Security Assistance
Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight Gao ID: GAO-06-850 July 31, 2006Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are important U.S. allies in the war on terrorism. The United States provides these countries with security assistance, however, Congress restricts funding when credible evidence exists that foreign security units have committed gross human rights violations. GAO (1) describes the goals of U.S. security assistance to these countries and examines U.S. agencies' assessment of this assistance, (2) assesses U.S. agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State's policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with congressional human rights funding restrictions, and (3) examines agencies' efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense articles provided through U.S. security assistance programs in the three countries, including Western Sahara, to ensure that they are not misused or diverted. GAO visited U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia and analyzed trainee files to determine compliance with human rights vetting policy.
The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security, building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have allocated approximately $146.6 million, from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, to train and equip security forces in these countries. DOD and State assess these programs together with other related activities through evaluations of security cooperation, counterterrorism, and other country goals. State policy requires human rights vetting of individuals and units of foreign security forces receiving U.S.-provided training. In Morocco and Tunisia, GAO found lapses in the vetting of trainees during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These lapses include more than 400 trainees for whom no vetting files existed at the posts. In addition, even though posts maintained vetting files on 468 trainees, GAO estimates that 27 percent of these files did not have evidence of vetting. The lapses in vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities for vetting, and the lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures were followed. Although State has issued a guide to clarify procedures and has required posts to assign an official responsible for vetting, it does not monitor whether posts are following vetting procedures. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin defense articles subject to DOD's systematic monitoring requirements, such as physical inventory and inspection requirements. According to DOD officials and human rights organizations, no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment have been made that would call for greater scrutiny of end use by these countries.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-850, Security Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2006:
Security Assistance:
Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate
Need for Further Oversight:
Security Assistance:
GAO-06-850:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-850, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are important U.S. allies in the war on
terrorism. The United States provides these countries with security
assistance, however, Congress restricts funding when credible evidence
exists that foreign security units have committed gross human rights
violations. GAO (1) describes the goals of U.S. security assistance to
these countries and examines U.S. agencies‘ assessment of this
assistance, (2) assesses U.S. agencies‘ implementation in Morocco and
Tunisia of State‘s policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure
compliance with congressional human rights funding restrictions, and
(3) examines agencies‘ efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin
defense articles provided through U.S. security assistance programs in
the three countries, including Western Sahara, to ensure that they are
not misused or diverted. GAO visited U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia
and analyzed trainee files to determine compliance with human rights
vetting policy.
What GAO Found:
The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security
cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security,
building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting
interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, the
Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have allocated
approximately $146.6 million, from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, to train
and equip security forces in these countries. DOD and State assess
these programs together with other related activities through
evaluations of security cooperation, counterterrorism, and other
country goals.
State policy requires human rights vetting of individuals and units of
foreign security forces receiving U.S.-provided training. In Morocco
and Tunisia, GAO found lapses in the vetting of trainees during fiscal
years 2004 and 2005. These lapses include more than 400 trainees for
whom no vetting files existed at the posts. In addition, even though
posts maintained vetting files on 468 trainees, GAO estimates that 27
percent of these files did not have evidence of vetting. The lapses in
vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting procedures,
undefined roles and responsibilities for vetting, and the lack of a
systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures were
followed. Although State has issued a guide to clarify procedures and
has required posts to assign an official responsible for vetting, it
does not monitor whether posts are following vetting procedures.
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin
defense articles subject to DOD‘s systematic monitoring requirements,
such as physical inventory and inspection requirements. According to
DOD officials and human rights organizations, no allegations of
unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment have been made that would
call for greater scrutiny of end use by these countries.
Figure: The United States Provides Excess Defense Articles to Morocco
and Tunisia:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, strengthen the process for human rights vetting
of foreign security forces by establishing a systematic monitoring
mechanism that will ensure that State‘s vetting procedures are carried
out at overseas posts. State concurred with our recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-850].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202)
512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support
Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed
Collectively with Other Activities:
Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from
Unclear Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts'
Compliance with State Policy:
Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.-Origin Defense Articles that
Require Systematic Monitoring:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process in Morocco and Tunisia as of
February 2006:
Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence of Vetting
in Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments37:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Algeria, Fiscal Years
2002-2005:
Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Morocco, Fiscal Years
2002-2005:
Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Tunisia, Fiscal Years
2002-2005:
Table 4: Offices Implementing Training Programs in Morocco and Tunisia:
Table 5: Estimated Number of Trainees with No Vetting Files, Fiscal
Years 2004-2005:
Table 6: GAO Sample of Files Maintained on Training Nominees in Morocco
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005:
Figures:
Figure 1: Total Security Assistance Allocations to Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005:
Figure 2: Total Security Assistance Allocations by Program to Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005:
Abbreviations:
ACES: Abuse Case Evaluation System:
ALP: Aviation Leadership Program:
ATA: Antiterrorism Assistance:
CTFP: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency:
EDA: Excess Defense Articles:
EUCOM: U.S. European Command:
FMF: Foreign Military Financing:
IMET: International Military Education and Training:
INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement:
JCET: Joint Combined Exchange Training:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
PART: Program Assessment Rating Tool:
UN: United Nations:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 28, 2006:
The Honorable Tom Coburn:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information,
and International Security:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Chairwoman:
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ted Poe:
House of Representatives:
The U.S. government views Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as stable
Islamic countries that are key partners in the war on terrorism. These
countries are adjacent to vast expanses of ungoverned desert and have
porous borders vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist organizations.
The Department of State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD)
provide these countries with security assistance[Footnote 1] to further
U.S. foreign policy and security goals, such as supporting
counterterrorism, promoting stronger bilateral relationships,
strengthening self-defense capabilities, and promoting greater respect
for democracy and human rights. To further human rights goals, Congress
restricts certain security assistance funds from being provided to any
units of foreign security forces when credible evidence exists that
such units have committed gross violations of human rights.[Footnote 2]
However, we recently found lapses in State's process for human rights
screening, or vetting,[Footnote 3] of foreign candidates for U.S.-
funded training in other countries.[Footnote 4] Additionally, an
unresolved territorial dispute in the Western Sahara is viewed as an
impediment to regional cooperation and contributes to concerns about
human rights abuses.
In response to your request, this report (1) describes the goals of
U.S. security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and examines
U.S. agencies' assessment of this assistance; (2) assesses U.S.
agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State's policy to
screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with congressional
human rights funding restrictions; and (3) examines U.S. agencies'
efforts to monitor the use of U.S-origin defense articles provided
through U.S. security assistance programs in the three countries,
including in Western Sahara, to ensure that they are not misused or
diverted for unauthorized uses.
To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant State and DOD
planning, funding, and evaluation documents, and the agencies' policies
and procedures. We spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington,
D.C; Rabat, Morocco; and Tunis, Tunisia. We also interviewed DOD
officials at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany.
