Military Transformation
Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization Gao ID: GAO-06-847 September 8, 2006In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to anticipate and counter global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has responsibility for seven mission areas including nuclear deterrence and integrated missile defense. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1) implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and (2) defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with other Department of Defense (DOD) commands and organizations. To assess progress, GAO compared USSTRATCOM's efforts with lessons learned in implementing successful organizational transformations.
Since its establishment in 2002, USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions by taking a wide range of actions such as developing concepts of operations for its new missions, establishing processes and procedures, and identifying and obtaining personnel and resources needed to begin operations. However, further steps are needed to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the command's leadership recognizes the need to build on progress to date and has some additional actions underway to expand and enhance capabilities in its seven mission areas, GAO identified several areas in which more specific actions are needed to help the command achieve its vision. Specifically, the command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its exercise program but has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide USSTRATCOM with several planning, training, and evaluation tools. In addition, most of USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not established clear criteria for determining when they will reach full operating capability. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM has not developed performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the command and in each of its mission areas. GAO's prior work examining organizational change and defense transformation shows that each of these tools is important for transforming organizations to increase their likelihood of success, particularly when multiple organizations are involved in mission execution. Developing plans in each of these areas should help the command demonstrate it can provide added value to the combatant commanders and give the President an expanded set of military options for responding to future threats--two key DOD goals. USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations that have responsibility for the daily management of operations. However, it has not fully clarified roles and expectations of its service component organizations and had not developed a commandwide approach for enhancing outreach to other DOD organizations. While USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its service component organizations, because this guidance has not been specific or well documented, the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not fully understand their expectations in providing support to the command. In addition, while USSTRATCOM conducts some outreach with other combatant commands and organizations, it lacks a commandwide approach to effectively manage outreach activities. GAO has previously found that it is essential for organizations to develop a comprehensive communication strategy that seeks to engage customers and stakeholders. Providing additional guidance and developing a communications strategy should help USSTRATCOM's service component organizations to better understand their roles and enable the command to build effective relationships with other commands.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-847, Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization
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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Military Transformation:
Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen
Implementation of Its Many Missions and New Organization:
Military Transformation:
GAO-06-847:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-847, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2002, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the creation
of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to anticipate and
counter global threats. Currently, USSTRATCOM has responsibility for
seven mission areas including nuclear deterrence and integrated missile
defense. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has
made progress in (1) implementing its new missions and assessing
mission results and (2) defining organizational responsibilities and
establishing relationships with other Department of Defense (DOD)
commands and organizations. To assess progress, GAO compared
USSTRATCOM‘s efforts with lessons learned in implementing successful
organizational transformations.
What GAO Found:
Since its establishment in 2002, USSTRATCOM has made progress in
implementing its new missions by taking a wide range of actions such as
developing concepts of operations for its new missions, establishing
processes and procedures, and identifying and obtaining personnel and
resources needed to begin operations. However, further steps are needed
to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals
envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the
command. While the command‘s leadership recognizes the need to build on
progress to date and has some additional actions underway to expand and
enhance capabilities in its seven mission areas, GAO identified several
areas in which more specific actions are needed to help the command
achieve its vision. Specifically, the command has taken initial steps
to include its new missions in its exercise program but has not yet
fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise
support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide
USSTRATCOM with several planning, training, and evaluation tools. In
addition, most of USSTRATCOM‘s new mission organizations have not
established clear criteria for determining when they will reach full
operating capability. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM has not developed
performance measures and criteria for assessing results across the
command and in each of its mission areas. GAO‘s prior work examining
organizational change and defense transformation shows that each of
these tools is important for transforming organizations to increase
their likelihood of success, particularly when multiple organizations
are involved in mission execution. Developing plans in each of these
areas should help the command demonstrate it can provide added value to
the combatant commanders and give the President an expanded set of
military options for responding to future threats”two key DOD goals.
USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall
organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission
organizations that have responsibility for the daily management of
operations. However, it has not fully clarified roles and expectations
of its service component organizations and had not developed a
commandwide approach for enhancing outreach to other DOD organizations.
While USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its service component
organizations, because this guidance has not been specific or well
documented, the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not fully understand their
expectations in providing support to the command. In addition, while
USSTRATCOM conducts some outreach with other combatant commands and
organizations, it lacks a commandwide approach to effectively manage
outreach activities. GAO has previously found that it is essential for
organizations to develop a comprehensive communication strategy that
seeks to engage customers and stakeholders. Providing additional
guidance and developing a communications strategy should help
USSTRATCOM‘s service component organizations to better understand their
roles and enable the command to build effective relationships with
other commands.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that USSTRATCOM take actions to provide more guidance to
its mission and service component organizations, improve
communications, and evaluate mission performance. DOD agreed with some
recommendations but disagreed with others, including that it develop a
results-oriented management process. Therefore, GAO included a matter
for congressional consideration that would require DOD to develop such
a process given the importance of the role assigned to USSTRATCOM.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-847].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, but Efforts
Are Incomplete:
USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a Commandwide
Outreach Strategy:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United States
Strategic Command's Budget:
Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Strategic
Command Military and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level:
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix IV: United States Strategic Command Organizations and
Responsibilities:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: USSTRATCOM Historical and Projected Budgets from Fiscal Years
2003 through 2011:
Table 2: Key Dates for Establishing and Implementing New USSTRATCOM
Mission Organizations:
Table 3: USSTRATCOM First Principles:
Table 4: Approved and Filled Positions at USSTRATCOM's New Mission
Organizations as of February 2006:
Table 5: Projected Distribution of USSTRATCOM Civilian and Military
Positions in October 2007:
Table 6: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review:
Table 7: Key USSTRATCOM Organizations and Responsibilities:
Figures:
Figure 1: USSTRATCOM Organization:
Figure 2: Locations of USSTRATCOM's Headquarters and Subordinate
Mission Organizations:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
USSTRATCOM: United States Strategic Command:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 8, 2006:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Chairman:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
In 2002, following a series of high-level Department of Defense (DOD)
studies including the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear
Posture Review, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the
creation of a new unified command, the United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM),[Footnote 1] to effectively and efficiently anticipate and
counter the diverse and increasingly complex global threats the United
States faces for the foreseeable future. USSTRATCOM was initially
assigned responsibility for nuclear deterrence, space, and computer
network operations. The President, in January 2003, expanded
USSTRATCOM's global responsibilities and capabilities to include global
strike planning and execution; integration of global ballistic missile
defense; oversight of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
and global command and control; and DOD information operations. In
January 2005, the Secretary of Defense also assigned the command with
responsibilities for integrating and synchronizing DOD's efforts in
combating weapons of mass destruction. Each of USSTRATCOM's seven
missions has a significant role in implementing DOD's New Triad concept
for transforming U.S. strategic capabilities.[Footnote 2] DOD envisions
that the combination of capabilities provided by these global missions
would potentially add value for the combatant commanders in conducting
operations in and across regional areas and provide the President and
Secretary of Defense with an expanded range of military options for
responding to future threats, including those involving weapons of mass
destruction.
The set of diverse global missions assigned to USSTRATCOM span multiple
levels and lines of authority, cross combatant command regional
boundaries, and intersect with various national and international
organizations. Under USSTRATCOM's most recent reorganization, which it
began implementing in late 2004, the command has assigned day-to-day
operations and management responsibility for most of its mission areas
to five new subordinate organizations.[Footnote 3] These new
organizations are geographically dispersed and most are aligned with
key DOD agencies or military services to provide leadership and access
to their competencies, such as the Joint Functional Component Command
for Network Warfare partnering with the National Security Agency.
USSTRATCOM is attempting to transform its organization to better meet
the security challenges of the new century and effectively anticipate,
counter, and eliminate the emergence of unconventional threats overseas
and at home. In our prior work to identify useful practices and lessons
learned in implementing successful organizational mergers and
transformations, we found that in successful transformations,
organizations undergo a change of their cultures to become more results-
oriented, client-and customer-oriented, and collaborative in nature.
Such high-performing organizations create a culture that includes
moving from outputs to results; stovepipes to matrixes; hierarchical to
flatter and more horizontal structures; an inward to an external focus
on customers and other stakeholders; reactive behavior to proactive
approaches; hoarding knowledge to sharing knowledge; and protecting
"turf" to forming partnerships. To successfully transform, an
organization must fundamentally reexamine its processes, organizational
structures, and management approaches.[Footnote 4]
At your request, we reviewed the progress made by USSTRATCOM in
developing and integrating its missions to provide new capabilities and
expand U.S. options for responding to global threats. Specifically, we
assessed the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in (1)
implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and (2)
defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships
with other DOD commands and organizations.
To obtain information on USSTRATCOM's efforts to implement and assess
its new missions, define its organization, and establish relationships
with other organizations, we reviewed USSTRATCOM, DOD, Joint Staff, and
military service guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status
reports, and other pertinent documentation. We observed a major
USSTRATCOM command exercise, Global Lightning, in November 2005, at the
command's headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska; discussed the results with
participating officials; and reviewed the command's after-action report
and associated documentation. We also interviewed USSTRATCOM officials
at headquarters; subordinate mission organizations; Army, Air Force,
and Marine Corps service components; and the Navy Fleet Forces Command.
In addition, we reviewed organizational assessments prepared by think
tanks, such as LMI Government Consulting and RAND Corporation, and
discussed the assessments with their staffs to obtain their
perspectives on USSTRATCOM's approach for organizing and managing its
missions. We also obtained and analyzed information on USSTRATCOM's
budget and authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring
the resources, staff levels, and skills needed to implement the
command's missions (see apps. I and II).
We assessed the reliability of the data used in our analyses, and
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted our review from May 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix III
for a more complete description of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions but
additional steps are needed to expand upon this progress in order to
achieve the vision and goals underlying the command's establishment. To
date, the command has made progress in developing concepts of
operations; establishing plans, guidance, and policy for its missions;
and obtaining personnel and resources needed to begin operations. For
example, in implementing its intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance mission, the command has partnered with the Defense
Intelligence Agency to improve its access and coordination with DOD and
national intelligence agencies. In addition, to prevent and defend
against intrusions into DOD's critical information network systems, the
command has recently instituted new controls and trained system users
to reduce system vulnerabilities. However, while the command's
leadership recognizes the need to build on its progress to date and has
some additional actions underway in its seven mission areas, more
comprehensive plans and actions are needed in several areas to help the
command achieve DOD's vision. First, while USSTRATCOM has taken initial
steps to include its newer missions in its training exercises, the
command has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that
integrates the exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces
Command's Joint Warfighting Center, whose mission includes providing
planning tools and independent observer teams to strengthen exercises.
Our prior work has shown that robust exercise programs are important
for assessing and improving mission capabilities, particularly when
multiple organizations are involved in mission execution. Second,
USSTRATCOM has established specific milestones for its mission areas to
achieve full operating capability but neither the command nor its
subordinate mission organizations have established clear criteria to
use in assessing whether mission organizations have reached full
operating capability. Third, the command has not developed a results-
oriented management approach with strategic goals and performance
measures and criteria for continuously assessing results across the
command and in each of its mission areas. Our prior work has shown that
organizations undertaking complex transformations can increase their
likelihood of success by adopting a results-oriented management
approach to guide and measure progress. Developing plans in each of
these areas should better position the command to meet two of DOD's
major goals for the command--providing combatant commanders with added
value in conducting operations and giving the President and the
Secretary of Defense an expanded set of military options for responding
to future threats.
USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall
organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission
organizations that have responsibility for daily operations. However,
opportunities exist to clarify and improve the command's relationships
with subordinate organizations and other commands. The command's new
organizational framework, while still being implemented, has led to
better identification of resources, staffing, and skills for each of
USSTRATCOM's diverse missions. Also, many of the actions the command
has taken to implement its latest reorganization--such as establishing
a matrixed, horizontal organizational structure that openly shares
information--are consistent with transformation approaches that have
been used by high-performing organizations. However, moving forward,
two areas warrant additional attention. Specifically, while USSTRATCOM
has provided some guidance to its service component organizations, this
guidance has not been specific or well documented and Army, Air Force,
and Navy service component officials told us that additional guidance
is needed to more clearly define responsibilities and relationships. In
addition, while the command conducts some outreach with other combatant
commands and organizations, USSTRATCOM has not developed a commandwide
strategy to effectively manage and coordinate its external outreach
activities. Because USSTRATCOM supports or is supported by a large
number of commands and organizations in executing its diverse missions,
the command considers effective relationships and communications
essential. However, providing coordinated, consistent outreach to other
DOD organizations, such as combatant commands, has become more
difficult since USSTRATCOM established separate subordinate
organizations for several of its missions. Developing additional
strategies and plans to address these two challenges should help
USSTRATCOM's service component organizations better understand their
roles and the command build more effective relationships with other
commands.
