Defense Acquisitions
Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-06-955 September 11, 2006In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, a key element of its effort to transform military operations to be network centric. Using emerging software-defined radio technology, the JTRS program plans to develop and procure hundreds of thousands of radios that give warfighters the capability to access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice and video, and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. The JTRS program has encountered a number of problems, resulting in significant delays and cost increases. The program is currently estimated to total about $37 billion. Given the criticality of JTRS to DOD's force transformation, Congress directed GAO to continue its ongoing review of the JTRS program. This report (1) assesses whether a recent restructuring puts the program in a better position to succeed and (2) identifies any risks that challenge the successful fielding of JTRS.
The proposed JTRS restructuring--a plan DOD approved in March 2006--appears to address and reduce program risks that GAO and others have documented in recent years. While still meeting key requirements, including those related to DOD's network centric transformation effort, the revised approach is expected to develop and field capabilities in increments rather than attempting to develop and field the capabilities all at once. Costly and non-transformational requirements will be deferred to later increments. Deferring these requirements will allow more time to mature critical technologies, integrate components, and test the radio system before committing to production. JTRS program management has also been strengthened through the establishment of a Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO). The more centralized management structure should help the program improve oversight and coordination of standards, system engineering, and development of the radios. The real test will be in execution, and, for that, several management and technical challenges remain. First, JPEO must finalize the details of the restructuring, including formal acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and evaluation plans. DOD also needs to develop migration and fielding plans for how JTRS networking capabilities will be used. Completing and obtaining DOD's approval of these activities is needed to ensure the JTRS program is executable. There are also a number of longer-term technical challenges that the JTRS program must address. For example, the proposed interim solutions for enabling network interoperability among different JTRS variants have yet to be developed. In addition, integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has also been a longstanding challenge that must be overcome. Furthermore, operating in a networked environment open to a large number of potential users has generated an unprecedented need for information assurance. This need has resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and still evolving certification process from the National Security Agency. At the same time, the program must address the need to obtain and sustain commitments and support from the military services and other stakeholders--a challenge that has often hampered joint development efforts in the past. The extent to which DOD overcomes these challenges will determine the extent to which the program manages cost, schedule, and performance risks and supports JTRS-dependent military operations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-955, Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-955
entitled 'Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk,
but Significant Challenges Remain' which was released on September 11,
2006.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Defense Acquisitions:
Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges
Remain:
Defense Acquisitions:
GAO-06-955:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-955, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Joint Tactical
Radio System (JTRS) program, a key element of its effort to transform
military operations to be network centric. Using emerging software-
defined radio technology, the JTRS program plans to develop and procure
hundreds of thousands of radios that give warfighters the capability to
access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice and video, and
obtain information directly from battlefield sensors.
The JTRS program has encountered a number of problems, resulting in
significant delays and cost increases. The program is currently
estimated to total about $37 billion. Given the criticality of JTRS to
DOD‘s force transformation, Congress directed GAO to continue its
ongoing review of the JTRS program. This report (1) assesses whether a
recent restructuring puts the program in a better position to succeed
and (2) identifies any risks that challenge the successful fielding of
JTRS.
What GAO Found:
The proposed JTRS restructuring”a plan DOD approved in March
2006”appears to address and reduce program risks that GAO and others
have documented in recent years. While still meeting key requirements,
including those related to DOD‘s network centric transformation effort,
the revised approach is expected to develop and field capabilities in
increments rather than attempting to develop and field the capabilities
all at once. Costly and non-transformational requirements will be
deferred to later increments. Deferring these requirements will allow
more time to mature critical technologies, integrate components, and
test the radio system before committing to production. JTRS program
management has also been strengthened through the establishment of a
Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO). The more centralized management
structure should help the program improve oversight and coordination of
standards, system engineering, and development of the radios.
The real test will be in execution, and, for that, several management
and technical challenges remain. First, JPEO must finalize the details
of the restructuring, including formal acquisition strategies,
independent cost estimates, and test and evaluation plans. DOD also
needs to develop migration and fielding plans for how JTRS networking
capabilities will be used. Completing and obtaining DOD‘s approval of
these activities is needed to ensure the JTRS program is executable.
There are also a number of longer-term technical challenges that the
JTRS program must address. For example, the proposed interim solutions
for enabling network interoperability among different JTRS variants
have yet to be developed. In addition, integrating the radio‘s hardware
onto diverse platforms and meeting respective size, weight, and power
limitations has also been a long-standing challenge that must be
overcome. Furthermore, operating in a networked environment open to a
large number of potential users has generated an unprecedented need for
information assurance. This need has resulted in a lengthy, technically
challenging, and still evolving certification process from the National
Security Agency. At the same time, the program must address the need to
obtain and sustain commitments and support from the military services
and other stakeholders”a challenge that has often hampered joint
development efforts in the past. The extent to which DOD overcomes
these challenges will determine the extent to which the program manages
cost, schedule, and performance risks and supports JTRS-dependent
military operations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations aimed at ensuring that the activities
required for completing the JTRS restructuring reflect stable
requirements, knowledge-based acquisition strategies, realistic costs,
and comprehensive test plans, as well as to develop plans for fielding
JTRS radios. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with
these recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-955].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter1:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Program Restructuring Appears to Address Many Concerns with JTRS:
Program Uncertainties and Technical Risks Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel Bandwidth, and
Data Rates for Selected Legacy Waveforms and New Wideband Waveforms:
Table 2: Responsibilities of JTRS Program/Product Offices until 2005:
Table 3: Three JTRS Development Options Presented in November 2005:
Table 4: Responsibilities of JPEO JTRS Domains:
Table 5: Estimated Procurement Amounts Required for Other Radio Systems
from 1998 through 2006 by Procuring Organization:
Table 6: Summary of JPEO-Initiated Changes to JTRS Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: JTRS Operational Overview:
Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on Product Schedules:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System:
JPEO: Joint Program Executive Office:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 11, 2006:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Chairman:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
The Honorable David Obey:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a
major transformation of its military operations--one that will rely on
network centric communications to improve force information sharing,
collaboration, and situational awareness and, thereby, enable more
rapid and effective decision-making and speed of execution on the
battlefield. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, initiated
in 1997, is a key effort in this transformation. By capitalizing on
emerging software-defined radio technology, the program plans to
develop and procure hundreds of thousands of JTRS radios, which are
expected to interoperate with existing radio systems and provide the
warfighter with additional communications capability to access maps and
other visual data, communicate via voice and video with other units and
levels of command, and obtain information directly from battlefield
sensors.
Although JTRS offers the potential to address key communications
shortfalls and significantly improve military capabilities, the program
has encountered a number of problems, including unstable requirements,
immature technologies, and aggressive schedules, which have resulted in
significant cost increases and delays. In August 2003, we reported that
the lack of a strong, joint-management structure presented significant
challenges to the program's ability to control costs[Footnote 1]--
currently estimated to total about $37 billion. In response, Congress
directed DOD to strengthen program management, and in February 2005,
DOD established a Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) to manage the
JTRS program and its various components. Following JPEO's assessment of
the program, the Defense Acquisition Board directed JPEO to come up
with a plan to restructure the JTRS development effort--a plan that DOD
approved in March 2006.
Given the criticality of JTRS to DOD's force transformation, Congress
directed GAO to continue its ongoing review of the JTRS
program.[Footnote 2] This report (1) assesses whether the recent
restructuring puts the program in a better position to succeed and (2)
identifies any risks that challenge the successful fielding of JTRS.
