Tactical Aircraft
Questions Concerning the F-22A's Business Case Gao ID: GAO-06-991T July 25, 2006The F-22A--the Air Force's next generation air superiority fighter aircraft--incorporates a low observable (stealth) and highly maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a new engine capable of sustained supersonic flight without the use of afterburners. The F-22A acquisition history is a case study in increased cost and schedule inefficiency. Since the program's inception in 1986, the Air Force has added new requirements, more than doubled the length of the acquisition schedule, cut purchase quantities by more than 75 percent, and increased total acquisition unit costs by more than 100 percent. The F-22A program's significant cost and schedule growth is illustrative of a number of systemic problems in the Department of Defense's (DOD) major weapon system acquisitions. Currently, DOD is proposing to buy the remaining 60 F-22As under a 3-year contract. At the Congress's request, GAO was asked for its views on DOD's latest plan to restructure the program and on the Air Force's request for authority to enter into a multiyear contract to implement this restructuring.
Under DOD's latest restructuring of the F-22A program, as reflected in the fiscal year 2007 President's budget, the program will spread the production of the remaining 60 aircraft over 3 lots extending the period of production by 2 years. The Air Force states that this is to avoid a gap in the production capabilities of the industrial base sector responsible for the latest generation of tactical fighter aircraft. Stretching out the production period will result in lower annual production rates and increased costs to the program of $1.7 billion when compared to the costs the program would have incurred under the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget proposal to buy the then-remaining quantity of 56 F-22As in two annual lots. The restructured F-22A program's increased costs to complete the production will reduce the Department's options in fulfilling other important national security priorities. Having made the decision to extend the program, the Air Force, in an attempt to reduce some of the costs of the restructured program, is proposing that Congress authorize its use of a multiyear contract to buy the remaining aircraft. The Air Force has concluded that it has met the six statutory criteria required for entering into a multiyear contract. GAO offers several points for congressional consideration. The Air Force estimates savings of approximately $225 million, 2.7 percent of remaining procurement cost for 56 aircraft--a significantly lower estimated savings percentage than past multiyear procurement program estimates, which averaged 13 percent. The Air Force wants to buy 4 additional aircraft at a cost of $674 million to save an additional $10 million, but has not yet funded this plan. Finally, the statute requires that production rates and quantities remain substantially unchanged during the contract period as downward adjustments could impact contract prices and savings. F-22A quantities have fluctuated recently and further downward adjustments after signing a multiyear contract could result in cancellation costs as high as $201 million currently not funded.
GAO-06-991T, Tactical Aircraft: Questions Concerning the F-22A's Business Case
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST:
Tuesday, July 25, 2006:
Tactical Aircraft:
Questions Concerning the F-22A's Business Case:
Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States:
GAO-06-991T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-991T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The F-22A”the Air Force‘s next generation air superiority fighter
aircraft”incorporates a low observable (stealth) and highly
maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a new engine
capable of sustained supersonic flight without the use of afterburners.
The F-22A acquisition history is a case study in increased cost and
schedule inefficiency. Since the program‘s inception in 1986, the Air
Force has added new requirements, more than doubled the length of the
acquisition schedule, cut purchase quantities by more than 75 percent,
and increased total acquisition unit costs by more than 100 percent.
The F-22A program‘s significant cost and schedule growth is
illustrative of a number of systemic problems in the Department of
Defense‘s (DOD) major weapon system acquisitions. Currently, DOD is
proposing to buy the remaining 60 F-22As under a 3-year contract. At
the request of this subcommittee, GAO was asked for its views on DOD‘s
latest plan to restructure the program and on the Air Force‘s request
for authority to enter into a multiyear contract to implement this
restructuring.
What GAO Found:
Under DOD‘s latest restructuring of the F-22A program, as reflected in
the fiscal year 2007 President‘s budget, the program will spread the
production of the remaining 60 aircraft over 3 lots extending the
period of production by 2 years. The Air Force states that this is to
avoid a gap in the production capabilities of the industrial base
sector responsible for the latest generation of tactical fighter
aircraft. Stretching out the production period will result in lower
annual production rates and increased costs to the program of $1.7
billion when compared to the costs the program would have incurred
under the fiscal year 2006 President‘s Budget proposal to buy the then-
remaining quantity of 56 F-22As in two annual lots. The restructured F-
22A program‘s increased costs to complete the production will reduce
the Department‘s options in fulfilling other important national
security priorities.
