Defense Management
Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture Restructuring Gao ID: GAO-06-852 September 13, 2006The Department of Defense's (DOD) Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy calls for a comprehensive restructuring of U.S. forces overseas. DOD's planned changes will require billions of dollars to implement at a time when DOD is supporting operations in Iraq and realigning domestic bases. As requested, GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD has articulated a global posture strategy that has the characteristics necessary to guide its efforts and to achieve desired results and (2) the challenges that could affect DOD's implementation of its strategy and the mechanisms DOD has in place to inform Congress of its overall progress in achieving global posture goals.
DOD has articulated its global posture strategy in four principal documents, but these documents fully address only three of the six characteristics that GAO's prior work has identified as useful components of an effective strategy. Specifically, DOD's strategy documents state the purpose, scope, and methodology for changing its global posture; define the problems its strategy is directed against; and describe how the strategy is to be integrated with related strategies. However, the documents do not fully address other important characteristics such as performance metrics to measure intended improvements in operational effectiveness and service members' quality of life; sources of funding for implementing global restructuring initiatives; or methods of resolving conflicts that may arise during implementation. In the absence of a comprehensive strategy that addresses important characteristics such as performance measures, Congress will lack sufficient information to evaluate funding requests and assess whether the strategy is improving operational capabilities, quality of life, and alliances as intended. Ongoing negotiations between the United States and host nations, evolving cost estimates, and difficulties establishing service management and funding responsibilities for new overseas sites contribute to the complexity and uncertainty of DOD's overseas restructuring effort. In addition, DOD has not established a comprehensive and routine process to keep Congress informed on its progress dealing with these issues and the overall status of implementing the strategy. First, negotiations between the United States and host nations continue to evolve, causing periodic adjustments to the pace and scope of DOD's plans and making it difficult to determine the overall status of this effort. Second, DOD's initial cost estimate of $9 billion to $12 billion will continue to change, reflecting uncertainties such as those related to host-nation negotiations and burden-sharing, and total costs may be understated. Third, DOD has not yet fully determined how it will allocate responsibilities for managing and funding its planned worldwide network of smaller operating sites to the services, and therefore, it is still uncertain who will manage these sites and how they will be paid for. DOD has not established a comprehensive, routine method of informing Congress of ongoing changes to the strategy and its total costs. Reliable and timely information about the full costs, activities, and outputs of federal programs is important as Congress makes decisions about allocating resources in an environment of competing demands. DOD has not established a comprehensive and periodic reporting process because DOD officials believe that current congressional briefings and reporting requirements, which largely focus on military construction requirements, provide Congress with sufficient information. However, these existing reports do not provide comprehensive information on total costs, overall progress, or changes to DOD's plan. Without a periodic reporting process focused on overall progress and costs, Congress may not be well positioned to evaluate funding requests for implementing the strategy.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-852, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture Restructuring
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Defense Management:
Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure
Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture Restructuring:
Defense Management:
GAO-06-852:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-852, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) Integrated Global Posture and Basing
Strategy calls for a comprehensive restructuring of U.S. forces
overseas. DOD‘s planned changes will require billions of dollars to
implement at a time when DOD is supporting operations in Iraq and
realigning domestic bases. As requested, GAO examined (1) the extent to
which DOD has articulated a global posture strategy that has the
characteristics necessary to guide its efforts and to achieve desired
results and (2) the challenges that could affect DOD‘s implementation
of its strategy and the mechanisms DOD has in place to inform Congress
of its overall progress in achieving global posture goals.
What GAO Found:
DOD has articulated its global posture strategy in four principal
documents, but these documents fully address only three of the six
characteristics that GAO‘s prior work has identified as useful
components of an effective strategy. Specifically, DOD‘s strategy
documents state the purpose, scope, and methodology for changing its
global posture; define the problems its strategy is directed against;
and describe how the strategy is to be integrated with related
strategies. However, the documents do not fully address other important
characteristics such as performance metrics to measure intended
improvements in operational effectiveness and service members‘ quality
of life; sources of funding for implementing global restructuring
initiatives; or methods of resolving conflicts that may arise during
implementation. In the absence of a comprehensive strategy that
addresses important characteristics such as performance measures,
Congress will lack sufficient information to evaluate funding requests
and assess whether the strategy is improving operational capabilities,
quality of life, and alliances as intended.
Ongoing negotiations between the United States and host nations,
evolving cost estimates, and difficulties establishing service
management and funding responsibilities for new overseas sites
contribute to the complexity and uncertainty of DOD‘s overseas
restructuring effort. In addition, DOD has not established a
comprehensive and routine process to keep Congress informed on its
progress dealing with these issues and the overall status of
implementing the strategy. First, negotiations between the United
States and host nations continue to evolve, causing periodic
adjustments to the pace and scope of DOD‘s plans and making it
difficult to determine the overall status of this effort. Second, DOD‘s
initial cost estimate of $9 billion to $12 billion will continue to
change, reflecting uncertainties such as those related to host-nation
negotiations and burden-sharing, and total costs may be understated.
Third, DOD has not yet fully determined how it will allocate
responsibilities for managing and funding its planned worldwide network
of smaller operating sites to the services, and therefore, it is still
uncertain who will manage these sites and how they will be paid for.
DOD has not established a comprehensive, routine method of informing
Congress of ongoing changes to the strategy and its total costs.
Reliable and timely information about the full costs, activities, and
outputs of federal programs is important as Congress makes decisions
about allocating resources in an environment of competing demands. DOD
has not established a comprehensive and periodic reporting process
because DOD officials believe that current congressional briefings and
reporting requirements, which largely focus on military construction
requirements, provide Congress with sufficient information. However,
these existing reports do not provide comprehensive information on
total costs, overall progress, or changes to DOD‘s plan. Without a
periodic reporting process focused on overall progress and costs,
Congress may not be well positioned to evaluate funding requests for
implementing the strategy.
What GAO Recommends:
To facilitate DOD‘s management of global restructuring, GAO recommends
that the Secretary of Defense take specific steps to improve the
strategy, periodically report to Congress on cost and host-nation
negotiation status, and address management and funding issues for new
operating locations. In responding to a draft of this report, DOD
partially agreed with GAO‘s recommendations. However, it did not
specify any actions it plans to take in response to our
recommendations. Because DOD‘s response was unclear, we have added a
matter for congressional consideration suggesting that Congress require
DOD to report annually on its strategy and implementation.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-852].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Included Some but Not All Important Characteristics of an
Effective Strategy in Its Global Basing Strategy Documents:
Key Challenges Contribute to Uncertain Strategy Outcomes, and No
Routine, Comprehensive Mechanisms Exist to Report on Progress:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: GAO's Identification of the Six Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Principal U.S. Global Defense Posture Strategy Documents
Identified by DOD:
Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National
Strategy:
Table 3: Extent to Which the Four Principal Global Posture Strategy
Documents Collectively Address GAO-Identified Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy:
Table 4: Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy:
Figure:
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility and
Areas Affected by the Global Posture Strategy:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IGPBS: Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 13, 2006:
The Honorable Joel Hefley:
Chairman:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
In August 2004, President George W. Bush announced what has been
described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military
forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. In his announcement,
the president stated that this restructuring is intended to increase
U.S. military capabilities and combat power in every part of the world,
provide service members with more time at home, reduce the number of
moves service members must undergo over a military career, and
significantly reduce the number of overseas facilities.
In September 2004, shortly after the president announced this new
policy, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Report to Congress
entitled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. This report
outlined DOD's proposed changes, which were aimed at implementing the
president's new policy and which DOD called the "Integrated Global
Posture and Basing Strategy" (IGPBS). Overall changes involved in this
shift in overseas posture would be significant. For example, DOD plans
to transfer home to American territory up to 70,000 service members and
about 100,000 family members and civilian employees currently living
overseas. The 2004 Report to Congress also described DOD's strategy to
transform the U.S. posture abroad into a network of worldwide locations
of three types: main operating bases, which will be enduring, large
sites with permanently stationed service members and their families;
forward operating sites, which will be smaller but expandable sites
that can support rotational forces; and cooperative security locations,
which will be small, rapidly expandable sites with little or no
permanent U.S. presence. According to DOD's Report to Congress, many
advantages would be gained by using this network of locations. The new
U.S. overseas posture is intended to position U.S. forces to better
conduct the Global War on Terrorism, ease the burden of the post-9/11
operational tempo on members of the armed forces and their families,
and improve the U.S. ability to meet its alliance commitments while
making these alliances more affordable and sustainable. DOD will be
making these global posture changes, which will entail significant
amounts of funding, at a time when it is also supporting operations in
Iraq and implementing other initiatives such as those approved by the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission. DOD has reported to Congress
that it will cost $9 billion to $12 billion to implement the strategy
over a period of several years.
In our report on 21st Century challenges facing the federal government,
we cite some of the most urgent issues the Department of Defense must
address as it seeks to meet the demands of the new security
environment.[Footnote 1] One of the issues cited is whether DOD's plans
to restructure its overseas posture provide a significantly improved
capability to respond to global threats in the new security
environment, considering diplomatic, operational, and cost factors. We
have also issued reports on DOD's plans to build new facilities
overseas, as reported to Congress in master plans for overseas
infrastructure.[Footnote 2] These reports have discussed the degree to
which the information provided by DOD to Congress on the military
construction costs at overseas locations was complete and reliable, and
we have made recommendations for improvement.
You requested that we assess DOD's efforts to realign its military
posture overseas. Specifically, we examined the following questions:
(1) To what extent has DOD articulated a global posture strategy that
addresses the characteristics necessary to guide its efforts and
achieve desired results? (2) What key challenges, if any, could affect
DOD's implementation of its strategy, and does DOD have mechanisms in
place to inform Congress of its mitigation plans and overall progress
in achieving IGPBS goals?
