Military Pay
DOD Improperly Paid Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers in Deserter Status
Gao ID: GAO-06-848R July 28, 2006
Over the past several years, we have reported examples of hundreds of Army National Guard and Army Reserve (Army Guard and Reserve) soldiers who received inaccurate and untimely payroll payments due to a labor-intensive, error-prone pay process; human capital weaknesses; and the lack of integrated pay and personnel systems. As part of that work, we reported several cases for which mobilized Army Reserve soldiers never reported for active duty and improperly received pay that they did not earn. If a soldier remains absent, without authority, from his or her unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to remain away permanently, a soldier is guilty of desertion. Desertion from the military is a serious offense. The civilian law enforcement community sometimes assists the Army on desertion cases. For example, the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point (USADIP) enters data about soldiers in deserter status into the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Crime Information Center's (NCIC) Wanted Person File that is used by civilian law enforcement officers. Whenever a civilian law enforcement officer has reason to question someone about any apparent unlawful activity, standard practice for the law enforcement officer is to determine whether there are any outstanding warrants for the arrest of that person. If the person is a soldier with an outstanding arrest warrant for desertion, the civilian law enforcement officer is to arrest and hold the soldier until the soldier can be transferred to military custody for subsequent legal proceedings to determine innocence or guilt. This report follows up on earlier-identified issues concerning Army Guard or Reserve soldiers who did not report for active duty and who may have continued to get paid. Specifically, as part of our earlier work we had notified the Army Reserve 99th Regional Readiness Command about a number of Reserve soldiers who were improperly paid after they failed to report for duty related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The objectives of this investigation were to (1) determine what the 99th Regional Readiness Command had done regarding the Reserve soldiers assigned to the 1004th Quartermaster Company who failed to report for duty as ordered and whether their retention of the pay represented possible criminal behavior, (2) look for other examples of improper pay to Army Guard and Reserve soldiers who were charged with desertion related to GWOT missions, and (3) determine the status of arrest warrants for any soldiers charged with desertion that we identify.
We confirmed that at least seven Army Reserve soldiers assigned to the 1004th Quartermaster Company, located in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, did not report for active duty in December 2003 in accordance with their orders. During the following 8-month period, they cumulatively improperly accepted $195,000 of military pay. The Army Reserve did not stop improper military pay to these soldiers until we notified Reserve officials in August 2004 during a prior assignment. Even after our notification, one of the seven soldiers continued to be paid for an additional 8 months and accepted a total of about $58,000 in improper payments, including about $28,000 for the later 8-month period. We found no evidence that arrest warrants had been filed against any of the seven soldiers as of May 2006. Our limited investigation showed that at least 68 additional soldiers, 38 with the Army Guard and 30 with the Army Reserve, received improper and potentially fraudulent pay, estimated at $684,000, while in a deserter status. This number and amount likely significantly understates the number and amount the Department of Defense (DOD) paid to Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in deserter status. Army, Army Guard, and Reserve officials acknowledged that they were unaware of the extent to which Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in deserter status improperly received potentially fraudulent military pay. They explained that determining the extent to which soldiers charged with desertion continue to receive improper payments is difficult for several reasons. First, initiating and processing desertion cases depend upon unit commanders preparing timely manual paperwork. Second, there is no central database that electronically stores this paperwork. Without these data, military leaders do not have readily available aggregate data affording visibility over the number of desertion cases initiated. Additionally, they do not have a readily available tool to match against pay data to ensure that soldiers in deserter status have not been paid. Knowingly keeping unearned military pay is potentially fraud. Additionally, many of the 75 cases (7 cases from the 1004th Quartermaster Company and the 68 other cases) of Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in deserter status that we identified as having received unearned pay may have willfully converted the pay to their own use, which is punishable by a maximum confinement of 10 years. For example, six of the seven Reserve soldiers who were assigned to the 1004th Quartermaster Company admitted to us that they received unearned military pay when we initially interviewed them in late 2004. Of these six, five told us that they had spent the money and one said she had put the money in a separate bank account. Although we confirmed that the seventh soldier also received unearned military pay, she advised us that she thought that the money she had received was an educational benefit. Subsequently, between April 2005 and September 2005, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sent the first debt collection letter to each soldier asking for repayment of the unearned pay. Little has been repaid thus far. DFAS information shows that about 9 percent of the estimated $195,000 in improper payments had been repaid as of May 2006. Two of the seven soldiers had not yet made any repayments. Arrest warrants had been issued for 51 of the 75 soldiers. Regarding the soldiers from the 1004th Quartermaster Company, USADIP had no record of arrest warrants. However, 1 of the 7 soldiers voluntarily surrendered to military authorities and received an other than honorable discharge from the military in December 2005 in lieu of a court-martial. Thus, all 51 arrest warrants applied to the 68 other deserter cases we identified. As of May 11, 2006, 18 of the 51 had been apprehended by civilian authorities, 2 soldiers had voluntarily surrendered to military authorities, and 31 soldiers remained at large.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-06-848R, Military Pay: DOD Improperly Paid Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers in Deserter Status
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United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 28, 2006:
Congressional Requesters:
Subject: Military Pay: DOD Improperly Paid Army National Guard and Army
Reserve Soldiers in Deserter Status:
Over the past several years, we have reported[Footnote 1] examples of
hundreds of Army National Guard and Army Reserve (Army Guard and
Reserve) soldiers who received inaccurate and untimely payroll payments
due to a labor-intensive, error-prone pay process; human capital
weaknesses; and the lack of integrated pay and personnel systems. As
part of that work, we reported several cases for which mobilized Army
Reserve soldiers never reported for active duty and improperly received
pay that they did not earn. If a soldier remains absent, without
authority, from his or her unit, organization, or place of duty with
intent to remain away permanently, a soldier is guilty of desertion.