In addition, we met with government officials from Morocco to discuss
U.S.-provided security assistance and spoke with the commander of the
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Western Sahara regarding
Morocco's military presence there. In Rabat and Tunis, we analyzed a
stratified random probability sample of 273 out of 468 available human
rights vetting case files to determine U.S. agencies' compliance with
State's human rights vetting policy. These State and DOD files were
maintained for nominees for U.S.-provided training during fiscal years
2004 and 2005. We did not collect data on whether any individual or
unit trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed
human rights violations. We did not visit Algeria because the United
States provides much less security assistance to Algeria than it does
to Morocco and Tunisia. Appendix I contains a more detailed description
of our scope and methodology. We performed our work from October 2005
to July 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security
cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security,
building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting
interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, State and
DOD have allocated[Footnote 5] approximately $146.6 million to train
and equip security forces in these countries from fiscal year 2002
through fiscal year 2005. All three countries participated in a variety
of U.S.-provided training programs for their domestic and military
security forces. The U.S. government also provided Morocco and Tunisia
with excess military equipment from U.S. stockpiles, such as used
transport vehicles and 1960s-era helicopters. The government also
provided Foreign Military Financing grants, which were used to purchase
spare parts to refurbish and maintain the equipment. State and DOD
assess whether and how these security assistance programs, in addition
to other activities such as humanitarian assistance and military-to-
military events, support U.S. foreign policy and security goals through
evaluations of security cooperation and counterterrorism goals.
In Morocco and Tunisia, we found lapses in the human rights vetting of
foreign security forces receiving U.S.-funded training in fiscal years
2004 and 2005. We found that the lapses in vetting took two forms: (1)
no files existed to determine whether vetting occurred for
approximately 438 trainees and (2) for the 468 trainees for whom posts
maintained files, we estimate that 27 percent of the files (127
trainees)[Footnote 6] lacked evidence of vetting. These lapses in
vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting policies and
procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities for vetting, and a
lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures
were followed. In July 2005, we found similar lapses at U.S. posts in
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Since then, State has taken
steps to address two of the three weaknesses. State has clarified
vetting policies and procedures by issuing a guide to human rights
vetting for posts. State has also defined roles and responsibilities by
requiring each post to assign a single point of contact with
responsibility for oversight of vetting procedures. However, State has
not established a systematic monitoring mechanism. In Morocco and
Tunisia, we found that the assigned points of contact did not routinely
monitor whether vetting procedures were followed at the posts. In
addition, State headquarters does not monitor whether posts are
following procedures for vetting foreign security forces.
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin
equipment subject to DOD's systematic monitoring requirements, which
include physical inventory and inspection requirements. U.S. law
generally limits the transfer of defense articles and services to
countries for purposes of internal security, legitimate self-defense,
or regional or collective arrangements. To ensure compliance with these
limitations, DOD employs an end-use monitoring program, which requires
systematic monitoring only for the most sensitive defense articles,
such as stinger missiles and night vision devices. For nonsensitive
articles, DOD guidance directs security assistance officers at overseas
posts to conduct monitoring in conjunction with other routine visits
with host country officials. According to DOD officials and human
rights organizations, there have been no allegations of unauthorized
use of U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia, Morocco and Western Sahara
that would require greater scrutiny. Because there are no sensitive
U.S.-origin defense articles or allegations of unauthorized use, DOD
officials have not conducted end-use monitoring activities involving
Morocco's use of equipment in Western Sahara.
We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, further strengthen the process of human
rights vetting of foreign security forces by establishing a systematic
monitoring mechanism that will ensure that State's vetting procedures
are carried out at overseas posts. Specifically, we recommend the
following two actions:
* The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at each
post should verify that the various offices implementing U.S. training
at the post comply with State's vetting policy.
* Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to a
designated State headquarters unit to provide State with assurance of
posts' compliance with its human rights vetting policy.
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and
State for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our draft.
State provided a written response that is reprinted in appendix IV and
technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
In commenting on our draft and in a subsequent e-mail, State concurred
with our recommendations and indicated that they are taking steps to
implement them. State also noted that our review did not uncover any
evidence that the U.S. government has trained any individual or unit
that has committed gross violations of human rights. However, our
review only focused on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis
vetted trainees. We did not collect data on whether any individual or
unit trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed
human rights violations.
Background:
State and DOD provide a variety of security assistance programs to
train and equip security forces (military and police) in North Africa.
Many of these programs are funded by State and implemented by DOD. DOD
manages security assistance under its Theater Security Cooperation
umbrella along with a variety of other activities.[Footnote 7] The
European Command, which is the U.S. military entity responsible for
these countries' programs, focuses its security cooperation activities
on assisting allies and partner countries to develop the capabilities
to conduct peacekeeping, participate in the war on terrorism, and
perform contingency operations with U.S. forces.
State funds the following programs to train and equip foreign security
forces:
* Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) provides strategic, operational, and
technical training and equipment to foreign law enforcement agencies to
assist them in detecting and eliminating terrorist threats and in
protecting facilities, individuals, and infrastructure. State
implements this program.
* Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides grants and loans for the
acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training by
foreign governments. The goal of these grants is to enable key allies
to improve their defense capabilities and to foster closer military
relationships between the United States and recipient nations. DOD
implements the program.
* International Military Education and Training (IMET) provides
training to foreign military and related civilian personnel. IMET
training is intended to promote professional militaries around the
world and strengthen U.S. military alliances. DOD implements the
program.
* International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) seeks to
enhance the law enforcement capabilities of foreign governments in
combating criminal, drug, and terrorist threats. INCLE programs support
counternarcotics, intelligence, border patrol, and interdiction
activities. State implements the program through interagency agreements
with other U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of
Justice and Homeland Security.
DOD funds and implements several programs to train foreign security
forces.
* The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)
provides education and training on counterterrorism activities to
foreign military and related civilian officials. This training is
intended to bolster the capacity of friendly foreign nations to detect,
monitor, and interdict or disrupt the activities of terrorist networks.
* Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special
operations forces to train with foreign military forces to enhance
readiness through language proficiency, cultural immersion, knowledge
of foreign environments, and instructor skills. The training primarily
benefits U.S. forces. Benefits to the host nation's security forces are
incidental.
* The Aviation Leadership Program (ALP) is a U.S. Air Force-funded
program that provides undergraduate pilot training to a small number of
international students from friendly, less developed countries.
* Regional Centers for Security Studies provide a forum for bilateral
and multilateral communication, and military and civilian exchanges
within a region. Activities at five regional centers range from
extended academic programs to conferences on topics such as regional
security issues, defense planning, and civilian-military relations.
* DOD's three service academies conduct traditional academic exchange
programs of varying length and content. Up to 60 foreign students may
attend one of the service academies as members of an academy class. The
goal of the program is to expose future foreign leaders to their U.S.
peers and to promote military professionalism.
State and DOD also coordinate to provide nonappropriated assistance for
foreign security forces.
* Excess Defense Articles (EDA) is nonappropriated assistance to help
build the defense capabilities of friendly countries in the form of
excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. Defense articles
declared as excess by the military departments can be transferred in an
"as-is, where-is" condition to the recipient.
* Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that transfers in-stock
defense articles and services from DOD's inventory, as well as from any
other U.S. agency of the U.S. government, to foreign countries and
international organizations in response to unforeseen military
emergencies, humanitarian catastrophes, peacekeeping needs, or
counternarcotics requirements.
The governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are considered stable,
although State has reported problems with their human rights
practices.[Footnote 8]
* Algeria. Algeria has emerged from a period of terrorist and related
violence during the 1990s when more than 100,000 lives were lost,
according to State. Since then, as Algeria has made progress toward
democratization, casualties have declined sharply. Although Algerian
government actions have weakened terrorist groups domestically,
Algerians have been found among suicide bombers and terrorists captured
in Iraq. Terrorist cells operate in the Algerian east and far south and
in the Sahel, the area bordering southern Algeria. State's most recent
human rights report stated that the Algerian government had several
human rights problems, including impunity of security forces,
allegations of abuse and torture of detainees, and arbitrary arrest and
prolonged pretrial detention. State also credited the Algerian
government for taking steps to strengthen human rights, which resulted
in fewer such incidents than in the past.