To determine the extent to which DOD's IGPBS contains all the desirable
characteristics of an effective national strategy, we evaluated the
content of each of the four principal global posture strategy documents
identified by DOD officials using six desirable characteristics of
effective national strategies we have developed in prior work.[Footnote
3] In this prior work, we identified a set of desirable characteristics
by reviewing several sources of information, such as the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 and guidance from the Office of
Management and Budget on the President's Management Agenda. We also
researched recommendations from various research organizations that
have commented on national strategies, such as the RAND Corporation and
the Brookings Institution. To identify key challenges that could affect
DOD's implementation of its strategy, we examined global posture
strategy plans, programs, cost estimates, and other documentation
obtained from the geographic combatant commands, service headquarters,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and State Department
Headquarters. To identify the mechanisms DOD has in place to inform
Congress of its efforts to overcome these challenges and report on
overall progress in achieving the strategy's goals, we reviewed
congressional testimony, briefings prepared for congressional Members
and other organizations, and reports produced as a result of
legislative requirements. We assessed the reliability of the data used
in this report and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. Appendix I provides additional information on the six
characteristics of effective national strategies. Appendix II provides
additional information on our scope and methodology. We conducted our
review from November 2004 through January 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated May
2006.[Footnote 4] That report provides additional details on the
proposed changes to the U.S. military posture overseas and specific
examples that highlight the challenges faced by DOD in implementing its
strategy.
Results in Brief:
The Department of Defense has articulated its strategy to restructure
the U.S. military overseas posture in four principal documents, but the
characteristics of effective national strategies have not been fully
addressed in these documents, which may limit the department's efforts
to implement the strategy and achieve desired results. In prior work,
we identified six characteristics of an effective national strategy
that can assist organizations to develop and implement strategies, to
enhance their usefulness in resource and policy decisions, and to
better assure accountability. DOD's four principal strategy documents
for restructuring overseas presence address three important
characteristics of effective national strategies: the overall purpose
and scope of changing the global military posture, the problems the
strategy is intended to address, and the way the strategy is to be
integrated with other related strategies. However, the following three
other important characteristics have been only partially addressed by
the documents:
* Establishing goals, subordinate objectives and activities, and
performance measures--DOD has not established ways to measure the
extent to which intended improvements in operational effectiveness or
quality of life are occurring.
* Identifying resources, investments, and methods of managing risk--DOD
has not identified sources of funding (for example, specific
appropriations or military services) for the network of smaller
operating locations it plans to establish.
* Defining organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordinating
mechanisms--DOD has not identified a process for resolving conflicting
priorities either within DOD or between DOD and other government
organizations, such as the State Department.
Without clearly and fully identifying these elements, the Secretary of
Defense and other stakeholders may be limited in their ability to
demonstrate progress toward achieving DOD's identified goals, such as
improving worldwide response times and quality of life for service
members. Moreover, Congress will lack assurance that funds allocated to
implement the strategy will produce the benefits DOD intends.
Three significant challenges exist that contribute to the complexity
and uncertainty of the overseas basing restructuring effort. DOD is
taking some steps to address these challenges; however, many actions
are incomplete, and the department has not established a comprehensive,
routine method of informing Congress on its progress toward addressing
these issues or its progress toward implementing the strategy. Up-to-
date and reliable information on issues such as these is important to
Congress and the Secretary of Defense in helping to shape decisions
about funding policies and defense-related programs. The three
challenges we identified that limit DOD's ability to implement its
IGPBS strategy are the following:
* DOD faces a challenge in determining how to adjust its global basing
strategy as negotiations with host nations evolve.
* DOD faces a challenge in accurately estimating the costs of
implementing the strategy as its plan matures and changes.
* DOD is encountering difficulties in establishing management and
funding responsibilities as it develops its worldwide network of
smaller operating sites.
These issues will continue to make the restructuring of overseas
military posture a dynamic process and contribute to the uncertainty of
the costs and overall progress of the department's efforts. DOD has not
yet established a comprehensive and routine method of keeping Congress
informed of its progress. Reliable and timely information about the
full cost, activities, and outputs of defense-related programs is
important to Congress in making decisions about allocating resources,
authorizing and modifying programs, and evaluating program performance.
Although DOD has provided a September 2004 Report to Congress on the
strategy and has periodically testified and briefed various Members of
Congress and their staffs, DOD has not established a mechanism for
providing comprehensive and routine reporting of the overall program
status and costs. As a result, Congress may not be fully informed of
DOD's progress and challenges in implementing the strategy or have a
complete understanding of the potential financial obligations on the
horizon.
To facilitate DOD's management of its global basing strategy and to
establish a routine method of keeping Congress informed of progress in
achieving its goals, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense
fully address the six characteristics of an effective national
strategy, develop a periodic reporting process that summarizes
important information such as up-to-date costs to increase the
transparency of this process, and address management and funding issues
for new operating locations.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed
with our recommendations. However, DOD's response to our
recommendations was unclear in that the department did not cite any
specific actions it planned to take to implement the recommendations.
Specifically, the department did not acknowledge the need to update its
strategy document or to provide Congress with routine updates on host-
nation negotiations and cost. Also, while DOD emphasized that improving
the management and funding of new operating locations should be
synchronized with other DOD initiatives, it did not indicate how it
planned to synchronize these efforts. As we state in our report, we
continue to believe that the department needs to identify specific
actions it will take to ensure that our recommendations are
implemented. Because DOD's response to our recommendations does not
clearly indicate how it plans to provide comprehensive and routine
information to Congress, we have included a matter for congressional
consideration to suggest that Congress may wish to consider requiring
that DOD report annually on its global posture strategy, costs, and
implementation plans.
Background:
In September 2001, DOD issued a Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
which addresses, among other issues, the need to reorient the U.S.
military global posture. The report called for developing a permanent
basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in
critical areas of the world as well as providing temporary access to
facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to train and
operate in the absence of permanent ranges and bases.
In April 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began an
initiative to explore the issue of U.S. global posture and presence in
more detail.[Footnote 5] OSD developed a broad set of ideas and
assumptions about the strategic environment facing the United States in
the 21st Century, the most critical of which was the uncertainty facing
the United States and its allies in the post-Cold War world. In May
2003, an integration team was formed to help guide the IGPBS process.
This team was led by OSD Policy and included officials from the Joint
Staff; the Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation;
and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. This group held working-level
and senior-level meetings that helped steer the early analysis and all
the decision briefings for the Senior Level Review Group and the Senior
Planning Committee.[Footnote 6] In mid-2003, four geographic combatant
commands--the U.S. European, Pacific, Southern, and Central
Commands[Footnote 7]--started presenting their proposals, which were
reviewed by the OSD-led integration team. The team evaluated the
proposals against four risk categories.[Footnote 8]
In the September 2004 Report to Congress, DOD stated that the United
States had held Ambassadorial-level consultations with over 30
countries on five continents.[Footnote 9] According to DOD, allies
stated that they understood and shared the U.S. general perception of
the need to update its force posture globally to meet 21st Century
challenges. DOD officials also stated that allies expressed their
appreciation for the opportunity to suggest adjustments to U.S.
proposals.
In August 2004, the president announced the proposed restructuring of
the U.S. military posture overseas. As previously discussed, in
September 2004, DOD issued a Report to Congress - Strengthening U.S.
Global Defense Posture, which listed the specific locations for 87
proposed "changes and continuities" in positioning U.S. forces
worldwide by U.S. combatant command and by country. Figure 1 provides a
map of the areas of responsibility for the geographic combatant
commands.
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility and
Areas Affected by the Global Posture Strategy:
[See PDF for image]
Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Unclassified.
[A] The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command's area
of responsibility. Forces based in Alaska, however, remain assigned to
the U.S. Pacific Command.
[End of figure]
DOD Has Included Some but Not All Important Characteristics of an
Effective Strategy in Its Global Basing Strategy Documents:
DOD has articulated its global posture strategy in four key documents
but has not addressed all of the characteristics of effective national
strategies, which may limit its ability to guide implementation efforts
and achieve desired results. In prior work, we identified six
characteristics of an effective national strategy that can aid
organizations to develop and implement their strategies, to enhance
their usefulness in resource and policy making, and to better assure
accountability.[Footnote 10] DOD has generally addressed three of these
characteristics, for example, the overall purpose and scope of this
effort, but the documents only partially address three other
characteristics. Specifically, DOD does not (1) establish performance
measures such as ways to measure the extent to which intended
improvements in operational effectiveness or quality of life are
occurring, (2) identify sources of funding for the network of smaller
operating locations it plans to establish, or (3) identify a process
for resolving conflicting priorities either within DOD or between DOD
and other government organizations. In addition, the dispersion of the
strategy in a collection of documents and briefings limits its overall
clarity. Without clearly and effectively addressing the desirable
characteristics that would shape the policies, programs, priorities,
and resource allocations in a single document, DOD and other
stakeholders may be limited in their ability to implement the
strategies and to demonstrate progress in achieving the identified
goals.
Global Posture Strategy Articulated in Four Principal Documents:
Officials in the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Strategy (OSD/Strategy) identified four documents that they
believe are key to describing the global defense posture strategy: (1)
the Quadrennial Defense Review (September 2001) and its Terms of
Reference (June 2001); (2) the National Security Strategy of the United
States (September 2002); (3) Strengthening U.S. Global Posture, Report
to Congress (September 2004); and (4) the National Defense Strategy of
the United States of America (March 2005). Table 1 describes these four
documents and how they relate to the U.S. global defense posture.
Table 1: Principal U.S. Global Defense Posture Strategy Documents
Identified by DOD:
Strategy document: September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and its
June 2001 Terms of Reference, Issued by the Secretary of Defense;
Description of Strategy: The Quadrennial Defense Review and its Terms
of Reference provide a broad framework for guiding the development of
U.S. forces and capabilities. The Quadrennial Defense Review also
describes DOD‘s current security environment, defense strategy, changes
in force planning, transformation of operations and capabilities, and a
risk management framework. The Quadrennial Defense Review also devotes
one section to reorienting the U.S. global defense posture to focus on
new challenges the military will face, new ways to deter conflict,
plans to place forces in forward areas to respond to threats, goals to
reorient global defense posture, and general activities that each of
the military services should take to address those goals.
Strategy document: September 2002 National Security Strategy of the
United States, Issued by the President;
Description of strategy: The National Security Strategy provides a
broad framework for strengthening U.S. security in the future. It
identifies the national security goals of the United States, describes
the foreign policy and military capabilities necessary to achieve those
goals, evaluates the current status of these capabilities, and explains
how national power will be structured to utilize these capabilities.
