Military Training
Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint National Training Capability Gao ID: GAO-06-802 August 11, 2006The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training Transformation Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces deploying to their theaters have had experience operating jointly. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which accounts for 84 percent of the $2 billion the department plans to invest by 2011 to provide a persistent global network that will increase the level of joint training. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) JNTC has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve components are benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint Forces Command has developed an accreditation process to facilitate program goals. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents. GAO also reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 events selected in 2005 as JNTC training events, and observed 2 of those events firsthand.
The extent to which the JNTC initiative is improving joint training overall is unclear because DOD has not yet assessed the program's results; however, GAO's review of five JNTC-enhanced training events found indications of some joint training improvements. Prior GAO work and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report have stressed the importance of performance metrics to gauge program success. While DOD's initial training transformation assessment set a basic framework for measuring future program performance, DOD has not developed a strategy to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative that includes metrics, time frames, and processes for gathering data. Without such a plan, DOD will not know whether the money invested in the initiative will produce desired results or maximize the benefit for the investment. Reserve units have participated in JNTC training events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered because Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working relationship with them. The Training Transformation Strategic Plan recognizes that the reserve components face unique training requirements and circumstances that must be considered. However, the command has not established a liaison position for any of the reserve components and has not included the reserve components in working groups and planning sessions, as it has done with the active service components and the combatant commands. Until the command incorporates the reserves more fully into the JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have limited ability to enhance their joint training skills. The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop an accreditation process to facilitate the JNTC initiative's goals, but it has not emphasized new and emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will continue in future training rotations, or incorporated the National Guard. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that training transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission areas, such as irregular warfare and combating weapons of mass destruction. The Joint Forces Command has allowed services and combatant commands to nominate existing training programs to be accredited, but these programs may not reflect the priorities established in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report because nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Further, no training programs specific to the National Guard are currently being considered for accreditation. Until the department establishes nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards and includes the National Guard in the accreditation process, JNTC events may not reflect DOD's training priorities, the services may not continually incorporate JNTC enhancements into their training exercises, and the National Guard will continue to have limited ability to enhance its joint training skills.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-802, Military Training: Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint National Training Capability
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GAO:
August 2006:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
Military Training:
Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint
National Training Capability:
Military Training:
GAO-06-802:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-802, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training Transformation
Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces deploying to their
theaters have had experience operating jointly. The centerpiece of this
effort is the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative,
which accounts for 84 percent of the $2 billion the department plans to
invest by 2011 to provide a persistent global network that will
increase the level of joint training. GAO assessed the extent to which
(1) JNTC has improved the ability of the services and combatant
commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve components are benefiting
from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint Forces Command has
developed an accreditation process to facilitate program goals. To
address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC
documents. GAO also reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 events selected in
2005 as JNTC training events, and observed 2 of those events firsthand.
What GAO Found:
The extent to which the JNTC initiative is improving joint training
overall is unclear because DOD has not yet assessed the program‘s
results; however, GAO‘s review of five JNTC-enhanced training events
found indications of some joint training improvements. Prior GAO work
and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report have stressed the
importance of performance metrics to gauge program success. While DOD‘s
initial training transformation assessment set a basic framework for
measuring future program performance, DOD has not developed a strategy
to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative that includes
metrics, time frames, and processes for gathering data. Without such a
plan, DOD will not know whether the money invested in the initiative
will produce desired results or maximize the benefit for the
investment.
Reserve units have participated in JNTC training events, but the unique
training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered
because Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working
relationship with them. The Training Transformation Strategic Plan
recognizes that the reserve components face unique training
requirements and circumstances that must be considered. However, the
command has not established a liaison position for any of the reserve
components and has not included the reserve components in working
groups and planning sessions, as it has done with the active service
components and the combatant commands. Until the command incorporates
the reserves more fully into the JNTC initiative, the reserve
components will continue to have limited ability to enhance their joint
training skills.
The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop an accreditation process
to facilitate the JNTC initiative‘s goals, but it has not emphasized
new and emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint
tasks will continue in future training rotations, or incorporated the
National Guard. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares
that training transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission
areas, such as irregular warfare and combating weapons of mass
destruction. The Joint Forces Command has allowed services and
combatant commands to nominate existing training programs to be
accredited, but these programs may not reflect the priorities
established in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report because nomination
guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit programs that will
improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Further, no
training programs specific to the National Guard are currently being
considered for accreditation. Until the department establishes
nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards and includes the
National Guard in the accreditation process, JNTC events may not
reflect DOD‘s training priorities, the services may not continually
incorporate JNTC enhancements into their training exercises, and the
National Guard will continue to have limited ability to enhance its
joint training skills.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take a number of actions
to further enhance the quality of joint training for active and reserve
components. In response to a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed
with GAO‘s recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-802].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on
Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements:
Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint
Forces Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves' Unique Training
Needs:
JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to
New and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities,
or Include the National Guard:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined:
Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in
Joint Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005:
Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for
Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006:
Table 4: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
JNTC: Joint National Training Capability:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 11, 2006:
The Honorable Joel Hefley:
Chairman:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Effective joint operations are fundamental to the ability of the U.S.
military to decisively defeat its adversaries, and the Secretary of
Defense has stated that in the new and evolving security environment,
"Achieving jointness in wartime requires building jointness in
peacetime." In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,[Footnote 1]
Department of Defense (DOD) leadership emphasized that meeting the
challenges of an uncertain security environment would require
transformations in education and training. The Defense Planning
Guidance 2003-2007 directed the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to work with the services, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commander of the Joint Forces
Command to develop a plan for transforming military training that would
better enable joint force operations. Consequently, the department
created the Training Transformation Program, which is focused on
providing dynamic, capabilities-based education and training for DOD in
support of national security requirements across the full spectrum of
service (active and reserve components), joint, interagency,
intergovernmental (state and local), and multinational operations. The
ultimate goal of DOD's training transformation is to provide combatant
commanders with better-prepared individuals, units, staffs, and
organizations that are aligned with their joint operational needs.
DOD plans to invest almost $2 billion in the Training Transformation
Program by 2011. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint Forces
Command's Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which
accounts for 84 percent of the department's planned spending. The
primary goal of the initiative is to provide a persistent global
network of live, virtual, and constructive capabilities[Footnote 2]
that will enhance the level of joint training in existing service and
combatant command training programs. The JNTC initiative is expected to
enhance the joint operational environment by providing more specific
guidance on conducting joint mission essential tasks,[Footnote 3]
creating a persistent joint communication network to support joint
training with more virtual and constructive capability, and accrediting
training programs to ensure the appropriate joint environment exists.
The initiative expects to have established a global network of
accredited joint training programs across the services and combatant
commands by 2010.
You asked us to review the JNTC initiative's implementation.
Specifically, we assessed (1) the extent to which the JNTC initiative
has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to
train jointly, (2) the extent to which the reserve components are
benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the extent to which the
Joint Forces Command has developed an accreditation process to
facilitate program goals.
To address the above objectives, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and
JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006
revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC
initiative strategic plan. We reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 combatant
command and service training events that were selected in 2005 as JNTC
training events. Our analysis evaluated a number of attributes for each
of these training events to determine the extent to which the JNTC
initiative enhanced their joint training capability. Additionally, we
observed two of the selected events firsthand to obtain a real-time
assessment of the past and planned evolution of the exercises and
feedback from exercise participants, including the planners, on the
extent of joint training. We also met with key officials in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, as well as officials
from the combatant commands and service organizations that are affected
by the JNTC initiative. Additionally, we examined the extent to which
the reserve components participated in selected training events
enhanced by the JNTC initiative and formal collaboration mechanisms, as
well as the development and initial implementation of the JNTC
initiative's accreditation process. We also interviewed key National
Guard and reserve component officials to further evaluate the benefits
that the reserve components derive from the JNTC initiative. We
discussed our methods and assumptions with agency officials to obtain
their input, and we also assessed the quality of information and
determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We
performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD does not know the extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved
the services' and combatant commands' ability to train jointly because
it has not yet assessed the program's impact. Our analysis of five
service and combatant command training events selected to be enhanced
by the JNTC initiative provided some indications of potential
improvements in joint training. However, the department's first
assessment of the Training Transformation Program in 2005 did not
include an evaluation of the collective impact of the JNTC initiative
on joint training because the initiative is still early in its
implementation. Instead, the department has established a basic
framework for measuring the performance of joint training in future
assessments. However, the department has not finalized a plan for its
2007 training transformation assessment that includes metrics,
processes it will employ, and time frames for obtaining data. Our prior
work has stressed the importance of performance metrics that set up
time frames and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program's
implementation. The department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
also emphasizes that to ensure the department's objectives are being
met, each organization is accountable for measuring performance and
delivering results that support the departmentwide strategy.
