Force Structure
Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans Gao ID: GAO-06-745 September 6, 2006The Army considers its modular force transformation its most extensive restructuring since World War II. Restructuring units from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force will require an investment of over $52 billion, including $41 billion for equipment, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011, according to the Army. Because of broad congressional interest in this initiative, GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority and assessed (1) the Army's progress and plans for equipping modular combat brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for assessing the results of its modular conversions and the need for further changes to designs or implementation plans.
The Army is making progress in creatingactive and National Guard modular combat brigades while fully engaged in ongoing operations, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for active brigades and has not completed development of an equipping strategy for its new force rotation model. This raises uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades will be equipped both in the near and longer term as well as the ultimate equipping cost. The Army plans to employ a force rotation model in which units nearing deployment would receive required levels of equipment while nondeploying units would be maintained at lower readiness levels. However, because the Army has not completed key details of the equipping strategy--such as defining the specific equipping requirements for units in various phases of its force rotation model--it is unclear what level of equipment units will have, how this strategy may affect the Army's equipment funding plans, and how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to respond to unforeseen crises. While the Army has several initiatives under way to meet its modular force personnel requirements in the active component, it faces challenges in achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army plans to increase its active combat force but doing so without permanently increasing its overall active end strength will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions in its noncombat force. The Army has made some progress in reducing military personnel in noncombat positions by converting some to civilian positions and pursuing other initiatives, but Army officials believe future initiatives may be difficult to achieve and could lead to difficult trade-offs. Without information on the progress of these initiatives and what risks exist if the Army's goals are not met, Congress and the Secretary of Defense lack the information they need to understand challenges and risks. Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent approach to measure progress against its modularity objectives, assess the need for further changes to modular designs, and monitor implementation plans. While GAO and DOD have identified the importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into measurable metrics that in turn provide accountability for results, the Army has not established outcome-related metrics linked to most of its modularity objectives. Further, although the Army is analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and training events, the Army does not have a long-term comprehensive plan for further analysis and testing of its modular combat brigade designs and fielded capabilities. Without performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full visibility into how the modular force is currently organized, staffed, and equipped. As a result, decision makers lack sufficient information to assess the capabilities, cost, and risks of the Army's modular force implementation plans.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-745, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Force Structure:
Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding
Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans:
Force Structure:
GAO-06-745:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-745, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army considers its modular force transformation its most extensive
restructuring since World War II. Restructuring units from a division-
based force to a modular brigade-based force will require an investment
of over $52 billion, including $41 billion for equipment, from fiscal
year 2005 through fiscal year 2011, according to the Army.
Because of broad congressional interest in this initiative, GAO
prepared this report under the Comptroller General‘s authority and
assessed (1) the Army‘s progress and plans for equipping modular combat
brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel
requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army
has developed an approach for assessing the results of its modular
conversions and the need for further changes to designs or
implementation plans.
What GAO Found:
The Army is making progress in creating active and National Guard
modular combat brigades while fully engaged in ongoing operations, but
it is not meeting its equipping goals for active brigades and has not
completed development of an equipping strategy for its new force
rotation model. This raises uncertainty about the levels to which the
modular brigades will be equipped both in the near and longer term as
well as the ultimate equipping cost. The Army plans to employ a force
rotation model in which units nearing deployment would receive required
levels of equipment while nondeploying units would be maintained at
lower readiness levels. However, because the Army has not completed key
details of the equipping strategy”such as defining the specific
equipping requirements for units in various phases of its force
rotation model”it is unclear what level of equipment units will have,
how this strategy may affect the Army‘s equipment funding plans, and
how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to respond
to unforeseen crises.
While the Army has several initiatives under way to meet its modular
force personnel requirements in the active component, it faces
challenges in achieving its modular restructuring without permanently
increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, as
specified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army plans to
increase its active combat force but doing so without permanently
increasing its overall active end strength will require the Army to
eliminate or realign many positions in its noncombat force. The Army
has made some progress in reducing military personnel in noncombat
positions by converting some to civilian positions and pursuing other
initiatives, but Army officials believe future initiatives may be
difficult to achieve and could lead to difficult trade-offs. Without
information on the progress of these initiatives and what risks exist
if the Army‘s goals are not met, Congress and the Secretary of Defense
lack the information they need to understand challenges and risks.
Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent
approach to measure progress against its modularity objectives, assess
the need for further changes to modular designs, and monitor
implementation plans. While GAO and DOD have identified the importance
of establishing objectives that can be translated into measurable
metrics that in turn provide accountability for results, the Army has
not established outcome-related metrics linked to most of its
modularity objectives. Further, although the Army is analyzing lessons
learned from Iraq and training events, the Army does not have a long-
term comprehensive plan for further analysis and testing of its modular
combat brigade designs and fielded capabilities. Without performance
metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the Secretary of
Defense nor Congress will have full visibility into how the modular
force is currently organized, staffed, and equipped. As a result,
decision makers lack sufficient information to assess the capabilities,
cost, and risks of the Army‘s modular force implementation plans.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Army develop and submit to Congress information
about its modular force equipping strategy, personnel initiatives, and
plans for assessing implementation progress. DOD generally agreed with
three recommendations but disagreed to develop and provide to Congress
risk assessments and evaluation plans. GAO added a matter for
congressional consideration because it believes these actions are
needed to improve accountability and transparency.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-745].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade Conversions, but
Its Ability to Meet Near-and Long-Term Equipping Goals Is Unclear:
Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel
Requirements for Its New Modular Force Structure:
Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity, but Lacks a
Long-Term Comprehensive Approach to Assess Progress and Monitor
Implementation:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Actions:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Planned Numbers of Modular Combat Brigades in the Active
Component and National Guard as of March 2006:
Table 2: Army Schedule for Creating Active Component and National Guard
Modular Combat Brigades as of March 2006:
Table 3: Modular Force Cost Estimates for the Entire Army by Function:
Table 4: Army's End-strength Authorization History and Modular Force
Goal:
Figures:
Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Combat Brigades:
Figure 2: Army's Force Rotation Model:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 6, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure
itself from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force--an
undertaking it considers the most extensive reorganization of its force
since World War II. This initiative, according to Army estimates, will
require a significant investment exceeding $52 billion through fiscal
year 2011, at a time when the Army is fully engaged in a high pace of
operations and is facing many other demands for funding such as the
Future Combat System program, now expected to cost over $160
billion.[Footnote 1] The foundation of the modular force is the
creation of standardized modular combat brigades in both the active
component and National Guard. The new modular brigades are designed to
be stand-alone, self-sufficient units that are more rapidly deployable
and better able to conduct joint and expeditionary operations than
their larger division-based predecessors. The Army plans to achieve its
modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active
component end strength above 482,400, in accordance with a Department
of Defense (DOD) decision reached during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). It plans to achieve this primarily by eliminating some
noncombat positions in which military personnel currently serve, and
transferring these positions to its operational combat forces.[Footnote
2] The February 2006 QDR also specified that the Army would create 70
modular combat brigades in its active component and National Guard.
This represents a 7-brigade reduction from the Army's original plan of
having 77 modular combat brigades. However, according to Army
officials, resources from the 7 brigades that were part of the original
plan will be used to increase support units in the reserve component,
and DOD officials believe that 70 brigades will be sufficient to
execute the defense strategy.
Because of the cost and magnitude of the Army's transformation plans,
and broad congressional interest, we have initiated a body of work on
both the force structure and cost implications of the Army's
transformation to a modular force under the Comptroller General's
statutory authority. We presented our preliminary observations on the
Army's plan in a March 2005 hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical
Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services.[Footnote 3] In
our September 2005 report on the cost of the modular force conversion,
we reported that the Army's $48 billion total modular force conversion
cost estimate was evolving and included uncertainties that may drive
costs higher. We recommended that the Army clarify its definition of
modular force costs including equipment costs, which constituted $41
billion of the $48 billion estimate.[Footnote 4] In our April 2006
testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
House Committee on Armed Services, we observed that the Army's cost
estimate through fiscal year 2011 had increased from the earlier $48
billion estimate to $52.5 billion, and that the Army faces significant
challenges in executing its modularity plans to fully achieve planned
capabilities within this current estimate and the time frames it has
established for the modular conversion.[Footnote 5] This report focuses
on the Army's plans for implementing the modular force initiatives,
with an emphasis on active combat brigades, since the Army has already
begun to restructure its active divisions to the new brigade-based
designs.
We are sending this report to you because of your oversight
responsibilities on defense matters. Specifically for this report we
assessed (1) the Army's progress and plans for equipping modular combat
brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel
requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army
has developed an approach for assessing the results of the modular
conversions and for further adjusting designs or implementation plans.