The strategy highlights the need but does not provide specific guidance
on how to reorient DOD‘s global defense posture.
Strategy document: September 2004 Strengthening U.S. Global Posture-
Report to Congress, Issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy;
Description of strategy: The Report to Congress on Strengthening U.S.
Global Posture identifies the reasons for the restructuring and defines
the key elements of global posture as relationships, activities,
facilities, legal arrangements, and global sourcing and surge. It also
describes the key objectives for changing the U.S. global defense
posture, provides a region-by-region synopsis of those changes, and
highlights diplomatic relationships and interactions with Congress.
Further, it provides a rough order of magnitude cost estimate and
describes how the restructuring is integrated with DOD‘s Base
Realignment and Closure process.
Strategy document: March 2005 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America, Issued by the Secretary of Defense;
Description of strategy: The National Defense Strategy provides a
general planning framework for DOD to address current and future
defense challenges. The strategy describes U.S. defense strategic
objectives, actions to accomplish these objectives, and implementation
guidance for strategic planning and decision-making. It devotes one
section to the key aspects of reorienting the U.S. global defense
posture, which were outlined in the 2004 Report to Congress.
Source: GAO.
[End of Table]
In addition to these four principal documents, OSD officials stated
that congressional testimonies and briefings, the military service
implementation plans, budget documents, senior-level review board
meetings, and the overseas master plans provide additional details on
DOD's strategy and plans.
GAO-Identified Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy:
In our February 2004 testimony related to combating terrorism, we
identified six desirable characteristics of effective national
strategies.[Footnote 11] In our testimony, we reported that there are
no legislative or executive mandates identifying a single, consistent
set of characteristics for all national strategies. Given that there is
no such mandate, we identified a set of desirable characteristics by
reviewing several sources of information. For example, we consulted the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature on
strategic planning and performance, and guidance from the Office of
Management and Budget on the President's Management Agenda. In
addition, we studied our past reports and testimonies for findings and
recommendations pertaining to desirable elements of a national
strategy. Similarly, we researched recommendations from various
research organizations that have commented on national strategies, such
as the ANSER Institute on Homeland Security, the RAND Corporation, and
the Brookings Institution. Table 2 provides a summary of the six
characteristics we identified.
Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National
Strategy:
Desirable Characteristics: Purpose, scope, and methodology;
Description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its
coverage, and the process by which it was developed.
Desirable Characteristics: Problem definition and risk assessment;
Description: Discusses the particular national problems and threats the
strategy is intended to address.
Desirable Characteristics: Goals, subordinate objective, activities,
and performance measures;
Description: Addresses what the national strategy strives to achieve
and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the
priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results.
Desirable Characteristics: Resources, investments, and risk management;
Description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and
types of resources and investments needed, and where those resources
and investments should be targeted.
Desirable Characteristics: Organizational roles, responsibilities, and
coordination;
Description: Addresses what organizations will implement the strategy,
their roles and responsibilities, mechanisms for coordinating their
efforts, and a process for resolving conflicts.
Desirable Characteristics: Integration;
Description: Addresses how a national strategy relates to other
strategic goals, objectives, and activities.
Source: GAO.
Notes: See GAO-04-408T. Our prior work identified the sixth
characteristic as "integration and implementation." For the purposes of
this report, we decided not to evaluate the extent to which the four
principal strategy documents addressed "implementation" because our
second reporting objective addresses challenges associated with
implementation in more detail.
[End of table]
In our prior testimony, we stated that a clearly defined set of
desirable characteristics would aid responsible parties in further
developing and implementing their strategies, in enhancing their
usefulness in resource and policy decisions, and in better assuring
accountability. Although the authors of national strategies might
organize these characteristics in a variety of ways and use different
terms, we present them in this order because we believe that they flow
logically from conception to implementation. Specifically, the
strategy's purpose leads to specific actions for tackling those
problems and risks, allocating and managing the appropriate resources,
identifying different organizations' roles and responsibilities, and
integrating actions taken by all relevant parties implementing the
strategy. See appendix I for additional details on these
characteristics, and see appendix II for our scope and methodology in
developing them.
DOD Has Not Fully Developed Some Important Strategy Characteristics:
In the four principal global posture strategy documents discussed
above, DOD generally addresses three of the desirable characteristics
to guide the overseas posture initiatives. Specifically, DOD addresses
the overall purpose and scope for changing its global posture, the
problems and threats its strategy is directed against, and how the
strategy will be integrated with those of other governmental
organizations. However, the four principal strategy documents only
partially address aspects of three other important characteristics of
an effective national strategy, including (1) milestones and outcome-
related performance measures, such as tools to gauge the extent to
which intended improvements in operational effectiveness or quality of
life are occurring; (2) sources of funding and types of resources; and
(3) a description of how conflicts will be resolved. According to our
methodology, a strategy "addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly
cites all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks specificity
and details and thus could be improved upon. A strategy "partially
addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites some but not all
elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of "partially
addresses," there is a wide variation between a strategy that addresses
most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy that addresses
few of the elements of a characteristic. A strategy "does not address"
a characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any
elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references are either
too vague or too general.[Footnote 12] Table 3 summarizes the extent to
which the principal global posture strategy documents collectively
address, partially address, or do not address the six characteristics.
Table 3: Extent to Which the Four Principal Global Posture Strategy
Documents Collectively Address GAO-Identified Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy:
Desirable characteristics: Purpose, scope, and methodology;
Extent to which characteristic is addressed: Addressed;
Description: The stated purpose of the strategy is to reorient the
current global defense posture to meet the threats of the new strategic
environment. Key terms were defined, such as global posture, main
operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security
locations. The key elements that guided the development of the strategy
include strengths, vulnerabilities, opportunities, and challenges that
DOD faces in the 21st century.
Desirable characteristics: Problem definition and risk assessment;
Extent to which characteristic is addressed: Addressed;
Description: The strategy is intended to address a combination of
changes in U.S. forces‘ operating patterns, advances in military
capabilities, and an increasingly uncertain global security
environment, in particular the threat of terrorism. Risks were
discussed as traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.
Desirable characteristics: Goals, subordinate objectives, activities,
and performance measures;
Extent to which characteristic is addressed: Partially addressed;
Description: The overall goal articulated by the strategy is to
strengthen U.S. global defense posture while providing U.S. service
members and their family members with more predictability and
stability. Subordinate objectives include expanding allied roles and
building new security partnerships, developing rapidly deployable
capabilities, and positively affecting service members and their
families. The activities are identified by a list of specific
initiatives DOD intends to implement. The strategy does not address,
however, milestones and outcome-related performance measures (such as
metrics to demonstrate improvements in operational response times or in
quality of life for service members) that would identify progress in
achieving the stated goals and objectives.
Desirable characteristics: Resources, investments, and risk management;
Extent to which characteristic is addressed: Partially addressed;
Description: The cost to implement the strategy was estimated at $9
billion to $12 billion, but there were no detailed estimates, such as
costs for each global posture initiative or costs incurred by the
military services, to support that estimate. The strategy does not
address sources of funding, types of resources, or a mechanism to
prioritize and allocate resources. Further, there is no discussion of
the timing of how the initiatives will be funded over the next decade.
(We discuss the uncertainty and understatement of the reported estimate
in more detail later in the report.)
Desirable characteristics: Organizational roles, responsibilities, and
coordination;
Extent to which characteristic is addressed: Partially addressed;
Description: In the strategy, DOD is assigned the lead role and
responsibility for strategy implementation and accountability. The
military services were assigned lead and supporting roles and
responsibilities to implement specific initiatives. DOD coordinates the
implementation of the strategy with the Department of State. However,
the strategy does not describe a process for how conflicts will be
resolved within and outside of DOD. (For example, the documents do not
describe a process that would resolve interagency conflicts).
Desirable characteristics: Integration;
Extent to which characteristic is addressed: Addresses;
Description: According to the strategy, the global posture strategy
helped inform DOD‘s 2004 Base Realignment and Closure process.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
The following is a more detailed discussion of the characteristics that
are partially addressed in the key documents we examined.
Goals, Subordinate Objectives, Activities, and Performance Measures:
The global posture strategy addresses its goals, subordinate
objectives, and activities, but performance measures are not developed.
Specifically, the overall end-state of the global defense strategy is
to strengthen DOD's global defense posture while providing U.S. service
members and their families with more predictability and stability over
the course of a military career. The overarching defense policy goals
are to assure allies and friends; dissuade future military competition;
deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and decisively
defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. Subordinate objectives
related to global posture include (1) expanding allied roles and
building new security partnerships; (2) creating greater flexibility to
contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly
concentrating military forces in a few locations; (3) focusing within
and across regions by complementing regional military presence with the
capability to respond quickly to a location across the world; and (4)
developing rapidly deployable capabilities by planning and operating
from the premise that forces will not likely fight where they are
stationed. The Report to Congress - Strengthening U.S. Global Defense
Posture provides a general description of activities within each
geographic region as well as a detailed list of specific IGPBS
initiatives, many of which require discussions and negotiations with
host nations.
The principal strategy documents did not address milestones and outcome-
related performance measures. For example, the 2004 Report to Congress
highlighted the positive effect on service members and their dependents
as a key strategy goal but did not identify related performance
measures to gauge how the quality-of-life goal would be achieved. Also,
the global posture strategy identified the development of rapidly
deployable capabilities and the improvement of operational flexibility
as subordinate objectives but did not identify related performance
measures. Furthermore, officials at the Pacific Command, the European
Command, the Central Command, the Southern Command, the Special
Operations Command, and the military service headquarters told us that
they had not conducted detailed analysis, including performance
metrics, to support how quality of life or operational capabilities
would be improved by implementing the global posture strategy.[Footnote
13]
Resources, Investments, and Risk Management:
The 2004 Report to Congress estimated rough order of magnitude costs to
implement the strategy at $9 billion to $12 billion over the 2006-2011
future years defense program. (We discuss the uncertainty and
understatement of the reported estimate in more detail later in this
report.) However, the 2004 Report did not provide any details beyond
this overall estimate, such as costs for each global posture initiative
or costs incurred by the military services, to support the reported
estimate. Further, the principal strategy documents did not identify
sources of funding, such as military service or combatant command
funds; types of resources, such as military construction or operations
and maintenance funds; or a mechanism to allocate resources. OSD
officials told us that information related to the sources of funding
and types of resources and investments is contained in the regional
combatant commands' overseas master plans and does not need to be
included in the principal strategy documents because it would be
duplicative. However, in prior work, we reported that overseas master
plans do not provide a definitive picture of future U.S. funding
requirements, particularly for future locations.[Footnote 14] In
addition, there is no discussion in the principal strategy documents of
when the initiatives will be funded over the next decade. OSD officials
told us that DOD had programmed about $3.9 billion to implement the
global posture strategy in the 2006-2011 future years defense program
and that the services will program additional funds in the fiscal year
2008 budget submission as initiatives move toward implementation.
