Defense Logistics
Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support Should Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation Challenges Gao ID: GAO-06-928R September 5, 2006As part of the Army's ongoing transformation efforts, in October 1999 the Army announced the Stryker brigade concept. The Stryker brigade is a unit designed to provide the Army with a rapidly deployable force that is capable of operating against the full spectrum of military threats. To meet the Army's requirements for being rapidly deployable and combat capable, the Stryker brigade relies on new sustainment concepts, such as minimizing the number of personnel and spare parts within the brigade and reaching back to assets outside the brigade for support, which are not found in other existing Army brigades. In a span of 6 years, the Army announced its intention to create a new brigade, chose a vehicle, tested the operational concept, and deployed three brigades in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army is also sending one Stryker brigade for a second rotation to Iraq and is developing four additional Stryker brigades. To support the accelerated development and deployment timeline, the Army relied on contractors to support some equipment within the Stryker brigade, such as the Stryker vehicle and computer and communication systems. The largest group of contractor support within the brigade focuses on the Stryker vehicle, and the duties of those contractor personnel include conducting maintenance on the Stryker vehicle and managing the Stryker-specific supply chain. An Army official from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology stated that at the time the first brigade deployed, the Army did not have the institutional capacity to train soldiers on conducting Stryker vehicle maintenance, and it faced an immediate need for maintenance personnel to support the deployment. This official also stated that the Army has since developed the institutional capacity to train soldiers to conduct Stryker vehicle maintenance. On November 1, 2005, the Army directed changes to Stryker vehicle support. One of these planned changes is to replace the Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor personnel within the brigade with soldiers. Army officials stated that the Army's general preference is to use soldiers instead of contractor personnel, and the specific rationale for making this change is to increase the flexibility of the Stryker brigade to perform in different combat missions. The Army expects to begin implementing this change by fiscal year 2008. We initiated this work under the statutory authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative and are providing this report to Congress because of its' committees' oversight responsibility. We reviewed issues related to implementing the Army's planned change to use soldiers, rather than contractors, to conduct maintenance on the Stryker vehicle and specifically assessed the extent to which the Army's planned change will achieve the desired outcome when implemented.
The Army's change from contractor personnel to soldiers conducting maintenance on the Stryker vehicle may not fully achieve its intended outcome of increasing the brigade's flexibility to perform in different types of combat operations. We identified three potential challenges that may affect the Army's ability to achieve its intended outcome. First, personnel challenges may affect implementation of the planned change. Since vehicle maintenance contractors focus solely on the Stryker vehicle while soldiers perform a variety of tasks in addition to maintenance, the Army's plan replaces the existing 45 Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor personnel with 71 soldiers. Accordingly, to implement its plan, the Army must annually recruit or retain 497 additional soldiers with specific military specialties to support all seven Stryker brigades. As we have previously reported, some of these specialties have been consistently underfilled. The Army also may experience difficulties in sustaining soldier skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, due to the limited number of Stryker brigades combined with regularly scheduled transfers of soldiers among units. However, the Army's plan does not include strategies to (1) enable it to recruit and retain the soldiers necessary to implement this change or (2) sustain soldier skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance. Second, the Army's plan increases the size of the brigade, and transporting the additional personnel and their associated equipment may exacerbate the existing difficulties in meeting deployment timelines that we have previously reported. Deploying the Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours is a component of the Stryker brigade's flexibility. However, the Army's plan does not address the effect of the increased logistical footprint on the brigade's ability to deploy within 96 hours. Finally, since the Stryker brigade was designed with a limited ability to perform major combat operations, achieving the Army's desired flexibility requires the Stryker brigade to receive additional sustainment support from Army units external to the brigade in order for it to perform a major combat operation. However, the Army has not addressed this support in its planned change. Until the Army addresses all of these challenges as part of its planned change, it may not achieve its intended outcome of increasing the Stryker brigade's flexibility to perform in different types of combat operations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-928R, Defense Logistics: Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support Should Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation Challenges
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September 5, 2006:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Defense Logistics: Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance
Support Should Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation
Challenges:
As part of the Army's ongoing transformation efforts, in October 1999
the Army announced the Stryker brigade concept. The Stryker brigade is
a unit designed to provide the Army with a rapidly deployable force
that is capable of operating against the full spectrum of military
threats. To meet the Army's requirements for being rapidly deployable
and combat capable, the Stryker brigade relies on new sustainment
concepts, such as minimizing the number of personnel and spare parts
within the brigade and reaching back to assets outside the brigade for
support, which are not found in other existing Army brigades. In a span
of 6 years, the Army announced its intention to create a new brigade,
chose a vehicle, tested the operational concept, and deployed three
brigades in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army is also
sending one Stryker brigade for a second rotation to Iraq and is
developing four additional Stryker brigades.