To assess the Army's progress and plans for equipping active component
modular combat brigades, we analyzed Department of Army data on
selected equipment that the Army identified as essential for achieving
the modular combat brigades' intended capabilities. For these selected
items, we analyzed the Army's active component equipment requirements
obtained from the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Training for each of the three brigade
variants--heavy, light, and Stryker. We compared the equipment
requirements of the brigades to data we obtained from officials from
the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-8[Footnote 6] on the
levels of equipment expected to be on hand in 2007 and discussed plans
for meeting key equipment requirements with these officials. We also
reviewed unit readiness reports from those brigades that had completed
or were in the process of completing their modular conversion as of
February 2006. In addition, we visited the first three Army divisions
undergoing modular conversions to obtain information on the plans for
organizing, staffing, and equipping the modular brigades. To assess
progress made and challenges to managing personnel requirements of the
modular force, we reviewed documents and discussed the implications of
force structure requirements with officials from the Department of Army
Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, and
Operations and Training, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. We also reviewed the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report. Finally, to assess the extent
to which the Army has developed an approach for assessing the results
of the modular conversions and for further adjusting designs or
implementation plans, we examined key Army planning documents and
discussed objectives, performance metrics, and testing plans with
officials in the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Training, and the Training and Doctrine
Command. Also, we met with a panel of retired senior Army general
officers at the Association of the U.S. Army Institute of Land Warfare.
In addition, we relied on our past reports assessing organizations
undertaking significant reorganizations. We conducted our work from
September 2004 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards and determined that the data used were
sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and methodology
used in our review are described in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
While the Army is well under way in creating active component modular
combat brigades, it is not meeting its equipping goals for these
brigades and has not yet completed its equipping strategy, which raises
considerable uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades
will be equipped both in the near and longer term and the ultimate
equipment cost. The Army established equipping goals in its Campaign
Plan in which converting units are expected to receive most of the
major equipment items required by the new modular design within
specified time frames. However, although the Army is procuring billions
of dollars of new equipment required by its new modular design, units
undergoing their modular conversions are not meeting these equipping
goals due to several factors, including the challenges of undertaking
such an extensive restructuring while managing equipment requirements
for ongoing operations. In addition, brigades will initially lack
planned quantities of items such as communications and surveillance
systems necessary to provide the enhanced intelligence, situational
awareness, and network capabilities that are essential for creating
smaller, more flexible and mobile combat brigades. Moreover, the Army
will likely face even greater challenges fully equipping 28 planned
National Guard modular combat brigades since National Guard units have
historically been underequipped and have transferred large quantities
of equipment to deploying units. To mitigate equipment shortages, the
Army is developing a force rotation model that will provide varying
levels of equipment to brigades depending on how close they are to
deployment. However, this strategy is not yet complete because key
details have not been decided, including the types and quantities of
equipment for brigades in each of the various phases of the model.
Until the Army completes the development of its equipping strategy, it
will not be possible to determine which units will be equipped, or how
this strategy may affect the Army's equipment funding plans. It is also
unclear how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to
respond to unforeseen crises.
While the Army has several initiatives under way to manage its modular
force personnel requirements, it faces significant challenges achieving
its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active
component end strength above 482,400, as specified by DOD's 2006 QDR
report. The Army plans to increase the size of its modular combat force
from 315,000 to 355,000, but doing so without permanently increasing
its active component end strength is an ambitious undertaking that will
require the Army to eliminate many positions in its noncombat force.
Effective strategic workforce planning includes the development of
strategies to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving goals.
However, the Army has not provided DOD or Congress with detailed
information on the status of its various personnel initiatives and
progress towards meeting its modular force personnel goals. We found
some of the Army's personnel realignment and reduction initiatives may
not meet the Army's initial goals or expectations. For example during
fiscal year 2005, the Army converted approximately 8,000 military
positions to civilian-staffed positions within the Army's noncombat
force. However, Army officials believe additional conversions to
achieve the 19,000 planned reductions in the noncombat force will be
significantly more challenging to achieve. Also, the Army expected that
the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure decisions would free up
approximately 2,000 to 3,000 positions in the noncombat force, but it
is revisiting this assumption based upon updated manpower levels at the
commands and installations approved for closure or consolidation. As a
result, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able to meet
its modular force requirements within its end-strength goal and what
risks exist if these goals are not met. Furthermore, without
information on the status and progress of these personnel initiatives,
the Secretary of Defense and Congress lack the visibility necessary to
assess the challenges and effectively address problems when they arise.
While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames for
modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent approach
to effectively measure progress against stated modularity objectives,
assess the need for further changes to its modular unit designs, and
monitor implementation plans. GAO and DOD have identified the
importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into
measurable metrics, which in turn provide accountability for results.
The Army has identified objectives and a timeline for modularity, but
metrics for assessing the Army's progress on modularity-specific,
quantifiable goals are extremely limited. Moreover, in 2004, the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted a wide-ranging
baseline analysis of the modular design using measures of combat
effectiveness against simulated threats; however, the Army does not
have a long-term plan to conduct a similar analysis so that it can
compare the performance of actual modular units with the TRADOC-
validated design. Army officials maintain that ongoing assessments such
as observations of training events provide sufficient validation that
the modularity concept works in practice. However, while these
assessments are useful, they do not provide a comprehensive evaluation
of the modular design as a whole. In November 2005, we reported that
methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating new doctrines and
concepts are important and established practices throughout the
military, and that particularly large and complex initiatives may
require long-term testing and evaluation guided by study
plans.[Footnote 7] Without performance metrics and a comprehensive
testing plan, neither the Army nor Congress will be able to assess the
capabilities of and risks associated with the modular force as it is
organized, staffed, and equipped.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to develop and provide Congress with detailed information
about the modular force equipping strategy, the status of its various
personnel initiatives, and plans for developing an approach for
measuring and assessing implementation progress. In commenting on a
draft of this report, DOD fully or partially agreed with our
recommendations to develop and provide information on its equipping
strategy and personnel initiatives and to develop expanded performance
metrics for assessing progress. However, DOD disagreed with our
recommendations to develop and provide assessments of the risk
associated with its equipping strategy and plans for staffing its
modular operational combat force. It also disagreed with our
recommendation to develop a testing plan for further assessing modular
unit designs. DOD stated that it is assessing equipment risk and is
continuing to evaluate all aspects of modular units' performance on a
continuous basis. However, while Army officials are managing risk in
allocating currently available equipment to Army units based on
scheduled overseas deployments, the Army had not yet completed its
equipping strategy for its new force rotation model at the time of our
review and therefore had not conducted and documented a formal risk
assessment of its equipping plans for implementing the new model. In
addition, although the Army is conducting further evaluation of its
modular forces through training exercises and modular unit deployments
to Iraq and Afghanistan, it has not developed a plan to further test
modular unit designs under a range of operational scenarios, such as
major offensive combat operations. Moreover, it is not clear how and to
what extent the Army is integrating lessons learned from training
exercises and deployments into periodic evaluations to assess the need
for further changes to the designs. Because of the significance, cost,
scope, and potential for risk associated with the Army's modularity
initiative along with the lack of transparency regarding these risks,
we continue to believe our recommendations that the Army develop and
provide Congress with additional plans and risk assessments are needed.
Therefore, to facilitate greater transparency and improve
accountability for results, we have included a matter for congressional
consideration that Congress require the Secretary of Defense to submit
more specific and complete information regarding the modular force
equipping strategy, the status of its various personnel initiatives,
risks associated with its plans, and efforts to measure and assess its
progress in implementing modularity.
DOD's comments are in appendix II and our evaluation of its comments is
on page 28.
Background:
The Army's conversion to a modular force encompasses the Army's total
force--active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve--and directly
affects not only the Army's combat units, but related command and
support organizations. A key to the Army's new modular force design is
embedding within combat brigades reconnaissance, logistics, and other
support units that previously made up parts of division-level and
higher-level command and support organizations, allowing the brigades
to operate independently. Restructuring these units is a major
undertaking because it requires more than just the movement of
personnel or equipment from one unit to another. The Army's new modular
units are designed, equipped, and staffed differently than the units
they replace; therefore, successful implementation of this initiative
will require changes such as new equipment and a different mix of
skills and occupational specialties among Army personnel. By 2011, the
Army plans to have reconfigured its total force--to include active and
reserve components and headquarters, combat, and support units--into
the modular design. The foundation of the modular force is the creation
of modular brigade combat teams--combat maneuver brigades that will
have a common organizational design and are intended to increase the
rotational pool of ready units. Modular combat brigades (depicted in
fig. 1) will have one of three standard designs--heavy brigade,
infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade.[Footnote 8]
Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Combat Brigades:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Army data; National War College; National War
College; and Army (images left to right).
[End of figure]
Until it revised its plans in early 2006, the Army had planned to have
a total of 77 active component and National Guard modular combat
brigades by expanding the Army's existing 33 combat brigades in the
active component into 43 modular combat brigades by 2007, and by
creating 34 modular combat brigades in the National Guard by 2010 from
existing brigades and divisions that have historically been equipped
well below requirements. To rebalance joint ground force capabilities,
the 2006 QDR determined the Army should have a total of 70 modular
combat brigades--42 active brigades and 28 National Guard brigades.
Table 1 shows the Army's planned numbers of heavy, infantry, and
Stryker combat brigades in the active component and National Guard.
Table 1: Planned Numbers of Modular Combat Brigades in the Active
Component and National Guard as of March 2006:
Modular combat brigades: Heavy;
Active component: 19;
National Guard: 6;
Total: 25.
Modular combat brigades: Infantry;
Active component: 17;
National Guard: 21;
Total: 38.
Modular combat brigades: Stryker;
Active component: 6;
National Guard: 1;
Total: 7.
Modular combat brigades: Total;
Active component: 42;
National Guard: 28;
Total: 70.
