A during the
June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
All-band antenna. Our undercover investigators identified and
requisitioned a new, unused all-band antenna during their June 2006
security penetration at DRMO A. According to manufacturer information,
the antenna is a high-powered portable unit that is used by the Air
Force to track aircraft. The antenna can be tripod-mounted or mounted
on a portable shelter. The new, unused all-band antenna, which was
purchased by DOD in 2003, had a reported acquisition cost of $120,000.
A manufacturer representative told our investigator that this antenna
is currently in production. Under department demilitarization policy,
this all-band antenna has a demilitarization code of D that requires it
to be destroyed when no longer needed by DOD. This antenna also has a
CIIC code of 7, which indicates it is a classified item that requires
protection in the interest of national security, in accordance with DOD
5200.1-R. Figure 11 shows a photograph of the all-band antenna obtained
during our undercover penetration of security at DRMO A.
Figure 11: All-band Antenna Obtained from DRMO A during the June 2006
Undercover Penetration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
DRMO B Penetration:
Posing as employees for the same DOD contractor identity used during
our June 2006 penetration at DRMO A, our investigators entered DRMO B a
day later for the purpose of testing security controls at that
location. DRMO officials appeared to be unaware of our security
penetration at DRMO A the previous day. During the DRMO B undercover
penetration, our investigators obtained the following items, most of
which had demilitarization requirements.
Body armor fragmentation vests. Our undercover investigators obtained
10 body armor fragmentation vests with a total reported acquisition
cost of $290 from DRMO B. Although the protective capability of this
body armor has been superseded by newer technology, it would still
provide firearm protection to terrorists or criminals. These
fragmentation vests have a demilitarization code of E, which identifies
them as critical items/materiel determined to require demilitarization,
either key point or total destruction. Figure 12 shows a photograph of
one the 10 fragmentation vests obtained during our undercover
penetration.
Figure 12: Body Armor Fragmentation Vest Obtained from DRMO B during
the June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Throat and groin protection armor. Our undercover investigators also
obtained a Kevlar throat protector related to the camouflage body
armor. The throat protector had a reported acquisition cost of $3.35
and a demilitarization code of D, which requires it to be destroyed
when no longer needed by DOD. The groin protector, which is designed to
hold a ceramic insert, had a reported acquisition cost of $37.85 and a
demilitarization code of D. Figure 13 shows a photograph of the throat
and groin protection armor obtained during our undercover penetration
at DRMO B.
Figure 13: Throat and Groin Protection Armor Obtained from DRMO B
during the June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Circuit card assemblies. Our undercover investigators obtained six
circuit card assemblies with a reported acquisition cost of $77,011
from DRMO B. The circuit card assemblies, which were turned in by the
Naval Air Warfare Center, had a demilitarization code of D which
requires them to be destroyed when no longer needed by DOD. A Lockheed
Martin representative, who confirmed that his company manufactured the
circuit cards we obtained, told our investigator that the circuit card
assemblies are used in a variety of computerized Navy systems. The
circuit cards also have a CIIC code of 7, which indicates they are
classified items that require protection in the interest of national
security, in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R. Figure 14 shows a photograph
of the circuit card assemblies obtained during our undercover
penetration at DRMO B.
Figure 14: Circuit Card Assemblies Obtained from DRMO B during the June
2006 Undercover Penetration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Palm V Organizer PDAs. During our undercover security penetration at
DRMO B in June 2006, our investigators noticed two Palm V Organizer
PDAs and accessories. The Palm PDAs had tags affixed to them which read
"Certificate of Hard Drive Disposition/This certified hard drive was
removed from CPU" and "Computer Casing Empty." Because PDAs do not have
hard drives, after successfully requisitioning them, we asked our
information technology (IT) security expert to test them to confirm
that all sensitive information had been properly removed. Our IT expert
used National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) utilities
recommended for forensic analysis to run the tests.[Footnote 12] Based
on the tests, our IT expert determined that the RAM on both devices had
been wiped clean of any trace of residual data, leaving only the normal
information that a user would expect to find on an unused Palm V PDA.