To support the accelerated development and deployment timeline, the
Army relied on contractors to support some equipment within the Stryker
brigade, such as the Stryker vehicle and computer and communication
systems. The largest group of contractor support within the brigade
focuses on the Stryker vehicle, and the duties of those contractor
personnel include conducting maintenance on the Stryker vehicle and
managing the Stryker-specific supply chain. An Army official from the
office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology stated that at the time the first brigade
deployed, the Army did not have the institutional capacity to train
soldiers on conducting Stryker vehicle maintenance, and it faced an
immediate need for maintenance personnel to support the deployment.
This official also stated that the Army has since developed the
institutional capacity to train soldiers to conduct Stryker vehicle
maintenance.
On November 1, 2005, the Army directed changes to Stryker vehicle
support. One of these planned changes is to replace the Stryker vehicle
maintenance contractor personnel within the brigade with soldiers. Army
officials stated that the Army's general preference is to use soldiers
instead of contractor personnel, and the specific rationale for making
this change is to increase the flexibility of the Stryker brigade to
perform in different combat missions. The Army expects to begin
implementing this change by fiscal year 2008.
We initiated this work under the statutory authority of the Comptroller
General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative and are providing
this report to you because of your committees' oversight
responsibility. We reviewed issues related to implementing the Army's
planned change to use soldiers, rather than contractors, to conduct
maintenance on the Stryker vehicle and specifically assessed the extent
to which the Army's planned change will achieve the desired outcome
when implemented.
To assess the extent to which the Army's planned change will achieve
its desired outcome, we reviewed Stryker vehicle maintenance support
contracts and documents related to the Army's plan for implementing its
proposed changes to Stryker vehicle support. We also obtained
documentation and met with personnel from three Stryker brigades,
representatives from the vehicle maintenance contractor, and officials
at Army Headquarters and from various Army major commands. We conducted
our review from September 2005 to June 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The Army's change from contractor personnel to soldiers conducting
maintenance on the Stryker vehicle may not fully achieve its intended
outcome of increasing the brigade's flexibility to perform in different
types of combat operations. We identified three potential challenges
that may affect the Army's ability to achieve its intended outcome.
First, personnel challenges may affect implementation of the planned
change. Since vehicle maintenance contractors focus solely on the
Stryker vehicle while soldiers perform a variety of tasks in addition
to maintenance, the Army's plan replaces the existing 45 Stryker
vehicle maintenance contractor personnel with 71 soldiers. Accordingly,
to implement its plan, the Army must annually recruit or retain 497
additional soldiers with specific military specialties to support all
seven Stryker brigades. As we have previously reported,[Footnote 1]
some of these specialties have been consistently underfilled. The Army
also may experience difficulties in sustaining soldier skills and
knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, due to the limited number of
Stryker brigades combined with regularly scheduled transfers of
soldiers among units. However, the Army's plan does not include
strategies to (1) enable it to recruit and retain the soldiers
necessary to implement this change or (2) sustain soldier skills and
knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance. Second, the Army's plan
increases the size of the brigade, and transporting the additional
personnel and their associated equipment may exacerbate the existing
difficulties in meeting deployment timelines that we have previously
reported.[Footnote 2] Deploying the Stryker brigade anywhere in the
world within 96 hours is a component of the Stryker brigade's
flexibility. However, the Army's plan does not address the effect of
the increased logistical footprint on the brigade's ability to deploy
within 96 hours. Finally, since the Stryker brigade was designed with a
limited ability to perform major combat operations, achieving the
Army's desired flexibility requires the Stryker brigade to receive
additional sustainment support from Army units external to the brigade
in order for it to perform a major combat operation. However, the Army
has not addressed this support in its planned change. Until the Army
addresses all of these challenges as part of its planned change, it may
not achieve its intended outcome of increasing the Stryker brigade's
flexibility to perform in different types of combat operations.
Accordingly, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
to direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and include, as part of
the Army's planning process for changes to Stryker vehicle support, (1)
strategies to enable the Army to recruit and retain the additional
soldiers needed to implement the changes, in light of existing
personnel challenges; (2) strategies to sustain Army skills and
knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, given the limited number of
Stryker brigades; (3) an assessment of the effects of an increased
logistical footprint, such as the need for additional airlift, on the
brigade's deployment timeline; and (4) plans to ensure the Stryker
brigade can receive additional sustainment support so that the brigade
can participate in major combat operations.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
(DOD) partially concurred with our recommendations, but said that no
additional direction was required because the Army could achieve its
missions using existing processes and strategies for recruiting and
training soldiers and deploying and supporting the Stryker brigade. We
continue to believe that our recommendations have merit and that the
Army should identify strategies for addressing these implementation
challenges. DOD's comments are reprinted in enclosure I and our
evaluation of its comments is on page 12.
