DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve
Gao ID: GAO-06-913R August 22, 2006In 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. Soon thereafter, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a report titled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. This report defined the key tenets of the integrated global presence and basing strategy, which outlines troop and basing adjustments overseas. Although the strategy is intended to make the overseas posture of the United States more flexible and efficient, it will require new facilities costing billions of dollars, some of the cost to be borne by the United States and some by other nations. As plans for overseas basing began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern about the use of military construction funds for projects at overseas bases that may soon be obsolete or closed because of changes being considered by DOD and the military services. Accordingly, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for changing infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands. The Senate report directed the master plans to identify precise facility requirements and the status of properties being returned to host nations. Additionally, the Senate report stated that the plans should identify funding requirements as well as the division of funding responsibilities between the United States and host nations. The Senate report also directed us to monitor the master plans developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense committees with assessment reports each year. For this report, we assessed the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) most recent guidance to overseas regional commands and its use in developing the overseas master plans DOD submitted to Congress on April 27, 2006. This report discusses the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans (1) complied with reporting requirements and provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner; (2) reflected how U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements have changed since last year; and (3) reflected the challenges DOD faces in the implementation of the plans.
The 2006 master plans generally exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress and--by addressing most of the recommendations for improving the plans from last year--they are more complete, clear, and consistent than last year's plans, although limitations exist in the information provided on fiscal year 2007 funding required for individual military construction projects. The master plans also reflected changes in overseas basing strategies and requirements that occurred since last year. It was apparent that OSD and the regional commands worked to incorporate key changes associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategies into the plans before they were provided to Congress. This year specifically, the master plans provided a much better description of the challenges DOD faces in implementing the master plans. For example, all of the plans addressed the uncertainties associated with host nations and recent agreements, and generally dealt with environmental concerns and training limitations, where they existed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Brian J. Lepore Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-5581GAO-06-913R, DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve
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August 22, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve:
In 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the
end of the Korean War. Soon thereafter, the Department of Defense (DOD)
issued a report titled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense
Posture.[Footnote 1] This report defined the key tenets of the
integrated global presence and basing strategy, which outlines troop
and basing adjustments overseas. Although the strategy is intended to
make the overseas posture of the United States more flexible and
efficient, it will require new facilities costing billions of dollars,
some of the cost to be borne by the United States and some by other
nations.
As plans for overseas basing began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations
Committee expressed concern about the use of military construction
funds for projects at overseas bases that may soon be obsolete or
closed because of changes being considered by DOD and the military
services. Accordingly, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year
2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD[Footnote 2]
to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for changing
infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the
overseas regional commands.[Footnote 3] DOD was required to provide a
baseline report on these plans with yearly updates on their status and
their implementation along with annual military construction budget
submissions through 2008. Subsequently, the House conference report
accompanying the 2004 military construction appropriation bill also
directed the department to prepare comprehensive master plans with
yearly updates through fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 4] The Senate report
directed the master plans to identify precise facility requirements and
the status of properties being returned to host nations. Additionally,
the Senate report stated that the plans should identify funding
requirements as well as the division of funding responsibilities
between the United States and host nations. The Senate report also
directed us to monitor the master plans developed and implemented for
the overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense
committees with assessment reports each year.
This is our third report that responds to the reporting requirements
contained in the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction
appropriation bill report. Our prior work[Footnote 5] found that
although DOD's overseas master plans provided a more complete picture
of future overseas defense infrastructure and funding requirements than
was available in other DOD documents, opportunities existed for the
plans to provide more complete, clear, and consistent information and
to present a more definitive picture of future requirements. For this
report, we assessed the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) most
recent guidance[Footnote 6] to overseas regional commands and its use
in developing the overseas master plans DOD submitted to Congress on
April 27, 2006.[Footnote 7] This report discusses the extent to which
the 2006[Footnote 8] overseas master plans (1) complied with reporting
requirements and provided information in a complete, clear, and
consistent manner; (2) reflected how U.S. overseas defense basing
strategies and requirements have changed since last year; and (3)
reflected the challenges DOD faces in the implementation of the plans.
To address our objectives, we met with OSD officials to discuss the
level of guidance available to the commands to facilitate consistent
preparation of overseas master plans, and we analyzed whether the
guidance meets the requirements for information contained in
congressional mandates and as suggested by GAO. We also visited
overseas regional commands--the Pacific Command (PACOM), including U.S.
Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces Japan; European Command (EUCOM);
and Central Command (CENTCOM)--to see selected installations and
military construction projects firsthand and to discuss OSD's guidance
and the various factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure
requirements and costs overseas.[Footnote 9] Once the master plans were
issued, we reviewed them to determine how the plans have changed since
last year and the extent to which they complied with the reporting
requirements. We assessed whether the plans provided information in a
complete, clear, and consistent manner, and we discussed with OSD and
command officials whether improvements in the guidance and reporting
were needed.
