Military Recruiting
DOD and Services Need Better Data to Enhance Visibility over Recruiter Irregularities Gao ID: GAO-06-846 August 8, 2006The viability of the All Volunteer Force depends, in large measure, on the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to recruit several hundred thousand individuals each year. Since the involvement of U.S. military forces in Iraq in March 2003, several DOD components have been challenged in meeting their recruiting goals. In fiscal year 2005 alone, three of the eight active and reserve components missed their goals. Some recruiters, reportedly, have resorted to overly aggressive tactics, which can adversely affect DOD's ability to recruit and erode public confidence in the recruiting process. GAO was asked to address the extent to which DOD and the services have visibility over recruiter irregularities; what factors may contribute to recruiter irregularities; and what procedures are in place to address them. GAO performed its work primarily at the service recruiting commands and DOD's Military Entrance Processing Command; examined recruiting policies, regulations, and directives; and analyzed service data on recruiter irregularities.
DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. DOD, for example, has not established an oversight framework that includes guidance requiring the services to maintain and report data on recruiter irregularities and criteria for characterizing irregularities and establishing common terminology. The absence of guidance and criteria makes it difficult to compare and analyze data across services and limits DOD's ability to determine when corrective action is needed. Effective federal managers continually assess and evaluate their programs to provide accountability and assurance that program objectives are being achieved. Additionally, the services do not track all allegations of recruiter wrongdoing. Accordingly, service data likely underestimate the true number of recruiter irregularities. Nevertheless, available service data show that between fiscal years 2004 and 2005, allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing increased, collectively, from 4,400 cases to 6,500 cases; substantiated cases increased from just over 400 to almost 630 cases; and criminal violations more than doubled from just over 30 to almost 70 cases. The department, however, is not in a sound position to assure Congress and the general public that it knows the full extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. A number of factors within the recruiting environment may contribute to irregularities. Service recruiting officials stated that the economy has been the most important factor affecting recruiting success. Almost three-quarters of active duty recruiters responding to DOD's internal survey also believed that ongoing hostilities in Iraq made it hard to achieve their goals. These factors, in addition to the typical challenges of the job, such as demanding work hours and pressure to meet monthly goals, may lead to recruiter irregularities. The recruiters' performance evaluation and reward systems are generally based on the number of contracts they write for applicants to enter the military. The Marine Corps is the only service that uses basic training attrition rates as a key component of the recruiter's evaluation. GAO previously recommended that the services link recruiter awards and incentives more closely to applicants' successful completion of basic training. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation, but has not made this a requirement across the services. The services have standard procedures in place, provided in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and service regulations, to investigate allegations of recruiter irregularities and to prosecute and discipline recruiters found guilty of violating recruiting policies and procedures. In addition, to help recruiters better understand the nature and consequences of committing irregularities in the recruitment process, all services use available information on recruiter wrongdoing to update their training.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-846, Military Recruiting: DOD and Services Need Better Data to Enhance Visibility over Recruiter Irregularities
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
August 2006:
Military Recruiting:
DOD and Services Need Better Data to Enhance Visibility over Recruiter
Irregularities:
GAO-06-846:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-846, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The viability of the All Volunteer Force depends, in large measure, on
the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) ability to recruit several hundred
thousand individuals each year. Since the involvement of U.S. military
forces in Iraq in March 2003, several DOD components have been
challenged in meeting their recruiting goals. In fiscal year 2005
alone, three of the eight active and reserve components missed their
goals. Some recruiters, reportedly, have resorted to overly aggressive
tactics, which can adversely affect DOD‘s ability to recruit and erode
public confidence in the recruiting process. GAO was asked to address
the extent to which DOD and the services have visibility over recruiter
irregularities; what factors may contribute to recruiter
irregularities; and what procedures are in place to address them. GAO
performed its work primarily at the service recruiting commands and
DOD‘s Military Entrance Processing Command; examined recruiting
policies, regulations, and directives; and analyzed service data on
recruiter irregularities.
What GAO Found:
DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to
which recruiter irregularities are occurring. DOD, for example, has not
established an oversight framework that includes guidance requiring the
services to maintain and report data on recruiter irregularities and
criteria for characterizing irregularities and establishing common
terminology. The absence of guidance and criteria makes it difficult to
compare and analyze data across services and limit‘s DOD‘s ability to
determine when corrective action is needed. Effective federal managers
continually assess and evaluate their programs to provide
accountability and assurance that program objectives are being
achieved. Additionally, the services do not track all allegations of
recruiter wrongdoing. Accordingly, service data likely underestimate
the true number of recruiter irregularities. Nevertheless, available
service data show that between fiscal years 2004 and 2005, allegations
and service-identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing increased,
collectively, from 4,400 cases to 6,600 cases; substantiated cases
increased from just over 400 to almost 630 cases; and criminal
violations more than doubled from just over 30 to almost 70 cases. The
department, however, is not in a sound position to assure Congress and
the general public that it knows the full extent to which recruiter
irregularities are occurring.
A number of factors within the recruiting environment may contribute to
irregularities. Service recruiting officials stated that the economy
has been the most important factor affecting recruiting success. Almost
three-quarters of active duty recruiters responding to DOD‘s internal
survey also believed that ongoing hostilities in Iraq made it hard to
achieve their goals. These factors, in addition to the typical
challenges of the job, such as demanding work hours and pressure to
meet monthly goals, may lead to recruiter irregularities. The
recruiters‘ performance evaluation and reward systems are generally
based on the number of contracts they write for applicants to enter the
military. The Marine Corps is the only service that uses basic training
attrition rates as a key component of the recruiter‘s evaluation. GAO
previously recommended that the services link recruiter awards and
incentives more closely to applicants‘ successful completion of basic
training. DOD concurred with GAO‘s recommendation, but has not made
this a requirement across the services.
The services have standard procedures in place, provided in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and service regulations, to investigate
allegations of recruiter irregularities and to prosecute and discipline
recruiters found guilty of violating recruiting policies and
procedures. In addition, to help recruiters better understand the
nature and consequences of committing irregularities in the recruitment
process, all services use available information on recruiter wrongdoing
to update their training.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making several recommendations to improve DOD‘s visibility over
recruiter irregularities and the services‘ ability to track and report
allegations and incidents of irregularities. In commenting on a draft
of this report, DOD concurred or partially concurred with four of GAO‘s
five recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-846].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results In Brief:
Background:
DOD and the Services Have Limited Visibility over Recruiter
Irregularities:
Many Factors May Affect the Recruiting Environment:
Services Have Standard Procedures in Place for Administering Military
Justice to Address Recruiter Irregularities:
Services Use Information on Recruiter Irregularities to Update Their
Training:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of the Average Recruiters by Service for Fiscal Years
2002 through 2006:
Table 2: Recruiter Irregularities by Service for Fiscal Years 2004 and
2005 That Are Unsubstantiated, Substantiated, or Other:
Table 3: Cases of Recruiter Criminal Violations in Fiscal Years 2004
and 2005 by Service:
Table 4: Substantiated Irregularities as a Percentage of Actual
Accessions by Service for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005:
Table 5: Irregularities as a Percentage of Recruiters by Service for
Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005:
Table 6: Disqualifications by Service from Fiscal Year 2003 through
Fiscal Year 2005:
Table 7: All Army Allegations and Service-identified Incidents of
Recruiter Irregularities by Disciplinary Action for Fiscal Years 2004
and 2005:
Table 8: Organizations and Offices Contacted During Our Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Service Recruiting Command Organizational Chart:
Figure 2: The Recruiting Process:
Figure 3: Recruiter Irregularities Occurring at the End of the Army
Monthly Recruiting Cycles:
Abbreviations:
AVF: All Volunteer Force:
DOD: Department of Defense:
E-5: Enlisted Grade--Five:
E-6: Enlisted Grade--Six :
MEPS: military entrance processing station:
OUSD: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense:
August 8, 2006:
The Honorable Vic Snyder:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Military Personnel:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Pete Stark:
House of Representatives:
The viability of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) depends, in large
measure, on the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to successfully
recruit several hundred thousand qualified individuals each year to
fill over 1,400 occupational specialties. Since the March 2003
involvement of U.S. military forces in Iraq, attracting sufficient
numbers of high-quality recruits to military service has proven to be
one of the greatest personnel challenges faced by DOD since the
inception of the AVF. The active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Navy
Reserve, for example, failed to meet their fiscal year 2005 recruiting
goals.
Recruitment of high-quality personnel is a tough proposition, made even
more challenging in the current environment when the nation is engaged
in combat operations. To exacerbate the recruitment challenges further,
DOD estimates that over half of the youth in the U.S. population
between the ages of 16 and 21 do not meet the minimum requirements to
enter military service. Moreover, additional factors such as the
shrinking numbers of new recruits in delayed entry programs[Footnote 1]
and the Army's use of stop loss, which delays servicemembers from
leaving active duty, indicate that the components may experience
continued recruiting challenges as they attempt to meet their personnel
requirements.
To help overcome recruiting challenges, the military services during
the past several years have assigned roughly 20,000 recruiters to
manage their recruiting programs and achieve their accession goals. In
addition, the services have taken other steps to enhance their
recruiting efforts, such as offering increased enlistment bonuses and
other benefits. Despite these actions, many of the recruiting
challenges remain.
Determined to find ways to succeed in a challenging recruiting
environment, some recruiters, reportedly, have resorted to overly
aggressive tactics, such as coercion and harassment. Such tactics are
violations of recruiting policies and diminish the public's perception
of, and confidence in, the recruiting process. Furthermore, recruiter
irregularities can negatively impact the services' recruiting ability
by damaging relationships with potential applicants, and causing those
who have influence over potential applicants to question military
service. These influencers include parents, coaches, teachers, and
other family members. Consequently, a recruiter's actions can be far
reaching and have significant impact. Given the large numbers of
servicemembers DOD must recruit every year, there is ample opportunity
for recruiter irregularities to occur. A 2005 internal DOD survey
reports about 20 percent of active duty recruiters believe that
irregularities occur frequently.[Footnote 2] Even one incident of
recruiter wrongdoing can erode public confidence in the recruiting
process.
We looked at military recruiting processes in two prior reports dated
January 1997 and January 1998,[Footnote 3] both of which recommended
that DOD needed to improve its recruiter performance criteria across
the services. Both of these reports point to the increased stress on
recruiters as a result of restrictive recruiting goals and long working
hours to succeed in a tough recruiting environment.