We conducted our review from August 2005 to August 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. To assess
program progress and risks, we reviewed program restructuring data from
the JTRS JPEO, including cost, schedule, and performance data. We also
reviewed the fiscal year 2007 budget request and projected future year
budget requests. We interviewed agency officials from various DOD and
service organizations and reviewed reports produced by Defense
organizations. More details about our scope and methodology are in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The recent restructuring of the JTRS program appears to put the program
in a better position to succeed, by emphasizing an incremental, more
moderate risk approach to developing and fielding capabilities. The
incremental approach reflects the military services' most urgent
priorities for a mobile, flexible communications and networking
capability and defers the development of some of the more challenging
requirements to later increments. Deferring these requirements will
allow more time to mature critical technologies, integrate components,
and test the radio system before committing to production. DOD expects
that JTRS program management through the JPEO and other structural
changes will improve oversight and coordination of standards and
development of the radios. The centralized management structure is also
empowered to manage development costs, which are expected to total $2.1
billion more than originally projected between fiscal years 2006 and
2011. In addition, the restructuring attempts to facilitate information-
sharing and competition by ensuring government purpose rights[Footnote
3] to contractor-developed products.
While the restructuring appears to address many of the problems that
affected JTRS in the past, several management and technical challenges
still remain. JPEO must finalize the details of the restructuring,
including test and evaluation plans and formal acquisition strategies.
Estimated program costs also require independent review and validation
and the services need to work out migration and fielding plans for the
radios. Completing these activities and obtaining DOD's approval of the
completed JTRS program restructuring are essential to ensuring the JTRS
program is executable. Over the longer term, the program faces several
key management and technical challenges. For example, although the new
joint management structure for JTRS is a significant improvement over
the previous fragmented program management structure, joint development
efforts in DOD have often been hampered by an inability to sustain
requirements commitments and funding support from the military services
and other department stakeholders. Regarding technical challenges,
integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting
respective size, weight, and power limitations has been a long-standing
challenge and remains so. Operating in a networked environment--open to
a large number of potential users--has also resulted in a lengthy,
technically challenging, and still evolving information assurance
certification process from the National Security Agency. Furthermore,
the proposed interim technical solutions for enabling network
interoperability among different JTRS variants have yet to be designed
and developed.
We are recommending the Secretary of Defense ensure that the activities
required for completing the JTRS restructuring reflect stable
requirements, knowledge-based acquisition strategies, and comprehensive
test plans, as well as to develop plans for fielding JTRS radios. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations.
Background:
The JTRS program was initiated to exploit advancements in software-
defined radio technology and provide battlefield commanders with
superior information capabilities. Since its initiation in 1997, the
program has experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance
shortfalls, due primarily to immature technologies, unstable
requirements, and aggressive schedules. In an effort to address these
problems, the program was restructured in March of this year. However,
due to JTRS' lengthy development path, DOD has had to continue buying
other tactical radios--currently estimated to cost $11 billion--to
support its communication needs.
JTRS Was Initiated to Address Long-Term Military Communications Needs:
Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on
smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information
and communication capabilities. The single function hardware design of
DOD's existing radio systems lack the functionality and flexibility
necessary to achieve and maintain information superiority or to support
the rapid mobility and interoperability required by today's armed
forces. To support new operational or mission requirements, DOD
determined that the large number and diversity of legacy radios in use
would require wholesale replacement or expensive modifications.
Software-defined radios such as JTRS primarily use software rather than
hardware to control how the radio works and, because they are
programmable, JTRS offers significant flexibility to meet a wide
variety of needs. Rather than developing radios that are built to
different standards and operate on different fixed frequencies, as was
the case in the past, JTRS is to be a single, interoperable family of
radios based on a common set of standards and applications. The radios
are expected to not only satisfy the requirements common to the
military's three operational domains--air, sea, and ground--but be able
to communicate directly with many of DOD's existing tactical radios. To
facilitate interoperability, JTRS will develop a set of waveforms
(software radio applications) designed with the same operating
characteristics as many of DOD's existing radios.[Footnote 4] Depending
on operational needs, different waveforms could be loaded onto a JTRS
radio and used to communicate with a variety of other radios.
In addition to supporting interoperability, JTRS is to contribute to
DOD's goal of network centric warfare operations by introducing new
wideband networking waveforms that dramatically increase the amount of
data and speed at which the data can be transmitted. As such, the
waveforms would facilitate the use of maps, imagery, and video to
support the decision-making of tactical commanders at all echelons.
Table 1 compares the frequency band, nominal channel bandwidth, and
data rates of selected legacy waveforms and new wideband waveforms.
Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel Bandwidth, and
Data Rates for Selected Legacy Waveforms and New Wideband Waveforms:
Waveform: Legacy: Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
(SINCGARS);
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 30 - 88;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 25;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice: 16; Data:
.075 - 16.
Waveform: Legacy: Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS);
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 420 - 450;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 3,000;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Data: 57 or 228.
Waveform: Legacy: High Frequency;
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 2 - 30;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 3/6/12;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice and Data: 11
distinct data rates between; .075 - 9.6.
Waveform: Legacy: Have Quick;
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 225 - 400;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 25;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice: 16; Data:
.075 - 16.
Waveform: Legacy: Tactical Data Information Link-Joint (TADIL-J);
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 960 - 1,215;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 3,000;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice: 2.4 and 16;
Data: 28.8 - 1,137.
Waveform: Legacy: Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications Demand
Assigned Multiple Access (UHF SATCOM DAMA);
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 225 - 400;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 5 and 25;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Voice and Data: .075 -
56, or 64.
Waveform: New: Wideband Networking[A];
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 2 - 2,000;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 25 - 30,000;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Data: up to 5,000.
Waveform: New: Soldier Radio[A];
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 2 - 2,000;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): 13,000;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): Data: up to 1,000.
Waveform: New: Joint Airborne Network - Tactical Edge;
Frequency band (millions of Hertz (MHz)): 2 - 2,000;
Nominal channel bandwidth (thousands of Hertz (KHz)): To be determined;
Data rate (thousands of bits per second (Kbps)): To be determined.
Source: GAO analysis of April 2003 JTRS Operational Requirements
Document, Annex E.
[A] The Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform are
actually families of waveforms. The Wideband Networking Waveform family
consists of four different waveforms and the Soldier Radio Waveform
family consists of three different waveforms.
[End of table]
In addition to providing new wideband waveforms, individual JTRS radios
would have the capability to support multiple services (e.g., voice,
data, and video) and operate on multiple channels simultaneously. For
example, a four-channel JTRS radio set intended for a ground vehicle
could be programmed to have channels dedicated to SINCGARS, Have Quick,
the Wideband Networking Waveform, and the Soldier Radio Waveform. All
four channels could be operating simultaneously. Data could also be
transferred from one channel (or network) to another through a
"gateway" device implemented with hardware and software.
Figure 1 depicts the JTRS operational overview.
Figure 1: JTRS Operational Overview:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JTRS Operational Requirements Document, April 2003.
Notes:
IBS: Integrated Broadcast Service:
GPS: Global Positioning System:
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:
EKMS: Electronic Key Management System:
IA: Information Assurance:
C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
[End of figure]
Developing JTRS is a significant challenge. Because JTRS is intended to
operate on the battlefield where there is no fixed infrastructure of
cell towers, fiber optic lines, and other network components such as
routers and switches, the radios must be powerful enough to transmit
and relay information wirelessly over long distances, maintain network
linkages and quality of service while on the move, and ensure that
communications and the network itself are secure. Development of the
individual waveforms and their ability to function effectively on
different JTRS sets is critical to the success of JTRS. The Wideband
Networking Waveform, for example, will require complex software
development and include over 1.6 million lines of software code. To
ensure the waveforms perform as intended, they will go through a
rigorous certification process--one that involves testing the
functionality, portability,[Footnote 5] interoperability, and security
aspects of the waveforms when operating on production representative
JTRS radios.