We conducted our review from September 2005 through July 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
enclosure I for more information on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The 2006 master plans generally exceeded the reporting requirements
established by Congress and--by addressing most of our recommendations
for improving the plans from last year--they are more complete, clear,
and consistent than last year's plans, although limitations exist in
the information provided on fiscal year 2007 funding required for
individual military construction projects. Whereas last year none of
the regional commands fully identified their precise facility
requirements and costs as specified in the reporting mandate, all of
the commands provided precise facility requirements for fiscal years
2007 through 2011 in their master plans. However, the plans submitted
to Congress did not provide estimated costs for individual military
construction projects for fiscal year 2007 as specified by OSD guidance
because of, according to a senior OSD official, the difficulty of
including the cost estimates that had not yet been finalized during
DOD's budget process. Consequently, the master plans must be matched
with the fiscal year 2007 military construction budget request to
obtain a complete picture of the precise facility and cost requirements
for fiscal year 2007. Although not required, we believe the plans could
be more complete and useful to decision makers if they also explained,
where applicable, how each implementation is being or has the potential
to be affected by other defense plans and activities that are likely to
affect future facility and funding requirements in a region. In 2005,
the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facilities Structure of
the United States[Footnote 10] recommended that the entire effort of
overseas basing be integrated into one overarching design that is
coordinated and synchronized with all ongoing initiatives. Although
overseas command officials told us that their plans were coordinated
with other defense plans and activities, only PACOM's plan explained
how its implementation could be affected by another activity--a
potential decrease in host nation support when the Government of Japan
provides resources to help fund the relocation of approximately 8,000
U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. EUCOM and CENTCOM plans did not
address other relevant and related plans and activities.[Footnote 11]
For example, EUCOM's master plan did not explain the potential impact
of base realignment and closure implementation on the movement of
troops from Germany to bases in the United States. This omission is due
primarily to OSD guidance that stipulated the plans were to address
overseas locations and to exclude the 50 states and U.S. territories.
Without explanations of the linkage between the overseas master plans
with other defense plans and activities, it is difficult to determine
their impact on U.S. defense infrastructure and funding requirements
overseas.
The 2006 master plans reflected changes in overseas basing strategies
and requirements that occurred since last year. It was apparent that
OSD and the regional commands worked to incorporate key changes
associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing
strategies into the plans before they were provided to Congress. For
example, EUCOM added requirements for facilities in Romania and
Bulgaria to its master plan based on agreements with those countries to
allow DOD use of their facilities, and CENTCOM removed infrastructure
requirements from its master plan that were planned for Uzbekistan
after its government requested that U.S. forces leave. In some
instances, basing decisions were made after the plans were prepared--
such as the realignment at Keflavik, Iceland, and La Maddelena, Italy-
-but OSD and the regional commands updated the plans to reflect those
decisions before the plans were submitted to Congress. Even with these
efforts to update the plans as changes occurred and decisions were
made, the evolution of U.S. overseas military basing strategies and
requirements continues. Changes occurring after the most recent plans
were submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in next year's
plans, and OSD and the regional commands could be faced with more
changes in the future.
This year, the master plans provided a much better description of the
challenges DOD faces in implementing the master plans. For example, all
of the plans addressed the uncertainties associated with host nations
and recent agreements, and generally dealt with environmental concerns
and training limitations, where they existed. An exception involves the
fact that PACOM's plan did not describe the limitations on training in
South Korea and Japan. If these training limitations are not addressed,
senior command officials told us, they could cause the United States to
either train in other locations or to downsize or relocate. As a result
of this omission, PACOM's plan does not provide decisionmakers a
complete picture of the challenges that could affect its implementation
and potential changes in infrastructure and funding requirements needed
to address training limitations in the Pacific region.
We are making two recommendations to improve future master plans for
changing defense infrastructure overseas. Specifically, we are
recommending that OSD (1) revise its guidance to require overseas
commands to explain how other relevant and related defense plans and
activities affect implementation of their master plans in terms of
infrastructure and funding requirements and (2) ensure that PACOM
explains how it plans to address existing training limitations and the
potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. In
written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with
our recommendations and indicated that it would address these issues in
a risk assessment framework in future master plans. We discuss DOD's
comments in detail later in this report.
Background:
Military construction appropriations fund the planning, design,
construction, alteration, and improvement of military facilities
worldwide. As of fiscal year 2005, DOD reportedly had 3,376
installations total, with 737 installations located overseas.[Footnote
12] Operational control of the U.S. combat forces and installations is
assigned to the nation's five geographic, unified overseas regional
commands, which are responsible for the security environment as
directed by the national security strategy and the national military
strategy. Composed of forces from two or more services, PACOM, EUCOM,
and CENTCOM span numerous countries and even continents and encompass
areas with economically, politically, and socially diverse regions, as
shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM Geographic Areas of
Responsibility:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO.
Note: Special Operations Command does not have a specific geographic
area of responsibility because it is a functional overseas regional
command with lead responsibility for waging war on terrorism. The
command also provides special operations forces to support the overseas
regional commanders' security plans and is a tenant unit on bases and
funds special operations forces-specific items--such as hangars for
aircraft--out of military construction appropriations, and uses
operation and maintenance appropriations for support items, such as
special operations-specific computers.
[End of Figure]
The United States has a large portion of its military personnel
deployed abroad at any given time; however, this number varies with the
frequency and types of military operations and deployment demands.
Currently, just more than 119,000 troops are regularly stationed in
Europe. Most of these are U.S. Army forces (62,600) stationed mainly in
Germany, with smaller numbers elsewhere in Europe and some in Africa.
Nearly 100,000 military personnel are located in East Asia, divided
between Japan, South Korea, and on the waters of the Pacific.
Additionally, the ongoing global war on terrorism has resulted in the
deployment of much larger numbers of forces in theaters of operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a
defense strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global
threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining
overseas basing requirements to allow for greater U.S. military
flexibility to combat conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide.
U.S. military presence overseas has been converting from a posture
established on familiar terrain to counter a known threat to one that
is intended to be capable of projecting forces from strategic locations
into relatively unknown areas in an uncertain threat environment. In
September 2001, DOD issued a Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which
addressed, among other issues, reorienting the U.S. military global
posture. The report called for developing a permanent basing system
that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of
the world as well as providing temporary access to facilities in
foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to train and operate in the
absence of permanent ranges and bases.
