Defense Space Activities
Management Actions Are Needed to Better Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel Gao ID: GAO-06-908 September 21, 2006The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on space to support a wide range of vital military missions. Many factors contribute to DOD success in space activities, and having sufficient quantities of space-qualified personnel to design, oversee, and acquire space assets, on which DOD expects to spend about $20 billion in fiscal year 2007, is critical to DOD's ability to carry out its mission. The individual services are responsible for providing adequately qualified space personnel to meet mission needs. The Air Force provides over 90 percent of the space personnel to DOD's mission, but has not identified the space acquisition workforce. This report examines the extent to which (1) the Air Force's space acquisition workforce is managed using a strategic workforce management approach, (2) there are sufficient numbers of Air Force space acquisition personnel to meet DOD's national security needs, and (3) the Air Force's space acquisition personnel are adequately qualified for their positions. For its analysis, GAO identified the space acquisition workforce as those Air Force scientists, engineers, and program managers with experience developing space assets.
While DOD and the Air Force have not achieved consensus about whether the space acquisition workforce should have a designated career field or a separate workforce strategy, the Air Force is responsible for strategically managing this segment of its workforce as it has for other workforce groups, such as pilots and navigators. The Air Force has done needs assessments on certain segments of its space workforce, but has not done an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its space acquisition workforce. Such a strategic assessment would help inform the Air Force's planned force reduction that will result in a decrease of 40,000 active personnel and a 25 percent reduction of contractor support over 5 years. However, the Air Force is not using a zero-based needs assessment that includes the entire space acquisition workforce--unclassified and classified programs and military, civilian, and contractor personnel--as part of its force reduction planning and process improvement efforts. Such an assessment would identify if there are skill and competency gaps. As a result, the Air Force may not be able to manage the impact of its force reductions on the space acquisition workforce or take actions to mitigate the impact to ensure this workforce meets national security space needs. In the absence of an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its space acquisition workforce and a career field specialty, the Air Force cannot ensure that it has enough space acquisition personnel or personnel who are technically proficient to meet national security space needs. The Air Force has a shortage of midgrade and senior officers who play vital management and oversight roles in space acquisition. At the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), 37 percent of the critical acquisition positions were vacant as of April 2006 and about 50 percent of the center's workload was being done by contractors. Also, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) depends on Air Force personnel to fill many of its key space acquisition positions. Continuing shortages may hamper SMC's and NRO's ability to meet mission needs and highlight the Air Force's need to strategically manage its space acquisition workforce. The technical proficiency of the Air Force's space acquisition workforce also may not be adequate to meet national security needs. At SMC, the percentage of space acquisition officers with the highest acquisition certification level dropped from 28 percent in 1996 to 15 percent in 2005. Reasons for the lower certification levels include NRO priority in selecting personnel, the lack of a space acquisition specialty, limited training, and the decline of personnel coming into the Air Force with technical degrees. Although required by law, the Air Force has not developed a career field for officers to develop space systems. Without a specialty to identify these personnel and increased space acquisition-related education and training, the Air Force may not be able to strategically manage its workforce and ensure personnel can effectively develop space systems.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-908, Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to Better Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Defense Space Activities:
Management Actions Are Needed to Better Identify, Track, and Train Air
Force Space Personnel:
Defense Space Activities:
GAO-06-908:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-908, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on space to support a wide range
of vital military missions. Many factors contribute to DOD success in
space activities, and having sufficient quantities of space-qualified
personnel to design, oversee, and acquire space assets, on which DOD
expects to spend about $20 billion in fiscal year 2007, is critical to
DOD‘s ability to carry out its mission. The individual services are
responsible for providing adequately qualified space personnel to meet
mission needs. The Air Force provides over 90 percent of the space
personnel to DOD‘s mission, but has not identified the space
acquisition workforce. This report examines the extent to which (1) the
Air Force‘s space acquisition workforce is managed using a strategic
workforce management approach, (2) there are sufficient numbers of Air
Force space acquisition personnel to meet DOD‘s national security
needs, and (3) the Air Force‘s space acquisition personnel are
adequately qualified for their positions. For its analysis, GAO
identified the space acquisition workforce as those Air Force
scientists, engineers, and program managers with experience developing
space assets.
What GAO Found:
While DOD and the Air Force have not achieved consensus about whether
the space acquisition workforce should have a designated career field
or a separate workforce strategy, the Air Force is responsible for
strategically managing this segment of its workforce as it has for
other workforce groups, such as pilots and navigators. The Air Force
has done needs assessments on certain segments of its space workforce,
but has not done an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its
space acquisition workforce. Such a strategic assessment would help
inform the Air Force‘s planned force reduction that will result in a
decrease of 40,000 active personnel and a 25 percent reduction of
contractor support over 5 years. However, the Air Force is not using a
zero-based needs assessment that includes the entire space acquisition
workforce”unclassified and classified programs and military, civilian,
and contractor personnel”as part of its force reduction planning and
process improvement efforts. Such an assessment would identify if there
are skill and competency gaps. As a result, the Air Force may not be
able to manage the impact of its force reductions on the space
acquisition workforce or take actions to mitigate the impact to ensure
this workforce meets national security space needs.
In the absence of an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its
space acquisition workforce and a career field specialty, the Air Force
cannot ensure that it has enough space acquisition personnel or
personnel who are technically proficient to meet national security
space needs. The Air Force has a shortage of midgrade and senior
officers who play vital management and oversight roles in space
acquisition. At the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), 37 percent
of the critical acquisition positions were vacant as of April 2006 and
about 50 percent of the center‘s workload was being done by
contractors. Also, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) depends on
Air Force personnel to fill many of its key space acquisition
positions. Continuing shortages may hamper SMC‘s and NRO‘s ability to
meet mission needs and highlight the Air Force‘s need to strategically
manage its space acquisition workforce.
The technical proficiency of the Air Force‘s space acquisition
workforce also may not be adequate to meet national security needs. At
SMC, the percentage of space acquisition officers with the highest
acquisition certification level dropped from 28 percent in 1996 to 15
percent in 2005. Reasons for the lower certification levels include NRO
priority in selecting personnel, the lack of a space acquisition
specialty, limited training, and the decline of personnel coming into
the Air Force with technical degrees. Although required by law, the Air
Force has not developed a career field for officers to develop space
systems. Without a specialty to identify these personnel and increased
space acquisition-related education and training, the Air Force may not
be able to strategically manage its workforce and ensure personnel can
effectively develop space systems.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO makes recommendations to DOD to take actions to better manage its
limited pool of space acquisition personnel. DOD concurred or partially
concurred with the recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-908].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at
(202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Air Force Has Done Some Space and Acquisition Workforce Planning, but
Lacks an Integrated Zero-Based Needs Assessment:
Air Force May Not Have Enough Space Acquisition Personnel to Meet
National Security Space Needs:
Air Force's Existing Space Acquisition Personnel May Not Be Technically
Proficient in Ways Needed to Meet National Security Space Needs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Comments from the National Reconnaissance Office:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Overview of DOD Space Acquisition Workforce:
Figure 2: Trends in Overall Science and Engineering Degrees Awarded to
U.S. Citizens and Permanent Residents:
Figure 3: Engineering Degrees Awarded to U.S. Citizens and Permanent
Residents:
Figure 4: Composition of the Workforce at SMC:
Figure 5: Fiscal Year 2006 Authorized and Assigned Totals for Air Force
Acquisition Managers by Rank:
Figure 6: Fiscal Year 2006 Authorizations for Acquisition Personnel by
Rank at SMC and for the Air Force Overall:
Figure 7: Acquisition Certification Levels at SMC, 1996-2005:
Figure 8: Acquisition Certification Levels for Acquisition Officers at
SMC and the Air Force:
Figure 9: Space Professional Certification Levels for SMC Space
Acquisition Workforce:
Figure 10: Acquisition Certification Levels for Classified and SMC
Space Acquisition Workforces:
Figure 11: Space Certification Levels for Classified and SMC Space
Acquisition Workforces:
Abbreviations:
AFSC: Air Force Specialty Code:
APDP: Acquisition Professional Development Program:
CLM: Continuous Learning Module:
DAU: Defense Acquisition University:
DAWIA: Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FFRDC: Federally Funded Research and Development Center:
NRO: National Reconnaissance Office:
NSF: National Science Foundation:
NSSI: National Security Space Institute:
SETA: Scientific and Engineering Technical Assistance:
SMC: Space and Missile Systems Center:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 21, 2006:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Chairman: Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on space to support a wide range
of vital military missions, including intelligence collection;
battlefield surveillance and management; global command, control, and
communications; and navigation assistance. Having sufficient quantities
of space-qualified personnel--the "space cadre"--available to design,
acquire, and oversee the production of space assets, on which DOD
expects to spend about $20 billion in fiscal year 2007, is critical to
DOD's and the individual warfighter's ability to carry out their
missions. In order to ensure that access to space remains reliable and
unfettered, DOD has stated that it will improve responsive space
access; satellite operations; and other space-enabling capabilities,
such as the space industrial base, space science and technology
efforts, and space-qualified personnel.
Congress has long been concerned about DOD's management and
organization of space activities, and it chartered a commission in
1999--known as the Space Commission--to review national security space
activities. In its January 2001 report, the Space Commission noted that
DOD needs a total force composed of well-educated, motivated, and
competent personnel to work on space operations, requirements, and
acquisition, but that DOD was not yet on course to develop the space
cadre the nation needs.[Footnote 1] The commission warned that many
experienced personnel were retiring and that recruitment and retention
of space-qualified personnel was a problem. In implementing the
commission's recommendations, the Secretary of Defense gave the
services the responsibility to develop and maintain sufficient
quantities of space-qualified personnel.[Footnote 2] To better manage
its space systems and acquisition of major space programs, DOD issued a
directive that established an Executive Agent for Space in June 2003 to
develop, coordinate, and integrate plans and programs for space systems
and for the acquisition of space major defense acquisition
programs.[Footnote 3] Currently, the Under Secretary of the Air Force
serves as the DOD Executive Agent for Space. In February 2004, DOD
issued its space human capital strategy that set overall goals for
developing and integrating space personnel, and that year Congress also
directed the Secretary of the Air Force to establish and implement
policies and procedures to develop a career field for Air Force
officers with technical competence in space-related matters.[Footnote
4]
We have previously reported on DOD's space human capital strategy and
efforts by the military departments to develop their space
personnel.[Footnote 5] In our first report, issued in August 2004, we
recommended that DOD develop an implementation plan for its strategy
and that the Army and Navy develop strategies and establish focal
points for managing their space personnel.[Footnote 6] In response to
our recommendations, DOD issued an implementation plan for its space
human capital strategy, and the Navy issued a space cadre strategy and
established a focal point. The Army has not yet implemented our
recommendations. In our second report, issued in September 2005, we
recommended that the Secretary of Defense issue agencywide guidance to
provide accountability by defining and institutionalizing space cadre
authorities and the responsibilities of the Executive Agent and the
services, and that the Secretary of Defense direct the DOD Executive
Agent for Space to develop appropriate performance measures and
evaluation plans for each service.[Footnote 7] As of May 2006, DOD had
not implemented the recommendations made in our 2005 report.
Many factors, such as the use of new and unproven technology and
workforce issues, can contribute to space program delays and cost
overruns. We have recently reported that DOD's space acquisition
programs have experienced cost and schedule overruns that have
postponed delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter; in some
cases, capabilities have not been delivered after decades of
development.[Footnote 8] We have identified a number of causes behind
these problems, noting that among the causes that most consistently
stand out are that DOD starts more programs than it can afford, starts
programs before it has assurance of technological maturity, and allows
new requirements to be added well into the acquisition phase. In
addition, we have identified additional problems that contribute to
space acquisition problems, though less directly affecting cost and
schedule problems. These include such problems as short tenures of top
leadership and acquisition managers as well as capacity shortfalls,
such as shortages in scientists and engineers and experts in systems
and software engineering to oversee its space programs.[Footnote 9]
Strategic human capital management is a pervasive challenge facing the
federal government. In January 2001 and again in January 2003, we
identified strategic human capital management as a governmentwide high-
risk area after finding that the lack of attention to strategic human
capital planning had undermined the federal government's ability to
serve the American people effectively.[Footnote 10] In the wake of
extensive downsizing performed during the early 1990s, largely without
sufficient consideration of the strategic consequences, agencies are
experiencing significant challenges to deploying the right skills, in
the right places, at the right times. With a growing number of
employees who are eligible for retirement, agencies are also finding it
difficult to fill certain mission-critical jobs--a situation that could
significantly drain their institutional knowledge.