To manage JTRS' development, DOD established a Joint Program Office and
service-led program/product offices in the late 1990s. Table 2
summarizes the general management structure of JTRS until 2005, at
which time it was changed.
Table 2: Responsibilities of JTRS Program/Product Offices until 2005:
Program/Product Office (lead service): Joint Program Office;
Responsibilities:
* JTRS Software Communications Architecture;
* Waveform applications and associated cryptographic algorithms;
* Certifying compliance of hardware and software with the architecture;
* Ensuring overall joint interoperability;
Major milestones:
* Development of Software Communications Architecture started in 2000;
* Development of waveform applications and associated cryptographic
algorithms started in 2002.
Program/Product Office (lead service): Cluster 1 (Army);
Responsibilities:
* Radios for ground vehicles and helicopters;
Major milestones:
* System development started in 2002.
Program/Product Office (lead service): Cluster 5 (Army);
Responsibilities:
* Handheld and manpack radios;
* Radios for use in weight-and power-constrained platforms, such as
sensors and weapons systems;
Major milestones:
* System development started in 2004.
Program/Product Office (lead service): Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site
(Air Force/Navy) Cluster;
Responsibilities:
* Radios for aircraft;
* Radios for maritime platforms;
* Radios for fixed-site locations;
Major milestones:
* Pre-system development started in 2004.
Program/Product Office (lead service): Multifunctional Information
Distribution System-JTRS (Navy);
Responsibilities:
* Radios for selected airborne platforms equipped with Multifunctional
Information Distribution System terminals;
Major milestones:
* System development started in 2004.
Program/Product Office (lead service): Special Operations Command;
Responsibilities:
* Handheld radios for Special Operations Forces;
Major milestones:
* System development started in 2002.
Source: GAO analysis of JTRS documents.
Note: A JTRS cluster was the term used to describe a grouping of
platforms with similar requirements.
[End of Table]
JTRS Program Restructured to Address Cost, Schedule, and Performance
Problems:
Achieving JTRS' technical requirements has proven to be a significant
challenge. In 2001, an independent assessment of the program identified
numerous concerns, including the program's aggressive acquisition
approach and schedule, unstable requirements, and an ambiguous
management decision chain.[Footnote 6]
In our reviews, we have found similar problems. For example, the JTRS
Cluster 1 program--which includes development of the Wideband
Networking Waveform, the waveform intended to serve as the main conduit
of information among Army tactical units--began development with an
aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly
defined and stable requirements. As a result, the program struggled to
mature and integrate key technologies and was forced to make major
design changes. These factors contributed to significant cost and
schedule problems that led DOD to stop key development work and propose
restructuring the program. Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5
radios proved even more challenging, given the radios' smaller size,
weight, and power needs.[Footnote 7] Several programmatic changes and a
contract award bid protest also slowed progress of the Cluster 5
program.
Subsequent to our reporting that the JTRS program lacked a strong,
joint-management structure for resolving requirements and funding
differences among the services,[Footnote 8] Congress directed DOD to
develop a plan for managing JTRS's development under a single joint
program office. Under DOD's plan, all JTRS programs were realigned
under the authority of a single JTRS Joint Program Executive Officer,
established within the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.
The JPEO's assessment of the JTRS program revealed that:
* the program evolved from a legacy radio replacement program to a
network centric radio program without a re-baselining of program
impacts;
* requirements significantly changed and never stabilized;
* the complexity of information assurance/security problems were not
anticipated; and:
* the program was executing at high technical, schedule, and cost risk.
To get the program on track, JPEO was directed by DOD to come up with a
proposal for JTRS that addressed the services' priority requirements,
was technically doable, and could be executed within a reasonable
budget. In November 2005, JPEO presented three program options
reflecting different sets of capabilities and development costs (see
table 3). Each option included a specific mix of form factors[Footnote
9] and waveforms for each of the services. For example, under option 3,
the Marine Corps would use 4-channel vehicle radios, capable of
operating two or three legacy waveforms and up to three new waveforms,
as well as 2-channel manpack radios operating one or two legacy
waveforms and one or two new waveforms. The Army would also use 4-
channel vehicle radios, but with the capability to operate three or
four legacy waveforms and two or three new waveforms, as well as 1-
channel and 2-channel radios operating the Soldier Radio Waveform for
its sensors and weapons systems. The Air Force would use a 4-channel
Multifunctional Information Distribution System terminal form factor
operating two legacy waveforms and one new waveform. The Navy would use
the same form factor, operating one legacy and one new waveform, as
well as a ship form factor operating one new waveform.
Table 3: Three JTRS Development Options Presented in November 2005:
Waveform: Legacy: SINCGARS;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: check;
Option 2: Transformational capability only: [Empty];
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: Legacy: EPLRS;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: [Empty];
Option 2: Transformational capability only: [Empty];
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: Legacy: High Frequency;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: [Empty];
Option 2: Transformational capability only: [Empty];
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: Legacy: Have Quick;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: [Empty];
Option 2: Transformational capability only: [Empty];
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: Legacy: TADIL-J (Link 16);
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: check;
Option 2: Transformational capability only: check;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: New: Wideband Networking;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: [Empty];
Option 2: Transformational capability only: check;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: New: Solider Radio;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: check;
Option 2: Transformational capability only: check;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: New: Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge[A];
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: [Empty];
Option 2: Transformational capability only: check;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: New: Mobile User Objective System[B] (or UHF SATCOM DAMA);
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: [Empty];
Option 2: Transformational capability only: check;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: check.
Waveform: Additional fiscal year 2006-2011 development cost, in
billions;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: NA;
Option 2: Transformational capability only: $1.8;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: $2.1.
Waveform: Total fiscal year 2006-2011 development cost, in billions;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: $1.9;
Option 2: Transformational capability only: $3.7;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: $4.0.
Waveform: Prior development cost (through fiscal year 2005), in
billions;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: $1.5;
Option 2: Transformational capability only: $1.5;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: $1.5.
Waveform: Total development cost, in billions;
Option 1: Execute program within existing budget profile: $3.4;
Option 2: Transformational capability only: $5.2;
Option 3: Transformational plus some legacy capabilities: $5.5.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by JPEO.
[A] A wideband waveform for airborne platforms.
[B] A waveform for a new satellite communication system that will
provide low data rate voice and data communications capable of
penetrating most weather, foliage, and manmade structures.
Note: NA = Not applicable.
[End of table]
DOD selected option 3, which establishes a priority for developing a
networking capability mainly through the introduction of
transformational wideband waveforms. Since future JTRS capabilities are
still planned, option 3 also reflects an incremental approach to
developing full JTRS capabilities. The initial option 3 increment is
referred to as JTRS Increment 1.[Footnote 10]
To implement JTRS Increment 1, JPEO established a new organizational
structure for JTRS that includes three domains and a program for
"special radios." Table 4 summarizes the general management structure
of JTRS after the program restructuring.
Table 4: Responsibilities of JPEO JTRS Domains:
Domain: Ground;
Responsibilities: Communications and networking capabilities for
vehicles, dismounted soldiers, sensors, and weapons systems.
Domain: Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Site;
Responsibilities: Communications and networking capabilities for
aircraft, ships, and ground fixed site platforms; A JTRS radio to
replace the Multifunctional Information Distribution System terminals
on selected platforms, including the F/A-18 aircraft.
Domain: Network Enterprise;
Responsibilities: Waveforms, gateways, and common networking services
solutions.
Domain: Special Radios;
Responsibilities: JTRS Enhanced Multi-Band Intra-Team Radio used by
Special Operations Forces.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by JPEO.
[End of table]
It is likely that the first users of operational JTRS radios will be
Navy F/A-18 aircraft equipped with Multifunctional Information
Distribution System-JTRS radios and Special Operations Forces using the
JTRS Enhanced Multi-Band Intra-Team Radio. Initially, the radios will
operate legacy waveforms only.