In August 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the
end of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no
longer needed to meet Cold War threats, as well as bring home many U.S.
forces while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in
strategic locations around the world. The Integrated Global Presence
and Basing Strategy is the culmination of various DOD studies,
including the overseas basing and requirements study, the overseas
presence study, and the U.S. global posture study. The military
construction appropriation request for fiscal year 2007 included
approximately $16.7 billion for military construction and family
housing, of which nearly $1.3 billion (7.6 percent) is designated for
specific overseas locations, mostly comprising enduring installations,
and not for new and emerging requirements outside existing basing
structures.[Footnote 13]
Congressional Requirement for Detailed Comprehensive Master Plans:
In previous years, the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee had expressed concern that the overseas basing
structure had not been updated to reflect the new realities of the post-
Cold War world. The Committee had also expressed concern about the use
of military construction budget authority for projects at bases that
may soon be obsolete because of changes being considered in overseas
presence and basing. Consequently, in Senate Report 108-82, the Senate
Appropriations Committee directed DOD to prepare detailed,
comprehensive master plans for the changing infrastructure requirements
for U.S. military facilities in each of its overseas regional commands.
Subsequently, the House conference report accompanying the 2004
military construction appropriation bill also directed the department
to submit comprehensive master plans. According to the Senate report,
at a minimum, the plans are to identify precise facility requirements
and the status of properties being returned to host nations. In
addition, the report stated that the plans should identify funding
requirements and the division of funding responsibilities between the
United States and cognizant host nations. The Senate report also
directed DOD to provide congressional defense committees a report on
the status and implementation of those plans with each yearly military
construction budget submission through fiscal year 2008. The first
report was due with the fiscal year 2006 military construction budget
submission and is to be updated each succeeding year to reflect changes
to the plans involving specific construction projects being added,
canceled, or modified, or funding for those projects being redirected
to other needs, and justification for such changes.[Footnote 14] The
Senate report also directed GAO to monitor the comprehensive master
plans being developed and implemented for the overseas regional
commands and to provide the congressional defense committees with a
report each year giving an assessment of the status of the plans.
Within the department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics has been tasked with responding to this
legislative requirement. In turn, the Under Secretary assigned the
overseas regional commands responsibility for preparing detailed,
comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility.
Prior GAO Work:
In our prior work,[Footnote 15] we found that while DOD's completion of
overseas master plans provided a more complete picture of future
facility and funding requirements for changing U.S. defense
infrastructure overseas than is available in other DOD reports,
documents, and annual budget requests, opportunities existed to improve
the guidance and term definitions to help overseas regional commands
provide more complete, clear, and consistent information and present a
more definitive picture of infrastructure and funding requirements,
particularly for new locations, in the future. We found limitations in
information that could be provided because of three key factors:
ongoing negotiations with host nations, continuing evolution of U.S.
overseas basing strategy, and differences commands had in
interpretation of OSD guidance. In addition, addressing the extent to
which residual value issues could affect U.S. funding requirements was
an open and continuing recommendation from our prior report.
Additionally, we reported that without more complete, clear, and
consistent reporting of various items--host nation agreements and
funding levels, including special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding
levels and sources in addition to military construction funds;
environmental remediation and restoration issues; population levels;
and facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S.
territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific--across future
master plans, users do not have the best data available to facilitate
their annual review and oversight. Also, we reported that without the
detailed reporting of individual construction projects as EUCOM did in
its plan and the anticipated strategic end state of the command's
overseas basing infrastructure as of 2010 as CENTCOM did in its plan,
Congress and other users would not have the best available and
consistent data on which to track progress and changes from year to
year and between commands. In many of these instances, providing
supplementary narrative explanation of the assumptions used or reasons
data were omitted could improve the usefulness of the comprehensive
master plans.
2006 Master Plans Exceeded Most Reporting Requirements and Are More
Complete, Clear, and Consistent Than Last Year's Plans:
While prior overseas master plans generally exceeded the reporting
requirements established by Congress, OSD has further improved the
plans by issuing guidance in 2005 to require overseas regional commands
to provide additional information and address most of our prior
recommendations. As a result, the 2006 plans are not only more
complete, clear, and consistent than last year's plans, they are also
more refined, focusing first on the mission and then on the
infrastructure requirements needed to support the mission. However, the
plans do not provide cost estimates for individual military
construction projects planned for fiscal year 2007 and generally do not
explain how their implementation is being or has the potential to be
affected by other relevant and related defense plans and activities.
OSD 2005 Guidance Helped to Further Improve the Overseas Master Plans:
To improve the overseas master plans and address some of our prior
recommendations, OSD provided additional guidance on October 5, 2005,
to the regional commands in preparing this year's plans.[Footnote 16]
Among other things, the guidance specifically required the overseas
regional commands to:
* explain any significant variances in population levels and usage of
terminology related to the three base categories--main operating bases,
forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations;
* address the desired strategic end state of overseas basing
infrastructure using an "as of" date within the range of 2011 and 2015
(OSD provided the commands the discretion in choosing an end date
between 2011 and 2015);
* report host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal
year 2007 and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2008 through
2011;
* report U.S. funding sources, including precise facility requirements
and costs for fiscal year 2007, facility requirements and total funding
for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, and a single, rolled-up figure for
sustainment funding; and:
* report environmental remediation issues per DOD Instruction
4715.8.[Footnote 17]
OSD 2005 guidance did not address our prior recommendations to require
that PACOM provide information on facility requirements and funding
levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in
the Pacific and on residual value issues. In comments on our 2005
report, DOD stated that Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific were
no different from other U.S. facilities within the continental United
States and that it was inappropriate to include them in the overseas
master plans. However, considering the upcoming move of approximately
8,000 U.S Marines from Okinawa to Guam, we continue to believe that the
inclusion of Guam, Hawaii, U.S. territories, and other insular areas
will provide a more complete picture of PACOM's infrastructure
requirements and associated costs in the Pacific. The omission of these
locations from PACOM's plan provides Congress and other users an
incomplete picture of the changing U.S. military presence in the
Pacific and only a portion of the infrastructure and funding
requirements associated with these changes. Also, as we reported last
year, residual value was excluded from OSD's guidance because it is
based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nations,
which is limited for most categories of military facilities and is
often reduced by actual or anticipated environmental remediation costs.