Desertion from the military is a serious offense. The civilian law
enforcement community sometimes assists the Army on desertion cases.
For example, the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point (USADIP) enters
data about soldiers in deserter status into the Federal Bureau of
Investigation National Crime Information Center's (NCIC) Wanted Person
File that is used by civilian law enforcement officers. Whenever a
civilian law enforcement officer has reason to question someone about
any apparent unlawful activity, standard practice for the law
enforcement officer is to determine whether there are any outstanding
warrants for the arrest of that person. If the person is a soldier with
an outstanding arrest warrant for desertion, the civilian law
enforcement officer is to arrest and hold the soldier until the soldier
can be transferred to military custody for subsequent legal proceedings
to determine innocence or guilt.
This report follows up on earlier-identified issues concerning Army
Guard or Reserve soldiers who did not report for active duty and who
may have continued to get paid. Specifically, as part of our earlier
work we had notified the Army Reserve 99TH Regional Readiness Command
about a number of Reserve soldiers who were improperly paid after they
failed to report for duty related to the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT). The objectives of this investigation were to (1) determine what
the 99TH Regional Readiness Command had done regarding the Reserve
soldiers assigned to the 1004TH Quartermaster Company who failed to
report for duty as ordered and whether their retention of the pay
represented possible criminal behavior, (2) look for other examples of
improper pay to Army Guard and Reserve soldiers who were charged with
desertion related to GWOT missions, and (3) determine the status of
arrest warrants for any soldiers charged with desertion that we
identify.
Summary of Investigation:
We confirmed that at least seven Army Reserve soldiers assigned to the
1004TH Quartermaster Company, located in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, did
not report for active duty in December 2003 in accordance with their
orders. During the following 8-month period, they cumulatively
improperly accepted $195,000 of military pay. The Army Reserve did not
stop improper military pay to these soldiers until we notified Reserve
officials in August 2004 during a prior assignment. Even after our
notification, one of the seven soldiers continued to be paid for an
additional 8 months and accepted a total of about $58,000 in improper
payments, including about $28,000 for the later 8-month period. We
found no evidence that arrest warrants had been filed against any of
the seven soldiers as of May 2006.
Our limited investigation showed that at least 68 additional soldiers,
38 with the Army Guard and 30 with the Army Reserve, received improper
and potentially fraudulent pay, estimated at $684,000, while in a
deserter status. This number and amount likely significantly
understates the number and amount the Department of Defense (DOD) paid
to Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in deserter status. Army, Army
Guard, and Reserve officials acknowledged that they were unaware of the
extent to which Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in deserter status
improperly received potentially fraudulent military pay. They explained
that determining the extent to which soldiers charged with desertion
continue to receive improper payments is difficult for several reasons.
First, initiating and processing desertion cases depend upon unit
commanders preparing timely manual paperwork. Second, there is no
central database that electronically stores this paperwork. Without
these data, military leaders do not have readily available aggregate
data affording visibility over the number of desertion cases initiated.
Additionally, they do not have a readily available tool to match
against pay data to ensure that soldiers in deserter status have not
been paid.
Knowingly keeping unearned military pay is potentially fraud.
Additionally, many of the 75 cases (7 cases from the 1004TH
Quartermaster Company and the 68 other cases) of Army Guard and Reserve
soldiers in deserter status that we identified as having received
unearned pay may have willfully converted the pay to their own use,
which is punishable by a maximum confinement of 10 years.[Footnote 2]
For example, six of the seven Reserve soldiers who were assigned to the
1004TH Quartermaster Company admitted to us that they received unearned
military pay when we initially interviewed them in late 2004. Of these
six, five told us that they had spent the money and one said she had
put the money in a separate bank account. Although we confirmed that
the seventh soldier also received unearned military pay, she advised us
that she thought that the money she had received was an educational
benefit.