Delay in JTRS Development Has Required Investments in Other Radio
Systems:
From the start of JTRS development through the end of this year, DOD
estimates that $11 billion has been required to buy other radio
systems.[Footnote 11] Of this total amount, $1.3 billion has been used
in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to procure SINCGARS radios to meet urgent
operational needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, because of
delays in the development of JTRS, several users depending on JTRS have
had to make adjustments and procure interim radios to meet operational
needs. For example, the Army is in the process of procuring radios for
several of its existing helicopter platforms and a new development
effort to outfit and equip individual ground soldiers. Since JTRS
development will require at least several more years, it is likely that
the estimated $11 billion investment in legacy radios will continue to
grow. Table 5 shows the annual procurement amounts for radio systems
other than JTRS from 1998 through 2006.
Table 5: Estimated Procurement Amounts Required for Other Radio Systems
from 1998 through 2006 by Procuring Organization:
Dollars in millions.
1998;
Army: 0;
Air Force: $7.74;
Marine Corps: 0;
Navy: 0;
Combatant commands and agencies: 0; Total: $7.74.
1999;
Army: $91.55;
Air Force: $19.25;
Marine Corps: $1.30;
Navy: $1.28;
Combatant commands and agencies: $24.87; Total: $138.25.
2000;
Army: 220.89;
Air Force: 65.68;
Marine Corps: 25.63;
Navy: 63.74;
Combatant commands and agencies: 0.60; Total: 376.54.
2001;
Army: 142.72;
Air Force: 4.00;
Marine Corps: 0;
Navy: 72.79;
Combatant commands and agencies: 1.52; Total: 221.03.
2002;
Army: 54.02;
Air Force: 1.62;
Marine Corps: 2.38;
Navy: 60.56;
Combatant commands and agencies: 71.17; Total: 189.75.
2003;
Army: 199.99;
Air Force: 78.66;
Marine Corps: 51.07;
Navy: 49.94;
Combatant commands and agencies: 0.30; Total: 379.96.
2004;
Army: 668.18;
Air Force: 104.10;
Marine Corps: 42.58;
Navy: 326.32;
Combatant commands and agencies: 3.29; Total: 1,144.47.
2005;
Army: 1,564.52;
Air Force: 2,289.17;
Marine Corps: 314.43;
Navy: 368.79;
Combatant commands and agencies: 0.75; Total: 4,537.66.
2006;
Army: [A];
Air Force: [A];
Marine Corps: [A];
Navy: [A];
Combatant commands and agencies: [A]; Total: 4,170.00.
Total;
Army: $2,941.87;
Air Force: $2,570.22;
Marine Corps: $437.39;
Navy: $943.42;
Combatant commands and agencies: $102.50; Total: $11,165.40.
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD.
[A] DOD provided only a total estimate for 2006.
[End of table]
Program Restructuring Appears to Address Many Concerns with JTRS:
The proposed JTRS restructuring approach appears to address past
concerns with the program that GAO and others have documented in recent
years. While still meeting the needs of key users such as Future Combat
Systems, the revised approach is expected to develop and field
capabilities in increments rather than attempting to develop and field
the capabilities all at once. Costly and non-transformational
requirements will be deferred to later increments. In addition, through
the establishment of the JPEO and other structural changes, JTRS
program management has been strengthened and has become more
centralized. The centralized management structure should help the
program control development costs and improve oversight through the
coordination of standards, system engineering, and development of the
radios and waveforms. A new governance structure is also expected to
help ensure appropriate oversight and establish clear lines of
accountability while, according to JPEO officials, the establishment of
an information repository is expected to help facilitate the delivery
of waveform and operating system software to the radios' hardware
developers. These efforts, if carried out, should help the restructured
JTRS program address previous cost, schedule and performance problems.
Table 6 summarizes the significant changes to the JTRS program as a
result of the restructuring.
Table 6: Summary of JPEO-Initiated Changes to JTRS Program:
Parameter: Management Structure;
Pre-JPEO: Decentralized;
JPEO: Centralized/Enterprise.
Parameter: Requirements Approach;
Pre-JPEO: Unconstrained (Big Bang);
JPEO: Constrained (Incremental).
Parameter: Program Milestones;
Pre-JPEO: Compressed;
JPEO: Expanded.
Parameter: Waveform Deliveries;
Pre-JPEO: Expansive;
JPEO: Reduced.
Parameter: JPEO Assessment of Program Risk;
Pre-JPEO: High;
JPEO: Moderate.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
New Approach Emphasizes Developing Capabilities in Increments and
Deferring Some Requirements:
A central feature of the JTRS program restructuring is its evolutionary
acquisition approach. The program plans to develop capabilities in
increments rather than attempt to field a complete capability all at
once, which was the previous approach. Specifically, the program plans
to defer or reduce costly and non-transformational requirements to
later increments. At the same time, the approach prioritizes the
development of networking capabilities, primarily through the
development of three networking waveforms, and the ability to
interoperate with key legacy radios. These capabilities are critical to
key dependent users such as the Army's Future Combat Systems and the
implementation of DOD's vision of network centric operations warfare.
Program officials noted several requirements that were reduced or
deferred from the previous program to later increments:
* Reduced number of waveforms: The number of waveforms to be delivered
for the first increment has been reduced from 32 to 11. The waveforms
deferred to later increments are all non-networking legacy waveforms.
Reducing the number of waveforms allows the program to focus the
initial JTRS increment on developing and testing the critical
networking waveforms as well as some of the more commonly-used legacy
waveforms. In addition, the smaller number of waveforms reduces porting
efforts.
* Reduced number of radio variants: The number of variants to be
delivered for the first increment has been reduced from 26 to 13. For
example, only 9 of the 15 small form radios will be developed for the
first increment. Reducing the number of variants provides relief in the
hardware design and platform integration work, allowing the program to
focus the initial JTRS increment on developing the variants most
critical to key dependent users such as the Future Combat Systems.
* Reduced number of waveform combinations per radio variant: The
original intent of JTRS was that most waveforms would operate on most
radio variants. However, DOD determined that porting 32 different
waveforms onto 26 different variants would have been an immense and
costly undertaking. In addition, operating numerous waveforms
simultaneously on a JTRS radio would have substantially increased power
demands. By reducing the number of waveform combinations per variant,
program officials expect to both reduce porting efforts and more easily
meet size, weight, and power requirements on some variants. In
addition, program officials expect that reducing the number of
waveforms operating on each radio will help to mitigate interference.
* Interim solutions for network interoperability: To achieve DOD's
desired networking capabilities, the waveforms must be able to
interoperate reliably and securely with each other. The optimal
solution is to have this functionality performed inside JTRS radios as
it reduces the overall footprint of the communication network. However,
technologies and radio designs are not mature enough at this point to
develop an interoperability capability that would function inside
individual JTRS radios. Thus, for the initial increment,
interoperability between the waveforms may be facilitated by developing
gateway devices that reside outside of the JTRS radio. This should help
developers mitigate integration challenges.
While lesser capabilities will be delivered in the first increment, the
program could still significantly enhance current communications and
networking capabilities through the development of the networking
waveforms and the ability to interoperate with the more commonly used
legacy radios, such as SINCGARS. The incremental approach should also
make the program more achievable by allowing more time to develop and
test key technologies. Figure 2 shows the impact of the expanded
schedule on Increment 1 product milestones. Despite the lengthened
schedule, the program schedules are still intended to address the needs
of key users depending on JTRS such as Future Combat Systems.
Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on Product Schedules:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of JTRS document.