Consequently, according to a senior DOD official, residual value cannot
be readily predicted and therefore should not be assumed in the master
plans. However, since these issues vary by host nation and may not be
clear to all users of the plans, we continue to believe OSD should
require commands, at a minimum, to explain the issues with obtaining
residual value from each host nation and report the implications for
U.S. funding requirements.
This Year's Plans Are More Complete, Clear, and Consistent:
The 2006 master plans are not only more complete, clear, and consistent
than last year's plans, they are also more refined, focusing first on
the mission and then on the infrastructure requirements needed to
support the mission. For example, see the following:
* Base categories. Whereas last year there appeared to be differences
in interpretation and usage of terminology related to forward operating
sites and cooperative security locations, this year all of the commands
categorized their installations into applicable base categories of main
operating base, cooperative security location, and forward operating
sites, which provided users a clearer picture of the infrastructure
plans and requirements at these sites. The commands also supplemented
the information on base categories with detailed data on the
installations' capabilities, overall mission, population, and types of
equipment and facilities located at each site.
* End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a strategic
end state date for overseas basing infrastructure using an "as of" date
within a range between 2011 and 2015, which provided users a more
complete and clearer basis for tracking progress in meeting the
commands' infrastructure objectives for their areas of responsibility.
Last year, only CENTCOM reported an anticipated strategic end state
date of 2010 for its basing infrastructure.
* Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported
host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2007
and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, which
provided users a better basis to determine the extent to which reported
host nation funding levels are realistic or complete. Also, PACOM
identified host nation funding for its bilateral agreements in South
Korea, such as the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan relocation
plan.[Footnote 18] While PACOM did not include host nation estimates
for projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, it
clearly explained the ongoing nature of bilateral agreements with the
Government of Japan and reported that host nation contributions related
to realignments in Okinawa will be reflected in future master plans
once bilateral agreements are finalized. EUCOM provided information for
two bilateral agreements, as well as information on North Atlantic
Treaty Organization contributions. CENTCOM also provided host nation
estimates and explained that discussions with various countries about
host nation funding were ongoing. Last year, none of the commands
provided complete data for host nation funding levels and PACOM's
schedule of host nation funding did not fully incorporate projects and
funding levels initiated through special bilateral agreements with host
nations.
* Facility requirements and costs. Whereas last year only one of the
regional commands fully identified its precise facility requirements
and costs as specified in the reporting mandate, this year all of the
commands provided facility requirements for fiscal years 2007 through
2011[Footnote 19] and estimated facility sustainment costs for fiscal
year 2007. However, although specified in OSD guidance, the master
plans provided to Congress did not provide cost estimates for
individual military construction projects planned for fiscal year 2007.
According to a senior OSD official responsible for overseeing the
development of the plans, reconciling the estimated costs while the
budget proposal was evolving proved to be too difficult to capture each
project's estimated costs in the master plans. Accordingly, the master
plans must be matched with the fiscal year 2007 military construction
budget request to obtain a complete picture of the precise facility and
cost requirements for fiscal year 2007.
* Environmental remediation issues. This year, EUCOM and PACOM
addressed the extent of their environmental issues, while CENTCOM did
not indicate to what extent it may be confronted with environmental
issues. For example, EUCOM reported that there were no environmental
remediation projects per DOD Instruction 4715.8 programmed for fiscal
years 2007 through 2011. PACOM also reported that there were no
environmental restoration issues in Japan and noted that USFK was in
the process of coordinating with the Government of South Korea on
remediation of vacated U.S. bases.[Footnote 20] While CENTCOM's master
plan did not mention any environmental issues, a senior command
official said there were no environmental issues to report. Last year,
none of the regional commands identified environmental remediation and
restoration requirements or issues in their master plans, which made it
difficult for users to compare and comprehend how environment-related
activities and costs have varied, and how these costs may affect
planned U.S. funding levels.
The 2006 plans are also more refined, focusing first on the mission and
then on the infrastructure requirements needed to support the mission.
For example, in CENTCOM's master plan, the descriptions of each forward
operating site focus first on the mission and then on requirements by
providing the type of mission the site has (such as providing
logistical support), the unit that it could host, and its role in the
region (such as supporting the war against terrorism or strengthening
capabilities for rapid and flexible response in the Central Asian
states), as well as identifying the requirements for equipment and
facilities to support the mission at the site. All of the plans provide
similar information for their main operating bases, cooperative
security locations, and forward operating sites.
Limited Explanation of the Impacts of Other Defense Plans and
Activities:
Despite improvements to the plans since last year, the 2006 master
plans do not always explain how their implementation could be affected
by other relevant and related defense plans and activities because
there is not a requirement for them to do so. In 2005, the Commission
on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States
recommended that the entire effort of overseas basing be integrated
into one overarching design that is coordinated and synchronized with
all ongoing initiatives. Further, in a statement to the House Armed
Services Committee on June 20, 2006, the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Installations and Environment, and the Vice Director of Strategic
Plans and Policies stated that one of the key themes the department
uses to guide its thinking on force posture changes is to act both
within and across regions. According to these officials, global force
management allows the department to adapt to increasingly global
challenges, relationships, and capability needs by establishing cross-
regional priorities.