To strengthen USSTRATCOM efforts to implement its missions and
establish its most recent organizational approach, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense take seven actions; three actions that
are designed to improve the command's access to the services and
resources that the U.S. Joint Forces Command can provide to support
USSTRATCOM's exercise program and four other actions intended to (1)
clarify guidance on the criteria to be used by USSTRATCOM mission
organizations in declaring full operating capability, (2) improve
evaluation of the command's longer-term progress in its mission areas,
(3) provide more complete guidance to its service component
organizations, and (4) strengthen its external communications with
other organizations and commands. DOD, in its comments on a draft of
this report, generally agreed with our three recommendations regarding
U.S. Joint Forces Command's support of USSTRATCOM's exercise program.
DOD disagreed with our four other recommendations. In its comments, DOD
stated that measures are already in place that address the issues
raised by the report. We disagree that the actions taken by USSTRATCOM
to date fulfill the intent of our recommendations and are complete.
While USSTRATCOM has taken some positive actions on these issues, we do
not believe that the command's actions go far enough in providing a
clear and transparent process for evaluating the command's progress in
implementing its mission areas, provide more complete guidance to its
mission and service component organizations, and strengthen its
external communications with other organizations and commands. For
example, while USSTRATCOM organizations routinely conduct outreach
activities to promote its missions and capabilities, we found that
these activities are often not well coordinated and consistently
conducted to achieve the most optimal benefit for the command.
USSTRATCOM commander's summary reports prepared after its two most
recent Global Lightning exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the
command develop a comprehensive outreach strategy to increase
understanding among other combatant commands about USSTRATCOM's
capabilities. However, command officials told us that the command does
not have any current plans to develop such a strategy. Additionally,
because of the importance of the command's new role in expanding the
military options for addressing emerging threats, we continue to
believe that creation of a longer-term, comprehensive, results-oriented
management process is needed that would improve transparency and
accountability of the extent to which the command is achieving the
desired outcomes of its overall goals and objectives in each of its
mission areas. Therefore, we are now suggesting that Congress consider
requiring the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop such a
process and report to Congress on command's progress in achieving
desired outcomes. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix V and our evaluation of its comments is on page 38.
Background:
USSTRATCOM's global missions provide a wide range of capabilities that
are intended to respond to a dramatically changing security environment
brought about by emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric threats
to U.S. national security. Unlike the command's nuclear deterrence and
space operations missions, the command's global strike; integrated
ballistic missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; information operations; global command and control; and
combating weapons of mass destruction missions had not been previously
assigned to a unified command. These newer missions have been
performed, mostly ad hoc, by multiple DOD organizations and the
military services but did not have a primary joint sponsor and central
focus within DOD.
The command's most recent reorganization, begun in late 2004, shifted
the day-to-day planning and execution responsibility for most of its
missions from its headquarters to several new subordinate
organizations. USSTRATCOM intends that its latest organizational
construct will provide greater focus, continuity, and performance for
its missions and better accommodate the execution of the command's
global responsibilities by reducing organizational layers and enabling
communication and information to flow more easily from the most senior
levels of leadership to those producing the information. The command
envisions that this new organizational construct will reduce the cycle
time for reaching and implementing decisions for its missions, increase
the effectiveness of the products and services it provides in support
of the regional combatant commands, and provide improved access to all
of the command's capabilities. USSTRATCOM, for example, has recently
established a joint space operations center, under its Joint Functional
Component Command for Space and Global Strike, to more effectively
respond to requests from regional combatant commands for space
capabilities. As shown in figure 1, the current USSTRATCOM organization
is comprised of a command headquarters, service component or supporting
commands, joint functional component commands, centers, and task
forces.
Figure 1: USSTRATCOM Organization:
[See PDF for image]
Source: USSSTRATCOM.
Notes: C2= command and control; JFCC= Joint Functional Component
Command; WMD= weapons of mass destruction.
[End of figure]
Under the new organization, USSTRATCOM's headquarters would focus
primarily on overseeing tasks for command and control; strategic-level
integration; and advocacy, including developing strategy and plans,
managing command and control operations and support, and advocating for
mission capabilities. It also has responsibility for designating
objectives; assigning missions, tasks, forces, and resources; defining
policy and concepts; and providing direction to the command's
subordinate organizations. Additionally, USSTRATCOM headquarters has
responsibility for planning and deploying forces for the command's
nuclear mission.
The reorganization created four new joint functional component commands
for (1) space and global strike; (2) integrated missile defense; (3)
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and (4) network
warfare. These commands have day-to-day responsibilities for
operational and tactical-level planning and execution and management of
forces. The new organization also includes the USSTRATCOM Center for
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joint Information Operations
Center, and Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations that work
with the command, the unified commands, and mission partners to provide
operational solutions to mission-related problems.
The command has also geographically aligned many of its subordinate
organizations with supporting military services and Defense agencies to
leverage the expertise and resources in their respective mission areas.
For example, the command has partnered and co-located its Joint
Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance with the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Washington,
D.C., area to take advantage of the agency's capabilities and improve
access and coordination with DOD and national intelligence agencies. To
further strengthen the partnership between the organizations, the
commander of the component command is also the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency. In response to intelligence information requests
from the combatant commanders, the agency would globally prioritize
intelligence collection requirements and the joint functional component
command would then prioritize and task the appropriate intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to best meet those
requirements. Appendix IV provides additional information about the
command's key mission organizations.
Additionally, the reorganization established new command relationships
with the military services to better focus service support. USSTRATCOM
accesses capabilities from each of the services through its three
service component commands--the Army Forces Strategic Command, Air
Force Forces Strategic Command, and Marine Corps Forces Strategic
Command--and the Commander, U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command. Unlike the
other services, the Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting command
rather than a designated service component command to
USSTRATCOM.[Footnote 5] However, Fleet Forces Command's overarching
responsibilities in supporting USSTRATCOM are consistent with those of
the other service components. Each service command acts as the primary
focal point for its respective service capabilities and has
responsibilities for ensuring that forces provided to USSTRATCOM are
organized, trained, and equipped to support the command in carrying out
its missions and providing the administrative chain of command and
control for its respective service forces.
Because of its expanded set of missions, USSTRATCOM's budget has grown
significantly from $276.8 million of total obligation authority in then-
year dollars in fiscal year 2003 to $500.4 million in fiscal year 2006,
excluding appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM service
component commands and other supporting agencies.[Footnote 6] The
command's annual budget is expected to increase to $551.4 million by
fiscal year 2011. Table 1 details the command's historic and projected
budget by major appropriations account from fiscal years 2003 through
2011. The command's budget is comprised mostly of operation and
maintenance funding, with lesser amounts of research and development
and procurement funding associated with programs for intelligence,
information operations, network warfare, command and control, and
planning systems. Appendix I provides more details about USSTRATCOM's
budget.
Table 1: USSTRATCOM Historical and Projected Budgets from Fiscal Years
2003 through 2011:
Total obligation authority in millions of then-year dollars.
Appropriations account: Operation and Maintenance;
Fiscal year: 2003: $253.2;
Fiscal year: 2004: $353.5;
Fiscal year: 2005: $408.6;
Fiscal year: 2006: $417.3;
Fiscal year: 2007: $438.6;
Fiscal year: 2008: $442.6;
Fiscal year: 2009: $457.9;
Fiscal year: 2010: $467.6;
Fiscal year: 2011: $477.6.
Appropriations account: Procurement;
Fiscal year: 2003: 23.6;
Fiscal year: 2004: 44.3;
Fiscal year: 2005: 45.0;
Fiscal year: 2006: 33.9;
Fiscal year: 2007: 31.9;
Fiscal year: 2008: 35.3;
Fiscal year: 2009: 39.0;
Fiscal year: 2010: 34.3;
Fiscal year: 2011: 34.9.
Appropriations account: Research and Development;
Fiscal year: 2003: 0;
Fiscal year: 2004: 8.8;
Fiscal year: 2005: 36.2;
Fiscal year: 2006: 49.2;
Fiscal year: 2007: 51.4;
Fiscal year: 2008: 37.6;
Fiscal year: 2009: 34.9;
Fiscal year: 2010: 38.3;
Fiscal year: 2011: 38.9.
Total[A];
Fiscal year: 2003: $276.8;
Fiscal year: 2004: $406.6;
Fiscal year: 2005: $489.9;
Fiscal year: 2006: $500.4;
Fiscal year: 2007: $521.9;
Fiscal year: 2008: $515.5;
Fiscal year: 2009: $531.8;
Fiscal year: 2010: $540.2;
Fiscal year: 2011: $551.4.
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Notes: Data for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 are actual command
expenditures, data for fiscal year 2006 are funding distributions, and
data for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 are funding projections current
as of the President's budget submission for fiscal year 2006. Totals do
not include Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps military personnel
appropriations and appropriations made to USSTRATCOM service components
and supporting agencies, because these appropriations are not managed
by the command in performing its operations.
[A] Totals may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM's authorized number of military and
civilian positions[Footnote 7] has increased by about 300. As of
October 2005, the command's overall authorized personnel level was
composed of 2,947 military and civilian positions, of which 91 percent
were filled. Of the 2,947 positions, military positions comprise about
72 percent of the positions (2,122), with the Air Force providing the
largest number of positions (1,256). Civilian positions make up the
remaining 28 percent (835). The command has begun to fill positions in
its new mission organizations from within its existing authorized
personnel levels by transferring positions from its headquarters to the
new organizations over a 3-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005.
The command's authorized personnel levels are made up of a relatively
few number of skills, although the mix of military skills has changed
since 2002. Additional information about USSTRATCOM's authorized
personnel levels is in appendix II.
USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, but Efforts
Are Incomplete:
USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions and has
taken a number of positive actions in each of its mission areas to
prepare or update concepts of operations, plans, guidance, and policy;
identify resources needed for mission planning and execution; and
establish an organization to more effectively manage its
responsibilities and provide the range of capabilities across its
mission areas. Many of the command's actions are consistent with the
useful practices and lessons learned with high-performing organizations
undergoing successful transformations that we have identified in our
past work. However, further steps are needed to build on this progress
in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by the President and
Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the command has
taken initial steps to include its new missions in its exercise
program, USSTRATCOM has not yet fully developed a robust exercise
program that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint
Forces Command, which can provide planning, training, and exercise
tools. In addition, while USSTRATCOM's leadership has provided general
guidance to its mission organizations, it has not provided specific
information or identified consistent requirements for achieving full
operating capability and most of the command's new mission
organizations have not established clear criteria for determining when
they have reached this milestone. Also, while the command has adopted
some key management principles, the command has not yet developed
strategic goals and outcome-oriented performance measures and criteria
for assessing results across the command and in each of its mission
areas.
USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing Its New Missions:
Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing
its new missions and has taken a wide range of positive actions to
integrate these missions into its organization, such as developing
various plans, concepts, and guidance; establishing procedures and
processes; identifying personnel and funding resources; developing new
relationships; building communication networks; and providing
education, training, and exercises. For example, the command has
prepared concepts of operations for its missions and organization, such
as operations for network warfare and global integrated missile
defense, and has recently approved a concept of operations describing
the processes it will use in integrating its diverse capabilities and
providing warfighting options to regional combatant commands.
Additionally, USSTRATCOM has taken other actions, including (1)
establishing collaboration tools and processes to improve communication
for planning, execution, and evaluation among its organizations and
customers; (2) creating various processes and groups within the command
to advocate for the capabilities necessary to accomplish its missions,
such as advocating for modification of the Trident II missile to
provide an improved near-term conventional global strike capability;
and (3) upgrading and expanding its facilities, such as improvements to
the command's headquarters command center. The command has also taken
actions to demonstrate the value added of its missions for other
combatant commands and DOD organizations. For example, to implement its
mission responsibilities for preventing and defending against
intrusions into DOD's critical information network systems, the
command's Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations has recently
instituted stringent use controls and trained system users to improve
security and reduce vulnerabilities for these systems.
As its missions have matured, USSTRATCOM has also undertaken several
reorganizations to more effectively manage its responsibilities and
provide the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the
actions the command has taken to implement its latest reorganization
are consistent with the useful practices and lessons learned with high-
performing organizations undergoing successful transformations that we
have identified in our prior work, including establishing a matrixed,
horizontal organizational structure that provides a greater external
focus for its customers, forms partnerships with key organizations, and
openly shares information. As discussed earlier, its latest
reorganization intends to leverage essential competencies of associated
components and key supporting agencies and decentralize the
responsibility of its headquarters for the day-to-day planning and
execution of its primary mission areas to several interdependent
mission organizations. While the command's mission organizations differ
in the extent of their maturity, USSTRATCOM has focused considerable
attention over the past year on establishing their responsibilities,
command and agency relationships, and operational competencies, and
assigning personnel to these new organizations. Its senior leadership
has also taken an active and visible role in supporting the
organizational changes underway.
USSTRATCOM's Exercise Program Has Not Fully Integrated Support
Available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command:
USSTRATCOM has restructured its exercise program to better incorporate
its missions and has conducted a few training exercises involving all
of its missions and new organizations. While the command is taking
steps to address the challenges in more fully including its missions in
its exercises, it has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program
that integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces
Command's Joint Warfighting Center, which can provide planning,
training, and exercise tools.[Footnote 8]
Exercise Program Must Overcome Challenges:
USSTRATCOM restructured its exercise program in 2003. It began
incorporating its newer missions into its exercises beginning in
November 2004 and brought together all of its missions in the same
exercise in its two most recent exercises, Global Lightning in November
2005, and Global Thunder in April 2006. Global Lightning is an annual
USSTRATCOM-sponsored command-post exercise, which involves the
commander and his staff in testing and validating the communications
within and between headquarters and simulated forces in deterring a
military attack and employing forces as directed. The annual Global
Thunder exercise is the command's main nuclear deterrence field
training exercise, which uses actual forces in training commanders,
staff, and individual units at all levels of their warfare skills.