Subsequently, between April 2005 and September 2005, the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) sent the first debt collection
letter to each soldier asking for repayment of the unearned pay. Little
has been repaid thus far. DFAS information shows that about 9 percent
of the estimated $195,000 in improper payments had been repaid as of
May 2006. Two of the seven soldiers had not yet made any repayments.
Arrest warrants had been issued for 51 of the 75 soldiers. Regarding
the soldiers from the 1004TH Quartermaster Company, USADIP had no
record of arrest warrants. However, 1 of the 7 soldiers voluntarily
surrendered to military authorities and received an other than
honorable discharge from the military in December 2005 in lieu of a
court-martial. Thus, all 51 arrest warrants applied to the 68 other
deserter cases we identified. As of May 11, 2006, 18 of the 51 had been
apprehended by civilian authorities, 2 soldiers had voluntarily
surrendered to military authorities, and 31 soldiers remained at large.
Scope and Methodology:
To investigate whether any Reserve soldiers who were assigned to the
1004TH Quartermaster Company in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, received
military pay for duties that they did not perform, we reviewed DFAS pay
account data for soldiers for whom we received investigative leads
about potential improper payments. We looked for any pay that they
received after the date that they failed to report for duty as required
by their mobilization orders. To investigate whether any of the Army
Reserve soldiers were potential deserters, we interviewed their company
commander and several people responsible for their personnel status at
their company, their battalion, and the 99TH Regional Readiness
Command. In addition, we reviewed available paperwork regarding the
deserter status of these soldiers. Their chain of command provided
limited paperwork, including copies of personnel forms recommending
deserter status for seven soldiers. We interviewed these seven soldiers
to determine their awareness of receipt of improper payments. We also
developed case studies to illustrate the experience of these seven
soldiers.
To determine whether the 7 cases were isolated cases or part of a
larger problem, we compared the list of active desertion cases on 2
days with DFAS pay data and identified another 68 cases where soldiers
were paid with GWOT funds while in deserter status. On April 23, 2005,
and March 8, 2006, we obtained USADIP's working file for arrest
warrants, which contained names of Army Guard and Army Reserve soldiers
who had been charged with desertion. The number of names in this
working file varies. For example, names are deleted whenever soldiers
surrender or are apprehended. Conversely, names are added when USADIP
receives new desertion cases. Our investigation was not designed to
determine the total number of Army Guard and Reserve deserters who were
not paid. In addition, the scope of our investigation did not include
verification of the accuracy of soldiers' pay accounts.
Because of data reliability concerns we identified in our prior
work,[Footnote 3] we did not rely on DFAS records to calculate precise
improper payments. Instead, we estimated improper payments based on the
time period, starting with the date the soldier was dropped from the
Army's personnel availability rolls because of desertion status until
the date the soldier's improper pays were stopped. We performed
procedures to assure ourselves that the data we used were sufficient
for our purposes. We provided Army officials an opportunity to confirm
our estimates and take appropriate action, including initiating
criminal proceedings and recovering improper payments.
To determine the status of arrest warrants for the previously mentioned
7 soldiers assigned to the 1004TH Quartermaster Company and the other
68 GWOT soldiers charged with desertion that we identified, we obtained
information from USADIP for these specific soldiers. We independently
confirmed the number of outstanding arrest warrants USADIP reported to
us as of May 11, 2006, by verifying that NCIC also listed outstanding
arrest warrants for the same soldiers.
We informed the 99TH Regional Readiness Command about our initial
concerns stemming from investigative leads about soldiers in potential
desertion status receiving unearned pays in August 2004. Regarding this
investigation, we requested comments from the Secretary of the Army,
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of
Defense (Personnel and Readiness) who conveyed DOD's position. We
conducted this investigation, including follow-up on our seven case
studies, from April 2005 through May 2006 in accordance with quality
standards for investigations as set forth by the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency.
Background:
A soldier is guilty of desertion when, without authority, he or she
remains absent from his or her unit, organization, or place of duty
with intent to remain away permanently. Desertion from the military is
a serious offense with serious legal consequences. Soldiers charged
with desertion who knowingly keep military pay that they did not earn
may also be found guilty of fraud and/or conversion or theft of
government funds, which is punishable by a maximum confinement of 10
years.
In the Army Guard and Army Reserve, the process for charging a soldier
with desertion begins with unit commanders. Unit commanders are
required to maintain accountability for all personnel assigned to their
units, including those soldiers who fail to report for active duty.
When a unit commander determines there is no legitimate reason for a
soldier's absence, the commander has 48 hours to report the soldier as
absent without leave to the installation's personnel office, provost
marshal, deserter control officer, and finance office.[Footnote 4] The
unit commander is to use a personnel action form (DA Form 4187) to
document unauthorized absences and as justification to stop the pay and
benefits of a soldier absent without leave.