Overseas regional command officials told us that generally, the
development of their 2006 master plans were coordinated with other DOD
plans and activities. However, only PACOM's plan gave some indication
of how its implementation could be affected by another activity--the
potential decrease in traditional Japanese funding which could be used
to help pay for the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam, as discussed
above. EUCOM's master plan did not explain the potential impact of
implementing base realignment and closure recommendations on the
movement of troops from Germany to bases in the United States. EUCOM
and Army officials told us that any delay in the implementation of base
realignment and closure recommendations would cause them to delay the
movement of Army service members and their families if facilities were
not available at receiving installations in the United States. This
would delay the closings of Army installations in Europe and increase
costs to operate those installations while they remain open. However,
EUCOM's master plan did not address this matter. Also, while CENTCOM
officials emphasized that infrastructure requirements in their master
plan directly supported and responded to ongoing operations in Iraq,
CENTCOM's master plan only made general references to operations in
Iraq and did not fully explain the potential impact of such operations
on other installations and facility requirements outside of Iraq in its
area of responsibility.
These omissions were due primarily to OSD guidance that stipulates the
plans are to address overseas locations only. OSD guidance does not
require regional commands to take into consideration facilities'
requirements and plans in the 50 states, U.S. territories, or at
locations where U.S. troops are deployed temporarily and funded outside
of traditional military construction appropriations, such as is the
case in Iraq. Without such explanations and linkage, it is difficult to
determine the extent to which the master plans are coordinated and
synchronized with other defense plans and activities and the impacts
these other activities have on the master plans in terms of
infrastructure and funding requirements.
2006 Master Plans Reflected Recent Changes in Overseas Basing
Strategies and Requirements:
OSD and the regional commands incorporated key changes associated with
the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and
requirements into this year's master plans before they were provided to
Congress. Even with these efforts, changes occurring after the 2006
plans were submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in next
year's plans, and it is likely that the department could face more
changes in the future.
While the plans are driven by periodic changes in U.S. overseas basing
strategies and requirements, OSD and the regional commands incorporated
these key changes into the 2006 master plans before they were provided
to Congress. As a part of DOD's efforts to establish a U.S. presence in
Eastern Europe through a network of forward operating sites and
cooperative security locations, the United States signed individual
agreements with the governments of Romania and of Bulgaria in December
2005 and April 2006, respectively, which will allow DOD access to their
facilities and training sites. In both instances, EUCOM's master plan
provided significant details, such as the mission, planned
capabilities, equipment and aircraft, population, and in some instances
the funding requirements to transition the camp into full operating
capacity, based on the results of these recent agreements. In addition,
CENTCOM removed infrastructure requirements that were planned for
Uzbekistan from its master plan. In late 2005, following the United
States' criticism of human rights abuses, the Uzbekistan government
requested that all U.S. government forces withdraw from Karshi-Khanabad
air base. According to senior CENTCOM officials, these forces were
relocated to other locations in its area of responsibility, which
affected infrastructure and funding requirements at the receiving
locations.
In some instances, basing decisions were made after the plans were
prepared, but OSD and the regional commands updated the plans to
reflect those decisions before the plans were submitted to Congress.
For example, after the EUCOM plan was prepared, the department decided
to realign the Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland, and the Naval
Support Activity La Maddelena, Italy--for both of which EUCOM had
included infrastructure and funding requirements in its plan.
Historically, these installations existed to meet Cold War security
threats. However, because of the realities of the new century's
security environment, DOD determined that the capabilities provided by
these installations were no longer required. While this effort helped
to provide Congress with the most current available data at the time,
it also contributed to DOD providing Congress copies of this year's
master plans nearly 2 months after its fiscal year 2007 military
construction budget submission, instead of simultaneously as specified
in the House conference report and Senate report accompanying the
fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bills.
Even with these efforts to update the plans as changes occurred and
decisions were made, the evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing
strategies and requirements continues. U.S. overseas defense basing
strategies and requirements continue to evolve simultaneously with the
implementation of associated plans and activities encompassed in the
integrated global basing strategy, base realignment and closure, Army's
modularity plans, and war on terrorism. In the 2006 master plans, OSD
recognizes that further changes will result as it continues to
implement the global defense posture decisions. For example, it
anticipates that the department will return about 30 percent of its
current overseas sites (22 percent of its overseas assets in terms of
plant replacement value) to host nations over the next 10 years.
Accordingly, OSD and the regional commands will be faced with more
changes in the future, and it remains difficult for such changes to be
included in the master plans and for DOD to provide a definitive
picture of infrastructure and funding requirements. Changes occurring
after the most recent plans were submitted to Congress will have to be
reflected in next year's plans.
2006 Master Plans Addressed Several Challenges, but PACOM's Plan Did
Not Mention Training Limitations:
As noted, the 2006 master plans addressed a number of challenges that
DOD faces in the implementation of the master plans--such as
uncertainties with host nation relations and environmental concerns--
but PACOM's plan did not address training limitations in South Korea
and Japan. In our prior reports, we explained how some of these
challenges could have a significant impact on infrastructure and
funding requirements and, because the prior plans did not always
describe such challenges and their potential effects, that Congress
lacked a complete picture it needed to evaluate the annual military
construction funding request. This year, the plans provided a much
better description of challenges and the potential impacts on
implementation.
This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Host Nation
Relations:
All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of
recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their 2006
master plans. Last year, we found that none of the commands fully
explained the status or challenges for finalizing host nation
agreements and recommended that the commands briefly explain the status
of negotiations with host nations to provide more complete and clearer
plans. These agreements depend largely on the political environment and
economic conditions in host nations and can affect the extent of host
nation support--access to facilities or funding--to U.S. forces.
Accordingly, the resulting agreements may increase or decrease U.S.-
funded costs for future infrastructure changes. This year, we found the
following:
* PACOM's master plan provided substantial information describing the
results of the Defense Policy Review Initiative[Footnote 21] with the
Government of Japan, such as the transfer of a carrier air wing,
collocation of United States and Japanese air command and control at
Yokota Air Base, and the reduction of U.S. forces on Okinawa. In
addition, USFK provided details on significant past and current
realignment efforts, including the Government of South Korea's approval
of the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan relocation plan and
coordination on the transfer of U.S.-vacated bases.