Source: U.S. Army.
[End of table]
At the time of this report, the Army was in the process of revising its
modular combat brigade schedule to convert its active component combat
brigades by fiscal year 2010 instead of 2007 as previously planned, and
convert National Guard combat brigades by fiscal year 2008 instead of
2010. Table 2 shows the Army's schedule that reflects these changes as
of March 2006.
Table 2: Army Schedule for Creating Active Component and National Guard
Modular Combat Brigades as of March 2006:
Active component combat brigades;
FY03: 2;
FY04: 11;
FY05: 8;
FY06: 14;
FY07: 3;
FY08: 2;
FY09: 1;
FY10: 1;
Total: 42.
National Guard combat brigades;
FY03: --;
FY04: --;
FY05: 7;
FY06: 7;
FY07: 7;
FY08: 7;
FY09: --;
FY10: --;
Total: 28.
Total;
FY03: 2;
FY04: 11;
FY05: 15;
FY06: 21;
FY07: 10;
FY08: 9;
FY09: 1;
FY10: 1;
Total: 70.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of table]
According to the Army, this larger pool of available combat units will
enable it to generate both active and reserve component forces in a
rotational manner. To do this, the Army is developing plans for a force
rotation model in which units will rotate through a structured
progression of increased unit readiness over time. Units will progress
through three phases of operational readiness cycles, culminating in
full mission readiness and availability to deploy. For example, the
Army plans for active service members to be at home for 2 years
following each deployment of up to 1 year.
The Army's objective is for the new modular combat brigades, which will
include about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel, to have at least the same
combat capability as a brigade under the current division-based force,
which range from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel. Since there will be more
combat brigades in the force, the Army believes its overall combat
capability will be increased as a result of the restructuring,
providing added value to combatant commanders. Although somewhat
smaller in size, the new modular combat brigades are expected to be as
capable as the Army's existing brigades because they will have
different equipment, such as advanced communications and surveillance
equipment, and a different mix of personnel and support assets. The
Army's organizational designs for the modular brigades have been tested
by its Training and Doctrine Command's Analysis Center against a
variety of scenarios, and the Army has found the new designs to be as
capable as the existing division-based brigades in modeling and
simulations.
The Army's cost estimate for modularity through fiscal year 2011 is
$52.5 billion as of April 2006. Of this $52.5 billion estimate, $41
billion, or 78 percent, is planned to be spent on equipment for active
and reserve units, with the remaining $11.5 billion allocated to
military construction, facilities, sustainment, and training (see table
3). In addition, Army leaders have recently stated they may seek
additional funds after 2011 to procure more equipment for modular
restructuring.
Table 3: Modular Force Cost Estimates for the Entire Army by Function:
Dollars in billions:
Equipping;
2005: $4.7;
2006: $5.8;
2007: $5.4;
2008: $5.9;
2009: $6.5;
2010: $6.7;
2011: $6.0;
Total: $41.0;
Percentage: 78.
Military construction/facilities;
2005: 0.3;
2006: 0.0;
2007: 0.5;
2008: 0.5;
2009: 1.5;
2010: 1.5;
2011: 1.5;
Total: 5.8;
Percentage: 11.
Sustainment and training;
2005: 0.0;
2006: 0.7;
2007: 0.7;
2008: 1.2;
2009: 1.1;
2010: 1.0;
2011: 1.0;
Total: 5.7;
Percentage: 11.
Total;
2005: $5.0;
2006: $6.5;
2007: $6.6;
2008: $7.6;
2009: $9.1;
2010: $9.2;
2011: $8.5;
Total: $52.5;
Percentage: 100.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of table]
Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade Conversions, but
Its Ability to Meet Near-and Long-Term Equipping Goals Is Unclear:
The Army has made progress in creating active component modular combat
brigades, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for these brigades
and has yet to complete the development of its rotational equipping
strategy, which raises concerns about the extent to which brigades will
be equipped in the near and longer term. Moreover, brigades will
initially lack planned levels of key equipment, including items that
provide enhanced intelligence, situational awareness, and network
capabilities needed to help the Army achieve its objective of creating
combat brigades that are able to operate on their own as part of a more
mobile, rapidly deployable, joint, expeditionary force. In addition,
because of existing equipment shortages, the Army National Guard will
likely face even greater challenges providing the same types of
equipment for its 28 planned modular combat brigades. To mitigate
equipment shortages, the Army has developed a strategy to provide
required levels of equipment to deploying active component and National
Guard units, while allocating lesser levels of remaining equipment to
other nondeploying units. However, the Army has not yet completed key
details of this strategy, including determining the levels of equipment
it needs to support this strategy, assessing the operational risk of
not fully equipping all units, or providing to Congress information
about these plans so it can assess the Army's current and long-term
equipment requirements and funding plans.
Army Faces Difficulty Meeting Its Goals for Equipping Active Modular
Combat Brigades:
The Army faces challenges meeting its equipping goals for its active
modular combat brigades both in the near and longer term. As of
February 2006, the Army had converted 19 modular combat brigades in the
active force.[Footnote 9] According to the Army Campaign Plan, which
established time frames and goals for the modular force conversions,
each of these units is expected to have on hand at least 90 percent of
its required major equipment items within 180 days after its new
equipment requirements become effective.[Footnote 10] We reviewed data
from several active brigades that had reached the effective date for
their new equipment requirements by February 2006, and found that all
of these brigades reported significant shortages of equipment 180 days
after the effective date of their new equipment requirements, falling
well below the equipment goals the Army established in its Campaign
Plan. Additionally, the Army is having difficulty providing equipment
to units undergoing their modular conversion in time for training prior
to operational deployments, and deploying units often do not receive
some of their equipment until after their arrival in theater. At the
time of our visits, officials from three Army divisions undergoing
modular conversion expressed concern over the lack of key equipment
needed for training prior to deployment.
The Army already faced equipment shortages before it began its modular
force transformation and is wearing out significant quantities of
equipment in Iraq, which could complicate plans for fully equipping new
modular units. By creating modular combat brigades with standardized
designs and equipment requirements, the Army believed that it could
utilize more of its total force, thereby increasing the pool of
available and ready forces to meet the demands of sustained rotations
and better respond to an expected state of continuous operations. Also,
by comparably equipping all of these units across the active component
and National Guard, the Army further believes it will be able to
discontinue its practice of allocating limited resources, including
equipment, based on a system of tiered readiness,[Footnote 11] which
resulted in lower priority units in both active and reserve components
having significantly lower levels of equipment and readiness than the
higher priority units. However, because of the need to establish a
larger pool of available forces to meet the current high pace of
operational commitments, the Army's modular combat brigade conversion
schedule is outpacing the planned acquisition or funding for some
equipment requirements. The Army has acknowledged that funding does not
match its modular conversion schedule and that some units will face
equipment shortages in the early years of transformation. According to
Army officials, the Army may continue to seek funding to better equip
its modular forces beyond 2011.
For example, according to Army officials, funds programmed for the
Army's tactical wheeled vehicle modernization strategy will not meet
all of its requirements for light, medium, and heavy tactical vehicles
and trucks through fiscal year 2011. In 2007, when 38 of 42 planned
active component brigades are expected to complete their modular
conversions, the Army expects to have only about 62 percent of the
heavy trucks it needs to meet its requirements for these
brigades.[Footnote 12] New higher requirements for trucks for the
modular brigades added to an existing shortage of trucks in the Army's
inventory. In addition, battle damage and losses along with higher-
than-normal wear and tear on Army vehicles from current operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan are contributing to this shortfall. While the Army
plans to eventually fill these shortages through a combination of new
procurement and modernization of its existing truck fleet, Army
officials told us that the higher requirement for trucks is currently
unaffordable within its near-term budget authority. Until the Army is
able to meet its modular combat brigade design requirement for trucks,
these brigades will not have their envisioned capability to conduct
their own logistical support operations if necessary without requiring
the augmentation of external combat and combat-service support forces.
Equipment Shortages Include Key Items the Army Identified as Essential
for Achieving Modular Force Capabilities:
Active modular combat brigades will initially lack required numbers of
some of the key equipment that Army force design analyses determined
essential for achieving their planned capabilities. Two primary
objectives underlying the Army's modular force designs and concepts are
to (1) create more combat forces within the Army's current end strength
that are as lethal as the division-based brigades they are replacing
and (2) organize, staff, and equip these units to be more responsive,
rapidly deployable, and better able to operate on their own compared to
division-based brigades. Army force designers identified a number of
key organizational, personnel, and equipment enablers they determined
must be present for the modular combat brigades to be as lethal as the
division-based brigades they are replacing. They include key battle
command systems that are intended to provide modular combat brigades
the latest command and control technology for improved situational
awareness; advanced digital communications systems to provide secure
high-speed communications links at the brigade level; and advanced
sensors to provide modular combat brigades with their own intelligence-
gathering, reconnaissance, and target-acquisition capabilities.
We reviewed equipping plans for several command and control,
communications, and reconnaissance systems to determine the Army's
timelines for providing active modular combat brigades some of the key
equipment they need to achieve their planned capabilities and function
as designed. According to Army officials responsible for managing the
distribution and fielding of equipment, the Army will not have all of
this equipment on hand to meet the new modular force design
requirements by 2007, when 38 of 42 active component modular combat
brigades are to complete their modular conversions. These shortfalls
are due to a range of reasons, but primarily because the modular
conversion schedule is outpacing the planned acquisition or funding.