Effectively managing today's workforce is multifaceted. The strategic
workforce planning model used by leading public and private
organizations to effectively manage their workforces includes the
following five key elements[Footnote 11]: involving management,
employees, and stakeholders; analyzing critical skill and competency
gaps between current and future workforce needs; developing strategies
to fill identified gaps; building capabilities to address requirements;
and monitoring and evaluating progress and the contribution of
strategic workforce planning efforts in achieving goals. We also
identified additional aspects of effectively managing today's
workforce, including the use of a zero-based needs assessment to
identify resources that are needed to carry out an organization's
mission. A zero-based integrated needs assessment "zeroes out" an
organization's existing resources and assesses the organization's needs
from a bottom-up approach. It often results in a clearer picture of the
resources that are needed without being encumbered by the need to
reorganize the organization's existing resource base. Other important
aspects of effectively managing a workforce include establishing career
fields to provide specific management and development of distinct
workforces, defining critical skill sets, and establishing training
requirements.
Personnel who acquire space assets--the space acquisition workforce--
are not defined as a distinct workforce or career field within DOD or
the Air Force. However, for the purposes of our review, we identified
space acquisition personnel as those belonging to either of two
workforces that DOD and the Air Force have defined--the acquisition
workforce and the space cadre workforce. These two workforces have
separate management frameworks, and each has certifications, career
fields, training, and other requirements tailored to its particular
needs. Certifications help establish and maintain professional
standards. Career fields provide a development path and identify the
training and experience needed for personnel to progress through the
career field.
Using the Air Force acquisition career field, we identified scientists,
engineers, and acquisition managers with experience in developing and
acquiring space assets. We determined that the Air Force accounts for
more than 90 percent of space personnel, with the remaining 10 percent
generally consisting of Army and Navy personnel. Additionally, the
space acquisition workforce includes military personnel, civilians, and
contractors. Figure 1 depicts our definition of the DOD space
acquisition workforce.
Figure 1: Overview of DOD Space Acquisition Workforce:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Since the overwhelming majority of space personnel work for the Air
Force, we focused our review on that service. Overall, our analysis
focused on Air Force officers because the Air Force does not yet track
civilians or enlisted personnel to the extent that it does officers.
Within the Air Force, the space cadre workforce consists of officers in
the following career fields: space operators, scientists, engineers,
and acquisition managers. The Air Force's acquisition workforce
consists of officers in the following career fields: scientists,
engineers, acquisition managers, contracting officers, and financial
managers. Using these definitions of the acquisition and space cadre
workforces, we defined the space acquisition workforce as comprising
scientists, engineers, and acquisition managers with experience in
developing and acquiring space assets.
As of April 2006, approximately 1,850 Air Force space acquisition
officers and civilians were located at the Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC), which is part of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. About
1,300 Air Force personnel, including approximately 340 acquisition and
contracting officers, were located at the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), which designs, builds, and operates the nation's
reconnaissance satellites.[Footnote 12] NRO has no permanently assigned
personnel; rather, it draws personnel on rotational assignments from
the services and the intelligence community.
In response to your request, our objectives for this report were to
determine the extent to which (1) the Air Force's space acquisition
workforce is managed using a strategic workforce planning approach, (2)
there are sufficient numbers of Air Force space acquisition personnel
available to meet DOD's national security space needs, and (3) the Air
Force's space acquisition personnel are adequately qualified for their
positions. In order to achieve these objectives, we first identified
the space acquisition workforce since, as previously mentioned, neither
DOD nor the Air Force had established this as a separate workforce. To
do this, we obtained Air Force data on the acquisition workforce and
identified those acquisition personnel who had space experience. We
also obtained Air Force data on the space cadre, and we identified
those space cadre personnel who had acquisition experience. We obtained
specific database codes in the space professional database that
contains all space cadre members, which allowed us to determine
education, experience, and expertise levels for the space acquisition
workforce, and whether the personnel were working on classified or
unclassified space programs. DOD and Air Force officials agreed with
our methodology to determine the space acquisition workforce, and we
found the data we used to make this determination to be sufficiently
reliable for purposes of this review.
To determine the extent to which the Air Force's space acquisition
workforce is managed using a strategic workforce planning approach, we
identified a strategic workforce planning model used by leading
organizations.[Footnote 13] We then interviewed officials and obtained
documentation to find out whether strategies, plans, or both for the
space acquisition workforce exist, and if so, if they are in accordance
with the accepted strategic workforce planning model. To determine the
extent to which there are sufficient numbers of Air Force space
acquisition personnel to meet DOD's national security space needs, we
interviewed officials, obtained documentation, and analyzed Air Force
Headquarters data to assess overall trends in composition and
assignments of the space acquisition workforce. To determine the extent
to which Air Force space acquisition personnel are adequately qualified
for their positions, we interviewed officials, obtained documentation,
and analyzed data from the Air Force Personnel Center and SMC and space
professional databases in order to assess the certification and
education levels of the Air Force's space acquisition workforce.
Part of our analysis regarding the quantity and quality of the space
acquisition workforce was limited due to the lack of NRO data. NRO did
provide us the overall number of Air Force personnel assigned to it,
but did not provide us information on the education, experience, or
expertise of NRO personnel. As a result, we could not compare the
education, experience, or expertise of the space acquisition workforce
at SMC and NRO, and we could not compare the NRO space acquisition
workforce directly to the Air Force acquisition workforce. In this
regard, we were only able to compare SMC personnel directly to Air
Force acquisition personnel. However, we were able to identify Air
Force acquisition officers who work on classified space programs and,
using them as a proxy for the NRO space acquisition workforce, we
compared this group to Air Force acquisition personnel. Additionally,
we noted the actions that DOD and the Air Force had taken to manage
their workforces using a strategic workforce management approach, but
we did not evaluate the sufficiency of the actions they took.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through June 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More
detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
While DOD and the Air Force have not achieved consensus about whether
the space acquisition workforce should have a designated career field
or a separate workforce strategy, the Air Force is responsible for
strategically managing this segment of its workforce just as it is for
other workforce groups, such as pilots and navigators.[Footnote 14] The
Air Force has taken actions to strategically manage the acquisition
workforce and the space cadre separately, including defining critical
skill sets and designating training for the space and acquisition
workforces, and it has done needs assessments on certain segments of
its space workforce. However, the Air Force has not done and does not
plan to do an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its space
acquisition workforce, including military personnel, civilians, and
contractors for both classified and unclassified space programs. Such a
strategic needs assessment would help inform the Air Force's planned
force reduction, which is projected to result in a decrease of 40,000
active duty positions and a 25 percent reduction in contractor support
over the next 5 years. A zero-based needs assessment enables an
organization to identify whether skill and competency gaps exist
between current and future workforces needed to meet program goals. It
is unclear to what extent needs assessments will be incorporated into
the Air Force's force reduction planning process. Without performing an
integrated and zero-based space acquisition workforce needs assessment
and using the results to inform its force reduction planning, the Air
Force may not be able to manage the impact of its force reduction on
the space acquisition workforce or take actions to mitigate the impact
to ensure it has the quantity and quality of space acquisition
personnel needed to accomplish its space mission.
In the absence of an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its
space acquisition workforce and a career field specialty, the Air Force
cannot ensure that it has enough space acquisition personnel or
personnel who are technically proficient to meet national security
space needs. According to the directive establishing the DOD Executive
Agent for Space, the services are responsible for developing and
maintaining sufficient numbers of space personnel to support space
planning, programming, acquisitions, and operations. According to Air
Force totals of authorized and assigned acquisition personnel, which
include space acquisition personnel, the Air Force is experiencing a
shortage of midgrade and senior officers[Footnote 15] who perform space
acquisition, and contractor support is filling these shortages.
Midgrade and senior officers provide experience and play vital
management and oversight roles, including as acquisition program
managers. At SMC, 37 percent of the senior officer positions in
engineering and program management were vacant as of April 2006, and
more than 50 percent of the center's workload is being performed by
contractors. At NRO, this shortage of midgrade and senior officers may
ultimately lead to increased reliance on contractors, since NRO depends
on Air Force personnel to fill many of its space acquisition positions.
As of March 2006, we determined that approximately 57 percent of NRO
employees were Air Force personnel. The shortages in midgrade and
senior positions are due, in part, to the overall post-Cold War
drawdown of military personnel, including space acquisition
personnel,[Footnote 16] and to the limited opportunities available for
senior officers in the technical acquisition career fields. The Air
Force has recognized the existence of these shortages and has begun
considering ways to address them, such as potentially identifying and
moving acquisition officers who are in nonacquisition positions to
space acquisition positions. However, the Air Force has not yet
addressed the shortages because it is trying to balance overall
shortages in multiple career fields, of which acquisition is not
perceived as the most important. For example, according to Air Force
officials, space acquisition workforce shortages have to compete for
resources with demands in other career fields, such as pilots and
navigators. Continuing shortages of these personnel may hamper SMC's
and NRO's ability to meet mission needs and highlight the need for the
Air Force to strategically manage its space acquisition workforce.
Furthermore, the technical proficiency of space acquisition personnel
who are available to the Air Force may not be adequate to meet national
security space needs. Title 10 of the United States Code contains a
provision to ensure that space personnel are adequately qualified to
meet mission needs, requiring the Secretary of the Air Force to develop
a career field for officers with technical competence in space-related
matters, including the capability to develop space systems.[Footnote
17] At SMC, 61 percent of the officers had the lowest space acquisition
certification level, and 23 percent had no certification. In addition,
the percentage of SMC officers with the highest acquisition
certifications has dropped from 28 percent in 1996 to 15 percent in
2005. The levels of space and acquisition certification levels can be
attributed to several factors. First, for SMC, the lower levels of
acquisition and space certifications may have occurred because NRO has
received priority in selecting space acquisition personnel with higher
qualifications, according to DOD and NRO officials. In June 2006, the
Air Force and NRO agreed to address a number of workforce issues, but
it is not clear how this will affect staffing between SMC and NRO.
Second, the Air Force has not institutionalized a means of identifying
the space acquisition specialty within any of its existing career
fields. Doing so could provide standardized education and training
requirements specific to space acquisition for all personnel involved
in managing space acquisition programs, and it could help to develop
personnel with the technical expertise to effectively oversee the
acquisition of space systems. Third, training that focuses on space
acquisition is limited. For example, the Defense Acquisition University
(DAU) does not incorporate space-specific training into its required
curricula for the acquisition workforce, and the Air Force's National
Security Space Institute offers only limited acquisition content in its
curricula for the space workforce. Without increased space and
acquisition-related training and a career field or specialty that
addresses standardized education and training requirements specific to
space acquisition, the Air Force may lack visibility over the
capabilities and career paths of its space acquisition personnel, and
therefore may not have the ability to ensure that space acquisition
personnel can effectively supervise and oversee the development of new
space systems. Lastly, the percentage of new acquisition managers
coming into the Air Force with technical degrees has declined over the
past 15 years, from 68 percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 2005. The
decline in acquisition managers with technical degrees, coupled with
the factors listed above, may undermine the Air Force's ability to
strategically manage its space acquisition workforce and meet national
security space mission needs.
We are making recommendations to the Air Force to take actions to
promote better management of its limited pool of space acquisition
personnel. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or
partially concurred with these recommendations. NRO provided comments
but did not formally agree or disagree with our recommendations.
Background:
Congress and DOD have become increasingly concerned about significant
cost increases and program delays for space acquisition programs.
Moreover, the skilled and technical workforce needed to manage space
programs may not be sustained at a rate necessary to meet national
security needs. We have previously reported on space acquisition
performance and space cadre workforce issues and have made
recommendations to improve both the acquisition performance of space
programs and the workforce, over 90 percent of which resides in the Air
Force.
Acquisition Workforce Management Concerns:
Over the past decade, Congress and DOD officials have expressed
concerns about the performance of acquisition programs, including space
acquisition programs, since the programs have consistently experienced
significant cost growth and schedule delays. These concerns led to the
commissioning of numerous studies, many of which highlighted systemic
issues with the acquisition workforce, including the space acquisition
workforce, as contributing to program difficulties. Two of the most
recent studies are reports by the Defense Science Board and the Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment Project.
In May 2003, a joint task force of the Defense Science Board issued a
report on the acquisition of national security space programs, known as
the Young Panel report.[Footnote 18] The task force had been chartered
by senior Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials,
including the Under Secretary of the Air Force who was also serving as
the Director of NRO, in order to determine underlying causes and
systemic issues related to significant problems in many critical
national security space programs. The members of the task force noted
that one systemic issue is that there is an overall underappreciation
of the importance of appropriately staffed and trained system
engineering staffs to manage the technologically demanding and unique
aspects of space programs. In July 2004, the task force followed up on
the progress made in implementing the Young Panel report
recommendations. Although the task force noted in this follow-up report
that the establishment of the space cadre was a very positive step, it
maintained that the distinctiveness of a space acquisition professional
should be recognized with a special identifier.