This report addresses the following questions: (1) To what extent do
DOD and the services have visibility over recruiter irregularities? (2)
What factors within the current recruiting environment may contribute
to recruiting irregularities? (3) What procedures are in place to
address individuals involved in recruiting irregularities?
Our work covers recruiting irregularities that affect all services'
active and reserve component enlisted personnel. For the purposes of
this report, we define recruiter irregularities as those willful and
unwillful acts of omission and improprieties that are perpetrated by a
recruiter or alleged to be perpetrated by a recruiter to facilitate the
recruiting process for an applicant. These recruiter irregularities
range from administrative paperwork errors, to actions such as failing
to disclose disqualifying eligibility criteria or instructing
applicants not to reveal medical conditions or prior civil litigation,
to criminal violations committed by a recruiter who is subsequently
prosecuted under articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Criminal violations may include such actions as sexual harassment and
falsifying documents. We performed our work primarily at the service
recruiting commands and DOD's Military Entrance Processing Command. To
answer our objectives, we examined DOD and service policies,
regulations, and directives related to recruiting. We also reviewed
data DOD compiled on recruiters and survey results on their opinions
about their jobs. Additionally, we analyzed data the services compiled
and maintained on recruiter irregularities. We also interviewed DOD and
service recruiting officials, and recruiters in each service. However,
we did not review irregularities within DOD's National Guard components
because the National Guard Bureau does not maintain centralized data.
Although we identified weaknesses in the available data, we determined
that, for the purposes of this report, the data were reliable for
providing limited information on recruiter irregularities. We conducted
our work from September 2005 through August 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Further details on
the scope and methodology are described in appendix I.
Results In Brief:
DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to
which recruiter irregularities are occurring. The Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for
reviewing and evaluating plans and programs, including DOD's
recruitment program. DOD, however, has not established an oversight
framework that includes guidance requiring the services to maintain and
report data on recruiter irregularities and criteria for characterizing
irregularities and establishing common terminology. Effective federal
managers continually assess and evaluate their programs to provide
accountability and assurance that program objectives are being
achieved. Although the services require their recruiting commands to
maintain data on recruiter irregularities, the lack of DOD criteria for
characterizing irregularities and establishing common terminology makes
it difficult to compare and analyze data across services. Similarly,
the individual services' visibility over recruiting irregularities is
problematic. The individual services use multiple data collection
systems that are not integrated and their processes are decentralized,
which makes it difficult to produce a comprehensive and consolidated
report on recruiter irregularities. Moreover, the services do not track
all allegations of recruiter wrongdoing. Accordingly, service data
likely underestimate the true number of recruiter irregularities.
Although likely underestimated, the data the services reported to us
are instructive in that they show all categories of irregularities
increased from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005: allegations and
service-identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing increased from
almost 4,400 to about 6,600 cases; substantiated irregularities
increased from just over 400 to almost 630 cases; and criminal
violations more than doubled from just over 30 to almost 70 cases.
Without a management framework that provides guidance and specific
criteria to the services to track complete and reliable data, DOD and
the services are not in a position to gauge the extent of recruiter
irregularities or when corrective action is needed, nor is the
department in a sound position to assure Congress and the general
public that it knows the full extent to which recruiter irregularities
are occurring.
A number of factors within the current recruiting environment may
contribute to recruiting irregularities. For example, service
recruiting command officials stated that the economy has been the
single most important factor recently affecting recruiting success.
According to Department of Labor data, the unemployment rate fell each
year between 2003 (when it was 6 percent) and 2005 (when it was 5.1
percent). The better the civilian job market, the harder DOD must
compete for talent. Also, almost three-quarters of active duty
recruiters responding to the department's 2005 internal survey believed
that ongoing hostilities in Iraq made it hard for them to achieve their
goals.[Footnote 4] These factors, in addition to the typical challenges
of the job, such as long, demanding work hours and pressure to meet
monthly goals, may lead to recruiter irregularities. Moreover,
performance measures vary among the services. The Army, Navy, and Air
Force measure recruiter performance primarily by the number of recruits
who enlist and report to basic training, rather than the number who
complete basic training, while the Marine Corps uses basic training
attrition rates as a key component of the recruiter's performance
evaluation. This criterion may deter Marine Corps recruiters from
committing recruiter violations because they are expected to perform
more rigorous screening of applicants to prevent them from recruiting
someone who cannot complete basic training and avoid the requirement to
recruit an additional applicant. DOD's Military Entrance Processing
Command data show, in fact, that Marine Corps applicants have a lower
rate of attrition throughout the recruiting process than the other
services. Other Military Entrance Processing Command data from its
Chicago station suggest that recruiter irregularities increase as the
end of monthly recruiting cycles near. In our January 1997 and January
1998 reports on military recruiting,[Footnote 5] we recommended that
the services link recruiter awards and incentives more closely to
recruits' successful completion of basic training. Although DOD
concurred with our recommendation, it has not made this a requirement
across the services. Recruiter irregularities can result in wasted
taxpayer dollars when ineligible applicants are recruited and processed
through a military entrance processing station, begin basic training,
but do not enter military service.
The services have procedures in place, provided in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and service regulations, to investigate allegations of
recruiter irregularities and to prosecute and discipline recruiters
found guilty of violating recruiting policies and procedures. Each
service recruiting command has a designated investigative authority to
handle allegations and service-identified incidents of irregularities,
and the services' respective Judge Advocates have primary
responsibility for adjudicating criminal violations of the recruiting
process. Each commander in the recruiter's chain of command has the
discretion to dispose of offenses within the limits of that commander's
authority and parameters of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. To
help recruiters better understand the nature and consequences of
committing irregularities in the recruitment process, all services use
available information on recruiter wrongdoing to update their recruiter
training. This information includes results of internal inspection
programs and routine recruiter discipline reports. The services also
react to reassure public confidence in the recruiting process when
specific incidents or reports of recruiter irregularities become widely
known.
We are making recommendations that would improve DOD's visibility over
recruiting irregularities and require the services to develop systems
and processes that better capture and integrate data on allegations and
service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities. We are also
recommending that the Military Entrance Processing Command provide
information on recruiter irregularities to the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three
of our recommendations that address the need for an effective oversight
management framework to improve DOD's visibility over recruiter
irregularities, and partially concurred with our recommendation to
establish a reporting requirement across the services. DOD did not
concur with our recommendation for the Military Entrance Processing
Command to provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense with data on
recruiter irregularities. However, the department did not disagree with
the substance of these recommendations; rather, DOD indicated that it
would implement the recommendations if it determined such requirements
were necessary. DOD's comments and our evaluation of them are discussed
on page 36. DOD's comments are included in their entirety in appendix
II.
Background:
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
Defense, each military service (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force) has the responsibility to recruit and train a force to conduct
military operations.[Footnote 6] In fiscal year 2006, DOD committed
over $1.5 billion to its recruiting effort.[Footnote 7] Each service,
in turn, has established a recruiting command responsible for that
service's recruiting mission and functions.[Footnote 8] The services'
recruiting commands are similarly organized, in general, to accomplish
the recruiting mission. Figure 1 illustrates the organization of the
recruiting commands from the senior headquarters level through the
recruiting station where frontline recruiters work to contact
prospective applicants and sell them on military service.
Figure 1: Service Recruiting Command Organizational Chart:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis based on service-provided organizational
structures.
Notes: The Marine Corps organization also includes substations beneath
the recruiting station level where its frontline recruiters work. The
Department of the Air Force is the only military department in which
the recruiting commands for the active and reserve force are still
separate commands. The Air Force Reserve Command Recruiting Service is
similarly organized as the active component and is not depicted
separately.
[End of figure]
Each service has at least two levels of command between the senior
headquarters and the recruiting station where frontline recruiters work
to contact prospective applicants for military service. The Army
Brigades, Navy and Marine Corps Regions, and Air Force Groups are
subordinate commands of their service recruiting command and have
responsibility for recruiting operations in large portions of the
country. The Navy and Marine Corps organize their servicewide
recruiting commands into Eastern and Western Regions that more or less
divide responsibilities east and west of the Mississippi River. The
Army, in comparison, has five Brigades and the Air Force has four
Groups based regionally across the country that are responsible for
their recruiting operations. These commands are further divided into
local levels responsible for coordinating the frontline recruiting
efforts. These 41 Army Battalions, 26 Navy and 6 Marine Corps
Districts, and 28 Air Force Squadrons are generally organized around
market demographics, including population density and geographic
location. Finally, the 1,200 to 2,000 recruiting stations per service
or in the case of the Marine Corps--the substations--represent that
part of the recruiting organization with which the general public is
most familiar.
Of the approximately 22,000 total military recruiters in fiscal year
2006, almost 14,000 are frontline recruiters who are assigned a monthly
recruiting goal. The recruiter's monthly goal varies by service, but is
generally 2 recruits per month. The remaining recruiters--roughly
8,000--hold supervisory and staff positions throughout the services'
recruiting commands. Table 1 provides a summary of the average number
of recruiters by service for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 broken out
by total number of recruiters and frontline recruiters who have a
monthly recruiting goal.
Table 1: Summary of the Average Recruiters by Service for Fiscal Years
2002 through 2006:
Service: Army[A];
Total recruiters: 2002: 9,730;
Total recruiters: 2003: 9,481;
Total recruiters: 2004: 8,517;
Total recruiters: 2005: 9,637;
Total recruiters: 2006: 10,634;
Frontline recruiters: 2002: 6,367;
Frontline recruiters: 2003: 6,078;
Frontline recruiters: 2004: 5,109;
Frontline recruiters: 2005: 5,953;
Frontline recruiters: 2006: 6,484.
Service: Navy;
Total recruiters: 2002: 5,835;
Total recruiters: 2003: 5,738;
Total recruiters: 2004: 5,016;
Total recruiters: 2005: 5,141;
Total recruiters: 2006: 4,936;
Frontline recruiters: 2002: 4,714;
Frontline recruiters: 2003: 4,617;
Frontline recruiters: 2004: 4,617;
Frontline recruiters: 2005: 3,365;
Frontline recruiters: 2006: 3,383.
Service: Marine Corps;
Total recruiters: 2002: 3,401;
Total recruiters: 2003: 3,494;
Total recruiters: 2004: 3,287;
Total recruiters: 2005: 3,343;
Total recruiters: 2006: 3,641;
Frontline recruiters: 2002: 2,650;
Frontline recruiters: 2003: 2,650;
Frontline recruiters: 2004: 2,650;
Frontline recruiters: 2005: 2,650;
Frontline recruiters: 2006: 2,650.