Regarding risk management, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review's Terms
of Reference generally identified overall defense priorities for
investment in areas such as people, intelligence, precision strike,
rapidly deployable maneuver forces, and infrastructure and logistics.
However, these priorities are not sufficient to determine how DOD will
manage the cost risk associated with implementing the global
restructuring, such as the potential for cost estimates to change and
for unexpected costs to be incurred without sufficient time to budget
for them and to make appropriate tradeoffs with other competing DOD
demands.
Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination:
The global posture strategy addresses which organizations will
implement the strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and a
mechanism for parties to coordinate their efforts. For example, the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review assigned lead responsibilities to each
of the services to plan and implement specific global posture
initiatives. Regarding coordination, the 2004 Report to Congress
identifies a process for coordinating DOD's global posture strategy
with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's relocation of
service members and dependents from overseas locations to the United
States. The 2004 Report to Congress also describes coordination with
the State Department regarding consultations with host nations. For
example, in the 2004 Report, DOD states that it had consulted closely
with the Department of State, especially with regard to the diplomatic
arrangements needed to secure the desired changes in foreign countries.
The global posture strategy does not address, however, a process for
how conflicts will be resolved either within DOD or between DOD and
other government organizations. While the Secretary of Defense can
resolve conflicting priorities within the Department of Defense, the
four documents do not describe how interagency conflicts will be
resolved if they arise during the strategy's implementation.
DOD officials agreed that the six characteristics of an effective
national strategy were not fully addressed in the four documents we
reviewed but pointed out that there are other documents, such as the
March 2004 Strategic Planning Guidance, the June 2004 Joint Programming
Guidance, and the overseas master plans, that contain additional
information on some of the identified characteristics. We reviewed
these supporting documents and others, such as combatant command
proposals, and found that they individually or collectively did not
fully address the desired characteristics. For example, none of these
additional documents provided outcome-related performance measures or
described a process for how conflicts will be resolved either within
DOD or between DOD and other government organizations. Moreover, while
it may be true that alternative documents in the department may help it
manage this effort, we believe that relying on numerous documents
written by different organizations at different points in time
underscores the lack of clarity in how the strategy is articulated and
reduces the overall effectiveness of these management tools.
Key Challenges Contribute to Uncertain Strategy Outcomes, and No
Routine, Comprehensive Mechanisms Exist to Report on Progress:
Three significant challenges exist that contribute to the complexity
and uncertain outcome of the overseas basing restructuring effort. DOD
has taken some steps to address these challenges, but many actions are
incomplete, and the department has not established a comprehensive,
routine method of informing Congress of its progress in addressing
these issues or the overall results of its efforts to implement the
strategy. The three challenges include (1) determining how to adjust
the global basing strategy as negotiations with host nations evolve;
(2) accurately estimating the cost of implementing the strategy as
DOD's plans evolve; and (3) assigning management and funding
responsibilities for establishing and maintaining DOD's planned network
of worldwide locations. These issues will continue to make the
restructuring of overseas military posture a dynamic process and
contribute to the uncertainty of the global posture strategy's end-
state. Despite this uncertainty and the changing nature of DOD's global
posture plans, DOD has not established a comprehensive and routine
method of informing Congress of adjustments to its plans and estimated
overall costs. Department officials we spoke with believe that current
reporting mechanisms such as testimonies and briefings to Members of
Congress are adequate in keeping Congress informed of their efforts and
that no additional formal reporting mechanisms are needed. The
Congress, however, has expressed concern over the information it
receives on the global posture strategy and recently required DOD to
provide additional information in several areas, such as the status of
host-nation agreements and funding for critical infrastructure at new
locations. These collective reporting requirements, however, do not
provide a comprehensive and routine representation of the overall
status of DOD's efforts. Without such information, Congress may not be
fully informed and remain abreast of changes in military capabilities,
relationships with U.S. partners and allies, and future financial
requirements.
Complexity and Sensitivity of Host-Nation Negotiations Continue to
Alter Planned Moves:
One challenge in the implementation of DOD's global posture strategy
relates to the need to adjust the pace and scope of DOD's announced
restructuring as negotiations with host nations evolve. Before the
United States can establish a U.S. presence in a host country, many
complex and critical legal arrangements must be made between the two
countries. The time it takes to finalize these agreements can vary from
days or months to years; involves close coordination between DOD, the
Department of State, and host nation governments; and frequently
involves having the countries' legislative bodies formalize the
agreements. The arrangements typically cover issues of interest to DOD,
such as U.S. forces' access to training areas, U.S. forces' ability to
conduct operations and deploy from the countries where they are
located, and arrangements with the host nations for sharing the costs
of maintaining these locations. The types of provisions found in these
legal arrangements include access/use provisions, status provisions,
and general provisions on cooperation.
Many of the initiatives identified in the September 2004 Report to
Congress have already been changed, are still being negotiated with the
host countries, or have been put on hold until DOD can ascertain
whether negotiations will allow U.S. forces the access they need. These
changes sometimes involve significant political sensitivities and large
amounts of investment by the United States and the host countries. If
one of DOD's proposed initiatives must be changed, corresponding
changes may need to be made to DOD's overall IGPBS plans to accommodate
the new conditions. The classified version of this report provides
specific examples that illustrate how sensitive DOD's overall IGPBS
plans are to negotiations with individual host countries.
DOD's Estimate of Global Posture-Related Costs Is Uncertain and May Be
Understated:
In September 2004, DOD estimated one-time, nonrecurring costs to
implement the global posture strategy at $9 billion to $12 billion over
the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program. However,
significant cost uncertainties still remain, and the cost to implement
the strategy may be understated. In some cases, host-nation
negotiations have necessitated adjustments to initial plans and
estimated costs. In other cases, the services did not prepare detailed
cost estimates for the network of smaller operating locations because
limited planning had been done at the time the estimates were
submitted. Because the costs of implementing IGPBS may be higher than
what is now reported, the services may be forced to make difficult
funding tradeoffs when the actual costs are identified, or Congress may
be required to allocate more resources to implement IGPBS than what are
now expected.
Global Posture-Related Costs Were Estimated at $9 Billion to $12
Billion:
In 2004, DOD estimated costs of $9 billion to $12 billion to implement
its global posture strategy. DOD's estimate of the cost of implementing
its global posture strategy was based on a cost methodology developed
by the Office of the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation. This
office distributed the methodology to the services to use in estimating
initial one-time nonrecurring global posture-related costs to the
United States in the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense
program. DOD grouped these costs into three categories: (1) costs
related to vacating current facilities, such as the cost of
environmental cleanup; (2) costs of transporting equipment, personnel,
and families; and (3) costs related to the facilities that would be
receiving personnel, including the construction of new facilities, the
renovation of old facilities, and the establishment of new leases. The
methodology also sought to estimate savings from the closure or
consolidation of facilities and operations. The estimate excludes
burden-sharing contributions by host nations because cost-sharing
agreements generally had not been completed when the report was issued
in September 2004. An OSD official told us that the reported cost
estimate of $9 billion to $12 billion represents a reasonable range of
the projected costs. Further, the costs are dynamic and continually
refined over time as better data becomes available. For example, OSD
officials stated that since the September 2004 reported estimate, DOD
has included recurring costs when they have been available. The new
estimated costs reflect the difference between the current recurring
costs and future recurring costs. OSD officials pointed out that,
despite the cost estimate's evolution, it has continued to stay within
the $9 billion to $12 billion range over the past 2 years. They also
stated that, though the $9 billion to $12 billion was estimated to be
spent during the years covered by the future years defense plan (2007-
11), adjustments might require that global posture moves be paid for in
years further into the future.
Negotiations with Host Nations Contribute to Cost Uncertainty:
Negotiations between the United States and host nations contribute to
cost uncertainty because they will determine, among other things,
specific locations where U.S. forces will have a presence and the
nature of that presence. This information is critical to developing
detailed cost estimates. In addition, cost-sharing agreements will
determine the financial responsibilities of host nations and the United
States, which will also be critical to estimate accurately the cost of
implementing the global posture strategy. Until negotiations between
the United States and host nations are completed, there will be
significant uncertainty with the reported estimates of IGPBS
initiatives, and costs may be understated.[Footnote 15]
The classified version of this report provides specific examples of
cases in which host-nation negotiations may significantly alter the
initially planned costs.
Detailed Cost Estimates Not Prepared for the Network of Smaller
Operating Locations:
There is uncertainty regarding the estimated costs for the network of
smaller operating locations[Footnote 16] partly due to limited planning
at the time the estimate was reported in September 2004. For example,
because precise estimates had not been developed for all cooperative
security locations in the plan, DOD used a rough order of magnitude
estimate in the $9 billion to $12 billion estimate to cover the cost of
these locations. In addition, it is unclear what the comprehensive
costs for all forward operating sites anticipated in the strategy will
be.
Two factors primarily contributed to the limited planning for smaller
operating locations and their cost estimates. First, senior DOD
leadership had decided to first concentrate its planning efforts on
initiatives that involved moving large numbers of forces around the
world, such as returning the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions
from Germany to the continental United States. Second, the services
generally had not conducted site surveys, partly because negotiations
with host nations were in the early stages and the services were often
reluctant to fund low-use sites, according to an OSD official. Site
surveys are critical to developing comprehensive cost estimates but
depend on specialists' visiting and assessing the current state of
facilities at given locations.