Additionally, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA)
Project completed an integrated acquisition assessment at the request
of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and issued its report in January
2006.[Footnote 19] Although this report was not limited to space
acquisition programs, it noted, among other things, that key DOD
acquisition personnel, particularly acquisition managers, do not have
sufficient experience, tenure, and training to meet current acquisition
challenges and that system engineering capability within DOD is not
sufficient to meet program needs. Consequently, the DAPA report
recommended that there be an increase in the number of federal
employees focused on critical skill areas, such as program management
and system engineering, with the cost of this increase to be offset by
reductions in funding for contractor support. Moreover, the report also
recommended the establishment of consistent training, education,
certification, and qualification standards for the entire acquisition
workforce. Finally, the report noted that the aging science and
engineering workforce and declining numbers of science and engineering
graduates willing to enter either industry or government will have a
negative impact on DOD's ability to address workforce concerns.
Trends in Science and Engineering Degrees:
According to the National Science Foundation (NSF), the numbers of U.S.
citizens and permanent residents earning science and engineering
degrees[Footnote 20] at the bachelor's and doctoral levels remained
constant or declined during the 1990s. At the bachelor's level, which
is the level at which officers normally enter the Air Force, the
numbers have increased since then in some fields. At the doctoral
level, from which the Air Force draws technical experts, the U.S.
citizen and permanent resident share of the total has continued to
decline. Figure 2 shows the trends in degrees by level.
Figure 2: Trends in Overall Science and Engineering Degrees Awarded to
U.S. Citizens and Permanent Residents:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NSF data.
Note: Bachelor's and master's degree data unavailable for 1999.
[End of figure]
Among engineering graduates, the number of doctoral degrees has
declined steadily over the past decade, and the number of bachelor's
and master's degrees declined in the mid-1990s but has grown since
2002. Figure 3 shows the trends in engineering degrees awarded to U.S.
citizens and permanent residents since 1989.
Figure 3: Engineering Degrees Awarded to U.S. Citizens and Permanent
Residents:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NSF data.
Note: Bachelor's and master's degree data unavailable for 1999.
[End of figure]
The number of engineering graduates, as depicted in figure 3,
represents the maximum pool from which Air Force engineering officers,
civilians, and contractors may be drawn. However, permanent residents
will not necessarily all go on to obtain citizenship, and not even all
citizens will be able to obtain the security clearances that some space-
related positions require. In addition, demand throughout DOD is high,
according to DOD officials: the department employs about 45 percent of
the federal government's approximately 200,000 scientists and
engineers, including about two-thirds of its engineers. Therefore, DOD
considers the dependability of the supply of scientists and engineers
who are able to obtain security clearances to be in question.
Air Force Role in Space Acquisition:
The Air Force is DOD's primary procurer and operator of space systems
that are used by the services and others throughout DOD. These
activities primarily occur at SMC or NRO. SMC, a subordinate command of
Air Force Space Command, designs and acquires all Air Force and most
DOD space systems. As of February 2006, SMC had an authorized workforce
of about 7,000 people, who are divided among eight system program
offices, such as the Space Superiority and the Global Positioning
System Program Office, and several technical, financial, and logistical
support directorates.
SMC's space acquisition workforce is composed of Air Force officers and
civilians, federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)
personnel, and other contractors, each of whom plays a specific role in
the acquisition process. Officers provide overall management and
military perspective on user needs; civilians provide continuity,
functional expertise, and institutional knowledge; FFRDC personnel
provide in-depth knowledge of programs and an independent perspective;
and contractors provide systems engineering and technical assistance
(SETA) as a surge capability to meet a variety of skills shortages. In
addition, enlisted personnel fill varied support roles. Figure 4 shows
the composition of the SMC workforce. The shaded portion represents
contractors, who constitute slightly more than half of the SMC
acquisition workforce.
Figure 4: Composition of the Workforce at SMC:
[See PDF for image]
Source: SMC as of April 2006.
Notes: Acquisition officers are the scientists, engineers, and
acquisition managers that we have defined as constituting the space
acquisition workforce. In addition, we included contracting and
financial management officers, whom SMC considers part of its
acquisition workforce and who are part of the broad Air Force
acquisition career field.
[End of figure]
NRO, which designs and acquires reconnaissance satellites, is a defense
agency whose director reports jointly to the Director for National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. From 2001 to 2005, the Under
Secretary of the Air Force also served concurrently as the Director of
NRO.[Footnote 21] Similar to SMC's space acquisition workforce, the
space acquisition workforce at NRO also includes Air Force officers,
enlisted personnel, and civilians. In addition, Central Intelligence
Agency employees, personnel from the other military services, and
contractors contribute personnel to NRO. Although exact figures were
not available, NRO is authorized approximately 40 percent as many
officers with acquisition specialties as is SMC.[Footnote 22]
Historically, the NRO space acquisition workforce has received
substantial support from both FFRDC personnel and private contractors.
Space Acquisition Workforce Is Not Defined as a Distinct Workforce:
DOD and the Air Force have not established a separate workforce for
space acquisition personnel.[Footnote 23] As a result, we determined
that the space acquisition workforce resides in two areas--the
acquisition workforce or the space cadre workforce. In other words, we
determined that the space acquisition workforce consists of acquisition
personnel with space experience and space cadre personnel with
acquisition experience. The Air Force acquisition workforce and the
space cadre workforce have separate management frameworks--each of
which has a separate workforce strategy--that include different
certification levels tailored to each of the workforces' needs.
The Air Force has not developed a separate workforce strategy for space
acquisition personnel because there is no consensus within DOD or the
services that space systems are inherently different from other
systems, and DOD's current position is that those involved in
developing or acquiring space assets are not different enough from
other acquirers to warrant a separate workforce strategy. The
departmentwide Space Professional Oversight Board has debated this
issue, and we found officials who agreed with both positions. Officials
cite two principal arguments in favor of the view that space is unique.
First, according to some Air Force and DOD officials, as well as a DAU
briefing to the Air Force's National Security Space Institute's (NSSI)
flag-officer level executive course, space acquisition is different
because space systems are purchased in small quantities; there are few
operators, and these require specialized training; and these systems
need to be perfect the first time, because satellites cannot be
recalled for repairs. In addition, a high proportion of total costs are
devoted to system acquisition rather than operations and support, which
is different from the typical DOD life cycle cost curve. Second, some
senior Air Force and DOD officials believe that personnel need to spend
at least a decade learning about space systems before they can become
effective acquirers and that knowledge of systems engineering is
critical for space acquisition work.
Officials who do not view space as inherently different cite two
principal arguments. First, each type of procurement has unique
aspects--for example, lives may be lost when prototype aircraft crash-
-and therefore making a distinction between space and non-space
acquisition would set a precedent that could lead to demands for
numerous separate acquisition strategies. In addition, officials
pointed out that Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)
requirements are structured functionally. Personnel specialize in such
areas as program management or systems planning, research, development,
and engineering, not in major systems like satellites or aircraft.
Therefore, an acquisition manager can acquire any type of platform.
In the absence of a defined space acquisition workforce, we identified
the acquisition workforce and the space cadre and the frameworks used
to manage them. The acquisition workforce has the Acquisition
Professional Development Program (APDP), which was established to
promote the development and sustainment of a professional acquisition
workforce within the Air Force in accordance with DAWIA
requirements.[Footnote 24] The APDP consists of three levels of
certification for the acquisition professional. Acquisition
professionals may obtain certification in one or more of several areas,
such as acquisition program management, systems engineering, and test
and evaluation. Each level of acquisition certification requires a
combination of education, experience, and training. For example, in
order to achieve the first level of certification in the area of
acquisition program management, an officer must have 1 year of
acquisition experience and attend an acquisition management course
offered by DAU.[Footnote 25] To achieve the second level in this area,
the officer must have 2 years of acquisition experience and have taken
additional DAU program management courses. To achieve the third level,
the officer should have taken some amount of coursework toward a
master's degree, have 4 years of acquisition experience, and take an
additional DAU program management course.
For the space cadre workforce, Air Force acquisition officers with
space experience are included in Air Force Space Command's space
professional development program as credentialed space professionals,
also known as space cadre members. The Space Professional Development
Program includes among its basic elements the identification of the
unique space experiences of space professionals, the tracking of these
experiences in a space professional database, and the establishment of
a Space Professional Certification Program to recognize distinct levels
of space expertise. The Space Professional Certification Program
consists of three levels of certification, each of which involves
varying levels of education, training, and experience, and emphasizes
substantial space experience as the main ingredient qualifying an
individual for higher levels of responsibility. For example, in order
to achieve the first level of certification, an officer must possess a
bachelor's degree, have taken the Space 100 course,[Footnote 26] and
have at least 1 year of space experience. In order to achieve the
second level of certification, which is usually around the 10-year
career point, an officer must additionally have taken the Space 200
course and possess at least 6 years of space experience. Finally, in
order to achieve the third and highest level of certification, which
usually takes place around the 15-year career point, an officer must
have also taken the Space 300 course and have at least 9 years of space
experience. Within the Air Force's acquisition workforce, officers in
both the scientist and engineer career fields are required to possess a
degree in a technical area that is relevant to their career field.
However, acquisition managers are not required to hold a technical
degree or a master's degree.
Air Force Has Done Some Space and Acquisition Workforce Planning, but
Lacks an Integrated Zero-Based Needs Assessment:
Although the Air Force has taken some actions to address the key
elements of strategic workforce management used by leading
organizations, these actions have been targeted to either the
acquisition workforce or the space cadre--not the space acquisition
workforce. More important, the Air Force has not done a zero-based
needs assessment for the space acquisition workforce--a critical step
in strategically managing a workforce.
Air Force Actions to Address the Strategic Planning Model Are Directed
at the Acquisition and Space Cadre Workforces:
We found that the Air Force has taken several actions to better manage
the acquisition and the space cadre workforces, such as identifying
personnel gaps and addressing career path and training development. For
example, the Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition recently
conducted a long-range review of scientific and engineering capacity
within the Air Force, and one of acquisition officer/civilian supply
and shortages. The Air Force Manpower Agency is currently conducting a
servicewide Acquisition and Sustainment Unit manpower study, and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has
entered into an agreement with the Office of Personnel Management to
conduct a workforce and succession planning study, which includes Air
Force civilian personnel with acquisition specialties.
The strategic workforce model also entails developing plans and
strategies to fill identified personnel gaps, building capabilities,
and monitoring and evaluating the progress of efforts. We found that
Air Force Headquarters has identified gaps in its acquisition workforce
and subsequently plans to allocate acquisition officers among areas of
need; however, the plan does not distinguish between space-related and
other acquisition officers. Building capabilities entails acquiring and
using flexibilities to shape the workforce. We found that the Office of
the Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition regularly monitors
the rates at which authorized positions are filled, and brings
acquisition personnel shortages to the attention of higher headquarters
for corrective action.
Efforts regarding Skill Sets, Training, and Career Path Development:
The Air Force Space Command has addressed critical skill sets,
training, and career path development as part of its effort to develop
and manage its space cadre officers, including acquisition personnel
who meet space cadre qualifications. For example, Air Force Space
Command is continuing to conduct an analysis of the current space cadre
and to identify critical skill sets needed for each segment, including
officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians. So far, the analysis has
been completed for acquisition officers, including those who are
assigned to NRO, but has not yet been completed for civilians.
Air Force Space Command has also established a space-specific series of
training courses.[Footnote 27] In addition, SMC and NRO offer space
acquisition-specific curricula to newly assigned officers and civilians
at those locations. Air Force Space Command has also published its
Career Opportunities Guide that lists each space-related position, and
describes the education, experience, and training prerequisites for
each to enable officers to prepare for specific assignments.
Air Force Space Command and the Air Force's acquisition career field
manager have developed sample career paths for space cadre members and
acquisition officers, respectively, to follow. Each sample career path
provides variations that provide flexibility and emphasize different
types of assignments, depending on individual preference and service
needs.
Efforts regarding Recruitment and Promotion:
In terms of recruitment and promotion, the Air Force Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel annually sets recruitment targets as well as
retention and promotion goals for each military rank with input from
each of the career field managers. The major commands, such as Air
Force Space Command, do not set recruitment targets. Rather,
acquisition officers are recruited and promoted according to targets
set for each career field and source of commission. Individuals who may
fill space acquisition positions at some time in their careers are
normally recruited into space operations or one of the acquisition
career fields, but officers from a wider range of career fields,
including pilots, may also fill acquisition positions. Civilian
recruitment is managed at the major command level. Air Force Space
Command, and subordinate commands such as SMC, may hire civilian
personnel up to the command's budget ceiling. Different major commands
can therefore tailor the civilian proportion of the workforce to their
particular needs.