Furthermore, the Training Transformation Plan requires periodic reviews
to measure the impact of training transformation initiatives, including
the JNTC initiative, on joint training. The training events we analyzed
from fiscal year 2005 provided indications of improved joint training,
such as more joint objectives than the prior year's exercises and more
participation by other services. For example, one Air Force exercise we
reviewed focused on achieving service-specific objectives before being
enhanced by the JNTC initiative. Since then, these objectives were
modified to include some joint training objectives. However, without a
strategy that clearly identifies how the department's next training
transformation assessment will evaluate the impact the JNTC initiative
is having on military joint training, the department will not be in a
position to know whether the money invested in the initiative will
produce the desired results or maximize the benefit for the investment.
To support the efforts of the Joint Forces Command to enhance the level
of joint training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to fully
develop a strategy for the next training transformation assessment to
evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative's implementation on
joint training, including time frames, outcome-oriented performance
metrics, roles and responsibilities, and outcomes. DOD agreed with this
recommendation and stated it is taking actions to implement it.
Through the participation of selected units and individuals in JNTC-
enhanced events, the reserve components have benefited from the JNTC
initiative, but the unique training needs of the reserve components
have not been fully considered because Joint Forces Command has not
established an ongoing working relationship with them. According to
Joint Forces Command officials, the command has not established a
liaison position for any of the reserve components and has not included
the reserve components in working groups and planning sessions, as it
has done with the active service components and the combatant commands.
According to service and reserve officials, the initiative's process
action teams, which are responsible for joint program coordination, are
composed of representatives from the services and combatant commands
but do not receive input from any of the reserve components. The
Training Transformation Strategic Plan recognizes that the reserve
components face several unique training requirements and circumstances
that must be considered at each step of this process, from strategic
planning through implementation. For example, compared to active duty
service members, reservists and National Guard members generally have
less time to train, less access to current technologies, and an
additional responsibility to conduct joint domestic missions related to
homeland defense. Until the Joint Forces Command incorporates the
reserve components more fully into the JNTC initiative, the reserve
components will continue to have limited ability to enhance their joint
training skills. To increase the benefits of joint training programs
for the reserve components, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers for the
reserve components and include representatives from the reserve
components as active participants in JNTC initiative working groups and
planning sessions. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation,
agreeing a liaison position was needed for the National Guard, but that
the current service liaison structure was adequate to represent the
other reserve components. We continue to believe that the entire
reserve component would benefit if they had a more active voice in JNTC
working groups and planning sessions.
The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process for accrediting
active service and combatant command training programs to facilitate
the goals of the JNTC initiative, but it has not emphasized new and
emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks
will continue to be incorporated into future training rotations after
programs complete initial accreditation, or accredited any National
Guard-specific training programs. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report declares that training transformation should emphasize new and
emerging mission areas, such as irregular warfare, complex
stabilization operations, combating weapons of mass destruction, and
information operations. The JNTC accreditation process is intended to
ensure that all units participating in joint training, regardless of
location, experience a recurring, consistent, realistic training
environment. The Joint Forces Command has allowed active services and
combatant commands to nominate specific joint tasks within their
existing training programs to be accredited. During fiscal year 2005,
the Joint Forces Command conditionally accredited joint tasks in 4
training programs and plans to grant accreditation to tasks in as many
as 23 additional programs during 2006. However, the Joint Forces
Command's nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit
service and combatant commander training programs that will improve
proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Currently, in some
instances, nominations for accreditation are based on the services'
needs to enhance joint training for the maximum number of participants.
In addition, the Joint Forces Command plans to reaccredit programs
every 3 years, but the command has not established standards or a
process for reaccreditation that would ensure that service and
combatant command training programs continuously incorporate and expand
upon previously accredited joint training tasks. Further, no training
programs specific to the National Guard are currently being considered
for accreditation by the Joint Forces Command because there is no
mechanism in place for nominating them. For example, the National Guard
has approached the Joint Forces Command to accredit its Vigilant Guard
exercise program outside the normal nomination process because there is
not a mechanism in place that allows the National Guard to nominate
programs. Currently, this request is being discussed by Joint Forces
Command and National Guard leadership. Until the department establishes
nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards, JNTC events may not
reflect DOD's training priorities and the services and combatant
commands may not continually incorporate JNTC enhancements into future
rotations of their training exercises. Additionally, until Joint Forces
Command incorporates the National Guard into the accreditation process,
the National Guard training programs may not be able to take full
advantage of JNTC resources, such as participation from other
components, access to new technologies and modeling, and training
environments that realistically portray overseas and domestic joint
operations. To support the efforts of the Joint Forces Command to
enhance the level of joint training and to increase the benefits of
joint training programs for the reserve components, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to (1) establish guidelines for the services
and combatant commands to follow when nominating programs for future
accreditation that reflect the importance of new and emerging missions,
as emphasized by DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2)
establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that
a recurring, consistent, realistic joint training environment exists
for all units participating in future rotations of accredited joint
training programs; and (3) expand the accreditation process to include
National Guard training programs. DOD agreed with these recommendations
and is planning actions to implement them.
Background:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall
responsibility for the Training Transformation Program and, through the
use of the Training Transformation Executive Steering Group and the
Training Transformation Senior Advisory Group, oversees the execution
of three capabilities or initiatives: JNTC, the Joint Knowledge
Development and Distribution Capability, and the Joint Assessment and
Enabling Capability. According to the 2006 Training Transformation
Implementation Plan,[Footnote 4] these 3 initiatives are designed to
prepare individuals, units, and staff for the new strategic environment
and to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out joint
missions. Specifically:
* The JNTC, focusing on collective training, is expected to prepare
forces by providing units and command staff with integrated live,
virtual, and constructive training environments. This initiative would
add enhanced service and combatant command training that emphasizes
jointness and enables global training and mission rehearsal in support
of combatant command operations.
* The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, which
focuses on individual training, is intended to prepare future decision
makers and leaders to better understand joint operations and the common
operational picture, as well as to respond innovatively to adversaries.
It develops and distributes joint knowledge via a dynamic, global-
knowledge network that provides immediate access to joint education and
training resources.
* The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability is expected to assist
leaders in assessing the value of transformational training initiatives
to individuals, organizations, and processes, and to link the impact of
the Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders' readiness
requirements. This initiative is also supposed to provide the processes
and tools to continuously improve joint training.
The JNTC initiative, the leading initiative for training
transformation, is managed by a Joint Management Office within the
Joint Forces Command's Joint Trainer Directorate. This Joint Management
Office, which was established in 2003, manages the operational,
technical and program resources necessary to implement the initiative.
The Joint Management Office coordinates its management efforts of the
initiative with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through senior
and executive advisory groups. The overall purpose of the JNTC
initiative is to provide a persistent capability to combatant command
and service training programs to create an appropriate, realistic joint
operating environment within their existing training activities. To
accomplish this, DOD plans to spend about $1.5 billion on the JNTC
initiative through fiscal year 2011, or 84 percent of training
transformation total funding. The JNTC initiative was deemed by the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness to be operationally
capable in October 2004--indicating that the initial infrastructure of
networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint environment of
training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005, 16 combatant
command and service training events were selected by the Joint Forces
Command to enhance their joint training environment through the JNTC
initiative.
The JNTC initiative includes several key efforts to enhance the joint
training environment of combatant commands and services. These efforts
include the following:
* Development of joint task articles. This is an effort to enhance the
level of details associated with joint mission essential tasks that are
identified by the combatant commands as critical to joint operations,
and to provide joint trainers specific guidance for developing
exercises and other joint training activities. These task articles are
a set of processes, procedures, or actions that address critical
horizontal (actions between services) and vertical (actions between a
service and a higher joint force command) elements of interoperability
for specific joint mission essential tasks. Currently, the JNTC
initiative has developed 156 approved articles and has 88 under various
stages of development.
* Joint training and experimentation network. The joint network is
intended to be a large-capacity communications network that will
provide persistent support to joint training exercises, service stand-
alone events, exercise preparation and rehearsal, experimentation,
evaluation of advanced training technologies, and evaluation of new
warfighting concepts. The network, when complete, will enable the Joint
Forces Command to use live, virtual, and constructive simulations in
concert to enhance the joint training environment for combatant
commands and services. By the end of fiscal year 2005, the joint
network had been expanded to 33 sites, including one in Hawaii and one
in Germany.
* Accreditation and certification programs. The JNTC accreditation
program works toward ensuring that combatant command and service joint
training programs include the appropriate joint environment for the
joint tasks being trained. Accreditation is program-centric, whereby
entire service and combatant command training programs are evaluated
and accredited for training selected joint tasks in a joint environment
that meets specific joint standards or conditions. The intent of this
effort is to establish a process that ensures delivery of a recurring,
consistent, realistic training environment for all units participating
in joint training, regardless of the locations from which they are
participating. The Joint Forces Command accredited 4 training programs
during fiscal year 2005 and is expecting to accredit 23 more programs
during 2006. JNTC's certification effort concurrently ensures that the
technical aspects of the training programs--the sites and the systems
comprising the training infrastructure, networks, and ranges--support
the accredited training program.
The JNTC initiative, now 1 year after being deemed initially
operational capable, is expected to reach full operational capability
in 2010 when it will provide a global joint training network that
allows live, virtual, and constructive participation by services,
combatant commands, and coalition and interagency partners in
accredited training programs.
DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on
Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements:
The full extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the ability
of the services and combatant commands to train jointly is not clear
because DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of the JNTC initiative
efforts on joint training or developed a strategy for conducting such
an assessment. Based on our examination of 5 of the 16 fiscal year 2005
exercises that the Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance
through the JNTC initiative, we found indications that the JNTC
initiative has begun to improve joint training. Examples we found
include increases in the use of joint objectives and increases in
participation by other services. Without a comprehensive assessment of
the JNTC initiative's enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has
no assurance that its investment in the initiative will produce the
desired results.
DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on
Training Programs:
DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of JNTC efforts on joint
training; therefore both the overall impact the JNTC initiative is
having on joint training programs and the extent to which it is
achieving the program's goals are unclear. The Training Transformation
Implementation Plan does not include a requirement for the JNTC Joint
Management Office to assess whether the JNTC initiative has improved
the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly.
The JNTC Joint Management Office receives feedback through working with
the services and combatant commands, but no formal evaluation of JNTC
efforts has been conducted. The individual services and combatant
commanders are aware of JNTC enhancements to their specific training
programs and resulting improvements and are documenting some of these
enhancements in after action reports and lessons learned reports. For
example, the Navy's preliminary assessment of its Fleet Synthetic
Training --Joint 05-2 exercise stated that the value added through
rapid delivery and improved interoperability and repeatability of the
Fleet Synthetic training capability and the joint network will save
operating costs while providing quality joint and coalition training to
the warfighter. Additionally, as a result of a lesson learned during
Terminal Fury 05, JNTC funds were used to develop an analytical tool
that enabled analysts to search through recorded exercise model data
and replay selected training exercises, which helped explain to the
exercise control group and the training audience how and why a
particular event occurred. However, these types of reports do not
provide an overall assessment of the collective impact JNTC efforts are
having on joint training.
DOD's most recent assessment of its training transformation efforts,
conducted by the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability in support of
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, is known as the training transformation block assessment.
This block assessment, conducted for the first time in 2005, is the
primary mechanism for providing feedback to senior DOD leadership on
how well DOD is meeting its training transformation goals. The block
assessment is to provide an assessment every 2 years that measures,
guides, and evaluates the progress of the training transformation
initiatives, including the JNTC initiative. These evaluations are
intended by DOD to be an innovative use of performance assessment
tools, techniques, and policies, using well-defined metrics to provide
a feedback capability to the leadership. Additionally, DOD recently
announced its plans to conduct a Joint Training Program Review during
mid-2006 to examine training transformation efforts and to realign
these efforts with the recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report and
program strategic guidance.
Our prior work,[Footnote 5] the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
and DOD's Training Transformation Implementation Plan emphasize the
importance of establishing performance metrics that set up time frames
and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program
implementation. GAO's Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic
Training Programs and Development Efforts in the Federal Government
emphasizes the importance of using program performance information to
assess the progress that training and development programs make toward
achieving results. The guide states that agencies should keep in mind
that they need to collect data corresponding to established training
objectives throughout the implementation process to refine and
continually improve, deliver, and enhance learning. Furthermore, the
guide asserts that it is important for agencies to develop and use
outcome-oriented performance measures to ensure accountability and to
assess progress toward achieving results aligned with the agencies'
missions and goals. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report emphasizes
that each initiative is accountable for measuring performance and
delivering results that support the departmentwide strategy. DOD's
Training Transformation Implementation Plan requires periodic reviews
to assess the success of its Training Transformation Program. According
to the plan, every 2 years, a formal program assessment should be
conducted to measure the impact of training transformation initiatives
on joint force readiness. The results of those assessments are intended
to help leaders decide strategy modifications and subsequent
investments.
DOD's initial 2005 training transformation block assessment did not
evaluate the JNTC initiative's collective impact on joint training.
According to DOD officials, this assessment was not expected to provide
a comprehensive evaluation of the JNTC initiative's impact on joint
training because the initiative is still early in its implementation.
Instead, it served as a baseline or framework for identifying joint
training measurements for future assessments, and provided a status of
the JNTC initiative's efforts implemented to date. However, the 2005
assessment did not address training efficiency measured by specific
cost, schedule, and outcome-oriented performance metrics. Specifically,
the 2005 assessment highlighted some progress: (1) the JNTC initiative
is providing more joint training through accreditation and
certification; (2) combatant command joint mission essential tasks are
addressed in events and integrated into training objectives for each
event; and (3) rapidly configurable, persistent training networks, such
as the Joint Training and Experimentation Network, are a current
reality and are being improved. However, the 2005 Training
Transformation Assessment Report noted that because of a wide variation
of joint training activities, the task of developing metrics that
supported effective assessment and corresponding program status
progress was unduly complicated.
The 2005 block assessment did identify 10 metrics DOD is considering
for its future assessments, such as the 2007 block assessment. These
metrics include the percentage of combatant command joint mission
essential tasks trained in the joint exercise; the number of programs
accredited and certified; and the number of participants using JNTC
resources. However, many of these metrics are output oriented and not
outcome performance measures, which are necessary to gauge the success
of program implementation. Additionally, one of the block assessment's
recommendations is to institutionalize a process to develop metrics for
training transformation exercises for use in future assessments.
However, it has not finalized its plans for which metrics are to be
assessed or identified the time frames and processes it will employ for
obtaining data. Because DOD has not finalized its metrics or identified
a process to collect the data, training transformation officials stated
that it may be difficult to show the impact of JNTC efforts on joint
training even in the 2007 block assessment. Without a comprehensive
assessment of JNTC's enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has no
assurance that the money invested in the JNTC initiative will produce
the desired results of providing combatant commanders with better
prepared forces aligned with their joint operational needs or maximize
the benefit for DOD's investment.
Indications Are That the JNTC Initiative Has Begun to Improve Joint
Training:
Even though DOD has yet to assess the overall impact of the JNTC
initiative on joint training, our analysis found indications of
potential improvements, such as events that include more joint
objectives and allow for more joint participation.
According to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction,[Footnote
6] joint training is defined as "Military training based on joint
doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint
forces and/or joint staff to respond to strategic and operational
requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their
assigned missions. Joint training involves forces of two or more
Military Departments interacting with a combatant commander or
subordinate joint force commander; involves joint forces and/or joint
staffs; and is conducted using joint doctrine or joint tactics,
techniques, and procedures."
Based on this definition, we selected several attributes to evaluate
the effect the JNTC initiative had on joint training. Specifically, we
determined whether selected JNTC events conducted in 2005 reflected the
following:
* increased use of joint training objectives,
* increased use of joint task articles,
* increased involvement of other services,
* increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities, and:
* persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC
initiative.
DOD officials reviewed the attributes listed above and agreed their use
was appropriate in evaluating the effect of the JNTC initiative on
joint training.
We analyzed 5 of 16 exercises conducted in fiscal year 2005 that the
Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC
initiative. Table 1 describes the exercises selected for our analysis.
Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined:
Exercise: Terminal Fury;
Description: Terminal Fury is a combatant command exercise designed to
train and evaluate the staff of the Pacific Command Headquarters and
one of its joint task forces in conducting crisis action planning. The
exercise makes extensive use of constructive models. The only live
participants in the exercise are the staff of the Pacific Command
Headquarters and the staff of the Joint Task Force.
Exercise: Air Warrior I;
Description: Air Warrior I is a live exercise designed to train
aircrews and ground personnel in the planning and execution of close
air support. The Air Force's aircraft deploy to and operate from Nellis
Air Force Base, Nevada. The Air Force ground units involved in
coordinating the close air support attacks deploy to and operate with
their associated Army units at Fort Irwin, California.
Exercise: Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint;
Description: Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint is a virtual and
constructive exercise designed to develop and maintain warfighting
proficiency of naval units through tactical exercises conducted by
ships while they are in port. It uses shore-based and ship-embedded
simulation, stimulation systems, and distribution networks to conduct
the exercise.
Exercise: National Training Center;
Description: The Army conducts several live exercises each year at the
National Training Center that are designed to prepare brigade combat
teams for operations. While historically these exercises have involved
armored tank units clashing in the desert, over the past 3 years
training has changed to meet the demands of ongoing operations in
Operation Iraq Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The National
Training Center is located at Fort Irwin, California, and the Army
holds the exercises in conjunction with the Air Force's Air Warrior I
exercises. (See above.)
Exercise: Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructors Course;
Description: The Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course is
a graduate level course of instruction, which is required for the
Marine Corps' aviation squadron weapons and tactics instructors. The 7-
week class involves academics, a flight phase, and live exercises. The
course is taught at the Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
Enhancements to the exercises brought about by the JNTC initiative were
many and varied. Some of the improvements purchased with JNTC
funds[Footnote 7] included radios, aircraft instrument pods, threat
emitters that imitated ground base enemy radar, and cruise missile
simulators. The Air Force used JNTC funds to help establish an Air
Support Operations Center that improved the realism of the Air Warrior
I exercise by including real-world joint operational organizations. The
Joint Forces Command also used JNTC funds to make improvements in
computer models used in the Terminal Fury exercise. Aircraft, including
former Russian aircraft, were obtained with JNTC funds to act as
opposing forces in the Weapons and Tactics Instructor course. JNTC
funds were also used to hire personnel and place them at service and
combatant command headquarters to assist in improving the joint
environment of existing exercises. Finally, the joint network is
supported and funded by JNTC funds, allowing a large number of
simulators and constructive models from around the country to connect
and interact in support of training programs.