[End of figure]
JTRS Program Management Strengthened:
With the creation of the JPEO, DOD has established a stronger, more
centralized joint management structure. Under the new management
structure, all JTRS domains--Ground; Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed
Site; Special Radios, and Network Enterprise--report directly to the
JPEO while the JPEO reports directly to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. As such, the JPEO controls
development funding and has full directive authority over standards,
systems engineering, and developing radios and waveforms. Such a
comprehensive authority did not exist in the previous structure where
authority was fragmented and the domains reported to individual service
executives. Also, to facilitate more effective management, the JPEO has
realigned various components of JTRS. Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 are now
combined under the new Ground domain while the waveform development was
placed under the newly established Network Enterprise domain.
Meanwhile, DOD removed the Army helicopter requirements from the JTRS
Cluster 1 program and transferred them to the Airborne, Maritime, and
Fixed Site domain. With the new strengthened management structure, the
program is in a better position to manage requirements growth and
control costs.
A key feature of the new management structure is the new governance
model which aims to streamline decision making and empower the
oversight capacity of the JPEO. We previously reported that the
existing management structure had been unable to get the services to
reach agreement over new and changing requirements
expeditiously.[Footnote 12] Under the prior structure, key decisions
were made by consensus, which made it difficult to resolve interservice
differences involving requirements and funding. This resulted in a
lengthy decision-making process. Under the revised governance
structure, stakeholder disagreements are elevated to and decided by a
JTRS Executive Council and later by a JTRS Board of Directors, if
necessary. The purpose is to make the acquisition process timelier,
provide appropriate oversight, and establish clear lines of
accountability.
Another key feature of the new management structure, according to JPEO,
is ensuring greater information sharing among JTRS components takes
place to better facilitate the delivery of waveform and operating
system software to the radios' hardware developers. JTRS components
depend on several software developers to deliver the required waveforms
to their programs for integration onto their particular radios. This
involves transfers of complex contractor-owned software code. Because
waveforms are such an integral part of the radio's functionality,
delaying their integration onto the radio's hardware could have a
ripple effect on a radio's overall development. To mitigate this risk,
the JPEO has established an information repository where waveform
developers would place their waveform software code for the purposes of
information sharing.[Footnote 13] Operating system software code--
critical to ensuring the development of a common software architecture-
-would also be placed in the repository. DOD intends to hold government-
purpose rights to all of the software specifications in the repository,
so that no single contractor will have complete control over JTRS
software development. While the information repository is new and its
usefulness is yet to be determined, it remains to be seen whether and
to what extent the contractors will be willing to share their software
code. If successful, the JPEO expects that information sharing will not
only make available software code to hardware developers more timely,
but will also contribute to technology innovation as developers attempt
to enhance existing software code. In addition, because the software
will be shared with many different vendors, the JPEO expects to enhance
competition among hardware developers. Furthermore, it is hoped that by
developers reusing the same software code in the information
repository, waveforms will be more standardized, cutting down on
development and integration costs.
Program Uncertainties and Technical Risks Remain:
While the restructuring appears to place JTRS in a better position to
succeed, several management and technical challenges remain. The JPEO
must first finalize the details of the restructuring, including
completing formal acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates,
and test and evaluation plans. DOD also needs to revise the Concept of
Operations so that it effectively describes how JTRS networking
capabilities will be used. Completing and obtaining DOD's approval of
these activities is needed to ensure the program is executable. Over
the longer term, the program faces key management and technical
challenges that must be overcome. For example, although the new joint
management structure for JTRS is a significant improvement over the
previous fragmented program management structure, joint development
efforts in DOD have often been hampered by an inability to obtain and
sustain commitments and support from the military services and other
stakeholders. Regarding technical challenges, developing waveforms and
porting them to radio hardware is a complex and lengthy undertaking.
The proposed interim technical solutions enabling network
interoperability have also yet to be developed. In addition, operating
in a networked environment open to a large number of potential users
has generated an unprecedented need for information assurance. This
need has resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and still
evolving certification process from the National Security Agency.
Moreover, integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and
meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has been a long-
term challenge and remains so.
Details of the Restructuring yet to Be Finalized:
According to program officials, efforts to complete the restructuring
have taken time and delays have occurred in gaining approval to go
forward. As such, important details of the restructuring have yet to be
finalized. This includes completing acquisition strategies, independent
cost estimates, test plans, and obtaining final approval of an amended
operational requirements document. These activities are currently in
the process of being completed. However, until each of these activities
is completed and DOD ensures that requirements are firm, acquisition
strategies are knowledge-based, cost estimates are realistic, and test
plans provide insight into the achievement of the networking capability
priorities, there will be uncertainty as to whether the JTRS program,
as restructured, is executable.
* Operational Requirements Document: An Operational Requirements
Document contains the requirements and operational parameters for a
system. The most recent JTRS Operational Requirements Document was
approved in April 2003. To reflect the restructured approach of
achieving JTRS requirements incrementally, it was necessary to develop
an amendment to the April 2003 Operational Requirements Document. The
process to develop the amendment has been led by the Joint Staff and
involved input from the requirements community, the services, and other
stakeholders; the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has provided
oversight of the process. Through the process of developing the
Operational Requirements Document amendment, some '"gaps" in
requirements have been identified by some stakeholders. In particular,
the proposed amendment to the Operational Requirements Document
includes a requirement for certain JTRS sets to be able to interface
with a new satellite system called the Mobile User Objective System.
Some stakeholders, however, have identified a need for the manpack and
handheld radios to also have this capability. According to agency
officials, if the capabilities are deferred to later increments, then
the Mobile User Objective System will have to consider options other
than JTRS to meet its terminal requirements. Also, according to agency
officials, the amendment process is nearly complete. The amendment to
the JTRS Operational Requirements Document is awaiting final approval
from the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
* Acquisition strategies: Individual acquisition strategies need to be
developed for each JTRS component. An acquisition strategy outlines the
business and technical management approach to achieve program
objectives within the constraints imposed by resources. A well-
developed knowledge-based strategy minimizes the time and cost required
to satisfy approved capability needs, and maximizes affordability
throughout the program lifecycle.[Footnote 14] Until the acquisition
strategies are complete, there is less assurance that a well-developed
and executable approach is in place. This could affect program cost
estimates, and fielding plans. Furthermore, an acquisition strategy
serves as the basis for other important activities such as testing
plans and contract negotiations. As such, any delay in the acquisition
strategy could have a ripple effect and delay these activities.
* Test and evaluation plans: Plans for the overall structure and
objectives of the test and evaluation program are also under
development and need to be completed. Given the radio's unprecedented
performance capabilities and technical complexity, it is critical that
a well-developed test and evaluation plan be developed. Not only is the
testing of individual radio components important, but testing the
network with sufficient scale is critical to demonstrating
transformational capabilities. At this point, it is not clear how DOD
plans to test the entire JTRS network including interoperability
between all the networking waveforms. The Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation recommended that the Army develop a test and evaluation
strategy that supports an evaluation of network maturity as part of
Future Combat Systems' production.
In addition to the activities that JPEO needs to accomplish to finalize
the restructuring, DOD also needs to complete its revisions to the
Concept of Operations and determine transition and fielding plans for
JTRS. According to JPEO officials, when JTRS development was first
initiated, DOD envisioned replacing virtually all legacy radios with
JTRS sets. Since then, there has been an evolution of thinking in DOD
about networked operations. Although the Concept of Operations for JTRS
has gone through several iterations, according to JPEO the current
version does not effectively provide a joint vision of how JTRS
networking capabilities will be used. How JTRS radios will be used may
also be affected by the large increase recently in fielding thousands
of newer versions of legacy radios. The recent fielding of so many new
legacy radios to the current force may call into question the
affordability of replacing them prematurely with JTRS sets. If
sufficient detail is not provided by the Concept of Operations, then
JTRS development efforts may be inadequate and operational goals may be
unfulfilled. Moreover, if migration and fielding plans are not driven
by an effective Concept of Operations, the production costs and
quantities for JTRS may need to be adjusted.