The Air Force Does Not Have an Integrated Zero-Based Needs Assessment
for the Space Acquisition Workforce:
The Air Force has not performed an integrated zero-based needs
assessment for the entire space acquisition workforce. It has performed
or will perform such assessments for components of the space
acquisition workforce. For example, the Air Force has done an
assessment of the personnel working on classified space systems that
recommended a 27 percent reduction in positions allotted to NRO. In
addition, at the time of our review, the Air Force was conducting an
assessment that included personnel working on unclassified systems;
however, the Air Force has not conducted an integrated needs assessment
of its entire space acquisition workforce, to include all segments of
the workforce--military, civilian and contractor personnel--and those
who work on both classified and unclassified space systems. In May
2005, the Air Force completed a separate zero-based needs assessment
that included those Air Force personnel who were assigned to classified
programs. This assessment included all Air Force personnel who are
assigned to classified positions, not only those space acquisition
personnel working on classified space systems. According to Air Force
officials, the purpose of the ongoing assessment of personnel working
on unclassified space systems is to establish an approved method of
distributing all acquisition personnel, including space acquisition
personnel, among the various acquisition organizations in order to
ensure that each organization has the right number of personnel with
the right skill sets to meet its mission goals. Although Air Force
officials told us that this assessment includes military, civilian, and
contractor personnel, they noted that it does not include the portion
of the space acquisition workforce that works on classified space
systems.
The Air Force is entering a 5-year period that will see a projected
decrease of 40,000 active duty positions and a 25 percent reduction in
both the SETA and the FFRDC contractor workforces. It is unclear to
what extent the two completed and ongoing needs assessments will be
incorporated into the service's force reduction planning and process
improvement efforts. Also, the Air Force cannot draw on overall DOD
guidance: the recently published acquisition workforce strategic plan
lacked information on the space workforce. The absence of such a fact-
based gap analysis can undermine an organization's efforts to identify
and respond to current and emerging challenges. For example, without
such an analysis, the Air Force may find itself with a workforce that
does not have the education, experience, or expertise needed when
program goals change. Additionally, without incorporating an integrated
space acquisition workforce needs assessment into its force reduction
planning, or reducing the number of space acquisition programs, the Air
Force may find it difficult to determine the impact of its force
reductions on the quantity and quality of its space acquisition
personnel and to formulate actions to mitigate the reductions.
Air Force May Not Have Enough Space Acquisition Personnel to Meet
National Security Space Needs:
In the absence of an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its
space acquisition workforce, the Air Force cannot ensure that it has
enough space acquisition personnel to meet national security space
needs given its current number of space acquisition programs. The Air
Force is experiencing a shortage of midgrade and senior officers--
specifically, captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels--who perform
space acquisition work, and contractor support is filling this
shortage. The Air Force has recognized the existence of this shortage
and has begun considering ways to address it, but it has not yet
addressed it.
Air Force May Not Have Sufficient Numbers of Mid-and Senior-Grade Space
Acquisition Personnel:
Determining sufficient numbers of qualified personnel for current and
future needs is a key function of workforce planning. The DOD directive
that established the Executive Agent for Space charges the military
services with developing and maintaining a sufficient number of space-
qualified personnel to support space planning, programming,
acquisitions, and operations. The Air Force is experiencing a shortage
of mid-and senior-grade officers in the engineering and acquisition
manager career fields, according to Air Force totals of authorized and
assigned acquisition personnel, which include space acquisition
personnel.[Footnote 28] The shortages of these officers within the
space acquisition workforce may hamper the Air Force's ability to meet
national security space needs. Specifically, the engineering career
field is experiencing a shortage from captain to colonel, and the
acquisition manager career field is experiencing a shortage from major
to colonel. For example, in fiscal year 2006, the Air Force authorized
that 48 percent of its officers, or 1,285 total, in the engineering
workforce should be the rank of captain, but currently only 29 percent,
or 767, are captains. Additionally, while 21 percent should be the rank
of major, only 15 percent are currently majors. Similarly, the Air
Force has authorized 28 percent of acquisition managers (713 total) to
be majors and 25 percent (639 total) to be lieutenant colonels, but
these ranks are currently 18 percent (472) of the total and 20 percent
(511 total), respectively. Despite this shortage, the Air Force
currently has more scientists and acquisition managers assigned than
authorized. This is because there is a surplus of junior officers in
these acquisition career fields. For example, in fiscal year 2006, the
Air Force authorized 20 percent of engineers, or 535 total, to be the
rank of lieutenant, but currently 46 percent of engineers, or 1,205
total, are lieutenants. Similarly, the Air Force authorized 10 percent
of acquisition managers, or 254 total, to be the rank of lieutenant,
but currently 26 percent of acquisition managers, or 686 total, are
lieutenants. Acquisition managers play an important role in managing
space programs, and the surplus of lieutenants, or junior officers, as
acquisition managers may hamper the Air Force's ability to meet program
needs. For an example, see figure 5, which shows the authorized and
assigned totals by rank for the acquisition manager career field. In
addition, Air Force officials told us that there are other career
fields within the service that are also experiencing shortages.
Figure 5: Fiscal Year 2006 Authorized and Assigned Totals for Air Force
Acquisition Managers by Rank:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force headquarters data.
[End of figure]
Based on our analysis, there are similar shortages of majors and
lieutenant colonels at SMC. As of February 2006, SMC's authorized
positions for majors and lieutenant colonels were both filled at 63
percent, which is equivalent to 111 majors and 68 lieutenant colonels.
In contrast, SMC's positions for lieutenants were filled at 302 percent
of their authorized numbers; although 116 lieutenants were authorized,
there were 350 lieutenants assigned to SMC. Several officials from the
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and SMC told us that SMC is
staffed with much higher percentages of such junior officers than of
midgrade and senior officers as part of Air Force's attempt to address
SMC shortages. Additionally, 37 percent of SMC's senior management
acquisition positions for military personnel performing systems
engineering or program management functions--positions requiring a rank
of lieutenant colonel or higher--were vacant as of February 2006. SMC
officials have consistently expressed concern that the shortage of
acquisition personnel with the right experience and knowledge--such as
those eligible to fill senior management acquisition positions--will
make it difficult to properly manage space system acquisition programs.
We also observed that, without considering actual fill rates, SMC was
authorized to receive a greater percentage of junior officers in the
acquisition career fields than were authorized for the balance of the
Air Force in fiscal year 2006. For example, in the acquisition manager
career field, SMC was authorized to have about 14 percent lieutenants
and 38 percent captains, whereas the comparable acquisition manager
authorizations for the balance of the Air Force were 9 percent
lieutenants and 29 percent captains. Correspondingly, SMC was
authorized to receive a lower percentage of senior officers than was
the rest of the Air Force, with SMC authorized to have 7 percent of its
engineers be at the rank of lieutenant colonel, compared to the Air
Force authorization that 10 percent of engineers be at this rank. In
the scientist career field, SMC is authorized zero lieutenant colonels
and zero colonels, with the remaining Air Force authorization being 93
lieutenant colonels and 20 colonels. In the engineer career field, SMC
is authorized to have 23 lieutenant colonels and 5 colonels, with the
remaining Air Force authorization being 230 lieutenant colonels and 33
colonels. Having a lower number of senior officers authorized for SMC
may create a risk of hampering SMC's ability to carry out its mission,
especially compared to locations that are receiving a higher rate of
senior officers. According to a former Commander of Air Force Space
Command, the continuing shortage of experienced space acquisition
personnel assigned to SMC is one of the command's most urgent problems.
See figure 6 for more detail on the authorizations by rank for
acquisition personnel at SMC and within the Air Force as a whole.
Figure 6: Fiscal Year 2006 Authorizations for Acquisition Personnel by
Rank at SMC and for the Air Force Overall:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force headquarters data.
[End of figure]
SMC is using contractor support to fill the shortages of midgrade and
senior officers in the engineering and acquisition manager career
fields. This contractor support includes both personnel from FFRDCs as
well as contractors from private companies who provide SETA support. As
of April 2006, contractors were performing approximately 50 percent of
SMC's workload. In addition, SMC employs about 1,300 civilians, about
half of whom work in technical and financial acquisition positions.
Civilian acquisition positions in program offices were filled at a rate
of 96 percent as of April 2006. According to SMC officials, civilians
provide functional expertise and continuity, and SMC is pursuing
initiatives to increase its civilian positions in order to counter the
shortage of military space acquisition personnel. However, SMC was
experiencing a 26 percent vacancy rate in its civilian acquisition
positions for systems engineering and program management as of April
2006, and SMC officials related that approximately 40 percent of its
civilian workforce will be eligible for retirement by 2007. We were not
able to make a comparison to NRO because of lack of information from
NRO. However, NRO depends on Air Force personnel to fill many of its
space acquisition positions, with approximately 57 percent of NRO
employees being Air Force personnel as of March 2006. The shortage of
midgrade and senior officers in the Air Force may ultimately lead NRO
to increase its contractor support. In general, the vacancy rates at
SMC for both senior military and civilian management acquisition
positions and the high percentage of the civilian workforce that is
eligible for retirement in a few years are factors that may affect
SMC's ability to carry out its mission.
The Air Force has recognized the existence of this shortage and has
recently begun considering potential ways to address it. For example,
during a March 2006 conference, Air Force officials discussed potential
near-term solutions to acquisition personnel shortages, such as tapping
available resources to the maximum extent practicable to fill
acquisition positions. This near-term solution would involve utilizing
acquisition officers who currently serve in nonacquisition positions,
such as instructor positions, as well as officers with nonacquisition
specialties, particularly if they have technical degrees or space
experience. Air Force officials also discussed mid-and longer-term
solutions, such as reevaluating the nonrated prioritization plan for
acquisition personnel, streamlining the civilian hiring process, and
defining future acquisition manpower requirements. It is unclear what
actions will stem from these discussions. If actions are not taken to
address the shortage of midgrade and senior acquisition officers, the
Air Force may be facing substantial risk, as the shortage may affect
the Air Force's ability to strategically manage its workforce to ensure
that national security space needs are met.
Shortages Are Due to 1990s Reductions in Acquisition Personnel and
Other Factors:
There are several reasons for the Air Force's shortage of midgrade and
senior officers in the engineering and acquisition manager career
fields. First, the shortage is due, in part, to the drawdown of
acquisition personnel in the 1990s and the effects of DOD's subsequent
acquisition reform. Following the end of the Cold War, there was a
decline in the national security space budget and a corresponding
decrease in the number of acquisition personnel available to perform
space acquisition work. For example, DOD reduced the size of its
acquisition workforce in the 1990s, beginning in fiscal year 1996 when
Congress directed the services to reduce the workforce by 15,000 within
a year and by 25 percent over the following 5 years. This decrease in
acquisition personnel means that today there are fewer officers,
particularly majors and lieutenant colonels, to perform acquisition
work. This is consistent with the Air Force's workforce model, which
shows that it takes an average of 11 and 16 years, respectively, to
reach the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel.
The decrease in midgrade and senior space acquisition officers is also
consistent with the emphasis on breadth in the acquisition career
field. Scientists and engineers have three defined career paths:
technical expert, manager/leader, and senior leader. Those who embark
on the technical expert path, and continue to pursue technical depth
beyond the senior captain level, can generally expect to retire as
majors or lieutenant colonels. The acquisition manager timeline also
concentrates system program office assignments early in a career and
emphasizes staff assignments for majors and lieutenant colonels. By
contrast, the space professional career guide emphasizes depth of
experience; therefore, an acquisition officer who is also a member of
the space cadre may experience difficulty in balancing both sets of
expectations.
The 1990s drawdown of the acquisition workforce, including the space
acquisition workforce, had the effect of increasing DOD's reliance on
contractor support to perform space acquisition work. We have
previously reported that in the 1990s, DOD structured contracts for
acquisition programs, including space acquisition programs, in a way
that reduced oversight and shifted key decision-making responsibility
onto contractors.[Footnote 29] For example, in 1994, the Secretary of
Defense directed that acquisition programs, including space acquisition
programs, decrease reliance on military specifications and standards
and encouraged contractors to propose nongovernment standards and
industrywide standards instead. DOD officials told us that the
workforce reductions of the 1990s, coupled with this decision to grant
substantial control over specifications and standards to contractors,
led to poor management of acquisition programs, including space
acquisition programs, especially with regard to testing, process,
quality control, and subcontractor oversight. As a result, these
officials believe that current space acquisition programs have many
undetected problems that could lead to cost, performance, and schedule
problems upon discovery.