To analyze the exercises, we developed a comparative analysis[Footnote
8] based on the attributes discussed above. This practice allowed us to
determine the measure of change in attributes for each selected
training exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained
and reviewed exercise documentation, such as exercise planning
documents and after action reports for selected exercises to determine
the measure of change in the exercise based on our attributes. Our
analysis revealed indications that some joint training improvements
were made in each of the exercises we assessed. Table 2 summarizes the
results of our analysis.
Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in
Joint Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005:
Increased use of joint training objectives;
Terminal Fury[A]: [Empty];
Air Warrior I: X;
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint: X;
National Training Center: X;
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: X.
Increased use of joint task articles;
Terminal Fury[A]: [Empty];
Air Warrior I: X;
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint: X;
National Training Center: [Empty];
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: [Empty].
Increased involvement of other services;
Terminal Fury[A]: [Empty];
Air Warrior I: X;
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint: X;
National Training Center: X;
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: X.
Increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities;
Terminal Fury[A]: ; X;
Air Warrior I: [Empty];
Fleet Synthetic Training
--Joint: ; X;
National Training Center: [Empty];
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: ; X.
Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC
initiative;
Terminal Fury[A]: ; X;
Air Warrior I: ; X;
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint: ; X;
National Training Center: ; X;
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: ; X.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information and documents.
Note: An X indicates where the JNTC initiative has improved the joint
training to some degree.
[A] Terminal Fury is a historical joint combatant command exercise;
therefore the level of increase in its joint training environment was
not as apparent as it was for service exercises.
[End of table]
Our analysis of the five exercises and discussions held with exercise
planners at two of these exercises revealed several key areas in which
indications exist that the JNTC initiative has begun to improve joint
training.
* Increased use of joint training objectives. Our analysis found that
for four of the five exercise events we reviewed, the services
increased the number of joint training objectives to which they
trained. For example, prior to being enhanced by the JNTC initiative,
Air Warrior I's exercise objectives were determined by the squadron
commanders and were focused on achieving service-specific objectives.
After JNTC, service-specific training objectives were modified to
include some joint training objectives, such as conducting a joint,
live-fire event within a realistic combat scenario and employing real-
time joint and combined fires. In another exercise, according to the
exercise planner, JNTC efforts enabled the Navy Fleet Synthetic
Training --Joint exercise to include Army and Air Force units in its
exercise. Through the participation of the Army and Air Force units,
the Navy began including joint interoperability training objectives in
exercise planning documents for both Navy Fleet Synthetic Training --
Joint 05-2 and 06-1. The National Training Center's primary focus, both
before and after the JNTC initiative, has been on accomplishing service-
specific training objectives. However, after the JNTC initiative's
involvement, the National Training Center has added some joint and
interoperability tasks in its exercises, although these tasks are
subordinate to the service-specific training objectives. Prior to the
JNTC initiative, the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course
trained to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, which had some
joint aspects. After JNTC designation, the Marine Corps continued to
train to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, but it began using
several joint tactical tasks and joint training objectives in the
exercise.
* Increased use of joint task articles. The Air Force and the Navy used
joint task articles in enhancing their Air Warrior I and Fleet
Synthetic Training --Joint exercises. Joint task articles detail the
integrated tasks and steps necessary to provide a specific warfighting
capability to a joint force commander and are based on the joint
mission essential tasks. Air Force officials compared the task article
for close air support with current practices at Air Warrior I and
identified deficiencies in the procedures used during these exercises
prior to 2005. Steps were then taken to correct the deficiencies which
included adding an Air Support Operations Center. Consequently, Air
Warrior I exercises are now conducted more in line with close air
support joint doctrine. The Navy also made extensive use of the task
articles in preparing for its accreditation review.
* Increased involvement of other services. Four of the five exercises
we examined showed that participation had expanded to include more
services when compared to years before the JNTC enhancements were
included. The fifth exercise was a combatant command exercise that was
already joint and did not show an increase in the participation of
other services as a result of JNTC efforts. Joint training requires the
involvement of two or more services; therefore the JNTC initiative used
a variety of means, such as additional funding and the Joint Training
and Experimentation Network, to increase the participation of other
services in an exercise. As a result, Navy and Marine air units and the
staff of the Commander, Third Fleet, participated in the National
Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises in 2005. Army and Air Force
units participated in the Navy's Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint in
2005 and 2006. A NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft joined the
Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course exercise in 2005,
and a similar unit from the United Kingdom plans to participate in
2006.
* Increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities. Our
analysis showed that key virtual and constructive training capabilities
made possible by the use of the Joint Training and Experimentation
Network have had a positive impact on three of the five exercises we
examined. The joint network is a persistent, rapidly reconfigurable
communications network that connects multiple training sites. According
to Navy training exercise planners, the joint network is what allowed
the Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint exercises to include Army and Air
Force simulators to participate in the exercise. For example, we
observed during a recent Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint exercise,
Army and Navy operators, using virtual and constructive capabilities,
track an incoming missile attack and coordinate a joint response.
Without the joint network, the Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint
exercises would likely have remained solely a Navy exercise. According
to Terminal Fury exercise planners, the joint network improved Terminal
Fury by increasing the capacity to include a larger number of
constructive models in the exercise. For example, Tactical Simulation
is a very large intelligence model used to simulate the entire spectrum
of intelligence operations. Prior to the joint network, the Tactical
Simulation model was not included in the exercise because the model was
too large to transport to Hawaii. The joint network provided the means
to connect the Tactical Simulation model to the exercise from its home
station in the continental United States. In addition, Terminal Fury
participants are spread out over a wide area, including several sites
in Hawaii and the continental United States. According to Terminal Fury
exercise planners, two tools made possible by the joint network, Video
Teleconferencing and Voice Over Internet Protocol, provided the means
by which these geographically separated sites could coordinate the
execution of the exercise. Finally, according to a Marine Corps
official, the joint network has aided the Marine Corps Weapons and
Tactics Instructor Course in developing exercise scenarios, executing
the exercise, and connecting a virtual Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to the
exercise.
* Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC
initiative. All five exercises reviewed received enhancements that will
continue to benefit these exercises into the future. Each exercise
received a persistent link to the joint network and embedded Support
Element staff hired to assist service and combatant command
headquarters in adding joint capabilities to their exercises. In
addition, the Air Force received radios and aircraft instrument pods
for Air Warrior I, computer model improvements were made for Terminal
Fury, and the National Training Center received surrogate weapons for
its opposing force. All these persistent capabilities were procured
with JNTC funds.
In addition to the improvements noted above, we also found that the
JNTC initiative has reduced some of the travel and transportation costs
associated with one of the five exercises we examined. Specifically, a
number of the constructive models used in the Terminal Fury exercise
are based in the continental United States. In prior years, the
hardware and supporting personnel would have to travel to Hawaii to
participate in the exercise. Since the joint network connected these
models to the exercise from their home stations, there was no need to
move the hardware and support staff to Hawaii for the exercise.
Finally, there are a number of JNTC efforts under way to further
improve joint training. For example, in future iterations of the
National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercise, the Air Force would
like to use the joint network to include a Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System aircraft simulator to create a realistic joint
environment. Due to their limited number and the high demand for these
aircraft, the planes are not always available to participate in the
exercises. The joint network will allow the use of these aircraft
simulators in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercise by
having them participate virtually from their home stations. In addition
to increasing the availability of these aircraft virtually in future
exercises, the joint network will also reduce the travel,
transportation, and fuel costs of deploying and using the actual
aircraft in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises.
Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint
Forces Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves' Unique Training
Needs:
Reserve component members have benefited from JNTC-enhanced training
events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have
not been fully considered because the Joint Forces Command has not
established an ongoing working relationship with them.
Reserve Units Have Participated in JNTC Training Events:
Members of the reserve components have potentially benefited from JNTC-
enhanced training when they participate in active service-and combatant
command-sponsored combat training programs enhanced by the JNTC
initiative, such as predeployment and mission rehearsal exercise
programs. For example, based on our analysis of five training events
enhanced by the JNTC initiative, reserve and guard units and
individuals have participated to a limited extent in all but one of the
five events. Specifically, Air National Guard personnel participated in
a fiscal year 2005 Air Warrior I exercise, Army reservists participated
in a fiscal year 2005 National Training Center exercise, Navy
reservists participated in a fiscal year 2005 Fleet Synthetic Training-
-Joint exercise, and Marine Corps reservists participated in a fiscal
year 2006 Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course exercise. Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials stated that
reserve participation in many of these events occurred, in part,
because active duty units were unavailable to fully participate and
reserve units were asked to fill in. According to JNTC and service
officials, reserves participating in these events may benefit from many
of the same JNTC enhancements to the joint training environment as do
active forces. To date, Joint Forces Command officials said they have
relied on active service components and combatant commands to involve
the reserve components in JNTC-enhanced training.