Management and Funding Challenges Exist with Establishing the Network
of Operating Locations:
The third challenge that creates uncertainty about the status of the
global posture strategy involves difficulties DOD is encountering in
establishing management and funding responsibilities and synchronizing
service priorities as it develops its planned network of smaller
operating locations. Specifically, although combatant commanders have
developed a plan for assigning executive agent responsibilities for
each of these locations to individual services, some services are
reluctant to assume "host" status for these locations because of the
potential funding responsibilities they may entail. The department has
recognized that new funding mechanisms may be needed to overcome this
issue and is examining alternative ways of addressing this issue.
Similar challenges have arisen in cases where a service operates a base
used jointly by other military services. The classified version of this
report provides examples of challenges the services have encountered in
managing and funding what are envisioned to be multiservice sites.
In prior work, we have reported on long-standing challenges DOD has
faced at military installations managed by one service but used by
multiple services.[Footnote 17] For example, in late 2004, DOD formed a
Senior Joint Basing Group to address installation management issues,
such as problems involving support agreements where one service is a
tenant on an installation operated by another service. A lack of common
definitions among the services can lead to differing expectations for
base operating support services, and it obscures a full understanding
of the funding that is required for these support services. The working
group planned to develop common definitions and DOD-wide standards,
metrics, and reimbursement and costing rules for base operating
services and programs of all military services. DOD completed a base
operations assessment study in March 2005 and funded an extensive cross-
department initiative to develop definitions for the common delivery of
installation services.
Similarly, in recognition of funding issues at joint use bases, the
Joint Governance Working Group of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review
Committee is responsible for developing alternatives for prioritizing
and funding joint projects[Footnote 18] desired by the combatant
commanders. One option envisions that the Deputy Secretary of Defense
will have the authority to assign "executive agency" or "host" status
for joint locations to the military services. Any military construction
projects for these locations would be vetted through a Joint
Infrastructure Working Group that will qualify and accept the projects,
validate the project plans, prioritize the projects, and recommend
funding levels. It is envisioned that a joint funding mechanism would
be used to fund these projects either directly or on a reimbursable
basis. Officials initially hoped that a process for assigning
responsibility for managing overseas operating sites that benefit more
than one service would be finalized during the Quadrennial Defense
Review. However, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued in
February 2006 did not identify a solution, and the issue is still
unresolved. As a result, it is not clear whether or how the services
will plan for costs associated with these sites in preparing upcoming
budget submissions.
No Routine, Comprehensive Mechanism Exists to Report on Progress Toward
Achieving Strategy Goals:
Reliable and timely information on the full costs, activities, and
outputs of federal programs is important to Congress and the Secretary
of Defense in making decisions about allocating resources, authorizing
and modifying programs, and evaluating program performance. In some
cases, DOD has established mechanisms to provide routine reporting on
program status and performance information for large-scale, complex
efforts. For example, DOD determined that a new initiative to improve
stability operations capabilities was important enough to require,
among other things, a semiannual report to the Secretary of Defense
that includes identifying performance metrics and evaluating progress
made in achieving the stated policy goals.[Footnote 19] This type of
reporting mechanism can provide the Secretary of Defense with timely
information to shape decisions about authorizing and modifying programs
and evaluating program performance.
In contrast, DOD has a more fragmented approach to provide Congress
with information on selected aspects of the global posture
restructuring effort. In June 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy testified before the House Armed Services Committee on the
Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy, preceding the
president's announcement of the strategy. This testimony was followed
by the September 2004 Report to Congress - Strengthening U.S. Global
Defense Posture. The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and commanders of the regional commands have also
testified before some congressional committees. In commenting on a
draft of this report, DOD stated that it had provided "over 40
briefings to the Hill" on its global basing strategy. According to OSD/
Strategy officials, the department believes that these existing
reporting mechanisms provide Congress with sufficient information on
the status of the restructuring effort.
However, the Senate Committee on Appropriations has expressed concern
about the use of military construction budget authority and has
directed DOD to provide information on various aspects of the global
posture strategy. The Senate report to the fiscal year 2004 military
construction appropriations bill[Footnote 20] required those plans to
identify precise facility requirements and the status of properties
being returned to host nations. The report also states that the plan
should identify funding requirements as well as the division of funding
responsibilities between the United States and cognizant host nations.
The Senate report directed us to monitor the master plans developed and
implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide
congressional defense committees with annual assessment reports.
Additionally, the House conference report accompanying the fiscal year
2004 military construction appropriation bill[Footnote 21] directed DOD
to prepare comprehensive master plans for overseas military
infrastructure and provide them with its fiscal year 2006 budget
submission with yearly updates on the status of those plans and their
implementation with annual military construction budget submissions
through fiscal year 2009.
In addition, the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility
Structure of the United States was created by Congress in the Military
Construction Appropriations Act of 2004 and was required to report on
its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for legislation by
August 15, 2005.[Footnote 22] The Commission provided Congress with a
report that contained several conclusions.[Footnote 23] For example,
the Commission stated that Congress should provide more rigorous
oversight (including hearings) of the global basing process, given the
scope and impact of DOD's rebasing plans. Particular attention, the
Commission believed, should be paid to the timing, synchronization, and
cost of all the related efforts. The Commission was also concerned
about the costs associated with IGPBS and whether budgetary forecasts
had adequately addressed the investments that will be required to meet
the implementation timelines set for fiscal years 2006-2011.
Furthermore, the Commission expressed great concern on quality-of-life
issues and their ultimate impact on DOD's ability to maintain a
volunteer force. For example, the Commission stated that DOD should
further analyze what the impact would be on a volunteer force of
frequently lengthy peacetime rotations abroad.
Also, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on specified global
basing issues by no later than March 30, 2006.[Footnote 24] The Act
states that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall develop criteria for assessing,
with respect to three kinds of facilities[Footnote 25] to be located in
a foreign country, several factors,[Footnote 26] as well as develop a
mechanism for analyzing overseas basing alternatives, incorporating
factors (1) through (5) referenced in footnote 26. The act also directs
the Secretary of Defense to submit to congressional defense committees,
not later than 30 days after an agreement is made, a written
notification of agreements with a foreign country to support the
deployment of elements of U.S. forces in that country.
We believe that the current reporting requirements, while providing
Congress with significant information on some aspects of the global
posture strategy, do not provide a periodic mechanism through which
DOD's progress in achieving the overall goals and objectives of the
strategy can be reported. For example, none of the reporting
requirements addresses the extent to which DOD will achieve its
strategic goals, such as expanding allied roles, providing service
members with more time at home, developing greater operational
flexibility, or developing rapidly deployable capabilities. In
addition, DOD's master plans provide annual information on expected
military construction costs, but none of the reports provides Congress
with complete and up-to-date information on the total costs to
implement the global restructuring, including operations and
maintenance costs. Further, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 only provides for a one-time report to the Congress on
aspects of the plan, written notification of host-nation agreements
once they are concluded, and information regarding the funding sources
for the establishment, operation, and sustainment of the main operating
bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations as
an element of the annual budget request. As a result, Congress will not
have a clear understanding of the extent to which global posture
objectives are being achieved or whether resources are being
efficiently and effectively applied.
Conclusions:
Restructuring the U.S. military presence overseas is a complex and
dynamic process that will require a significant investment in
resources, time, and commitment by military and civilian leaders. The
goals of this effort--a repositioning of U.S. military forces to
enhance warfighting capabilities, quality of life for service men and
women, and alliances with host nations while reducing overall costs to
the American taxpayer--are important to the successful execution of the
Global War on Terror and the transformation of the Department of
Defense. Accomplishing these goals efficiently and effectively will
require a comprehensive strategy, periodic review and evaluation of
progress, and a mechanism to communicate program status to key decision
makers and Congress. To its credit, the department has recognized the
importance and need to change the overseas military presence and has
begun to articulate a strategy to achieve this goal, but we have
highlighted key characteristics of effective strategies that the
department has not fully addressed. For example, the department has not
established results-oriented performance measures and therefore is not
in a position to demonstrate whether the actions it takes to change
overseas presence are in fact achieving its goals in the most efficient
and effective manner.
The challenges DOD faces in implementing this strategy, as discussed in
this report, add to the uncertainty of the costs and potential outcomes
of DOD's efforts, and current reporting mechanisms will not give
Congress routine and comprehensive information to facilitate effective
oversight. DOD is challenged to develop complete and accurate cost
estimates because ongoing negotiations with host nations will
significantly influence the planned moves and burden-sharing between
the United States and host nations. The challenges the department faces
in establishing operating locations that may be jointly used by more
than one service, yet funded by a single service through the
traditional budget process, are delaying the establishment of these
locations, which are the backbone of the new strategy. These and other
uncertainties, while understandable considering the magnitude and
complexity of the changes underway, present a significant challenge to
the Department of Defense to effectively manage. Similarly, Congress is
presented with the challenge of conducting oversight responsibilities
and allocating resources over the long term with incomplete
information, while the program matures and more refined estimates of
cost, operational capabilities, and other aspects of overseas presence
are developed. Without a routine reporting mechanism that can clearly
communicate the extent to which these uncertainties exist and, more
importantly when they are resolved, Congress may not have the
information it needs as it evaluates and prioritizes these requirements
with other aspects of government operations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To facilitate DOD's management and implementation of its global basing
strategy and to establish a clear and routine method of informing
Congress of significant changes to the strategy and progress in
achieving its goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take
the following five actions:
* Develop an updated strategy document that includes the six
characteristics of an effective national strategy as discussed in this
report, including performance measures and metrics for assessing
progress in achieving stated goals.
* Summarize the status of host-nation negotiations and annually update
DOD's global basing strategy to reflect changes resulting from these
negotiations.
* Periodically update DOD's estimate of the total cost to implement the
global basing strategy and identify the extent to which these costs are
included in DOD's future years defense program.
* Establish a process to prioritize, assign management responsibility
for, and fund the network of operating locations DOD is planning.