In addition, there have been consolidations within the defense supplier
base for space programs. Since 1985, there were at least 10 fully
competent prime contractors competing for the large programs and a
number that could compete for subcontracts. Arguably today, there are
only two contractors that could handle DOD's most complex space
programs. We observed that SMC's Technical Acquisition Support Services
contractor firms include the major satellite-building prime contractor
firms, as well as some firms that are owned by or have other
relationships with these prime contractors. This interrelationship has
caused both the House Committee on Armed Services[Footnote 30] and
space acquisition organization leaders to express concern about the
potential for conflict of interest and the outsourcing of inherently
governmental functions. SMC officials observed that they lack
visibility over the work of subcontractors, which can lead to technical
problems that cause cost overruns or schedule delays. While SMC has
calculated that contractors carry out approximately 50 percent of the
organization's workload, NRO does not have a standard method to count
its contractors. The DOD Inspector General recently reported that
although DOD is not required to report the number of contractors,
omitting contractors from the workforce count results in the
invisibility of a large part of the true acquisition
workforce.[Footnote 31] This lack of visibility, over what could be a
substantial percentage of the workforce, also makes it difficult to
determine workforce gaps in critical skills and to take corrective
actions.
Another reason for the shortage of midgrade and senior officers in the
engineering and acquisition manager career fields that constitute the
space acquisition workforce is that the Air Force is trying to balance
overall shortages in multiple career fields, not only in the
acquisition career fields. Although it has recognized the existence of
this shortage, the Air Force considers the needs of all career fields
with respect to mission, people, and available resources when directing
personnel actions. However, the acquisition career fields are not
perceived as the most important of the career fields within the Air
Force, which generally places greater emphasis on recruiting and
retaining personnel in the pilot career field. Thus, space acquisition
workforce shortages have to compete for resources with demands for
pilots and navigators. According to Air Force personnel data, pilots
entering the Air Force in fiscal year 2007 will increase as a
percentage of total Air Force personnel over the course of the next 30
years whereas engineers decrease as a percentage over the same time
period. For example, pilots entering the Air Force in fiscal year 2007
will make up 19 percent of total Air Force officers, with these pilots
at the end of this period constituting about 27 percent of total Air
Force officers. However, engineers will enter the Air Force in fiscal
year 2007 constituting 7 percent of total Air Force officers and, in 30
years, they will constitute only 2 percent. The lack of emphasis on the
acquisition career path and the small percentage of Air Force engineers
may affect the Air Force's ability to strategically manage its
workforce and ensure adequate staffing of its program offices.
Finally, the Air Force has not addressed the shortage of midgrade and
senior space acquisition officers because it is currently concentrating
on Air Force overall force reduction planning and process improvement
efforts. The Air Force is entering a 5-year period that will see a
projected decrease of 40,000 active duty positions and a 25 percent
reduction in both the SETA and the FFRDC contractor workforces. In the
face of these reductions, the Air Force has also begun an effort that
focuses on the identification and elimination of activities, actions,
and policies that do not contribute to its efficient and effective
operation. At the time of our review, Air Force officials told us they
did not know what impact these force reduction and process improvement
efforts would have on the Air Force space acquisition workforce.
Air Force's Existing Space Acquisition Personnel May Not Be Technically
Proficient in Ways Needed to Meet National Security Space Needs:
The technical proficiency of the current space acquisition workforce
that is available to the Air Force may not be adequate to meet national
security space needs. Although Title 10 of the United States Code
requires the Air Force to develop a career field for officers with
technical competence in space-related matters, including the capability
to develop space systems,[Footnote 32] there are no specific technical
requirements for the space acquisition workforce. However, there are
certification programs for the acquisition and space cadre workforces,
the two workforces we have identified as including members of the space
acquisition workforce. These certification programs are the APDP and
the Space Professional Certification Program. Based on our analysis,
the space acquisition workforce at SMC had fewer of the higher
certification levels in both certification programs. Because of the
unavailability of NRO data, we were generally only able to examine the
certification levels for SMC staff. For example, SMC's percentage of
personnel with the highest level of acquisition professional
certification has steadily dropped in the last few years while those at
the lowest level of certification have steadily increased. Several
factors contribute to these differences.
SMC Acquisition Officers Have Fewer Higher Certification Levels:
Our analysis showed that SMC acquisition officers have fewer
acquisition certifications at the higher levels than do Air Force
acquisition officers overall. The Air Force APDP requires a combination
of education, coursework, and experience to attain any of three levels
of certification, with the first level being for junior acquisition
personnel; the second level for midgrade acquisition personnel; and the
third level for senior acquisition personnel, such as lieutenant
colonels and above.
For SMC only, while the percentage of APDP level 1 personnel is higher
in 2005 than in 1996, the percentage of APDP level 3 personnel--the
highest certification level--has gone down, as shown in figure
7.[Footnote 33]
Figure 7: Acquisition Certification Levels at SMC, 1996-2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force Personnel Center data.
[End of figure]
Certification at the third level is required for officers to serve in
senior management acquisition positions, which are acquisition
positions designated by the Secretary of Defense that carry significant
responsibility. Specifically, the number of acquisition officers at SMC
certified at the highest level was about 28 percent in 1996 and in 2005
was 15 percent. As previously mentioned, approximately 37 percent of
SMC's senior management acquisition positions for military personnel
performing systems engineering or program management functions were
vacant as of April 2006. One reason for the drop in highly certified
acquisition officers may be the Air Force's lack of emphasis on the
acquisition career path. For example, officials from the Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force and SMC told us that scientists and
engineers may choose to leave the Air Force before reaching higher
certification levels because of the lack of promotion opportunities and
the lure of higher wages in the private sector, a view which was echoed
in a discussion we held with about a dozen SMC junior officers.
Moreover, according to an official from the Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force, the drop in the number of highly certified acquisition
officers may also be explained by a change in Air Force philosophy
about promotions, in which information regarding an individual's
advanced degree was masked from promotion boards in favor of a focus on
the individual's operational or warfighting experience. Acquisition
personnel, who generally do not deploy and are therefore less likely to
have operational or warfighting experience, may have seen this change
concerning promotions as career limiting and left the Air Force. The
Secretary of the Air Force recently decided that beginning with
calendar year 2008 promotion boards, information on all degrees earned
by an individual will once again be made available to the board. The
steadily rising percentage of certification level 1 personnel since
2001 may be explained by the large number of junior officers at SMC but
may bode well for future higher certification levels over the next
decade and beyond. However, the continued lack of promotion
opportunities for those in the acquisition workforce, including those
in the space acquisition workforce, may not allow the Air Force to
build on the rising certification levels in the future.
Acquisition officers at SMC generally had fewer of the acquisition
certifications at the higher levels compared to acquisition officers
for the Air Force as a whole. Figure 8 shows these comparisons.
Figure 8: Acquisition Certification Levels for Acquisition Officers at
SMC and the Air Force:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force space professional and SMC databases.
Note: Numbers for each group may add up to more than 100 percent
because acquisition officers can have certification levels in more than
one acquisition category.
[End of figure]
For the space certification levels at SMC, we found that in spring
2006, 61 percent of the workforce had certification for level 1 of the
space professional certification program--the lowest level of the
program--and 23 percent of the workforce had no certification. As noted
in the previous section, these percentages more than likely reflect the
relatively large percentage of the SMC workforce made up of junior
officers and the relatively small percentage made up of senior
officers. Figure 9 reflects the breakout of the space professional
certifications at the three levels at SMC during our review.
Figure 9: Space Professional Certification Levels for SMC Space
Acquisition Workforce:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
Notes: The no certification or level 0 category includes individuals
who have not yet attained level 1, who are not currently considered
credentialed space professionals, or both. We found only one case in
which a level 1 officer was not concurrently a credentialed space
professional.
[End of figure]
Differences in SMC Space Acquisition Personnel and Personnel Working in
Classified Space Programs:
Our analysis showed that the acquisition officers at SMC also possess
fewer of the acquisition and space professional certifications at the
higher levels than those serving in classified space
positions.[Footnote 34] Specifically, for the acquisition certification
levels, we found that as of April 2006, a greater percentage of SMC
acquisition officers had the lowest certification level than did the
acquisition officers serving in classified space positions. Conversely,
a higher percentage of acquisition officers working in classified space
programs had certifications at levels 2 and 3. Figure 10 depicts these
comparisons.
Figure 10: Acquisition Certification Levels for Classified and SMC
Space Acquisition Workforces:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force space professional and SMC data.
Notes: Numbers for each group may add up to more than 100 percent
because acquisition officers can have certification levels in more than
one acquisition category.
[End of figure]
Similarly, our analysis showed that those working on classified
programs have a greater percentage of the higher levels of space
certification compared to the SMC workforce. We believe this may be a
reflection of the Air Force's decision to place more senior officers at
NRO as well as a reflection of the perceived risk level of classified
programs and the need to place more experienced personnel on these
programs. Figure 11 shows the comparison of space certification levels
for personnel working on classified space programs and at SMC.
Figure 11: Space Certification Levels for Classified and SMC Space
Acquisition Workforces:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
Note: The no certification or level 0 category includes individuals who
have not yet attained Level 1, who are not currently considered
credentialed space professionals, or both.
[End of figure]
Additionally, our analysis showed that acquisition officers working in
classified space programs have more education and space and acquisition
experience than do their counterparts in unclassified space programs.
Specifically, of the acquisition officers who are currently serving in
classified space positions, about 40 percent have technical master's
degrees or higher, whereas 16 percent of those serving in unclassified
space positions do. The comparable figures for technical bachelor's
degrees were 83 and 60 percent, respectively.
In general, SMC's acquisition managers had less depth and breadth of
experience than their classified counterparts. Acquisition managers
constituted a higher share of entry-level positions at SMC, and a
smaller share of the most senior positions, than either their
classified counterparts or those in the Air Force as a whole. Moreover,
acquisition managers are encouraged to already have experience in a
different specialty, preferably at the beginning of their
careers.[Footnote 35] However, only a little more than half of
acquisition managers at SMC had prior experience in a different
specialty, whereas most acquisition managers in classified space
programs had such experience. Of the 180 acquisition managers we
identified as assigned to a classified space program in February 2006,
80 percent had had one or more prior assignments in another field, and
more than half of these were in scientific or engineering specialties.
Several DOD officials, along with officers from the Navy as well as the
Air Force, expressed the opinion that acquisition management skills are
broadly transferable for any type of program; therefore, space
acquisition managers do not need a distinct academic background or type
of experience. Yet the classified acquisition managers are more likely
to have technical degrees and higher certification levels, reflecting
more education, training, and experience than their SMC peers--
creating, in effect, a specialty for some but not all acquisition
managers.
Lower Levels of Education and Experience in Space Acquisition Workforce
Are Attributable to Several Factors:
The lower levels of technical education and certification in the Air
Force space acquisition workforce are due to several factors. First,
the lower levels of certification and experience among acquisition
officers at SMC have occurred because NRO has received priority in
selecting space acquisition personnel with higher qualifications, based
on a historical agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence, as well as on the Air Force's
prioritization plan for acquisition officers. Second, the Air Force has
not institutionalized a means of identifying the space acquisition
specialty within any of its existing career fields. At a minimum,
identifying space acquisition as a specialty within the acquisition
career field could allow the Air Force to identify personnel and
provide standardized training in space acquisition. Finally, training
that focuses on space acquisition is limited. Without increased space-
and acquisition-related training and a career field or specialty within
a career field that addresses standardized education and training
requirements specific to space acquisition, the Air Force may not have
the visibility it needs over its space acquisition personnel in order
to strategically manage the workforce and to ensure that these
personnel can effectively supervise and oversee the development of new
space systems. These issues are compounded by the decline of
acquisition managers entering SMC with technical degrees.
NRO Priority in Selecting Qualified Space Acquisition Personnel:
We believe that the shortage of qualified space acquisition personnel
with a technical education has occurred at SMC in part because NRO
receives priority in selecting space acquisition personnel with higher
certification levels. This priority is founded upon a provision of a
1965 agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence, which states that NRO is to receive the best
talent appropriately available from the military services and other
agencies. In addition, NRO currently receives priority fill status in
the Air Force nonrated prioritization plan, while Air Force Space
Command, which includes SMC, receives only entitlement fill
status.[Footnote 36] As previously mentioned, this prioritization plan
serves the purpose of allocating scarce numbers of acquisition officers
among the various requirements, in an effort to ensure that the most
critical requirements are filled and that when necessary, vacancies
occur in the lowest priority organizations. At present, staff
organizations such as Air Force Headquarters have the highest priority,
with NRO occupying the next highest priority. The major commands, such
as Air Force Space Command, have the lowest priority according to the
prioritization plan. This means that NRO can choose the better
qualified personnel to fill its space acquisition positions before SMC
does. Moreover, officials from NRO and the Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force told us that NRO has historically been accorded this
staffing priority over other Air Force locations competing for the same
acquisition personnel. In addition, NRO has entry-level requirements
for its space acquisition positions that are higher than the Air Force
entry-level requirements established by the APDP.