Joint Forces Command Has Not Established a Working Relationship with
the Reserve Components:
In an effort to develop and manage active service and combatant command
training programs, the Joint Forces Command has developed formal
coordination mechanisms, including liaison officers, planning
conferences, and process action teams that involve numerous
participants from various organizations within the active service and
combatant commands, but these coordination mechanisms do not include
reserve personnel. For example, the Joint Forces Command has
established on-site liaison officer positions to serve as the active
service representative on a daily basis to communicate with the JNTC
officials and aid in the development of the business and operational
processes related to the JNTC initiative. Currently, all liaison
officer positions include representatives from the active services with
no representatives from the reserve components. According to Joint
Forces Command officials and service liaison officers, these active
service liaison officers primarily represent their respective active
service components' needs and issues and do not specifically
communicate the needs of the reserve component to Joint Forces Command
officials.
Active services and combatant command personnel also regularly attend
planning conferences to organize upcoming training exercises. These
meetings occur periodically throughout the initial, middle, and final
planning stages of an exercise, and to date, the Joint Forces Command
has not reached out specifically to the reserve components to include
them in these planning conferences. The Joint Forces Command has also
established nine process action teams organized by functional areas in
operations, technical, and program management to discuss JNTC
implementation and development. These process action teams perform a
vast array of responsibilities, such as:
* developing JNTC event requirements and timelines;
* defining required operational capabilities in order to fully
coordinate live, virtual, and constructive opposition forces into joint
training;
* defining technical goals for data systems that will enable joint
distributed training;
* selecting advanced training technologies to ensure integration of
live, virtual, and constructive components into a seamless joint
training environment; and:
* developing all JNTC budget and program activities.
According to Joint Forces Command officials, the reserve components are
not formally invited to participate in these process action teams.
DOD guidance regarding reserve components and joint training requires
full integration of the reserve components into every aspect and each
stage of the overall process in developing a joint training initiative.
For example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report specifically
highlights the need for joint training to include the reserve
components in ensuring the readiness of the total force. In addition,
the Training Transformation Strategic Plan identifies that the reserve
components face several unique training requirements and circumstances
that must be considered at each step of this process, from strategic
planning through implementation. Further, the 2005 training
transformation block assessment calls for including the reserve
components' training in transformation training events. Specifically,
the assessment states that the reserve components (1) should
participate in training transformation events in order to integrate the
reserve component with the active component and (2) may have special
needs for training, and training events should be tailored to meet
these needs.
During discussions with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Reserve Affairs, officials, they noted the following unique reserve
training circumstances that should be considered when developing the
JNTC enhancements:
* Geography. Since members of the National Guard and reserves are often
not physically located at their respective home duty stations, the
scheduling of training is more complex.
* Limited training time. Reservists are constrained to 39 training days
per year. Only if a reservist is activated or volunteers can he/she
exceed this limitation.
* Competing requirements. Reservists must complete training
requirements similar to the active core training requirements, such as
general military training and physical training, as well as satisfying
any other reserve requirements. Reservists must also consider and
manage their civilian careers along with their military obligations.
* Limited training assets. Resources, such as classrooms and computer
simulation systems and networks for joint training (such as those that
enable live, virtual, and constructive participation), are not readily
available to National Guard members and reservists.
* Lack of training predictability. Since reserve components are
currently not included in the scheduling of joint training events,
planning for joint training opportunities is much more difficult and
erratic.
Along with these unique training requirements, National Guard Bureau
officials stated that some of the National Guard's missions, such as
homeland defense and responding to natural disasters, should be
included as a part of the JNTC initiative that currently are not.
As a result of the absence of formal reserve component representation
in the development of the JNTC initiative, the unique characteristics
of the reserve component have not been incorporated into the
initiative's development of joint training requirements. According to
Joint Forces Command officials, the inclusion of unique reserve
component training needs into the JNTC initiative is a long-term goal.
To date, there has been no specific effort made by the Joint Forces
Command to develop joint tasks or technical enhancements associated
with the needs and missions of the reserve components.
The JNTC initiative's priority remains on active services and combatant
commands, as the development of joint tasks and technical enhancements
has been primarily for existing active service and combatant command
training programs. According to Joint Forces Command officials, the
process for the development of joint articles has involved the active
services and combatant commands and focused on developing tasks for
combat missions, such as close air support, joint force targeting, and
joint fires. Although reserve members deploying to overseas operations
are expected to perform these combat tasks as appropriate, Joint Forces
Command officials have stated that the development of joint articles
has not significantly focused on tasks unique to the reserve
components, such as disaster relief and homeland defense. Further, the
reserve components were not included in the team responsible for the
development of joint articles. Additionally, the development of the
Joint Training and Experimentation Network has established permanent
capability throughout the continental United States at active service
and combatant command facilities. The joint network has been
coordinated with existing active training networks, such as the Navy's
Continuous Training Environment, according to Navy officials, and the
Air Force's Distributed Mission Operations Center. According to Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials,
interfaces with reserve and guard networks have not yet occurred. The
continued lack of focus on the joint training needs of the reserve
components will limit their ability to enhance their joint training
skills.
JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to
New and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities,
or Include the National Guard:
The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process of accrediting
training programs and joint tasks to facilitate the JNTC goals.
However, the command has not (1) placed priority on accrediting
training programs related to new and emerging missions, as highlighted
in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) taken steps
to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to occur after
initial accreditation; and (3) accredited any National Guard-specific
training programs.
Joint Forces Command Has Begun an Accreditation Process:
In fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began a process of
accrediting active services' and combatant commands' training programs
on specific joint tasks, in an effort to facilitate the goals of the
JNTC initiative. The intent of the accreditation process is to validate
that the training programs can provide the training audience,
regardless of location, with a recurring, consistent, realistic
environment for the joint tasks being trained. An accreditation review
is not an inspection or a report card, but can be compared to
accrediting a university, where individual courses of instruction are
officially approved.[Footnote 9] Initially, the JNTC initiative used an
event-centric approach that focused on enhancing single designated
training events. Starting in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command
began employing a program-centric approach that focused on establishing
permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all rotations of
active service and combatant command training programs. Previously, the
event-centric approach only provided a limited number of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines with an opportunity to experience a JNTC-
enhanced joint training event. Specifically, one rotation of the Navy's
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint exercise would have been enhanced by
the JNTC initiative, and the one event would have incorporated enhanced
joint capabilities. However, in the program-centric approach, the
number of training opportunities using JNTC enhancements significantly
increases. Now, every rotation of the Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint
exercise has the opportunity to include enhanced joint training.
The accreditation process involves several steps, beginning with the
nomination process and ending with the Joint Forces Command's
recommendation. The key steps of the accreditation process are
summarized below:
* The Joint Forces Command sends a message to the active services and
combatant commands, requesting that they nominate training programs and
joint tasks to be accredited.
* Once the active services and combatant commands submit their training
programs for nomination, the Joint Forces Command reviews and selects
these programs, and consolidates and prioritizes a master schedule of
those nominated programs to include joint tasks to be performed by each
program.
* To familiarize the active services and combatant commands with the
accreditation process, the Joint Forces Command's Accreditation Review
Team develops a Web site for each training program and provides
training for the services and combatant commands.
* The Joint Forces Command schedules site visits with cognizant active
service and combatant command officials to perform its accreditation
review.
* The Joint Forces Command team conducts the review and makes a
recommendation to the Commander, who will grant the appropriate level
of accreditation status to that training program on specific joint
tasks, in the final accreditation report.[Footnote 10]
JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasize
Priorities Identified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report:
Although the Joint Forces Command has begun its accreditation process
to facilitate the JNTC goals, it has not emphasized nominating training
programs that place a priority on new and emerging missions as stressed
in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. These new and emerging
mission areas include irregular warfare, complex stabilization
operations, combating weapons of mass destruction, and information
operations, which may emphasize additional skill sets than offensive
combat operations, such as cultural awareness training and coordination
with other agencies. In the past nomination cycles, there has been no
guidance that provides criteria for nominating training programs and
joint tasks. In lieu of established nomination guidance, we found that
the active services nominated training programs based on several
reasons. For example, Army and Marine Corps officials told us they
selected programs based on their need to enhance joint tasks for the
maximum number of participants. The Navy nominated programs based on
their ability to provide joint and coalition training. The Air Force
nominated programs based on their perceived gains from adding jointness
to the training environment. While there have been no specific
nomination criteria, the Joint Forces Command has established criteria
it uses for selecting programs once nominated. These criteria focus on
(1) programs that address critical joint training issues that are
affecting warfighting capabilities; (2) the mission of organizations
that will receive joint training; (3) programs that provide
predeployment training; and (4) joint throughput, or the number of
multi-service and joint units that can be trained on required joint
training. These criteria do not emphasize skill sets required for new
and emerging mission areas.