For example,
* The Army does not expect to meet until at least 2012 its modular
combat brigade requirements for Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance
Systems, an advanced visual sensor that provides long-range
surveillance capability to detect, recognize, and identify distant
targets.
* The Army decided that it cannot meet design requirements within its
current budget for Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2),
a battle command component that provides real-time situational
awareness information through identification and tracking of friendly
forces to control battlefield maneuvers and operations. Moreover,
because it has been in full production for less than 2 years, FBCB2
production has not kept pace with the new higher modular force FBCB2
requirements. As a result, the Army plans to provide active heavy and
infantry brigades with less than half of their design requirement for
FBCB2 through at least 2007.
* The Army plans to meet only 85 percent of its requirements across the
force for Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, a command
and control network radio system that provides voice and data
communications capability in support of command and control operations,
due to a funding decision.
* The Army's design requirement for Shadow tactical unmanned aerial
vehicle systems was to have one system composed of seven air vehicles
per modular combat brigade, but because the Army lacks adequate numbers
of air vehicle operators and maintainers, it decided to field the
Shadow systems with four air vehicles instead.
* The Army's schedule for the acquisition of Joint Network Node--a key
communications system that provides secure high-speed computer network
connection for data transmission down to the battalion level--could be
delayed. According to Army officials, DOD recently decided to require
the Army to have Joint Network Node undergo developmental and
operational testing prior to further acquisition, which could delay
equipping modular combat brigades.
The systems discussed above are key to achieving the benefits Army
officials expect to achieve with a modular force. For example, the Army
decided to structure its new modular combat brigades with two maneuver
battalions each instead of three battalions each, even though Army
analysis showed that brigades with three maneuver battalions have
several advantages and the Army's former division-based brigades have
three battalions. The Army's decision to approve a brigade design with
two maneuver battalions was made largely because of affordability
concerns. However, the Army determined that brigades with two maneuver
battalions could be as effective in combat as its division-based
brigades provided they have the right mix of maneuver companies and
enablers such as the systems discussed above. Until the Army is able to
provide modular units with required quantities of these enablers, it is
not clear whether the new brigades are as capable as the division-based
brigades they are replacing.
National Guard Faces Significant Equipping Challenges:
In addition to the challenges the Army faces in providing active
component modular combat brigades the equipment necessary for meeting
expected capabilities, the Army will face greater challenges meeting
its equipping requirements for its 28 planned National Guard combat
brigades. The Army's modular force concept is intended to transform the
National Guard from a strategic standby force to a force that is to be
organized, staffed, and equipped comparable to active units for
involvement in the full range of overseas operations. As such, National
Guard combat units will enter into the Army's new force rotational
model in which, according to the Army's plans, Guard units would be
available for deployment 1 year out of 6 years. However, Guard units
have previously been equipped at less than wartime readiness levels
(often at 65 to 75 percent of requirements) under the assumption that
there would be sufficient time for Guard forces to obtain additional
equipment prior to deployment. Moreover, as of July 2005, the Army
National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment
from nondeploying units to support Guard units' deployments overseas.
As we noted in our 2005 report on National Guard equipment
readiness,[Footnote 13] National Guard Bureau officials estimated that
the Guard's nondeployed units had only about 34 percent of their
essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005 and had exhausted
inventories of 220 critical items. Although the Army says it will
invest $21 billion into equipping and modernizing the Guard through
2011, Guard units will start their modular conversions with less and
much older equipment than most active units. This will add to the
challenge the Army faces in achieving its plans and timelines for
equipping Guard units at comparable levels to active units and fully
meeting the equipping needs across both components. Moreover, the Army
National Guard believes that even after the Army's planned investment,
the Army National Guard will have to accept risk in certain equipment,
such as tactical wheeled vehicles, aircraft, and force protection
equipment.
To Mitigate Equipment Shortages, Army Plans to Rotate Equipment among
Units Based on Their Movement through Training, Readiness, and
Deployment Phases:
Because the Army realized that it would not have enough equipment in
the near term to simultaneously equip modular combat brigades at 100
percent of their requirements, the Army is developing a new equipping
strategy as part of its force rotation model; however, this strategy is
not yet completed because the Army has not finalized equipping
requirements for this new strategy or assessed the operational risk of
not fully equipping all units. Under the force rotation model, the Army
plans to provide increasing amounts of equipment to units as they move
through training phases and near readiness for potential deployment so
they would be ready to respond quickly if needed with fully equipped
forces. The Army believes that over time, equipping units in a
rotational manner will enable it to better allocate available equipment
and help manage risk associated with specific equipment shortages.
Under this strategy, brigades will have three types of equipment sets-
-a baseline set, a training set, and a deployment set. The baseline set
would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the equipment it
includes could be significantly reduced from amounts the modular
brigades are designed to have. Training sets would include more of the
equipment units will need to be ready for deployment, but units would
share the equipment that would be located at training sites throughout
the country. The deployment set would include all equipment needed for
deployment, including theater-specific equipment, high-priority items
provided through operational needs statements, and equipment from Army
prepositioned stock. With this rotational equipping approach, the Army
believes it can have up to 14 active combat brigades and up to 5 Army
National Guard combat brigades equipped and mission ready at any given
time.
While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip both active
and Army National Guard units within the force rotation model, it has
not yet fully developed specific equipment requirements, including the
types and quantities of items, required in each phase of the model. As
of March 2006, the Army was still developing proposals for what would
be included in the three equipment sets as well as the specific
equipping requirements for units. Figure 2 shows the Army's three-phase
force rotation model.
Figure 2: Army's Force Rotation Model:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[A] The Army's force rotation model proposes that active component
units in the Available phase will be available for deployment 1 year in
every 3 years, and reserve component units will be available for
deployment 1 year in every 6 years.
[End of figure]
The Reset/Train phase will include modular units that redeploy from
long-term operations and are unable to sustain ready or available
capability levels. The Ready phase will include those modular units
that have been assessed as ready at designated capability levels, may
be mobilized if required, and can be equipped if necessary to meet
operational surge requirements. The Available phase will include those
modular units that have been assessed as available at designated
capability levels to conduct missions. In this last phase, active units
are available for immediate deployment and reserve component units are
available for mobilization, training, and validation for deployment.
However, this strategy is not yet complete because the Army has not yet
defined specific equipping requirements for units as they progress
through the force rotation model. Therefore, it is difficult to assess
the risk associated with decreasing nondeploying units' readiness to
perform other missions or the ability of units in the Reset/Train and
Ready phases of the force rotation model to respond to an unforeseen
conflict or crisis, if required.
Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel
Requirements for Its New Modular Force Structure:
The Army has made some progress toward meeting modular personnel
requirements in the active component, but faces significant challenges
in achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing
its active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the
QDR. The Army plans to increase the size of its modular combat force
but doing so without permanently increasing its overall end strength is
an ambitious undertaking that will require the Army to eliminate or
realign many positions in its noncombat force. While the Army is moving
forward with its personnel reduction and realignment plans through a
variety of initiatives, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be
able to meet its overall end-strength goals and what risks to meeting
modular force personnel requirements exist if these goals are not met.
We have found that strategic workforce planning is one of the tools
that can help agencies develop strategies for effectively implementing
challenging initiatives. Effective strategic workforce planning
includes the development of strategies to monitor and evaluate progress
towards achieving goals. Without information on the status and progress
of its personnel initiatives, Congress and the Secretary of Defense
lack the data necessary to identify challenges, monitor progress, and
effectively address problems when they arise.
The Army accounts for its congressionally authorized active component
personnel end strength in three broad categories--the operational
combat force, the institutional noncombat force, and personnel who are
temporarily unavailable for assignment. The operational combat force
consists of personnel who are assigned to deployable combat, combat
support, and combat service support units; these include modular combat
brigades and their supporting units such as logistics, medical, and
administrative units. The Army's institutional noncombat force consists
of personnel assigned to support and training command and headquarters
units, which primarily provide management, administrative, training,
and other support, and typically are not deployed for combat
operations. This includes personnel assigned to the Department of the
Army headquarters and major commands such as the Training and Doctrine
Command. In addition, the Army separately accounts for personnel who
are temporarily unavailable for their official duties, including
personnel who are in transit between assignments, are temporarily not
available for assignment because of sickness or injury, or are students
undergoing training away from their units. The Army refers to these
personnel as transients, transfers, holdees, and students.
The Army plans to reduce its current temporary end-strength
authorization of 512,400[Footnote 14] to 482,400 by 2011 in order to
help fund the Army's priority programs. Simultaneously, the Army plans
to increase the number of soldiers in its operational combat force from
its previous level of approximately 315,000 to 355,000 in order to meet
the increased personnel requirements of its new larger modular force
structure. The Army plans to utilize several initiatives to reduce and
realign the Army with the aim of meeting these planned personnel
levels. For example, the Army has converted some noncombat military
positions into civilian positions, thereby freeing up soldiers to fill
modular combat brigades' requirements. During fiscal year 2005, the
Army converted approximately 8,000 military positions to civilian-
staffed positions within the Army's noncombat force. However, Army
officials believe additional conversions to achieve the 19,000 planned
reductions in the noncombat force will be significantly more
challenging to achieve. In addition to its success with the military-
to-civilian conversions, the Army has been given statutory authority to
reduce active personnel support to the National Guard and reserve by
1,500.[Footnote 15] However, the Army must still eliminate additional
positions, including reducing transients, transfers, holdees, and
student personnel utilizing these and other initiatives, so it can
reduce its overall end strength while filling requirements for modular
units. As shown in table 4, the Army's goal is to reduce overall active
component end strength from the current temporary authorization level
while increasing the size of its operational combat force.