This prioritization plan is currently under review. During the course
of our review, SMC and Air Force Space Command leadership requested
that the Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff for Personnel reconsider the
prioritization plan because of SMC's shortage of senior acquisition
personnel. Specifically, they asked that SMC receive the same status
under the prioritization plan as NRO; this means having must fill or
priority fill status instead of its current entitlement status.
Following the February 2006 Air Force staffing conference, the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition agreed to
review the prioritization plan. In June 2006, the Air Force Chief of
Staff and the Director of NRO signed a joint statement of intent aimed
at enhancing Air Force-NRO relations, space capabilities, and mission
performance. Among other things, this statement of intent calls for the
establishment of a Space Assignment Advisory Board to oversee the
assignments of Air Force space professionals, including those assigned
to NRO. According to the statement, this board offers the potential to
provide a proper balance of Air Force professional manning and
experience levels between SMC and NRO, but it does not specify that
this involves any change to SMC's or NRO's status under the
prioritization plan. Additional workforce issues may be addressed in
future agreements.
However, as previously mentioned, the Air Force has not conducted an
integrated zero-based needs assessment for the space acquisition
workforce, as called for by the strategic workforce planning model that
is used by leading private and public sector organizations. Conducting
such an assessment would help the Air Force to ensure proper staffing
of all space acquisition positions, such as those at NRO and SMC,
because it involves identification of gaps that exist between the
current and future workforces needed to meet program goals.
Lack of a Designated Career Field:
Although the Secretary of the Air Force is required to develop a career
field for officers to ensure that they have the technical competence to
develop space systems, there is currently no single space acquisition
career field or specialty. Title 10 of the United States Code contains
a provision requiring the Air Force to develop a career field for
officers with technical competence in space-related matters, including
the capability to develop space systems.[Footnote 37] We believe that
the capability to develop space systems includes the capability to
acquire them. The law also requires technical competence in operating
space systems and in developing space doctrine and concepts of space
operation, both of which are encompassed in the training required by
the Air Force's space operations career field. However, the space
operations career field does not include space acquisition personnel,
and there is no corresponding career field or specialty to develop
technical competence in space acquisition. Moreover, of the acquisition
career fields that encompass the space acquisition workforce,
scientists and engineers are required to possess a degree in a
technical area, whereas acquisition managers are not required to hold a
technical degree. We have previously reported that DOD and Air Force
officials have expressed concern that there are not enough experienced
acquisition managers to run space programs or enough experts in
software engineering. These officials also commented that acquisition
managers for space systems are often not equipped to understand what is
behind a contractor's proposal.[Footnote 38]
The Air Force has not specifically identified the personnel who work on
space acquisition programs within any of its existing career fields
because, as previously mentioned, there is an ongoing debate within the
Air Force over the extent to which space acquisition is different
enough from non-space acquisition to warrant tailored training,
education, career path development, or a combination of these. However,
DOD believes that space is different because of the complexity of space
systems and the inability to recall space systems once they are
launched. The need for space systems that operate properly upon launch
is reflected in the fact that a high proportion of the cost of
developing a space system is devoted to system acquisition rather than
to operations and support, as is the case with non-space acquisition
programs. Personnel with technical and space acquisition knowledge are
therefore important in ensuring that complex space systems are
developed and acquired successfully.
As previously mentioned, the acquisition manager career field is the
one acquisition career field in the space acquisition workforce that
does not require a technical degree. We believe that at a minimum,
establishing a space acquisition specialty within the Air Force's
existing acquisition manager career field[Footnote 39] could identify
the space acquisition workforce and direct standardized education and
training requirements specific to space acquisition for all personnel
involved in managing space acquisition programs. Although we are not
arguing for a separate category for space acquisition within the DAWIA
construct, we do believe that establishing a specialty within the Air
Force's acquisition manager career field would also provide the Air
Force with a mechanism to apply strategic workforce management
principles to the space acquisition workforce, as is done by leading
public and private organizations. Without a career field or specialty
within a career field that addresses standardized education and
training requirements specific to space acquisition, the Air Force may
lack visibility over the capabilities and career paths of its space
acquisition personnel and therefore may not have the ability to
strategically manage the workforce and ensure that space acquisition
personnel can effectively supervise and oversee development of new
space systems.
Decrease in Acquisition Officers with Technical Degrees Entering SMC:
In addition, there has been a decrease in the number of acquisition
officers entering SMC with technical degrees, a pattern that has
paralleled the overall decline in U.S. citizens and permanent residents
earning bachelor's degrees in science and engineering at U.S.
institutions in the 1990s. The percentage of new acquisition managers
coming into the Air Force with technical degrees, including those in
charge of acquiring space systems, has declined over the past 15 years,
from 68 percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 2005. There has been a similar
decrease in new acquisition managers at SMC who possess technical
degrees during this same period, although Air Force Space Command,
which includes SMC, has more officers with technical bachelor's degrees
than does the Air Force as a whole. Title 10 of the United States
Code[Footnote 40] directs the Secretary of the Air Force to establish
and implement policies and procedures to develop a career field for Air
Force officers with technical competence in space-related matters so
that these officers have the capability to develop space doctrine and
concepts of space operations, develop space systems, and operate space
systems. Although acquisition managers, unlike scientists and
engineers, are not required to hold technical degrees, officials and
space acquisition officers we interviewed considered it desirable.
Because this decrease in technically educated acquisition managers
parallels a decline during the 1990s in the number of U.S. citizens and
permanent residents receiving bachelor's degrees in science and
engineering, it appears at least partly attributable to the drop in the
national supply rather than to the preferences of Air Force officials.
Entering the acquisition workforce with a technical degree could be
particularly useful at SMC, where there is a high proportion of junior
officers who, as acquisition managers, begin supervising experienced
contractors early in their careers. Conversely, acquisition managers
without technical degrees may be at a disadvantage in evaluating
proposals and conducting progress reviews. Moreover, the overall
decline in the national pool of technical expertise also limits the Air
Force's ability to rely on contractors and civilians to offset the
decline of expertise among military personnel. Over the past few years,
however, the national number of U.S. citizens and permanent residents
earning bachelor's degrees in science and engineering has increased,
but the number of new acquisition managers entering the Air Force with
technical degrees continues to decrease, according to Air Force
Personnel Center data.
Limited Space Acquisition Training:
The limited availability of training that focuses on space acquisition
also contributes to the shortage of technically proficient personnel.
For example, DAU does not incorporate space-specific training into its
required curricula for the acquisition workforce and the Air Force's
NSSI offers limited acquisition content in its curricula for the space
workforce. NSSI's 4-week intermediate-and senior-level courses--Space
200 and Space 300--have 2 1/2 and 3 days of acquisition content,
respectively. Although DAU, in collaboration with NSSI, has developed a
course that focuses on the acquisition process guidance for DOD space
programs--known as the National Security Space Acquisition Policy--this
course is in the form of a continuous learning module (CLM), which is
an online course. We note that after our inquiry about the amount of
space acquisition training, NSSI designated this space CLM as a
prerequisite to the Space 200 course. Because of the lack of space
acquisition training, SMC has developed a space acquisition school,
which provides initial qualification training before an officer is
assigned to a system program office. Similarly, NRO has an Acquisition
Center of Excellence, which provides NRO-centered acquisition training
to less experienced personnel assigned to NRO. However, without adding
more space-specific content to DAU's courses and adding more
acquisition content to NSSI's courses, the Air Force may lose an
opportunity to broaden the pool of personnel who are qualified to serve
in space acquisition positions. Moreover, as the Air Force prepares to
carry out force reductions, it will become increasingly important to
get the best-qualified people to fill space acquisition positions;
moreover, those who are assigned may not have the luxury of extended
training periods. As a result, the Air Force may not have enough
technically proficient space acquisition personnel within the existing
space acquisition workforce to meet national security space needs.
Conclusions:
Congress and DOD have repeatedly emphasized that qualified space
personnel are critical to the success of space systems. Although the
Air Force has made progress in identifying, training, and providing
career path guidance to its space cadre, more remains to be
accomplished. The Air Force is managing its existing space acquisition
workforce using some facets of the strategic workforce planning model
that is used by leading organizations; however, neither DOD nor the Air
Force has developed a separate workforce strategy, as they have for
other workforce groups, because there is a lack of consensus about the
merits of doing so. While the lack of a separate strategy is not
necessarily a deficiency, we continue to believe that DOD and the Air
Force need to ensure that the personnel who are essential to developing
and acquiring national security space systems are effectively managed.
Without performing an integrated and zero-based space acquisition
workforce needs assessment and using the results to inform its force
reduction planning, the Air Force may not be able to manage the impact
of its planned force reductions on the space acquisition workforce or
take actions to mitigate the impact to ensure it has the quantity and
quality of space acquisition personnel needed to accomplish its space
mission. Moreover, the Air Force has not developed a space acquisition
career field or specialty for its officers to ensure technical
competence in space acquisition-related matters, including the ability
to develop space systems. Without increased space and acquisition-
related training and a career field or specialty that addresses
standardized education, training, and career path development
requirements specific to space acquisition, the Air Force may lack
visibility over the capabilities and career paths of its space
acquisition personnel and therefore may not have the ability ensure
that space acquisition personnel can effectively supervise and oversee
development of new space systems. Additionally, without a career field
or specialty, the Air Force may find it more difficult to apply
strategic workforce management principles to the space acquisition
workforce. Without adequate numbers of technically proficient personnel
to meet national security space needs, the government may have to rely
more on contractors to fill the gap, but reliance on contractors may
become more difficult as the Air Force conducts its force shaping.
Current force shaping plans call for 25 percent cuts in contractor and
FFRDC support. SMC currently relies on an FFRDC to supplement its
technical support needs. Without such support, the Air Force may be
unable to maintain the necessary expertise on legacy systems and fully
support emerging space programs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Air Force to take the following three actions:
* Direct that an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of space
acquisition personnel be performed and then incorporated into the Air
Force's force reduction planning and process improvement efforts in
order to ensure that the resulting force structure is optimally
balanced among workforce segments--that is, military, civilian,
contractor, those who work on classified and unclassified programs, and
FFRDC support personnel--and functional areas, such as classified and
unclassified space systems.
* Institutionalize and manage a space-specific specialty within the Air
Force's acquisition manager career field in order to ensure that all
incumbents in the space acquisition workforce, including personnel at
SMC and NRO, have strong technical backgrounds and to better manage the
career paths and retention of technical personnel in accordance with
strategic workforce management principles.
* Improve training by providing greater acquisition-specific content in
the Air Force's NSSI's curricula in order to broaden the pool of
personnel who are qualified to fill space acquisition positions.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the
following action:
* Improve training by bolstering space-specific content in DAU's
curricula in order to broaden the pool of personnel who are qualified
to fill space acquisition positions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Both DOD and NRO provided us comments on a draft of this report. DOD
provided specific comments on whether it concurred or did not concur
with each of our recommendations. NRO provided comments; however, it
declined to concur or not concur with our recommendations because it
believes that the recommendations fall within the purview of the Air
Force.
DOD concurred with our recommendation on improving training at DAU but
only partially concurred with our remaining recommendations. Regarding
our recommendation that the Air Force conduct an integrated, zero-based
needs assessment and incorporate it into the Air Force's force
reduction planning and process improvement efforts, DOD partially
concurred, stating that a needs assessment of space acquisition
personnel is important and that it must be integrated as part of the
component's force planning and process improvement initiatives. This
statement mirrors our recommendation and reaffirms our discussion in
this report.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Air Force
institutionalize and manage a space-specific specialty within the Air
Force's acquisition manager career field. We agree with DOD that the
Air Force Space Professional Development Program has identified and
continues to track space-specific experience, and we relied on the
space experience codes found in Air Force Space Command's database for
portions of our analysis. DOD also stated that this process enables
effective career management while still affording the flexibility to
use individuals in other assignments; however, we think that its
process still does not provide adequate visibility over the career
paths of space acquisition personnel. For example, we attempted to
obtain certain information, such as promotion rates, for space
acquisition personnel, and found that the Air Force was not tracking
this information as part of the Air Force Space Professional
Development Program. We believe that having a specialty would allow the
Air Force to track such information to provide more effective strategic
human capital management. Furthermore, implementing our recommendation
would not diminish the Air Force's flexibility to use these individuals
in any positions that Air Force requirements dictate. As our report
points out, a specialty within the acquisition manager career field
would be a better means of providing visibility and management of
personnel involved in managing space acquisition programs, such as by
tracking the numbers of officers (and civilians) who are attaining
senior levels and establishing standardized training and education
requirements specific to space acquisition. As the Air Force determines
its priorities, we continue to believe that at a minimum, having a
space-specific specialty would give it the visibility that it currently
lacks over this important segment of its workforce.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to improve training by
providing greater acquisition-specific content in the curricula of the
Air Force's NSSI. Although DOD concurred that more space acquisition
training is needed, it noted that NSSI is only one forum for such
training. However, we note that NSSI is, according to its own mission
statement, the DOD center of excellence for space education throughout
the national security space community and that its acquisition content
is limited. While we acknowledge that there are other venues for
training in space acquisition, including DAU, we focused on NSSI
because of its role as DOD's single focal point for space education and
training.