Currently, the Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing
guidance for future use that will provide criteria for nominating
programs. These criteria ask active services and combatant commands to
nominate programs that have the following traits: (1) primary training
audience composed of units or staff; (2) established system for
providing training feedback; (3) established training cadre and/or
exercise control structure; and (4) realistic threat portrayal (i.e.,
opposing forces) within the training programs. Additionally, it
provides nomination criteria for accrediting the joint tasks within the
program. The criteria requires that the joint tasks (1) come from the
Universal Joint Task List[Footnote 11] or the latest approved list of
joint tasks, and (2) fall within the normal core competencies and
normal training environment of the nominated training programs.
Although the Joint Forces Command has proposed nomination guidance, its
draft guidance still has not emphasized the need to accredit tasks
within active service and combatant command training programs that will
improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Until DOD
establishes such nomination guidance, new and emerging missions will
not be given priority in the accreditation process and thus be able to
incorporate the JNTC enhancements.
By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command had
conditionally accredited joint tasks in 4 programs and plans to grant
accreditation to joint tasks in as many as 23 additional programs by
the end of 2006. Most of these training programs focus primarily on
traditional combat missions. For example, the Navy's Fleet Synthetic
Training --Joint program has been conditionally accredited on seven
joint tasks, including developing and sharing intelligence, conducting
joint fires, conducting air and missile defense operations, and
conducting defensive counter air operations. Additionally, the Joint
Forces Command anticipates that the active services and combatant
commands will nominate 3 or 4 additional programs for accreditation in
2007. Table 3 shows the total nominated programs, including the 4
programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005 and the 23
programs planned to be accredited for 2006.
Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for
Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006:
Active service/combatant command: Army;
Training program: Battle Command Training Program[A];
Joint Readiness Training Center;
National Training Center;
Combat Maneuver Training Center.
Active service/combatant command: Air Force;
Training program: Blue Flag[A];
Air Warrior I;
Air Warrior II;
Virtual Flag;
Red Flag;
Cope Thunder;
Warrior Prep Center (nominated by European Command).
Active service/combatant command: Navy;
Training program: Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint[];
Joint Task Force Exercise.
Active service/combatant command: Marine Corps;
Training program: Marine Aviation Weapons Training Squadron 1;
Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program;
Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center;
Mountain Warfare Training Center.
Active service/combatant command: Joint Forces Command;
Training program: Unified Endeavor Mission Rehearsal Program[A].
Active service/combatant command: Pacific Command;
Training program: Pacific Command Joint Task Force Training Program.
Active service/combatant command: Central Command;
Training program: Internal Look.
Active service/combatant command: Northern Command;
Training program: Ardent Sentry.
Active service/combatant command: European Command;
Training program: Joint Training Requirements and Exercise Division;
Warrior Prep Center.
Active service/combatant command: Strategic Command;
Training program: Strategic Command Training Program.
Active service/combatant command: Special Operations Command;
Training program: Able Warrior/Able Focus.
Active service/combatant command: Southern Command;
Training program: Southern Command Joint Exercise Program.
Active service/combatant command: Transportation Command;
Training program: Turbo Challenge.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation.
[A] Indicate training programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year
2005 by Joint Forces Command.
[End of table]
Accreditation Process Has No Mechanism to Ensure Recurring Use of JNTC
Capabilities:
The Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that accredited
joint training will consistently reoccur in active service and
combatant command training programs. As previously noted, the intent of
the accreditation process is to ensure that all units participating in
joint training, regardless of location, experience a recurring,
consistent, realistic joint environment. In addition, DOD has directed
the services to conduct joint training to the maximum extent possible
in accredited exercises. As previously noted, in fiscal year 2005, the
Joint Forces Command began to transition its JNTC initiative from an
event-centric approach to a broader program-centric approach, focusing
on establishing permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all
rotations of training events, not just a single designated training
event.
However, the Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that
joint tasks previously accredited will consistently be incorporated in
future service and combatant commander training events. According to
DOD officials, the services and combatant commands should participate
in the accreditation process in order to obtain JNTC funding for their
nominated training programs. However, according to a Joint Forces
Command official, the command cannot require the services and combatant
commands to train to the joint tasks that have been accredited. Service
officials we spoke with stated that currently there are no consequences
for them not continuing to include accredited joint tasks in future
training rotations. While service officials recognized the value of
training to accredited joint tasks, they also recognized that there are
competing demands for their time and resources that may preclude them
from training to joint tasks. Situations that compete for their time
and resources include service-specific unit training requirements,
shortage of training funds, and the deployment of personnel and
equipment to overseas operations. While the Joint Forces Command
provides financial contributions to the services to help offset the
costs associated with incorporating the JNTC enhancements, it is not
clear if the JNTC initiative's financial contributions are significant
enough to function as leverage to encourage the repeated training of
accredited joint tasks. For example, an Army official stated that the
Army has budgeted $640 million to support its combat training centers
in fiscal year 2006, and that the Joint Forces Command's support for
the Army's combat training centers amounts to $11.6 million.
The Joint Forces Command is taking a proactive step to help support the
active services and combatant commands in embedding JNTC enhancements
in their training programs. It is hiring Support Elements--JNTC
representatives placed permanently at service and combatant command
training programs--to help ensure that the program officials implement
the JNTC initiative by creating a supporting relationship between
organizations. Additionally, the Support Elements are to assist program
officials with joint training planning and executions at their
locations and ensure that standards are maintained in accreditation
reviews. However, according to JNTC officials, these individuals alone
may not be able to ensure that accredited joint training will continue
to occur. Furthermore, it is too early to determine if the services
will continue to include joint tasks on a regular basis, since the
Joint Forces Command only began the accreditation process in 2005 and
only recently established positions to be filled by Support Element
representatives.
The Joint Force Commander plans to reaccredit training programs every 3
years but has not established criteria for their reaccreditation
process that would ensure that services and combatant commanders
continue to incorporate and expand on previously accredited joint
tasks. According to the JNTC Accreditation Concept of Operations, a
reaccreditation process will be used to reaffirm accredited status upon
expiration (following 3 years) or determine the status of a training
program that has undergone such significant change that the existing
program is considerably different from the program that last received
accreditation status. However, this concept of operations does not
address what standard of training needs to be accomplished or what
level of accredited tasks should be trained to receive reaccreditation.
Without providing adequate reaccreditation guidance, the Joint Forces
Command may risk not accomplishing the intent of JNTC's accreditation
efforts. Moreover, until DOD establishes standards for reaccrediting
training programs that ensure the consistent incorporation of JNTC
enhancement in future training rotations, DOD risks not maximizing its
investment in the JNTC initiative.
No National Guard Training Programs Have Been Considered for JNTC
Accreditation:
DOD encourages the integration of the reserve components into joint
training. Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
reinforces the need for joint training to include the reserve
components in ensuring the readiness of the total force, and a DOD
directive on military training[Footnote 12] says that to the maximum
extent possible, all components shall conduct joint training in
accredited events. Our analysis found that the National Guard has
developed joint training exercise programs dealing with missions
involving homeland defense and security. However, no National Guard
training programs have currently been considered for JNTC
accreditation. Joint Forces Command officials stated they have not
placed a priority on involving the National Guard in the JNTC
accreditation process, and incorporating the National Guard into the
JNTC initiative is still a long-term goal for the Joint Forces Command.
The Joint Forces Command has not sent request messages seeking
nominations for joint training accreditation to the National Guard as
it has done for the active services and combatant commands. In
addition, we found that the Joint Forces Command has not established a
process for nominating and accrediting National Guard-specific training
programs.
The National Guard Bureau has approached the Joint Forces Command about
considering the Vigilant Guard training program--a series of training
exercises that will further enhance the preparedness of the National
Guard to perform roles and responsibilities related to homeland defense
and defense support to civil authorities--for the JNTC accreditation
process. The training program involves 4 to 6 states per event with a
focus on the training and coordination of the newly established state
joint force headquarters and state joint task forces. Vigilant Guard
provides the National Guard the opportunity to execute core joint
tasks, such as (1) acquire and communicate operational-level
information and maintain status; (2) establish, organize, and operate a
joint force headquarters; and (3) provide theater support to other DOD
and government agencies. However, National Guard officials stated that
Vigilant Guard has not yet been considered for accreditation by the
Joint Forces Command.
National Guard Bureau officials have also recently discussed with the
Joint Forces Command officials the potential for linking the National
Guard's GuardNet network to JNTC's joint network. GuardNet is a network
for delivering telecommunications services to National Guard users in
54 U.S. states and territories, providing persistent connectivity. It
consolidates video and data functions to support simulation, training,
mobilization command and control, and computer emergency response, in
addition to operational missions assigned to the National Guard. These
telecommunications capabilities have helped to reduce stress on the
National Guard force by decreasing personnel travel and increasing home
station time available for training. To date, National Guard officials
stated that GuardNet has not been integrated into JNTC's joint network
design. Although Joint Forces Command and National Guard officials have
had meetings regarding the inclusion of both Vigilant Guard and
GuardNet into the JNTC joint network, National Guard Bureau officials
stated that no action has yet been taken. Without specific JNTC-
accredited training programs and linkages with JNTC's joint network,
National Guard training programs may not be able to take full advantage
of JNTC resources, such as participation from other components, access
to new technologies and modeling, and training environments that
realistically portray overseas and domestic joint operations.