Service: Air Force;
Total recruiters: 2002: 2,942;
Total recruiters: 2003: 2,956;
Total recruiters: 2004: 2,940;
Total recruiters: 2005: 2,990;
Total recruiters: 2006: 2,800;
Frontline recruiters: 2002: 1,574;
Frontline recruiters: 2003: 1,494;
Frontline recruiters: 2004: 1,460;
Frontline recruiters: 2005: 1,453;
Frontline recruiters: 2006: 1,412.
Service: Total;
Total recruiters: 2002: 21,908;
Total recruiters: 2003: 21,669;
Total recruiters: 2004: 19,760;
Total recruiters: 2005: 21,111;
Total recruiters: 2006: 22,011;
Frontline recruiters: 2002: 15,305;
Frontline recruiters: 2003: 14,839;
Frontline recruiters: 2004: 13,836;
Frontline recruiters: 2005: 13,421;
Frontline recruiters: 2006: 13,929.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
[A] The number of Army recruiters includes civilian contract
recruiters.
[End of table]
A typical frontline military recruiter is generally a midlevel enlisted
noncommissioned officer in the rank of Army and Marine Corps Sergeant
(E-5) or Staff Sergeant (E-6), Navy Petty Officer Second Class (E-5) or
First Class (E-6), and Air Force Staff Sergeant (E-5) or Technical
Sergeant (E-6), who is between the ages of 25 and 30 years old and has
between 5 and 10 years of military service. While some frontline
recruiters volunteer for recruiting as a career enhancement, others are
selected from among those the services have identified as their best
performers in their primary military specialties. All services have
comprehensive selection processes in place and specific eligibility
criteria for recruiting duty. For example, recruiters must meet service
appearance standards, have a stable family situation, be able to speak
without any impairment, and be financially responsible. The services
screen all prospective recruiters by interviewing and conducting
personality assessments and ensuring the prospective recruiters meet
all criteria.
To augment its uniformed recruiters, the Army also uses contract
civilian recruiters, and has been doing so under legislative authority
since fiscal year 2001. This pilot program, which authorizes the Army
to use civilian contractors, will run through fiscal year 2007. The
goal of the program is to test the effectiveness of civilian
recruiters. If civilian recruiters prove effective, this would allow
the Army to retain more noncommissioned officers in their primary
military specialties within the warfighting force. Currently, the Army
is using almost 370 contract civilian recruiters, representing
approximately 3 percent of the Army's total recruiting force.
In general, training for frontline recruiters is similar in all
services and has focused on ethics and salesmanship, with a growing
emphasis placed on leadership and mentoring skills to attract today's
applicant. Each service conducts specialized training for approximately
6 weeks for noncommissioned officers assigned as recruiters.[Footnote
9] The number of hours of training time specifically devoted to ethics
training as a component of the recruiter training curriculum ranges
from 5 hours in the Navy to 34 hours of instruction in the Army.
After recruiters successfully convince applicants on the benefits of
joining the military, they complete a prescreening of the applicant,
which includes an initial background review and a physical and moral
assessment of the applicant's eligibility for military service. After
the recruiter's prescreening, the military pays for the applicant to
travel to 1 of 65 military entrance processing stations (MEPS) located
throughout the country. At the processing stations, which are under the
direction of DOD's Military Entrance Processing Command, processing
station staff administer the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery, a test to determine whether the applicant is qualified for
enlistment and a military job specialty,[Footnote 10] and conduct a
medical examination to determine whether the applicant meets physical
entrance standards. After the processing station staff determine that
an applicant is qualified, the applicant signs an enlistment contract
and is sworn into the service and enters the delayed entry program.
When an applicant enters the delayed entry program, he or she becomes a
member of the Individual Ready Reserve, in an unpaid status, until
reporting for basic training. An individual may remain in the delayed
entry program for 1 day up to 1 year. Just before reporting for basic
training, the applicant returns to the processing station, undergoes a
brief physical examination, and is sworn into the military.
Figure 2, in general, illustrates the recruiting process from a
recruiter's initial contact with a prospective applicant to the
applicant's successful graduation from the service's initial training
school, commonly referred to as basic training.
Figure 2: The Recruiting Process:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of service-provided recruiting process depictions.
[End of figure]
DOD and the Services Have Limited Visibility over Recruiter
Irregularities:
DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to
which recruiter irregularities are occurring. The Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Personnel and Readiness has the
responsibility for overseeing the recruiting program. However, OUSD has
not established a framework to conduct oversight of recruiter
irregularities and provide guidance requiring the services to maintain
data on recruiter wrongdoing. Although not required by OUSD to do so,
the services require their recruiting commands to maintain data for 2
years; the Army Recruiting Command maintains data for 3 years and can
retrieve case files back to fiscal year 1998. Furthermore, OUSD has not
established criteria for the services to characterize recruiter
irregularities or developed common terminology for irregularities.
Accordingly, the services use different terminology, which makes it
difficult to compare and analyze data across the services. Moreover,
each of the services uses multiple systems for maintaining data that
are not integrated and decentralized processes for identifying and
tracking allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter
irregularities. Perhaps most significantly, none of the services
accounts for all allegations or incidents of recruiter irregularities.
Therefore, service data likely underestimate the true number of
recruiter irregularities. Nevertheless, our analysis of service data
suggests that most allegations are not substantiated.
DOD Lacks an Oversight Framework to Provide Guidance on Recruiter
Irregularities, and Has Not Established Criteria to Characterize
Irregularities:
Effective federal managers continually assess and evaluate their
programs to provide accountability and to assure that they are well
designed and operated, appropriately updated to meet changing
conditions, and achieving program objectives. Specifically, managers
need to examine internal control to determine how well it is
performing, how it may be improved, and the degree to which it helps
identify and address major risks for fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement. According to the mission statement for the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, its
responsibilities include reviewing and evaluating plans and programs to
ensure adherence to approved policies and standards, including DOD's
recruitment program. OUSD officials stated that they review service
recruiter irregularity issues infrequently usually in response to a
congressional inquiry, and they do not perform oversight of recruiter
irregularities. OUSD has not issued guidance requiring the services to
maintain data on recruiter irregularities. Nevertheless, the services
require their recruiting commands to maintain data on recruiter
irregularities for 2 years; the Army Recruiting Command maintains data
for 3 years and can retrieve case files dating back to fiscal year
1998.
Moreover, OUSD has not established or provided criteria to the services
for how they should characterize various recruiter irregularities and
has not developed common terminology because it responds to individual
inquiries and, in general, uses the terminology of the service in
question. Accordingly, the services use different terminology to refer
to recruiter irregularities. How the services categorize the
irregularity affects how they maintain data on recruiter
irregularities. For example, the Army uses the term impropriety while
the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force use the term malpractice to
characterize the intentional enlistment of an unqualified applicant.
Only the Army uses the term recruiter error to describe those
irregularities not resulting from malicious intent or gross negligence.
Consequently, if DOD were to require services to report on recruiter
wrongdoing, the Army might not include its recruiter error category
because these cases are not willful violations of recruiting policies
and procedures and the Army does not identify such cases as
substantiated or unsubstantiated in their data system. The Air Force
uses the term procedural error to refer to an irregularity occurring as
a result of an administrative error by the recruiter due to lack of
knowledge or inattention to detail. If DOD were to require services to
report on recruiter wrongdoing, the Air Force might not include its
procedural error category because these cases are not intentional acts
to facilitate the recruiting process for an ineligible applicant. In
both cases, however, wasted taxpayer dollars result; unintentional
recruiter errors can have the same effect as intentional recruiter
irregularities because both result in inefficiencies in the recruiting
process.
DOD's need for oversight may become more critical if the department
decides to rely more heavily on civilian contract recruiters in the
future. As we previously stated, the civilian recruiter pilot program
currently authorizes the Army to use civilian recruiters, through
fiscal year 2007, to test their effectiveness. Future reliance on
civilian recruiters, in any service, would allow a service to retain
more noncommissioned officers in their primary military specialties.
However, OUSD would also need to be in a position to assure that this
type of change is well designed and operated, and that its recruiting
programs are appropriately updated to reflect a change in recruiting
operations.
Each Service Uses Systems That Are Not Integrated and Do Not Allow the
Services to Readily Report All Recruiter Irregularities:
None of the services can readily provide a comprehensive and
consolidated report on recruiter irregularities within their own
service because they use multiple systems that are not integrated.
Currently, the services use systems that range from electronic
databases to hard-copy paper files to track recruiter irregularities
and do not have a central database dedicated to compiling, monitoring,
and archiving information about recruiter irregularities. When we asked
officials in each of the services for a comprehensive report of
recruiter irregularities that occurred within their own service, they
were unable to readily provide these data. Officials had to query and
compile data from separate systems. For example, the Navy Recruiting
Command had to access paper files for allegations of recruiter
irregularities, while the Air Force Judge Advocate provided information
from an electronic database from which we were able to extract cases
specifically related to recruiter irregularities.
Furthermore, the services cannot assure the reliability of their data
because the services lack standardized procedures for recording data,
their multiple systems use different formats for maintaining data, and
in some instances the services do not conduct quality reviews or edit
checks of the data. The services used the following systems to maintain
data on recruiter irregularities at the time of our review:
* Army: The Army maintains three separate data systems that contain
information about recruiter irregularities. The Army Recruiting
Command's Enlistment Standards Division has a database that houses
recruiting irregularities that pertain to applicant eligibility. The
Army Recruiting Command Inspector General maintains a separate database
that houses other irregularities, including recruiter misconduct that
may result in nonjudicial punishment. The Judge Advocate maintains hard-
copy case files for recruiter irregularities that are criminal
violations of the recruiting process that may result in judicial
punishment.
* Navy: The Navy maintains four separate data systems that contain
information about recruiter irregularities. The Naval Inspector
General, the Navy Bureau of Personnel Inspector General, and the Navy
Recruiting Command Inspector General all maintain some data on
allegations of recruiter irregularities. The Naval Criminal
Investigative Service investigates and maintains data on Navy criminal
recruiting violations.
* Marine Corps: The Marine Corps Recruiting Command maintains two
systems that track information on recruiting irregularities, one that
captures reported allegations and another that only tracks the
disposition of allegations and service-identified incidents that a
commander or recruiting official at some level in the recruiting
command structure determined to merit an inquiry or investigation. The
Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigates and maintains data on
Marine Corps criminal recruiting violations.