Figure 15 shows a photograph of one of the Palm V PDAs and related
accessories obtained from DRMO B.
Figure 15: Example of Excess DOD Palm V Organizers and Accessories
Obtained from DRMO B during the June 2006 Undercover Penetration:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Waste Associated with Sales of A-Condition Excess Items that Military
Services Are Continuing to Use in Operations:
Because significant numbers of new, unused A-condition excess items
still being purchased or in use by the military services are being
disposed of through liquidation sales, it was easy for our undercover
investigator to pose as a liquidation sales customer and purchase
several of these items for a fraction of what the military services are
paying to obtain these same items from DLA supply depots. For example,
we paid $1,146 for several wet weather and cold weather parkas, a
portable field x-ray enclosure, high-security locks, a gasoline engine
that can be used as part of a generator system or as a compressor, and
a refrigerant recovery system used to service air conditioning systems
on automobiles. The military services would have paid a total
acquisition cost of $16,300 for these items if ordered from supply
inventory, plus a charge for processing their order.[Footnote 13] It
was easy for us to purchase new, unused items that are in demand by the
military services because of the limited scope of DOD's actions to
address this problem.
Undercover Purchases of New, Unused Items that DOD Is Continuing to Buy
or that Are in Demand by Military Units:
Our undercover investigator used a fictitious identity to obtain a DOD
liquidation sales customer account and purchase several new, unused
excess DOD items that the military services are continuing to order
from supply inventory or use in operations. The following discussion
describes examples of the new, unused excess DOD items that we
purchased.
Wet-weather parkas. In March 2006, our undercover investigator
purchased 10 new, unused excess DOD wet-weather parkas with the
manufacturer's tags still attached from DOD's liquidation sales
contractor. Although Army combat units have begun using an upgraded
version of the parkas, they are a nondeteriorative item, and Army
training units and other military services are continuing to use them
in military operations. However, after the New Jersey Army National
Guard turned in the unused items as excess to their needs, the parkas
were transferred to DOD's liquidation contractor for sale instead of
being returned to supply inventory for reissue. We paid $87 for the 10
wet-weather parkas, which had a total reported acquisition cost of a
$359. Figure 16 shows a photograph of one of the wet-weather parkas our
undercover investigator purchased at the public liquidation sale.
Figure 16: Example of New, Unused Wet-Weather Parkas Purchased in March
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Cold-weather parkas. In May 2006, our undercover investigator purchased
10 excess DOD cold-weather desert camouflage parkas from DOD's
liquidation sales contractor. Although the parkas were listed as being
in H condition (unserviceable, condemned condition), they were
advertised as new. We paid a total of $373 for these 10 parkas, which
had a total reported acquisition cost of $1,468. After receiving the
parkas, we noted that all of them appeared to be unused and 7 of them
still had the manufacturer's tags attached. According to a Defense
Supply Center, Philadelphia official, these cold-weather parkas are
nondeteriorative and are currently stocked and issued to the military
services. The cold-weather parkas, which were ordered in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom, were turned in as excess by the Al Udeid
Air Base, in Qatar. Instead of being returned to inventory for reissue,
the new, unused parkas were transferred to DOD's liquidation sales
contractor. Figure 17 shows a photograph of one of the excess new,
unused parkas that we purchased.
Figure 17: New, Unused Cold-Weather Parka Purchased by GAO in May 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Portable field x-ray processing enclosure. In April 2006, our
undercover investigator purchased a portable field x-ray processing
enclosure with a reported acquisition cost of $7,235. We paid $87 for
this item. We received the x-ray enclosure in May 2006, after approval
of our bogus Food and Drug Administration (FDA) certificate. DOD's
liquidation sales contractor requires buyers of medical and laboratory
equipment items that are subject to federal regulation to submit FDA
certificates as a condition of sale. On the FDA certificate, the buyer
certifies that he or she is a licensed medical practitioner or person
regularly and lawfully engaged in the manufacture or refurbishing of
the medical device listed and agrees to assure that items resold will
not be adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of those terms in
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (codified at 21 U.S.C. Ch. 9).