Another command-post exercise, Global Storm, is designed to cover the
command's missions that are most relevant in the early stages of
conflict, such as information operations and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. The command plans to conduct this
exercise annually depending on scheduling and resource considerations.
The command faces challenges in effectively executing its exercise
program across its missions and new organizations. However, the command
is taking some actions to overcome these challenges, and some of these
challenges should lessen over time as the command's missions and
organizations mature. First, many of the command's operational
concepts, directives, and instructions used in designing and executing
exercises have not yet been approved, developed, or revised to reflect
its new organization. For example, at the time of the November 2005
Global Lightning exercise, some USSTRATCOM mission organizations were
executing their processes and procedures without the benefit of
complete and approved doctrine because several key concepts of
operations for its missions, such as the concept of operations for
horizontally integrating its missions, were still in draft form.
According to USSTRATCOM officials, the command has to prepare plans for
an exercise many months in advance even if its doctrine continues to
evolve. The officials said that USSTRATCOM incorporates any changes to
doctrine and guidance as it develops its exercise plan, but these
changes are more difficult to make as the plan becomes more complete
and the exercise nears. A USSTRATCOM official told us that doctrine and
guidance should become more stable and change less frequently as the
command's missions, organization, and processes mature.
Second, several of the command's new mission organizations are still
being established, which has affected their ability to fully
participate in the command's recent exercises and identify exercise
objectives. For example, at the time of the November 2005 Global
Lightning exercise, the new joint functional component commands had
existed for less than 1 year, and the Center for Combating Weapons of
Mass Destruction had been established for only 3 months. According to
the Chief of Staff for the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance component, the component was not able to establish full
connectivity during the exercise because it was still operating out of
temporary facilities. Further, the new mission organizations were too
immature, did not have staff in place, and lacked the established
processes and procedures needed to plan their own objectives for the
November 2005 exercise, according to USSTRATCOM officials. Instead, the
new organizations' exercise objectives for the November 2005 Global
Lightning exercise were established by the command's headquarters and
linked to a broader set of critical tasks and responsibilities.
Moreover, while the command's Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction personnel participated extensively in the November 2005
Global Lightning exercise, no specific exercise objectives had been
developed for the center's mission area. To begin addressing the
challenge of increasing involvement of its new organizations in
exercise development, the command has advocated the establishment of an
exercise or training group within each of its mission organizations and
some groups have been created, such as in the space and global strike
and integrated missile defense components. Additionally, in preparation
for the next Global Lightning exercise in fall 2006, the mission
organizations plan to be more involved in preparing exercise objectives
for their mission areas and intend to send their personnel to training
workshops conducted by the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint
Warfighting Center to learn how to develop these objectives.
Third, the command has found it difficult to design an exercise that
fully covers all of its responsibilities because its missions are so
diverse and their relevancy to the exercise is dependent on the type
and stage of a particular crisis. USSTRATCOM's intent is to design its
exercises so as to integrate the unique and interdependent capabilities
of its global missions to provide a range of options throughout the
various stages of a crisis and possible conflict. For example, the
command has found that some of its missions, such as information
operations, quickly become overlooked during its exercises as events
move from crisis into actual conflict. Moreover, the command believes
that its exercise program needs to place greater emphasis on the early
stages of a crisis because much of USSTRATCOM's daily operations are
conducted before and just after a crisis has begun. To foster greater
inclusion of its missions into its exercises, the command used a series
of brief, scripted training events that preceded its first Global
Lightning exercise in November 2004 to provide opportunities to
incorporate some of its missions, particularly intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. During the November 2005 Global
Lightning exercise, the command incorporated a timeline that extended
from the early to the later stages of conflict to allow designers to
prepare a scenario suitable for a more complete range of the command's
missions. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, also has directed that
the annual Global Thunder exercise and other training events
incorporate multiple missions to provide additional evaluation
opportunities. Additionally, the command has designed its Global Storm
exercises to specifically focus on those missions that are most
pertinent before conflict begins.
Long-term U.S. Joint Forces Command Support Not Fully Identified:
USSTRATCOM has not fully made use of the exercise support available
from the U.S. Joint Forces Command. While USSTRATCOM has taken steps to
obtain greater assistance from the Joint Forces Command's Joint
Warfighting Center to help the command address its challenges in
executing a robust exercise program, the command and the center have
not reached agreement on the extent of support the center will provide.
Our past work has shown that robust exercise programs are important for
assessing and improving mission capabilities, particularly when
multiple organizations are involved in mission execution.[Footnote 9]
Moreover, DOD's recently issued Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD
Training[Footnote 10] supports an increased training focus for many
missions assigned to USSTRATCOM, including combating weapons of mass
destruction, global strike, information operations, and ballistic
missile defense.
U.S. Joint Forces Command has lead responsibility for joint force
training, and is responsible for helping combatant commanders to
identify training requirements and methods, and for assisting them with
executing exercises and other training events. As part of U.S. Joint
Forces Command, the Joint Warfighting Center provides support to
combatant commands in identifying requirements, objectives, methods,
and tools for planning, implementing, and evaluating exercises. The
center trains combatant command staff to better design exercise
objectives that are clearly linked to the command's essential tasks. It
can also send independent observer teams to an exercise to assess the
command's performance and prepare after-action reports and related
assessments. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
has overall responsibility for ensuring that DOD's joint training
programs and resources are sufficient to produce ready forces and
overseeing the implementation of DOD's training transformation
strategy.
USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain greater assistance from the Joint
Warfighting Center in recent exercises. The command, for example,
obtained limited support from the center during its April 2006 Global
Thunder exercise, including teams to observe the participation and
activities of its space and global strike component. However,
USSTRATCOM's requirements have not been typically identified far enough
in advance for the center to assign staff and commit resources in
providing the full range of requested support. For example, command
officials told us that USSTRATCOM sought extensive Joint Warfighting
Center support for the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, but the
center had already committed to supporting a U.S. Northern Command
exercise that was scheduled over the same time period. The center was
able to provide USSTRATCOM indirect support, such as providing
simulated video news clippings to add context to the events in the
exercise scenario, when the command linked its Global Lightning
exercise to the U.S. Northern Command exercise.
USSTRATCOM's relationship with the Joint Warfighting Center is still
developing. In the past, the center had a limited working relationship
with USSTRATCOM and involvement in its exercises because the command's
exercises had been largely focused on its nuclear deterrence mission,
which limited the involvement of other DOD organizations. As a result,
the center had not included the level of support for USSTRATCOM's
program that it provided to other combatant commands in its past plans.
However, to provide Joint Warfighting Center observers with access to
more areas and aspects of its exercises, including activities involving
the command's nuclear deterrence mission, USSTRATCOM is changing its
security procedures to grant center observers temporary clearances
during the exercises.
The Joint Warfighting Center's recent support for USSTRATCOM's exercise
program has helped the command to better define its requirements for
future support, but these requirements continue to evolve. USSTRATCOM
officials told us that since requirements for future support from the
center have traditionally been determined from prior support
experience, the command's limited relationship with the center in the
past and the recent restructuring of the command's exercise program
have not yet provided a basis for determining the support needed from
the center. The officials said that the specific requirements for the
center's assistance would be easier to determine as more exercises with
the center's involvement are completed. According to a USSTRATCOM
official, a key exercise objective in its April 2006 Global Thunder
exercise was to expose center personnel on a limited scale to the
command's exercise program. At the same time, the command would gain
exposure to the services provided by the center. A center official told
us that this type of interaction with the center would help USSTRATCOM
to better define and identify its future requirements for center
support.
Over the long term, USSTRATCOM plans to seek much greater support from
the center but has not yet fully defined its requirements. While the
Joint Warfighting Center currently supports only one of USSTRATCOM's
exercises each fiscal year, USSTRATCOM officials told us that the
center has committed to supporting both of its annual Global Lightning
and Global Thunder exercises for fiscal year 2007, including the use of
observation teams to help the command evaluate its performance.
However, as of March 2006, center officials told us it was unclear how
the center would adjust its current resources to support the November
2006 Global Lightning exercise because of the timing of that exercise
and its linkage to a U.S. Pacific Command exercise, for which the
center is already planning to provide support. In the long term, a
center official told us that while the center plans to provide greater
support to USSTRATCOM, the center can better plan and make resources
available if it is provided with well-defined requirements 3 to 5 years
in advance as other commands do. As a result, without fully providing
the U.S. Joint Forces Command with well-defined requirements to plan
the necessary resources to support USSTRATCOM's program, USSTRATCOM may
not be able to receive the supported needed to execute a robust
exercise program to effectively implement its missions.
New USSTRATCOM Organizations Lack Adequate Direction and Criteria for
Declaring Full Operating Capability:
USSTRATCOM had provided overall guidance to each of its subordinate
organizations for assessing two key milestones-initial operating
capability and full operating capability-used to implement these
organizations. However, this guidance does not fully establish clear
and well-documented objectives, goals, or criteria to use in
determining when these milestones have been achieved. Our prior work
shows that it is important that organizations undergoing major
transformations provide clear and complete guidance to subordinate
organizations on the requirements and expectations for successful
implementation of organizational changes. Each of the new subordinate
mission organizations has already declared initial operating
capability--the first milestone in implementing these organizations.
However, without applying specific criteria, such as the extent to
which mission organizations are staffed and trained and their mission
tasks implemented, in determining when full operating capability-the
second milestone-is achieved, the command may not have an accurate
understanding of the extent to which its mission organizations are
prepared to effectively carry out their missions.
After its most recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM issued implementation
directives that provide general guidance for establishing each of the
five new subordinate organizations. The directives broadly describe the
organizations' responsibilities, authorities, tasks, personnel and
resources requirements, and schedules for implementation. Additionally,
the command prepared an implementation plan that summarizes the
implementation directives and provides additional direction for
establishing the new subordinate organizations, including timelines and
implementation tasks. USSTRATCOM also created a reorganization
management team working group comprised of representatives from
headquarters and the new organizations to assist with and coordinate
the reorganization activities.
USSTRATCOM's implementation guidance[Footnote 11] calls for each new
organization to declare initial operating capability and full operating
capability, which are key milestones used to indicate the
organization's progress in implementing plans, procedures, and
structures and achieving the readiness required to perform its
missions. In addition, the guidance provides some general criteria to
follow before declaring initial operating capability or full operating
capability. For example, the guidance requires that prior to the
initial operating capability milestone, each new organization would
develop a mission statement; a detailed concept of operations for the
organization to manage and execute its assigned forces and missions,
including personnel requirements; and a task hand-over plan for the
transfer of functions from headquarters. The guidance also requires
formal updates on the new organizations' progress toward achieving the
milestones during quarterly command conferences.
Table 2 shows that each of the new organizations stated that it had
achieved initial operating capability in 2005. The Joint Functional
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense achieved full
operating capability in February 2006 and the other four organizations
plan to reach this milestone between September 2006 and January 2007.
Table 2: Key Dates for Establishing and Implementing New USSTRATCOM
Mission Organizations:
USSTRATCOM organization: JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense;
Date established: January 2005;
Date initial operating capability achieved: April 2005;
Date full operating capability planned or achieved: February 2006.
USSTRATCOM organization: JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance;
Date established: January 2005;
Date initial operating capability achieved: May 2005;
Date full operating capability planned or achieved: September 2006.
USSTRATCOM organization: JFCC-Space and Global Strike;
Date established: January 2005;
Date initial operating capability achieved: November 2005;
Date full operating capability planned or achieved: December 2006.
USSTRATCOM organization: JFCC-Network Warfare;
Date established: January 2005;
Date initial operating capability achieved: September 2005;
Date full operating capability planned or achieved: January 2007.
USSTRATCOM organization: USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of
Mass Destruction;
Date established: August 2005;
Date initial operating capability achieved:
December 2005; Date full operating capability planned or achieved:
December 2006.
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Notes: Dates as of June 2006. JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command.
[End of table]
While the implementation guidance provides general criteria for
achieving initial and full operating capability, it lacks clarity and
specificity for reaching these milestones. The Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, has delegated authority for establishing the new
mission organizations and decisions for declaring initial and full
operating capability to the senior leaders of these organizations.
Headquarters representatives of the reorganization management team told
us that a good deal of subjectivity is involved in deciding when each
milestone has been achieved. In addition, we found that the commander
or director of each new organization has interpreted the milestones
differently when developing the organization's approach and assessment
criteria for achieving the milestones. For example, the criteria used
by each organization to determine initial operating capability last
year varied greatly among the organizations:
* The commander of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
component declared reaching the milestone based on such factors as the
component having its deputy commander in place, establishing the
component's online Web portal that facilitates external communication
across various classified links, and beginning its intelligence
campaign planning support for three regional combatant commands.