* Develop a periodic reporting process that summarizes to Congress the
above information, includes progress in achieving performance goals,
and complements but does not duplicate information contained in DOD's
annual comprehensive master plans for overseas military infrastructure.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
The Congress should consider requiring that DOD report annually on the
status and costs of its plans to implement global basing initiatives to
ensure that it has more comprehensive and routine information to guide
it in overseeing this important effort. Congress may wish to require
that DOD include in such a report all the elements of an effective
national strategy--such as performance metrics--as well as the status
of host-nation negotiations, the evolving costs of global posture
initiatives, and a process for assigning management responsibility for
operating and funding the locations DOD is planning in its worldwide
network of sites.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed
with our five recommendations. (DOD's comments appear in their entirety
in app. III of this report.) However, the department did not describe
what actions, if any, it plans to take to implement our
recommendations. Because DOD's response is vague and ambiguous in
describing its planned actions, we have added a matter for
congressional consideration that the Congress require DOD to report
annually on its global posture strategy, costs, and implementation.
In overall comments on the report, DOD pointed out that the information
we present represents snapshots at different points in time on the
status of negotiations, cost estimates, and force posture changes. As
we discuss in the report, this information has been in constant flux
since it was summarized in DOD's Report to Congress in September 2004.
To clarify the report, we have added additional dates to our
discussions of changes to the global posture strategy. DOD also stated
that it did not believe that "creating new formal processes for
decision-making and assessment" was called for in implementing its
global posture strategy. In our recommendations, we are not suggesting
that DOD create new formal processes for decision making and
assessment. We are recommending that DOD add a formal and regular
reporting requirement to communicate to Congress on the implementation
of DOD's global posture strategy so that Congress will be kept more
fully informed.
Regarding our recommendation that DOD develop an updated strategy
document that contains all six characteristics of an effective national
strategy, DOD agreed that the strategy framework we suggested may serve
as a helpful tool for the future. However, it stated that it is
unnecessary to update its global posture strategy at this point in
time. DOD also stated that its September 2004 Report to Congress was
not intended to serve as a formal, comprehensive management mechanism
for posture changes. We continue to believe that developing a
comprehensive, single, consolidated strategy document with all six
characteristics of an effective national strategy would be useful for
DOD in managing the complex, long-term effort that its global posture
strategy represents. At present, some elements of such a management
tool are contained in different, isolated documents, and other elements
of an effective strategy are not articulated at all. We believe that
such a comprehensive, consolidated strategy document will not only
allow DOD to more effectively manage its future implementation of the
strategy but also could become a basis for satisfying the periodic
reporting process we are recommending in this report.
In response to our second recommendation--that DOD summarize the status
of host-nation negotiations and annually update its global strategy to
reflect changes resulting from these negotiations--DOD believes that
its current reporting requirements on host-nation agreements after they
have been signed are sufficient. DOD also states that changes are
reported in combatant commanders' master plans and in service
implementation plans. We agree that DOD is not currently required to
report to Congress on the status of host-nation agreements until after
they have been entered into. However, we believe that Congress should
be kept apprised of the status of host-nation negotiations as they
evolve because the resulting agreements could involve significant
commitments of U.S. resources to other countries and have foreign
policy implications. We acknowledge that combatant commanders' master
plans include information on planned military construction for many
global basing initiatives, but the master plans do not contain detailed
information on the status of host-nation negotiations before or after
they occur. In fact, in a prior report,[Footnote 27] GAO recommended
that the department provide more detailed information on the status of
host-nation negotiations to Congress in the comprehensive overseas
master plans. DOD did not agree with that recommendation, stating that
they did not believe the master plans were the appropriate vehicle in
which to report this information. Further, the services' implementation
plans do not contain a complete listing of all global posture
initiatives, and these plans are not routinely provided to Congress.
In response to our third recommendation--that DOD periodically update
its estimate of the total cost to implement the global posture strategy
and report this information to Congress--DOD states that it plans to
"internally update and keep Congress informed of estimated programmed
costs." As we state in our report, DOD's current method of informing
Congress of global posture costs is not comprehensive or routine. At
present, DOD reports annually to Congress on some of the military
construction costs of global posture initiatives. Also, once, in
September 2004, DOD reported its estimated cost of the entire global
basing effort. However, as we discuss in this report, DOD has no
routine, comprehensive method of keeping Congress informed of changes
to its cost estimates as they evolve over time, and DOD's global
posture restructuring effort will take place over several years to come
and will compete with other government initiatives for resources. DOD
and Congress will need accurate information on the costs of its
overseas basing initiatives so that they can make informed decisions
about spending future budget dollars.
In responding to our recommendation that DOD establish a process to
prioritize, assign management responsibility for, and fund the network
of operating locations DOD is planning, DOD states that the department
has cited this need in its recently issued Quadrennial Defense Review
Report and that establishing this process should be synchronized with
existing execution processes in the department. As we state in our
report, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report cited joint funding
issues as an area that required further study. In that report, DOD
states that it is implementing a Joint Task Assignment Process that
will centrally assign and oversee joint management arrangements.
However, the report does not state how this process will work or how it
will be applied to assigning management responsibilities to the
services for jointly used overseas locations. We agree that any effort
to establish such a process should be synchronized with existing
processes in the department.
In response to our fifth recommendation--that DOD develop a periodic
reporting process that summarizes to Congress comprehensive information
on DOD's global posture strategy and its costs--DOD agrees that keeping
Congress informed of posture changes is important. However, DOD
believes that its current informal processes of briefing and testifying
before Congress when Congress requests such information are sufficient.
We disagree. As we state in our report, we believe that the current
methods do not provide Congress with the regular and comprehensive
information on DOD's global posture strategy that would enable Congress
to fully perform its oversight functions. In March 2006, DOD provided
Congress a briefing on changes in its planned overseas posture and cost
estimates. However, this briefing was developed in response to a
requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act and is intended
to be a one-time report. We continue to believe that DOD should be
required to report annually to Congress comprehensive information on
the implementation of DOD's global posture strategy because this
initiative will entail significant investments on the part of the
United States, will involve fundamental changes in our relationships
with U.S. allies, and will take place over an extended period of time.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff members
who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: GAO's Identification of the Six Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy:
In a prior report, we identified what we consider to be six desirable
characteristics of an effective national strategy that would enable its
implementers to effectively shape policies, programs, priorities,
resource allocations, and standards and that would enable federal
departments and other stakeholders to achieve the identified
results.[Footnote 28] To develop the six desirable characteristics of
an effective national strategy, we reviewed several sources of
information. First, we gathered statutory requirements pertaining to
national strategies as well as legislative and executive branch
guidance. We also consulted the Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993, general literature on strategic planning and performance, and
guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the President's
Management Agenda. In addition, we studied its past reports and
testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining to desirable
elements of a national strategy. Simultaneously, we consulted widely
within GAO to incorporate the most up-to-date thinking on strategic
planning, integration across and between the government and its
partners, implementation, and other related subjects.
We used our judgment to develop desirable characteristics based on
their underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and the
frequency with which they were cited in other sources. We then grouped
similar items together in a logical sequence, from conception to
implementation. This was GAO's first effort to develop desirable
characteristics for an effective national strategy, so they may evolve
over time. The desirable characteristics are the following:
* Purpose, scope, and methodology: This characteristic addresses why
the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process
by which it was developed. For example, a strategy might discuss the
specific impetus that led to its being written (or updated), such as
statutory requirements, executive mandates, or other events.
Furthermore, a strategy would enhance clarity by including definitions
of key, relevant terms. In addition to describing what it is meant to
do and the major functions, mission areas, or activities it covers, a
national strategy would ideally address its methodology. For example, a
strategy might discuss the principles or theories that guided its
development, what organizations or offices drafted the document,
whether it was the result of a working group, or which parties were
consulted in its development. A complete description of purpose, scope,
and methodology would make the document more useful to the
organizations responsible for implementing the strategy as well as to
oversight organizations, such as Congress.
* Problem definition and risk assessment: This characteristic addresses
the particular national problems and threats the strategy is directed
toward. Specifically, this means a detailed discussion or definition of
the problems the strategy intends to address, their causes, and
operating environment. In addition, this characteristic entails a risk
assessment, including an analysis of threats to, and vulnerabilities
of, critical assets and operations. If the details of these analyses
are classified or preliminary, an unclassified version of the strategy
could at least include a broad description of analyses and stress the
importance of risk assessment to the implementing parties. A discussion
of the quality of data available regarding this characteristic, such as
known constraints or deficiencies, would also be useful. More specific
information on both problem definition and risk assessment would give
the responsible parties better guidance to implement those strategies.
Better problem definition and risk assessment also provide greater
latitude to responsible parties to develop innovative approaches that
are tailored to the needs of specific regions or sections and can be
implemented as a practical matter, given fiscal, human capital, and
other limitations. Such assessments help identify desired goals and end-
states without one-size-fits-all solutions.
* Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures:
This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to
achieve and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the
priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At
the highest level, this could be a description of an ideal "end-state,"
followed by a logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives,
and specific activities to achieve results. In addition, it would be
helpful if the strategy discussed the importance of implementing
parties' efforts to establish priorities, milestones, and performance
measures, which help ensure accountability. Ideally, a national
strategy would set clear desired results and priorities, specific
milestones, and outcome-related performance measures while giving
implementing parties the flexibility to pursue and achieve those
results within a reasonable timeframe. If significant limitations on
performance measures exist, other parts of the strategy might address
plans to obtain better data or measurements, such as national standards
or indicators of preparedness.[Footnote 29] Elements of this
characteristic provide a baseline set of performance goals and measures
upon which to assess and improve global posture. A better
identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures
would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific time
frames and would enable more effective oversight and accountability.
* Resources, investments, and risk management: This characteristic
addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of
resources and investments needed, and where those resources and
investments should be targeted. Ideally, a strategy would also identify
appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources, such as grants, in-kind
services, and loans, based on identified needs. Alternatively, a
strategy might identify appropriate "tools of government," such as
regulations, tax incentives, and standards, to mandate or stimulate
federal organizations to use their unique resources. In addition, a
national strategy might elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned
earlier and give guidance to implementing parties to manage their
resources and investments accordingly--and begin to address the
difficult but critical issues about who pays and how such efforts will
be funded and sustained in the future. Furthermore, a strategy might
include a discussion of the type of resources required, such as
budgetary, human capital, information technology, research and
development, procurement of equipment, or contract services. Finally, a
national strategy might also discuss in greater detail how risk
management will aid implementing parties in prioritizing and allocating
resources, including how this approach will weigh costs and benefits.