Lastly, DOD concurred with our recommendation to improve training by
bolstering space-specific content in DAU's curricula. In its comments,
DOD listed some of the ways in which DAU has expanded its support of
the space acquisition community. We acknowledge these efforts and noted
in our report that DAU has already developed a CLM related to the space
acquisition process. However, we continue to believe that additional
space-specific content is needed in DAU's curricula in order to
increase the pool of personnel who are qualified to fill space
acquisition positions. Adding such space-specific content would allow
more acquisition officers to receive a baseline level of training in
space acquisition through DAU. This baseline level of training would
help ensure that acquisition officers do not arrive in space
acquisition assignments with little or no knowledge of space-specific
acquisitions, such as is currently often the case at the SMC. In this
way, the recommendation is also intended to maximize Air Force
flexibility in assigning its acquisition officers to space acquisition
positions, the importance of which was noted by DOD in its response to
our second recommendation.
NRO provided us comments regarding specific issues discussed in the
report. Regarding our observation that the percentage of acquisition
personnel certified at the highest level at SMC dropped between 1996
and 2005, NRO stated that its hiring policies may currently exacerbate
the problems at SMC. We agree. We also agree with NRO, and have stated
in our report, that a variety of factors have contributed to SMC's
shortage of qualified space acquisition personnel with a technical
education. In an atmosphere of overall shortage, however, SMC's lower
staffing priority means that other organizations therefore have a
higher level of access to a comparatively senior workforce, whose
members are, as NRO stated, able to work on complex systems, hold high
clearances, and work in a multiagency environment with significant
levels of autonomy. Moreover, we acknowledge, and stated in our report,
that there is no consensus on a space acquisition career field within
DOD. However, as we have mentioned earlier, we continue to believe that
a space acquisition specialty within the existing acquisition manager
career field could both strengthen career path management and ensure
that those who manage space programs have strong technical backgrounds
by addressing standardized training and education requirements specific
to space acquisition. In addition, we also agree with NRO and noted in
our report that there are a variety of factors that have contributed to
Air Force-wide acquisition workforce shortages, such as 1990s workforce
management decisions.
DOD and NRO comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II and
appendix III, respectively. DOD and NRO did not provide technical
comments on this report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the DOD Executive Agent for
Space; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commanding
General, U.S. Air Force Space Command; and the Director, National
Reconnaissance Office. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Air Force has addressed strategies
for critical skill sets, training, recruiting, promotion, and career
path development for the space acquisition workforce, we reviewed human
capital strategies pertaining to the Department of Defense (DOD)
acquisition workforce and the Air Force space cadre. We compared the
DOD and Air Force documents to the strategic human capital planning
model that is generally accepted by the National Academy for Public
Administration, the Office of Personnel Management, and other leading
public and private sector organizations. We analyzed the documents to
ascertain whether they addressed each of the elements of a
comprehensive workforce planning strategy as well as whether they
addressed the five career stages listed above. We also discussed
workforce strategic planning with cognizant officials in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense; the National Security Space Office; U.S. Air
Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; the Air Force
Manpower Agency, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; the Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Arlington, Virginia; the
Directorate of Space Acquisition, Arlington, Virginia; and the Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower and
Personnel, Arlington, Virginia. We noted the actions that DOD and the
Air Force had taken to manage the Air Force's workforce using a
strategic workforce management approach, but we did not evaluate the
sufficiency of the actions they took. To gather information on Army and
Navy strategies and plans, we interviewed officials at the Army Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Arlington,
Virginia; U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Arlington,
Virginia; and the Office of the Navy Space Cadre Advisor, Arlington,
Virginia.
To determine the extent to which the Air Force has addressed how
sufficient numbers of space acquisition personnel are provided to meet
DOD's current and projected national security space needs, we collected
and compared recent data on acquisition positions and personnel from
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
and from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for
Manpower and Personnel, Arlington, Virginia, as well as from Air Force
Headquarters. We also received overall workforce figures from the
National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, that were current
as of March 2006. We limited our analysis to technical acquisition
personnel who are included in the Air Force's credentialed space
professional program, which corresponded to Air Force Specialty Codes
61S (scientist), 62E (engineer), and 63A (acquisition manager). We
excluded Air Force Specialty Codes 64P (contracting) and 65F (financial
management) from our scope since these acquisition codes are not
currently included as Air Force credentialed space professionals. We
also excluded civilians and enlisted personnel from our scope, since
the Air Force has not completed its identification of civilian and
enlisted space professionals, as well as contractors, since contractors
are not currently included as Air Force credentialed space
professionals. We also interviewed officials at the Air Force Personnel
Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; U.S. Air Force Space Command,
Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; Space and Missile Systems Center,
Los Angeles Air Force Base, California; the Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition, Arlington, Virginia; and the Office of
Security and Special Programs Oversight, Arlington, Virginia.
To determine the extent to which the Air Force has addressed whether
space acquisition personnel are adequately qualified for their
positions, we collected and analyzed data on space acquisition
positions and personnel from U.S. Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air
Force Base, Colorado, and the Space and Missile Systems Center, Los
Angeles Air Force Base, California, and conducted discussion groups
about topics including education and prior experience with junior and
midgrade officers at Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air
Force Base, California. We reviewed National Science Foundation data as
of May 2006 and Air Force Personnel Center data as of March 2006 in
order to determine the extent to which new Air Force acquisition
managers hold technical degrees and the extent to which the numbers
represent a national trend. We also interviewed officials at Air Force
Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; the Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Arlington, Virginia; and
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower
and Personnel, Arlington, Virginia. The Space and Missile Systems
Center database is current as of February 2006, and the space
professional database is current as of March 2006. We used the Space
and Missile Systems Center database and the space professional
database, obtained from Air Force Space Command, to analyze the
certification and experience levels of acquisition officers at the
Space and Missile Systems Center and Air Force-wide. We did this by
examining their degree and certification levels, as well as duty
histories, and comparing them with the certification requirements of
the Air Force's Acquisition Professional Development Program and Space
Professional Development Program. To assess comparative certification
and experience levels between unclassified and classified space
acquisition personnel, we used the Space and Missile Systems Center
database and the space professional database and compared the results.
We also used these two databases to analyze the prior experience and
education of acquisition managers working on unclassified space systems
and acquisition managers working on classified space systems. We
examined acquisition officers' degree and certification levels, as well
as duty histories, and compared them with the certification
requirements of the Air Force's acquisition professional development
program and space professional development program. To capture the
acquisition officers working on unclassified space systems, we used all
Space and Missile Systems Center acquisition officers except for those
acquisition officers working in the Space Superiority system program
office, which is a classified space system. Although we did not have
detailed personnel data from the National Reconnaissance Office, we
were able to search the space professional database for certain key
elements that were known to indicate classified space positions; and we
used the acquisition officers thus identified to represent the
classified space acquisition workforce. These key elements included
whether the acquisition officer worked at the Space and Missile Systems
Center's Space Superiority system program office; was in a space
position that required a very high-level security clearance; or was in
a space position with an experience code that indicated work at certain
classified space locations, including the National Reconnaissance
Office. In the interest of issuing an unclassified product, we did not
attempt to identify whether specific individuals worked at the National
Reconnaissance Office or another intelligence agency. We also reviewed
applicable National Reconnaissance Office directives and interviewed
officials from the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia;
the Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base,
California; and Air Force Headquarters. In addition, we used the Space
and Missile Systems Center database and the space professional database
to analyze records of officers who either work in the Space Superiority
system program office or have had intelligence-related assignments in
the past. We assessed the reliability of Air Force Space Command's
space professional database and the Space and Missile Systems Center
database by (1) reviewing existing information about the data and the
system that provided them, (2) interviewing Air Force and contractor
officials knowledgeable about the data, and (3) comparing information
in the databases. We determined that the data in these databases were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also assessed
the reliability of the data provided by the Air Force Personnel Center
and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report. To determine the extent to which acquisition
is reflected in space training, we reviewed and discussed the curricula
of the National Security Space Institute's Space 200 and 300 courses;
to determine the extent to which space is reflected in acquisition
training, we reviewed the Defense Acquisition University's catalog. We
also interviewed officials from both organizations, including Defense
Acquisition University consultants to the National Security Space
Institute and the Space and Missile Systems Center.
Part of our analysis regarding the quantity and quality of the space
acquisition workforce was limited because of the lack of data from the
National Reconnaissance Office. As noted above, the National
Reconnaissance Office did provide us the overall number of Air Force
personnel assigned to that agency, but it did not provide us
information on the education, experience, or expertise of its space
acquisition personnel. As a result, we could not directly compare the
education, experience, or expertise of the space acquisition workforce
at the Space and Missile Systems Center and the National Reconnaissance
Office, and we could not compare the workforces at these two locations
collectively to the Air Force acquisition workforce overall. In this
regard, we were only able to compare the Space and Missile Systems
Center personnel to the Air Force acquisition workforce overall.
We performed our work from October 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Department Of Defense:
Defense Acquisition University:
Office Of The President:
9820 Belvoir Road:
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5565:
August 31, 2006:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441G. Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Defense Space Activities: "Management Actions Are Needed to
Better Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel," dated
July 28, 2006, (GAO Code 350741/GAO-06-908):
The Department partially concurs or concurs with the recommendations as
outlined in the enclosed. The Department appreciates the opportunity to
comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Frank J. A erson, Jr.
President:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated July 28, 2006 GAO Code 350741/GAO-06-908:
"Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to Better
Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to direct that an integrated,
zero-based needs assessment of space acquisition personnel be performed
and then incorporated into the Air Force's force reduction planning and
process improvement efforts in order to ensure that the resulting force
structure is optimally balanced among workforce segments - that is,
military, civilian, contractor, those who work on classified and
unclassified programs, and Federally Funded Research and Development
Center support personnel-and functional areas, such as classified and
unclassified space systems. (p, 48/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Partially concur. A needs assessment of space acquisition
personnel is important, but it must be integrated as part of the
Component's force planning and process improvement initiatives, These
efforts must be balanced with the component's total workforce
requirements,
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to institutionalize and manage a
space-specific specialty within the Air Force's acquisition manage
career field in order to ensure that all incumbents in the space
acquisition workforce, including personnel at Space and Missile Systems
Center and National Reconnaissance Office, have strong technical
backgrounds and to better manage the career paths and retention of
technical personnel in accordance with strategic workforce management
principles. (p, 48/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Air Force Space Professional
Development Program has identified and continues to track Air Force
scientists, engineers, and program managers who have space-unique
experience. This process enables effective career management and
placement of acquisition officers with space experience but still
affords the flexibility to use these . individuals in other acquisition
positions as, Air Force requirements dictate. The Air Force continues
to evaluate the merits of establishing a separate space-specific
acquisition career specialty. Recently, the Air Force and the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) signed a Statement of Intent to establish
the Space Assignment Advisory Board which will oversee assignments of
all Air Force Credentialed Space Professionals. This will enable
development of a larger pool of space leaders with operations and
acquisition experience.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to improve training by providing
greater acquisition-specific content in the Air Force's National
Security Space Institute's curricula in order to broaden the pool of
personnel who are qualified to fill space acquisition positions. (p.
48/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Partially concur. The DoD and Air Force concur that more
space acquisition training is needed, and the NSSI is one forum.
Acquisition is one of many key elements covered by NSSI courses,
especially through their flagships courses, Space 200 and Space 300.
Other venues for additional space acquisition training include the SMC
Acquisition School (SAS) and the Defense Acquisition University. There
are several ongoing initiatives between DAU, Air Force Space Command,
NRO, and NASA that will expand and leverage available training.