* Morocco. The United States views Morocco as a stable, moderate Arab
regime; an ally against terrorism; and a free trade partner. King
Mohammed VI retains ultimate power, including over the military. In May
2003, Moroccan suicide bombers attacked several sites in Casablanca. In
response, the government arrested an estimated 3,000 people and
sentenced at least 900 for crimes under counterterrorism laws,
according to State. Moroccan-born extremists associated with al Qaeda
affiliates were implicated in the March 2004 train blasts in Madrid.
According to State's human rights report, Morocco's human rights record
"remained poor in many areas." The report highlighted accusations of
excessive force and harsh sentences against demonstrators in Western
Sahara and torture of human rights activists in that region. Also
included among the human rights problems were reports of police
impunity, arbitrary arrest, and incommunicado detention.
* Western Sahara. Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front
for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have
disputed the independence of Western Sahara since the 1970s, when Spain
decolonized the territory.[Footnote 9] Following a long war in Western
Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario, the UN brokered a ceasefire
that went into effect in 1991, and a UN peacekeeping force remains in
the region. Morocco currently occupies 80 percent of Western Sahara.
The United States, which does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over
Western Sahara, supports efforts to reach a mutually acceptable
resolution under UN auspices; however, the situation remains at an
impasse. This issue is the main impediment to improving bilateral
relations between Morocco and Algeria, as Algeria backs the Polisario.
* Tunisia. Tunisia has a stable yet authoritarian government with a
dominant majority political party and a president who has been in power
since 1987. The Tunisian government harshly suppressed an Islamist
opposition movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. More recently,
suspected terrorists bombed a synagogue on the Tunisian island of
Djerba in 2002 and Tunisian expatriates have been arrested in Europe
and North America on terrorism-related charges. State's human rights
report stated that Tunisia's human rights record remained poor. Among
the human rights problems reported were incidents of torture and abuse
of prisoners and detainees, police impunity, and sanctioned attacks by
police on citizens who criticize the government.
U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support
Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed
Collectively with Other Activities:
The United States uses security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia to support the broad goals of security cooperation and
counterterrorism. Security assistance programs provide these countries
a mixture of training and equipment through programs such as IMET, FMF,
EDA for foreign military forces, and counterterrorism and other
training for domestic security forces. To carry out these security
assistance programs, State and DOD have allocated[Footnote 10] the
equivalent of approximately $146.6 million from fiscal years 2002 to
2005. The contributions of these security assistance programs to
achieving security cooperation and counterterrorism goals are assessed
collectively with those of other activities, such as military-to-
military events and economic and humanitarian assistance.
U.S. Security Assistance Programs Are to Support Counterterrorism and
Security Cooperation Goals:
In Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, the goals for U.S.-provided security
assistance programs are to enhance security and political
relationships, fight terrorism, improve foreign military capabilities
and interoperability, and increase U.S. access for overflight rights
and port visits. The security assistance programs in each of these
countries may support one or more of these goals. Security assistance
programs attempt to achieve these goals by training and equipping
foreign security forces.
State has a mission performance process in which the posts outline
goals for their countries and identify the security assistance and
other programs that would support those goals. For example, State has a
goal to increase Tunisia's antiterrorism capabilities. State planning
documents list the ATA program, which provides training in airport
security and crisis management, as one of the resources it will employ
to meet its goal. Additionally, State has a goal to cooperate with
Morocco on counterterrorism and provides communications equipment and
intelligence officer training, under the FMF and IMET programs, as a
means to achieve this goal.
Similarly, DOD develops country campaign plans that include country
security cooperation goals and implementation activities, which
encompass security assistance programs. For example, DOD's goals in
Algeria are to increase military professionalization and
interoperability. To achieve these goals, DOD uses security assistance
programs, such as IMET and JCET. Additionally, DOD links its goals to
State's mission planning documents.
State and DOD Provided Security Assistance to Train and Equip Security
Forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia:
State and DOD collectively allocated approximately $146.6 million
through their security assistance programs to Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. Tunisia was the largest
recipient of U.S.-provided security assistance in this region,
receiving $74.8 million, although about 40 percent of this came from
the estimated value of excess U.S. equipment delivered in fiscal year
2002 under the EDA program. Morocco received approximately $66.9
million, and Algeria received $5 million. Figure 1 illustrates a
breakdown of total assistance to each North African country.
Figure 1: Total Security Assistance Allocations to Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.
[End of figure]
Figure 2 shows the total allocations by program that Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia received from fiscal years 2002 to 2005.
Figure 2: Total Security Assistance Allocations by Program to Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.
[End of figure]
Security Assistance to Algeria Primarily Funded Training for Military
Forces:
State and DOD allocated approximately $5 million to Algeria in security
assistance from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. The IMET and ATA
programs were the principal security assistance programs (85 percent of
funding) in Algeria. IMET was used to train approximately 263 Algerian
security force personnel during this period.[Footnote 11] Unlike
Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria does not receive FMF funding or EDA
equipment transfers. Table 1 shows the U.S. agency, program,
allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided security assistance.
Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Algeria, Fiscal Years
2002-2005:
Dollars in thousands.
Funding agency: State;
Program: IMET;
Allocation: $2,321.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained approximately 263 Algerian
security personnel in courses such as intelligence, English, and basic
officer training.
Funding agency: State;
Program: ATA;
Allocation: 1,847.5;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained Algerian security personnel in
hostage negotiation and incident management.
Funding agency: DOD;
Program: CTFP;
Allocation: 247.5;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained 25 Algerian security personnel
in counterterrorism.
Funding agency: DOD;
Program: JCET;
Allocation: 212.8;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided joint training for U.S.
Special Operations Forces and Algerian security forces.
Funding agency: DOD;
Program: Other;
Allocation: $293.1;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided training for 182 Algerian
security personnel at Regional Centers for Strategic Studies.
Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.
[End of table]
Security Assistance to Morocco Funded a Mixture of Training and
Equipment Programs for Security Forces:
State and DOD allocated approximately $66.9 million in security
assistance to Morocco for training and equipment from fiscal years 2002
to 2005. Of U.S. security assistance programs in Morocco, FMF and EDA
are the largest, accounting for about $47 million (71 percent) of the
total. IMET trained approximately 458 Moroccan security forces. Also,
State-funded training was provided in fiscal year 2005 through the
INCLE program for border security at ports-of-entry. Morocco is an
active user of the EDA program, acquiring hundreds of used U.S. 5-ton
and 2.5-ton trucks, which they use for spare parts. Additionally,
Morocco uses the FMF program to obtain spare parts to sustain aging
equipment. According to DOD officials in Morocco, as the equipment
continues to age, it will become unsustainable, and Morocco will need
to find resources to replace this equipment. Table 2 shows the U.S.
agency, program, allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided security
assistance.
Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Morocco, Fiscal Years
2002-2005:
Dollars in thousands.
Funding Agency: State;
Program: FMF;
Allocation: $33,468.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Purchased spare parts for aircraft and
other vehicles, radio equipment, and packaging and shipping charges for
EDA transfers.
Funding Agency: State;
Program: IMET;
Allocation: 6,533.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained approximately 458 Moroccan
security personnel in logistics readiness, munitions inspections, and
command and general staff training.
Funding Agency: State;
Program: INCLE; A
Allocation: 2,992.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained Moroccans in border
interdiction and border control.
Funding Agency: State;
Program: ATA;
Allocation: 8,394.1;
Examples of assistance provided: Funded hostage negotiation, management
of mass casualty, and cyberterrorism training.
Funding Agency: DOD;
Program: EDA;
Allocation: 13,931;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided several hundred 2.5-ton-cargo
and other truck acquisitions.