* Air Force: The Air Force maintains three separate databases with
information about recruiter irregularities. The Air Force Recruiting
Service Inspector General maintains a database that houses data on
allegations of recruiter irregularities. The liaison from the Air Force
Recruiting Service, located at the Air Force basic training site,
maintains data within a separate electronic system on allegations of
recruiter irregularities that applicants raise about their recruiters
when they report to basic training. The Air Force Judge Advocate
maintains a database containing criminal violations of recruiting
practices and procedures.[Footnote 11]
At the time of our review, Navy officials told us they believe there is
value in having servicewide visibility over the recruiting process and
they plan to improve their systems for maintaining data on recruiter
irregularities. Navy officials stated that the Navy Bureau of Personnel
Inspector General is working with the Navy Recruiting Command Inspector
General and the Naval Education and Training Command to develop a
system that maintains recruiting and training data that will include
allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter
irregularities. Marine Corps officials told us they are in the process
of improving their systems for maintaining data on recruiter
irregularities by merging all data on allegations and service-
identified incidents of recruiter irregularities into one database that
can be accessed at all command levels of the Marine Corps Recruiting
Command. An Air Force official told us that as a result of our review,
the Air Force modified its system for capturing allegations and service-
identified incidents surfacing at basic training by improving its
ability to query the system for information on the type of allegation
or incident and whether or not it was a substantiated case of recruiter
wrongdoing.
Services' Decentralized Processes Do Not Allow Them to Account for All
Recruiter Irregularities:
Where and how an irregularity is identified will often determine where
and how it will be resolved. The services identify an allegation or
incident of recruiter wrongdoing in a number of ways. These include
input from service hotlines, internal inspections, congressional
inquiries, and data collected by DOD's Military Entrance Processing
Command. The services' recruiting command headquarters typically handle
allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter
irregularities that surface through any of these means during the
recruiting process. At other times, allegations surface in the
recruiting process at command levels below the service recruiting
command headquarters, and commanders at the Army Battalion, Navy and
Marine Corps District, and Air Force Squadron level handle allegations
that typically surface during supervisory reviews at the recruiting
stations and substations. We were unable to determine the extent of
these allegations, however, because the service recruiting commands do
not maintain complete data. For example, Military Entrance Processing
Command officials, responsible for assessing an applicant's moral,
mental, and physical eligibility for military service, stated that they
forward all allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter
irregularities that surface during the screening process at the
military entrance processing station to the services' recruiting
commanders. However, officials also stated that the services'
recruiting commanders do not provide feedback to them regarding the
disposition of these cases. In fact, the services' recruiting command
headquarters data did not show records of allegations and service-
identified incidents of recruiter irregularities received from the
Military Entrance Processing Command.
Additionally, each service provides applicants an opportunity to
disclose any special circumstances relating to their enlistment
process, including allegations of recruiter wrongdoing, when they enter
basic training. Army and Air Force officials told us that they record
all allegations of recruiter irregularities made by applicants at basic
training. Army Recruiting Command officials stated that liaison
officers at each of the basic training installations forward all
allegations received from applicants to the Army Recruiting Command
Enlisted Standards Division to record in its database. The Air Force
implemented a new database in fiscal year 2005 specifically to record
and resolve all allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter wrongdoing that surface at basic training. The Navy and
Marine Corps, on the other hand, do not record all allegations of
recruiter irregularities made by applicants at basic training.
* Navy: The Navy gives applicants a final opportunity to disclose any
irregularity that they believe occurred in their recruiting process
when they arrive at basic training. The Recruiting Command Inspector
General has the authority to investigate allegations or service-
identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing and uses its Navy Recruit
Quality Assurance Team to conduct the final Navy recruiting quality
assurance check before applicants begin basic training. In turn, the
Assurance Team generates reports on allegations raised by applicants
who claim they were misled during the recruiting process and submits
its reports to the Navy Recruiting Command Inspector General. Navy
recruiting command officials explained that the Inspector General
investigates those allegations that the Assurance Team, based on the
professional judgment and experience of its team members, recommends
for further investigation. The Navy Recruiting Command Inspector
General, however, does not maintain data on allegations that it does
not investigate. The Assurance Team also sends its reports to the Navy
Recruiting District Commanders who are responsible for overseeing the
recruiters who appear on the reports. The District Commanders use the
Assurance Team's reports to monitor recruiter wrongdoing. Again,
however, the District Commanders do not provide feedback to the
Assurance Team as to how they resolve these allegations, nor do they
report this information to the Navy Recruiting Command Inspector
General unless they deem the case to merit further investigation or
judicial processing. Moreover, the Assurance Team members do not record
allegations of wrongdoing as a recruiter irregularity in those cases
where they can easily resolve the discrepancy by granting an applicant
an enlistment waiver to begin basic training. Assurance Team officials
told us that they believe that some recruiters encourage applicants to
conceal potentially disqualifying information until they arrive at
basic training because the recruiters perceive that it is relatively
easy to process a waiver at basic training. In addition, these same
officials told us that this behavior saves recruiters the burden of
collecting supporting documentation and expedites the time it takes a
recruiter to sign a contract with an applicant and complete the
recruiting process.
* Marine Corps: The Marine Corps also gives applicants a final
opportunity to disclose any irregularity that they believe occurred in
their recruiting process prior to beginning basic training. However,
the Marine Corps' Eastern and Western Recruiting Region staff use
different criteria to handle allegations of recruiter irregularities
that they cannot corroborate. Recruiting staff at the Eastern Region
basic training site in Parris Island, South Carolina, enter all
allegations applicants make against recruiters, while recruiting staff
at the Western Region basic training site in San Diego, California,
only enter those allegations that a third party can verify. A Marine
Corps Recruiting Command official told us that, as a result of our
review, Marine Corps officials discussed accounting procedures for
allegations of recruiter irregularities at the command's national
operations conference held in May 2006. The official further stated
that the Marine Corps Recruiting Command's goal is to standardize
procedures to account for all allegations of recruiter irregularities.
Although Likely Underestimated, Service Data Suggest Most Allegations
Are Not Substantiated:
Existing data suggest that substantiated cases of recruiter wrongdoing
make up a small percent of all allegations and service-identified
incidents, although, for reasons previously cited, we believe the
service data likely underestimate the true number of recruiter
irregularities. Substantiated cases of recruiter irregularities are
those cases in which the services determined a recruiter violated
recruiting policies or procedures based on a review of the facts of the
case. (A more detailed discussion of the procedures that are in place
to address substantiated cases of recruiter irregularity are discussed
later in this report.) While the services cannot assure that they have
a complete accounting of recruiter irregularities, the data that they
reported to us are instructive in that they show the number of
allegations, substantiated cases, and criminal violations increased
overall from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005. At the same time,
the number of accessions into the military decreased from just under
250,000 in fiscal year 2004 to about 215,000 in fiscal year 2005.
Table 2 shows that, DOD-wide, the services substantiated about 10
percent of all allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities. The services categorized cases as
substantiated when the preponderance of the evidence supported the
allegation of wrongdoing against a recruiter. Similarly, the services
categorized cases as unsubstantiated when the preponderance of the
evidence did not support the allegation against a recruiter.
Table 2: Recruiter Irregularities by Service for Fiscal Years 2004 and
2005 That Are Unsubstantiated, Substantiated, or Other[A]:
FY 2004;
Army;
Irregularities[B]: 1,037;
Unsubstantiated: 682 (66%);
Substantiated: 121 (12%);
Other[C]: 234 (23%).
FY 2004;
Navy;
Irregularities[B]: 1,482;
Unsubstantiated: 296 (20);
Substantiated: 245 (17);
Other[C]: 941 (63).
FY 2004;
Marine Corps;
Irregularities[B]: 1,840;
Unsubstantiated: 162 (9);
Substantiated: 28 (2);
Other[C]: 1,650 (90).
FY 2004;
Air Force;
Irregularities[B]: 29;
Unsubstantiated: 14 (48);
Substantiated: 15 (52);
Other[C]: 0.
FY 2004;
Total;
Irregularities[B]: 4,388;
Unsubstantiated: 1,154 (26%);
Substantiated: 409 (9%);
Other[C]: 2,825 (64%).
FY 2005;
Army;
Irregularities[B]: 913;
Unsubstantiated: 551(60);
Substantiated: 123 (13);
Other[C]: 239 (26).
FY 2005;
Navy;
Irregularities[B]: 2,397;
Unsubstantiated: 513 (21);
Substantiated: 226 (9);
Other[C]: 1,658 (69).
FY 2005;
Marine Corps;
Irregularities[B]: 1,877;
Unsubstantiated: 227 (12);
Substantiated: 32 (2);
Other[C]: 1,582 (84).
FY 2005;
Air Force[D];
Irregularities[B]: 1,415;
Unsubstantiated: 127 (9);
Substantiated: 248 (18);
Other[C]: 1,034 (73).
FY 2005;
Total;
Irregularities[B]: 6,602;
Unsubstantiated: 1,418 (21%);
Substantiated: 629 (10%);
Other[C]: 4,513 (68%).
Source: GAO analysis based on information provided by the services.
[A] Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.
[B] Data include allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities for both the active and reserve components.
For the purpose of this report, we combined the Air Force active and
reserve data because the Air Force is the only service that has
separate active and reserve recruiting commands and therefore maintains
these data separately.
[C] Army data we categorized as other includes those irregularities
that the Army has defined as unintentional recruiter error and cases of
unresolved intentional recruiter misconduct, which were forwarded to
either the Army Recruiting Command Inspector General for investigation
or Judge Advocate for judicial processing. Navy data that we
categorized as other are uncorroborated allegations recorded by the
Navy's Recruit Quality Assurance Team and not investigated. Marine
Corps data we categorized as other are those allegations that Marine
Corps officials determined not to merit an official investigation
following a preliminary review and therefore did not report as either
substantiated or unsubstantiated allegations. Air Force data that we
categorized as other include those cases where the Air Force determined
someone other than the applicant or the recruiter to be at fault.
[D] Some of the increase in Air Force irregularities is at least
partially a result of implementing a new tracking system in fiscal year
2005 that now captures allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities, and other issues that surface at basic
training.
[End of table]
Table 3 shows the number of recruiter irregularities that were criminal
violations of the recruiting process and addressed by the services'
Judge Advocate or criminal investigative service. The number of
criminal violations in the recruiting process increased in fiscal year
2005; however, in both fiscal years, this number represented
approximately 1 percent of all allegations and service-identified
incidents of recruiter irregularities. The large increase in the number
of Navy cases in fiscal year 2005 is likely a result of a special
investigation where four cases led to nine additional cases of criminal
wrongdoing.