Untested Management Structure:
DOD has historically had difficulty managing joint programs primarily
because of inter-service differences involving funding and
requirements. To succeed, the new JTRS management structure will have
to meet those challenges. According to DOD officials, obtaining the
necessary resources to execute JTRS development will be one such
challenge. The proposed funding arrangement is for the services to
individually request and secure development funding that then gets
rolled into a centralized account under JPEO control. As currently
proposed, each service will fund equal shares unless there are service-
unique development efforts, which would be funded by the proponent
services. The services will also be required to fund the integration of
the radio into their respective platforms. Some agency officials
expressed concern whether the services would have the budget capacity
to fund integration once the radio sets were available for
installation. Stakeholders also need to come to agreement on
requirements by obtaining final approval of the amended Operational
Requirements Document. If requirements are not thoroughly vetted
through the various stakeholders and agreed upon, there is greater risk
of future requirements growth or decreased stakeholder support for the
program.
Regarding JPEO's new governance model, the decision-making model is
untested. The JPEO expects the system development decision for the JTRS
Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site product line to be decided through
the new governance structure.
Program Continues to Face Significant Technical Risks:
While the program has reported making progress in maturing technologies
and stabilizing system designs, several technical challenges must still
be overcome to achieve program success.
Waveform Development and Portability:
The development of waveforms--particularly the networking waveforms--
remains a technically challenging and lengthy effort. This effort
involves complex software development and integration work by
contractors as well as oversight by the government through a series of
rigorous tests and certifications from various authorities, including
the JTRS Technology Laboratory, National Security Agency, and the Joint
Interoperability Test Command. If waveforms are not available as
planned, potential schedule delays or performance impacts could occur
to key dependent users, particularly the Future Combat Systems.
The JTRS program began with the assumption that the Wideband Networking
Waveform would meet the networking waveform needs for all the services.
However, the program underestimated the complexity of meeting the
Wideband Networking Waveform requirements and the services' needs
within the size, weight, and power constraints of the various user
platforms. As a result, DOD began developing two additional networking
waveforms to address specialized capabilities. The Soldier Radio
Waveform is being designed for radios with severe size, weight, and
power constraints such as the handheld, manpack, and small form radios.
The Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge waveform is being designed to
better enable time critical airborne operations. The networking
waveforms are the core of the JTRS networking capability and their
availability is crucial to the program's success. The three networking
waveforms are in various stages of development:
* Wideband Networking Waveform: The Wideband Networking Waveform--
designed for JTRS ground vehicle radios--is the farthest along in
development of the three networking waveforms. Nevertheless, while
initial functionality has been demonstrated through a contractor
demonstration held in the summer of 2005, some technical challenges
remain. The demonstration showed that ground mobile radios operated in
a network with the Wideband Networking Waveform and were able to
connect to the network as well as reconnected when the network was
disrupted. However, the Wideband Networking Waveform also experienced
various performance problems including limited data throughput,
latency, and start-up time.[Footnote 15] Program officials believe
these performance problems have largely been corrected. Nonetheless,
the demonstrated network linked only 4 users, far fewer than the
required 250. In addition, program officials noted that meeting the
Wideband Networking Waveform requirement for voice communications over
a mobile ad hoc network remains challenging.
* Soldier Radio Waveform: The Soldier Radio Waveform is a low power,
short range networking waveform optimized for radios with severe size,
weight, and power constraints such as dismounted soldier radios and
small form radios. Currently, the waveform is transitioning from a
science and technology program.[Footnote 16] Program officials expect
to award a sole source contract in fiscal year 2007 for further
development of the waveform. While the Soldier Radio Waveform has
demonstrated some functionality, program officials noted that it will
take significant effort to transition the waveform from a science and
technology project to meet full operational requirements. In
particular, program officials are concerned about the waveform's
insufficient security architecture and how this may affect porting it
onto a JTRS radio. Given these concerns, the waveform's development
schedule may be ambitious. Future Combat Systems is the driver of near-
term Soldier Radio Waveform requirements. The success of the first spin-
out of Future Combat Systems is dependent on the delivery of the
certified waveform ported to selected JTRS small form radios.
* Joint Airborne Network--Tactical Edge: The Joint Airborne Network--
Tactical Edge is an extremely low latency networking waveform optimized
for airborne platforms. Like the Soldier Radio Waveform, the Joint
Airborne Network--Tactical Edge is transitioning from a science and
technology project and program officials expect to award a sole source
contract in fiscal year 2006.[Footnote 17] For Increment 1, the
waveform will initially operate on a Multifunctional Information
Distribution System--JTRS radio and will have limited capabilities.
Program officials expect that it will be upgraded to full networking
functionality in subsequent increments.
After waveforms are developed, they must be ported to radio hardware.
According to agency officials, porting waveforms onto JTRS radios has
been more technically challenging than originally expected. The intent
of JTRS is that waveforms be highly portable meaning that waveforms can
be transported and adapted to a variety of radio platforms at a cost
lower than the cost of redeveloping the waveform again for a radio set
with different hardware components. When waveforms are developed, the
software code is designed to operate on a particular radio's hardware
architecture. When the same waveform is transported to different
hardware, changes to the software code may be necessary to ensure
proper integration of the waveform onto the new hardware. The more
costly the integration effort is, the less portable the waveform.
Although the JTRS Software Communications Architecture specifies design
rules for waveform software to enhance portability across different
hardware, the limited experience of porting waveforms thus far has
shown significantly higher costs and longer schedules than anticipated.
The JPEO noted that government direction and oversight as well as
coordination between waveform, operating environment, and hardware
developers needs improvement. Officials are also concerned about the
porting of the networking waveforms being developed in science and
technology programs to meet the full requirements for the Soldier Radio
Waveform and the Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge waveform. To make
this happen the waveforms will need to become compliant with the JTRS
Software Communications Architecture, incorporate network management
functions, and develop required security capabilities. Efforts to
rework software to effectively transfer the waveforms, therefore, could
result in cost and schedule problems.
Interoperability of Networking Waveforms:
The proposed interim technical solutions enabling network
interoperability have yet to be developed. To achieve DOD's desired
networking capabilities, waveforms must be able to communicate and
interoperate with each other. However, technologies and radio designs
are not mature enough at this point to develop an interoperability
capability that would function inside individual JTRS radios. As a
result, the program plans to meet network interoperability requirements
for the initial increment through the use of gateways. A gateway is a
separate node within a network equipped to interoperate with another
network that uses different protocols. As such, key functions
facilitating interoperability between waveforms may be performed
outside of the JTRS radio rather than inside.
At this point, the JPEO is assessing different options to achieve the
gateway function and anticipates that development will start in 2007.
The JPEO expects that the development of the gateway will result in a
separate acquisition decision but is uncertain as to whether it will be
acquired through the forthcoming Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Site system
development contract or through a separate contract. In addition, the
JPEO is uncertain as to whether the gateway will be employed as a
separate piece of hardware or whether it will leverage an existing
radio in the network. According to JPEO officials, employing the
gateway as a separate piece of hardware could result in additional
size, weight, and power risks for some platforms. JPEO officials also
noted that without a fully functioning gateway capability, users
operating in separate networks will not be able to communicate directly
with one another. For example, a ground soldier operating on a Soldier
Radio Waveform with a handheld radio would not be able to call directly
for fire support from an aircraft operating on the Joint Airborne
Network--Tactical Edge Waveform with a Multifunctional Information
Distribution System-JTRS radio.