Funding Agency: DOD;
Program: CTFP;
Allocation: 508.2;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained 19 Moroccan security personnel
in counterterrorism.
Funding Agency: DOD;
Program: JCET;
Allocation: 246.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided joint training for U.S.
Special Operations Forces and Moroccan security forces.
Funding Agency: DOD;
Program: Other;
Allocation: $836.3;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided one slot for Morocco at the
U.S. Air Force Academy in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Provided training
at Regional Centers for Strategic Studies.
Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.
[End of table]
Security Assistance to Tunisia Primarily Funded Equipment Procurement
Programs:
State and DOD allocated approximately $74.8 million for training and
equipment to Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. FMF and EDA were
the largest security assistance programs in Tunisia, accounting for 80
percent of the country's total security assistance. EDA value is based
on DOD's estimated value of the equipment at the time of delivery.
Tunisia received EDA in fiscal year 2002 only. The United States
offered Tunisia 15 UH-1H 1960s-era helicopters in fiscal year 2005, 7
of which are being refurbished as of April 2006 and will be delivered
thereafter, according to DOD officials. DOD would like to refurbish one
or two additional helicopters, if additional funds can be found. As in
Morocco, the equipment becomes unsustainable as it ages, and Tunisia
will need to find resources to replace it, according to State and DOD
officials. IMET funding was used to train approximately 406 Tunisian
security personnel from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. State
provided ATA training in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, but not in 2005.
Table 3 shows the U.S. agency, program, allocations, and examples of
U.S.-provided security assistance.
Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Tunisia, Fiscal Years
2002-2005:
Dollars in thousands.
Funding agency: State;
Program: FMF;
Allocation: $28,634.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Purchased spare parts for vehicles and
radios, helicopter refurbishment, and miscellaneous equipment.
Funding agency: State;
Program: IMET;
Allocation: 6,272.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained approximately 406 Tunisian
security personnel in English language skills, crisis command and
control, and water treatment.
Funding agency: State;
Program: ATA;
Allocation: 1,999.8;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided training in crisis management
and airport security.
Funding agency: DOD;
Program: EDA;
Allocation: 30,929.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided surplus guided chaparral
missiles, guided missile system, and tool kits.
Funding agency: DOD;
Program: CTFP;
Allocation: 158.3;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained 19 Tunisian security personnel
in counterterrorism.
Funding agency: DOD;
Program: JCET;
Allocation: 311.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided joint training for U.S.
Special Operations Forces and Tunisian security forces.
Funding agency: DOD;
Program: Drawdown;
Allocation: 5,000.0;
Examples of assistance provided: Provided maintenance of C-130 aircraft
to Tunisia in fiscal year 2002.
Funding agency: DOD;
Program: Other;
Allocation: $1,480.7;
Examples of assistance provided: ALP provided two scholarships to two
cadets at the Tunisian Air Force Academy in fiscal year 2003. The
United States also provided several slots for Tunisians to attend U.S.
service academies in fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.
[End of table]
State and DOD Assess the Broader Goals of Security Cooperation and
Counterterrorism:
For these countries, State and DOD assess whether and how security
assistance programs support U.S. foreign policy and security goals
through their evaluation of how broad goals, such as counterterrorism,
regional stability goals, and security cooperation goals, are being
achieved. State assesses these goals in its annual mission planning
process. While the goals are rated for the degree to which they are
being achieved, the effectiveness of specific programs, such as FMF or
IMET, is not assessed. State officials in Tunis and Rabat said that the
assessments of goals in country planning documents are qualitative and
that the outcomes or results are difficult to measure, requiring
professional judgment to determine the progress made from one year to
the next.
DOD assesses the collective effectiveness of its programs, which
include security assistance and other activities. DOD's unified command
for the region, EUCOM, is developing a new evaluation tool to assess
how they are achieving their country goals. This tool will attempt to
measure the degree to which desired outcomes, such as reduction in
terrorist activities, are achieved. EUCOM plans to use these
assessments to allocate its resources and set priorities.
Although neither State nor DOD conducts assessments for specific
security assistance programs, results from some programs are
periodically reported to Congress, and some results indicators are
monitored for other programs.[Footnote 12] The ATA program annually
reports to Congress on program activities and provides some examples of
how these activities were implemented worldwide. For example, the ATA
fiscal year 2005 report states that Morocco's use of ATA cyberterrorism
training supported U.S. efforts to arrest a primary terrorism suspect.
The IMET program tracks individuals trained through IMET if they rise
to important positions within their government. IMET program officials
are also developing a survey tool to be administered to foreign
trainees to measure whether the training has affected their
preparedness for joint military activities with the United States and
has instilled respect for U.S. values of democracy, human rights, rule
of law, and civilian control of the military.
Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from
Unclear Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts'
Compliance with State Policy:
In Morocco and Tunisia, lapses in vetting trainees for human rights
abuses occurred in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We found that these
lapses consisted of (1) the absence of vetting files at posts for
approximately 438 trainees[Footnote 13] and (2) the absence of vetting
evidence in an estimated 27 percent[Footnote 14] (127 of 468
trainees[Footnote 15]) of the vetting files maintained at
posts.[Footnote 16] These lapses resulted from unclear vetting
procedures, undefined roles for vetting, and the lack of a monitoring
mechanism to ensure posts' compliance with vetting procedures. State
took steps in December 2005 to address the need for clear procedures
and defined vetting roles. However, we found that responsible officials
at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia did not monitor whether offices
within each post were following vetting procedures, and State
headquarters did not monitor the efforts of the posts to vet trainees.
To Comply with U.S. Laws, State Policy Calls for Human Rights Vetting
of Foreign Security Forces Receiving U.S. Assistance:
Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998
has included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment,
that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts
to any foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible
evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human
rights.[Footnote 17] DOD's appropriations acts have contained a similar
restriction on DOD-funded training since fiscal year 1999.[Footnote 18]
While the legal provisions restrict funding to "any unit of the
security forces of a foreign country," State policy applies the
restrictions to individual members of security forces, as well.
To implement these legislative restrictions, State's guidance calls for
posts and State headquarters units to vet individuals or units proposed
for training or assistance to determine whether these foreign security
forces have committed gross human rights violations. The various State
or DOD offices that implement different training programs at each post
initiate the vetting process by submitting names of training candidates
for vetting by post officials. These offices also receive the results
of human rights vetting conducted at each post and State headquarters,
and they maintain vetting files for trainees. See table 4 for various
offices implementing training in Morocco and Tunisia. See app. II for
details on the description of the human rights vetting process.
Table 4: Offices Implementing Training Programs in Morocco and Tunisia:
Office implementing training at posts: Office of Defense Cooperation
(DOD);
Applicable training program: IMET, CTFP, FMF, ALP.
Office implementing training at posts: Defense Attaché Office (DOD);
Applicable training program: Regional centers, service academies.
Office implementing training at posts: Office of Regional Security
(State);
Applicable training program: ATA, INCLE.
Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.