Background:
As part of the Army's ongoing efforts to transform its forces, in
October 1999 the Army announced the creation of a new brigade that
would provide a lighter and more rapidly deployable force, capable of
operating against the full spectrum of military threats, ranging from
small-scale contingencies to a major theater war. This brigade--known
as the Stryker brigade--was designed to balance lethality, mobility,
and survivability with the capabilities required for responsiveness,
deployability, sustainability, and a reduced in-theater footprint. By
February 2009, the Army plans to create a total of seven Stryker
brigades, of which three have been completed and deployed to Iraq.
These brigades will be stationed inside and outside the continental
United States. Each of the seven Stryker brigades is expected to have
approximately 320 Stryker vehicles, of which there are 10 variants that
use a common vehicle platform. A total of 2,559 Stryker vehicles have
been funded, and 8 of the 10 Stryker vehicle variants[Footnote 3] have
been distributed to Army units. Additionally, Stryker vehicles are used
by other organizations, such as Special Operations Command, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, and Air Force Tactical Air Control
Parties.[Footnote 4]
Currently, contractors support some equipment within the Stryker
brigade, and the largest group provides maintenance support for the
Stryker vehicle. These 45 contractor personnel, who are embedded in the
Stryker brigade, are centrally managed by the Stryker brigade support
battalion, and the brigade support battalion commander directs the
priority of Stryker vehicle maintenance.[Footnote 5] Army officials
stated that the Stryker vehicle contractor personnel perform duties
associated with several Army military occupational
specialties,[Footnote 6] to include conducting maintenance on the
Stryker vehicle and some subsystems and ordering and tracking Stryker
vehicle spare parts. Army officials stated that this contracted
maintenance support exceeded the Army-established performance goal of
maintaining a 90 percent operational readiness rate.[Footnote 7] For
the first two Stryker brigades that deployed to Iraq, Army officials
reported operational readiness rates for the Stryker vehicle averaging
96 percent from October 2003 through September 2005. Contractor
personnel were able to exceed the Army's performance goal of
maintaining a 90 percent operational readiness rate despite the 5.6
million miles driven by the Stryker vehicle during the first two
deployments, which Army officials estimated to be 800 percent higher
than anticipated peacetime usage.
Army personnel in the Stryker brigades also expressed satisfaction with
the performance of the Stryker vehicle's contracted support and
provided several explanations for the quality of support, noting that
the contractors were knowledgeable about maintenance issues; were able
to deliver parts faster than the standard Army supply system; provided
the Stryker brigades with information on the status of maintenance and
repair parts in the frequency and manner requested; and focused
exclusively on performing Stryker vehicle maintenance tasks. Army
officials also stated that the use of contractor personnel enabled
soldiers to dedicate more time to train on soldier skills and perform
other missions, such as guard duty and convoy escort. Because Stryker
vehicle contractors were able to focus on the Stryker vehicle, soldiers
were able to perform these additional tasks without degrading the
quality of maintenance on the Stryker vehicle. Additionally, Army
officials praised the ongoing collaborative relationship between the
Stryker brigade and the contractors, observing that the contractors
worked with the soldiers while in garrison. As we have previously
reported,[Footnote 8] contractors deployed with a Stryker brigade to
Army training centers. This preexisting relationship ensured a working
collaboration between soldiers and contractors before the brigades
deployed to Iraq.
The Army directed that the Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor
personnel embedded at the brigade level be replaced with soldiers in
order to increase the Stryker brigade's flexibility to perform in
different combat operations.[Footnote 9] Army officials stated that the
plan to transition to soldier maintenance is based on the Army's
preference to minimize the number of contractors in forward locations
in order to increase flexibility in different combat situations. Based
on our review and discussions with various Army officials, this
decision to transition was not predicated on the costs of providing
support. Army officials specifically cited the march to Baghdad
conducted by other Army units during Operation Iraqi Freedom as the
type of combat operation the brigade could have the flexibility to
perform with the transition from contractor to soldier
maintenance.[Footnote 10] The Army is still developing the plan for
transitioning from contractor to soldier field-level maintenance, and
one of its assumptions is that its plan will be properly resourced, to
include the necessary personnel and funding. The Army intends to begin
this transition by fiscal year 2008, and is expected to finalize its
plan in 2006.
Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support May Not Achieve Intended
Outcome:
The Army may be unable to fully achieve the increased flexibility
intended by the change to Stryker vehicle maintenance support due to
three challenges. First, the Army's ability to replace contractor
personnel with soldiers may be affected by personnel challenges,
particularly with respect to the recruitment and retention of
additional soldiers, as well as sustaining soldier skills and knowledge
on Stryker vehicle maintenance. Second, the increased size of the
brigade resulting from additional soldiers may exacerbate the brigade's
existing difficulty in meeting its 96-hour deployment goal. Third, the
planned change does not include additional sustainment support from
Army units external to the brigade that could enable the Army to fully
achieve the desired flexibility for the Stryker brigade to perform in
major combat operations.