Guidance on resource, investment, and risk management would help
implementing parties allocate resources and investments according to
priorities and constraints, track costs and performance, and shift such
investments and resources as appropriate. Such guidance would also
assist Congress and the administration in developing more effective
federal programs to stimulate desired investments, enhance oversight,
and leverage finite resources.
* Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: This
characteristic addresses what organizations will implement the
strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for
coordinating their efforts. It helps to answer the fundamental question
of who is in charge, not only during times of crisis, but also during
all phases of DOD activities. This characteristic entails identifying
the specific federal departments, agencies, or offices involved, and
where appropriate, the different sectors, such as state, local,
private, or international sectors. A strategy would ideally clarify
implementing organizations' relationships in terms of leading,
supporting, and partnering.[Footnote 30] In addition, a strategy should
describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework for
accountability and oversight, such as the National Security Council,
the Office of Management and Budget, Congress, and other organizations.
Furthermore, a strategy might also identify specific processes for
coordination and collaboration between sectors and organizations--and
address how conflicts would be resolved. These elements would be useful
to agencies and other stakeholders in fostering coordination and
clarifying specific roles, particularly where there is overlap, and
thus enhancing both implementation and accountability.
* Integration: This characteristic addresses how a national strategy
relates to other strategies' goals, objectives, and activities
(horizontal integration) and how the strategy relates to subordinate
levels of government and other organizations and their plans to
implement the strategy (vertical integration). For example, a national
strategy could discuss how its scope complements, expands upon, or
overlaps other national strategies. Similarly, related strategies could
highlight their common or shared goals, subordinate objectives, and
activities. In addition, a national strategy could address its
relationship with relevant documents from implementing organizations,
such as the strategic plans, annual performance plans, or the annual
performance reports that the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 requires of federal agencies. A strategy might also discuss, as
appropriate, various strategies and plans produced by the state, local,
private, or international sectors. A strategy could also provide
guidance such as the development of national standards to link together
more effectively the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of the
implementing parties. More information on this characteristic would
build on the identified organizational roles and responsibilities--and
thus further clarify the relationships between various implementing
parties, both vertically and horizontally. This identification would in
turn foster effective implementation and accountability.
Table 4 provides the desirable characteristics and examples of their
elements.
Table 4: Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy:
Desirable characteristic: Purpose, scope, and methodology;
Description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its
coverage, and the process by which it was developed;
Examples of elements:
* Statement of broad or narrow purpose, as appropriate;
* How it compares and contrasts with other national strategies;
* What major functions, mission areas, or activities it covers;
* Principles or theories that guided its development;
* Impetus for strategy, e.g., statutory requirement or event;
* Process to produce strategy, e.g., interagency task force;
* Definition of key terms.
Desirable characteristic: Problem definition and risk assessment;
Description: Addresses the particular national problems and threats the
strategy is directed toward;
Examples of elements:
* Discussion or definition of problems, their causes, and operating
environment;
* Risk assessment, including and analysis of threats and
vulnerabilities;
* Quality of data available, e.g., constraints, deficiencies, and
"unknowns".
Desirable characteristic: Goals, subordinate objectives, activities,
and performance measures;
Description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps to
achieve those results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and
performance measures to gauge results.
Examples of elements:
* Overall results desires, e.g., "end-state";
* Hierarchy of strategic goals and subordinate objectives;
* Priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance measures;
* Specific performance measures;
* Process for monitoring and reporting on progress;
* Limitations of progress indicators.
Desirable characteristic: Resources, investments, and risk management;
Description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and
types of resources and investments needed, and where resources and
investments should be targeted by balancing risk reductions and costs.
Examples of elements:
* Resources and investment associated with the strategy;
* Types of resources required, such as budgetary, human capital,
information technology, and research and development;
* Sources of resources, e.g., federal, state, local, and private;
* Economic principles, such as balancing benefits and costs;
* Resources allocation mechanisms, such as grants, in-kind services,
loans, or user fees;
* "Tools of government," e.g., mandates or incentives to spur action;
* Importance of fiscal discipline;
* Linkage to other resource document, e.g., the federal budget;
* Risk management principles.
Desirable characteristic: Organizational roles, responsibilities, and
coordination;
Description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what
their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to
coordinate their efforts;
Examples of elements:
* Roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies, departments,
or offices;
* Roles and responsibilities of federal, state, local, private, and
international sectors;
* Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities;
* Accountability and oversight framework;
* Potential changes to current organizational structure;
* Specific processes for coordination and collaboration;
* How conflicts will be resolved.
Desirable characteristic: Integration;
Description: Addresses how a national strategy relates to other
strategies' goals, objectives, and activities;
Examples of elements:
* Integration with other national strategies (horizontal);
* Integration with relevant documents from implementing organizations
(vertical);
* Details on specific federal, state, local, or private strategies and
plans.
Source: GAO.
Notes: See GAO-04-408T. Our prior work identified the sixth
characteristic as "integration and implementation." For the purposes of
this report, we decided not to evaluate the extent to which the four
principal strategy documents addressed "implementation" because our
second reporting objective addresses challenges associated with
implementation in more detail.
[End of Table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which DOD's IGPBS contains all the desirable
characteristics of an effective national strategy, we evaluated the
content of each of the four principal global posture strategy documents
identified by OSD officials using six desirable characteristics of
effective national strategies developed by GAO in prior work.[Footnote
31] According to officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
DOD's articulation of its IGPBS strategy is contained in the following
four principal documents:
* the Quadrennial Defense Review (September 2001) and its Terms of
Reference (June 2001);
* the National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002);
* Strengthening U.S. Global Posture, Report to Congress (September
2004); and:
* National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March
2005).
We evaluated the content of each of the four principal global posture
strategy documents identified by OSD officials using our six desirable
characteristics of an effective national strategy. We developed a
checklist based on our criteria, which enabled us to apply the criteria
to the relevant documents. The team pretested the checklist to verify
its relevance and the team's ability to apply the checklist to the
information contained in the documents. Two readers independently
assessed a selected strategy document to pretest the checklist. The
team concluded that the checklist was relevant and appropriate for
assessing the principal global posture documents.
Next, we independently read through each strategy document to apply our
characteristics and record the results on separate checklists. We gave
each of the elements a rating from one of three potential scores:
"addresses," "partially addresses," or "does not address." According to
our methodology, a strategy "addresses" a characteristic when it
explicitly cites all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks
specificity and details and thus could be improved upon. Within our
designation of "partially addresses," there is a wide variation between
a strategy that addresses most of the elements of a characteristic and
a strategy that addresses few of the elements of a characteristic. A
strategy "does not address" a characteristic when it does not
explicitly cite or discuss any elements of that characteristic and/or
any implicit references are either too vague or too general to be
useful. The analysts' ratings were the same in 67 percent of the cases.
The two analysts then met to discuss similarities and resolve
differences in their respective checklist analyses. On the basis of
those discussions, both analysts developed consolidated, final
checklists for each of the four principal IGPBS documents. Because we
examined four principal strategy documents and each document may not
contain all of the elements, we decided to rate the strategy element as
"addresses" if one of the documents provided sufficient information.
For example, if the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Security
Strategy, and the Report to Congress are all rated as "does not
address" in a particular element, but the National Defense Strategy is
rated "addresses" for the same element, then the overall rating for DOD
is "addresses." We assessed the reliability of the data used in this
report and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our
purposes.
To identify key challenges that could affect DOD's implementation of
its strategy, we examined global posture strategy plans, programs, cost
estimates, and other documentation obtained from the geographic
combatant commands, service headquarters, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, State Department Headquarters, and U.S. embassies in six
countries. Specifically, we identified the status of the proposed and
ongoing initiatives associated with DOD's overseas posture strategy by
reviewing DOD's September 2004 Report to Congress, Strengthening U.S.
Global Defense Posture; various congressional testimonies;
implementation plans of combatant commands; and briefings by service
components and OSD.
To understand the challenges associated with host-nation negotiations,
we obtained documentation of various types of legal arrangements to be
negotiated with host countries, information papers, briefings, and
legal analyses of international agreements that affect IGPBS prepared
by OSD, U.S. European, Pacific, Central, and Southern Commands, and the
military services' 2004 and 2005 implementation plans.
To examine cost and funding issues related to implementation, we
reviewed OSD/Program Analysis and Evaluation estimates that supported
costs reported in the September 2004 Report to Congress - Strengthening
U.S. Global Defense Posture; the military service's 2004 and 2005
implementation plans; the February 2005 comprehensive master plans
prepared by the U.S. European, Pacific, and Central Commands; the
European Command's Strategic Theater Transformation Strategy, January
2005; and the Pacific Command's Operationalizing the Asia-Pacific
Defense Strategy 2003 and 2005. We also reviewed prior GAO work related
to DOD's overseas master plans. Further, we discussed DOD's cost-
estimating methodology with knowledgeable officials at the Office of
the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.
To identify challenges in establishing a worldwide network of operating
locations, we obtained briefings that included information on joint
infrastructure funding, proposed assignments of executive agency
responsibilities for new locations, and U.S. European and Pacific
Command implementation plans for IGPBS. We also reviewed legislation
relating to the funding of DOD infrastructure, as well as prior GAO
reports on the subject.[Footnote 32] In addition, we visited selected
cooperative security locations and spoke with officials concerning
implementation issues.
To identify the mechanisms DOD has in place to inform Congress of its
efforts to overcome these challenges and report on overall progress in
achieving the strategy's goals, we reviewed congressional testimony,
multiple briefings conducted for congressional Members and their
staffs, and reports produced as a result of legislative requirements.
Specifically, we examined existing reporting requirements in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the House
conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military
construction appropriation bill, the Senate report on the fiscal year
2004 military construction appropriation bill report, the 2005 report
by the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of
the United States, and prior GAO reports on overseas military
infrastructure. We assessed the reliability of the data used in this
report and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our
purposes.