* EUCOM's master plan provided specific information on efforts to
consolidate missions because of limitations on training and military
activities, in addition to identifying a possible closure of a main
operating base in its area of responsibility.
* CENTCOM's master plan discussed efforts to solicit host nation
contributions and the amount of coordination and support that is needed
from DOD, the State Department, and Congress. The plan also reflected
the results of agreements with host nations, which have established
cooperative security locations and forward operating sites in strategic
areas of the world such as North Africa and Central Asia.
This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Environmental Issues:
As discussed, EUCOM and PACOM addressed the extent of their
environmental issues in their 2006 master plans, while CENTCOM gave no
indication concerning environmental issues in its master plan. Last
year, none of the regional commands identified environmental
remediation and restoration issues in their master plans. This year,
EUCOM reported that there were no environmental restoration and
remediation projects programmed for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
PACOM reported that U.S. Forces Japan had no environmental restoration
and remediation requirements and that USFK was coordinating with the
Government of South Korea on remediation of vacated U.S. bases.
Although CENTCOM did not report any environmental issues, a senior
CENTCOM official said there were no environmental issues in the
command's area of responsibility.
PACOM's 2006 Plan Did Not Describe Training Limitations:
While the 2006 master plans generally addressed the other challenges
that DOD faces in the implementation of the master plans, Congress
still does not have a complete picture of the challenges that DOD faces
in implementing the master plans, which could affect their
implementation because PACOM's plan did not describe the challenges DOD
faces in addressing training limitations in South Korea and Japan.
Senior command officials told us that training limitations could cause
the United States to pursue alternatives, such as either to train in
other locations or to downsize or relocate, which could affect funding
and facility requirements included in overseas basing plans. Further,
we reported last year that similar challenges could have a significant
impact on funding requirements but that the plans did not always
describe the status and the potential impact of such challenges on
future basing plans and funding requirements. This year, EUCOM's master
plan addressed known training limitations in its region by identifying
a specific instance in which a realignment action was not successful in
part because of training limitations, and explaining that EUCOM was in
the process of exploring further options to meet its requirements.
CENTCOM officials told us that their focus was on ongoing operations
and that training was not an issue in its region.
While PACOM's master plan provided extensive details on other
challenges, it did not describe the challenges the command faces in
addressing training limitations in South Korea and Japan, although
senior officials told us that these limitations could cause the United
States to pursue alternatives, such as to either train in other
locations or to downsize or relocate, which could affect overseas
basing plans. Specifically, we found that PACOM master plan did not
address the following:
* The Seventh Air Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain combat
capability in the long term due to lack of adequate air-to-surface
ranges, according to senior Air Force and USFK officials. For decades,
the Government of South Korea has attempted to relocate the Koon-Ni
range, which had served as the primary air-to-ground range for the
Seventh Air Force. Last year the air and ground range management of the
Koon-Ni training range was transferred to the Government of South
Korea, which closed the range in August 2005. While there is an
agreement with the Government of South Korea to train at other ranges,
according to senior Air Force and USFK officials, the other ranges do
not provide electronic scoring capabilities necessary to meet the Air
Force's air-to-surface training requirements. As a result, the Air
Force has been using ranges in Japan and Alaska to meet its training
requirements, which results in additional transportation costs to the
U.S. government. While South Korea has agreed to upgrade its ranges,
senior Air Force officials said that the Seventh Air Force will be able
to maintain its combat capability only in the short term if the issue
is not addressed.
* The Eighth Army in South Korea needs rail links or high-speed roads
to facilitate transportation of troops and equipment between Camp
Humphreys, which is located south of Seoul, to major training areas
located in the northern part of the country, according to senior USFK
officials. While this is not a significant problem at this time, it
remains a necessity to complete a successful realignment of U.S. forces
in South Korea. According to senior USFK officials, a vital component
of the training capability in South Korea depends upon having access to
a rail head or a high-speed road that can deliver troops and equipment
from Camp Humphreys to major training areas in the northern part of
South Korea.
* There are limited combat arms training ranges and facilities in
Japan, according to senior U.S. Forces Japan and Pacific Air Forces
officials. These officials said that even though they have received
increased range time at Japanese training facilities, training
opportunities still remain insufficient in Japan to meet their training
requirements.
As discussed above, the Air Force in South Korea may be unable to
maintain combat capability in the future because of a lack of access to
modernized air-to-surface ranges, insufficient opportunities to meet
training requirements in Japan, and the need of the Army in South Korea
for rail links or high-speed roads to facilitate transportation of
troops and equipment between Camp Humphreys to the major training areas
in the northern part of South Korea. While these training issues were
readily identified by USFK, U.S. Forces Japan, and PACOM officials,
none of these issues were recognized as a challenge in PACOM's master
plan. We believe that identifying these issues would provide Congress
an awareness of potential challenges to training U.S. forces in Japan
and South Korea, which are likely to affect facility requirements and
funding in these countries.
Conclusions:
U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements continue to
evolve simultaneously with the implementation of associated plans and
activities encompassed in the integrated global basing strategy, base
realignment and closure, Army's modularity plans, and the war on
terrorism, and it remains difficult for such changes to be included in
the master plans and for DOD to provide a definitive picture of
infrastructure and funding requirements. To the department's credit,
this year's overseas master plans provide more complete, clear, and
consistent information than last year's plans. Still, until overseas
regional commands link their master plans with other relevant and
related defense plans and activities, including those involving base
realignment and closure implementation and Iraq operations, and until
PACOM addresses training limitations in its master plan, Congress and
other users will lack complete information on the magnitude of U.S.
defense infrastructure and funding requirements overseas.