Table 4: Army's End-strength Authorization History and Modular Force
Goal:
Operational combat force;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Fiscal year 2000: 315.0;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Current (temporary): 355.0;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Modular force goal: 355.0.
Noncombat force;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Fiscal year 2000: 102.0;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Current (temporary): 94.0;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Modular force goal: 75.0.
Other (transients, transfers, holdees, students);
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Fiscal year 2000: 63.0;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Current (temporary): 63.4;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Modular force goal: 52.4.
Total;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Fiscal year 2000: 480.0;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Current (temporary): 512.4;
End-strength authorizations (in thousands): Modular force goal: 482.4.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: End-strength authorizations account for the maximum numbers of
positions available in which to assign personnel, but do not account
for the numbers of personnel actually assigned to those positions.
[End of table]
While the Army is attempting to reduce end strength in its noncombat
force and realign positions to the combat force via several
initiatives, it may have difficulty meeting its expectations for some
initiatives. For example, the Army expected that the Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) decisions of 2005 could free up approximately 2,000
to 3,000 positions in its noncombat force, but the Army is revisiting
this assumption based upon updated manpower levels at the commands and
installations approved for closure and consolidation. Army officials
believe they will be able to realign some positions from BRAC, but it
is not clear whether the reductions will free up 2,000 to 3,000
military personnel that can be reassigned to modular combat units. In
the same vein, Army officials expected to see reductions of several
hundred base support staff resulting from restationing forces currently
overseas back to garrisons within the United States. However, Army
officials are still attempting to determine if the actual savings will
meet the original assumptions. As a result, it is not clear to what
extent the Army will be able to meet its overall end-strength goals and
what risks exist if these goals are not met.
Furthermore, the Army will face challenges in meeting its new modular
force requirements for military intelligence specialists. The Army's
new modular force structure significantly increases requirements for
military intelligence specialists. In late 2005, Army intelligence
officials told us that the modular force would require approximately
8,400 additional active component intelligence specialist positions,
but the Army planned to fill only about 57 percent of these positions
by 2013, in part because of efforts to reduce overall end strength. In
May 2006, Army officials told us that the Army had completed its most
recent Total Army Analysis (for fiscal years 2008-2013), which balances
Army requirements within a projected end-strength authorization of
482,400. Accordingly, the Army revised its earlier estimate of
intelligence specialist position requirements and determined that its
increased active component requirement for intelligence specialists was
only 5,600 and that it planned to fill all of these positions by
2013.[Footnote 16] However, Army officials acknowledge that meeting
modular force requirements for intelligence specialists is a
significant challenge because it will take a number of years to recruit
and train intelligence soldiers.
According to Army intelligence officials, intelligence capability has
improved over that of the previous force; however, any shortfalls in
filling intelligence requirements would further stress intelligence
specialists with a high pace of deployments. Since intelligence is
considered a key enabler of the modular design--a component of the new
design's improved situational awareness--it is unclear to what extent
any shortages in planned intelligence capacity will affect the overall
capability of modular combat brigades. Without continued, significant
progress in meeting personnel requirements, the Army may need to accept
increased risk in its ability to conduct operations and support its
combat forces or it may need to seek support for an end-strength
increase from DOD and Congress.
Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity, but Lacks a
Long-Term Comprehensive Approach to Assess Progress and Monitor
Implementation:
While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames for
modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent approach
to effectively measure its progress against stated modularity
objectives, assess the need for further changes to its modular unit
designs, and monitor implementation plans. A comprehensive approach
includes performance measures and a plan to test changes to the design
of the modular combat brigades. The Army has not developed a
comprehensive approach because senior leadership has focused attention
on developing broad guidance and unit conversion plans for modularity
while focusing less attention on developing ways to measure results.
Without such an approach, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress
will have full visibility into the capabilities of the modular force
and the Army's implementation plans.
Army Lacks Performance Metrics to Measure the Results of Modularity:
While the Army has identified objectives for modularity, it has not
developed modular-specific quantifiable goals or performance metrics to
measure its progress. GAO and DOD, among others, have identified the
importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into
measurable, results-oriented metrics, which in turn provide
accountability for results. In a 2003 report we found that the adoption
of a results-oriented framework that clearly establishes performance
goals and measures progress toward those goals was a key practice for
implementing a successful transformation.[Footnote 17] DOD has also
recognized the need to develop or refine metrics so it can measure
efforts to implement the defense strategy and provide useful
information to senior leadership.
The Army considers the Army Campaign Plan to be a key document guiding
the modular restructuring. The plan provides broad guidelines for
modularity and other program tasks across the entire Army. However,
modularity-related metrics within the plan are limited to a schedule
for creating modular units and an associated metric of achieving unit
readiness goals for equipment, training, and personnel by certain dates
after unit creation. Moreover, a 2005 assessment by the Office of
Management and Budget identified the total number of brigades created
as the only metric the Army had developed for measuring the success of
its modularity initiative. Another key planning document, the 2005 Army
Strategic Planning Guidance, identified several major expected
advantages of modularity, including an increase in the combat power of
the active component force by at least 30 percent, an increase in the
rotational pool of ready units by at least 50 percent, the creation of
a deployable joint-capable headquarters, the development of a force
design upon which the future network-centric developments can be
readily applied, and reduced stress on the force through a more
predictable deployment cycle. However, these goals have not translated
into outcome-related metrics that are reported to provide decision
makers a clear status of the modular restructuring as a whole. Army
officials stated that unit-creation schedules and readiness levels are
the best available metrics for assessing modularity progress because
modularity is a reorganization encompassing hundreds of individual
procurement programs that would be difficult to collectively assess in
a modularity context. However, we believe that results-oriented
performance measures with specific, objective indicators used to
measure progress toward achieving goals are essential for restructuring
organizations.
A major Air Force transformation initiative may provide insights on how
the Army could develop performance metrics for a widespread
transformation of a military force. In 1998, the Air Force adopted the
Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept as a way to help manage its
deployments and commitments to theater commanders and reduce the
deployment burden on its people. Like the Army's modular restructuring,
the Air Force's restructuring was fundamental to the force, and
according to the Air Force, represented the largest transformation of
its processes since before the Cold War. In our 2000 report,[Footnote
18] we found that the Air Force expected to achieve important benefits
from the Expeditionary Concept, but had yet to establish specific
quantifiable goals for those benefits, which included increasing the
level of deployment predictability for individual service members. We
recommended that the Air Force develop specific quantifiable goals
based on the Expeditionary Concept's broad objectives, and establish
needed metrics to measure progress toward these goals. In a January
2001 report to Congress on the Expeditionary Aerospace Force
Implementation, the Air Force identified 13 metrics to measure progress
in six performance areas. For example, to better balance deployment
taskings in order to provide relief to heavily tasked units, the Air
Force developed 4 metrics, including one that measures active duty
personnel available to meet Expeditionary Force requirements. The Air
Force described each metric and assigned either a quantitative goal
(such as a percentage) or a trend goal indicating the desired direction
the metric should be moving over time. These results were briefed
regularly to the Air Force Chief of Staff. The Army's transformation is
more extensive than the Air Force's in that the Air Force did not
change traditional command and organizational structures under its
Expeditionary Concept, while the Army modular force has made extensive
changes to these structures, and the Air Force did not plan for nearly
the same implementation costs as the Army. Nonetheless, we believe some
of the goals and challenges faced by the Air Force that we reported in
August 2000 may have relevance to the Army today.
While we recognize the complexity of the Army's modular restructuring,
without clear definitions of metrics, and periodic communication of
performance against these metrics, the Secretary of Defense and
Congress will have difficulty assessing the impact of refinements and
enhancements to the modular design--such as DOD's recent decision to
reduce the number of modular combat and support brigades reported in
the QDR, as well as any changes in resources available to meet modular
design requirements.
Army Lacks a Plan for Comprehensively Evaluating Modular Designs:
Since 2004, when the Army approved the original designs for its modular
brigades, it has made some refinements to those designs but does not
have a comprehensive plan for evaluating the effect of these design
changes or the need for additional design changes as the Army gets more
operational experience using modular brigades and integrating command
and control headquarters, combat support units, and combat brigades. In
fiscal year 2004, TRADOC's Analysis Center concluded that the modular
combat brigade designs would be more capable than division-based units
based on an integrated and iterative analysis employing computer-
assisted exercises, subject matter experts, and senior observers. This
analysis culminated in the approval of modular brigade-based designs
for the Army. The assessment employed performance metrics such as
mission accomplishment, units' organic lethality, and survivability,
and compared the performance of variations on modular unit designs
against the existing division-based designs. The report emphasized that
the Chief of Staff of the Army had asked for "good enough" prototype
designs that could be quickly implemented, and the modular
organizations assessed were not the end of the development effort.