Personnel Challenges May Affect Implementation of Change:
Two personnel challenges may affect the Army's ability to implement the
change to replace the contractors with soldiers. First, recruiting or
retaining the additional soldiers needed for the planned change is a
challenge that could affect implementation. According to Army
officials, there are currently a total of 45 Stryker vehicle
maintenance contractor personnel within each Stryker brigade. To
implement the change and have soldiers fill the functions provided by
these contractor personnel, the Army plans to add 71 soldiers of
different specialties for each Stryker brigade, or a total of 497
soldiers for all seven brigades.[Footnote 11] Recruiting these
additional soldiers may be a challenge because, as we have previously
reported,[Footnote 12] the Army faced difficulties in meeting its
recruiting goals in fiscal year 2005 (92 percent of target). With the
transition from contractor personnel to soldiers, the maintenance and
supply tasks currently performed by contractor personnel within the
brigade would be conducted by soldiers from five military occupational
specialties. Army officials acknowledged that there is a general
shortage in maintenance capability across the Army. Additionally, as we
have previously reported,[Footnote 13] the Army has consistently been
unable to fill one of these five specialties. Further, all of these
specialties were underfilled in fiscal year 2005. If the Army is unable
to find soldiers in these specialties and assign them to the Stryker
brigade, the brigade may not have enough people to perform Stryker
vehicle maintenance.
The second personnel challenge is the ability of soldiers to develop
and sustain skills and knowledge on the maintenance of the Stryker
vehicle. Army officials noted that the contractor personnel's exclusive
focus on the Stryker vehicle increased their expertise on the system,
so they became more knowledgeable about maintenance issues. In
contrast, soldiers usually work on a system for about 3 years and then
leave the unit because of promotion or a scheduled transfer to another
unit. For vehicles that are common throughout the Army, soldiers can
transfer to another unit and then continue to perform maintenance and
develop skills and knowledge on that same vehicle. However, since there
will be only seven Stryker brigades, building long-term expertise on
the Stryker vehicle would require ensuring that the soldiers conducting
Stryker vehicle maintenance are only transferred among the different
Stryker brigades. Without long-term personnel management to target
soldiers' transfers, the Army may face difficulties in developing and
sustaining its skills and knowledge on the Stryker vehicle.
Changes May Exacerbate Existing Difficulties in Meeting Deployment
Timelines:
The increased size of the Stryker brigade associated with additional
soldiers may exacerbate the brigade's existing difficulties in meeting
its deployment timelines. According to its organizational and
operational concept, the Stryker brigade is designed as an early entry
combat force that is intended to deploy within 96 hours of "first
aircraft wheels up" and to begin operations immediately upon arrival in
theater. Army officials told us that the reason for the 96-hour goal is
to deter conflict and promote peace by getting the brigade into the
theater quickly. However, as we noted in our earlier report[Footnote
14] on Stryker brigade deployment timelines, airlift shortages already
preclude meeting the 4-day deployment goal, which would require
transporting about 15,000 tons of vehicles, equipment, and supplies and
about 3,900 personnel. In its response to that report, DOD stated that
the Army continues to maintain an overall Stryker brigade program goal
of deploying the brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours and is
working with other services to address transportation constraints.
Army officials told us that each Stryker brigade would require more
soldiers than the existing number of contractor personnel they were
replacing because contractors focus on their specific tasks, while
soldiers must perform other activities in addition to their maintenance
duties. To support these additional soldiers, Army officials estimated
an 8 percent increase in the amount of equipment and supplies required
by the brigade. Some items that increase when the brigade adds soldiers
include more wheeled vehicles to support the new soldiers as well as
additional maintenance parts, fuel, food, and headquarters personnel.
Army officials acknowledged that, as more people and their associated
equipment are added to the brigade, the logistical footprint grows.
This increase in the Stryker footprint may affect the ability of the
brigade to deploy within the 96-hour goal. As we have previously
reported, the deployment goal of 96 hours is unrealistic because
airlifting a Stryker brigade within that time frame would require use
of a sizeable portion of available military airlift. Army officials did
not identify deploying the brigade in 96 hours as a concern, and
continued to state that the issue is a lack of airlift resources, which
is outside of the Army's control. However, the increased size of the
Stryker brigade may increase the number of aircraft required to deploy
the brigade, and these aircraft may not be available when needed to
support the deployment. Without addressing the effects of the increased
logistical footprint on the deployment timelines, the Army will
continue to face challenges in rapidly deploying the Stryker brigade
within 96 hours.
Change Does Not Include Sustainment Support for Major Combat
Operations:
The Army's planned change does not include the additional sustainment
support that would enable the Stryker brigade to achieve the desired
flexibility to perform in major combat operations. The business case
analysis the Army is developing focuses on the cost of the transition
between contractor maintenance personnel and soldiers. However, there
are other considerations specific to supporting a Stryker brigade in
major combat operations. The example cited by Army officials as a
rationale for changing Stryker vehicle maintenance support to allow the
brigade to perform in different combat operations was the march to
Baghdad that occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the
Stryker brigade was not optimized for this type of combat operation.