Conclusions:
In the new security environment, U.S. forces are conducting
significantly more complex operations requiring increased joint
interoperability among participants in the theater and on the
battlefield. DOD's JNTC initiative is designed to help the services and
combatant commands meet these challenges. Without thoroughly assessing
the progress of the Joint Forces Command's training transformation
efforts, DOD does not know the value added to the readiness of services
and combatant commands resulting from the significant investment of
resources devoted to the JNTC initiative. Furthermore, recent domestic
events and ongoing overseas operations have placed extremely high
demands on the reserve components, which play a critical role in
executing our national defense strategy. Once mobilized, reservists and
National Guard members operate in the same joint environment as active
service members. Unless the reserve components receive the training
necessary to allow them to operate seamlessly in this environment,
reservists may be unprepared to face the full range of responsibilities
they are called upon to perform both at home and abroad. Until the
Joint Forces Command embraces the reserve components, incorporating
their unique training needs into the development of the JNTC
initiative's joint training enhancements, the reserve and the National
Guard forces will not be able to take full advantage of the enhanced
joint training offered through this initiative. Additionally, without
clear criteria to guide the accreditation and reaccreditation process,
DOD will have no assurance that the joint training initiative reflects
DOD's training priorities on new and emerging threats or that the
services and combatant commands will continually take advantage of the
resources and capabilities provided by the JNTC initiative. Without
consistently training its forces in a recurring, realistic, joint
operating environment, DOD will lack assurance that forces deployed to
its theaters will have the necessary skills to operate effectively in
today's complex, multinational, interagency operations. Also, without
incorporating the National Guard into the accreditation process, DOD
has no assurance that the National Guard will experience realistic
overseas and domestic joint operational training environments portrayed
by JNTC enhancements. Furthermore, DOD needs to address the issues
highlighted above in order to ensure that the joint training benefits
from its $1.5 billion investment in the JNTC initiative are being
optimized.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To further enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the
benefits of the JNTC initiative for the reserve components, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five
actions:
* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
fully develop a strategy for the next training transformation
assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative's
implementation on joint training, including time frames, outcome-
oriented performance metrics, roles and responsibilities, and outcomes;
* direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers for the
reserve components and include representatives from the reserve
components as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning
sessions;
* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish guidelines for the services and combatant commands to follow
when nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect the
importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by DOD's 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review Report;
* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that
a recurring, consistent, realistic joint training environment exists
for all units participating in accredited joint training programs; and:
* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training
programs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with four
recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation to
establish reserve liaisons. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix
II.
Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department
develop a strategy for evaluating the overall impact of the JNTC
initiative as part of its 2007 training transformation assessment. DOD
stated that it is in the process of developing a plan for its 2007
assessment that will include detailed metrics and roles and
responsibilities and will address the impact of transformation
initiatives on DOD-wide training.
DOD also agreed with our recommendations to (1) establish guidelines
that emphasize the need for the services and combatant commands to
consider new and emerging issues when nominating programs for
accreditation, (2) establish reaccreditation standards and criteria,
and (3) expand the accreditation process to include National Guard
training programs. DOD stated that its accreditation guidance will be
refined to include consideration of new and emerging missions during
the next phase of accreditation reviews. Additionally, DOD stated that
the Joint Forces Command will ensure that the accreditation concept of
operations is strengthened to include specific reaccreditation
standards. Further, DOD stated it will add National Guard training
programs with the appropriate joint environment to the accreditation
nomination list. Moreover, it noted that the JNTC Joint Management
Office is actively discussing this action with National Guard
leadership to develop a plan for inclusion of National Guard joint
training programs.
Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Joint
Forces Command establish liaison officers for the reserve components
and include reserve component representatives as participants in JNTC
working groups and planning sessions. The department agreed it should
establish liaison officers for the National Guard and include Guard
representatives as participants in JNTC working groups and planning
sessions. However, DOD stated that the joint training requirements of
the other reserve components are adequately addressed through the
current service liaison officer structure within JNTC and the assigned
reserve Joint Warfighting Center. DOD's approach would require that the
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp reserves continue to voice their
training needs indirectly through their respective service headquarters
rather than through direct participation. However, as discussed in this
report, Training Transformation documents and officials from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense's Office of Reserve Affairs have
recognized that the reserve components have some unique training
requirements and that these requirements have yet to receive priority
in the Joint Forces Command's JNTC initiative. We continue to believe
that all reserve components would benefit if the Joint Forces Command
would establish liaison officers for both the National Guard and the
service reserve components and include them as active participants in
JNTC working groups and planning sessions to allow them to voice their
unique training needs and enhance their awareness of new developments
and opportunities in joint training.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the
Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report is available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Joint National Training Capability
(JNTC) initiative has improved the ability of the services and
combatant commands to train jointly, we analyzed 5 of the 16 training
exercises selected by the Joint Forces Command to incorporate JNTC
enhancements in fiscal year 2005. We reviewed relevant exercise
planning documents pertaining to the exercises and JNTC enhancements.
We also discussed the impact of the JNTC initiative with a variety of
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, service
headquarters, combatant commands, and Joint Chiefs of Staff who were
involved in this effort. Additionally, we discussed our methods, the
attributes to be assessed, and the information collected with agency
officials and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because some elements of the population
have no chance of being selected. Specifically, we did the following:
* To select the five exercises, we reviewed the descriptions and
training profiles provided by JNTC initiative officials, and in
consultation with these officials, we identified one event selected by
the Joint Forces Command to be enhanced by the JNTC initiative from
each of the military services and one sponsored by a combatant command.
* To analyze the exercises, we identified attributes that would allow
us to quantitatively discern the differences in selected exercises
prior to their JNTC designation and afterwards. We then developed a
detailed data collection instrument to precisely and consistently
gather attribute information for comparative analysis. Our analysis of
these attributes allowed us to determine the measure of change in a
selected fiscal year 2005 training exercise prior to fiscal year 2005
and afterwards. We obtained and reviewed exercise documentation, such
as exercise planning documents, and after action reports for selected
exercises to determine the measure of change in the exercises based on
our attributes.
* To augment our documentation review of the JNTC initiative's impact
on existing service and combatant exercises, we met with service,
combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss their perspectives on
the overall value added to joint training by the JNTC initiative. We
then visited and observed 2 of the 5 exercises to obtain a real-time
assessment of the past and planned evolution of the exercises and
feedback from exercise participants, including the planners.
To determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had assessed the
full impact of the JNTC effort on joint training through its first
training transformation assessment, we reviewed and analyzed key DOD
and JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
2006 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2005
Training Transformation Assessment Report, and the JNTC initiative's
strategic plan. Additionally, we met with Office of the Secretary of
Defense officials directly involved in conducting the training
transformation assessment to discuss the methodology for the current
assessment and plans for future assessments.
To determine the extent to which the reserve components are benefiting
from the JNTC initiative, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC
documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006
revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the JNTC strategic and
implementation plans, to identify program guidance on the inclusion of
the reserve components in training transformation initiatives and
assess the level of coordination established between the JNTC
initiative and the reserve components. We also examined the extent to
which the reserve components participated in JNTC current events and
formal collaboration mechanisms to further evaluate the effectiveness
of the program to benefit the reserve components. Additionally, we
conducted interviews with key reserve, National Guard, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, service, and JNTC representatives to discuss the
overall impact of the JNTC initiative on the reserve components.
To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has developed
an accreditation process that facilitates program goals, we obtained
and reviewed key accreditation documentation, such as the Accreditation
Concept of Operations, JNTC accreditation program briefing slides, the
draft accreditation handbook and DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report. We also reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents,
including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 revised
Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC strategic
plan, to identify program guidance and critical milestones.
Additionally, we reviewed selected training programs' JNTC
accreditation reports. To augment our documentation review, we met with
service, combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss the status
and intent of the accreditation process. Specifically, we inquired
about the status of the accreditation effort, the nomination process,
and the reaccreditation process. We also examined to what extent the
reserve components participated in the JNTC initiative's accreditation
process. Table 4 lists the organizations and locations we visited
during the course of this review.
Table 6: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment:
Organization: Army;
Locations: Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Training,
Collective Training Division, Washington, D.C.
Organization: Army;
Locations: Army National Guard, Readiness Center, Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: Air Force;
Locations: Headquarters Air Force, Joint Exercises and Training
Innovation, Washington, D.C.
Organization: Air Force;
Locations: Air Combat Command, Joint Training and Exercise Directorate,
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
Organization: Marine Corps;
Locations: Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education Command,
Quantico, Virginia.
Organization: Marine Corps;
Locations: U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia.
Organization: Navy;
Locations: Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Ranges and Fleet Training
Branch, Arlington, Virginia.