Since these initial design assessments, the Army has been assessing
implementation and making further adjustments in designs and
implementation plans through a number of venues, to include:
* unit readiness reporting on personnel, equipment, and training;
* modular force coordination cells to assist units in the conversion
process;
* modular force observation teams to collect lessons during training;
and:
* collection and analysis teams to assess units' effectiveness during
deployment.
Based on data collected and analyzed through these processes, TRADOC
has approved some design change recommendations and has not approved
others. For example, TRADOC analyzed a Department of the Army proposal
to reduce the number of Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance Systems,
but recommended retaining the higher number in the existing design in
part because of decreases in units' assessed lethality and
survivability with the reduced number of surveillance systems.
Army officials maintain that ongoing assessments described above
provide sufficient validation that the modularity concept works in
practice. However, these assessments do not provide a comprehensive
evaluation of the modular designs. Further, the Army does not plan to
conduct a similar overarching analysis to assess the modular force
capabilities to perform operations across the full spectrum of
potential conflict. In November 2005, we reported that methodically
testing, exercising, and evaluating new doctrines and concepts is an
important and established practice throughout the military, and that
particularly large and complex issues may require long-term testing and
evaluation that is guided by study plans.[Footnote 19] We believe the
evolving nature of the design highlights the importance of planning for
broad-based evaluations of the modular force to ensure the Army is
achieving the capabilities it intended, and to provide an opportunity
to make course corrections if needed. For example, one controversial
element of the design was the decision to include two maneuver
battalions instead of three in the modular combat brigades. TRADOC's
2004 analysis noted that the modular combat brigade designs with the
two maneuver battalion organization did not perform as well as the
three maneuver battalion design, and cited this as one of the most
significant areas of risk in the modular combat brigade design.
Nonetheless, because of the significant additional cost of adding a
third combat battalion the Army decided on a two-battalion design for
the modular combat brigades that included key enabling equipment such
as communications, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
Some defense experts, including a current division commander and
several retired Army generals, have expressed concerns about this
aspect of the modular design. In addition, some of these experts have
expressed concerns about whether the current designs have been
sufficiently tested and whether they provide the best mix of
capabilities to conduct full-spectrum operations. In addition, the Army
has recently completed designs for support units and headquarters
units. Once the Army gets more operational experience with the new
modular units, it may find it needs to make further adjustments to its
designs. Without a comprehensive testing plan, neither the Army nor
congressional decision makers will be able to sufficiently assess the
capabilities of the modular combat brigades as they are being
organized, staffed, and equipped.
Conclusions:
The fast pace, broad scope, and cost of the Army's effort to transform
into a modular force present considerable challenges for the Army, and
for Congress as well in effectively overseeing a force restructuring of
this magnitude. The Army leadership has dedicated considerable
attention, energy, and time to achieving its modularity goals under
tight time frames. However, the lack of clarity in equipment and
personnel plans raises considerable uncertainty as to whether the Army
can meet its goals within acceptable risk levels. For example, until
the Army defines and communicates equipment requirements for all
modular units and assesses the risk associated with its plan to not
equip brigades with all of their intended capabilities, it will remain
unclear the extent to which its new modular combat brigades will be
able to operate as stand-alone, self-sufficient units--a main goal of
the Army's modular transformation. With respect to personnel, the
Army's goal to increase its operational force while not permanently
increasing its current end strength will require it to make the most
efficient use of its personnel. Until the Army communicates the status
of its various ongoing personnel initiatives, the Army's ability to
meet personnel requirements of its new modular force will also remain
unclear. Finally, until the Army develops a long-term comprehensive
approach for measuring progress and a plan for evaluating changes, it
remains uncertain how the Army will determine whether it is achieving
its goal of creating a more rapidly deployable, joint, expeditionary
force. Without such an approach, and clearly defined and communicated
plans, the Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have the
information needed to weigh competing funding priorities and monitor
the Army's progress in its over $52 billion effort to transform its
force.
Recommendations for Executive Actions:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to take the following actions.
First, in order for decision makers to better assess the Army's
strategy for equipping modular combat brigades, we recommend the Army
develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with:
* details about the Army's equipping strategy, to include the types and
quantities of equipment active component and National Guard modular
units would receive in each phase of the force rotation model, and how
these amounts compare to design requirements for modular units; and:
* an assessment of the operational risk associated with this equipping
strategy.
Second, in order for decision makers to have the visibility needed to
assess the Army's ability to meet the personnel requirements for its
new modular operational forces while simultaneously managing the risk
to its noncombat forces, we recommend that the Army develop and provide
the Secretary of Defense and Congress with:
* a report on the status of its personnel initiatives, including
executable milestones for realigning and reducing its noncombat forces;
and:
* an assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular
operational combat force while managing the risk to its noncombat
supporting force structure.
Third, to improve information available for decision makers on progress
of the Army's modular force implementation plans, we recommend that the
Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a
comprehensive plan for assessing the Army's progress toward achieving
the benefits of modularity to include:
* specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure progress toward
meeting the goals and objectives established in the Army Campaign Plan;
and:
* plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular
unit designs that discuss the extent to which unit designs provide
sufficient capabilities needed to execute National Defense Strategy and
2006 QDR objectives for addressing a wider range of both traditional
and irregular security challenges.
Finally, the Secretary of the Army should provide a testing plan as
part of its Army Campaign Plan that includes milestones for conducting
comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is being
implemented so that decision makers---both inside and outside the Army-
--can assess the implications of changes to the Army force structure in
terms of the goals of modular restructuring. The results of these
assessments should be provided to Congress as part of the Army's
justification for its annual budget through fiscal year 2011.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the Army's
plans for creating modular forces, Congress should consider requiring
the Secretary of Defense to provide the information outlined in our
recommendations including;
* details about the Army's equipping strategy and an assessment of the
operational risk associated with this equipping strategy;
* the status of the Army's personnel initiatives and an assessment of
how the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force and
manage the risk to its noncombat force structure; and:
* the Army's plan for assessing its progress toward achieving the
benefits of modularity, plans and milestones for conducting further
evaluation of modular unit designs, and a testing plan for conducting
comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is being
implemented.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report provided by the Army on
behalf of DOD, the department noted that the report adequately reflects
the challenges associated with transforming the Army to modular force
designs while at war, but stated that the report fails to recognize
ongoing efforts and accomplishments to date. (DOD's comments are
reprinted in app. II). DOD also stated that citing the views of unnamed
sources regarding the modular combat brigade design does not contribute
to an accurate, balanced assessment of the Army's progress. DOD agreed
or partially agreed with our recommendations to develop and provide
information on its equipping strategy and personnel initiatives and to
develop expanded performance metrics for assessing progress. However,
DOD disagreed with three recommendations regarding the need for risk
assessments and a testing plan to further assess designs for modular
units. As discussed below, because of the significance, cost, scope,
and potential for risk associated with the Army's modularity
initiative, we continue to believe that more transparency of the Army's
plans and risk assessments is needed in light of the limited amount of
information the Army has provided to Congress. Therefore, we have
included a matter for congressional consideration to require the
Secretary of Defense to provide more detailed plans and assessments of
modularity risks. Our specific comments follow.
First, we strongly disagree with DOD's assertion that GAO used
anonymous and unverifiable sources which detracted from an accurate and
balanced assessment of the Army's progress in implementing modularity.
Our analysis of the Army's progress and potential for risk in
implementing modular units is primarily based on our independent and
thorough analysis of Army plans, reports, briefings, and readiness
assessments, which we used to compare the Army's goals for modularity
against its actual plans for equipping and staffing modular units. We
sought views on modular unit designs to supplement our analysis from a
diverse group of knowledgeable people both inside and outside the Army
and DOD, including Army headquarters officials, division and brigade
commanders, Army officials who played key roles in developing and
assessing modular unit designs, and retired generals and defense
experts who have studied and written about Army transformation. Our
long-standing policy is not to include the names of individuals from
whom we obtained information but to use information and evidence from
appropriate and relevant sources and provide balance in our report. We
integrated evidence and information from all sources to reach
conclusions and formulate the recommendations included in this report.
Our report recognizes the Army's progress in implementing modular units
while fully engaged in ongoing operations but also identifies and
provides transparency regarding a number of risks inherent in the
Army's plans so that Congress will have better information with which
to make decisions on funding and oversight. The discussion we present
highlighting the concerns of some current and retired senior Army
officers and defense experts regarding certain aspects of modular
designs is used to illustrate the need for further evaluation of
modular units as they move from concept to reality--an approach
consistent with DOD policy and best practice in transforming defense
capabilities.
DOD also stated that the report inaccurately (1) asserts that Shadow
tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems will be fielded with fewer air
vehicles due to a shortage of operators and maintainers, and (2)
depicts the growth of Army Intelligence positions. We disagree with
DOD's assessment. As our report clearly points out, based on
documentation obtained from the Army, the Army's approved modular
combat brigade design was for seven air vehicles per Shadow system,
which would provide 24-hour per day aerial surveillance, but the Army
opted to field Shadow systems with four air vehicles instead, primarily
because it lacks adequate numbers of air vehicle operators and
maintainers. Although the Army believes that Shadow systems with four
air vehicles are adequate at this time, we believe it is important to
provide transparency by presenting information which shows that modular
combat brigades will not have all of the capabilities intended by the
original modular combat brigade designs (i.e., brigade-level 24-hour
per day surveillance operations) without Shadow systems composed of
seven air vehicles.