According to the Stryker organizational and operational concept, the
Stryker brigade was optimized for small-scale contingencies instead of
major combat operations. Unlike other Army units, the logistical
footprint for the Stryker brigade is smaller, and the brigade is
capable of sustaining itself for only 72 hours. In order to perform in
major combat operations, such as a march to Baghdad, the Stryker
brigade would require significant combat service support augmentation.
This augmentation would come from Army units external to the brigade,
which is generally the Army division under which it fights. Army
officials stated that if a Stryker brigade needed augmentation, the
Army would then decide what actions to take based on the situation.
According to the Army, units that participated in the actual march to
Baghdad experienced some sustainment challenges. Although these Army
units were able to successfully defeat the enemy and travel across
great distances very quickly, these successes resulted in Army units
not receiving an immediate resupply of spare vehicle parts, with some
brigades not receiving additional parts for periods greater than a
month. This sustainment schedule would be difficult for the Stryker
brigade, but the Army's planned change does not address the support
challenges associated with determining how the Stryker brigade would
receive the necessary sustainment support. Until the Army develops
plans to augment the support of the Stryker brigade, the change may not
be able to provide the Army's desired flexibility.
Conclusions:
The Army is focused on implementing the specific change to replace
contractors with soldiers to allow the brigade to perform in all types
of combat operations. However, the Army has not addressed challenges
that may hinder its ability to achieve this intended outcome. By not
addressing personnel recruiting and management challenges, the Army may
be unable to replace contractors with soldiers or build and sustain the
long-term skills and knowledge necessary to ensure quality Stryker
vehicle maintenance. Additionally, without addressing the effect of the
increased size of the Stryker brigade on its deployment timeline, the
brigade may face even greater difficulty in meeting its 96-hour
deployment goal. Finally, if the Army does not plan for how the Stryker
brigade will receive additional sustainment support, it may be
difficult for the brigade to perform in major combat operations such as
a march to Baghdad. Clear identification of challenges that may limit
the Army's ability to achieve the desired outcome of the proposed
change, an assessment of the effects of these challenges, and
development of strategies to address these challenges during the
planning process could enhance the likelihood that the Stryker vehicle
continues to receive high levels of maintenance support and meet
performance requirements after the proposed change is implemented.
Because the Stryker brigade concept is the bridge between the existing
force and the Army of the future, the process by which conceptual
changes are viewed and implemented determines not only how the Stryker
brigade operates, but also how the Army plans to address the same
issues for future brigades.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop and include, as part of the Army's planning process for
changes to Stryker vehicle support, (1) strategies to enable the Army
to recruit and retain the additional soldiers needed to implement the
changes, in light of existing personnel challenges; (2) strategies to
sustain Army skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, given
the limited number of Stryker brigades; (3) an assessment of the
effects of an increased logistical footprint, such as the need for
additional airlift, on the brigade's deployment timeline; and (4) plans
to ensure the Stryker brigade can receive additional sustainment
support so that the brigade can participate in major combat operations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with all four of our recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in
enclosure I. Regarding our recommendation to develop strategies to
enable the Army to recruit and retain the additional soldiers needed to
implement the changes, in light of existing personnel challenges, DOD
partially concurred, stating that it agreed with the importance of
recruiting and retaining soldiers. According to DOD, existing processes
have achieved the Army's recruiting and retention goals. The department
also noted that the Army has effective processes for distribution of
occupational skills in support of the total force, which it has used to
meet recruiting and retention objectives within the Stryker brigade and
can use to fully support the incremental inclusion of soldier
mechanics. The department stated that additional direction is not
required. We disagree that the existing processes are effective
because, as we have noted in this report, the Army has not achieved its
recruiting and retention goals in recent years. While the Army may have
met the personnel objectives for the Stryker brigade in the past, Army
officials have already acknowledged that there is a general shortage of
maintenance capability across the Army. Further, implementing the
Army's planned transition increases the personnel requirement for the
Stryker brigade in five specific occupational specialties where the
Army has been unable to meet its recruiting goals. For example, as our
report points out, in fiscal year 2005 the Army experienced shortages
in filling requirements for wheeled vehicle mechanic (63B), fire
control repair (45G), armament repair (45K), automated logistics
specialist (92A), and unit supply specialist (92Y), and has
consistently been unable to fill one of these five specialties. As a
result, we continue to believe that the Army may face challenges in
recruiting and retaining personnel for the Stryker brigade in current
and future years, and that the Army should consider strategies to
address this issue in its planning for changes to Stryker vehicle
support.
In response to our recommendation to develop strategies to sustain Army
skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, given the limited
number of Stryker brigades, DOD partially concurred, agreeing that
sustaining skills and knowledge is essential. The department stated
that the Army's Training and Doctrine command (TRADOC) is meeting
current requirements for Stryker training and is prepared to meet the
Army's timeline for the transition to soldier field-level maintenance.