* The commander of the integrated missile defense component declared
reaching the milestone based on completing preparation of several
documents, for example, ballistic missile defense emergency activation
plans and a supporting plan for one of the command's contingency plans;
undertaking the process of making operational several required
functions, such as ballistic missile defense situational awareness and
operational oversight of the ballistic missile defense command and
control system; and assuming responsibility for performing most of its
directed tasks.
* The acting deputy commander of the network warfare component told us
the component declared initial operating capability on the basis that
its mission responsibilities were already being performed by a
predecessor organization that became the new component.
* Space and global strike component officials told us that the
component based its initial operating capability decision largely on
the results of its performance in events before and during USSTRATCOM's
November 2005 Global Lightning exercise. However, the component did not
publish and make available the criteria that would be used to evaluate
the component's performance during the exercise, according to the
component's chief of staff.
Similarly, the objectives, goals, and criteria that would be used for
determining full operating capability vary among the organizations.
According to network warfare component officials, the component plans
to base its full operating capability decision on 8 to 10 items that
were explained during a briefing to USSTRATCOM officials in early 2005,
which include the component having adequate staffing and funding; its
tactics, techniques, and procedures guidance approved; and its
functions, tasks, and authorities clearly defined. The chief of staff
for the space and global strike component told us that the component
has considerable criteria for evaluating full operating capability. For
example, several concepts of operations related to the component's
mission areas contain tasks that the component needs to perform. Other
criteria include such goals as setting up a training program for new
staff and developing a visual information panel in its command center.
However, the official said that the component has not clearly assembled
all of its criteria to make them readily accessible to those outside
the component. The integrated missile defense component, which declared
full operating capability in February 2006, used criteria that included
the component's assuming responsibilities and tasks delineated in the
USSTRATCOM implementation directive, completing facility construction,
getting staff trained and certified, developing approved joint mission
essential tasks, and initiating reporting of operational readiness. The
component considered its full participation in USSTRATCOM's November
2005 Global Lightning exercise and the incorporation of the lessons
learned from the exercise into its participation in a subsequent U.S.
Pacific Command exercise as critical factors for declaring full
operating capability.
Additionally, although the target dates for declaring full operating
capability are soon approaching, some of the new organizations have not
fully developed the criteria that will be used to assess their
milestone decisions. Although the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction plans to achieve the milestone in December
2006, center officials told us in February 2006 that the center is
still deciding how to define full operating capability. Similarly, the
deputy commander for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
component told us in April 2006 that the component, which plans to
reach the milestone in September 2006, has not fully decided on the
criteria it would use because the selection of criteria has not been a
high priority among the component's implementation activities. However,
the official told us that the component needs to have its criteria
approved about 3 months before it decides to declare its milestone
achieved.
USSTRATCOM Has Not Fully Implemented a Results-oriented Management
Approach for Evaluating its Performance:
USSTRATCOM has adopted some key management practices, but the command
has not yet fully developed a results-oriented management approach for
continuously assessing and benchmarking its performance in achieving
desired outcomes and for identifying actions to improve performance.
Our prior work and the work of others show that organizations
undertaking complex transformations can increase their likelihood of
success by adopting a results-oriented management framework, which
includes key management practices and results-oriented management tools
to guide implementation efforts and progress toward achieving desired
outcomes.[Footnote 12] These tools and practices include establishing
long-term goals and objectives and performance measures and criteria
for assessing results and value added; strong and inspirational
leadership to set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear,
consistent rationale for implementing the framework; and timelines to
achieve results. While USSTRATCOM uses different techniques to review
its progress in implementing its missions and responsibilities, these
techniques do not provide the range of quantifiable metrics and
criteria needed to fully assess the command's progress toward achieving
its goals and objectives and value added.
The command's senior leadership has taken an active role in
articulating and supporting the command's transformation, a factor that
we have identified in prior work as critical to success. The Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command, has addressed a variety of audiences to discuss
the need for changing the way the command is organized in order to be
more effective, and has described the needs and reasons for change in
command concepts of operations and guidance. USSTRATCOM has also
prepared guidance that assigns responsibility and describes the
processes for implementing and integrating its missions. For example,
to support its most recent reorganization, the command has prepared a
draft integrating guidance document intended to provide a consolidated,
objective framework describing how the command is organized, as well as
its responsibilities, relationships, and processes. It also has issued
a more detailed horizontal command-and-control integration concept of
operations to identify how it brings together all of its missions and
capabilities to support national objectives. Our prior work has shown
that successfully transforming organizations have leaders who define
and articulate a compelling reason for change; set the direction, pace,
and tone for transformation; and assign accountability for
results.[Footnote 13]
The command has also created a collection of first principles to better
align the command with national defense priorities, focus its efforts
for integrating and synchronizing its missions, and provide advocacy
for its missions as they mature. Table 3 provides USSTRATCOM's nine
principles, which include establishing a globally focused organization
built to collaborate with all elements of national power; establishing
operationally interdependent components; and embracing effects-based
operations. The command also identified areas of emphasis that contain
several key objectives for mission support, such as (1) for combating
weapons of mass destruction, integrate and enable capabilities across
the DOD enterprise; (2) in organizing for the global fight, embrace
horizontal integration; and (3) for global force management, optimize
the employment of low-density and high-demand intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.
Table 3: USSTRATCOM First Principles:
Principle: 1. Establish a globally focused organization built to
collaborate with all elements of national power.
Principle: 2. Focus USSTRATCOM headquarters on strategic-level command
and control, integration, and advocacy.
Principle: 3. Conduct decentralized operational/tactical-level planning
and execution through USSTRATCOM components.
Principle: 4. Establish operationally interdependent components.
Principle: 5. Exploit mission-area-unique competencies in other
organizations.
Principle: 6. Expand partnerships across departments, academia,
industry, and allies.
Principle: 7. Create a USSTRATCOM web of global capabilities with
multiple entry points.
Principle: 8. Leverage the full capabilities of a global command,
control, communications, and computer architecture.
Principle: 9. Embrace effects-based operations.
Source: USSTRATCOM.
[End of table]
However, USSTRATCOM has not yet developed clear, well-defined, outcome-
based goals and measures to indicate how the command will measure
success, track the progress it is making toward its goals, and give its
leaders critical information on which to base decisions for improving
the command's implementation efforts. While the command's first
principles and areas of emphasis provide direction for better focusing
its implementation efforts, these principles are process-oriented,
tactical goals, rather than long-term, results-oriented strategic goals
and objectives that can provide the basis for determining the command's
performance and progress.
Our prior work has shown that long-term strategic goals and objectives
are important for an organization to explain the results it expects,
what it intends to accomplish, and how these goals would be assessed.
Outcome-based performance measures should be objective and results
oriented with specific target levels to meet performance goals.
Measuring performance allows organizations to track progress toward
goals and provides crucial information on which to base organizational
and management decisions.[Footnote 14]
The command has adopted some processes and metrics to monitor its
performance and provide information on its progress in implementing its
missions; however, these processes and metrics are largely subjective
and do not provide the command with the full range of both quantitative
and qualitative outcome-based performance measures it needs to fully
assess progress in achieving its goals. Organizations use evaluation
and corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to
improve performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those
goals that were not met. In contrast, USSTRATCOM's current processes
result in largely subjective assessments and are intended to support
more limited purposes. For example, according to an official
responsible for coordinating the command's readiness reporting, the
command has adapted its readiness reporting process to include inputs
from each of the command's mission organizations and service
components. The official said that this process gives the USSTRATCOM
commander access to a broad perspective on the command's overall
readiness. However, the readiness reports resulting from the process
discuss the commander's subjective assessment of USSTRATCOM's ability
to execute its missions, based on short-term internal and external
factors affecting the command's operations. Similarly, the command's
annual training assessments are subjective evaluations, based on
observations of prior training, exercises, real-world operations, and
other factors, which are used to set priorities for future training
priorities.
USSTRATCOM senior officials told us that the command has not yet
established strategic goals and outcome-based performance metrics to
fully assess the command's progress because the command is still
sorting out the implementation of its new organizational construct.
Although command officials stated they believe such metrics are needed
and the command should begin to develop them, they have not yet
developed a process or assigned responsibility for developing metrics.
While the development of such metrics will present a significant
challenge due to the complex nature of the command's missions, such an
effort is needed so that the command can assess its progress and
identify areas that need further improvement. For example USSTRATCOM
officials believe they can and should develop metrics to assess the
extent to which they are efficiently allocating intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to optimize the use of high-
demand aircraft. Without developing strategic goals and the full range
of outcome-based performance measures, the command will lack a process
to evaluate its performance, identify areas that may need improvement,
and take corrective actions.
USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a Commandwide
Outreach Strategy:
USSTRATCOM has not clarified the roles and responsibilities of its
service component organizations and lacks a commandwide outreach
strategy for enhancing its relations with other DOD organizations.
Since its most recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM has provided some
guidance to its service component commands. However, the command's
guidance is not always specific and service officials believe that
additional guidance from USSTRATCOM would help to more clearly define
their responsibilities, expectations, and relationships with the
command, particularly with its new mission organizations. In addition,
USSTRATCOM lacks a commandwide strategy to effectively manage and
coordinate its external outreach activities with the large number of
commands and organizations it interacts with in executing its diverse
missions. Without clear service component guidance and a comprehensive
communications strategy, USSTRATCOM's service components will not have
complete information on the command's expectations for their support
and the command may not have the most effective approach for building
relationships, promoting its capabilities, and providing the most
effective level of support to other combatant commands and
organizations.
USSTRATCOM's Guidance to Its Service Components Is Not Specific:
While USSTRATCOM has provided broad guidance to its service components,
Army, Navy, and Air Force component officials told us they lack
specific guidance that clarifies and provides more detailed information
on their responsibilities, requirements, expectations, and
relationships with the command and, particularly, its newer mission
organizations. Our prior work has shown that it is important for
organizations undergoing significant change to provide clear and
complete guidance to their subordinate organizations. Without clearly
defined, specific guidance, it can be difficult for the service
components to effectively organize, plan, and identify resources to
provide the expected support. Moreover, the lack of this guidance can
also limit the understanding that USSTRATCOM's headquarters and its
organizations have about the components' organizations, organizational
relationships, and range of support they provide.
USSTRATCOM has provided guidance to its service components in its
concepts of operations, orders, plans, and other documents and through
meetings and other activities between command and service component
staffs, such as conferences, videoconferences, and command exercises.
Guidance and expectations have also been provided during routine and
crisis-oriented collaborative planning[Footnote 15] activities among
the command's organizations and service components. However, USSTRATCOM
Army component officials told us that much of the command's overall
guidance, such as USSTRATCOM's standing operational order for its
global strike mission and its overarching concept of operations, is too
general and often does not provide enough specific information for the
service components to fully understand the command's requirements and
expectations.
Our review of USSTRATCOM guidance found that key guidance lists the
overarching responsibilities for the command's service components, such
as providing support for the command's operations and planning and
advocacy activities. Some mission-specific guidance, such as the
concept of operations for the space and global strike missions,
provides additional responsibilities for each of the components that
relate to a specific mission area or organization. In particular, this
concept of operations assigns the Air Force service component
responsibility for establishing an operations center for global strike
planning and execution, and for performing day-to-day command and
control of space forces assigned to the command. In contrast, much of
the remaining guidance we reviewed provided few specific details on
what is expected or required to carry out the components'
responsibilities, such as the type of military personnel skills,
planning systems, or secure communications lines that are needed to
effectively support the command.
Additionally, several guidance documents we reviewed that contain
references to the services are still in draft, such as the command's
integrating guidance, or need revision as a result of the command's
recent reorganization. For example, in 2004 the command drafted a
concept for integrating its missions that included detailed annexes
describing the how the command's service components were to monitor
global events affecting U.S. interests; analyze, evaluate, and
communicate information; predict likely consequences of military
operations on U.S. and adversary forces; and plan and execute
operations in support of each of the command's mission areas. However,
according to a USSTRATCOM official the command leadership decided not
to include specific expectations for its service components following
the decision to reorganize the command and establish the joint
functional component commands in late 2004. As a result, the command's
most recently drafted guidance does not yet completely reflect service
responsibilities and expectations and unique support that may be
required to support USSTRATCOM's new organization. According to
USSTRATCOM officials, the command does not plan to provide additional
formal guidance to its service component organizations at this time.
The relationships between the command's service components and new
subordinate mission organizations are still evolving. Army component
officials told us that USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations have not
yet developed a full understanding of the Army service component's
responsibilities, and as a result, USSTRATCOM's expectations may not be
consistent with the support that can be provided by the Army. For
example, the acting chief of staff for USSTRATCOM's Army service
component told us that according to the Joint Staff's Unified Action
Armed Forces policy publication,[Footnote 16] which clarifies all
command relationships and other authorities, the Army's service
component has responsibility for providing Army personnel with training
in service-related tasks. The official told us the USSTRATCOM command
assumed that training in the use of joint systems, such as secure
communications lines operated by the USSTRATCOM command for integrated
missile defense, would be done by the service component. However, the
respective USSTRATCOM command is responsible for providing any joint
training to service personnel. The official said the Army could provide
this training if USSTRATCOM defined this requirement in its guidance.