With regard to the number of intelligence positions, our report
accurately notes that the Army decided to increase its intelligence
positions by 5,600 in the active force. However, we also note that this
was a revision of an earlier higher estimate of 8,400 positions
projected by Army intelligence officials. Therefore, we do not agree
with the department's comment that the report inaccurately depicts the
growth of Army intelligence positions, nor do we agree with its
characterization that the report inappropriately focuses on the Army's
manning challenges. We believe that it is important for the Secretary
of Defense and Congress to have a clear and transparent picture of the
personnel challenges the Army faces in order to fully achieve the goals
of modular restructuring and make informed decisions on resources and
authorized end strength.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and provide
the Secretary of Defense and Congress with details about the Army's
equipping strategy. DOD commented that the Army recently completed
development of the equipping strategy for modular forces and that the
Army has conducted equipping conferences to ensure that soldiers have
the best equipment available as they train and deploy. We requested a
copy of the Army's recently completed equipping strategy but did not
receive a copy prior to publication and therefore have not been able to
assess how and to what extent it meets the intent of our
recommendation. Moreover, DOD did not indicate what, if any, actions it
planned to take to provide Congress with specific details about the
Army's equipping strategy, as we recommended. Therefore, we have
highlighted the need for more complete information on the Army's
equipping strategy in a matter for congressional consideration.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and provide
the Secretary of Defense and Congress with an assessment of the risk
associated with the Army's rotational equipping strategy and said in
its comments that this action is already occurring on a regular basis.
Although the Army is considering risk in managing existing equipment,
at the time of our review the Army had not finished developing its
equipping strategy for its new rotational force model. Therefore, we
continue to believe that the Army needs to document and provide risk
assessments to Congress based on its newly completed equipping
strategy. This is particularly important given other Army priorities
such as the Future Combat System and near-term equipping needs for Iraq
that will compete for funding and may cause changes to the Army's
current equipping strategy for modular units.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army develop
and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a report on the
status of its personnel initiatives. However, DOD commented that adding
another report on this issue would be duplicative and irrelevant and
said this action is already occurring on a regular basis. However,
while Army documents present an overview of how the Army is allocating
military personnel to operational and nonoperational positions, they do
not provide specific information on the Army's progress in implementing
personnel initiatives. Moreover, the department's comments did not
address whether the Army plans to provide additional information to
Congress. We continue to believe that such information is needed by
Congress to inform their decisions on Army personnel levels.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and provide
the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a risk assessment of how the
Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force while
managing the risk to its noncombat supporting force structure. DOD
commented that the Army provided the Office of the Secretary of Defense
with a plan for reshaping the Army, including increasing the active
operating force and downsizing overall active end strength by fiscal
year 2011, based on several assumptions. However, this document, which
Army officials provided to us, does not highlight potential risks in
executing the Army's plan. Moreover, DOD's comments did not address the
intent of our recommendation that the Army improve transparency by
providing Congress with additional information on its plans and
assessment of risk.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and
provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a comprehensive plan
for assessing the Army's progress toward achieving modularity goals and
said the Army will explore the development of expanded performance
metrics. However, DOD stated that plans and milestones for measuring
progress are unwarranted as such evaluations occur continuously. We
commend DOD for agreeing to develop expanded performance metrics.
However, because of the cost and magnitude of the Army's transformation
plans, we continue to believe that developing and disseminating a
comprehensive and formal evaluation plan are critical for providing
transparency and accountability for results. As discussed in the
report, the Army is collecting some data on the performance of modular
units that attend training events and deploy overseas, but lacks a long-
term comprehensive and transparent approach for integrating the results
of these assessments to measure overall progress.
Finally, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to provide a testing plan that
includes milestones for assessing modular unit designs as they are
being implemented. DOD said the Army thoroughly evaluated modular force
designs and continues to evaluate all facets of modular force
performance both in training and combat operations. Nevertheless, we
believe that the Army needs a more transparent, long-term, and
comprehensive plan for evaluating the modular designs. The Army is
still early in its implementation of modular support brigades and
higher echelon command and control and support units and further
evaluation of these designs based on actual experience may demonstrate
that design refinements are needed. Furthermore, although the Army has
gained some useful operational experience with modular combat units,
this experience has been limited to stability operations and irregular
warfare, rather than major combat operations or other operations across
the full spectrum of potential conflict. To facilitate further
assessment of unit designs, we have included this issue in our matter
for congressional consideration.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Secretary of the Army.
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4402. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, obtained and
reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials from Headquarters,
Department of Army; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army
Forces Command; and the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis. We
supplemented this information with visits to the first three Army
divisions undergoing modular conversions---the 3rd and 4th Infantry
Divisions and the 101st Airborne Division--to gain an understanding of
the Army's modular force implementation plans and progress in
organizing, staffing, and equipping active modular combat brigades.
To determine the Army's modular force organizational design
requirements and supporting analysis, we analyzed Department of the
Army guidance for creating modular forces, and briefings and other
documents on the Army's modular force design and analytical process
from the Training and Doctrine Command's Analysis Center. To determine
the Army's progress and plans for equipping active component modular
combat brigades, we analyzed Department of Army data on selected
equipment that Army analysis identified as essential for achieving the
modular combat brigades' intended capabilities. For these selected
items, we calculated the Army's equipment requirements for active
component modular combat brigades by multiplying equipment requirements
obtained from the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Training (G-3) for each of the three brigade
variants--heavy, light, and Stryker--by the planned number of brigades
in each variant. We then compared the sum of equipment requirements in
the active component to data we obtained from officials from the
Department of the Army G-8 on the expected on-hand levels of equipment
and assessed the reliability of the data by discussing the results with
knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data used were
sufficiently reliable for our objectives. We also reviewed unit
readiness reports from those brigades that had completed or were in the
process of completing their modular conversion as of February 2006. For
our assessment of Army National Guard equipping challenges, we relied
on past GAO reports and testimony.
To determine the progress made and challenges to managing personnel
requirements of the modular force, we reviewed documents and discussed
the implications of force structure requirements with officials from
the Department of Army Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for
Personnel (G1) and Intelligence (G2). We also discussed key personnel-
related concerns during our visits to the divisions undergoing modular
conversion. To determine the Army's strategies and plans for meeting
its modular force personnel requirements without permanently increasing
overall end strength, we interviewed officials from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and
the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Training (G3). We also reviewed the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review as it pertained to Army personnel end strength, and the
Army's Future Year Defense Program and supplemental budget requests for
fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to determine the Army's personnel funding
plans.
To determine the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for
assessing implementation of modularity and for further adjusting
designs or implementation plans, we reviewed our prior work on
assessing organizations undertaking significant reorganizations. We
reviewed and analyzed the Army Campaign Plan and discussed it with
officials in the Department of Army Headquarters, especially officials
from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training (G3). To
analyze the Army's approach for assessing the implementation of its
modular conversion, we examined key Army planning documents and
discussed objectives, performance metrics, and testing plans with
appropriate officials in the Department of the Army Headquarters, and
the Training and Doctrine Command's Analysis Center. In addition, we
met with a panel of retired senior Army general officers at the
Association of the U.S. Army Institute of Land Warfare, Arlington,
Virginia. We relied on past GAO reports assessing organizations
undertaking significant reorganizations.
We conducted our work from September 2004 through March 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Department Of The Army:
Office Of The Deputy Chief Of Staff, G-8:
780 Army Pentagon:
Washington DC 20310-0700:
June 30, 2006:
Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft
report, 'Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation
Plans,' dated June 2, 2006 (GAO Code 350707/GAO-06-745).
While the report adequately reflects the challenges associated with
transforming the Army to modular force designs while at war and with
limited funding, we believe the report fails to recognize ongoing
efforts and accomplishments to date. Additionally, the use of anonymous
and unverifiable sources throughout the report (e.g., "Some defense
experts, including a current division commander and several retired
Army generals, have expressed concerns about this aspect of the modular
design.") does not contribute to an accurate, balanced assessment and
should be discouraged.
The Department's comments to the draft report and recommendations are
enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
N. Ross Thompson III:
Major General, U.S. Army:
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation:
Enclosure:
GAO Draft Report - Dated June 2, 2006 GAO Code 350707/GAO-06-745:
"Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DoD and Congress More
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation
Plans"
Department of Defense Comments and Comments to GAO Recommendations:
Comments:
Transforming the Army to modular force designs remains a high priority
for the Department of Defense. The GAO report recognizes the
unprecedented challenges associated with this comprehensive and
accelerated redesign of an Army that is at war. The report also notes
that the Army entered this long war against global terrorism following
a decade of inadequate equipping investments, resulting in widespread
equipment shortages across the Army, especially in its reserve forces.
It will take at least a decade of robust, continuous modernization
investments to fully equip all Army forces.
To better manage the manning, equipping, and training of modular forces
for the long war, the Army has developed a rotational readiness model,
referred to as Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). The Army's force
structure goal is 70 brigade combat teams and 211 support brigades,
each fully manned, equipped, and trained for the missions assigned.