DOD said that TRADOC will provide the necessary training base for the
soldier mechanics and that additional direction is not required. We
believe that DOD has misunderstood the intent of our recommendation. We
are not questioning the Army's training capability for Stryker vehicle
maintenance. As we acknowledged in this report, the Army has developed
the institutional capacity to train soldiers on Stryker vehicle
maintenance. As this report points out, our concern is about the Army's
ability to develop and sustain long-term institutional expertise on the
Stryker vehicle. Army officials told us that expertise on any vehicle
is best developed by continuous use of the skill through hands-on
maintenance, and that this expertise must be managed because soldiers
routinely transfer to different units after a 3-year period. These
officials also acknowledged that building this expertise would take
time because the Stryker vehicle will not be found in all Army units.
In contrast, developing and sustaining expertise on other Army
vehicles, such as the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle,
requires less management because the vehicle is found throughout the
Army and soldiers are able to continue building expertise after
reassignment. Since the Stryker vehicle will only be located in the
seven Stryker brigades and in a limited number of other locales,
ensuring that soldiers are assigned to other units with Stryker
vehicles is necessary to develop and sustain their skills and knowledge
on maintaining the Stryker vehicle. Accordingly, we continue to believe
that our recommendation has merit and that the Army should identify
strategies to build long-term expertise on the Stryker vehicle.
The department partially concurred with our recommendation to include
in its planning process the effects of an increased logistical
footprint, such as the need for additional airlift, on the brigade's
deployment timeline, agreeing with the importance of minimizing the
effect of any increased logistical footprint. DOD agreed that the
structures required to provide the logistics of projecting, moving,
protecting, and sustaining contract personnel are not included in
Stryker's current structure, but noted that the transition to soldier
field maintenance includes adding required equipment into Stryker's
formal structure and will facilitate accurate planning for strategic
deployability. According to DOD, the transition from interim contractor
field maintenance to soldier field-level maintenance will not result in
a significant increase to the logistics footprint, so additional
direction is not required. We disagree. Army officials estimate that
the transition will require an 8 percent increase in the amount of
equipment and supplies required for the brigade, which is an increase
in the size of the Stryker brigade logistics footprint. Because the
amount of equipment necessary to support contractors is not formalized,
as noted in DOD's response, the Army does not currently have an
accurate picture of the assets necessary to deploy the Stryker brigade.
We are encouraged that DOD is taking steps to facilitate accurate
planning for strategic deployability of the Stryker brigade. As we have
stated in previous reports, the existing goal of deploying a Stryker
brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours is unrealistic. By
implementing the transition, the Army now has the opportunity to
reexamine the deployment goals for the Stryker brigade. Therefore, we
continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and that the
Army, with the data provided by the more formalized logistics
structure, should take additional action and consider the effects of
the increased logistical footprint on the brigade's deployment
timeline, to include identifying the number of assets necessary to
transport the brigade to meet more realistic deployment goals.
With respect to our recommendation that DOD develop plans to ensure the
Stryker brigade can receive additional sustainment support so that the
brigade can participate in major combat operations, DOD partially
concurred, agreeing with the objective of enhancing the Stryker
brigade's capability to participate in major combat operations, with
augmentation, as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or
corps, in a variety of possible roles. The department noted that all
Army units require some level of support based on mission, enemy,
terrain, available troops, time, and civilian considerations. DOD
stated that the transition from interim contractor support to a
permanent support strategy significantly improves operational
flexibility and the Army's ability to employ the Stryker brigade by
giving it the capability to logistically support a much broader range
of military operations. DOD said that additional direction is not
required. While we agree that using soldiers who possess expertise on
Stryker vehicle maintenance provides the Stryker brigade with improved
operational flexibility, as we stated in this report, the Army has not
developed a plan for how to support the Stryker brigade in a major
combat operation. Army officials told us that if a Stryker brigade
needed augmentation, the Army would decide what actions to take based
on the situation. The department's response reinforces this point. As
we have stated in this report, the Stryker brigade is different than
other Army units in that it has a smaller logistical footprint, is self-
sustaining for only 72 hours, and requires augmentation from Army units
external to the brigade in order to perform a major combat operation.