Having made the decision to extend the program, the Air Force, in an
attempt to reduce some of the costs of the restructured program, is
proposing that Congress authorize its use of a multiyear contract to
buy the remaining aircraft. The Air Force has concluded that it has met
the six statutory criteria required for entering into a multiyear
contract. GAO offers several points for congressional consideration.
The Air Force estimates savings of approximately $225 million, 2.7
percent of remaining procurement cost for 56 aircraft”a significantly
lower estimated savings percentage than past multiyear procurement
program estimates, which averaged 13 percent. The Air Force wants to
buy 4 additional aircraft at a cost of $674 million to save an
additional $10 million, but has not yet funded this plan. Finally, the
statute requires that production rates and quantities remain
substantially unchanged during the contract period as downward
adjustments could impact contract prices and savings. F-22A quantities
have fluctuated recently and further downward adjustments after signing
a multiyear contract could result in cancellation costs as high as $201
million currently not funded.
Figure: Changes in F-22A Procurement Quantities and Effect on Unit
Costs:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: U.S. Air Force (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of Figure]
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-991T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at
(202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's
(DOD) proposal to buy sixty F-22As under a multiyear contract. As you
know, GAO has recommended that the Air Force prepare a new business
case for the F-22A program to justify the substantial changes planned
in the mission roles and the quantities to be acquired--a
recommendation that has yet to be implemented. Additionally, we share
the Congress's concerns over DOD's wherewithal to acquire the F-22A and
other key assets in light of current and expected resource constraints.
Over the past several years, it has become increasingly clear that DOD
must reassess what is affordable and separate its many wants from its
real needs. DOD must make tough acquisition choices in order for the
country to begin to address the large and growing fiscal imbalance it
faces.
My statement today--which is based on our recent report on the F-22A
program[Footnote 1]--will highlight our key concerns with moving
forward with F-22A procurement, as DOD proposes. Our work was performed
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Our review indicates that DOD's proposal to add 2 years to the
production period of the remaining F-22A's and to procure the planes
under a 3-year multiyear contract will cost about $1.7 billion more
than called for to procure the last two annual lots as compared to the
amount previously provided in the fiscal year 2006 budget. The primary
reasons cited for this change to the program are industrial base health
and the need to preserve the F-22A production line until production of
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) begins. The Air Force has reported to
Congress that the F-22A program meets the criteria set forth in section
2306b of Title 10 of the U.S. Code for a multiyear contract. We have
serious concerns regarding whether all of the criteria have been
satisfied (i.e. substantial savings, sufficient funding, and stable
quantities).
First, the timing of the proposal--near the end of the F-22A's
acquisition--reduces the ability of the program to achieve substantial
savings. Savings are currently estimated to be about $225 million or
2.7 percent of remaining procurement cost if 56 additional aircraft are
purchased--a savings that, in terms of percentage of costs, is far
below historic estimates of savings for other multiyear contracts.
Second, the Air Force is proposing to buy 4 additional aircraft--60 in
total--at an added cost of $674 million in order to save an additional
$10 million under the multiyear contract; however, it has not funded
the proposal. Finally, to satisfy other needs in DOD, F-22A quantities
have been unstable over the last 2 years reducing quantities from 279
aircraft to 179 in the fiscal year 2006 budget and increasing
quantities to 183 aircraft in the fiscal year 2007 budget. If
quantities continue to fluctuate downward it could result in additional
costs. For example, according to the Air Force cancellation costs alone
could be as much as $201 million--a sum currently unfunded in the
multiyear proposal. This financial risk, when compared to the savings
projected from a multiyear contract, raises additional questions about
the proposal and limits flexibility for future decision making.
Background:
The F-22A program is illustrative of a number of systemic problems in
DOD's acquisition system. First, the F-22A was approved in an
environment with no clear agreement on enterprise-wide priorities and
without due consideration of current and likely future threats and
resource constraints. Second, the requirements and key program
specifications were not fixed when the program began and have changed
over its decades-long development. Third, key procurement decisions
were made without adequate consideration of technology and other
program risks, with costly consequences. And finally, in this program
as in many others, DOD has paid out significant incentive and award
fees to its contractors despite large cost overruns and schedule
delays.