A manufacturer official told our undercover investigator that the x-ray
enclosure that we purchased is manufactured and sold to DOD on an as-
needed basis. The official stated that there is no shelf-life issue
associated with this product. In addition, a Defense Supply Center,
Philadelphia official assigned to the X-ray Equipment and Supplies/
Biomedical Systems Office of the Technical, Quality, and Packaging
Staff responsible for x-ray equipment and supply items advised us that
the x-ray enclosure is currently used by the military services, and the
Army is the primary user. The supply center official noted that the
enclosure is a depot-stocked item. However, after checking the
inventory system, the official told us that there were currently none
of these items in stock. The supply center official confirmed that the
enclosure has no shelf-life issues.
At the time we purchased the x-ray enclosure, 40 identical x-ray
enclosures with a reported acquisition cost of $289,400 were sold for a
total liquidation sales price of $2,914. Figure 18 is a photograph of
the excess DOD portable x-ray enclosure that we purchased over the
Internet. The enclosure is stored in an oversized foot-locker-type
container approximately 5 feet in length.
Figure 18: New, Unused Portable Field X-ray Processing Enclosure
Purchased in April 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
High-security locks. Our undercover investigator purchased 20 new,
unused high-security locks from the DOD liquidation sales contractor in
April 2006. The locks, which were in the original manufacturer's boxes,
had a total reported acquisition cost of $1,675, and we paid a total of
$59 for them. We contacted the manufacturer, whose representative told
us that his company sold DLA 100 of these locks in September 2005. The
representative explained that the locks are used to secure the back bay
of logistics trucks. He said that his company was not aware of any
problems with the locks. A U.S. Marine Corps unit in Albany, Georgia,
turned the locks in as excess, and they were not returned to inventory
for reissue. At the time we purchased the 20 locks, DOD's liquidation
sales contractor had advertised a total of 19 lots consisting of 480
locks for sale. Six of the 19 lots, with a reported total acquisition
cost of $18,423, sold for $365. Figure 19 shows a photograph of one of
the excess DOD high-security locks that we purchased in April 2006.
Figure 19: New, Unused DOD High-Security Lock Purchased in April 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Gasoline engine. Our undercover investigator purchased a new, unused
Teledyne 4-cylinder gasoline engine in March 2006. The engine, which
was manufactured in the 1990s, is part of a generator unit. It can also
be used with a compressor. According to FedLog data, the engines are
required to be issued until current supplies are exhausted. The item
manager for this engine told our undercover investigator that DLA
currently has about 1,500 of these engines in stock and they are still
being issued, primarily to Army National Guard and Reserve units. He
said that the Air Force and the Marine Corps also use them. He noted
that the Marine Corps ordered 4 of these engines in June 2006. We paid
$355 for the gasoline engine, which had a reported acquisition cost of
$3,119--the amount the Marine Corp paid for each item, plus a service
charge. At the time we purchased this unit, a total of 20 identical
gasoline engines with a total reported acquisition cost of $62,380 were
sold for a total liquidation sales price of $6,221. Figure 20 shows a
photograph of the gasoline engine that we purchased.
Figure 20: New, Unused DOD Gasoline Engine Purchased in March 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Refrigerant recovery system. In April 2006, our undercover investigator
purchased a new, unused excess DOD refrigerant recovery system Model ST-
100A. This is a portable system designed to recover and recycle R- 12,
R-22, R-500, and R-502 refrigerants at the rate of 2 to 3 pounds per
minute. According to a manufacturer representative, the unit that we
purchased is designed to recover refrigerants from small systems, such
as those in automotive vehicles. We paid a total of $185 for the new,
unused refrigerant recovery system, which had a reported acquisition
cost of $2,445. According to a Refrigerant Recovery Systems, Inc.,
representative, this item is still being purchased and used by DOD. The
refrigerant recovery system that we purchased was likely turned in as
excess by the Army Risk Assessment Modeling System (ARAMS) Project
Office located in Chesapeake, Virginia. ARAMS turned in nine identical
excess recovery systems in January 2006 that appeared to have been sold
during the liquidation sales event at which we made our undercover
purchase. These 9 refrigerant recovery systems, which had a listed
acquisition cost of $22,004, sold for a total liquidation sale price of
$1,140.