[End of table]
Lapses in Human Rights Vetting Existed at Posts Due to Unclear
Guidance:
In Morocco and Tunisia, we found two categories of lapses in human
rights vetting in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The first category
consisted of approximately 438 trainees[Footnote 19] for whom posts did
not maintain vetting files. The second category consisted of files that
were maintained at the posts but lacked evidence of vetting. Based on
our review of 273 out of 468 files, we estimate that 27 percent (127
trainees)[Footnote 20] lacked evidence of vetting.[Footnote 21]
Of the 438 trainees for whom posts maintained no vetting files, post
officials stated that no vetting occurred for approximately 148
Moroccan and Tunisian trainees.[Footnote 22] These trainees included
those who attended DOD-implemented IMET and CTFP training courses
outside of the United States, as well as attendees of regional centers
and service academies. In addition, we found that the two posts did not
maintain vetting documentation on approximately 290 trainees and were,
therefore, unable to determine whether vetting occurred. These
trainees, who may not have been vetted for human rights abuses,
attended State-provided training, including all 168 trainees who
attended fiscal year 2004 INCLE courses in Morocco, all 42 trainees who
attended fiscal year 2004 ATA courses in Tunisia, and some (80) of the
trainees who attended fiscal year 2005 ATA courses in Morocco. See
table 5 in app. III for more information on the number of trainees and
types of training for which no vetting files existed at the two posts.
The two posts did maintain vetting files for 468 trainees. However, we
estimated that 27 percent (127 trainees) of the files did not contain
evidence of human rights vetting. This estimate is based on a
stratified random sample of 273 of 468 available files at the two
posts. For these files lacking vetting evidence, posts could not locate
any documentation indicating that either the posts or State
headquarters provided the implementing office with results on vetting.
Based on the results of our sample, we estimate that 100 percent of the
files for DOD-implemented training in Tunisia had evidence of vetting.
In Morocco, however, we estimate that about two-thirds of the files for
DOD-implemented training contained no evidence of vetting. We also
reviewed all the available files of State-implemented training in
Morocco and found that about one-sixth of them contained no evidence of
vetting. Table 6 in app. III shows the results of the sample of
trainees we reviewed at each post for evidence of human rights vetting.
According to agency officials at both posts, lapses in vetting
candidates in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 were generally attributable to
unclear guidance that had been provided over the past decade. The
guidance did not clearly identify all types of training to which the
vetting requirement applied. Until December 2005, the guidance had been
issued through multiple cables from headquarters to posts dating from
January 1994 through February 2005. Moreover, in Tunisia, State
officials stated that, in keeping with their understanding of standard
State record retention policies, which were distinct from human rights
vetting guidance on record retention, they destroyed files that may
have contained evidence of vetting for attendees of ATA training
courses. Additionally, in Morocco, a State official stated that he did
not know if past vetting occurred because staff responsible for
implementing training at that time had rotated to a new post.
State Has Clarified Procedures and Responsibilities for Human Rights
Vetting, but Lacks a Monitoring System to Ensure that Posts Comply with
Vetting Procedures:
Lapses in vetting occurred in prior years because of weaknesses in
agencies' management controls: lack of clear and consistent vetting
procedures at departments and posts; lack of clear roles and
responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; and lack of an
established system to monitor compliance with these procedures at State
and posts.[Footnote 23] Although State has taken steps to correct the
first two weaknesses, State still lacks a mechanism to monitor
compliance.
State Has Taken Steps to Clarify Procedures and Responsibilities for
Vetting:
To address our prior recommendation for State to establish clear and
consistent vetting procedures, State drafted a standard guide to human
rights vetting and distributed it to overseas posts in December 2005.
This guide clarifies the vetting procedures, outlines key steps in the
vetting process, requires each post to assign a single point of contact
with responsibility for vetting procedures, and provides required
vetting documentation and record retention policy. Moreover, the guide
suggests that each post develop standard vetting operating procedures
that take into consideration its needs and circumstances. In Morocco
and Tunisia, State officials established post-specific vetting
procedures. For example, the procedures at both posts require that the
office implementing training prepare a standard memorandum and send it
to other offices within the post to request vetting of training
candidates. According to these officials, the issuance of a written
guide has clarified post officials' understanding of vetting
requirements under State's policy. For example, the two posts did not
always maintain the records of completed vetting results in fiscal
years 2004 and 2005. The new State guidance and posts' standard
operating procedures now specify a requirement to maintain these
records for 3 years.
State Has Required Points of Contact at Posts:
Furthermore, in response to our prior recommendation that State
establish clear roles and responsibilities at posts for human rights
vetting, State has required that each post assign a point of contact
with responsibility over human rights vetting. Specifically, State's
December 2005 guide specified that this official would have
responsibility for oversight of vetting procedures. At the posts in
Morocco and Tunisia, an official from the political affairs section
serves as the designated point of contact responsible for human rights
vetting.
State Lacks a Monitoring Mechanism to Ensure Posts' Compliance with
State Policies:
As we found in Southeast Asian countries, post officials in Morocco and
Tunisia, along with officials from State headquarters office, do not
monitor posts' compliance with State's human rights vetting procedures.
However, our internal control standards state that an organization
should ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs as part of normal
operations to assess the quality of performance over time. State's
December 2005 guide states that each post's point of contact should
have oversight of vetting procedures, with the Chief of Mission
responsible for ensuring that vetting procedures are in place and being
followed. However, neither post had established specific activities to
carry out this oversight responsibility. For example, the points of
contact did not regularly verify with the State and DOD offices
implementing training at posts that all relevant trainees were vetted.
Also, they did not monitor whether these offices were following vetting
procedures, such as maintaining documentation of completed vetting of
trainees.
Furthermore, as of June 2006, no headquarters office within State is
charged with monitoring posts' compliance with State's human rights
vetting procedures. State's December 2005 guide specifically states
that no single bureau is tasked with monitoring human rights vetting
procedures. According to State, some oversight is provided through the
established channel of periodic post inspections conducted by the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG). However, as of May 2006,
assessments of posts' compliance with State's human rights vetting
process were not part of State OIG's post inspections. In March 2006,
State officials requested the OIG to include reviews of human rights
vetting procedures in post inspections. In May 2006, a State OIG
official stated that the OIG workplan for inspection would incorporate
a check that posts are vetting candidates appropriately. However,
inspections of a post would be conducted approximately once every 5 or
6 years, according to a State OIG official. This periodic inspection of
posts' compliance does not meet our standard for ongoing monitoring.
Without a monitoring system in place, State has no means of determining
whether posts are complying with required procedures intended to ensure
that trainees do not have records of human rights abuses. Consequently,
State lacks the information it needs to ensure that all posts are
following procedures to prevent foreign security forces with suspected
human rights records from receiving U.S. assistance.
Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.-Origin Defense Articles that
Require Systematic Monitoring:
To comply with the Arms Export Control Act, DOD established the Golden
Sentry program to monitor countries' use of U.S.-origin defense
articles provided through government-to-government transfers. This
program requires systematic monitoring, such as conducting physical
inventories, of only the most sensitive defense articles. Morocco and
Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment subject to this
systematic monitoring, and Algeria does not participate in any programs
involving government transfers of U.S.-origin equipment, such as
foreign military sales or EDA. Monitoring of non-sensitive defense
articles is done in conjunction with other assigned duties with no
reporting requirements or additional resources. DOD officials in Rabat
have not conducted any end-use monitoring in Western Sahara.
Additionally, according to State and based on our work, there have been
no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia,
Morocco, and the Western Sahara that would trigger greater scrutiny of
end use.
End-Use Monitoring Program Established to Comply with Arms Export
Control Act:
In compliance with the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as
amended,[Footnote 24]DOD established an end-use monitoring program
called Golden Sentry to ensure the proper end-use monitoring of
government-to-government transfers.[Footnote 25] To make optimum use of
the limited resources available for such monitoring purposes, the
Golden Sentry program requires different levels of monitoring for
different types of defense articles. For those articles deemed
sensitive by Golden Sentry such as man-portable air defense systems and
night vision devices, systematic monitoring, including physical
inventory and inspection procedures, is required. In addition, other
conditions or events can affect the level of monitoring that may occur.