The program has been a case study in cost increases and schedule
inefficiency in major weapon system acquisitions. We have issued
numerous reports over the years on the problems and issues associated
with the F-22A development program. Beginning in 1986 the program was
expected to complete development in 9 years for an estimated cost of
$12.6 billion. After taking 19 years to complete development in
December 2005, development costs were reported at $26.3 billion--109
percent more than expected. The end result of these inefficiencies in
the acquisition program has been a loss of buying power as the reduced
quantity of aircraft will require a significantly higher unit cost than
expected. Figure 1 shows the changes in procurement quantities over
time and allocates both development and procurement costs to those
changing procurement quantities to show the trend of average total
acquisition unit costs and procurement unit costs.
Figure 1: Changes to Quantities and Costs of F-22As as Program Has
Evolved:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: U.S. Air Force (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of figure]
While the F-22A program has completed development and testing of its
initially planned air-to-air capability, the Air Force now sees a need
to develop more robust air-to-ground attack and intelligence-gathering
capabilities. Therefore, it has started a multibillion dollar
development program for these additional capabilities. These
capabilities were not previously considered a primary role for the F-
22A as it was intended to be primarily an air-to-air fighter to replace
the F-15. From the outset the F-22A was built to counter expected large
numbers of new advanced Soviet fighter aircraft but this threat never
materialized. The expanded air-to-ground attack capability is intended
to allow the F-22A to engage a greater variety of ground targets, such
as surface-to-air missile systems, that have posed a significant threat
to U.S. aircraft in recent years.
DOD's Latest Restructuring Is More Expensive and Slows F-22A
Deliveries:
Amidst changes to expand F-22A missions and roles, the procurement
quantities and acquisition strategy have also been in flux in recent
years. In December 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
reduced planned quantities to a total of 179 F-22A aircraft. At the
same time, it decided to terminate the procurement program at the end
of 2008 in order to free up about $10 billion for other priorities.
Then, the fiscal year 2007 budget extended the procurement program 2
years, to 2010. The department cited the health of the industrial base-
-the need for maintaining a fifth generation fighter[Footnote 2]
production line--as its rationale for this added expense and delay. DOD
also proposed buying four additional aircraft and using a 3-year
multiyear contract to procure the remaining 60 F-22As to mitigate some
of the costs of extending procurement for at least 2 years.
To identify savings that might reduce the cost impact of the
restructured acquisition strategy, the Air Force is proposing a
multiyear contract to buy the remaining F-22A aircraft. The Air Force
formulated an estimate for three annual contracts to compare to a
single multiyear contract to buy 56 aircraft. While this comparison can
provide a basis for determining potential savings, the Air Force had
not previously planned to buy the remaining aircraft over 3 years.
Instead, the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget included procurement
costs to buy 56 F-22As in two annual lots--29 F-22As in 2007 and 27 F-
22As in 2008. Therefore, even utilizing the multiyear contract
authority, the restructuring will add $1.7 billion in cost to the
procurement program and slow deliveries of the final aircraft when
compared to the plan previously provided for in DOD's fiscal year 2006
budget. The final 60 aircraft will each cost 10 percent more on average
(unit procurement costs increase from $166 million per aircraft to $183
million per aircraft) under the restructured plan, even taking into
account expected savings from the multiyear procurement.
Concerns Whether DOD Satisfies All Multiyear Procurement Criteria:
The Air Force submitted its justification to the Congress on May 16,
2006, to buy the remaining 56 to 60 F-22A aircraft over a 3-year period
with a multiyear contract. To enter into a multiyear contract for the F-
22A, the Air Force must first obtain specific legislative authorization
in both the annual DOD appropriations act and in an authorization act.
If authorization is obtained from Congress, the Air Force must also
meet the statutory criteria listed in 10 U.S.C. § 2306b(a) for entering
into a multiyear contract. The justification package the Air Force
submitted to Congress in support of its request for authority to enter
into a multiyear contract for the F-22A concludes that the statutory
criteria for multiyear procurement have been met and that such a
multiyear contract would provide substantial cost savings or avoidance
over three annual lot buys. In reviewing these criteria and the Air
Force's position, we have serious concerns regarding whether all of the
criteria have been satisfied (i.e. substantial savings, sufficient
funding and stable quantities). Table 1 lists the six criteria and our
observations (we did not assess two of the criteria).