Table 3: Cases of Recruiter Criminal Violations in Fiscal Years 2004
and 2005 by Service:
Service: Army;
FY 2004: 19;
FY 2005: 38.
Service: Navy;
FY 2004: 1;
FY 2005: 13.
Service: Marine Corps;
FY 2004: 0;
FY 2005: 2.
Service: Air Force;
FY 2004: 11;
FY 2005: 12.
Service: Total;
FY 2004: 33;
FY 2005: 68.
Source: GAO analysis based on information provided by the services.
[End of table]
Table 4 shows that on average, the percentage of substantiated cases of
recruiter wrongdoing compared to the number of actual accessions was
under 1 percent in each service during the past 2 fiscal years.
Table 4: Substantiated Irregularities as a Percentage of Actual
Accessions by Service for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005:
Service: Army;
FY 2004: Accessions: 110,296;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 121 (0.11%);
FY 2005: Accessions: 97,232;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 123 (0.13%).
Service: Navy;
FY 2004: Accessions: 51,117;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 245 (0.48);
FY 2005: Accessions: 47,491;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 226 (0.48).
Service: Marine Corps;
FY 2004: Accessions: 38,866;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 28 (0.07);
FY 2005: Accessions: 41,311;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 32 (0.08).
Service: Air Force[B];
FY 2004: Accessions: 43,265;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 15 (0.03);
FY 2005: Accessions: 29,164;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 248 (0.85).
Service: Total;
FY 2004: Accessions: 243,544;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 409 (0.17%);
FY 2005: Accessions: 215,198;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 629 (0.29%).
Source: GAO analysis based on information provided by the services.
Accessions data obtained from GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action
Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel Recruitment and Retention
Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).
[A] Data include substantiated allegations and service-identified
incidents of recruiter irregularities for both the active and reserve
components. For the purpose of this report, we combined the Air Force
active and reserve data as the Air Force is the only service that has
separate active and reserve recruiting commands and therefore maintains
these data separately.
[B] Some of the increase in Air Force data is at least partially a
result of implementing of a new tracking system in fiscal year 2005
that now captures allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities, and other issues that surface at basic
training.
[End of table]
Table 5 shows that when we compared the number of substantiated cases
of recruiter wrongdoing to the number of frontline recruiters, 4.7
percent of recruiters would have had a substantiated case against them
in fiscal year 2005 if each recruiter who committed an irregularity had
committed only one. (However, this is not to say that 4.7 percent of
frontline recruiters committed an irregularity, given that some
recruiters may have committed more than one irregularity).
Table 5: Irregularities as a Percentage of Recruiters by Service for
Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005:
Service: Army;
FY 2004: Recruiters: 5,109;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 121 (2.4%);
FY 2005: Recruiters: 5,953;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 123 (2.1%).
Service: Navy;
FY 2004: Recruiters: 4,617;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 245 (5.3);
FY 2005: Recruiters: 3,365;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 226 (6.7).
Service: Marine Corps;
FY 2004: Recruiters: 2,650;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 28 (1.1);
FY 2005: Recruiters: 2,650;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 32 (1.2).
Service: Air Force[B];
FY 2004: Recruiters: 1,460;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 15 (1.0);
FY 2005: Recruiters: 1,453;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 248 (17.1).
Service: Total;
FY 2004: Recruiters: 13,836;
FY 2004: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 409 (3.0%);
FY 2005: Recruiters: 13,421;
FY 2005: Substantiated irregularities[A]: 629 (4.7%).
Source: GAO analysis based on information provided by the services.
Data on recruiters obtained from DOD.
[A] Data include allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities for both the active and reserve components.
For the purpose of this report, we combined the Air Force active and
reserve data as the Air Force is the only service that has separate
active and reserve recruiting commands and therefore maintains these
data separately.
[B] Some of the increase in Air Force irregularities is at least
partially a result of implementing a new tracking system in fiscal year
2005 that now captures allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities, and other issues that surface at basic
training.
[End of table]
Without an oversight framework to provide complete and reliable data,
DOD and the services are not in a position to gauge the extent of
recruiter irregularities or when corrective action is needed, nor is
the department in a sound position to give Congress and the general
public assurance that recruiter irregularities are being addressed.
Many Factors May Affect the Recruiting Environment:
A number of factors within the current recruiting environment may
contribute to recruiting irregularities. Such factors include the
economy, ongoing hostilities in Iraq, and fewer applicants who can meet
military entrance standards. These factors, coupled with the typical
difficulties of the job and pressure to meet monthly recruiting goals,
challenge the recruiter and can lead to recruiter irregularities in the
recruiting process. Data show that as the end of the monthly recruiting
cycle draws near, the number of recruiter irregularities may increase.
Many Factors Contribute to a Challenging Recruiting Environment:
Among a number of factors that contribute to a challenging recruiting
environment are the current economic situation and the ongoing
hostilities in Iraq. Service recruiting officials told us that the
state of the economy, specifically the low unemployment rate, has had
the single largest effect recently on meeting recruiting goals. These
officials stated DOD must compete harder for qualified talent to join
the military when the economy is strong. According to U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the national unemployment
rate fell each year between 2003 (when it was at 6 percent) and 2005
(when it was 5.1 percent). In fiscal year 2005, three of the eight
active and reserve components we reviewed--the Army, Army Reserve, and
Navy Reserve--failed to meet their recruiting goals.
Recruiters also believe that the ongoing hostilities in Iraq have made
their job harder. Results of a DOD internal survey show that almost
three-quarters of active duty recruiters agreed with the statement that
current military operations made it hard for them to achieve recruiting
goals and missions.[Footnote 12] Recruiters we interviewed expressed
the same opinion. DOD has found that the public's perceptions about
military enlistment have changed because youth and their parents
believe that deployment to a hostile environment is very likely for
servicemembers with some types of military specialties.[Footnote 13]
Officials further stated that adults who influence a prospective
applicant's decision about whether to join the military are
increasingly fearful of the possibility of death or serious injury to
the applicant.
Recruiters also must overcome specific factors that routinely make
their job hard. Recruiters told us that their work hours were dictated
by the schedules of prospective high school applicants, which meant
working most evenings and weekends. Almost three-quarters of active
duty recruiters who responded to DOD's survey stated that they worked
more than 60 hours a week on recruiting or recruiting-related duties.
Other factors that affect the recruiting environment include a
recruiter's location and access to eligible applicants. For example,
service officials stated that it was easier to recruit in or near
locations with a military presence. Recruiters also have difficulty
finding eligible applicants. DOD researchers have estimated that over
half of U.S. youth aged 16 to 21 are ineligible to join the military
because they cannot meet DOD or service entry standards.[Footnote 14]
DOD officials stated that the inability to meet medical and physical
requirements accounts for much of the reason youth are ineligible for
military service. Additionally, many youth are ineligible because they
cannot meet service standards for education, as indicated by DOD's
preference for recruits with a high school diploma; mental aptitude, as
indicated by receipt of an acceptable score on the armed forces
vocational aptitude test; and moral character, as indicated by few or
no criminal convictions or antisocial behavior. All of these factors
contribute to a difficult recruiting environment that is challenging
for recruiters to succeed.
Pressure to meet monthly goals contributes to recruiter
dissatisfaction. Over 50 percent of active duty military recruiters
responding to the 2005 internal DOD survey stated that they were
dissatisfied with their jobs. Approximately two-thirds of Army
recruiters reported that they were dissatisfied with recruiting, while
over a third of Air Force recruiters stated they were dissatisfied. The
Navy and Marine Corps rates of recruiter dissatisfaction fell within
these extremes, with just under half of Navy and Marine Corps
recruiters reporting that they were dissatisfied with their jobs. When
asked in this same survey if they would select another assignment if
they had the freedom to do so, over three-quarters of active duty DOD
recruiters said they would not remain in recruiting.
On the one hand, the services expect recruiters to recruit fully
qualified personnel; while on the other hand, the services primarily
evaluate recruiters' performance on the number of contracts they write,
which corresponds to the number of applicants who enter the delayed
entry program each month. In 2005, over two-thirds of those active duty
recruiters responding to the internal DOD survey believed that their
success in making their monthly quota for enlistment contracts had a
make-or-break effect on their military career. Over 80 percent of
Marine Corps recruiters held that opinion, as did almost two-thirds of
Army and over half of Air Force recruiters. Navy officials stated that
individual recruiters are not tasked with a monthly goal; rather, the
goal belongs to the recruiting station as a whole. Still, approximately
two-thirds of Navy recruiters responding to DOD's survey indicated they
felt their careers were affected by their success in making their
individual recruiting goal. The recruiters who we interviewed also
believed their careers were affected by how successful they were in
achieving monthly recruiting goals.
Recruiter Evaluations Are Linked to Monthly Recruiting Results:
Recruiters, like all servicemembers, receive performance evaluations at
least once a year. Our review of service performance evaluations and
conversations with the services' recruiting command officials show that
Army, Navy, and Air Force recruiter evaluations are not directly linked
to an applicant successfully completing his or her service's basic
training course. Instead, we found that the Army, Navy, and Air Force
generally evaluate recruiters on their ability to achieve their monthly
goal to write contracts to bring applicants into the delayed entry
program. The Army's civilian contractor recruiters, for example,
receive approximately 75 percent of their monetary compensation for
recruiting an applicant when that applicant enters the delayed entry
program and the remaining 25 percent of their compensation when the
applicant begins basic training. The Army's contract, therefore, does
not tie compensation to the applicant's successful completion of basic
training and joining the Army. Even though Navy officials told us that
recruiters do not have individual goals because the monthly mission is
assigned to the recruiting station, Navy performance metrics include
data on the number of contracts written. However, the Navy does not
hold recruiters directly accountable for attrition rates from either
the delayed entry program or basic training.