Since the Stryker vehicle is not found in most other units, the
existing division and corps headquarters that would provide combat
service support to the Stryker brigade in a major combat operation
would not necessarily have the support packages and spare parts needed
for the brigade. Resupply functions in Iraq are currently being
performed by contractor personnel, and the Stryker brigade is currently
operating from forward operating bases. The Stryker brigade deployed
for the first time to Operation Iraqi Freedom and has yet to perform as
a subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps in a major
combat operation and with reduced contractor support. As we have stated
in this report, other non-Stryker brigades that had an existing
relationship with division support structures still faced resupply
challenges while performing major combat operations in the march to
Baghdad. We believe that waiting to develop a plan based on the
situation would inhibit the rapid use of the Stryker brigade in major
combat operations. Therefore, we continue to believe that our
recommendation has merit and that the Army should take action to ensure
the Stryker brigade can receive additional sustainment support so that
it can participate in major combat operations.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in the
body of the report as appropriate. Some of these comments related to
the context of the report. Specifically, DOD stated that the transition
to soldier maintainers will improve Stryker's deployability at all
points of deployment--to include theater reception, staging, and onward
integration in a broader range of environments and conditions--thereby
improving both strategic and operational capability. We do not dispute
the point that soldiers are more deployable than contractors. Instead,
our first recommendation focuses on whether the Army can recruit and
retain the soldiers necessary to accomplish the plan, and our third
recommendation focuses on the effects on the timelines for deploying
the brigade given the overall increase in the size of the Stryker
brigade's logistical footprint. DOD further stated that the transition
from Stryker interim contractor field maintenance to soldier field
maintenance may not require more than a one-for-one swap. The
department noted that while contractors may be able to dedicate more
time to performing maintenance tasks, they are also less deployable
than soldiers and require force protection and sustainment. While we
agree that contractors are less deployable than soldiers, we disagree
that the transition may not require more than a one-for-one swap. Army
officials stated that there are currently a total of 45 Stryker vehicle
maintenance contractor personnel within each Stryker brigade, and these
personnel provide functions similar to five military occupational
specialties. According to the Army plan that was provided to us and
sent to Army leadership, the Army intends to add 71 soldiers in these
five specialties to each Stryker brigade, which is greater than a one-
for-one swap. Based on our interviews with Army officials, a one-for-
one swap would likely result in a decrease in operational readiness
rates for the Stryker vehicle, since soldiers perform multiple
functions while contractors focus solely on maintaining the Stryker
vehicle.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Army's planned change to Stryker
vehicle support will achieve its desired outcome, we reviewed the
decision memorandum and briefings prepared for the Army Systems
Acquisition Review Council's Sustainment Readiness Review and talked
with officials at the Program Executive Office for Ground Combat
Systems. We also reviewed Army documents related to the plans for
implementing the change and previous GAO reports and reviewed the
current and most recent contracts for Stryker vehicle maintenance
support. We collected Army statistics on Stryker vehicle operational
readiness rates, and met with Army Materiel Command officials to
discuss other support for the Stryker brigades.[Footnote 15]
Additionally, we met with officials from the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command's System Manager for the Stryker vehicle, the Combined
Arms Support Command, the Project Manager's office at the Tank-
Automotive and Armaments Command, and Army Materiel Command. We also
interviewed officials from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; personnel from three
Stryker brigades; representatives from the contractor that provides
vehicle maintenance services, operates the Stryker vehicle supply
chain, conducts new equipment training, and performs reset actions; and
officials at Army headquarters (Logistics and Force Development), U.S.
Army Forces Command, and the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command. We
conducted our review from September 2005 to June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to others on request. In addition, this report will be
available on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If
you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-
8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures - II:
[End of Section]
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense For Logistics And Materiel Readiness:
3500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3500:
Aug 0 9 2006:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Defense Logistics: Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance
Support Should Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation
Challenges, dated July 11, 2006 (GAO Code 350742/GAO-06-928R)."
The Department partially concurs with each recommendation. An
explanation of the DoD position is enclosed. Additionally, since
portions of the draft report supporting the recommendations could be
misleading, technical comments are provided to improve the accuracy and
clarity of the draft report. The Department appreciates the opportunity
to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jack Bell:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated July 11, 2006 GAO Code 350742/GAO Code-06-
928R:
"Defense Logistics: Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support
Should Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation Challenges"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and include, as part of the
Army's planning process for changes to Stryker vehicle support,
strategies to enable the Army to recruit and retain the additional
soldiers needed to implement the changes, in light of existing
personnel challenges.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. The DoD agrees with the importance of
recruiting and retaining Soldiers. However, existing processes have
achieved U.S. Army recruiting and retention goals. Additionally, the
U.S. Army has effective processes for distribution of occupational
skills in support of the total force. Using these processes, the U.S.
Army has met recruiting and retention objectives within the Stryker
Brigade and can fully support the incremental inclusion of Soldier
mechanics. Additional direction is not required.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and include, as part of the
Army's planning process for changes to Stryker vehicle support,
strategies to sustain Army skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle
maintenance, given the limited number of Stryker Brigades.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. The DoD agrees that sustaining skills
and knowledge is essential. The U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine
command (TRADOC) is meeting today's requirements for Stryker training.