Since we have previously recommended that overseas regional commands
address residual value issues and that PACOM provide information on
facility requirements and funding levels for Guam, Hawaii, U.S.
territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific in our prior
reports, we are not including them in this report. However, since they
have not been addressed, we consider them open and therefore the
department should implement them.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To further enhance future comprehensive master plans and facilitate
annual review and oversight by Congress and other users, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to (1) revise OSD's guidance to
require overseas commands to explain how other relevant and related
defense plans and activities, including those involving base
realignment and closure implementation and Iraq operations, affect
implementation of their master plans in terms of infrastructure and
funding requirements and (2) ensure that PACOM explains how it plans to
address existing training limitations in its area of responsibility and
the potential effects of those limitations on infrastructure and
funding requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment partially concurred with both
recommendations. In commenting on our recommendations to require
overseas commands to explain how other relevant and related defense
plans and activities and existing training limitations affect
implementation of their master plans, he agreed with our
recommendations' intent and stated that the department's preference was
to address these issues in a risk assessment framework. Specifically,
he stated that future guidance would require overseas commands to
identify and discuss risks to their plans--such as those that would
directly affect execution and could result from political, financial,
base realignment and closure, training, and other issues--as well as
steps taken to mitigate the risks. We have no basis to question this
approach and plan to evaluate its effectiveness in our next annual
review of DOD's overseas master plans.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense further stated that nonprogrammed
and nonvalidated training limitations experienced by service components
were not appropriate for inclusion and would not be addressed in the
overseas commands' risk assessment for their master plans. We agree.
While we are not aware of any nonprogrammed and nonvalidated training
limitations, our report discusses only those training limitations
raised by senior command officials during our review. We assume that if
there is a need to make a distinction between nonvalidated versus
validated training limitations, OSD and the overseas commands would
work together to identify those validated limitations that should be
addressed in their master plans.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense's comments are reprinted in
enclosure II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
overseas regional commanders; and the Director, Office of Management
and Budget. Copies will be made available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on our Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. The GAO staff members who made key
contributions to this report are listed in enclosure III.
Signed by:
Barry W. Holman, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Chair:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs, and
Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James T. Walsh:
Chairman:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and:
Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of Section]
Enclosure I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans
complied with congressional reporting requirements and provided
information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner, we compared
the overseas master plans with the reporting requirements in the
congressional mandate, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
guidance, which incorporated our prior recommendations. In order to
identify improvements to the overseas master plan, we compared and
contrasted the 2005 and 2006 plans. We assessed the quantity and
quality of one plan's responses for each of the data elements and
compared them to equivalent responses in the other plans to form
conclusions as to the completeness, clarity, and consistency of plans.
We also discussed with Department of Defense (DOD) officials our
observations and recommendations, specific reporting requirements, and
whether improvements in the guidance and reporting were needed. To
determine whether improvements in guidance and reporting were needed,
we assessed the plans to identify those elements and properties that
provided information in the most complete, clear, and consistent
manner.
To determine the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans
reflected how U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements
have changed since last year, we interviewed cognizant officials from
DOD about the various changes that were identified within the plans. We
met with officials from OSD and each of the following commands and
agencies: U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Army Pacific; Commander, U.S.
Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Forces Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces;
U.S. Forces Korea; U.S. Eighth Army; Seventh Air Force; Commander,
Naval Forces Korea; Army Installation Management Agency Korea Regional
Office; Army Corps of Engineers Far East District; DOD Education
Activity; U.S. Forces Korea Status of Forces Agreement Office; U.S.
Forces Korea Judge Advocate Office; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan;
U.S. Air Forces Japan; Commander, Naval Forces Japan; U.S. Marine
Forces Japan; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces Europe; Naval Facilities Engineering Command-Japan; Naval
Facilities Engineering Command-Italy; U.S. Air Force Europe; Army
Installation Management Agency Europe Regional Office; U.S. Central
Command; and Special Operations Command. In general, we discussed the
reporting requirements contained in OSD's guidance, host nation
agreements and funding levels, U.S. funding levels and sources,
environmental remediation and restoration issues, property returns to
host nations, and training requirements. In addition, we compared and
contrasted the 2005 and 2006 overseas master plans to each other in
order to identify changes in overseas defense basing strategies and
requirements. We also analyzed available reports, documents, policies,
directives, international agreements, guidance, and media articles to
keep abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense basing strategies
and requirements. During our overseas visits, to see firsthand the
condition of facilities and status of selected construction projects,
we visited and toured the facilities at Camp Schwab, Camp Hansen, Camp
Foster, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Marine Corps Air Station
Futenma, Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air Base, Japan;
Camp Humphreys, South Korea; Army Garrison Grafenwöhr, Bitburg Annex,
Spangdahlem Air Base, and Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and Naval Support
Activity Capodichino (Naples), Italy.
To determine the extent to which the 2006 master plans reflected the
challenges DOD faces in the implementation of the plans, we met with
officials from the aforementioned agencies and discussed challenges
involving various topics, host nation relations and funding levels,
U.S. funding levels and sources, environmental remediation and
restoration issues, property returns to host nations, and training
limitations. We compared and contrasted the 2005 and 2006 overseas
master plans to each other to determine the extent to which
improvements were made in identifying key challenges for each command.
We also analyzed available reports, documents, policies, directives,
international agreements, guidance, and media articles pertaining to
challenges that may affect DOD's implementation of the overseas master
plans.
While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning
efforts were not specifically included in the master plans provided in
response to the congressional mandates and detailed data were not
available for inclusion in this report. In addition, we did not include
Southern Command in our analysis because this command has significantly
fewer facilities overseas than the other regional commands in the
Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia.