Table 1: Observations of F-22A Multiyear Contract Criteria:
Multiyear criteria: Contract will result in substantial savings;
GAO observations: Substantial savings are not defined in the statute,
but the 2005 F-22A Independent Cost Estimate states that between 1982
and 1989 estimates for multiyear savings for proposed weapon systems
averaged 13 percent. The Air Force justification package shows only 2.7
percent cost avoidance ($225 million) for 56 aircraft.
Multiyear criteria: Reasonable expectation agency head will request
funding at required level to avoid contract cancellation;
GAO observations: The Air Force has indicated that its multiyear budget
is currently under funded by $674 million and is seeking authorization
to use incremental funding rather than fully funding each aircraft lot.
Multiyear criteria: Minimum need expected to remain substantially
unchanged during contract period in terms of production rates and total
quantities;
GAO observations: F-22A quantities have changed in the last 2 fiscal
years to accommodate the need to fund other annual priorities. Given
the potential for other priorities in the future--military presence
overseas, global war on terrorism, and response to natural disasters--
there is a risk that F-22A quantities would need to be adjusted again.
Quantity reductions could result in cancellation costs of as much as
$201 million, an amount that is currently unfunded.
Multiyear criteria: There is stable design, and technical risks are not
excessive;
GAO observations: The baseline F-22A aircraft design is stable (the
proposed multiyear contract is for the baseline aircraft). While not
the subject of the proposed multiyear contract because it is a separate
effort, the design for adding new ground attack and ISR capabilities
has not been demonstrated through development or operational testing
and cannot be considered "stable" at this time.
Multiyear criteria: Estimates of contract cost and cost avoidance are
realistic;
GAO observations: Not assessed.
Multiyear criteria: Use of the multiyear contract will promote national
security of the United States;
GAO observations: Not assessed.
Source: GAO Analysis and 10 U.S.C. 2306b.
[End of table]
Substantial Savings Criterion:
To identify potential savings, the Air Force formulated an estimate for
three annual contracts to compare to a single multiyear contract with
buys of 56 and 60 aircraft. Section 2306b of Title 10 of the U.S. Code
does not define what constitutes substantial savings, but the 2005 F-
22A Independent Cost Estimate[Footnote 3] indicates that from 1982 to
1989, DOD proposed at least 60 multiyear procurement programs for
congressional approval, with estimated savings averaging 13 percent.
The Air Force estimates F-22A multiyear procurement savings to be 2.7
percent if 56 aircraft are procured, approximately $225 million. The
justification package also shows that an additional $10 million could
be saved by buying 60 aircraft as stated in the fiscal year 2007
President's Budget, but it would require an additional $674 million not
included in the fiscal year 2007 future year defense plan.
Funds Have Not Been Budgeted:
The proposed multiyear contract for 60 F-22As submitted with the fiscal
year 2007 budget is under funded by about $674 million--funds the Air
Force believes it will need in fiscal years 2008 through 2010 to
complete these buys. Additionally, the Air Force has proposed using
incremental funding to pay for the multiyear contract. Instead of fully
funding the buy for each fiscal year, this proposal plans four funding
increments--economic order quantity, advanced buy, subsystem, and final
assembly. Incremental funding for multiyear procurement is neither
permitted by the annual DOD appropriations act[Footnote 4] nor the
multiyear authorizing statute, which requires that funds only be
obligated under a multiyear contract "for procurement of a complete and
usable end item."[Footnote 5] The Air Force is seeking an exception to
these requirements in its request to Congress for statutory
authorization for the multiyear contract. The congressional defense
committees are aware of the concerns with incremental funding, and
those committees that have completed a defense bill have provided full
funding for the initial year of the proposed multiyear contract.
However, the congressional authorization and appropriations processes
are ongoing.
Multiyear Contract Quantities Could Be Changed in the Future:
OSD has restructured the F-22A acquisition program twice in the last 2
years in order to allocate funds to other priorities. In December 2004,
OSD reduced the program from 279 to 179 F-22As to save $10.5 billion.
Then in December 2005, OSD changed the F-22A program again, adding $1
billion to extend the production line for 2 years to ensure a fifth
generation fighter aircraft production line would remain in operation
in case the JSF experiences delays or problems. So far we have not seen
detailed rationale concerning the impact to the health of the
industrial base. OSD also added 4 aircraft at this time for a total of
183 F-22As. We have also not seen the threat based justification for
buying these additional aircraft at an estimated cost of $674 million.