When our undercover investigator went to pick up the refrigerant
recovery system that we purchased, he found that it was stored outside
and exposed to weather. As a result, the box the unit was stored in had
become wet and the filters included with the unit had become soaked.
Figure 21 is a photograph of the excess DOD refrigerant recovery system
that we purchased.
Figure 21: New, Unused Refrigerant Recovery System Purchased in April
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Limited DOD Actions to Assure Reutilization of New, Unused Items:
Although DLA and DRMS implemented several initiatives to improve the
overall reutilization rate for excess A-condition items, our analysis
of DRMS data found that the reported reutilization rate as of June 30,
2006, remained the same as we had previously reported--about 12
percent.[Footnote 14] This is primarily because DLA reutilization
initiatives are limited to using available excess A-condition items to
fill customer orders and to maintain established supply inventory
retention levels. As a result, excess A-condition items that are not
needed to fill orders or replenish supply inventory are disposed of
outside of DOD through transfers, donations, and public sales, which
made it easy for us to purchase excess new, unused DOD items. The
disposal of items that exceed customer orders and inventory retention
levels is an indication that DOD bought more items than it needed. In
addition, several of the items we purchased at liquidation sales events
were being ordered from supply inventory by military units at or near
the time of our purchase, and for one supply-depot-stocked item--the
portable field x-ray enclosure--no items were in stock at the time we
made our undercover purchase, indicating continued waste and
inefficiency.
DLA and DRMS initiatives resulted in a reported $38.1 million in excess
property reutilization savings through June 2006. According to DLA data
as of June 30, 2006, interim supply system initiatives using the
Automated Asset Recoupment Program, which is part of an old legacy
system, achieved reutilization savings of nearly $2.3 million since
July 2005, while Business System Modernization supply system
initiatives, implemented in January 2006 as promised at the June 2005
hearing, have resulted in reutilization savings of nearly $1.1 million.
In addition, DRMS reported that excess property marketing initiatives
implemented in late March 2006 have resulted in reutilization savings
of a little over $34.8 million through June 2006. These initiatives
include marketing techniques using Web photographs of high-dollar items
and e-mail notices to repeat customers about the availability of A-
condition items that they had previously selected for reutilization.
Corrective Action Briefing:
On June 28, 2006, we briefed DOD, DLA, DRMS, and military service
management on the results of our investigations. We discussed the
causes of the control breakdowns we identified with regard to security
of sensitive excess military equipment and provided our perspectives on
ways to address the following problems.
* Some military units and DLA supply depots recorded incorrect
demilitarization codes to excess military property items and in some
cases improperly included these items in batch lots before sending
these items to DRMOs.
* DRMO personnel failed to verify the recorded demilitarization codes
when they processed receipts of excess military property.
* The limited scope of DLA and DRMS compliance reviews is not
sufficient to detect problems with incorrect demilitarization codes.
* DOD's excess property liquidation sales contractor failed to verify
demilitarization codes of items received and return items requiring
mutilation or destruction to the DRMO for proper disposal.
The managers told us that they shared our concern about the breakdowns
in security controls that allowed sensitive military items requiring
demilitarization to be sold to the public. They asked us for pertinent
documentation obtained during our investigations to support their
follow-up inquiries and corrective action plans. We have provided this
information. In addition, the managers told us that the DRMOs rely on
access controls executed by the DOD installations at which the DRMOs
are located to preclude access by unauthorized parties. During our
briefing, we also pointed out that because the reutilization and
marketing program permits public access to DRMOs and liquidation sales
locations, it is most important to confirm the identities and
requisitioning authority of the individuals who enter the DRMOs to
screen and requisition excess property. With regard to reutilization
program economy and efficiency issues, the DOD managers maintained that
forecasting the correct inventory level is difficult and that some
amount of excess purchasing is necessary to assure that inventory is
available when needed. They also stated that there is a cost associated
with retaining excess inventory for extended periods of time. We
provided DOD documentation to show that the excess A-condition items
that we purchased were continuing to be ordered and used by the
military services at the time of our undercover purchases.