Once a commander determines that the absent soldier knew of or received
mobilization orders and the soldier fails to report for duty 30
days[Footnote 5] after the orders require, the unit commander is
required to change the soldier's duty status to deserter and to inform
the commander, personnel control facility.[Footnote 6] Within 72 hours
of the desertion determination, the unit commander is to send the
control facility commander copies of the initial paperwork required to
charge the soldier with desertion and drop the soldier from the
rolls.[Footnote 7] Within 30 days of reporting a soldier as a deserter,
the unit commander must complete paperwork (called deserter packets) to
drop the soldier from the rolls and forward it to the Chief of USADIP.
"Dropped from rolls" is an administrative action that removes the
soldier from the unit's personnel strength--or the number of soldiers
available for deployment.
As we have previously reported, internal control weaknesses in Army
processes, human capital problems, and the lack of integrated systems
caused improper payment of active duty military pay. As our prior
reports have shown, active duty military pay is initiated by finance
offices and continues for the period of time specified on the soldier's
mobilization orders--typically for 1 to 2 years for mobilized Army
Guard and Reserve soldiers--unless finance offices receive
authorization to stop military pay before the mobilization end date
stated on these orders.
USADIP is responsible for initiating arrest warrants for all Army
soldiers charged with desertion, including Army Guard and Reserve
soldiers. After reviewing the deserter information packets for
completeness, USADIP is to enter data regarding these soldiers into
NCIC's Wanted Person File that contains data on outstanding arrest
warrants. There is no statute of limitations for arrest warrants.
Arrest warrants are valid until the wanted soldier (1) voluntarily
surrenders to military authorities, (2) is arrested by military police
or civilian law enforcement officers, or (3) dies. The USADIP Chief
told us there is no systematic effort to locate these individuals, and
DOD military police are not routinely charged with the responsibility
for finding and arresting soldiers charged with desertion. Instead,
whenever a civilian law enforcement officer has reason to question
someone about any apparent unlawful activity, the law enforcement
officer also checks NCIC to determine whether there are any arrest
warrants for that person. If the person is a soldier and there is an
outstanding military arrest warrant, the civilian law enforcement
officer arrests and holds the soldier until the soldier is transferred
to military custody for subsequent legal proceedings leading to
acquittal or conviction and punishment for desertion.
Details of Investigation - 1004th Quartermaster Company, Greensburg,
Pennsylvania:
We confirmed that at least seven Army Reserve soldiers assigned to the
1004TH Quartermaster Company, in Greensburg, Pennsylvania,[Footnote 8]
under the authority of the 99TH Regional Readiness Command, received
improper and potentially fraudulent payments totaling an estimated
$195,000. We also found that USADIP had no record of arrest warrants
for these soldiers for failure to report for duty when we initially
referred this problem to the 99TH Regional Readiness Command in August
2004.
As of May 2006, we determined that one of the seven soldiers had been
discharged from the Reserve under other than honorable conditions in
lieu of a court-martial. Although a human resource officer with the
99TH Regional Readiness Command told us that a second soldier had
received an honorable discharge after a surgeon determined that the
soldier was unfit for military retention, the soldier told us that she
had not received a Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty
(DD Form 214) authorizing her discharge from the Army Reserve. The
human resource officer informed us that the 99TH Regional Readiness
Command had sent deserter packets for the other five soldiers to the
U.S. Army Reserve Command in March 2005 but did not know the status of
those cases.
Improper payments to these seven soldiers had been made each pay period
during the 8 months from the December 2003 mobilization date through
our initial August 2004 inquiry and stopped shortly thereafter. It took
another 8 months to stop payments to the seventh soldier, who received
more than $58,000 in total estimated improper payments, including about
$28,000 improperly paid to this soldier after our initial notification.
Only a small amount of the improper payments had been repaid as of May
2006.
The unit commander for the soldiers assigned to the 1004TH
Quartermaster Company did little to prevent or detect improper payments
to these seven soldiers, who admitted to us that they did not report
for active duty at the required location. The unit commander did not
maintain accountability for their physical presence at their assigned
duty location or monitor their pay in a timely manner as required. The
unit commander should have ensured desertion paperwork was completed
within 7 days after the report date stated on the soldiers' active duty
orders, as required by Army policy in effect at that time, unless there
was a legitimate reason for their absence from duty.
About 6 weeks after the seven soldiers failed to report for active duty
on December 7, 2003, as directed by their mobilization orders, the unit
commander signed paperwork requesting that his senior officers approve
personnel actions documenting that six of the seven soldiers were
absent without approved leave. He subsequently signed additional
paperwork for the six soldiers recommending approval of additional
personnel actions for desertion. However, he did not ensure that
finance officials stopped the soldiers' pay. Although we found no
evidence that the 1004TH Quartermaster Company completed personnel
actions for the seventh soldier, another reserve official assigned to
the 99TH Regional Readiness Command recommended approval for personnel
actions documenting that the seventh soldier was both absent without
approved leave and in desertion status. We also found that no one
timely stopped the pay for the seventh soldier.