We conducted our review from September 2005 through July 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of Section]
Enclosure II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Aug 10 2006:
Mr. Barry W. Holman:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Holman:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-06-913R, `Defense Infrastructure: DOD'S Overseas
Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve,' dated July 11, 2006
(GAO Code 350740).
Enclosed is the Department's response to the recommendations of the
draft GAO report. Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments. My
point of contact for this action is Sherry Holliman, who can be reached
at (703) 571-9069.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
for : Philip W. Grone:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment):
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO CODE 350740/GAO-06-913R:
GAO Draft Report - Dated July 11, 2006:
GAO Code 350740/GAO-06-913R:
"Defense Infrastructure: DOD'S Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans
Continue to Evolve"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) to revise OSD guidance to require overseas commands to
explain how other relevant and related defense plans and activities,
including those involving base realignment and closure implementation
and Iraq operations, affect implementation of their master plans in
terms of infrastructure and funding requirements.
DoD Response: Partially concur. DoD concurs with the intent of the
recommendation but prefers that overseas commands couch the information
in a risk assessment framework. DoD future guidance will require
overseas commands to identify and discuss risks to their master plans
as well as steps taken to mitigate those risks. Such risks would
directly impact master plan execution and could result from political,
financial, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAG), training, or other
issues.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) to ensure that PACOM explains how it plans to address
existing training limitations in its area of responsibility and the
potential effects of those limitations on infrastructure and funding
requirements.
DoD Response: Partially concur. DoD concurs that validated training
requirements which are affected by force posture transformation plans
should be addressed in the master plans. However, it is more germane
for these issues to be addressed as part of the risk assessment
discussion (described above) than to be addressed separately.
Therefore, DoD will advise overseas combatant commands to include
training issues as part of their risk assessment discussion. Non-
programmed and non-validated training limitations experienced by
Service components are not appropriate for inclusion and will not be
addressed.
[End of Section]
Enclosure III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Barry W. Holman, (202) 512-5581:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director;
Nelsie Alcoser; Thom Barger; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; and Roger
Tomlinson also made major contributions to this report.
(350740):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2004).
[2] In fulfilling this requirement, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense asked the overseas regional commands to prepare comprehensive
master plans for their areas of responsibility.
[3] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003).
[4] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003).
[5] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure
Overseas, GAO-05-680R (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005), and Defense
Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas
and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-04-609
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004).
[6] DOD, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Update of Overseas Master Plans (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5,
2005). OSD also issued guidance in February and October 2004 to aid the
overseas regional commands in developing their plans last year.
[7] Last year, OSD provided Congress the overseas master plans along
with its fiscal year 2006 military construction budget proposal in
early March 2005. This year's master plans were submitted on April 27,
2006, later than when the annual budget submissions went to Congress,
at least in part because of OSD's efforts to incorporate last minute
changes in basing plans, such as those in Iceland and Italy. OSD made
the plans available to us on May 2, 2006, which did not provide us
sufficient time to fully assess the plans or provide a draft report to
Congress by May 15 as we have done in the past.
[8] We refer to the plans in the year that they were issued to
Congress. The content of the plans issued in 2006 covers fiscal years
2007 through 2011.
[9] For the purposes of this report, we did not include Southern
Command in our analysis because this command has significantly fewer
facilities overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific,
Europe, and Central Asia.
[10] U.S. Congress, Commission on Review of Overseas Military
Facilities Structure of the United States Final Report (Arlington, Va.:
Aug. 15, 2005). The commission was established in 2003 by Pub. L. No.
108-132 § 128 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 111 note) to evaluate
the current and proposed overseas basing structure for U.S. military
forces.
[11] Like last year, CENTCOM's plan excluded any detailed discussion of
facilities in Iraq since DOD does not consider them permanent bases.
[12] These numbers do not include U.S. facilities in Iraq.
[13] In our estimates for military construction and family housing for
overseas locations, we included U.S. territories and possessions in the
Pacific, such as Guam and Wake Island. However, we excluded worldwide
classified and unspecified appropriations from our total because these
categories may include domestic military construction and family
housing.
[14] See footnote 7.
[15] See footnote 5.
[16] See footnote 6.
[17] Department of Defense, Environmental Remediation for DOD
Activities Overseas, DOD Instruction 4715.8 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2,
1998).
[18] As discussed in our prior report, within the provisions of the
Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan relocation plan, USFK intends to
strengthen its overall military effectiveness by consolidating
installations north of Seoul, including the Yongsan Army Garrison
located in the Seoul metropolitan area, to two major hubs in the
central and southern sections of South Korea. USFK expects the
consolidation and relocation of thousands of soldiers to increase
readiness, efficiencies, and cost savings; enhance quality of life;
provide a less intrusive presence; and increase training opportunities.
[19] CENTCOM also included information on proposed military
construction projects and estimated costs for fiscal year 2012 in its
2006 master plan.
[20] On April 7, 2006, USFK announced a plan for the return of
facilities and areas that have been vacated by the command to the
Government of South Korea. USFK's plan includes a number of measures
designed to address issues identified in joint South Korea and U.S.
environmental surveys of these vacated facilities and areas. For
example, the plan calls for the United States to remedy known,
imminent, and substantial endangerments to human health and safety. The
United States will also remove underground fuel storage tanks to
preclude future leaks and initiate a technology process for skimming
fuel from the groundwater at locations where this contamination was
found. USFK expects that the plan will accelerate the return of vacated
facilities and areas to the Government of South Korea and the
relocation of U.S. forces from Seoul and other locations.
[21] The Defense Policy Review Initiative, a bilateral agreement
between the U.S. and Japanese governments, established a framework for
the future U.S. force structure in Japan. According to DOD, this effort
assessed the security environment in the region and bilaterally
determined the required roles, missions, capabilities, and force
structure. The interim agreement plan was signed in October 2005.
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Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