Marine Corps recruiters, unlike recruiters in the other services, are
held accountable when an applicant does not complete basic training and
remain responsible for recruiting an additional applicant to replace
the former basic trainee. Marine Corps recruiter evaluation performance
standards measure both the number of contracts written each month as
well as attrition rates of applicants from the delayed entry program
and basic training. Marine Corps Recruiting Command officials stated
that they believe their practice of holding recruiters accountable for
attrition rates helps to limit irregularities because recruiters are
likely to perform more rigorous prescreening of applicants to ensure
that a recruit is likely to complete Marine Corps basic training. In
fact, Military Entrance Processing Command data show that Marine Corps
recruiters have been the most consistently successful of all service
recruiters at prescreening and processing applicants through their
initial physical assessments, subsequently maintaining applicants'
physical eligibility while in the delayed entry program, and finally
ensuring that applicants pass the final physical assessment and enter
basic training. Table 6 shows the low medical disqualification rate of
the Marine Corps in comparison with the other services.
Table 6: Disqualifications by Service from Fiscal Year 2003 through
Fiscal Year 2005:
Percentage of total Military Entrance Processing Station medical
disqualifications.
Army;
2003: 6.3;
2004: 4.6;
2005: 4.7.
Navy;
2003: 5.0;
2004: 3.3;
2005: 3.7.
Marine Corps;
2003: 3.9;
2004: 2.6;
2005: 2.4.
Air Force;
2003: 4.9;
2004: 3.6;
2005: 4.1.
Source: GAO analysis of Military Entrance Processing Command data.
Note: Applicants who were disqualified but were able to obtain a
medical waiver are not included in the percent of disqualifications.
[End of table]
In addition to performance evaluations, the services provide awards to
recruiters that are generally based on the number of contracts that a
recruiter writes, rather than on the number of applicants that graduate
from basic training and join the military. We reported in 1998 that
only the Marine Corps and the Navy used recruits' basic training
graduation rates as key criteria when evaluating recruiters for
awards.[Footnote 15] Recruiters in some services and other service
recruiting command officials stated their belief that recruiters who
write large numbers of contracts over and above their monthly quota are
almost always rewarded. Such rewards can include medals and trophies
for recruiter of the month, quarter, or year; preferential duty
stations for their next assignment; incentives such as paid vacations;
and meritorious promotion to the next rank.
When unqualified applicants are recruited or when applicants who lack
eligibility documentation are processed through the military entrance
processing station in the effort to satisfy end-of-month recruiting
cycle goals, wasted taxpayer dollars result. For example, the Army
spends approximately $17,000 to recruit and process one applicant, and
as much as $57,500 to recruit and train that applicant through basic
training.
We continue to believe our 1997 and 1998 recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense have merit. Specifically, we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense require all the services to review and revise
their recruiter performance evaluation and award systems to strengthen
incentives for recruiters to thoroughly prescreen applicants and to
more closely link recruiting quotas to applicants' successful
completion of basic training. The department concurred with our
recommendations in order to enhance recruiter success and help
recruiters focus on DOD's strategic retention goal, and it indicated
that the Secretary of Defense would instruct the services to link
recruiter awards more closely to recruits' successful completion of
basic training. Our review shows that the Army, Navy, and Air Force
have not implemented this recommendation.
Recruiter Irregularities May Increase as the Deadline to Meet Monthly
Goals Nears:
DOD Military Entrance Processing Command officials told us that they
believe data from the Chicago military entrance processing station for
the first 6 months of fiscal year 2006 indicate that it may be possible
to anticipate when irregularities may occur. While service data show
that the numbers of irregularities that occur in the recruiting process
are relatively small when compared with the total number of applicants
that access into the military, the Chicago station data suggest that
recruiter irregularities increase as the end of the monthly recruiting
cycle nears and recruiting goals are tallied. The end-of-month
recruiting cycle for the Army occurs midmonth and data from DOD's
Chicago processing station show that irregularities peaked at the
midmonth point. Figure 3 illustrates the increase in recruiter
irregularities that occurred at the Chicago station at the end of the
Army's monthly recruiting cycle. We present Army data because the
Chicago station processes more applicants for the Army than it does for
the other services. However, Chicago station data show similar results
for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force.
Figure 3: Recruiter Irregularities Occurring at the End of the Army
Monthly Recruiting Cycles:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command data.
[End of figure]
When we asked U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command officials for
data from the other stations, they said that the other stations did not
maintain these data and that this data collection effort was the
initiative of the Chicago station commander. We believe these data can
be instructive and inform recruiting command officials whether monthly
goals have an adverse affect on recruiter behaviors, and if so, whether
actions to address increases in irregularities near the end of the
monthly recruiting cycle may be necessary.
Services Have Standard Procedures in Place for Administering Military
Justice to Address Recruiter Irregularities:
The services have standard procedures in place, provided in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and service regulations, to investigate
allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter
irregularities and to prosecute and discipline recruiters found guilty
of violating recruiting policies and procedures. Each service
recruiting command has a designated investigative authority to handle
allegations of irregularities, and the services' respective Judge
Advocates have primary responsibility for adjudicating criminal
violations of the recruitment process. Moreover, each service has
mechanisms by which to update its recruiter training as a result of
information on recruiter irregularities.
As previously discussed, the services identify allegations and service-
identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing in a number of ways.
Allegations made or discovered at the Army Battalion, Navy and Marine
Corps District, and Air Force Squadron command level are generally
resolved by that commander using administrative actions and nonjudicial
punishment under authority granted by the Uniformed Code of Military
Justice. The commander forwards allegations and service-identified
incidents of recruiter irregularities arising at that level that he or
she deems sufficiently egregious to require further investigation, or
as service regulations require, to the service recruiting command or to
the Judge Advocate for judicial processing of possible criminal
violations in the recruitment process.
Commanders in the service recruiting commands, like all commanders
throughout the military, exercise discretion in deciding whether a
servicemember should be charged with an offense, just as prosecutors do
in the civilian justice system. Army Battalion, Navy and Marine Corps
District, and Air Force Squadron commanders initiate a preliminary
inquiry into allegations of wrongdoing against recruiters after
receiving a report of a possible recruiter irregularity.[Footnote 16]
When the preliminary inquiry is complete, the commander must make a
decision on how to resolve the case. The commander can decide that no
action is warranted or take administrative action, such as a reprimand
or counseling. The commander can also decide to pursue nonjudicial
punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice,[Footnote 17] or refer the case to trial and decide what
charges will be brought against the recruiter.
Limitations in data we previously discussed prevent a thorough review
of how services discipline recruiters found guilty of violating
recruiting policies and procedures. In addition, we found that in some
cases, the services did not document the disciplinary action a
commander took against a recruiter. Even though service data are not
complete, data the Army provided allow us to illustrate the range of
disciplinary actions commanders may take to resolve cases of recruiter
irregularities. These actions range from counseling a recruiter for an
irregularity up to discharge from the Army. For example, in fiscal year
2005, Army data show that commanders imposed disciplinary actions
ranging from a verbal reprimand to court martial for recruiters who
concealed an applicant's medical information. Service recruiting
officials stated that the range of possible disciplinary actions a
commander may impose is mitigated by the circumstances of each case,
including the recruiter's overall service record, duty performance, and
number of irregularities the recruiter may have previously committed.
Table 7 summarizes disciplinary actions taken against Army recruiters
in the past 2 fiscal years for specific kinds of irregularities.
Table 7: All Army Allegations and Service-identified Incidents of
Recruiter Irregularities by Disciplinary Action for Fiscal Years 2004
and 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Army.
Note: Most of the cases in the disciplinary category identified as "No
action taken" were for allegations that were unsubstantiated and
service-identified incidents deemed as recruiter error in which the
Army determined no wrongdoing occurred.
[End of figure]
Services Use Information on Recruiter Irregularities to Update Their
Training:
All of the services have mechanisms for updating their recruiter
training as a result of information on recruiter irregularities. These
mechanisms include internal inspection programs and routine recruiter
discipline reports. The services also react to reassure public
confidence in the recruiting process when specific incidents or reports
of recruiter irregularities become widely known. Each service
recruiting command assesses and evaluates how recruiting policies and
procedures are being followed, the results of which are focused on
training at the Army Battalion, Navy and Marine Corps District, and Air
Force Squadron command level. For example, the Navy Recruiting
Command's National Inspection Team conducts unannounced inspections at
the Navy recruiting districts and forwards the results of the
inspection to the Navy Recruiting Command headquarters. The Navy
Recruiting Command's National Training Team follows up by conducting
refresher training at the recruiting station locations or in the
subject areas where the National Training Team identified
discrepancies. The Marine Corps' National Training Team also conducts
periodic inspections and training based on the results of their
inspections. Additionally, the Marine Corps National Training Team
provides input and guidance to the Marine Corps recruiter school course
curriculum. The Air Force Recruiting Command Judge Advocate distributes
quarterly recruiter discipline reports to heighten awareness of
wrongdoing and encourage proper recruiter behavior. In addition, these
reports are used to show examples of wrongdoing during new recruiter
training. The Army Recruiting Command conducted commandwide refresher
training on May 20, 2005, in response to a series of press reports of
recruiters using inappropriate tactics in their attempts to enlist new
servicemembers. The Army stated that the training goal was to reinforce
that recruiting operations must be conducted within the rules and
regulations and in accordance with Army values.[Footnote 18]
Conclusions:
Military recruiters represent the first point of contact between
potential servicemembers and those who influence them--their parents,
coaches, teachers, and other family members. Consequently, a
recruiter's actions can be far reaching. Although existing data suggest
that the overwhelming number of recruiters are not committing
irregularities and irregularities are not widespread, even one incident
of recruiter wrongdoing can erode public confidence in DOD's recruiting
process. Existing data show, in fact, that allegations and service-
identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing increased between fiscal
years 2004 and 2005. DOD, however, is not in a position to answer
questions about these allegations and service-identified incidents
because it does not know the true extent to which the services are
tracking recruiter irregularities or addressing them. Moreover, DOD is
unable to compile a comprehensive and consolidated report because the
services do not use consistent terminology regarding recruiter
irregularities. Individual service systems are not integrated,
processes are decentralized, and many allegations are undocumented.
Although DOD officials can point to external factors, such as a strong
economy and current military operations in Iraq as recruiting
challenges, data suggest that internal requirements to meet monthly
recruiting goals may also contribute to recruiter irregularities.
Having readily available, complete, and consistent data from the
services would place DOD in a better position to know the nature and
extent of recruiter irregularities and identify opportunities when
corrective action is needed.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's visibility over recruiter irregularities, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense take the following action:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish an oversight framework to assess recruiter irregularities and
provide overall guidance to the services.
To assist in developing its oversight framework, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to take the following three actions:
* Establish criteria and common definitions across the services for
maintaining data on allegations of recruiter irregularities.
* Establish a reporting requirement across the services to help ensure
a full accounting of all allegations and service-identified incidents
of recruiter irregularities.