For example, allegations of a country's misuse, a country's development
of ties with countries prohibited from receiving U.S. exports, or
unusual political or military upheaval can result in greater scrutiny.
The monitoring of nonsensitive defense articles and services, such as
trucks and spare parts, is referred to as routine end-use monitoring.
This routine end-use monitoring is performed by DOD officials in
conjunction with other assigned duties. Because DOD applies its
resources to end-use monitoring of sensitive items, it does not expend
additional resources nor require specific reporting on routine
monitoring that is performed incidental to its normal business contacts
in these countries.
Only routine end-use monitoring is required in Morocco and Tunisia
because these countries do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin
equipment. The U.S. government gives these countries excess equipment
through the EDA program and sells them material to sustain their aging
stocks of U.S.-origin equipment with the help of FMF grants. Algeria
does not obtain any defense articles from the U.S. government. In
accordance with DOD and EUCOM guidelines for routine end-use
monitoring, DOD officials at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia stated
that they visit a sample of host country bases while conducting other
business, such as meetings, exercises, or exchange events, at those
locations. These visits help DOD officials confirm the proper use and
condition of non-sensitive U.S.-origin equipment. Additionally,
according to DOD officials from EUCOM, DSCA, and at the posts in Rabat
and Tunis, there have been no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-
origin equipment, including in Western Sahara, that would trigger
greater scrutiny.
Morocco's Use of Equipment in Western Sahara:
According to State, the United States has not placed any special
restrictions on Morocco's use of equipment in Western Sahara beyond
those provided for in the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign
Assistance Act.[Footnote 26] Since DOD officials in Morocco do not
generally conduct other business in the Western Sahara, they have not
conducted end-use monitoring activities involving Morocco's use of
equipment in Western Sahara, according to a DOD official in Rabat. This
official and a DSCA official responsible for DOD's end-use monitoring
program noted that, given the absence of sensitive defense articles or
allegations of misuse, DOD has no reason to commit resources to
inspections there. According to State and other officials, State
representatives do, however, visit Western Sahara on other business
including fact finding and humanitarian activities. In addition, a
State official stated and DOD guidance indicate that, should an
allegation of misuse arise, procedures exist for investigation. In
addition, the commanding general of the UN peacekeeping mission in
Western Sahara stated that there had been no allegations of Moroccan
military misuse of U.S.-origin equipment in the Western Sahara.
Representatives of the human rights organizations we spoke with also
reported that they had no reports of misuse.
Conclusion:
Security assistance is used as a tool to advance U.S. foreign policy
and security goals, including respect for human rights. In 2005, we
reported that U.S. agencies did not have adequate assurance that U.S.
training funds were used to train and equip only foreign security
forces with no violations of human rights. Although State has taken
steps to ensure more consistent human rights vetting of foreign
security forces receiving U.S.-provided training, it still lacks a
mechanism to monitor whether or not posts are following its guidance,
which is intended to ensure that trainees do not have records of human
rights abuses. State's guide, issued in December 2005, assigned
responsibility for monitoring the vetting process to points of contact
at U.S. posts but did not provide them with guidance in carrying out
this responsibility. Posts' points of contact in Morocco and Tunisia
were not monitoring posts' compliance with vetting procedures, and
State headquarters lacks assurance that posts are following its vetting
policy. This suggests that additional action is needed to strengthen
the monitoring element of internal controls. Although State OIG
inspections of posts once every 5 years may be a means of monitoring
whether posts follow vetting guidelines, internal control standards
recommend ongoing monitoring in the course of normal operations. A
routine monitoring mechanism would provide greater assurance that all
individuals are properly vetted for human rights issues before
receiving U.S. assistance and that any lapses in the proper screening
of recipients of U.S. assistance could be corrected.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security
assistance programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and
State policies on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, further
strengthen the process of human rights vetting of foreign security
forces by establishing a systematic monitoring mechanism that will
ensure that State's vetting procedures are carried out at overseas
posts. Specifically, we recommend the following two actions:
* The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at each
post should verify that the various offices implementing U.S. training
at the post comply with State's vetting policy.
* Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to a
designated State headquarters unit to provide State with assurance of
posts' compliance with its human rights vetting policy.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and
State for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our draft.
State provided a written response that is reprinted in appendix IV and
technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
In commenting on our draft and in a subsequent e-mail, State concurred
with our recommendations and indicated that they are taking steps to
implement them. State also noted that our review did not uncover any
evidence that the U.S. government has trained any individual or unit
that has committed gross violations of human rights. However, our
review only focused on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis
vetted trainees. We did not collect data on whether any individual or
unit trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed
human rights violations.
We are providing copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense
and State and interested congressional committees. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will
be available on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the goals of U.S. security assistance and how these goals
are assessed, we interviewed officials from the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C.,
responsible for overseeing security assistance programs. We also
interviewed DOD officials at the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart,
Germany; U.S. Embassy officials in Rabat, Morocco, and Tunis, Tunisia;
and foreign government officials in Rabat. We did not include Algeria
in our site visits because its level of participation in U.S. security
assistance programs was significantly lower than Morocco's and
Tunisia's. Additionally, we reviewed State's Mission Performance Plans
and DOD's Country Campaign Plans for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, as
well as a variety of other State and DOD documents to determine how
U.S. security assistance programs were linked to State and DOD goals.
We obtained data on the nature and extent of the activities funded by
these programs in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia from program officials
and State and DOD documents. We reviewed the reliability of funding
data provided by State and DOD by comparing it with similar data
obtained from other sources to check for completeness, consistency, and
reasonableness. We also interviewed program officials responsible for
managing the data to assess how it was developed and maintained. We
found the data sufficiently reliable for representing the nature and
extent of program funding and activities.
To assess U.S. agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of
State's policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance
with congressional human rights funding restrictions, we reviewed
relevant statutes and implementing guidelines. These include the fiscal
years 2004 through 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts and the
DOD Appropriations Acts, and the DOD Security Assistance Management
Manual. We also reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State
and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at the posts in Rabat and
Tunis. To understand human rights vetting requirements and processes,
we interviewed relevant officials in Washington, D.C., the U.S.
European Command, and the two posts to discuss vetting requirements and
processes. We also reviewed the recommendations made in our July 2005
report on human rights vetting in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, we
communicated with a State Office of Inspector General (OIG) official to
determine the extent to which State OIG has oversight of human rights
vetting at posts. To obtain a general understanding of the human rights
situation in Morocco and Tunisia, we met with State human rights
officers and representatives of nongovernmental organizations involved
with human rights issues.
To determine the extent to which the two posts complied with human
rights vetting policy in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, we asked the
relevant State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at each post
to determine the number of foreign security force personnel receiving
training implemented at the posts in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We
further asked post officials to identify the total number of vetting
files maintained at the post for trainees in this time frame. To
identify the approximate number of trainees for whom posts did not
maintain vetting files and, therefore, who may not have been vetted, we
used training data provided by agency reports as well as State and DOD
officials. For vetting files that were available at the posts, we drew
a stratified random probability sample of 273 of 468 trainee vetting
files available at the U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia. With our
probability sample, each member of the study population had a nonzero
probability of being included, and that probability could be computed
for any member. We stratified the population by country and by agency
implementing training into the Morocco DOD, Morocco State, and Tunisia
DOD case files. Each sample case file was subsequently weighted in the
analysis to account statistically for all the case files in the
population, including those who were not selected. We reviewed the
files for compliance with State human rights vetting policy. To conduct
the file review, we used a data collection instrument to systematically
capture whether key steps in the post's human rights vetting process
occurred, such as whether the political affairs office at each post was
involved. We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit
trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed
human rights violations.
Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections,
our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have
drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we
express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample's
results as 95 percent confidence intervals (e.g., plus or minus 7
percentage points). These are intervals that would contain the actual
population values for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As
a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence
intervals in this report will include the true values in the study
population.
To examine U.S. agencies' efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin
defense articles provided to these countries, we reviewed relevant
federal laws governing the use of arms exports, including the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended, and reviewed DOD end-use monitoring guidance. We
interviewed DOD officials responsible for end-use monitoring at the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and the posts in
Rabat and Tunis to determine what monitoring activities took place in
these countries, whether these countries have any sensitive defense
articles requiring systematic monitoring under DOD guidelines, and
whether there have been any allegations of misuse of U.S.-origin
equipment. Algeria does not receive U.S.-origin defense articles from
the U.S. government. We also interviewed State human rights officers in
Rabat, Tunis and Washington, D.C. as well as representatives of Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International to determine if there have been
any allegations of misuse involving U.S.-origin defense articles.
Furthermore, we spoke with the commander of the United Nations
peacekeeping force in Western Sahara regarding Morocco's military
presence there. We also received intelligence briefings from EUCOM and
DIA officials. To determine U.S. policy on the use of U.S.-origin
equipment by Morocco in Western Sahara, we interviewed State and DOD
officials in Washington, D.C., and at the post in Morocco and reviewed
relevant State and DOD congressional testimony regarding Western
Sahara.
We conducted this review from October 2005 to July 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process in:
[End of section]
Morocco and Tunisia as of February 2006:
Agency vetting of candidates for human rights concerns in Morocco and
Tunisia typically includes the following steps. First, the office at
the post implementing the training programs receives names of training
candidates and reviews background information from the host government.
Second, the implementing office forwards the names of training
candidates to the point of contact at State's political affairs office
at the post for screening, which includes searches using paper and
electronic files, for evidence of the candidates' involvement in human
rights violations. The political office may also consult human rights
nongovernmental organizations for any information they have on the
candidates. The implementing office also circulates the candidates'
names to other relevant offices within the post, such as State's
regional security office and consular affairs office, for vetting.
These offices respond to the implementing office with their vetting
results.
The point of contact in the post's political affairs office sends the
training candidates' names via cable to the relevant regional bureau,
such as the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, to request human rights
screening by State headquarters. The regional bureau checks candidates'
names against bureau files, and then forwards these names to other
bureaus at State headquarters for further vetting. These bureaus--
including the Bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor;
Intelligence and Research; and Political-Military Affairs--screen
candidates' names using paper and electronic files available to them
and then report vetting results to the regional bureau.
Finally, the regional bureau communicates State headquarters' vetting
results via cable to the post to inform the point of contact and the
implementing office whether credible evidence of gross human rights
violations existed for training candidates.
When vetting candidates' names, the political affairs office at posts
and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor access State's
Abuse Case Evaluation System (ACES), a database that contains
information on alleged human rights abuses. Data in the system come
from post reporting, the press, nongovernmental organizations, national
human rights commissions, and other sources. Users at posts and State
headquarters enter comments on allegations, and the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor validates information for
completeness and accuracy. In screening training candidates, post
officials use ACES to conduct vetting checks by entering names into the
database to determine whether it contains derogatory information on an
individual. Although State implemented ACES in February 2005, officials
at posts and State headquarters informed us that ACES does not contain
entries for Morocco and Tunisia because they had no derogatory
information on specific individuals to report as of June 2006.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence of Vetting
in Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005:
We obtained the estimated number of trainees for whom posts lacked
vetting files using data provided by State and DOD training reports and
agency officials. See Table 5 for more information on the types of
training which lacked vetting files.
Table 5: Estimated Number of Trainees with No Vetting Files, Fiscal
Years 2004-2005:
Implementing agency and country: DOD: International Military Education
and Training, Morocco;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 29.
Implementing agency and country: DOD: International Military Education
and Training, Tunisia;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 25.
Implementing agency and country: DOD: Regional Defense Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program, Morocco;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 6.
Implementing agency and country: DOD: Regional Defense Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program, Tunisia;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 10.
Implementing agency and country: DOD: Regional centers, Morocco;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 29.
Implementing agency and country: DOD: Regional centers, Tunisia;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 35.
Implementing agency and country: DOD: Service academies, Morocco;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 1.
Implementing agency and country: DOD: Service academies, Tunisia;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 13.
Implementing agency and country: DOD subtotal;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 148.
Implementing agency and country: State: Antiterrorism Assistance,
Morocco;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 80.
Implementing agency and country: State: Antiterrorism Assistance,
Tunisia;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 42.
Implementing agency and country: State: International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement, Morocco;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 168.
Implementing agency and country: State subtotal;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 290.
Implementing agency and country: Total;
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 438.
Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.
[End of table]
Our review of a sample of human rights vetting files showed that an
estimated 27 percent had no evidence of vetting. Details by the
implementing office and country are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: GAO Sample of Files Maintained on Training Nominees in Morocco
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005:
Implementing agency and country: DOD: Morocco[A];
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 148;
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 49;
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 65%.
Implementing agency and country: DOD: Tunisia[B];
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 143;
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 47;
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 0%.
Implementing agency and country: State: Morocco[C];
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 177;
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 177;
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 17%.
Implementing agency and country: Morocco subtotal[D];
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 325;
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 226;
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 39%.
Implementing agency and country: Tunisia subtotal[E];
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 143;
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 47;
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 0%.
Implementing agency and country: Total[F];
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 468;
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 273;
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 27%.
Source: GAO.
[A] This number is composed of training nominees for International
Military Education and Training (IMET), the Regional Defense
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and Foreign Military
Financing. We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of DOD
Morocco files with no evidence of vetting is between 53 percent and 76
percent.
[B] This number is composed of training nominees for IMET, CTFP, and
the Aviation Leadership Program. We are 95 percent confident that the
percentage of DOD Tunisia files with no evidence of vetting is between
0 percent and 6 percent.
[C] This number is composed of Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training
nominees for whom State maintained vetting files. Some training
nominees may not have attended the training course due to
cancellations. State's data indicated that Morocco held additional ATA
courses; however, we did not find vetting files for training nominees
for these courses. The sample size represents the entire population of
available State-provided training courses with vetting files.
[D] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of Morocco files
with no evidence of vetting is between 34 and 44 percent.
[E] See table note b.
[F] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with
no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D. C. 20520:
Jul 19 2006:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Security
Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries
Indicate Need for Further Oversight," GAO Job Code 320382.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Ellen Germain, Deputy Director, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, at
(202) 647-4679.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc:
GAO - Muriel Forster:
NEA - C. David Welch:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Security Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African
Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight (GAO-06-850, GAO Code
320382):
We are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the GAO's report on
USG security assistance to North Africa. We are concerned that the
audit found lapses in the vetting procedure for members of Moroccan and
Tunisian security forces who receive USG training, and are taking steps
to correct that. However, we are pleased that the GAO review did not
uncover any evidence that the USG has trained any individual or unit
that has committed gross violations of human rights.
The report's first recommendation is that a single point of contact at
post be responsible for verifying that all offices comply with the
vetting process. We have already taken steps to implement this
recommendation. As the report notes, in December 2005 the State
Department issued a guide to vetting procedures: "Compliance with the
State Leahy Amendment: A Guide to the Vetting Process." This guide
directs posts to assign a single point of contact in the mission with
responsibility for oversight of, and compliance with, vetting
procedures.