Given longstanding equipment shortages, the Army 'maneuvers' equipment
across the force to Soldiers and units as they progress through the
various phases of ARFORGEN. To ensure National Guard forces are always
prepared for state and territorial responsibilities, the Army has
identified 342 types of equipment for priority fielding to National
Guard units. The Army has also concentrated equipment in combat zones
to reduce the costs associated with transporting heavy equipment to/
from the theater and to ensure that deployed forces have the best
equipment available. While percentages of equipment fill across the
Army may be less than 100 percent, deployed forces have what they need
to accomplish their mission. Additionally, theater-unique items, such
as jammers for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and armored wheeled
vehicles, are concentrated almost exclusively in the combat zone and
are passed between rotating units. The Department believes that the GAO
report unnecessarily focuses on longstanding equipment shortages, vice
the significant progress being made to equip forces according to the
new modular designs.
The Army regularly and rigorously assesses its responsibilities
associated with providing the most appropriate mix of capabilities to
the warfighter within available resources. As with any complex and
dynamic undertaking, objectives, priorities, and approaches continue to
be refined over time. This is a simple reflection of the continuous
process within a Service to provide relevant capabilities within the
resources provided. Specifically, the GAO report asserts that Shadow
tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems will be fielded with less than
their full complement of air vehicles (i.e., four vice seven) due to a
shortage of operators and maintainers. This is inaccurate. Informed by
operational analysis and professional judgment, the Army determined
that four air vehicles per Shadow system are adequate at this time.
Shadow units will be fully manned, equipped, and trained. The GAO
report also inaccurately depicts the growth of Army intelligence
positions. Informed by the Total Army Analysis for fiscal years 2008-
2013, the Army decided to increase its intelligence positions by 7600
positions: 5600 in the active force and 2000 in the reserve force.
Recruiting and training the personnel to fill the additional 7600
intelligence positions will be a challenge, as noted in the GAO report,
but so is the entire Army modular transformation while at war. The
Department believes this GAO report inappropriately focuses on the
Army's manning challenges, vice provide a balanced assessment of
significant change underway.
Department of Defense Comments to GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army
develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with details
about the Army's equipping strategy, to including the types and
quantities of equipment active component and National Guard modular
units would receive in each phase of its force rotation model, and how
these amounts compare to design requirements for modular units. (p. 25/
GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur. The Army recently completed development and
coordination of the equipping strategy for modular forces, consistent
with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. To maximize use of
constrained resources, the Army conducts global equipping conferences
biannually. To date, the Army has conducted six equipping conferences
with representatives from all Army components - Regular Army, Army
National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve --to ensure that combatant
commanders' needs are addressed and that all Soldiers and units have
the very best equipment available as they train and deploy in support
of the global war on terrorism or domestic contingencies.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army
develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with an
assessment of the operational risk associated with this equipping
strategy. (p. 25/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Nonconcur. This action is already occurring on a regular
basis. Assessment of risk (operational, institutional, future, and
force management) is an integral part of the Department's management
oversight of Defense initiatives, including Army modular
transformation. Adding another report on this issue would be
duplicative and irrelevant. As the report noted, the Army entered the
current long war against global terrorism with a significant equipment
shortfall ($56 billion), following a decade of inadequate investment in
modem equipment. As a result, the Army is maneuvering equipment across
the force to ensure units are adequately equipped as they train for a
pending deployment. Once in theater, the unit is augmented with theater-
provided equipment (TPE), which consists of low density, high demand,
modem equipment. The strategy of equipment maneuver and the use of TPE
amplifies that the Amy's current equipment inventory is inadequate to
fully equip all units. The Army is on a path to fully equip all units
regardless of Component. However, sustained, robust procurement funding
is necessary to fill longstanding shortages, fully equip reserve
component forces to effectively operate as part of the operational
force, address expanded equipment needs of modular force designs, and
account for increased wear and tear and baffle losses from the ongoing
global war on terrorism. The Army equipping strategy is designed to
ensure that Soldiers and units deployed in harm's way have the best
equipment the Nation can provide.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army
develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a report
on the status of its personnel initiatives, including executable
milestones for realigning and reducing its noncombat forces. (p. 25-26/
GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Partially concur. This action is already occurring on a
regular basis. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, reports quarterly
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on Army
progress in reshaping the force, including the expansion of the active
operating force and management of overall active force endstrength.
Adding another report on this issue would be duplicative and
irrelevant.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army
develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with an
assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular operational
combat force while managing the risk to its noncombat supporting force
structure. (p. 25-26/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Nonconcur. The Army provided the Office of the Secretary
of Defense a plan for reshaping the Army, including increasing the
active operating force to 355,000 Soldiers and downsizing Regular Army
endstrength to 482,400 Soldiers by fiscal year 2011, based on several
assumptions. The Army will revisit its endstrength plan if the
assumptions prove invalid.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Army
develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a
comprehensive plan for assessing the Army's progress toward achieving
the benefits of modularity to include:
* specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure progress toward
meeting the goals and objectives established in the Army Campaign
Plans; and:
* plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular
unit designs that discuss the extent to which unit designs provide
sufficient capabilities needed to execute National Defense Strategy and
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review objectives for addressing a wider range
of both traditional and irregular security challenges. (p. 26/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Amy will explore the development of
expanded performance metrics to determine their potential value in
managing the modular transformation of the Army. Given the ongoing long
war against global terrorism, fulfilling combatant commander needs for
Army forces is the preeminent performance metric, and the Army
continues to fully meet force requirements for the war. The Army
equipping strategy also provides for the adequate equipping of Army
forces for homeland missions. Development of plans and milestones for
further evaluation of modular unit designs is unwarranted, as such
evaluations are embedded in Army processes and occur continuously under
the close supervision of the Army leadership. The doctrine,
organization, training, manning, and equipping of Army modular forces
will be a continuous process, informed by multiple sources, including
feedback from Soldiers and leaders who have served in combat in modular
forces.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to provide a testing plan as part of
its Army Campaign Plan that includes milestones for conducting
comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is being
implemented so that decision makers - both inside and outside the Army
- can assess the implications of changes to the Army force structure in
terms the goals of modular restructuring. The results of these
assessments should be provided to Congress as part of the Army's
justification for its annual budget through fiscal year 2011. (p. 26/
GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Nonconcur. The Army thoroughly evaluated modular force
designs, as noted in this report, and continues to evaluate all facets
of modular force performance both in training and combat operations.
Proposed changes in doctrine, organization, training, manning, and
equipping are thoroughly and continuously assessed and implemented,
consistent with the needs of the warfighter and available resources.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant
Director; Margaret Best; Alissa Czyz; Christopher Forys; Kevin Handley;
Joah Iannotta; Harry Jobes; David Mayfield; Jason Venner; and J. Andrew
Walker made major contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Future Combat System (FCS) is a family of weapons and other
systems including manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles,
sensors, and munitions linked by an information network. The FCS cost
estimate is in then-year dollars as of January 2006.
[2] Army personnel assigned to noncombat positions provide management,
administrative, training, and other support. Operational combat forces
include personnel assigned to the Army's combat, combat support, and
combat service support units.
[3] GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to
Implement and Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
16, 2005).
[4] GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and
Oversight of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926
(Washington, D.C.: Sep. 29, 2005).
[5] GAO, Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force
Remain Uncertain, GAO-06-548T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006).
[6] This office is responsible for programming, materiel integration,
and management of Department of the Army studies and analyses.
[7] GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit
from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, GAO-06-
84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005).
[8] The Army began the formation of Stryker brigades in 2002 and
completed the formation of the first two Stryker brigades in fiscal
year 2003.
[9] This number does not include the formation of two Stryker brigades
in fiscal year 2003.
[10] The Army defines this in its Campaign Plan as the effective date
on which the new modular organizational designs' equipment requirements
formally apply to converting brigades. The Army calls this a Modified
Table of Organization and Equipment, which documents the specific types
and amounts of equipment Army units are authorized to have.
[11] Under this model, which the Army calls its tiered readiness
system, high-priority or first-to-deploy units in the active component
received much higher levels of resources than lower priority or later-
deploying active and reserve component units. While some units
maintained high levels of readiness, a large part of both the active
and reserve components were in a low state of readiness, with the
expectation that there would be sufficient time to add the required
resources prior to deployment.
[12] At the time of this report, the Army was in the process of
revising its equipment requirements based on the planned reduction in
the number of modular combat brigades from 43 to 42 in the active
component.
[13] GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives, GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4,
2005).
[14] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-163, § 401 (2006), sets the end-strength level for the Army
at 512,400, but stipulates costs of active duty personnel of the Army
for that fiscal year in excess of 482,400 shall be paid out of funds
authorized to be appropriated for that fiscal year for a contingent
emergency reserve fund or as an emergency supplemental appropriation.
[15] The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 515 (2004) reduces the minimum number
of active component advisors required to be assigned to units of the
selected reserve from 5,000 to 3,500.
[16] Army officials also told us that some of the earlier 8,400
intelligence specialist positions have been reclassified as aviation
specialist positions.
[17] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[18] GAO, Force Structure: Air Force Expeditionary Concept Offers
Benefits but Effects Should Be Assessed, GAO/NSIAD-00-201 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 15, 2000).
[19] GAO-06-84.
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