* Direct the services to develop internal systems and processes that
better capture and integrate data on allegations and service-identified
incidents of recruiter irregularities.
To assist DOD in developing a complete accounting of recruiter
irregularities, we further recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
take the following action:
* Direct the commander of DOD's Military Entrance Processing Command to
track and report allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities to the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Such analysis would include
irregularities by service and the time during the monthly recruiting
cycle when the irregularities occur.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three
of our recommendations that address the need for an effective oversight
management framework to improve DOD's visibility over recruiter
irregularities. While DOD partially concurred with our recommendation
to establish a reporting requirement across the services and did not
concur with our recommendation for the Military Entrance Processing
Command to provide OSD with data on recruiter irregularities, the
department did not disagree with the substance of these
recommendations. Rather, DOD indicated that it would implement these
recommendations if it determined such requirements were necessary.
DOD's comments are included in this report as appendix II.
DOD concurred with our recommendations to establish an oversight
framework to assess recruiter irregularities and provide overall
guidance to the services; to establish criteria and common definitions
across the services for maintaining data on recruiter irregularities;
and for the services to develop internal systems and processes that
better capture and integrate data on recruiter irregularities.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to establish a
reporting requirement across the services to help ensure a full
accounting of recruiter irregularities, but agreed that some type of
reporting requirement be established. The department believes that
implementing this recommendation may be premature until it has
established an over-arching management framework to provide oversight
that uses like terms for recruiter irregularities, and that the
requirement and frequency should be left to the judgment of the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. DOD
stated its intent to establish an initial reporting requirement to
ensure the processes it develops are functioning as planned and to use
this time period to assess the severity of recruiter irregularities
issues. DOD further stated that regardless of whether or not it
establishes a fixed reporting requirement, the services will be
required to maintain data on recruiter irregularities in a format that
would facilitate timely and accurate reports upon request. We do not
believe it would be premature to establish a reporting requirement at
this time. As we stated in our report, data that the services reported
to us show that the number of allegations, substantiated cases, and
criminal violations all increased from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year
2005. Without a reporting requirement, we believe it would be difficult
for OUSD to identify trends in recruiter irregularities and determine
if corrective action is needed. Accordingly, we continue to believe
that a reporting requirement for the services would help the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to carry out
its responsibilities to review DOD's recruitment program to ensure
adherence to approved policies and standards.
The department did not concur with our recommendation for DOD's
Military Entrance Processing Command to track and report allegations
and incidents of recruiter irregularities to OUSD because it believed
this reporting would duplicate service reporting, and added that we had
stated that recruiter irregularities are not widespread. However, DOD
acknowledged, as our report points out, that even one incident of
recruiter wrongdoing can erode public confidence in the recruiting
process and agreed to consider this recommendation at a later date if
it determines that recruiter irregularities are a significant problem
and further analyses are required. While we did conclude from the data
services provided to us that recruiter wrongdoing did not appear to be
widespread, we also stated our belief that service data likely
underestimate the true number of recruiter irregularities, and further
concluded that DOD is not in a position to answer questions about these
allegations and service-identified incidents because it does not know
the full extent to which the services are tracking recruiter
irregularities or addressing them. We believe, therefore, that the
significance of recruiter irregularities is not fully understood, and
that addressing this recommendation should not be delayed. As we
reported, Military Entrance Processing Command officials told us that
they forward all allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities that surface during the screening process at
the military entrance processing stations to the services' recruiting
commands. We found, however, that the services' recruiting command
headquarters data do not show records of allegations and service-
identified incidents of recruiter irregularities received from the
Military Entrance Processing Command. Data currently captured by the
Military Entrance Processing Command would be instructive, particularly
because these data show an increase in irregularities as Army
recruiters approach the end of their monthly recruiting cycle, and we
believe that these data would further inform DOD about the
effectiveness of the oversight management framework it has agreed to
establish.
As arranged with your office, unless you publically announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies
of this report to interested congressional members; the Secretaries of
Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Derek B. Stewart, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work, we examined Department of Defense (DOD) and
military services' policies, regulations, orders, and instructions that
govern the recruitment of military servicemembers and the investigation
and resolution of allegations and service-identified incidents of
recruiter wrongdoing. We also reviewed recruiting-related reports
issued by GAO, DOD, and the services. We analyzed data on allegations
and service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities from the
active and reserve components of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force databases, reports, and individual paper files. Additionally, we
interviewed individuals at several DOD and service offices and
recruiters in each service, and visited a number of recruiting and
recruiting-related commands.[Footnote 19] In the course of our work, we
contacted and visited the organizations and offices listed in table
8.[Footnote 20]
Table 8: Organizations and Offices Contacted During Our Review:
Name of organization or office: Air Force Recruiting Service;
Location: Randolph Air Force Base, Tex.
Name of organization or office: Air Force Recruiting School;
Location: Lackland Air Force Base, Tex.
Name of organization or office: Air Force Reserve Command Recruiting
Service;
Location: Robins Air Force Base, Ga.
Name of organization or office: Air Force Recruiting Office; Location:
San Antonio, Tex.
Name of organization or office: Air Force Recruiting Office;
Location: Universal City, Tex.
Name of organization or office: Army Recruiting Command;
Location: Fort Knox, Ky.
Name of organization or office: Army Recruiting and Retention School;
Location: Fort Jackson, S.C.
Name of organization or office: Army Recruiting Station;
Location: Elizabethtown, Ky.
Name of organization or office: Marine Corps Recruiting Command;
Location: Quantico, Va.
Name of organization or office: Marine Corps Recruit Depot;
Location: San Diego, Calif.
Name of organization or office: Marine Corps District Command;
Location: San Diego, Calif.
Name of organization or office: Marine Corps Recruiting Station;
Location: San Diego, Calif.
Name of organization or office: Marine Corps Recruiting Sub-Station;
Location: San Diego, Calif.
Name of organization or office: Marine Corps Recruit Liaison Office;
Location: San Diego, Calif.
Name of organization or office: Marine Corps Recruiting School;
Location: San Diego, Calif.
Name of organization or office: Military Entrance Processing Command;
Location: North Chicago, Ill.
Name of organization or office: Military Entrance Processing Command
Inspector General;
Location: North Chicago, Ill.
Name of organization or office: Military Entrance Processing Stations;
Location: Des Plaines, Ill; San Diego, Calif.
Name of organization or office: Navy Recruiting Command;
Location: Millington, Tenn.
Name of organization or office: Navy Recruiting Command Inspector
General;
Location: Millington, Tenn.
Name of organization or office: Navy Orientation and Recruiting Unit;
Location: Pensacola, Fla.
Name of organization or office: Naval Inspector General;
Location: Washington Navy Yard, D.C.
Name of organization or office: Navy Bureau of Personnel Inspector
General;
Location: Millington, Tenn.
Name of organization or office: Naval Criminal Investigative Service;
Location: Washington Navy Yard, D.C.
Name of organization or office: Navy Judge Advocate General;
Location: Washington Navy Yard, D.C.
Name of organization or office: Navy Recruit Quality Assurance Team;
Location: Great Lakes, Ill.
Name of organization or office: Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness;
Location: Washington, D.C.
Name of organization or office: Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, Manpower and Personnel;
Location: Washington, D.C.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To assess the extent to which DOD and the services have visibility over
recruiter irregularities, we examined DOD and service policies,
procedures, regulations, and instructions related to recruiting. In
addition, we interviewed officials in the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the services' recruiting
officials and Inspectors General to obtain an understanding of various
aspects of the data DOD and the services collect on allegations and
service-identified incidents of recruiting irregularities. We obtained
data on recruiter irregularities from service recruiting commands'
Inspectors General or other designated recruiting command offices, the
Headquarters Air Force Recruiting Service Basic Training Inspector
General Liaison, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the
recruiting commands' Staff Judge Advocates. Specifically, within each
service, we analyzed fiscal years 2004 and 2005 data.
* For the Army, we obtained data on allegations and service-identified
incidents of recruiter irregularities from its Recruiting Improprieties
All Years database. We also obtained data on recruiting irregularities
that were processed as criminal violations from the Army Recruiting
Command Judge Advocate's paper files.
* For the Navy, we obtained data on allegations and service-identified
incidents of recruiter irregularities from the Naval Inspector
General's Case Management Information System, the Navy Bureau of
Personnel Inspector General, the Navy Recruiting Command Inspector
General's paper files, and the Navy Recruiting Quality Assurance Team.
We also obtained data on Navy recruiter criminal violations from the
Navy's Criminal Investigative Service.
* For the Marine Corps, we obtained data on allegations and service-
identified incidents of recruiter irregularities from its Marine Corps
Recruiting Information Support System. We also obtained data on
recruiter criminal violations from the Navy's Criminal Investigative
Service data system.
* For the Air Force, we obtained data on allegations and service-
identified incidents of recruiter irregularities from its Automated
Case Tracking System and Trainee Tracking System, and data on criminal
violations from its Automated Military Justice Administrative
Management System. We also obtained data from the Air Force Reserve
Command Recruiting Service's Headquarters Queries database.
To identify the factors within the current recruiting environment that
may contribute to recruiting irregularities, we reviewed prior GAO
work, Congressional Research Service reports addressing the recruiting
environment, and the 2005 DOD Recruiter Quality of Life Survey Topline
Report. We reviewed the sampling and estimation documentation for this
survey and determined that it conforms to commonly accepted statistical
methods for probability samples; the response rate for the DOD internal
survey was 46 percent. Because DOD did not conduct a nonresponse bias
analysis, we cannot determine whether estimates from this survey may be
affected by nonresponse bias. Such bias might arise if nonrespondents'
answers to survey items would have been systematically different from
those of respondents. We reviewed service policies and processes
governing recruiter selection, training, and performance evaluation,
and interviewed key service officials about the types of challenges
that exist in the recruiting environment and the methods used to
evaluate recruiter performance. Additionally, we gathered and analyzed
statistical information from the Department of Labor and reviewed
Military Entrance Processing Command data on the frequency and
occurrence of applicant disqualifications by service and reports on
recruiter irregularities. Finally, we interviewed officials at the U.S.
Military Entrance Processing Command and two military entrance
processing stations regarding recruiter irregularities.
To identify what procedures DOD and the services have in place to
address individuals involved in recruiting irregularities, we examined
service case data and spoke with service recruiting command officials
to determine how services imposed disciplinary action and what, if any,
other actions they took to mitigate wrongdoing in the recruiting
process. For each service, we obtained data on disciplinary actions
imposed for cases of recruiter irregularities but specifically examined
and analyzed Army data as they appeared to be the most comprehensive.