Army component officials also told us that the Army can better respond
to USSTRATCOM requirements when expectations are more clearly described
in guidance and related documents. For example, USSTRATCOM cited a
requirement in its draft concept of operations for a small Army
detachment to be assigned to USSTRATCOM's intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance command. The Army provided this type of detachment
based on that requirement. Similarly, the head of the Eighth Air
Force's air operations center, which is part of the USSTRATCOM Air
Force service component, told us that the component has clear guidance
about its responsibilities to provide direct support to USSTRATCOM's
space and global strike command, and therefore, has a clear
understanding of what is required to support the component. The space
and global strike command has provided information on the direct
support expected from the Air Force in its concept of operations.
However, the official said the requirements and expectations for
supporting other USSTRATCOM mission organizations, such as the Joint
Functional Component Commands for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance and Network Warfare, are not as clearly known because
USSTRATCOM has not yet provided guidance on the required Air Force
support for those organizations.
According to Navy Fleet Forces Command officials, USSTRATCOM has not
provided clear and specific guidance on the command's responsibilities
and expectations, despite its unique relationship to USSTRATCOM.
Officials of the Navy Fleet Forces Command told us that the Fleet
Forces Command has a unique relationship to USSTRATCOM because it is a
supporting command and not a traditional service component. The
officials said their command is not formally assigned to and under
USSTRATCOM's operational chain of command, but rather their command
provides advice to USSSTRATCOM on the best use of Navy forces and
capabilities in support of its missions. The officials said that clear
and specific guidance is necessary to provide an understanding of their
command's unique relationship to USSTRATCOM headquarters and
organizations. In March 2006, USSTRATCOM, in consultation with the
Fleet Forces Command, did issue a command instruction that clarifies
the Fleet Forces Command's relationship with USSTRATCOM and its
responsibilities, which include taking part in the command's
collaborative planning processes, participating in its exercise
program, and helping USSTRATCOM prepare its readiness review reports.
However, while this document helps to clarify the Navy component's
support responsibilities, it neither sets priorities for the Fleet
Forces Command nor includes mission-specific requirements.
According to service officials, USSTRATCOM's unique organization,
complex planning processes, and global focus are very different than
more traditionally organized combatant commands that have clearly
defined geographic areas of responsibility. In contrast to more
traditional regional combatant commands, USSTRATCOM has constructed a
collaborative planning process, which is globally focused, and involves
a much broader range of military capabilities. As this planning process
continues to evolve, the role and involvement of the service components
will change. For example, the director of the Army component's planning
and exercise group told us that USSTRATCOM's new mission organizations
have not always provided well-documented requirements for certain Army
capabilities, which has delayed the Army component's ability to provide
the needed capabilities to these organizations. The official told us
that in the summer of 2005 the Army component had difficulty in both
staffing its office and initially providing information operations
capabilities to support command missions because USSTRATCOM had not
documented the Army requirements for these capabilities. The Army
official said that although the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has
been satisfied with the Army's support for this mission area, greater
clarity about USSTRATCOM's expectations would have helped the Army
component to better identify its authorized personnel requirements and
ensure that the required Army capabilities were more quickly available.
Unlike the other service components, however, the Marine Corps Forces
component is satisfied with the guidance that has been provided,
according to a Marine Corps component official. The official said the
component does not need additional guidance at this time because the
component has a more limited role and fewer responsibilities than the
other services in supporting USSTRATCOM and its organizations. The
official said that the Marine Corps' component of about 20 people
largely serves as a conduit to USSTRATCOM to ensure Marine Corps
representation and provide inputs, when needed, on command issues.
USSTRATCOM Lacks a Coordinated, External Outreach Strategy:
While USSTRATCOM routinely conducts outreach with other combatant
commands and organizations, it lacks a common approach across the
command because it has not developed a comprehensive, commandwide
outreach strategy to effectively manage these activities. Without an
outreach strategy, the command and its organizations do not have a
consistent, coordinated approach to use in developing and expanding
relationships, educating other organizations on the command's
capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to
other commands and organizations.
In our prior work[Footnote 17] in identifying key practices adopted by
organizations undergoing successful transformations, we found that it
is essential for organizations to adopt a comprehensive communication
strategy that reaches out to customers and stakeholders and seeks to
genuinely engage them in the organization's transformation. In
particular, successfully transformed organizations have found that by
communicating information early and often, organizations are able to
build trust and increase understanding among their stakeholders about
the purpose of planned changes. Organizations use these communication
strategies to provide a common framework for conducting consistent and
coordinated outreach throughout their organizations by clearly
presenting the organization's rationale, specific objectives, and
desired outcomes of outreach efforts. These strategies also cover the
range of integrated information activities to be implemented and
clearly articulate how all the various components of the strategy will
be coordinated and managed in order to achieve the objectives most
efficiently and effectively. Additionally, outreach strategies provide
measurable criteria against which to evaluate the outcomes of
organizations' outreach efforts and determine whether any adjustments
are necessary.
Command Considers External Outreach Essential:
Because USSTRATCOM supports or is supported by a large number of
commands and organizations in executing its diverse set of global
missions, the command considers its external outreach efforts essential
to (1) develop effective relationships and communications, (2) promote
and educate others about the value of its missions and capabilities,
and (3) obtain information on how the command can best support other
organizations. USSTRATCOM and its organizations regularly use a wide
range of methods and activities to promote its missions and
capabilities to combatant commands, military services, and DOD and
other government organizations. These methods and activities include
conferences and symposia, exercises and training events, senior
leadership visits, exchange of liaison staff, routine meetings, and
voice and electronic communication. The command has also established a
strategic knowledge integration Web site, which is called SKIWeb, on
DOD's classified computer network to provide information about the
command and the status of its activities and allow open exchange among
its staff and other individuals with access to the network.
While USSTRATCOM officials told us that USSTRATCOM has developed good
working relationships with other combatant commands and organizations
across DOD since its establishment in 2002, they believe that the
command's missions, capabilities, and authorities are not yet fully
understood by others. The USSTRATCOM commander's summary report for its
November 2005 Global Lightning exercise states that while the command
has expended a great amount of effort in developing processes and
strategies to integrate the command's missions, the organizations it
supports, particularly other combatant commands, have a vague
understanding of the "value added" by USSTRATCOM capabilities. The
report states that USSTRATCOM's ability to provide capabilities and
influence global events are not clearly understood, nor do some other
commands' headquarters completely understand how to access that
capability. For example, in observing the Global Lightning exercise,
U.S. Central Command and other participants told us that they were
unsure of value added by USSTRATCOM in planning for global strike
operations in their theater. However, USSTRATCOM officials said
USSTRATCOM brings the full range of capability options into global
strike planning, particularly nonkinetic capability options[Footnote
18] such as computer network operations; other commands are just
beginning to see the potential value of these options.
Additionally, USSTRATCOM has also had to change the perceptions held by
other organizations that the command is responsible only for nuclear
deterrence, which was the case with the previous U.S. Strategic
Command, but has other essential missions that are global in scope and
span all levels of military operations. While some missions, such as
nuclear deterrence and military space, are well practiced and have
established histories and interactions with outside organizations,
others, such as its combating weapons of mass destruction and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, are less
mature and still evolving. Further, many of USSTRATCOM authorities,
responsibilities, and capabilities are still being refined, clarified,
and demonstrated to other organizations in exercises and training
events and in real-time military activities. For example, the deputy
commander of USSTRATCOM's intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance command told us that USSTRATCOM's evolving role in
providing support for decisions on allocating intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets is not yet clear to all of the
regional combatant commands. The official said that some combatant
commands have concerns about how USSTRATCOM responsibilities could
affect their ability to exercise operational and tactical control over
any assets assigned to their commands. According to the official, these
commands do not yet understand that USSTRATCOM's role is to provide
overall management for these assets rather than control their
operational use.
Moreover, DOD commands and organizations are still getting acquainted
with USSTRATCOM's new organizational construct, particularly the new
subordinate organizations that are responsible for the day-to-day
management of several command missions. The command's new organization
does not follow the headquarters-centric model, in which information
flows vertically, that is used by other combatant commands. According
to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, horizontal flows of
information and command and control run counter to traditional military
thinking, which prefers a vertical chain of command. While the new
organizational structure has the potential to greatly expand the
command's opportunities to conduct external outreach, relationships and
communication links are still being developed or reestablished with
other organizations.
Outreach Efforts Lack Common Approach:
Each of the command's organizations conduct numerous outreach
activities daily, but these efforts are often not well coordinated and
consistently conducted to achieve the most optimal benefit for the
command. We also found that USSTRATCOM does not have an approach for
comprehensively collecting information on the needs and priorities of
the combatant commands and other stakeholders who use its capabilities,
information which USSTRATCOM could then use to determine how it can
provide the most effective level of support.
USSTRATCOM has recognized the need to develop a comprehensive outreach
strategy to increase understanding among other combatant commands about
the specific capabilities and contributions that the command can
provide to their operations. Both of the command's summary reports for
its October 2004 and November 2005 Global Lightning exercises
recommended development of an outreach strategy for identifying
USSTRATCOM capabilities for the benefit of combatant commands and
stakeholders. The November 2005 report recommended that the strategy
provide an integrated methodology for conducting effective outreach and
education of the command's capabilities. The report also recommended
(1) improving the command's SKIWeb Web site to allow outside users to
more easily identify capabilities, (2) providing briefings and seminar
support to the Defense and interagency community, and (3) developing
outreach products to provide key information about the command. The
report states that much of the understanding and credibility of the
command can be achieved though an effective outreach plan that is
focused at other commands, at the interagency level, and with the
services to demonstrate and provide understanding about its global
support capabilities. USSTRATCOM headquarters officials told us that
the command does not have any current plans to develop an outreach
strategy as recommended in each of the two exercise reports.
To provide the most effective level of support to other combatant
commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command recently developed an approach that
could serve as a best practice in identifying the priorities of the
commands it supports for inclusion in an external outreach strategy.
Under U.S. Joint Forces Command's approach, the command asks each of
the other combatant commands to provide a list of its top priorities
for the type and level of support needed from the command in the coming
year. These lists are incorporated into the command's annual plans and
are used to make adjustments in its activities and resources to best
meet the needs of its customers. During the year, the command schedules
periodic updates with staffs of the other commands to determine to what
extent the command is addressing these priorities or whether the
priorities have changed. A USSTRATCOM headquarters official responsible
for coordinating the command's priorities with the U.S. Joint Forces
Command told us that approach has been helpful for USSTRATCOM in
communicating the command's priorities for support. The official said
that USSTRATCOM added to the effectiveness of the approach by preparing
a detailed matrix that identified and ranked the command's priorities
and provided contact information for command staff.
Conclusions:
USSTRATCOM has been assigned a new role in providing the President and
the Secretary of Defense with an expanded set of military options to
more effectively respond to emerging global, transregional, and
asymmetric threats to U.S. national security, including those involving
weapons of mass destruction. While the command has made progress in
implementing its global missions, its ability to strengthen
implementation efforts and ensure that its leadership has critical
information on the effectiveness of its missions and organizations will
continue to be limited until it identifies long-term support
requirements for its exercise program; establishes clear, consistent
criteria for assessing the establishment of its newest mission
organizations; and fully implements a results-oriented approach for
evaluating its progress. The U.S. Joint Forces Command offers a range
of capabilities and resources for supporting command exercises. Until
it clearly identifies the long-term support it requires from the U.S.
Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Forces Command incorporates these
requirements into its plans, USSTRATCOM will continue to lack a robust
exercise program, which is essential for evaluating its capabilities
and identifying areas in need of improvement. Additionally, absent
clear, consistent guidance from the command, four new mission
organizations that have not yet achieved full operating capability are
establishing their own criteria for this milestone, which results in
different understandings of what it means to reach this milestone and
how it would be evaluated. Without establishing clear, consistent
criteria at major points in implementation, the command cannot create a
foundation on which to assess and measure the success of these
organizations even after full operating capability has been declared.
Further, while the command has adopted some elements of a results-
oriented management approach, without a process that includes criteria
and benchmarks for measuring the progress toward mission goals at all
levels of its organization, the command will be limited in its ability
to adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding its mission areas,
measure the success of its efforts, and target shortfalls and gaps and
suggest corrective actions, including any needed adjustments to future
goals and milestones.
Similarly, without complete and clearly articulated expectations and
requirements, the service components will not have the information
needed to fully determine the personnel, resources, and capabilities
required to support the command and respond to its requests and tasks
in a timely way. In addition, in the absence of a commandwide
communications strategy to conduct consistent, coordinated outreach to
other commands and organizations, USSTRATCOM cannot effectively develop
and expand relationships, foster education about its capabilities, and
provide the most effective level of support to other commands and
organizations. Lastly, without incorporating into its external outreach
strategy a systematic tool to help identify the priorities of the
combatant commands and organization it supports--similar to one used by
the U.S. Joint Forces Command--USSTRATCOM is limited in its ability to
fully address the priorities for support of the other commands and
organizations, improve feedback, and identify resources needed to
respond to these priorities.