During our interview with the Commander for the 1004TH Quartermaster
Company, he acknowledged not completing or overseeing completion of the
necessary support for the deserter packets that are required to be sent
to USADIP and others. The commander told us that he believed deserter
soldiers were his reserve battalion's responsibility. The 99TH Regional
Readiness Command, which had oversight responsibility for the 1004TH
Quartermaster Company, provided no information regarding whether anyone
else in the seven soldiers' chain of command knew anything about their
failure to report for duty. In fact, several individuals whom we spoke
with at the 99TH Regional Readiness Command explained that this problem
was not limited to the 1004TH. Additionally, the USADIP Chief explained
that compiling deserter packets were not a high priority for commanders
and that they did not understand deserter processing procedures. The
USADIP Chief estimated that 30 to 35 percent of the deserter packets
USADIP receives are incomplete and returned to the points of origin
without action taken to issue arrest warrants.
It was not until April 2005 that the first debt collection letter was
sent to one of the seven soldiers. Letters demanding payment were sent
to the other six soldiers between June and September 2005. The amount
of debt established by DFAS for the seven soldiers--about $187,000--was
in the same order of magnitude as our estimated $195,000 in improper
payments. Only about 9 percent of the improper payments have been
repaid, and as shown in figure 1, two of the seven soldiers have yet to
repay anything as of May 2006.
Figure 1: Army Reserve Soldiers Who Accepted Improper and Potentially
Fraudulent Military Pay:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[A] GAO estimated unearned pay by reviewing DFAS pay extracts and
calculating payments made to the soldiers after the date that they were
dropped from personnel availability rolls due to deserter status.
[B] Date of the initial letter from DFAS to the soldier asking for
payment to recoup amounts paid to the soldier while in deserter status
and previous absent without leave status. According to a DFAS official,
the debt was for nonperformance of duty, which is equivalent to
unearned pay.
[C] DOD established debt for unearned military pay does not equal GAO-
estimated unearned pay because some amount may have been repaid by the
soldier before the DFAS demand for payment was issued or because of
other information that DFAS had obtained subsequent to our estimates.
[D] Amounts paid as of May 2006.
[End of Figure]
During our interviews with the seven soldiers, each admitted to failing
to report for active duty and six admitted to knowingly receiving
military pay that they did not earn. One soldier told us that she
believed that the payments that she received were financial educational
benefits. However, our investigation confirmed that this soldier
received about $17,000 in military pay under the GWOT code after being
charged with desertion. Knowingly keeping unearned military pay is
potential fraud and/or potential conversion or theft of government
funds, which is punishable by a maximum confinement of 10 years.
One of the two soldiers who did not repay any debt during our
investigation voluntarily surrendered to military authorities as a
deserter. He subsequently received an other than honorable discharge
from the military in December 2005 that stated that it was in lieu of a
court-martial.
The results of our interviews with these seven soldiers are summarized
below. Case numbers correspond to the case numbers of the soldiers
listed in figure 1.
Case 1: Soldier was a specialist in an Army Reserve, Maryland unit and
was a nurse's aide in civilian life. We confirmed that the soldier
resided at the address stated on his mobilization orders. Although the
soldier said he never received written mobilization orders, he did
admit that he received a phone call from his Maryland Reserve unit in
October 2003 advising him that he was going to be transferred to a
Reserve unit in Pennsylvania. He also admitted that he received a phone
call in November 2003 from his new Reserve unit, advising him that he
was going to be mobilized to active duty. The soldier acknowledged
receiving active duty pay beginning in January 2004 and continued to
receive pay until April 2005. Although he was aware that he was not
entitled to this military pay since he did not report for active duty,
he said he used the money. He told our investigators that if required,
he would be willing to make restitution to the Army for the improper
payments, which according to DFAS pay data, totaled about $58,000. DFAS
records show that he has not paid any of his debt as of May 2006.
Case 2: Soldier was a sergeant in an Army Reserve, Maryland unit and
was unemployed in civilian life at the time of our investigation. We
confirmed that the soldier resided at the address stated on her
mobilization orders. However, the soldier said that she never received
any notice that she had been mobilized to active duty. The soldier
acknowledged receiving active duty pay beginning in December 2003. She
also acknowledged that she was aware that she was not entitled to this
military pay since she did not report for active duty. According to the
soldier, she contacted her Reserve unit in December 2003 to report the
overpayments. In October 2004, she told our investigators that she
spent the overpayments and would make restitution to the Army, which
according to DFAS pay data, totaled about $37,000. According to DFAS
records, she subsequently paid $10,543 of her debt as of May 2006.