We present these data for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We also reviewed
service regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to
understand departmentwide standards and the authorities that are
granted to commanders to administer military justice. Finally, we
reviewed service training materials and spoke with service recruiting
command officials to identify other ways services use information on
recruiter wrongdoing to try to mitigate errors and irregularities in
the recruiting process.
To assess the reliability of the services' data on allegations and
service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities, we
interviewed officials about the processes used to capture data on
recruiter irregularities, the controls over those processes, and the
data systems used; and we reviewed documentation related to those
systems. Based on responses to our questions, follow-up discussions,
and the documentation we reviewed, we found limitations in many service
data systems, including reliance on paper files; databases that cannot
be fully queried, if at all; and in some cases, lack of edit checks and
data quality reviews. Although we identified weaknesses in the
available data, we determined, for the purposes of this report, that
the data were reliable for providing limited information on recruiter
irregularities.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Personnel And Readiness:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
4000 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
Jul 24 2006:
Mr. Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stewart:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Military Recruiting: DoD and Services Need Better Data to
Enhance Visibility Over Recruiter Irregularities," dated July 6, 2006
(GAO Code 350752/GAO-06-846).
The Department concurs with some, but not all of the Report's
recommendations. We concur with the first GAO recommendation that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should establish
an oversight framework to assess recruiter irregularities and to
provide overall guidance to the Services. Establishing criteria and
common definitions across the Services and the development of internal
systems and processes to better capture data concerning recruiter
irregularities will be essential in establishing this framework. While
each of the Services currently has a system and process for
accomplishing this task, it is clear that there is room for
improvement.
However, the Department does not concur with the recommendations that a
reporting requirement be established nor do we agree with adding a
Military Entrance Processing Command tracking requirement to the
process. We believe these are premature. If, through the newly
implemented oversight framework, it is determined that there is a
significant problem with recruiter irregularities, we would proceed to
implement these recommendations. But, in this report GAO itself stated
that existing data suggest that recruiter irregularities are not
widespread.
We certainly agree with the GAO statement that even one incident of
recruiter wrongdoing can erode public confidence in DoD's recruiting
process. We also take this issue very seriously and believe that the
oversight framework as recommended by GAO will adequately address the
issue. The Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness
will work in concert with the Services to implement the appropriate
recommendations in a timely manner. We believe these actions can be
completed by June 2007.
The enclosure contains detailed departmental comments on each of the
five recommendations identified by the GAO. The Department appreciates
the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael L. Dominguez:
Principal Deputy:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated July 6, 2006:
GAO CODE 350752/GAO-06-846:
"Military Recruiting: DoD and Services Need Better Data to Enhance
Visibility Over Recruiter Irregularities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish an oversight framework to assess recruiter irregularities and
provide overall guidance to the Services. (p. 36/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur.
While the Department has relied on the Services to provide timely and
accurate data on recruiter irregularities, it is appropriate for the
DoD to establish a standardized framework allowing for a fair and
accurate assessment of recruiter irregularities across the Services.
Done correctly, this will provide the Department with sufficient
information to identify both positive and negative trends that may
warrant attention. The current absence of an over-arching framework
does not negate the level of importance the Department places on this
issue. Each incident of recruiter irregularity negatively impacts the
Services and the enlistment process.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish criteria and common definitions across the Services for
maintaining data on allegations of recruiter irregularities. (p. 36/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur.
An integral part of a standardized framework will require the
establishment of similar terms across the Services. Currently, the
Services use various methods and terms to identify and report recruiter
infractions. A redefining of those terms may prove challenging and will
necessitate a change in the Services' internal procedures and follow-up
actions. This change will include both formal and informal practices
established by the Services over time. It is vital that this be done in
concert with the Services so valid comparisons can be made and guidance
be provided as required.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish a reporting requirement across the Services to help ensure a
full accounting of all allegations and Service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities. (p. 36/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Partially Concur.
The Department agrees that some type of reporting requirement be
established; however, we believe it may be premature to establish this
requirement at this time. it is our belief that once we have
established an over-arching framework, where like terms are used, the
report frequency/requirement be left to the judgment of the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. An initial
report requirement will be established to ensure the process developed
is functioning as planned. During this period the Department will
assess the severity of the recruiter irregularities issue and will
implement reporting requirements based on those findings. Regardless of
whether or not a fixed reporting requirement is established, the
Services will be required to maintain the data in a format that would
facilitate timely and accurate reports upon request.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
direct the Services to develop internal systems and processes that
better capture and integrate data on allegations and Service-identified
incidents of recruiter irregularities. (p. 36/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur.
This recommendation, when coupled with "Recommendation #2", will lay
the framework for a program that provides oversight of recruiter
irregularities. Both of these recommendations will be integral parts of
a process which ultimately provides DoD with more useful data for
assessing the issue. Like the standardization of terms, this will
require DoD to work closely with the Services to establish a system
that will provide any information on the subject at a moment's notice.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
direct the commander of DoD's Military Entrance Processing Command to
track and report allegations and Service-identified incidents of
recruiter irregularities to the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Such analysis would include
irregularities by Service and the time during the monthly recruiting
cycle when the irregularities occur. (p. 36/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Non-Concur.
The Department believes this reporting requirement would be duplicative
of Service reporting. Once recommendations 2 and 4 are fully
implemented, they should include these violations regardless of final
disposition. If, at a later date it is determined that recruiter
irregularities are a significant problem and further analyses are
required, then the Department may consider this recommendation.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, David E. Moser, Assistant Director,
Grace A. Coleman, Tanya Cruz, Nicole Gore, Gregg J. Justice III,
Mitchell B. Karpman, Warren Lowman, Julia C. Matta, Charles W. Purdue,
and Shana Wallace made key contributions to this report.
(350752):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Recruits in a delayed entry program include those recruits who have
completed the enlistment process but not yet reported to basic
training. The time period that recruits spend in the delayed entry
program ranges from 1 day to 1 year. The Army now refers to the delayed
entry program as the Future Soldiers Training Program.
[2] Department of Defense, Defense Human Resources Activity, Joint
Advertising, Market Research and Studies, 2005 Recruiter Quality of
Life Survey, Topline Report, JAMRS Report No. 2006-002 (Arlington, Va.:
February 2006). The response rate for the DOD internal survey was 46
percent. Because DOD did not conduct a nonresponse bias analysis, we
cannot determine whether estimates from this survey may be affected by
nonresponse bias. Such bias might arise if nonrespondents' answers to
survey items would have been systematically different from those of
respondents.
[3] GAO, Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better
Screening Enlisted Personnel, GAO/NSIAD-97-39 (Washington, D.C.:
January 1997) and Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter
Selection and Incentive Systems, GAO/NSIAD-98-58 (Washington, D.C.:
January 1998).
[4] The response rate for the DOD internal survey was 46 percent.
Because DOD did not conduct a nonresponse bias analysis, we cannot
determine whether estimates from this survey may be affected by
nonresponse bias. Such bias might arise if nonrespondents' answers to
survey items would have been systematically different from those of
respondents.
[5] GAO/NSIAD-97-39 and GAO/NSIAD-98-58.
[6] Each of the military departments has the responsibility to recruit
its own forces, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense. Secretary of the Army, 10 U.S.C. § 3013(b)(1);
Secretary of the Navy, 10 U.S.C. § 5013(b)(1); Secretary of the Air
Force, 10 U.S.C. § 8013(b)(1).
[7] DOD's collective recruiting budgets for fiscal year 2006 include
$800.7 million for its recruiting programs, $663 million for
advertising, and $551.6 million for financial incentives, such as
enlistment or selective reenlistment bonuses.
[8] The Army Recruiting Command is located at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the
Navy Recruiting Command is located in Millington, Tenn; the Marine
Corps Recruiting Command is located at Quantico, Va; and the Air Force
Recruiting Service is located at Randolph Air Force Base, Tex. The
Department of the Air Force is the only military department in which
the recruiting commands for the active and reserve force are still
separate commands.
[9] The Army Recruiter School is located at Ft. Jackson, S.C; the Navy
Recruiter School is located at Pensacola Naval Air Station, Fla; the
Marine Recruiter School is located at U.S. Marine Corps Recruit Depot,
San Diego, Calif; and the Air Force Recruiter School is located at
Lackland Air Force Base, Tex.
[10] In some cases, applicants are given the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery test in high school or at independent sites apart from
the military entrance processing stations.
[11] The Department of the Air Force is the only military department in
which the recruiting commands for the active and reserve force are
still separate commands. For the purposes of this report, we combined
Air Force and Air Force Reserve data on irregularities but only refer
to Air Force systems and processes for managing information on
recruiter irregularities.
[12] The DOD 2005 Recruiter Quality of Life Survey is the seventh
survey conducted since 1989, and the first survey administered in the
past 5 years, dealing with recruiters' opinions about their job. The
response rate for the DOD internal survey was 46 percent. Because DOD
did not conduct a nonresponse bias analysis, we cannot determine
whether estimates from this survey may be affected by nonresponse bias.
Such bias might arise if nonrespondents' answers to survey items would
have been systematically different from those of respondents.
[13] GAO, Military Personnel: Reporting Additional Servicemember
Demographics Could Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO-05-952
(Washington, D.C.: September 2005).
[14] National Research Council, Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations
of American Youth; DOD, Overview Report June 2003 Youth Poll 5
(December 2003), p. 71.
[15] GAO/NSIAD-98-58.
[16] Commanders conduct preliminary inquiries under the Rules for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) found in the Manual for Courts-Martial. These
informal inquiries are sometimes referred to as R.C.M. 303 Inquiries.
[17] Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, is intended to
handle minor offenses. A minor offense is one for which the maximum
sentence at a court-martial would not include a dishonorable discharge
or confinement in excess of 1 year.
[18] The Army values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service,
honor, integrity, and personal courage.
[19] Discussions with officials at the National Guard Bureau revealed
that the National Guard Bureau does not maintain data on allegations
and service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities. Further,
if the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard collect and
maintain these data, they would do so at 54 state, District of
Columbia, and territory Guard offices. As a result, our study is
limited to a discussion of the data on allegations of recruiter
irregularities from the active and reserve components of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
[20] The organizations and offices listed as those contacted during our
review are limited to those that provided information that had an
impact on our findings.
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