Recommendations:
To better determine and obtain the assistance that can be provided by
the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center in supporting
USSTRATCOM's exercise program, we recommend the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to fully identify and
request in a timely manner the long-term services and resources
required from the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center
to support the command's program and to reach agreement with the U.S.
Joint Forces Command on the support to be provided. We further
recommend that the Secretary direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
(1) in the near term, to make any possible adjustments among the Joint
Warfighting Center's current resources to more fully support
USSTRATCOM's exercise program; and (2) in the long term, incorporate
USSTRATCOM requirements for support in the center's plans to provide
the full range of assistance necessary to help USSTRATCOM execute a
robust exercise program.
To strengthen USSTRATCOM's efforts to implement its missions and
provide greater visibility of its progress, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to
take the following four actions:
* Provide clear and complete guidance to the Joint Functional Component
Commands for Space and Global Strike, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance, and Network Warfare, and the USSTRATCOM Center for
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction that clearly defines full
operating capability and provides specific, common criteria for
determining what is required and how it will be assessed. This guidance
should be developed, in consultation with these organizations, before
each organization declares full operating capability.
* Develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management process for
continuously assessing and benchmarking the command's overall progress
in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to
enhance the command's efforts to implement and integrate its missions.
Develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate
performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down through
the command; assign clear leadership with accountability and authority
to implement and sustain the process; and develop and ensure that goals
and objectives are clear and achievable and timelines are established.
Set a specific time frame for completing development of this process.
* Provide additional guidance to the command's service components that
clearly defines and provides more specific information about their
responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and expectations for
supporting the command's headquarters and subordinate mission
organizations. Set a specific time frame for approval of this guidance.
* Develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to guide
and coordinate USSTRATCOM's efforts to conduct outreach with other
combatant commands and Defense and other organizations to develop
effective relationships and communications, promote and educate others
about the value of its mission and capabilities, and obtain information
on how the command can best support other commands and organizations.
This strategy should include the command's rationale, specific
objectives, desired outcomes, and strategies for conducting outreach
with other commands and organizations, and criteria against which the
command can evaluate the success of its efforts.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Given the importance of the new role assigned to USSTRATCOM by the
President and the Secretary of Defense to provide an expanded set of
military options to more effectively respond to emerging threats to
U.S. national security, Congress should consider requiring the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop a longer-term,
comprehensive and transparent, results-oriented management process for
continuously assessing and benchmarking the command's overall progress
in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to
enhance the command's efforts to effectively carry out its missions, as
outlined in our recommendation to DOD. In developing this process, the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should:
* develop and ensure that long-term goals and objectives are clear and
achievable and milestones and timelines for achieving desired outcomes
are established;
* develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate
performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down through
the command; and:
* assign clear leadership with accountability and authority to
implement and sustain the process.
The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should set a specific time frame
for developing and implementing this process. Additionally, the
Commander should periodically report to Congress on the command's
progress in achieving desired outcomes.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD's Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD generally
agreed with our three recommendations regarding U.S. Joint Forces
Command's support of USSTRATCOM's exercise program. DOD did not agree
with our other four recommendations that USSTRATCOM provide clear and
complete guidance to its joint functional component commands on
achieving full operating capability; develop a comprehensive results-
oriented management process to assess and benchmark the command's
overall progress; provide additional guidance to its service
components; and develop and implement a commandwide communications
strategy. In regard to these four recommendations, DOD commented that
measures are already in place that address the issues raised by the
report. We disagree that the actions taken by USSTRATCOM to date
fulfill the intent of our recommendations and are complete. While
USSTRATCOM has taken some positive actions on these issues, we do not
believe that the command's actions go far enough, are specific enough,
or are sufficiently transparent in improving evaluation of the
command's progress in implementing its mission areas, providing more
complete guidance to its mission and service component organizations,
and strengthening its external communications with other organizations
and commands. Therefore, we believe our recommendations are still
warranted and we have added a matter for congressional consideration
for Congress to direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to
develop and implement a longer-term results-oriented management process
for assessing the command's overall progress and periodically reporting
to Congress its progress in achieving desired outcomes. DOD's comments
are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V and more specific
information on DOD's comments on our recommendations and our assessment
of these comments follows below.
DOD generally agreed with our recommendations regarding USSTRATCOM's
exercise program. Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that
USSTRATCOM should identify and request, in a timely manner, the long-
term services and resources required from the U.S. Joint Forces
Command's Joint Warfighting Center to support USSTRATCOM's exercise
program. In its comments, DOD said that while the center had provided
limited exercise planning, execution, and assessment support to
USSTRATCOM, the command and the center have steadily built a
relationship over the past year to support USSTRATCOM's seven mission
areas and are jointly solving problems that hindered the center's
support in previous USSTRATCOM exercises. The department partially
agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
in the near term make any possible adjustments among the Joint
Warfighting Center's current resources to more fully support
USSTRATCOM's program. DOD commented that the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is currently
conducting an in-depth review of the joint training programs to
determine how it can provide better flexibility and synergism through
joint training investments. DOD agreed with our recommendation that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the long term, incorporate
USSTRATCOM's requirements for support into the Joint Warfighting
Center's plans. DOD commented that its current review of joint training
programs intends to match, to the greatest extent possible, joint
training requirements and resources, including the training support
provided by the U.S. Joint Forces Command. DOD also said while
USSTRATCOM's requirements must compete with other training priorities
for joint training funding, the center can better plan and make
resources available if USSTRATCOM provides the center with well-defined
requirements 3 to 5 years in advance.
DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to its joint functional
component commands that clearly defines full operating capability and
provides specific, common criteria for determining what is required and
how it will be assessed. DOD commented that the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, has provided specific guidance in the form of a
tailored implementation directive that assigns specific duties,
responsibilities, tasks, and authorities to the components. DOD also
said that the Commander is continuing to work closely with the
component commanders to develop, implement, and assess the measures of
progress by which full operating capability will be declared and will
report to the Secretary of Defense when the milestone is achieved for
each mission area. We believe that the command's tailored
implementation directives do not go far enough in providing clear and
specific criteria for assessing whether specific duties,
responsibilities, tasks, and authorities assigned to each organization
have been met. For example, during our review we found that the
components had different interpretations as to what criteria might
apply for declaring full operating capability. We believe that it is
important for USSTRATCOM and its organizations to have a clear
definition of full operating capability and the criteria, or measures
of progress, in place as early as possible, by which the achievement of
the milestone will be assessed for each of the new mission
organizations. These criteria should be complete and readily accessible
so the command and its mission organizations will have confidence in
the extent that planned capabilities will be achieved at full operating
capability. After declaring full operating capability, each of the new
organizations will require further actions to more completely implement
and enhance their mission capabilities and responsibilities.
Establishing clear, documented criteria for assessing and measuring
success for declaring full operating capability can provide a baseline
and a sound foundation for assessing the future progress of the
organization in carrying out its mission responsibilities.
DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM develop a
comprehensive results-oriented management process for continually
assessing and benchmarking the command's overall progress in achieving
desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to enhance the
command's efforts to implement and integrate its missions. In its
comments, DOD stated that a variety of directives, including concepts
of operations, articulate the command's goals and objectives. The
department also stated that the command conducts periodic exercises,
external inspections, and in-progress reviews to help assess the
command's effectiveness in making operational the assigned mission
areas and achieving stated objectives. While these actions by
USSTRATCOM may be helpful to the command's leadership, they do not
represent a comprehensive and transparent plan for assessing progress
in achieving desired outcomes. Moreover, DOD interpreted our
recommendation as being directed at the metrics to be used by the
command's organizations in declaring full operating capability for its
missions, which are scheduled to occur by early 2007. However, our
recommendation calls for creation of a longer-term, comprehensive,
results-oriented management process that would provide the command with
a framework for continuously assessing its future progress in achieving
desired outcomes in each of its mission areas and the command's overall
goals and objectives. Because of the importance of the command's new
role in providing expanded military options for addressing emerging
threats, we continue to believe that creation of a results-oriented
management process that establishes long-term goals and objectives,
milestones and timelines for achieving desired outcomes, performance
measures that clearly demonstrate performance results, and clear
leadership to implement and sustain the process is needed. Therefore,
we have included a matter for congressional consideration to require
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop such a process that
would improve transparency and accountability of the extent to which
the command is achieving desired outcomes in each of its mission areas.
DOD also did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to the command's service
components that clearly defines and provides more specific information
about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and
expectations for supporting the command's headquarters and subordinate
mission organizations. In its comments, DOD said that the duties and
responsibilities of USSTRATCOM and its service components are
documented in Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. The
department also stated that day-to-day liaison activities between the
command and the services are provided by on-site service component
representatives. While broad guidance is provided in the Joint Staff's
Unified Action Armed Forces publication on the relationships and
authorities of the military services in supporting combatant commanders
and by USSTRATCOM in various documents, we continue to believe that
additional guidance from the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to the
command's service components is needed to provide clear and specific
information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships,
and expectations for supporting the command's headquarters and
subordinate mission organizations, particularly since the components
have expressed a desire for further guidance from the command. As
USSTRATCOM continues to implement its new organization and develop
capabilities in each of its mission areas, this additional guidance can
strengthen relationships with the services by (1) providing better
information for the components in effectively organizing, planning, and
identifying resources to support the command; and (2) increasing
understanding among the command's headquarters and its organizations
about the components' organizations, organizational relationships, and
the range of support they provide.
Lastly, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM develop
and implement a commandwide communications strategy to guide and
coordinate the command's efforts to conduct outreach with other
combatant commands and Defense and other organizations. DOD commented
that USSTRATCOM provides and promotes insight to all its activities
through its classified Web site; maintains a senior officer
representative at each of the combatant commands and with the Joint
Staff; and, as a supporting command, conducts continuous liaison
activities with other combatant commands. DOD also stated that Web-
based mission area training for USSTRATCOM missions is available on the
U.S. Joint Forces Command's Web site. However, as discussed in our
report, we found that while USSTRATCOM organizations routinely conduct
outreach activities to promote its missions and capabilities, these
activities are often not well coordinated and consistently conducted to
achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. Both of USSTRATCOM
commander's summary reports prepared after its two most recent Global
Lightning exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the command
develop a comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding
among other combatant commands about the specific capabilities and
contributions that the command can provide to their operations. The
November 2005 Global Lightning report also recommended that the
strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting effective
outreach and education of the command's capabilities. Therefore, we
continue to believe that USSTRATCOM needs a commandwide communications
strategy to provide a framework to effectively manage these activities
and a common approach for conducting consistent and coordinated
outreach across the command.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Commander, U. S. Joint
Forces Command. We will make copies available to others upon request.
In addition the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-
4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Staff members who made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the United States
Strategic Command's Budget:
This appendix provides information on trends and changes we identified
in the United States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) historic and
projected budget, from fiscal years 2003 through 2011.
USSTRATCOM's Budget Has Grown Significantly Since Its Establishment:
Since its establishment in fiscal year 2003, USSTRATCOM's budget has
grown significantly, from $276.8 million of total obligation authority
in then-year dollars to $500.4 million in fiscal year 2006, excluding
military personnel funds. The command's budget comprises mostly
operation and maintenance funding, with lesser amounts of research and
development and procurement funding associated with programs for
intelligence, information operations, network warfare, command and
control, and planning systems. Funding projections prepared to support
the fiscal year 2006 President's budget submission show that
USSTRATCOM's budget is expected to decline between fiscal years 2007
and 2008, from $521.9 million to $515.5 million, as research and
development funding is reduced. However, beginning in fiscal year 2009,
the command's budget is expected to increase each year to $551.4
million in fiscal year 2011, as operation and maintenance funding
increases by $35 million compared to the fiscal year 2008 projection.
Procurement funding projections remain relatively stable through fiscal
year 2011.
USSTRATCOM officials told us that the command's budget projections have
changed since the President's fiscal year 2006 budget was submitted.
However, these changes, prepared to support the President's fiscal year
2007 budget submission, had not been finalized at the time our work was
completed in March 2006 because the Department of Defense (DOD) was
still making adjustments to the command's budget projections for fiscal
year 2007 and thereafter, even after the fiscal year 2007 budget was
submitted. USSTRATCOM officials expect that the command's annual
budgets for fiscal years 2007 though 2011 will be lower than the
projections prepared for the fiscal year 2006 budget submission. At the
same time, the command has been directed to allocate funding for new
activities that had not been part of the fiscal year 2006 submission,
including $11 million to $13 million per year in new total obligation
authority for mission activities for combating weapons of mass
destruction and about $7 million per year for missile defense
operations.