Case 3: Soldier was a staff sergeant in an Army Reserve, Maryland unit
and worked in administration at a pharmacy office in civilian life. She
said she received notice that she had been mobilized to active duty in
November 2003. She also acknowledged that she started receiving active
duty checks beginning in December 2003, continued to receive these
checks until August 2004 and used the money. She said she was aware
that she was not entitled to this military pay since she failed to
report for active duty in November 2003. According to DFAS pay data,
these improper payments totaled about $26,000. DFAS records also show
that she has paid about $6,836 as of May 2006.
Case 4: Soldier was a sergeant in an Army Reserve, Maryland unit and
was a firefighter in civilian life. We confirmed that the soldier
resided at the address stated on his mobilization orders. He said he
received his mobilization orders to active duty in mid-December 2003.
The soldier acknowledged receiving active duty pay beginning in
December 2003 and said he was aware that he was not entitled to this
military pay since he did not report for active duty. He said he spent
the money. He also told our investigators that he wanted to make
restitution to the Army for the overpayments, which according to DFAS
pay data, totaled about $22,000. DFAS records also show that he has
paid about $50 as of May 2006.
Case 5: Soldier was a specialist in an Army Reserve, Maryland unit and
was a student in civilian life. We confirmed that the soldier resided
at the address stated on her mobilization orders. However, the soldier
said that she never received any notice that she had been mobilized to
active duty. The soldier did acknowledge that she started receiving
bimonthly active duty checks beginning in December 2003 and continued
to receive these checks until August 2004. She said she thought the
checks were educational payments. However, according to DFAS pay data,
this soldier received about $17,000 in military pay under the GWOT code
after being dropped from personnel rolls due to deserter status. DFAS
records also show that she has not paid any of her debt as of May 2006.
Case 6: Soldier was a private first class in an Army Reserve, Virginia
unit and was unemployed in civilian life at the time of our
investigation. We confirmed that the soldier resided at the address
stated on his mobilization order at the time the order was issued.
However, the soldier said that he never received any notice that he had
been mobilized to active duty. The soldier did acknowledge that he
started receiving active duty payments beginning in December 2003 and
continued to receive these payments until August 2004. He said he was
aware that he was not entitled to this military pay since he did not
perform any military duty during the pay periods from December 2003
through August 2004 and that he spent the money for his personal use.
He said he would be willing to make restitution to the Army for the
improper payments, which according to DFAS pay data, totaled about
$17,000. DFAS records also show that he has paid about $300 as of May
2006.
Case 7: Soldier was a specialist in an Army Reserve, Maryland unit and
was a student in civilian life. She said that she was an active duty
member of the U.S. Army and was honorably discharged in August 2002.
Shortly after her discharge, she joined the Army Reserve and became a
member of the 374TH Finance Detachment located in Owings Mill,
Maryland. In November 2002 she was involuntary transferred to the 424TH
Medical Logistics Unit in Pennsylvania and on November 8, 2003, she was
transferred to the 1004TH Quartermaster Company in Greensburg,
Pennsylvania. Although mobilization orders required her to report to
her new unit--the 1004TH---on December 7, 2003, she said she continued
to report for monthly drill with the 374TH. Drill records indicate that
she attended drills for the 374TH in November and December 2003 and
January and February 2004. She acknowledged receiving active duty pay
beginning in December 2003 and said she was aware that she was not
entitled to this unearned military pay since she failed to mobilize for
active duty with the 1004TH. She told us that she kept the unearned
money in a separate account. She also stated that she saw a debt on her
leave and earnings statement but she believed that the amount of debt
was inaccurate. DFAS pay data show that she was improperly paid about
$18,000. DFAS records also show that she has paid about $248 as of May
2006.
Details of Investigation - Other Cases:
In addition to the 7 soldiers assigned to the 1004TH Quartermaster
Company who improperly received unearned military pay, we identified 68
other soldiers, 38 with the Army Guard and 30 with the Army Reserve,
who continued to receive military pay that we estimated to total
$684,000 after they were charged with desertion.[Footnote 9]
The improper payments continued for all 68 soldiers after desertion
charges were made by unit commanders from calendar year 2001 through
February 2006. Arrest warrants were issued for 51 of the 68 soldiers
wanted for desertion. As of May 11, 2006, 18 of the 51 soldiers had
been apprehended by civilian authorities, 2 soldiers voluntarily
surrendered to military authorities, and 31 soldiers remained at large
(listed in NCIC as having an outstanding arrest warrant). Arrest
warrants had not been issued for 17 of the 68 soldiers at that time.
A summary of the improper payments by year and related arrest warrant
status is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Other Army Guard and Reserve Soldiers Who Accepted Improper
and Potentially Fraudulent Military Pay:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[A] Data for 2006 represent desertion charges made in January and
February.
[End of Figure]
Although we identified 68 soldiers in deserter status, this number
likely understates the problem. Determining the extent to which
soldiers charged with desertion continue to receive improper payments
is difficult for several reasons. First, initiating and processing
desertion cases depend upon unit commanders preparing timely manual
paperwork. Second, there is no central database that electronically
stores this paperwork. Without these data, military leaders do not have
readily available aggregate data affording visibility over the number
of desertion cases initiated. Additionally, they do not have a readily
available tool to match against pay data to ensure that soldiers in
deserter status have not been paid.