Hardware Integration/Size, Weight, and Power:
Integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting
their respective size, weight and power limitations remains a
challenge. To realize full networking capabilities, the radios require
significant amounts of memory and processing power, which add to the
size, weight, and power consumption of the radio. The added size and
weight are the result of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the
radio are not overheated.
While progress has been made in meeting the size, weight, and power
requirements for the ground mobile radios, developers still face some
challenges. The JPEO has already delivered 30 partially functioning
prototype radios--built on production assembly lines--to the Future
Combat Systems program. However, until the ground mobile radios
demonstrate greater Wideband Networking Waveform functionality--a key
source of power consumption--using a fully functioning prototype, size,
weight, and power concerns remain. The delivery of new power amplifiers
that are currently being developed as part of a science and technology
program by the Army's Communications--Electronics Research, Development
and Engineering Center could help address these concerns. According to
center officials, the power amplifiers are approaching maturity and
have demonstrated significantly higher power output and improved
efficiency over the current amplifier used on the ground mobile radios.
The JPEO expects to begin receiving the new power amplifiers this
September.
Meeting the requirements of the handheld, manpack, and small form
radios continues to be the most challenging of all JTRS components
because of their smaller size, weight, and power constraints. Program
officials expect that the requirements relief provided through the
restructuring should help to address size, weight, and power
requirements. For example, the restructuring reduces the number of
waveforms required to operate on each radio, which is expected to
reduce power demands, thereby reducing the size and weight demands. In
addition, like the ground mobile radios, the JTRS small form radios are
also expected to benefit from the delivery of new wideband power
amplifiers. However, these technologies are still maturing. Moreover,
the handheld, manpack, and small form radio designs are not stable.
Security:
The JTRS requirement to operate applications at multiple levels of
security in a networked environment has resulted in significant
information assurance challenges. Developers not only have to be
concerned with traditional radio security issues but also must be
prepared to implement the features required for computer and network
security. One challenge is that military software defined radio
technology capable of processing data at multiple security levels is
immature. In addition, the requirement to operate in an open networked
environment allows greater access to external networks increasing the
number of potential users and the likelihood of threats to the network.
These challenges will require the development of new technologies,
obtaining certification through a rigorous process by the National
Security Agency, and accommodating an expected growth in security
requirements.
The complexities and uncertainties involved with JTRS security
certification were illustrated when the National Security Agency
determined that the design for the Cluster 1 radio was not sufficient
to meet newly identified operational requirements from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense to operate in a networked environment. This
resulted in the need for additional security requirements and
significant hardware design changes to the radio's security
architecture that ultimately resulted in significant cost increases.
National Security Agency officials noted that one of the key lessons
learned from the Cluster 1 experience was that security requirements
need to be considered early in the development of the radio. As such,
the JPEO has taken steps to better coordinate with the National
Security Agency to meet security requirements. Specifically, the
National Security Agency currently has a representative in each JTRS
domain and participates in management reviews, design reviews, vendor
technical exchanges, and weekly conference calls. The National Security
Agency is also expected to be a member of the JTRS Executive Council
and advisory member of the JTRS Board of Directors in the new JTRS
governance structure. Both National Security Agency and JPEO officials
noted that coordination and cooperation between the agencies has
significantly improved since the JPEO was established. In addition,
National Security Agency officials do not expect the other JTRS radios
will encounter the same design problems experienced by the Cluster 1
radio as contractors now have a greater understanding of security
requirements. Further, the restructured schedules for Ground domain
radios appear to be sufficiently aligned to receive National Security
Agency certification in time to meet the needs of Future Combat
Systems. Nevertheless, because of the complex software encryption and
networking requirements, security will continue to be a challenge for
all JTRS components.
Spectrum Availability:
JTRS radios will require considerable radio spectrum for effective
operations especially when using the new networking waveforms that
could operate within several different bands of radio spectrum.
However, obtaining sufficient radio spectrum allocations is problematic
because the program must compete with other military and civilian
users. Radio spectrum in general is becoming more saturated and demand
for spectrum is increasing. Efforts are underway by the JPEO to work
through the required DOD spectrum certification processes; however,
certification of software defined radios remains a challenge because,
according to spectrum management officials, these processes were
designed around hardware-based radios and may not fully support the
certification of cutting edge technologies such as JTRS. DOD has
recognized the shortcomings of the existing processes and has taken
initial steps to address them. Most recently, DOD has worked with the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration to stand up
a permanent software defined radio working group that would study how
to proceed.
Conclusions:
U.S. military forces' communications and networking systems currently
lack the interoperability and capacity DOD believes are needed to
access and share real-time information, identify and react quickly to
threats, and operate effectively as a joint force. JTRS is critical to
providing the capabilities to support DOD's future vision of net-
centric warfighting. Yet, since its inception, the JTRS development
effort has struggled due to unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance
expectations. As a consequence, DOD and the military services have had
to make adjustments and acquire interim communications solutions to
meet their near-term communications requirements.
The restructuring approach developed by JPEO and approved by DOD holds
promise for delivering much needed communications capability to the
warfighters. However, given the program's troubled development history,
putting the approach into action will be a challenge and require strong
and continuous oversight. Key details of the JTRS restructuring--
including assurance that there are stable operational requirements,
knowledge-based acquisition strategies for each domain's product lines,
and effective test plans that reflect the priority of developing
networking capabilities--must be finalized and approved by DOD. In
addition, significant programmatic and technical risks--including
further technology maturation, certification of waveforms and radios,
and implementation of the new JTRS governance model--must still be
overcome. Furthermore, detailed migration and fielding plans that are
consistent with a well-developed concept of operations are needed to
ensure an affordable and operationally effective use of JTRS radios in
the future. Any manifestations of these risks will likely increase
program costs, delay fielding, or reduce planned capabilities. To the
extent JTRS delivers less capability than planned, future warfighting
concepts may have to be altered as well as the design of weapons
systems such as Future Combat Systems that are dependent on JTRS.
Recommendations:
To enhance the likelihood of success of the JTRS program, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense:
* before approving the detailed program plans for each JTRS domain,
ensure that they reflect stable and well-defined requirements;
knowledge-based acquisition strategies; clear and meaningful test plans
that address the need to not only test individual JTRS components but
the overall networking capabilities of JTRS as well; and, funding
commitments necessary to execute the program; and:
* develop JTRS migration and fielding plans that are consistent with a
well-developed concept of operations for using JTRS networking
capabilities and effectively balances recent investments in acquiring
legacy radios with future needs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its letter commenting on the draft of our report, DOD agreed with
our recommendations. DOD's letter is reprinted in appendix II. DOD
noted that the report recommendations are consistent with the measures
taken by the department to restructure the JTRS program, develop JTRS
radios in an incremental manner, and effectively balance recent
investments in legacy radios with future needs. While we acknowledge
that DOD has taken measures to put the JTRS program in a better
position to move forward, we continue to believe that additional
measures, as outlined in our recommendations, are needed to ensure that
the program will be successfully executed and achieve its intended
objectives.
DOD also provided detailed comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees
that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will
also send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the
Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841, or
Assistant Director John Oppenheim at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess whether recent actions taken by DOD puts the JTRS program in
a better position to succeed, we obtained briefings on restructuring
assessments, plans, and decisions, analyzed documents describing
Increment 1 requirements, and interviewed program and product officials
from the Joint Program Executive Office, San Diego, California. To
obtain the perspective of organizations that provide policy guidance,
oversight, and technology support for the JTRS program, we interviewed
officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Arlington, Virginia; Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, Arlington, Virginia;
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration,
Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and, the
Army's Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering
Center, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
To identify the risks that might continue to undermine the successful
fielding of JTRS, we obtained and analyzed briefings from the JTRS
Domain, Program, and Product Managers, as well as the JTRS Technical
Director, San Diego, California. We also reviewed Selected Acquisition
Reports, budget requests, acquisition decision memorandums, and the
JTRS governance structure. We interviewed officials from the National
Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland; Joint Interoperability Test
Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Defense Contract Management Agency,
Anaheim, California; Project Manager for Future Combat Systems Network
Systems Integration, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and, JTRS contractors
in Arlington, Virginia and Anaheim, California.