Conclusions:
Our security tests clearly show that sensitive military equipment items
are still being improperly released by DOD and sold to the public, thus
posing a national security risk. The sensitive nature of these items
requires particularly stringent internal security controls. Our tests,
which were performed over a short duration, were limited to our
observations, meaning that the problem may likely be more significant
than what we identified. Although we have referred the sales of items
identified during our investigation to federal law enforcement agencies
for follow-up, the solution to this problem is to enforce controls for
preventing improper release of these items outside DOD. Further,
liquidation sales of items that military units are continuing to
purchase at full cost from supply inventory demonstrates continuing
waste and inefficiency in DOD's excess property reutilization program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of our report to DOD for comment on July 10, 2006.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel
Readiness responded that given the time allotted to comment, the
Department was not able to do a detailed review and has no comments at
this time. However, the Deputy Under Secretary also stated that the
department continues to implement changes to our procedures based on
recommendations in our May 13, 2005, report.[Footnote 15]
We are sending copies of this letter to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Logistics and Personnel Readiness, the Under Secretary of
Defense Comptroller, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the
Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Director of the Defense
Logistics Agency, the Director of the Defense Reutilization and
Marketing Service, and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget. We will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Please contact me at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov, if you or your
staffs have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are
acknowledged in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Gregory D. Kutz:
Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
[End of section]
Appendix I: DOD Excess Property Demilitarization Codes:
Department of Defense (DOD) property is assigned a demilitarization
code to identify the required disposition of items when they are no
longer needed by DOD. Demilitarization codes are contained in the
Defense Demilitarization Manual, DOD 4160.21-M-1 (1995), which
implements DOD policy to apply appropriate controls (e.g., restrictions
to use by authorized parties, destruction when no longer needed by DOD)
over items that have a significant military technology application to
prevent improper use or release of these items outside of DOD. These
items include materiel that the Secretary of Defense has designated as
requiring demilitarization, articles on the U.S. Munitions List (22
C.F.R. pt. 121), and certain articles subject to export controls
because they are on the Commerce Control List establish by the U.S.
Department of Commerce (15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1). Appendix 3 of the
Manual provides the demilitarization codes to be assigned to federal
supply items and coding guidance. The codes indicate whether property
is available for reuse without restriction or whether specific
restrictions apply, such as removal of classified components,
destruction of sensitive military technology, or trade security
control. The table below defines the DOD demilitarization codes.
Table 1: DOD Excess Property Demilitarization Codes:
Demilitarization code: A;
Required disposal action: Demilitarization not required.
Demilitarization code: B;
Required disposal action: Military List Item (MLI) Non--Significant
Military Equipment (SME) Demilitarization not required. Trade Security
Controls required at disposition.
Demilitarization code: C;
Required disposal action: MLI (SME) - Remove and/or demilitarize
installed key point(s) as prescribed in the Defense Demilitarization
Manual, or lethal parts, components, and accessories.
Demilitarization code: D;
Required disposal action: MLI (SME) - Total destruction of item and
components so as to preclude restoration or repair to a useable
condition by melting, cutting, tearing, scratching, crushing, breaking,
punching, neutralizing, etc. (As an alternate, burial or deep water
dumping may be used when coordinated with the DOD Demilitarization
Program Office.)
Demilitarization code: E;
Required disposal action: MLI (Non SME) - Additional critical
items/materiel determined to require demilitarization, either key point
or total destruction. Demilitarization instructions to be furnished by
the DOD Demilitarization Program Office.
Demilitarization code: F;
Required disposal action: MLI (SME) - Demilitarization instructions to
be furnished by the Item/Technical Manager.
Demilitarization code: G;
Required disposal action: MLI (SME) - Demilitarization required -
Ammunition, Explosives, and Dangerous Articles (AEDA).