In addition, TRADOC is prepared to meet the U.S. Army's timeline for
the transition to Soldier field level maintenance, and will provide the
necessary training base for the Soldier mechanics. Additional direction
is not required.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and include, as part of the
Army's planning process for changes to Stryker vehicle support, the
effects of an increased logistical footprint, such as the need for
additional airlift, on the Brigade's deployment timeline.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. The DoD agrees with the importance of
minimizing the effect of any increased logistical footprint. Changes to
the Stryker support concept are part of the U.S. Army's planned process
to implement a Soldier field maintenance strategy within the Brigade,
in order to better meet warfighter requirements. The structures
required to provide the logistics of projecting, moving, protecting and
sustaining contractor personnel are not included in Stryker's current
structure. However, the transition to Soldier field maintenance
includes adding required equipment into Stryker's formal structure and
will facilitate accurate planning for strategic deployability. The
transition from interim contractor field maintenance to Soldier field
level maintenance will not result in a significant increase to the
logistics footprint. Additional direction is not required.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and include, as part of the
U.S. Army's planning process for changes to Stryker vehicle support,
plans to ensure the Stryker Brigade can receive additional sustainment
support so that the Brigade can participate in major combat operations.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. The DoD agrees with enhancing the
Stryker Brigade's capability to participate in major combat operations.
The U.S. Army's planning process for transitioning Stryker to a
permanent support strategy includes the objective of enhancing the
Brigade's capability to participate in Large Scale Combat Operations,
with augmentation, as a subordinate maneuver component within a
division or corps, in a variety of possible roles. All U.S. Army units
require some level of support based on Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops
available, Time, and Civilian considerations. The transition of Stryker
from interim contractor support to a permanent support strategy
significantly improves operational flexibility and the U.S. Army's
ability to employ the Stryker Brigade by giving it the capability to
logistically support a much broader range of military operations.
Additional direction is not required.
[End of Section]
Enclosure II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact: William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments: In addition to the contact named above, major
contributors to this report were Lawson Gist, Assistant Director; Jim
Melton, Karyn Angulo, Renee Brown, Julia Denman, Charles Perdue, and
John Van Schaik.
(350742):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). Contractors would be replaced with soldiers from
five military occupational specialties. We found that the Army has
consistently been unable to fill one of these specialties. The Army
also experienced challenges filling the other four specialties in
fiscal year 2005.
[2] GAO, Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed
for Army Stryker Brigades, GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2003).
[3] The Stryker vehicle variants are: (1) Infantry Carrier Vehicle; (2)
Medical Evacuation Vehicle; (3) Reconnaissance Vehicle; (4) Commander's
Vehicle; (5) Mortar Carrier Vehicle; (6) Antitank Guided Missile
Vehicle; (7) Engineer Squad Vehicle; (8) Fire Support Vehicle; (9)
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; and (10) the
Mobile Gun System. The Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance
Vehicle and Mobile Gun System are in various stages of development and
testing.
[4] Other Stryker vehicles are dedicated as Operational Readiness Float
(ORF) and Ready-to-Fight (RTF) equipment. ORFs are vehicles that are
maintained by the brigade and used at the brigade commander's
discretion. There are approximately 10 ORF vehicles per Stryker
brigade. The RTF fleet vehicles are used to replenish the ORF. Army
officials said that they intend to create three RTF fleets, each with
14 vehicles.
[5] There are 30 contractors that provide support to various Army
computer and communication systems in the Stryker brigade. These
contractors are not embedded in the Stryker brigade and are centrally
managed by brigade logistics support teams that are controlled by the
Army Materiel Command.
[6] Stryker vehicle contractor personnel perform duties that are
similar to five military occupational specialties: wheeled vehicle
mechanic (63B), fire control repair (45G), armament repair (45K),
automated logistics specialist (92A), and unit supply specialist (92Y).
[7] The operational readiness rate requirement in the contract is
specific to the Stryker vehicle and does not include all of the
subsystems on the vehicle. For example, the Stryker vehicle maintenance
contractor is responsible for the engine, chassis, and wheels, but is
not responsible for communications equipment.
[8] GAO, Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative
Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues
Remain for Future Brigades, GAO-04-188 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12,
2003).
[9] The Army's plan will also reduce the number of contractors that
provide support to Army computer and communication systems from 30 to
17.
[10] DOD officials also stated that the transition to soldier
maintainers would improve the Stryker brigade's deployability in a
broader range of environments and conditions, thereby improving the
brigade's strategic and operational capability.
[11] Army officials told us that replacing the contractor vehicle
maintenance personnel with soldiers would require more than a one-for-
one swap. As noted earlier, the vehicle maintenance contractors focus
solely on the Stryker vehicle while soldiers perform a variety of tasks
in addition to maintenance, to include training, guard duty, and other
missions.
[12] GAO-06-134, p. 8.
[13] GAO-06-134, p. 52.
[14] GAO-03-801, p. 6.
[15] For this report, we did not address the cost effectiveness of
using contractors rather than soldiers to perform maintenance on the
Stryker vehicle.
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