Budget Increases Reflect New Mission Responsibilities:
USSTRATCOM's budget increases have included new total obligation
authority to fund the command's new mission responsibilities. For
example, the President's fiscal year 2004 budget submission included
$78.7 million in new funding for USSTRATCOM to support additional
planning, command and control, and information operations
responsibilities that were assigned to the command following the
completion of DOD's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.[Footnote 19] About
$50.9 million of this request was for improvements to USSTRATCOM's
command and control systems, including $25.9 million to upgrade the
USSTRATCOM command center and about $10.5 million for a mobile command
center capability. Of the remaining $27.8 million, about $13.5 million
was for new information operations activities and $14.3 million was to
improve the command's planning systems. In addition to the funding
associated with the Nuclear Posture Review, the fiscal year 2004 budget
request included about $44.5 million for USSTRATCOM to support
classified programs formerly managed by the Joint Staff and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
The fiscal year 2005 and 2006 budget requests included USSTRATCOM
funding increases associated with new missions assigned to the command
in January 2003--global strike; integrated missile defense; command,
control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; and DOD information operations. To support these new
responsibilities, the fiscal year 2005 budget request included about
$61.8 million in new total obligation authority. This amount included
about $23 million in new operation and maintenance funding, which the
USSTRATCOM commander had discretion to allocate among the command's
missions, according to a command official. According to the official,
the fiscal year 2005 request also included about $15.3 million in new
funding to support activities at the Joint Information Operations
Center, and what would later become the Joint Task Force for Global
Network Operations and the Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The 2005 budget request
also included additional increases to the command's planning and
command and control systems. Similarly, the fiscal year 2006 budget
request included about $33.7 million in new funding, mainly to support
new information operations programs.
USSTRATCOM Is Determining How Funding Will Be Allocated Among Its
Missions:
USSTRATCOM has recently developed an internal model to determine how
its programs will be allocated to its various mission organizations and
headquarters activities in DOD's budget and future funding plan.
According to a USSTRATCOM official, the model is designed to help the
command manage and prioritize its funding allocations and understand
the risks associated with any changes made to its future funding plans.
The command is using the model to allocate fiscal year 2006 funding to
USSTRATCOM's subordinate organizations and headquarters divisions.
According to information provided by command officials, the largest
funding allocations for fiscal year 2006 are to support the Joint
Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike, followed by
command and control activities performed at headquarters, including
nuclear command and control. The smallest allocations are to support
the Joint Functional Component Commands for Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance and Integrated Missile Defense. According to a
command official, activities performed at headquarters to support one
or more mission areas accounted for about 40 percent of the command's
fiscal 2006 budget.
Scope and Methodology:
To perform our analysis, we identified trends and changes in
USSTRATCOM's budget since its establishment in October 2002 by
obtaining and analyzing the command's historic, current, and projected
funding for fiscal years 2003 through 2011. We used data prepared to
support the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request, which were the
most current official data available when we conducted and completed
our work. We also discussed with USSTRATCOM officials anticipated
changes to the budget resulting from the fiscal year 2007 President's
budget request, and efforts taken by the command to identify how its
funding is allocated by mission responsibility and subordinate
organization. We took steps to assess the reliability of the data used
in this analysis, including (1) performing electronic testing of
required data elements, (2) comparing the data to another independently
prepared data source, and (3) interviewing agency officials
knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States Strategic
Command Military and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level:
This appendix provides information on trends and changes we identified
in the United States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) military and
civilian authorized personnel levels[Footnote 20] since its
establishment in October 2002. Our analysis shows that USSTRATCOM's
overall authorized personnel level has remained relatively stable since
2002, and that the percentage of filled military and civilian positions
has increased. The command is transferring positions to its new mission
organizations from its headquarters organization, rather than
increasing its overall commandwide authorized personnel level. Although
the command has expanded the number of professional military
skills[Footnote 21] of its authorized personnel, the majority of its
military positions encompass relatively few types of skilled positions.
We also determined that while Air Force and Navy military positions
continue to make up most of USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel, the
proportion of civilian positions is increasing.
Overall Authorized Personnel Level Has Been Relatively Stable and
Percentage of Filled Positions Has Increased:
USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel level has remained relatively stable
since the command's establishment in October 2002. The command's
overall authorized personnel level has increased since that time by
about 300 positions, through October 2005; however, the command expects
to have slightly fewer positions than it started with by October 2006.
The command's authorized personnel level increased from 2,646 positions
upon its establishment in October 2002 to 2,965 authorized positions by
October 2004. The largest increase occurred between October 2002 and
October 2003, when the command added 318 positions, including 291
positions to support four additional missions--global strike;
integrated missile defense; command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and DOD
information operations. Among these 291 positions, 108 positions were
transferred to USSTRATCOM from the cruise missile support activities,
which were formerly part of U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Pacific
Command.
In October 2005, USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel decreased to 2,947
positions, a reduction of 18 positions from October 2004, as the
command transferred positions to other combatant commands to provide
expertise in integrating USSTRATCOM's global missions into their
theater operations. According to a command official, there was no
authorized personnel level increase associated with the combating
weapons of mass destruction responsibilities assigned to the command in
January 2005. A larger reduction is expected by October 2006, mainly as
a result of a planned transfer of about 340 positions currently
supporting intelligence activities, which would bring the command's
authorized personnel to 2,605 positions, which is 41 fewer than
authorized when the command was established.
USSTRATCOM's ability to fill positions has increased steadily since the
new command was established in 2002, when only 1,828, or 69 percent of
the command's 2,646 authorized positions, were initially filled.
According to command officials, many of the service members and
civilians from the former U.S. Space Command, located near Colorado
Springs, Colorado, did not immediately transfer to USSTRATCOM
headquarters, located near Omaha Nebraska, leaving many positions
initially unfilled. However, as individuals transferred to the command,
the rate of filled positions increased to 83 percent (2,467 filled
positions) as of October 2003, 87 percent (2,564 filled positions) in
October 2004, and 91 percent (2,670 filled positions) in October 2005.
Personnel Requirements for New Organizations Are Being Met Within
Existing Authorization:
To meet the staffing requirements for its five new mission
organizations, USSTRATCOM is transferring positions to the new
organizations from its headquarters, rather than seeking to increase
its overall personnel authorization. To minimize the cost to the
services of relocating people to fill the transferred positions, the
command is first transferring positions that either do not need to be
relocated or are not filled by service members, and then relocating and
filling the remaining positions during the course of normal military
personnel rotations. Under the command's plan, the first 30 percent of
the transferred positions were to have been filled at each organization
by September 2005, 60 percent of the positions are to be filled by
September 2006, and 90 percent are to be filled by September 2007.
By February 2006 the command had approved the transfer of 793 positions
to the new mission organizations. Of this number, about 444 positions
(56 percent) had been filled, including about 76 percent of the 431
positions approved for the Joint Functional Component Command for Space
and Global Strike, which is co-located with USSTRATCOM headquarters and
where few positions needed to be relocated.[Footnote 22] In contrast,
fewer than one-third of the positions had been filled at three of the
four remaining organizations, which are not located in the Omaha,
Nebraska, area, although a command official told us that he believes
that positions at these organizations will be close to 60 percent
filled by September 2006, under current projections. To minimize the
impact of not filling positions, officials told us that the supporting
services and Defense agencies are providing the new organizations with
their own filled positions, until USSTRATCOM positions are filled.
Table 4 summarizes the status of filling positions at the new mission
organizations as of February 2006.
Table 4: Approved and Filled Positions at USSTRATCOM's New Mission
Organizations as of February 2006:
USSTRATCOM organization: JFCC-Space and Global Strike;
Positions approved: 431;
Positions filled: 326;
Percentage of positions filled: 76.
USSTRATCOM organization: JFCC-Network Warfare;
Positions approved: 120;
Positions filled: 38;
Percentage of positions filled: 32.
USSTRATCOM organization: JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance;
Positions approved: 102;
Positions filled: 33;
Percentage of positions filled: 32.
USSTRATCOM organization: JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense;
Positions approved: 90;
Positions filled: 34;
Percentage of positions filled: 38.
USSTRATCOM organization: USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of
Mass Destruction;
Positions approved: 50;
Positions filled: 13;
Percentage of positions filled: 26.
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Notes: Data do not include contractors or positions provided by
supporting services and Defense agencies. JFCC= Joint Functional
Component Command.
[End of table]
USSTRATCOM Has Expanded Its Military Skill Set, but Most Positions
Remain Concentrated in Relatively Few Specialties:
USSTRATCOM has expanded the number of military skills of its authorized
personnel since its establishment. As of January 2003, 3 months after
it was established, USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel included those
with 241 different military skills; by January 2006, the command added
51 skills and lost 44 skills, leaving 248 different military skills at
the command. Skills added by the command include Navy officer positions
for information technology planning and Marine Corps officer positions
for space operations, while those dropped include Air Force maintenance
officer positions.
While USSTRATCOM has changed the composition of its skill set,
relatively few skills comprise the majority of the command's authorized
military positions. For example, as of January 2006, 33 of the
command's 248 skills (13 percent) made up 1,364 of the command's 2,094
military positions (65 percent). USSTRATCOM officials told us that
several of the most prevalent skills are easily adaptable and capable
of being performed in a broad range of responsibilities. For example,
Air Force space and missile operations officer positions increased from
134 in 2003 to 140 in 2006, and this skill remains the largest military
specialty at the command. The command also has increased the number of
positions for Navy officers with warfare qualifications or air warfare
qualifications skill designations, Army officers skilled in space
operations, and Army officers specializing in information operations.
Air Force and Navy Positions Predominate, but Percentage of Civilian
Positions Is Increasing:
USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel are mainly composed of Air Force and
Navy positions, although the number and percentage of civilian
positions have increased since the command was established. As of
October 2005, USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel included 2,112 military
and 835 civilian positions. Among the 2,112 authorized military
positions:
* 1,256 were Air Force positions (59 percent of the authorized military
positions),
* 564 were Navy positions (27 percent),
* 227 were Army positions (11 percent), and:
* 65 were Marine Corps positions (3 percent).
Since the command's establishment, the number and percentage of
civilian positions relative to military positions have increased. From
October 2002 to October 2005, civilian positions increased from 676 to
835, an increase of 26 to 28 percent of the command's overall
authorized personnel level. The command expects to continue to increase
the proportion of authorized civilian positions, particularly at
USSTRATCOM headquarters, as positions are transferred to the new
mission organizations and as a few hundred military positions are
converted to civilian positions through October 2007. Command officials
responsible for overseeing the reorganization told us that civilians
have lower turnover rates than the military service members who
regularly rotate through the command. The command believes that lower
turnover among its civilian workforce will bring greater continuity and
stability to the headquarters' chief responsibilities, including
strategic-level planning and advocacy for new capabilities. Table 5
presents the projected distribution of the command's civilian and
military positions in October 2007.
Table 5: Projected Distribution of USSTRATCOM Civilian and Military
Positions in October 2007:
Organization: USSTRATCOM headquarters;
Civilian positions: 616;
Military positions: 592;
Percentage civilian positions: 51;
Percentage military positions: 49.
Organization: JFCC-Space and Global Strike;
Civilian positions: 77;
Military positions: 354;
Percentage civilian positions: 18;
Percentage military positions: 82.
Organization: Other[A];
Civilian positions: 54;
Military positions: 217;
Percentage civilian positions: 20;
Percentage military positions: 80.
Organization: Joint Information Operations Center;
Civilian positions: 77;
Military positions: 124;
Percentage civilian positions: 38;
Percentage military positions: 62.
Organization: JFCC-Network Warfare;
Civilian positions: 31;
Military positions: 89;
Percentage civilian positions: 26;
Percentage military positions: 74.
Organization: JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance;
Civilian positions: 19;
Military positions: 83;
Percentage civilian positions: 19;
Percentage military positions: 81.
Organization: Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations;
Civilian positions: 69;
Military positions: 63;
Percentage civilian positions: 52;
Percentage military positions: 48.
Organization: JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense;
Civilian positions: 25;
Military positions: 65;
Percentage civilian positions: 28;
Percentage military positions: 72.
Organization: USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction;
Civilian positions: 18;
Military positions: 32;
Percentage civilian positions: 36;
Percentage military positions: 64.
Organization: Total;
Civilian positions: 986;
Military positions: 1,619;
Percentage civilian positions: 38;
Percentage military positions: 62.
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Notes: Projections current as of February 2006. Data include both
military and civilian positions at USSTRATCOM headquarters and at other
locations. They do not include contractors at USSTRATCOM headquarters,
or contractors or positions at mission organizations that are provided
by supporting services and agencies. JFCC= Joint Functional Component
Command.
[A] Includes authorized personnel assigned to the National Airborne
Operations Center, Nebraska; Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center,
Colorado; various combined task forces, Atlantic and Pacific cruise
missile support activities; various liaison offices; and national
laboratories.