Demilitarization, and if required, declassification and/or removal of
sensitive markings or information, will be accomplished prior to
physical transfer to a DRMO. This code will be used for all AEDA items,
including those which also require declassification and/or removal of
sensitive markings or information.
Demilitarization code: P;
Required disposal action: MLI (SME) - Security Classified Item -
Declassification and any additional demilitarization and removal of any
sensitive markings or information will be accomplished prior to
accountability or physical transfer to a DRMO. This code will not be
assigned to AEDA items. Items received at a DRMO with Demilitarization
code P will not be processed for disposal without the required
certificate of declassification and a certificate of demilitarization.
Demilitarization code: Q;
Required disposal action: CCLI - Commerce Control List Item.
Demilitarization not required. CCLI are non-MLI and are dual-use
(military, commercial, and other strategic uses) items under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, through Export Administration Regulations (codified at 15
C.F.R., Ch. VII, Sub Ch C).
Demilitarization code: X;
Required disposal action: Indicates that demilitarization requirements
of MLI applicability not determined by the Inventory Control Point.
Local determination of demilitarization requirement is necessary prior
to disposal action.
Source: DRMS Automated Information System (DAISY) C-A-T (Codes and
Terms) reference guide (12th ed. 2006), DRMS-I 4160.14, vol. IV, Supp.
1, "Codes Index" (November 2004), and DOD-4160.21-M-1, Defense
Demilitarization Manual (1995).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Excess Property Condition Codes:
The Department of Defense's (DOD) condition code is a two-digit
alphanumeric code used to denote the condition of excess property from
the supply and the disposal perspective. The DOD supply condition code
is the alpha character in the first position and shows the condition of
property in the Defense Logistics Agency supply depot inventory, or is
assigned by the unit turning in the excess property. The General
Services Administration (GSA) disposal condition code, in the second
position, shows whether the property is in new, used, or repairable
condition, salvageable, or should be scrapped.
Table 2: Excess Property Condition Codes:
DOD Codes: A1, A4; B1, B4; C1, C4; D1, D4, D7;
DOD Supply Condition Code:
A - Issuable without qualification - New, used, repaired or
reconditioned property which is issuable without restriction, including
material with a shelf life of more than 6 months;
B - Issuable with qualification - New, used, repaired or reconditioned
property which is issuable, but is restricted from issue to specific
units, activities, or geographical areas by reason of its limited
usefulness or short service life expectancy, including materials with a
shelf life of 3 through 6 months;
C - Priority issue - Property is issuable to selected customers but
must be issued before Condition A and B material to avoid loss as a
usable asset, including materials with less than 3 months shelf life;
D - Test/Modification required - Property is in serviceable condition
but requires test, alteration, modification, or conversion or
disassembly;
GSA Disposal Condition Code:
1 - Excellent
- Property is in new or unused condition and can be used immediately
without repairs;
4 - Usable - Property shows some wear, but can be used without
significant repair;
7 - Repairable - Property is unusable in its current condition, but can
be economically repaired.
DOD Codes: E7; F7; G7; H7;
DOD Supply Condition Code:
E - Limited restoration required - Property requires only a limited
expense or effort to restore to serviceable condition;
F - Reparable - Property is economically reparable but requires
repairs, overhaul, or reconditioning to make it serviceable property;
G - Incomplete - Property requires additional parts or materials to
complete the item prior to issue;
H - Condemned - Property has been determined to be unserviceable and
does not meet repair criteria, including items whose shelf life has
expired and cannot be extended;
GSA Disposal Condition Code:
7 - Repairable - Property is unusable in its current condition, but can
be economically repaired.
DOD Codes: FX, GX, HX; (VX-Salvaged military munitions);
DOD Supply Condition Code:
F - Reparable;
G - Incomplete;
H - Condemned;
GSA Disposal Condition Code:
X - Salvage - Property has value in excess of its basic materiel
content but repair is impractical and/or uneconomical.
DOD Codes: FS, GS, HS;
DOD Supply Condition Code:
F - Reparable;
G - Incomplete;
H - Condemned;
GSA Disposal Condition Code:
S - Scrap - Property has no value except for its basic materiel
content.