The USADIP Chief informed us that the USADIP system was not intended to
be and is not an historical source of all Army Guard and Reserve
soldiers ever charged with desertion. Instead, it was designed to be a
working file to track the status of arrest warrants. As such, the
working file is not an accurate account of all soldiers in deserter
status because USADIP:
² manages arrest warrant status for only the desertion cases it
receives and has no way to confirm whether all deserter packets for
Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in deserter status have been prepared
and approved,
² deletes the names of soldiers when informed about their apprehension
or surrender, and:
² returns incomplete desertion packets to the points of origin without
initiating arrest warrants and is not required to follow up to ensure
that the packets are completed properly and returned to USADIP in a
timely manner.
In addition to the USADIP Chief, one Army official documented his
concern about the processing of potential deserter cases. In a
memorandum dated March 21, 2003, the Deputy Commanding General, U.S.
Army Reserve Command stated,
"The processing and reporting of USAR soldiers who fail to report for
mobilization are primarily the USAR unit commander's responsibility. In
attempts to track the soldiers who have failed to report, it has become
apparent that Commanders are not doing an adequate job of reporting
and/or processing these soldiers in accordance with the applicable
regulatory guidance."
Improper payments to soldiers charged with desertion were not unique to
citizen-soldiers in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve called to
active duty since the Army's full-time soldiers in deserter status have
also received improper payments. The U.S. Army Audit Agency issued a
report on November 13, 2002, concerning the Army's policy, procedures,
and controls for reporting active duty Army soldiers in deserter status
to the pay system and whether the pay and benefits of these Army
soldiers were promptly curtailed. The results of the audit disclosed
that policy, procedures, and controls for reporting deserters or
absentee soldiers to the pay system did not ensure that pay and
benefits for these Army soldiers were promptly curtailed. As a result,
the Army made more than $6.6 million in improper payments to 7,544 Army
soldiers from October 2000 through February 2002 for pay that they did
not earn. The report also noted that collection rates were only about
40 percent. The U.S. Army Audit Agency recommended policy changes to
require concurrent notification to applicable pay and personnel offices
whenever approved personnel forms documented a soldier's unauthorized
absence from duty. The requirement became effective in January
2005.[Footnote 10]
Conclusions:
Unless the Army specifically identifies and mitigates the unique risks
applicable to desertion cases, the Army will remain vulnerable to
soldiers taking advantage of flawed pay and personnel systems,
cumbersome processes, and weak human capital functions by accepting pay
they did not earn. Army Guard and Reserve soldiers who fail to report
to active duty when their units are mobilized do not meet the military
obligation that they took an oath to fulfill when they enlisted and
should not be rewarded by receiving pay for active duty they never
performed. Our investigation showed that there are sometimes few or no
consequences for soldiers--not only for desertion from their appointed
place of duty but also for keeping unearned military pay. This is
unfair to the vast majority of Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers
who fulfill their military obligation by reporting for active duty,
serving honorably, and earning the pay they deserve.
Corrective Action Briefing:
On June 16, 2006, we discussed the results of our investigation with
Army, Army Guard, Army Reserve, and DFAS officials. We also provided
them with details needed to take appropriate action on the 75 cases (7
cases from the 1004TH Quartermaster Company and 68 other cases)
involving Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in deserter status who had
received improper and potentially fraudulent military pay.
In light of our investigative results, the officials acknowledged that
there is a need for a joint effort by personnel and pay officials
within Army, Army Guard, and Army Reserve components to develop a near-
term strategy covering human capital, business processes, and systems
issues relevant to potential desertion cases in order to provide better
assurance that soldiers who do not report for duty are not paid. They
stated that starting a componentwide effort would require a joint
directive from Army, Army Guard, and Army Reserve top leadership with
DFAS cooperation.
The officials were unaware of the extent to which Army Guard and
Reserve soldiers failed to report for active duty and improperly
received potentially fraudulent military pay. They also acknowledged
that there is no readily available consolidated personnel data on
potential Army Guard and Reserve desertion cases for centralized
oversight and comparison with pay data. For example, National Guard
Bureau officials did not ask for periodic information regarding the
number of potential desertion cases initiated by Army Guard unit
commanders. Although, the Army Reserve personnel representative said
that starting in January 2003, Army Reserve staff informed her that a
total of about 137 potential desertion cases had been sent to USADIP,
she did not receive information from USADIP on the status of those
cases, including how many deserter packets were returned to unit
commanders because they were incomplete. She also informed us that she
had no direct access to the pay records for the 137 potential deserters
to determine whether the potential deserters received improper and
potentially fraudulent military pay. She further stated that beyond the
137 cases, she had no visibility over the number of personnel forms
recommending desertion status that had been prepared by unit commanders
and presented in paper form to their supervisors for approval.