To obtain the information described above, we contacted officials at
the following organizations:
* Pentagon.
* DOD's Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy and Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.
* The Joint Staff (J-5 and J-8).
* Service headquarters: Army Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations and Plans; Marine Corps Headquarters, Plans,
Policies, and Operations Department/Plans and Strategy Division; Navy
Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans,
Policy, and Operations/Strategy and Policy; Air Force Headquarters,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Combat
Support and Analysis.
* U.S. European Command Headquarters; U.S. Army, Europe; Special
Operations Command, Europe; U.S. Air Forces, Europe; and U.S. Naval
Forces, Europe.
* U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters; U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific; U.S.
Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Army Forces, Pacific; U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S.
Special Operations Forces, Pacific; U.S. Eighth Army, Korea; U.S.
Forces Korea.
* U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters.
* U.S. Transportation Command.
* State Department Headquarters and U.S. Embassies in Bulgaria, Italy,
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.
* U.S. Southern Command Headquarters.
* U.S. Central Command Headquarters.
We conducted our review from November 2004 through January 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense:
2100 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2100:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
(U) The Department of Defense appreciates the GAO's assessment of U.S.
global defense posture realignment and the opportunity to comment on
its draft report entitled "Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy
and Periodic Reporting are Needed to Gauge Progress and Costs of DoD's
Global Posture Restructuring," dated March 10, 2006 (GAO Code 350766/
GAO-06-486C).
(U) The Department is encouraged that the GAO focused its assessment on
implementation of global defense posture changes, and that the
assessment recognizes the complex, multidimensional nature of this
important effort. The Department is concerned, however, that the
assessment is hampered in places by the use of information that
represented snapshots at different points in time on the status of
negotiations, cost estimates, and force posture changes. The GAO's
assessment would be strengthened by clearer documentation of dates and
sources to more accurately reflect the temporal nature of global
defense posture's rolling decision-making process.
(U) The Department remains concerned with the GAO's view of how major
initiatives should be executed. The success of global defense posture
has been due to the Department's basic approach of centralizing
planning for the major initiative and decentralized execution by the
Combatant Commands and Services through existing Departmental planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution processes - not by creating new
formal processes for decision-making and assessment. This approach
provides the Department's senior leadership with maximum flexibility to
synchronize our posture changes with other major Departmental
initiatives (e.g., execution of GWOT and DoD and Service
transformation).
(U) With respect to GAO's five recommendations, the Department responds
as follows:
(U) Updated strategy document. DoD partially concurs with the
recommendation to "develop an updated strategy document. including
performance measures and metrics for assessing progress in achieving
stated goals." GAO's recommended strategy framework, with some
modification, may serve as a helpful implementation tool in the future,
but it does not necessitate updating the global defense posture
strategy. That strategy, outlined in the September 2004 Report to
Congress, was not intended to serve as a formal, comprehensive
management mechanism for posture changes. For example, performance
metrics, while critical to assessing progress, would more logically fit
in an implementation plan, not a broad strategy document.
(U) Host-nation negotiations. DoD partially concurs with the
recommendation to "summarize the status of host-nation negotiations and
annually update DoD's global basing strategy to reflect changes
resulting from these negotiations." There are mechanisms in place to
update Congress on defense-related international agreements, and the
Department feels that additional reporting requirements would be
redundant. Public Law 109-163 requires that DoD inform the Defense
Committees of USG defense agreements within 30 days of signature, and 1
USC 112(b) requires that the State Department inform Congress of all
international agreements. Additionally, the negotiations process
generally should not change the fundamental global posture strategy -
e.g., building allied roles, developing flexibility to contend with
uncertainty - but often may lead to adjustments to posture plans. DoD
reflects these changes by updating Combatant Command Master Plans and
internal Service implementation plans.
(U) DOD's cost estimate. DoD partially concurs with the recommendation
to "periodically update DoD's estimate of the total cost to implement
the global posture strategy and identify the extent to which these
costs are included in DOD's future years defense program." The
Department will continue to internally update and keep Congress
informed of estimated programmed costs of global posture. Importantly,
over time such cost estimates will reflect the evolving-set of global
posture changes, as some initial proposals are inevitably modified or
dropped, while others are added. Additionally, resources tied to some
posture changes may be the same ands used for Service transformation or
BRAC funding.
(U) In response to GAO's assertion that the posture strategy does not
have an articulated cost component, the Department notes that posture
changes are subject to the same resource constraints as any other
Departmental initiative. The Department assumes no increase in the top-
line of DoD's budget for posture changes, and thus has built-in
incentive to carefully assess the value-to-cost ratio of posture plans
because they compete for the same resources as other Departmental
programs.
(U) Funding process. DoD partially concurs with the recommendation to
"establish a process to prioritize, assign management responsibility
for, and fund the network of operating locations DoD is planning." The
Department, as part of the recent QDR, cited the need for establishing
a process to assign and oversee Service responsibilities for
administering establishment of facilities in posture plans, and more
broadly for funding infrastructure that is jointly operated. Again,
this effort should be synchronized with existing execution processes in
the Department.
(U) Congressional reporting. DoD partially concurs with the
recommendation to "develop a periodic reporting process that summarizes
to Congress the above information." The Department views as essential
the continuous dialogue with congressional members and staff it began
when the posture strategy was formulated and will continue providing
timely and tailored updates as posture changes evolve.
(U) Again, DoD is grateful for the opportunity to review the GAO's
report on this important matter.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Ryan Henry:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Robert Repasky, Assistant
Director; Kelly Baumgartner; Kenneth Daniell; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane;
Guy Lofaro; Charles Perdue; Maria-Alaina Rambus; Terry Richardson; and
Beverly Schladt made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
[2] GAO, Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master
Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas, GAO-05-680R
(Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005).
[3] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). In this testimony, we identified the six
characteristics of an effective national strategy as the following: (1)
purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk
assessment; (3) goals, objectives, activities, and performance
measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) roles,
responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration.
[4] GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Periodic
Reporting Are Needed to Gauge Progress and Costs of DOD's Global
Posture Restructuring, GAO-06-486C (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006).
[5] The Office of the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy is the DOD lead for IGPBS.
[6] The Senior Leader Review Group is composed of the Secretary of
Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service
Secretaries, and a select few Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The
Senior Planning Committee is composed of the Senior Leader Review Group
plus the combatant commanders. In December 2003 and January 2004, these
two groups had six meetings during which IGPBS was discussed.
[7] The five geographic commands--U.S. Central Command, U.S. European
Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern
Command--are responsible for all U.S. military operations within their
geographic areas of responsibility.
[8] The four risk categories were "political-military risk," "force
structure risk," "operational risk," and "cost risk."
[9] In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that
the United States visited "over 20 countries."
[10] GAO-04-408T.
[11] GAO-04-408T.
[12] See app. II for more details on our methodology.
[13] According to an OSD official, OSD compared the current global
defense posture with the future desired global defense posture to
determine the effect of these planned changes on response times. The
OSD analysis indicated that response times for the larger-sized forces
would not be substantially improved. Improvements could be expected,
however, in response times for the deployment of smaller, more mobile
forces, such as special operations forces. This information was not
contained in the strategy documents.
[14] Specifically, the master plans only provide information on U.S.
funding sources for military construction costs.
[15] According to DOD officials, the amount of burden-sharing that the
United States can expect varies widely by country and by type of
operating location. Also, in countries where smaller operating sites
are located, the United States will not be using military construction
funds to build large-scale family support infrastructure.
[16] Forward operating sites are planned to be smaller but expandable
sites that can support rotational forces, whereas cooperative security
locations are planned to be small, rapidly expandable sites with little
or no permanent U.S. presence.
[17] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in
Managing and Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support, GAO-05-556
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005).
[18] In this context, "joint" is applied when combatant commanders have
an interest in the project for the good of the joint force, but no
single service has a major interest. "Joint" projects traditionally
fare poorly under standard service rating schemes for determining
funding priority because they do not directly support the service's
daily activities. Projects eligible for being considered "joint"
include joint command headquarters buildings, some en route
infrastructure (generally overseas), and designated joint forward
operating sites and cooperative security locations.
[19] In a November 2005 Directive, DOD identified stability operations
as a core U.S. mission that is to be given priority comparable to
combat operations and specifically addressed and integrated across all
DOD activities. DOD defines stability operations as "military and
civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to
conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions."
[20] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003).
[21] H.R. Conf. Rep. No 108-342, at 17 (2003).
[22] Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
132, § 128 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-324, § 127 (2004)).
[23] Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of
the United States, Report to the President of the United States, August
15, 2005.
[24] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, § 1233 (2006).
[25] These facilities are main operating bases, forward operating
sites, and cooperative security locations.
[26] Factors these criteria should address include (1) the effect of
any new basing arrangement on DOD's strategic mobility requirements,
(2) the ability of U.S. forces deployed to overseas locations in areas
to which forces have not traditionally been deployed to meet mobility
response times required by operational plans, (3) the cost of deploying
units overseas to the locations required in (2) on a rotational basis,
(4) the strategic benefit of rotational deployments through countries
with which the United States is developing a close or new security
relationship, (5) whether the relative speed and complexity of
conducting negotiations in a particular country is a discriminator in
the decision to deploy U.S. forces in a country, (6) the
appropriateness and availability of funding mechanisms for the
establishment, operation, and sustainment of specific facilities
referenced in footnote 25, (7) the effect of proposed unaccompanied
deployments of new units to new facilities in overseas locations on
quality of life, and (8) other criteria as the Secretary of Defense
determines appropriate.
[27] GAO-05-680R.
[28] GAO-04-408T.
[29] For more information on the importance of national indicators for
measuring problems, see GAO, Forum on Key National Indicators:
Assessing the Nation's Position and Progress, GAO-03-672SP (Washington,
D.C.: May 2003).
[30] By partnering, we refer to shared, or joint, responsibilities
among implementing parties where there is otherwise no clear or
established hierarchy of lead and support functions.
[31] GAO-04-408T.
[32] H.R. Conf. Rep. No 108-342 (2003); S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14
(2003); GAO-05-556; and GAO-05-680R.
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