Organization: Navy;
Locations: Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia.
Organization: Navy;
Locations: Tactical Training Group, Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia.
Organization: Navy;
Locations: USS McFaul, (DDG-74), Norfolk, Virginia.
Organization: National Guard;
Locations: National Guard Bureau, Alexandria, Virginia.
Organization: Joint organizations;
Locations: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve
Affairs, Washington D.C.
Organization: Joint organizations;
Locations: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training
Policy and Programs, Washington, D.C;
- Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability Joint Management Office,
Alexandria, Virginia.
Organization: Joint organizations;
Locations: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C;
- Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate,
Washington, D.C.
Organization: Joint organizations;
Locations: U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia;
- Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, Suffolk,
Virginia;
- Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk,
Virginia.
Organization: Joint organizations;
Locations: U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii;
- Headquarters, Joint Training Directorate, Camp Smith,; Hawaii.
Organization: Joint organizations;
Locations: U.S. Pacific Air Force, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.
Organization: Joint organizations;
Locations: U.S. Pacific Fleet, Makalapa Compound, Hawaii.
Organization: Joint organizations;
Locations: Headquarters, Joint Task Force 519, Hawaii.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
4000 Defense Pentagon Washington D.C. 20361-4000:
July 21, 2006:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Government Accountability Office:
G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, "Military Training: Actions
Needed to Enhance DoD's Investment in the Joint National Training
Capability," dated June 21, 2006 (code 350724 / GAO-06-802).
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft. We
see value in the GAO's review and the resultant observations. We concur
with four of the five recommendations and partially concur with the
remaining recommendation. The Department's comments on the GAO draft
recommendations are enclosed, along with comments on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul W. Mayberry:
Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness):
Enclosures:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report- Dated June 21, 2006
GAO CODE 350724/GAO-06-802:
"Military Training: Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's
Investment Joint National Training Capability"
Department Of Defense Comments to the Recommendations:
Recommendation l: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
fully develop a strategy for the next training transformation
assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the Joint National
Training Capability (JNTC) implementation on joint training, including
timeframes, outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and
responsibilities, and outcomes.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department is developing a comprehensive
assessment strategy for all of joint training and specifically for the
Training Transformation Program as detailed in the Training
Transformation (T2) Strategic and Implementation Plans. The Joint
Assessment and Enabling Capability (JAEC), as part of T2, was chartered
specifically to assess the effectiveness of T2, including the Joint
National Training Capability (JNTC). An execution plan for the 2005
block assessment baseline was released in May 2005 (Training
Transformation 2005 Block Assessment Execution Plan). The 2005 Training
Transformation Assessment report formed the baseline for ongoing
training program assessments and reported favorably on the initiatives
when published in December 2005. A detailed plan for the 2007
assessment will be released for T2 stakeholder coordination in August
2006. This plan will include detailed metrics, roles, and
responsibilities and address the desired continuous assessment of T2
and the impact of our transformation initiatives on defense-wide
training, consistent with the recommendation.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, Joint Forces Command, to establish liaison
officers for the Reserve components and include representatives from
the Reserve components as active participants in Joint National
Training Capability working groups and planning sessions.
DOD Response: Partially concur. We concur with the National Guard
portion of the recommendation, however the recommendation does not
apply to the entire Reserve component, "the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve,
Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve in
addition to Army National Guard and Air National Guard. The report
addresses National Guard and Reserve component interchangeably. The
joint training requirements of the Reserve components of the Military
Services beyond the National components are adequately addressed
through the current Service liaison officer structure the Joint
National Training Capability (JNTC) and assigned Reserve Joint
Warfighting Center staff. This is reinforced also with the provisioning
of all forces (to include the Reserve component forces) to U.S. Joint
Forces Command by their respective Service component commands (e.g.,
U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S, Air Force Air Component Command, etc).
As a result of this report, U.S. Joint Forces Command leadership will
ensure that the full Reserve component becomes more engaged in the JNTC
process. Advocates for the Reserve component include the OSD Reserve
Affairs representation on the Training Transformation Executive
Steering Group, Senior Advisory Group, and Joint Integrated Process
Team, and by Reserve component officers at U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Our total force concept of active duty and Reserve component forces
serves as a foundation of U.S. military force employment and thus
serves as a vehicle for training planning, execution, and assessment.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish guidelines for the Services and combatant commands to follow
when nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect the
importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by DoD's 2005
Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
Dod Response: Concur. The Department supports the U.S. Joint Forces
Command (JSCOM)-led accreditation process as the proper vehicle for
determining operational requirements of the various programs conducting
Joint training. While we concur with the recommendation, it is
worthwhile to note that the category "new and emerging missions' is
only one source of total training requirements. During the first round
of accreditation reviews (FY 05 and FY 06) the Services and Combatant
Commanders were asked to nominate programs and their associated joint
training tasks for accreditation In the next phase FY 07 and FY 08) we
will institute a more directive approach to the process, as required by
the 2006 DoD Defense Review and the Strategic Planning Guidance for FY
2007-2013, The accreditation guidance will be refined to include
consideration of new and emerging missions identified in the 2006 DoD
Quadrennial Defense Review. This will likely require additional
resources. The details are under consideration within the Department.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish re-accreditation standards and criteria that will ensure a
recurring, consistent, and realistic joint training environment exists
for all units participating in accredited joint training programs.
DOD Response: Concur. The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is the lead
agency for executing Joint National Training Capability accreditations
under direction of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness),
and will ensure that the Accreditation Concept of Operations is
strengthened to include specific re-accreditation standards. During the
time of this GAO review, the accreditation program was in its first
round of activity with selected service and combatant command events.
The Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office is
developing re-accreditation standards aligned with the ongoing
accreditation activity.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training
programs.
DOD Response: Concur. Accreditation of National Guard training programs
is currently under coordination by the Joint National Training
Capability Joint Management Office; however an element of consideration
is realignment of Training Transformation (T2) resources. The
Department will add National Guard Training programs with appropriate
joint context to the accreditation nomination list. The Joint National
Training Capability Joint Management Office lively discussing this
action with National Guard leadership to develop a plan for inclusion
of National Guard joint training programs.
[End of section]
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant
Director; Fred Harrison; Joe Faley; Bonita Anderson; Angela Watson;
Yong Song; Kevin Keith; Susan Ditto; and Rebecca Shea also made major
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not Well-
Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid. GAO-06-211.
Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2006.
Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training
and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements. GAO-
06-193. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.
Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve
Personnel and Equipment Shortages. GAO-05-660. Washington, D.C.: July
12, 2005.
Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform
Joint Training. GAO-05-548. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to
Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat
Training Centers. GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Military Education: DOD Needs to Develop Performance Goals and Metrics
for Advanced Distributed Learning in Professional Military Education.
GAO-04-873. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. Washington,
D.C.: April 29, 2004.
Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development
Efforts in the Federal Government. GAO-04-546G. Washington, D.C.: March
2004.
Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could
Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program. GAO-03-
1026. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003.
Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air
Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2003.
Military Transformation: Progress and Challenges for DOD's Advanced
Distributed Learning Programs. GAO-03-393. Washington, D.C.: February
28, 2003.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint
Experimentation Program. GAO-02-856. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2002.
Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in
Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army
Division Training. GAO-01-902. Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped, but Training
and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain. GAO-01-27. Washington, D.C.:
November 14, 2000.
Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces,
but Challenges Remain. GAO/NSAID-00-162. Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2000.
Army National Guard: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but Personnel
and Workload Are Problems. GAO/NSAID-00-114. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2000.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressionally imposed DOD
effort to be conducted every 4 years to set defense strategy and goals.
[2] "Live training" refers to live simulations involving real people
operating real systems in a live environment. "Virtual training"
involves virtual simulations using real people operating simulated
systems. "Constructive training" refers to simulated people operating
simulated systems, often referred to as war games.
[3] Joint mission essential tasks are tasks selected by a joint force
commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using
the common, universal language.
[4] Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan,
2006 - 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
[5] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic Training
Programs and Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G
(Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
[6] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01C, Joint
Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States.
[7] JNTC funds were distributed between the Joint Forces Command and
the services. These funds were channeled through the Operations and
Maintenance; Other Procurement; and Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation appropriations.
[8] A cost analysis was not done because the data needed were not
readily available. Specifically, the JNTC funds resided in different
appropriations; the source of cost information was spread over a number
of organizations; and some fixed costs, such as installation of the
joint network, sustainment of the joint network, and maintenance of
existing exercise infrastructure, represented a number of exercises and
other activities.
[9] Similar to the accrediting of a university, a training program is
accredited, not the training audience. As the accrediting agency, the
Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center ensures that the
training program has the required resources and addresses key elements
to provide quality joint training to the training audience.
[10] When the Joint Forces Command considers a training program for
accreditation, it assesses the program and determines if it merits
being fully accredited, conditionally accredited, or not qualified to
be accredited.
[11] The Universal Joint Task List is a menu of capabilities that may
be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned
mission.
[12] Department of Defense Directive, 1322.18, Military Training.
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