Both Army Guard and Reserve officials acknowledged that oversight of
pay was a decentralized command responsibility and that unit commanders
receive reports on who is being paid within their units that they
should have reviewed to ensure that those soldiers who failed to report
for active duty were not getting paid. Because the policies and
procedures requiring commanders to notify finance offices to stop pay
for soldiers who do not report for duty within 48 hours were clearly
defined, the officials could not explain why some commanders were not
complying with this requirement. While they noted that the future
integration of pay and personnel systems may make it easy for a unit
commander to push one button that would stop pay and start desertion
processing when justified, they pointed out that the future
availability of such integration would still depend upon a commander's
confirmation of the daily presence of all the soldiers under his or her
command.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Based on the input from officials attending our corrective action
briefing and consistent with the ongoing efforts to improve Army Guard
and Reserve pay account management that have been initiated in response
to our previous reports, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army, in conjunction with the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness), to take the following three actions:
² take appropriate action, including initiating criminal proceedings
where warranted and recovering improper payments, on the 75 cases of
potential desertion identified in this investigative report;
² identify other existing desertion cases to determine whether
additional Army Guard and Reserve soldiers have received improper and
potentially fraudulent military pay, take appropriate action including
initiating criminal proceedings where warranted, and recover improper
payments on any additional cases identified; and:
² to provide better assurance going forward, direct a joint effort by
Army, Army Guard, and Reserve components to (1) develop a near-term
strategy covering the human capital, business processes, and systems
issues relevant to potential desertion cases in order to provide better
assurance that soldiers who do not report for duty are not paid and (2)
in the cases where future improper and potentially fraudulent
acceptance of unearned pay are detected, take appropriate action,
including initiating criminal proceedings and recovering those improper
payments.
Agency Comments:
The Director, Audit Follow-up and GAO Affairs in DOD's Office of
Inspector General orally informed us, on the basis of information he
received from applicable components, that DOD generally concurred with
the report and recommendations.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from its issuance date. At that time we will send copies of the report
to other interested congressional committees, the Secretary of the
Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Under
Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the Secretary of the
Army. We will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
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If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in the enclosure.
Signed by:
Gregory D. Kutz:
Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
Enclosure:
List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Todd Platts:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and Accountability:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger:
House of Representatives:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact: Gregory D. Kutz (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Mary Ellen
Chervenic, Assistant Director; Kord Basnight; Gary Bianchi; Dennis
Fauber; Wil Holloway; Daniel Kaneshiro; Jason Kelly; Renee McElveen;
John Ryan; and Wayne Turowski made key contributions to this report.
(192180):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Military Pay: Inadequate Controls for Stopping Overpayments of
Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army
National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers Assigned to Fort Bragg, GAO-
06-384R (Washington D.C.: Apr. 27, 2006); Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and
Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured Army National Guard and
Reserve Soldiers, GAO-05-125 and GAO-05-322T (Washington, D.C.: Feb 17,
2005); Army National Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in
Travel Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers, GAO-05-79
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2005) and GAO-05-400T (Washington, D.C;
Mar. 16, 2005); Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active
Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems, GAO-04-911 (Washington, D.C:
Aug. 20, 2004); and Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel
Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems, GAO-04-
89 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2003).
[2] 18 U.S.C. § 641.
[3] GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability
of Cost Data and Provide Additional Guidance to Control Cost, GAO-05-
882 (Washington, D.C: Sept. 21, 2005).
[4] This requirement became effective January 22, 2005. Commanders were
previously required to report absent personnel to the provost marshal
and had no time limits to do so. See AR 630-10 (Aug. 31, 2001) and as
revised, December 22, 2003.
[5] The Army's previous policy only required that the commanders wait 7
days, notwithstanding their ability to determine whether a soldier
received his/her orders, before placing the soldier into deserter
status. See AR 630-10, para. 6-2b (2), 6-5b (Dec. 22, 2003).
[6] There are two personnel control facilities, one at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, and the other at Fort Knox, Kentucky.
[7] The initial paperwork includes a completed DA Form 4187 requesting
that the soldier's duty status be changed to deserter, a completed DD
Form 553 providing the absentee's personal information for the law
enforcement officials who will be responsible for arresting the
absentee, and a completed DD Form 458 charging the soldier with
desertion. The final paperwork for dropping a soldier from the rolls
includes the three completed forms and the supporting investigative
documentation.
[8] Each of the seven soldiers had been transferred from other units
within the 99TH Regional Readiness Command into the 1004TH to increase
the number of soldiers within the 1004TH for a prior deployment.
[9] Although we asked DFAS for the amount of outstanding debt on their
records for these 68 soldiers, a DFAS official told us that the data
were not readily available and that some of the data had been purged.
[10] See footnote 4.
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