Source: DRMS Automated Information System (DAISY) C-A-T (Codes and
Terms) reference guide (12th ed. 2006), DRMS-I 4160.14, vol. IV, Supp.
1, "Codes Index" (November 2004).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense For Logistics And Materiel Readiness
3500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3500:
Jul 17 2006:
Mr. Gregory D. Kutz:
Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Kutz:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-06-943, "DOD Excess Property: Control Breakdowns Present
Significant Security Risk and Continuing Waste and Inefficiency," dated
July 10, 2006 (GAO Code 192188). There are no recommendations provided
in the report and based on the time allotted for providing technical
comments, the Department was not able to do a detailed review.
Therefore, the Department has no comments at this time. The Department
continues to implement changes to our procedures based on the GAO
report GAO-05-277 "DOD Excess Property: Management Control Breakdowns
Result in Substantial Waste and Inefficiency," dated May 13, 2005.
We appreciate the opportunity to review the draft report.
Signed by:
Jack Bell:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gregory D. Kutz, 202-512-7455:
Acknowledgments:
Staff making key contributions to this report include Mario Artesiano,
Donald L. Bumgardner, Matthew S. Brown, Paul R. Desaulniers, Stephen P.
Donahue, Lauren S. Fassler, Gayle L. Fischer, Cinnimon Glozer, Jason
Kelly, John Ledford, Barbara C. Lewis, Richard C. Newbold, John P.
Ryan, Lori B. Ryza, Lisa Warde, and Emily C. Wold.
Technical expertise was provided by Keith A. Rhodes, Chief
Technologist, and Harold Lewis, Assistant Director, Information
Technology Security, Applied Research and Methods.
(192188):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, DOD Excess Property: Management Control Breakdowns Result in
Substantial Waste and Inefficiency, GAO-05-277 (Washington, D.C.: May
13, 2005).
[2] DOD policy related to controls over items with significant military
technology application, is defined in app. I.
[3] DOD condition codes are defined in app. II.
[4] In concert with the federal government's E-government policy to use
information technology (IT) investments to deliver services and
information to citizens electronically, DOD's excess property
liquidation sales are conducted over the Internet. Office of Management
and Budget, Implementation Guidance for the E-Government Act of 2002, M-
03-18, at att. A, ¶ B, 1 (Aug. 1, 2003).
[5] An EUC is a form used by DOD to document the intended destination
and disposition of sensitive, controlled items released from the
department.
[6] Under DOD's excess property reutilization program, DOD contractors
are treated the same as DOD units and are not charged for excess
property items they requisition for reuse.
[7] GAO, DOD Excess Property: Management Control Breakdowns Result in
Substantial Waste and Inefficiency, GAO-05-277 (Washington, D.C.: May
13, 2005); DOD Excess Property: Risk Assessment Needed on Public Sales
of Equipment That Could Be Used to Make Biological Agents, GAO-04-15NI
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003); and DOD Management: Examples of
Inefficient and Ineffective Business Processes, GAO-02-873T
(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).
[8] JSLIST is a universal, lightweight, two-piece garment (coat and
trousers) that when combined with footwear, gloves, and a protective
mask and a breathing device, forms the warfighter's protective
ensemble. Together, the ensemble is to provide maximum protection to
the warfighter against chemical and biological contaminants without
negatively affecting the ability to perform mission tasks. JSLIST is
the current model protective suit used by the military services.
[9] DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program (January 1997),
established the DOD Information Security Program to promote proper and
effective classification and protection in the interest of national
security.
[10] An NSN is a unique 13-digit number that identifies standard use
inventory items.
[11] DOD 4160.21-M-1, Defense Demilitarization Manual (1995), at Appx.
3, "Demilitarization Codes to Be Assigned to Federal Supply Items and
Coding Guidance."
[12] NIST Pub. 800-72, Guidelines on PDA Forensics (November 2004).
[13] As noted in our May 2005 report, the weighted average cost for
warehousing and shipping all supply items was 20.7 percent in fiscal
year 2003.
[14] GAO-05-277 and GAO-05-729T.
[15] GAO-05-277.
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