Given the potential for priorities to change again in the future to
fund the military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, fight terrorism
around the globe, fund the response to natural disasters, or for other
reasons, there is risk that F-22A quantities under the proposed
multiyear contract would need to be adjusted again. According to the
Air Force's multiyear proposal, if a reduction in quantity were to
happen, it could result in cancellation costs of as much as $201
million in fiscal year 2007, the first year of the multiyear contract.
The current Air Force acquisition strategy does not fund these
potential cancellation costs. Therefore, the Air Force would have to
find funds from other sources to pay these costs in the event
quantities are reduced. This is therefore a risk that must be weighed
in approving a multiyear contract for the F-22A, particularly at this
late stage of its procurement program as it could limit the flexibility
of decision makers in the future.
Other Factors Influence the Practicality of Using Multiyear Contracts
at This Stage in the F-22A Program:
Other circumstances argue against using a multiyear contract. Multiyear
contracts are typically used earlier in an acquisition program when
greater efficiencies in buying materials and subsystems can be achieved
and thereby provide more substantial savings at both the prime
contractor and subcontractor levels. In the case of the F-22A, the
multiyear proposal comes at the end of production. At the same time,
the F-22A program plans to reduce the annual buying rate, providing
less opportunity to incur savings. Previously, the Air Force had
planned to purchase 29 and 27 aircraft in fiscal years 2007 and 2008,
respectively. The multiyear plan calls for 20 aircraft a year in 2008,
2009, and 2010--7 to 9 aircraft fewer in each of the 2 years under the
previous plan. Additionally, it appears the primary purpose for
proposing a multiyear contract was to mitigate the additional cost of
extending procurement for an additional 2 years; even with the proposed
multiyear contract, procurement costs will be $1.7 billion higher than
costs proposed under the previous program structure.
The length of the proposed multiyear contract and the lower quantity of
aircraft planned for multiyear are concerns identified in the May 2006
Air Force business case analysis for F-22A multiyear procurement. For
example, the business case analysis states that the average number of
air vehicles procured under a multiyear contract was 308[Footnote 6]--
more than five times the number of aircraft the F-22A program is
proposing to buy under its 3-year contract. The analysis also
acknowledges that there is limited opportunity to obtain additional
savings from the previously planned initiatives to improve the F-22A
production efficiency as these savings were obtained earlier in the
acquisition cycle.
In conclusion, the Air Force's decision to extend production for 2
years for industrial base purposes has increased the length and cost of
the F-22A program. We are not sure what the Air Force's rationale was
for extending production and how it specifically relates to maintaining
the industrial base so as to warrant an increased cost of at least $1.7
billion. At the same time, our nation's large and growing long-term
fiscal imbalance requires the federal government--especially DOD--to
begin making hard choices between its many wants and real needs. In
this context, we continue to believe that the Congress needs to
reevaluate a range of existing federal programs and polices, including
the F-22A program, based on credible current and future threats,
current and expected future national budget levels and priorities, and
the warfighter's many true needs. As it stands, the restructured F-22A
program's increased cost to complete the procurement program--$1.7
billion--will eventually serve to reduce the Department's options in
fulfilling other important national security priorities. This at a time
when the difference between DOD's program wants and its expected
resource levels is growing.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business
Case before Making Further Investments, GAO-06-455R (Washington, D.C.:
June 20, 2006).
[2] F-22A and F-35 are considered fifth generation fighter aircraft as
compared to the F-15, F-16, F/A-18, and F-117. The primary
characteristics are Very Low Observable (VLO) stealth and information
fusion capabilities that make fifth generation aircraft more survivable
and lethal.
[3] F/A-22 Independent Cost Estimate, Institute for Defense Analyses,
August 2005.
[4] Section 8008 of the fiscal years 2005 and 2006 Department of
Defense Appropriations Acts (Public Laws 108-287 and 109-148,
respectively) require full funding of units to be procured.
[5] 10 U.S.C. § 2306b (i)(4)(A). This restriction was added by section
820 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 (Public Law 107-314).
[6] The Institute for Defense Analysis analyzed the multiyear
procurement programs for the F/18, C-17, C-130J/KC-130, and F-16.
Institute for Defense Analysis, F-22A Multiyear Procurement Business
Case Analysis (May 2006).
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