Additionally, the Air Force is currently beta testing critical software
acquisition skills training that will soon be deployed and available
for the Space community.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to improve training by bolstering space-specific content in
the Defense Acquisition University's curricula in order to broaden the
pool of personnel who are qualified to fill space acquisition positions
(p. 48/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur. DAU has already expanded its support of the Space
acquisition community, including support for the Air Force. DAU has
established a major campus in San Diego adjacent to the Navy SPAWARS
center. DAU has also expanded the teaching staff collocated with AF
Space and Missile Center (Los Angeles). Additionally, they recently
established an on-site presence at the National Security Space
Institute (NSSI), Air Force Space Command (Colorado Springs). DAU
partnered with the Air Force and developed a Continuous Learning Module
(CLM) that provides a comprehensive overview of National Security Space
Directive 03-01. This CLM highlights both similarities and differences
between Space and non-Space major system acquisitions and went online
in March 2006. The course has been well received by the Space
community, and approximately 250 individuals have completed the course.
This CLM is now tightly integrated as a pre-requisite for NSSI and SMC
curriculum, DAU is leveraging other core courses to create a stronger
Space focus, Together, these learning assets will serve to strengthen
linkage between the operational space and acquisition development
communities. Ultimately this will foster improved acquisition outcomes.
In addition, DAU and the Air Force are working together to further
develop leadership training assets that will also be available for the
Space community.
[End of section]
Appendix III Comments from the National Reconnaissance Office:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Office of the Deputy Director:
National Reconnaissance Office:
14675 Lee Road:
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715:
September 6, 2006:
Ms. Lorelei St. James:
Assistant Director:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. James:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report Defense
Space Activities: Management Actions are Needed to Better Identify,
Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel (GAO-06-908).
The report highlights a number of national level problems associated
with the nation's space programs, notably the long-term decline in the
education and training of scientists and engineers, and the
government's struggle to attract and retain these individuals. As you
are aware, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) does not have an
indigenous workforce. We rely on the Services and other agencies to
provide the properly educated, trained, and experienced personnel
necessary to perform our mission. While we are in favor of actions that
will continue to enhance the caliber of the Department of Defense (DOD)
acquisition workforce, it is inappropriate for us to concur with your
recommendations since these recommendations fall within the purview of
the Air Force. The report does, however, present a few points on which
I would like to comment.
a. "At SMC, the percentage of space acquisition officers with the
highest acquisition certification level dropped from 29 percent in 1996
to 15 percent in 2005. Reasons for the lower certification levels
include NRO priority in selecting personnel, the lack of a space
acquisition specialty, limited training, and the decline of personnel
coming into the Air Force with technical degrees." [Page 0 and a theme
repeated throughout the report]
Response: The NRO's hiring policies have been in place for over 40
years. During that time, Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) was
able to fill its authorization of scientists, engineers, and program
managers, according to your report.
While the NRO's hiring policies may currently exacerbate the problems
at SMC, the policies are not the causal agent. Like most organizations,
the NRO seeks to hire the best qualified, most experienced people to
execute our mission. This hiring philosophy is driven by the combined
complexity of our systems, the clearance requirements, and the level of
maturity necessary to work in a multiagency environment where our
personnel exercise significant levels of autonomy. The shortage of
appropriately qualified individuals at the right levels is a result of
workforce management decisions made in the 1990s, prioritization plans
that put engineers in non-engineering jobs, and a decline in the number
of graduates with engineering and science degrees.
It would appear that the prima facie cause of the increase in Level 1
certified individuals at SMC would be the manning of lieutenants at 300
percent of authorization. If you increase the number of Level 1
certified individuals and keep Level 2 certifications constant, it
follows that there must be a corresponding decrease in Level 3
certified individuals. The lack of a space acquisition specialty is
unlikely to be the culprit; and there is no consensus across the DoD
that a space acquisition specialty is required or even a good idea. The
current problem is there are not enough qualified people to meet all
requirements. This is true across the acquisition career field, not
just in space-related duties. Additionally, many Air Force acquisition
professionals will earn de facto space specialties by virtue of the
education and assignment actions taken during their careers. Depth of
experience in space acquisition is essential; however, the Air Force
also has a requirement for acquisition professionals with breadth.
b. "Part of our analysis regarding the quantity and quality of the
space acquisition workforce was limited due to the lack of NRO data.
NRO did provide us the overall number of Air Force personnel assigned
to NRO, but it did not provide us information on the education,
experience, or expertise of NRO personnel." [Page 8]
Response: As written, the report paints the NRO as being uncooperative.
The NRO made every attempt to address the Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) request for information; however, there were information
requests, notably those identified above, where the NRO advised the GAO
that the Air Force Personnel Center was the appropriate agency from
which to request information concerning Air Force personnel.
Over the past few years there has been a great deal of effort,
including the agreements outlined in the recently released Statement of
Intent, to better manage the flow of space professionals between the
Air Force and the NRO. We have integrated our command selection
processes with Air Force Space Command's (AFSPC) processes. The NRO
sends representatives to the Air Force's developmental teams, provides
instructors to the National Security Space Institute, and works closely
with AFSPC to chart education and training requirements. Continued
efforts along this path will lead to even greater collaboration and
sharing between the Air Force and the NRO --strengthening our
partnership and enhancing the nation's space community.
If you have any further questions, please contact Eric Feldman, NRO
Inspector General, on 310-416-7405 or Lanie D'Alessandro, NRO Deputy
Inspector General, on 703-808-1810.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John T. Sheridan, Maj Gen, USAF:
The following is GAO's comment on NRO's letter dated September 6, 2006.
GAO Comment:
1. NRO also commented upon GAO's requests for information related to
NRO's space acquisition personnel. The NRO did provide us with the
overall number of Air Force personnel assigned to NRO, but in its
letter providing this information, NRO noted that it could not
disaggregate the personnel information without revealing intelligence
community information. We submitted a second request for information to
the Air Force Personnel Center, but this request was ultimately
forwarded to NRO, on the grounds that only NRO could provide the data,
where it was declined for similar reasons. In our report, we noted that
we did not have detailed information about NRO's space acquisition
workforce, as we did for SMC's space acquisition workforce, since this
affected our ability to report on the entire space acquisition
workforce.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant
Director; Gabrielle A. Carrington; Barbara Hills; Linda S. Keefer; Ron
La Due Lake; Julie Matta; Sally L. Newman; Jerome Sandau; and Cheryl
Weissman made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Department of Defense, Space Commission, Report of the Commission
to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 2001).
[2] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "National Security Space
Management and Organization," October 18, 2001.
[3] DOD Directive 5101.2, DOD Executive Agent for Space, June 3, 2003.
Executive agent is a term used to indicate a delegation of authority by
the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the Secretary's
behalf. According to a DOD directive issued in September 2002, the
nature and scope of an executive agent's responsibilities, functions,
and authorities shall be prescribed at the time of assignment and
remain in effect until revoked or superseded. See Section 3.1, DOD
Directive 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent, September 3, 2002.
[4] 10 U.S.C. § 8084.
[5] In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,
Congress required that we submit two reports assessing DOD's space
human capital strategy and the efforts by the military departments to
develop their space personnel.
[6] GAO, Defense Space Activities: Additional Actions Needed to
Implement Human Capital Strategy and Develop Space Personnel, GAO-04-
697 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2004).
[7] GAO, Defense Space Activities: Management Guidance and Performance
Measures Needed to Develop Personnel, GAO-05-833 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 21, 2005).
[8] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems
Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 6, 2006).
[9] GAO-06-626T.
[10] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2001), and High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2003).
[11] GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce
Plans Needed, GAO-04-753 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004).
[12] For NRO, the number of acquisition officers is only an
approximation because some who are coded as acquisition officers could
actually be performing non-space acquisition duties; conversely, some
who are not coded as acquisition officers could be performing space
acquisition duties. The amounts cited represent our best estimate in
the absence of more detailed information from NRO.
[13] See GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Planning, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002), and National Academy of Public
Administration, Building Successful Organizations: A Guide to Strategic
Workforce Planning (Washington, D.C.: May 2000).
[14] Examples of other workforce groups include personnel in specific
career fields, such as pilots or intelligence personnel, and a
designated grouping of several career fields, such as the space cadre,
which comprises personnel from several Air Force career fields.
[15] We define midgrade officers as those officers who have served 9 to
15 years of an average 20-year career, which can encompass the ranks of
captain and major. We define senior officers as those who have served
16 or more years of an average 20-year career, which can encompass the
ranks of lieutenant colonel and above.
[16] We also wanted to determine if the shortages were caused by
engineers being assigned to other career fields. However, we found that
the Air Force is predominantly using the engineers it has to fill
general acquisition-related positions. Specifically, we found that from
1994 to 2005, the Air Force placed approximately 84 percent of its
engineers in acquisition-related positions. In addition, we note that
Title 10 requires that there be a balance between the need for military
personnel to serve in career broadening positions and the need for them
to serve in positions for a sufficient length of time. 10 U.S.C. § 1722
(f)(2).
[17] 10 U.S.C. § 8084.
[18] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board/Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of
National Security Space Programs (Washington, D.C.: May 2003).
[19] Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment, January 2006.
[20] We included degrees in the following categories, which include
fields required to enter the Air Force as a scientist or engineer:
physical sciences, mathematics and computer sciences, and engineering.
We excluded the social and life sciences from our analysis.
[21] In 2001, the positions of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and
the Director of NRO were merged, upon the recommendation of the Space
Commission. However, in July 2005, the Secretary of Defense split the
positions once again, appointing a person to serve exclusively as the
Director of NRO.
[22] For NRO, the authorized percentage of acquisition officers is only
an approximation because some who are coded as acquisition officers
could actually be performing non-space acquisition duties; conversely,
some who are not coded as acquisition officers could be performing
space acquisition duties. The authorized percentage cited represents
our best estimate in the absence of more detailed information from NRO.
[23] The Navy and the Army also have space officers who perform
acquisition work, but Army and Navy space programs are relatively small
as a percentage of the overall DOD space program.
[24] In 1990, Congress passed DAWIA in order to enhance the quality and
professionalism of the defense acquisition workforce (Pub. L. No. 101-
510). Most of DAWIA was codified in Title 10 of the United States Code,
and it has been amended a few times since enactment. DAWIA specifies
the minimum qualification standards of those personnel performing
functions integral to the acquisition process, formalizes career paths
for personnel who wish to pursue careers in acquisition, and defines
critical or senior management acquisition positions.
[25] DAU was established in 1992, in accordance with DAWIA, in order to
provide for the professional education, development, and training of
the acquisition workforce.
[26] The courses known as Space 200 and Space 300 are offered by Air
Force Space Command's National Security Space Institute, which was
established in order to institute stronger, technically oriented space
education and training programs. Space 100 is offered by the Air
Education and Training Command.
[27] The series consists of three courses, which are designed to be
completed in approximately the 1st, 9th, and 15th year of service,
respectively. The latter two courses are managed by NSSI, and are meant
eventually to be given to all space cadre members at the appropriate
point in their careers.
[28] Authorization refers to the number of positions that the Air Force
has determined it will fund in a given fiscal year. Assignment refers
to the number of personnel that the Air Force has placed in those
funded positions.
[29] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems
Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 6, 2006).
[30] H.R. Rep. No. 109-452, at 350 (2006).
[31] Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Human
Capital: Report on the DOD Acquisition Workforce Count, D-2006-073
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2006).
[32] 10 U.S.C. § 8084.
[33] Percentages were determined by dividing the total for each level
by the overall total for that year.
[34] NRO declined to provide us a detailed breakout of all of its
personnel. Therefore, we could not directly compare SMC personnel
working on unclassified space programs to NRO personnel working on
classified space programs. Using Air Force personnel data, we were able
to identify and compare SMC personnel in unclassified programs to some
personnel working on classified space programs at other organizations,
including NRO.
[35] Officer Classification, Air Force Manual 36-2105, October 31,
2004, Attachment 43.
[36] Manpower positions are prioritized into three categories: Must
Fill, Priority Fill, and Entitlement Fill. The fill rate for the must
fill category is 100 percent. The manning percentage for priority fill
is normally 85 percent. The entitlement fill rate is a function of the
remaining available resources once the must fill and priority fill rate
positions are appropriately filled.
[37] 10 U.S.C. § 8084.
[38] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive
Problems Affecting Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO-05-570R
(Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2005).
[39] According to Air Force Instruction 36-2101, p.6, an Air Force
Specialty Code (AFSC) is the basic grouping of positions requiring
similar skills and qualifications. An AFSC is further grouped into
career field ladders, career field subdivisions, and career fields to
provide for career development in different aspects of a career field.
An AFSC may be subdivided by alphabetical "shredouts" to identify
specialization in a specific type of equipment or function. See also
Air Force Manual 36-2105, p. 5.
[40] 10 U.S.C. § 8084.
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