Our review was conducted from August 2005 through August 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
6000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-6000:
Networks And Information Integration:
29 August 2006:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition Sourcing and Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis,
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-06-955, "Defense
Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant
Challenges Remain," dated August 1, 2006 (GAO Code 120470). The
attached enclosure addresses some specific comments and observations
made in the report. Below is our response to the GAO recommendations.
The Department agrees with both of the GAO recommendations. The GAO
report and recommendations are consistent with the measures taken by
the Department to restructure the JTRS Program, develop JTRS Radios in
an incremental manner and effectively balance recent investments in
legacy radios with future needs.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report. We
appreciate the ongoing dialogue between the GAO and the DOD, and look
forward to further interaction to ensure JTRS supports the best
interests of the warfighter and the nation.
Sincerely,
Signed by: Ronald C. Jost:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
(C3, Space and Spectrum):
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO-06-955:
"Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but
Significant Challenges Remain" (U):
Department Of Defense Detailed Comments (U):
(U) The following is a detailed review of the GAO report on the JTRS
Program, with specific explanations of DoD's concerns.
1. (U) What the GAO Found:, 2nd paragraph, lines 1 and 2: "JPEO must
finalize the details of the restructuring, including completing an
operational requirements document."
(U) The Operational Requirements document has been completed, staffed
and is awaiting VCJS signature of the approval JROCM, which is expected
shortly.
2. (U) Results In Brief Page 3, paragraph 2, line 4: "JPEO must
finalize the details of the restructuring, including finalizing
operational requirements."
(U) The JTRS requirements community has come to agreement on Increment
1 requirements and has finalized the operational requirements for JTRS
Increment 1. The JTRS JPEO has concluded that it can deliver Increment
1 requirements within its current budget within moderate risk to cost
and schedule.
3. (U) JTRS Program Management Strengthened: Page 18, paragraph 1,
states: "Under the proposed governance structure."
(U) The JTRS Governance Process has been approved by USD/AT&L on August
1, 2006.
4. (U) Program Uncertainties and Technical Risks: Page 19, paragraph 1:
"The JPEO must first finalize the details of the restructuring,
including completing an operational requirements document."
(U) The operational requirements document is complete and has been
staffed through the JROC, attaining the concurrence of the Services.
Final JROCM approval is awaiting VCJS signature which is expected in
the near future (prior to final publication of the GAO report).
5. (U) Details of the Restructuring Yet To be Finalized, Operational
Requirements Document, states: Page 20, paragraph 2: "The JPEO has
drafted a modified version of the former Operational Requirements
Document, which is currently being reviewed by various stakeholders."
(U) Development of Operational Requirements is the joint responsibility
of the Requirements Sponsor with oversight from the Joint requirements
Oversight Council. The JPEO does not have the responsibility nor
authority to change operational requirements. Tasked by the JROC to
lead the effort to defer/reduce JTRS Increment 1 requirements, the
Joint Staff J6, in cooperation with the Army (JTRS Requirements
Sponsor), JTRS Stakeholders and the JPEO drafted the amendment to the
JTRS Operational Requirements Document. This amendment identifies
Increment 1 requirements and defers other requirements to later
Increments. As indicated in previous comments above, this ORD amendment
is complete and awaiting final approval, which is expected in the very
near future.
6. (U) Details of the Restructuring Yet To be Finalized, Acquisition
Strategies: Page 22, paragraph 2: " Regarding JPEO's proposed
governance model, the decision-making model is untested and has not
been formally approved."
(U) The JTRS Governance Process has been approved by USD/AT&L on August
1, 2006.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John Oppenheim, Assistant Director, (202) 512-4841:
Staff Acknowledgment:
In addition to the contact above, Katherine Bittinger, Ridge Bowman,
Karen Sloan, Amy Sweet, James Tallon, Tristan To, Hai Tran, and Paul
Williams made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio
System Program, GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003).
[2] Conference Report, Making Appropriations for the Department of
Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006, And For Other
Purposes, House of Representatives Report 109-359, December 18, 2005
[3] Government purpose rights means the rights to (1) use, modify,
reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose technical data or
computer software (or computer software documentation) within the
government without restriction and (2) to release or disclose technical
data or computer software (or computer software documentation) outside
the government and authorize persons to whom release or disclosure has
been made to use, modify, reproduce, release, perform, display, or
disclose the work for U.S. government purposes.
[4] A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the
frequency, modulation type, message format, and/or transmission system.
In general usage, the term waveform refers to a known set of
characteristics, for example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, and UHF),
modulation techniques (FM, AM), message standards, and transmission
systems. In JTRS usage, the term waveform is used to describe the
entire set of radio functions that occur from the user input to the RF
output and vice versa. A JTRS waveform is implemented as a reusable,
portable, executable software application that is independent of the
JTRS operating system, middleware, and hardware.
[5] Porting the waveform involves the transfer of the software from one
operational environment (hardware, operating system, etc.) to another.
[6] The independent assessment was requested through the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics' Tri-
Service Assessment Initiative. The Tri-Service Assessment Initiative
was founded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1998 to
address software acquisition issues. Subsequently, Independent Expert
Program Reviews, which serve as the basis for the Defense Acquisition
Program Support, were incorporated into the DOD acquisition regulation
and became part of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.
[7] The smallest Cluster 5 radio weighs only about 1 pound, compared
with 84 pounds for Cluster 1.
[8] GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio
System Program, GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003).
[9] Form factors is a term used to describe the various types of radios
used by the services. For example, there are radios that will be
customized for ground vehicles, manpacks, aircraft, ships, and embedded
in sensors and weapons systems.
[10] Subsequent to the selection of option 3, DOD determined that the
Have Quick waveform was not a priority and thus would not be included
in the Increment 1 development effort.
[11] In August 1998, shortly after the establishment of the JTRS
program, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence identified a need to stem the
continuing efforts by the services to acquire unique radios and
communications terminals. All component efforts to initiate any
contracting activity related to the development and acquisition of any
radio system were to be held in abeyance. However, service, command, or
agency acquisition executives were allowed to submit requests for
exceptions to the policy through the JTRS Joint Program Office.
Eventually, the waiver process was suspended. As of May 2005, the
services no longer had to request a JTRS waiver; they only had to
notify the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration of plans to acquire non-JTRS radios to meet current
operational needs.
[12] GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio
System Program, GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003).
[13] According to JPEO, while a library of completed waveforms was
envisioned under the original JTRS management structure, the JPEO has
implemented this concept by permitting incremental builds of software
to be placed in the library. The library is now called the information
repository.
[14] Our past work has shown that systems without sufficient knowledge-
-stable requirements, mature technologies, and the funding needed to
meet requirements--will take longer and cost even more than promised
and deliver fewer quantities and other capabilities than planned.
[15] Latency refers to the amount of time it takes data to travel from
source to destination. Together, latency and bandwidth define the speed
and capacity of a network.
[16] The Soldier Radio Waveform capability will leverage the Soldier
Level Integrated Communications Environment program being developed as
a science and technology project under the Army's Communications-
Electronics Research, and Development and Engineering Center.
[17] The Joint Airborne Network--Tactical Edge capability will leverage
the Tactical Targeting Network Technology program being developed as a
science and technology project under the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