The report also recommends that posts report the results of their
monitoring to the State Department, so that State can monitor posts'
compliance with vetting requirements. We believe that this
recommendation complements the efforts we have already initiated to
improve our compliance with the Leahy vetting requirements.
We have provided technical comments on the report separately.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
[End of section]
GAO Contact:
Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition, Muriel Forster, Assistant Director; Lynn Cothern; Howard
Cott; David Dornisch; James Krustapentus; Victoria Lin; Mary Moutsos;
and Sidney Schwartz made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this report, we defined security assistance as
U.S. government assistance aimed at training or equipping foreign
security forces (military and police).
[2] This restriction, commonly referred to as the "Leahy Amendment,"
first appeared in the1997 Foreign Operations Export Financing and
Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) and only applied to funds
appropriated to State's International Narcotics Control program. It was
broadened in fiscal year 1998 to apply to all funds appropriated under
the 1998 Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations
Act (P.L. 105-118). In fiscal year 1999, a similar provision appeared
in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-262),
which applied to funds appropriated under the act. The two provisions
have appeared each year since in the annual Foreign Operations
Appropriations Acts and the Department of Defense Appropriations Acts,
respectively.
[3] Human rights vetting involves checking the names of individuals or
units proposed for training against files, databases, and other sources
of information to ensure that they do not have records of gross human
rights violations.
[4] GAO, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic
Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces, GAO-05-
793 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005).
[5] We use the terms allocated and allocations to include
appropriations, expenditures, or estimated values dependent upon the
data available for each program.
[6] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with
no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent and that the total
number of files with no evidence of vetting is between 110 and 143.
[7] These activities include multinational exercises, military-to-
military contacts, and humanitarian assistance.
[8] See State's 2005 country reports on human rights practices,
[Hyperlink, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005].
[9] Western Sahara, a Spanish possession from the 1880s until the
1970s, is a desert area that has a population of approximately 267,000,
bordering the Atlantic Ocean between Mauritania and Morocco. It has
valuable phosphate resources and fishing grounds and the possibility of
off-shore oil reserves.
[10] We use the terms allocated and allocations to describe a broad mix
of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance provided to foreign
security forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. For State's FMF,
IMET, and INCLE programs, we used appropriations as allocated by State
to these countries' programs. For State's ATA program and DOD's CTFP,
JCET, and other funded programs, we used expenditure data because no
separate appropriation and country allocation data existed. The EDA and
Drawdown programs are nonappropriated equipment transfers.
[11] The data provided for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia did not allow
us to determine if some individuals received training in more than one
fiscal year. Therefore, there may be some over-counting of trainees in
the numbers reported from 2002 to 2005.
[12] The Office of Management and Budget assesses government programs
using the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which is intended to
help form conclusions about program benefits and whether the program is
meeting its annual and long-term goals. The ATA program was included in
a PART assessment of State and international assistance programs, in
which the worldwide ATA program was rated effective. In addition, State
officials expect a PART review of security assistance to the Middle
East and North African countries in August 2006.
[13] We were unable to determine if specific individuals in this set of
training instances participated in more than one course; consequently,
there may be fewer than 438 unique individuals.
[14] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files
with no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent.
[15] We are 95 percent confident that the total number of files with no
evidence of vetting is between 110 and 143.
[16] In this report, we determined no evidence of vetting to mean that
a post could not locate at least some documentation or indication that
the post or State headquarters responded to the sponsoring office with
vetting results, which would demonstrate that training candidates had
been screened for human rights abuses.
[17] Specifically, the most recent provision in the Foreign Operations
Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act for 2006 (P.L. 109-102,
§551) states, "None of the funds made available by this Act may be
provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the
Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed
gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and
reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such
country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members
of the security forces unit to justice." The provision has also
appeared in prior Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts. See P.L. 105-
118, §570 (FY1998); P.L. 105-277, §568 (FY1999); P.L. 106-113, § 564
(FY2000); P.L. 106-429, §563 (FY2001); P.L. 107-115, §556 (FY2002);
P.L. 108-7, § 553 (FY2003); P.L. 108-199, § 553 (FY2004); P.L. 108-447,
§551 (FY 2005).
[18] The most recent provision in the DOD Appropriations Act for 2006
states, "None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to
support any training program involving a unit of the security forces of
a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible
information from the State that the unit has committed a gross
violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have
been taken." (P.L. 109-148 §8069) Similar provisions have also appeared
in prior DOD appropriations acts. See P.L. 105-262, §8130 (FY1999);
P.L. 106-79, §8098 (FY2000); P.L. 106-259, §8092 (FY2001); P.L. 107-
117, §8093 (FY2003); P.L. 107-248, §8080 (FY2003); P.L. 108087, §8077
(FY2004); P.L. 108-287, §8076 (FY 2005).
[19] We were unable to determine if specific individuals in this set of
training instances participated in more than one course; consequently,
there may be fewer than 438 unique individuals.
[20] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files
with no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent and that the
total number of files with no evidence of vetting is between 110 and
143.
[21] In this report, we determined no evidence of vetting to mean that
post could not locate at least some documentation or indication that
the post or State headquarters responded to the implementing office
with vetting results, which would demonstrate that training candidates
have been screened for human rights abuses.
[22] We identified the approximate number of trainees for whom no
vetting files existed by using trainee data provided by State and DOD
reports and officials.
[23] In the July 2005 report reviewing human rights vetting in
Southeast Asia, we recommended that State establish clear and
consistent vetting procedures, clear roles and responsibilities for
human rights vetting, and monitoring mechanisms to verify that vetting
procedures are carried out properly. See GAO, Southeast Asia: Better
Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance
to Foreign Security Forces, GAO-05-793 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005).
[24] In 1996, P.L. 104-164, Title 1, section 150(a), amended the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to require the President to
establish an end-use monitoring program for defense articles and
services sold, leased, or exported under the act or the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. The provision requires that, to the extent
practicable, such a program shall be designed to provide reasonable
assurances that the recipient is complying with the requirements
imposed by the U.S. government with respect to the use, transfer, and
security of defense articles and services, and that such articles and
services are being used for the purposes for which they are provided.
22 U.S.C. 2785.
[25] Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, provides
that defense articles and defense services shall be sold or leased to
friendly countries solely for internal security, legitimate self-
defense, preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, participation in regional or collective arrangements or
measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or
otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective
measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining
or restoring international peace or security, or for the purpose of
enabling foreign military forces in less-developed friendly countries
to construct public works or engage in other activities helpful to the
economic and social development of friendly countries. 22 U.S.C 2754.
The Arms Export Control Act does not provide any further standards or
definitions to apply in determining whether these eligibility criteria
are met. The Act does provide that either the President, by a report to
Congress, or Congress by joint resolution, may determine whether a
violation has occurred that will render a country ineligible for
further assistance. 22 U.S.C. 2753(c)(3)(A). Under the statute the
President is required to report promptly to Congress upon receipt of
information that a substantial violation of an agreement entered into
under the Arms Export Control Act may have occurred. 22 U.S.C. Sec.
2753(c)(2).
[26] In congressional testimony in 1980, State and DOD articulated the
U. S. position that the use of U.S.-origin defense articles by Morocco
in Western Sahara was consistent with the Arms Export Control Act's
criteria. State officials told us that this position has not changed
and noted that it does not imply U.S. recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty over Western Sahara. See testimonies of Harold Saunders,
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State; and Lieutenant General Ernest Graves, Director,
Defense Security Assistance Agency before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on
International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Africa
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 1980).
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