[End of table]
Scope and Methodology:
To determine how USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel level has changed
since its establishment in 2002, we obtained and reviewed USSTRATCOM
projections and historic data that identify (1) the number of
authorized civilian and military positions assigned to USSTRATCOM, (2)
the number of authorized positions filled by individuals assigned to
the command, and (3) the professional military skills associated with
the command's military positions. The data we obtained include
USSTRATCOM positions assigned to the command's headquarters near Omaha,
Nebraska, its mission organizations, and to various other locations and
assignments.[Footnote 23] We also obtained the command's projections
for authorized personnel levels for the new mission organizations, and
discussed these projections with officials responsible for managing the
command's authorized personnel. In our analysis, we did not consider
staff positions from organizations that are supporting several of
USSTRATCOM's mission organizations, such as the Air Force Space
Command, Eighth Air Force, Army Space and Missile Defense Command,
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, and Defense Information Systems Agency. The data also
do not include part-time reservists or contractors. We took steps to
assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis, including (1)
performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) comparing
the data to another independently prepared data source, and (3)
interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
To address the extent to which the United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) has made progress in implementing its new missions and
assessing mission results, we reviewed a wide range of Department of
Defense (DOD) and command documentation including USSTRATCOM guidance,
plans, directives, speeches and testimony statements, and reports;
implementation plans and directives for creating its new mission
organizations; and documentation related to DOD's implementation of its
New Triad concept to transform U.S. strategic capabilities. We also
spoke with various officials involved in the command's implementation
efforts about their roles, related plans, and actions. When possible,
we met with the command and other organizations' senior leadership to
discuss and obtain their views on various command issues, including:
* Commander, U.S. Strategic Command;
* Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance/Director, Defense Intelligence Agency;
* Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare/
Director, National Security Agency;
* Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense/Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command;
* Commander, Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations/Director,
Defense Information Systems Agency;
* Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction/Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
* Commander, Air Force Space Command; and:
* Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has a robust exercise
program for demonstrating its capabilities, we reviewed the command's
annual training plan, which describes the command's individual
exercises, establishes an exercise schedule, and sets expectations for
the participation of the command's mission organizations. For the
November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, we reviewed the exercise plan,
collection management plan, after-action report, and final exercise
report. We also observed that exercise and discussed the exercise
results with the participants. We also reviewed the collection
management plan and the after-action report prepared for the April 2006
Global Thunder exercise, and after-action reports prepared for the
April 2005 Global Thunder, October 2004 Global Lightning, and October
2003 Global Guardian exercises. We obtained guidance from the Joint
Staff that describe the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Joint Forces
Command for supporting combatant command exercises. In addition we held
discussions with command officials from the exercise and training
branch and with other exercise observers to obtain their views on
USSTRATCOM efforts to plan and schedule its exercises. We also met with
officials from the new joint functional component commands as well as
the Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations and the USSTRATCOM
Center for Combating Weapons Of Mass Destruction to identify challenges
to more fully including their missions in the commands exercises and
assist in our understanding of the extent to which the command's
mission organizations were able to participate in the command's
exercises. Command officials also briefed us on the evolution of the
command's exercise program since its establishment, and plans for the
future. Finally, we met with officials from the U.S. Joint Forces
Command's Joint Warfighting Center to determine the extent to which
they have been involved in identifying requirements, objectives,
methods, and tools for planning, implementing, and evaluating
USSTRATCOM exercises to strengthen the design and execution of the
command's exercises, such as participant training and independent
observer team support and evaluation.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM and its mission
organizations had developed criteria for assessing their progress
toward achieving full operating capability, we reviewed documents from
the command and each of the new mission organizations. These documents
included the command's implementation directives for each new mission
organization and the overarching command reorganization implementation
plan for the current reorganization. We also reviewed briefings from
each of the mission organizations that gave status information on the
organizations' efforts towards achieving full operating capability. We
held discussions with USSTRATCOM officials who were part of the
command's reorganization management team and with the senior
leadership, when possible, to determine their roles and management
approach in assisting the mission organizations' efforts to reach full
operating capability and to obtain an understanding of what reaching
full operating capability means as a milestone in developing the new
USSTRATCOM organization. We met and held discussions with the senior
staff of each mission organization on their criteria for measuring the
organization's progress toward full operating capability.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a results-
oriented management approach to establish goals, continually track its
progress, achieve better synergy among its missions, and gauge the
results of its efforts, we reviewed key documentation and interviewed
officials to determine what steps, if any, the command has taken to
develop and follow this approach. We reviewed relevant GAO
reports[Footnote 24] that identified and reviewed management approaches
of other government and private sector organizations. We used the
practices and implementation steps identified in these approaches as
criteria for reviewing USSTRATCOM documents and for discussions with
command officials about their approach to transforming the USSTRATCOM
organization. We then compared USSTRATCOM's approach against these
examples of success that we had identified in other organizations to
determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM had these elements in place.
We reviewed key USSTRATCOM documents, including its first principles
(i.e., its long-term goals) related to reporting on the command's
performance and those from its biannual readiness reporting and its
annual training assessments. We reviewed the command's implementation
plan and related directives for establishing USSTRATCOM's joint
functional component commands. We compared these documents to
implementation plans used by other organizations, including the U.S.
Atlantic Command and U.S. Northern Command, and reorganization plans,
such as the Report to Congress on the Plan for Organizing the National
Nuclear Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security
Reorganization Plan, to determine any differences in the elements and
details for implementation that were considered in these plans and the
extent to which they had developed, used, or planned to use outcome-
based performance goals and measures.
To assess the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress defining
organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with
other DOD commands and organizations, we obtained and reviewed relevant
documents and spoke with various officials involved in implementing and
advocating for the command's new missions about its roles and related
plans and actions. To determine the extent to which the command has
clarified the roles and expectations of its service component
organizations, we reviewed command documentation including draft
integrating guidance, concepts of operations, orders, plans, and other
documents. We met with officials from each of the command's service
component/supporting commands and discussed the extent to which they
believed the command's guidance and expectations was sufficiently clear
about their supporting roles. We also discussed with command officials
the extent to which guidance was provided to the service components
through meetings and other activities.
To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a common
approach and comprehensive strategy to enhance its outreach to numerous
DOD organizations on which its success depends, we met with the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and with officials in the command's
directorate responsible for advocacy. We also met with senior
leadership in all of the subordinate mission organizations to
understand the extent to which a clear, coordinated, and unified
outreach strategy is in place and to identify the range of methods and
activities the command and its subordinate mission organizations use to
engage and promote its missions and capabilities with combatant
commands, military services, and DOD and other government
organizations. We met with officials at the U.S. Joint Forces Command
and U.S. Northern Command and discussed command relationships, the ways
that USSTRATCOM officials performed outreach with these organizations,
sought their viewpoint on lessons that should be learned in
communicating the command's missions and responsibilities, and their
perspectives on USSTRATCOM progress. During USSTRATCOM's Global
Lightning exercise in November 2005, we also obtained insights from
participants on the command's effectiveness at performing its outreach
activities.
We also reviewed several GAO reports[Footnote 25] that addressed key
practices organizations should implement during a significant
reorganization or transformation. We used the reports to identify
successful communication and outreach practices employed by other U.S.
and foreign government organizations. We reviewed the USSTRATCOM
commander's summary report for its November 2005 Global Lightning
exercise to identify any lessons learned, from participating in the
exercise with two other combatant commands, on the success of the
command's outreach efforts.
During our review, we obtained and analyzed USSTRATCOM budget and
authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring the
resources, personnel levels, and skills needed to implement the
command's missions. We took steps to assess the reliability of the data
used in these analyses, including (1) performing electronic testing of
required data elements, (2) comparing the data to other independently
prepared data sources, and (3) interviewing agency officials
knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. For additional methodological
details about how we performed our analyses, see appendixes I and II.
We performed our work from May 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In conducting our work, we contacted officials at the command's
headquarters, service, and functional components; think-tank
organizations; and other relevant stakeholders. Table 6 provides
information on the organizations and offices contacted during our
review.
Table 6: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review:
Organization/office contacted:
Department of Defense:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense;
* International Security Policy;
* Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Staff Directorate;
* J-1 (Manpower and Personnel);
* J- 3 (Operations);
* J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy);
* Defense Information Systems Agency;
* Defense Intelligence Agency;
* Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
* National Security Agency.
Organization/office contacted:
Department of Defense:
* Joint Information Operations Center;
* Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations;
* USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction;
* Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike;
* Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance;
* Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare;
* Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense.
Organization/office contacted:
Department of Defense:
* Department of the Air Force Headquarters;
* U.S. Air Force Space Command;
* Eighth Air Force;
* U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command;
* U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command;
* U.S. Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command.
Organization/office contacted:
Department of Defense:
* U.S. Northern Command;
* U.S. Joint Forces Command;
* Joint Warfighting Center;
* U.S. Central Command.
Organization/office contacted: Department of Defense:
* LMI Government Consulting;
* RAND Corporation.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: United States Strategic Command Organizations and
Responsibilities:
The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) organization is
comprised of a command headquarters, joint functional component
commands, task forces, and centers, which are located around one of
four metropolitan areas: Omaha, Nebraska; Colorado Springs, Colorado;
San Antonio, Texas; and Washington, D.C.
Figure 2: Locations of USSTRATCOM's Headquarters and Subordinate
Mission Organizations:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Note: JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons of mass
destruction.
[End of Figure]
Each of the command's organizations is supported by a primary Defense
agency or service partner organization. Table 7 shows the primary
responsibilities and related information for key USSTRATCOM
organizations.
Table 7: Key USSTRATCOM Organizations and Responsibilities:
USSTRATCOM organization, location, and date established: USSTRATCOM
headquarters Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr. October 2002;
Primary responsibilities: Responsible for exercising command authority
over USSTRATCOM's joint functional component commands (JFCC), task
forces, and centers and has strategic responsibility for integrating
all of USSTRATCOM missions of space operations; information operations;
integrated missile defense; global command and control; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; global strike; and strategic
deterrence, and is the lead combatant command for integrating and
synchronizing DOD-wide efforts in combating weapons of mass
destruction;
Primary supporting service or agency partner: Service component
commands, JFCCs, joint task forces, and centers.
USSTRATCOM organization, location, and date established: JFCC-
Integrated Missile Defense Shreiver Air Force Base, Colo. January 2005;
Primary responsibilities: Responsible for planning, integrating, and
coordinating global missile defense operations and support. The command
conducts the day-to-day operations of assigned forces and coordinates
activities with associated combatant commands, other USSTRATCOM JFCCs,
and the Missile Defense Agency;
Primary supporting service or agency partner: The Commander, JFCC-
Integrated Missile Defense, is also the Commander, U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command.
USSTRATCOM organization, location, and date established: JFCC-
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Bolling Air Force Base,
D.C. January 2005;
Primary responsibilities: Responsible for coordinating global
intelligence collection to address DOD worldwide operations and
national intelligence requirements. It will serve as the focal point
for the planning, execution, and assessment of the military's global
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; a key
enabler to achieving global situational awareness;
Primary supporting service or agency partner: The Commander, JFCC-
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, is also the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency.
USSTRATCOM organization, location, and date established: JFCC-Space and
Global Strike Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr. January 2005;
Primary responsibilities: Responsible for integrating all elements of
military power to conduct, plan, and present global strike effects and
also direct the deliberate planning and execution of assigned space
operation missions. For plans not aligned with a specific mission set,
the command is tasked to work in close coordination with USSTRATCOM
headquarters as the lead component responsible for the integration and
coordination of capabilities provided by all other JFCCs;
Primary supporting service or agency partner: The Commander, JFCC-Space
and Global Strike, is also the Commander, Eighth Air Force.
USSTRATCOM organization, location, and date established: JFCC-Network
Warfare Fort Meade, Md. January 2005;
Primary responsibilities: Responsible for facilitating cooperative
engagement with other national entities in computer network defense and
network warfare as part of the global information operations mission.
This coordinated approach to information operations involves two other
important supporting commands: Joint Task Force for Global Network
Operations and Joint Information Operations Center;
Primary supporting service or agency partner: The Commander, JFCC-
Network Warfare, is also the Director, National Security Agency.
USSTRATCOM organization, location, and date established: Joint
Information Operations Center[A[LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TEX.] ex.
September 19991;
Primary responsibilities: Responsible for integrating information
operations into military plans and operations across the spectrum of
conflict;
Primary supporting service or agency partner: The Commander, Joint
Information Operations Center, is also the Commander, Air Intelligence
Agency.
USSTRATCOM organization, location, and date established: Joint Task
Force for Global Network Operations Arlington, Va. August 2005;
Primary responsibilities: Responsible for supporting USSTRATCOM in
defending DOD's information infrastructure. This is done by integrating
the task force's capabilities into the operations of all DOD computers,
networks, and systems used by DOD, combatant commands, services, and
agencies;
Primary supporting service or agency partner: The Commander, Joint Task
Force for Global Network Operations, is also the Director, Defense
Information Systems Agency.
USSTRATCOM organization, location, and date established: USSTRATCOM
Center for Combating WMD Fort Belvoir, Va. August 2005;
Primary responsibilities: Responsible for integrating and synchronizing
DOD- wide efforts in support of the combating weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) mission and serves to plan, advocate, and advise the
Commander, USSTRATCOM, on WMD-related matters. The center provides
recommendations to dissuade, deter, and prevent the acquisition,
development, or use of WMD and associated technology. Through
collaboration with U.S. and allied organizations, the center leverages
around-the-clock situational awareness of worldwide WMD and related
activities, as well as provides day-to-day and operational crisis
support via the operations center. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
provides critical reachback and resources to the center and USSTRATCOM,
and other combatant commands;
Primary supporting service or agency partner: Director, USSTRATCOM
Center for Combating WMD, is also the Director, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency.
Source: USSTRATCOM.
Note: JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons of mass
destruction. A The Joint Information Operations Center was assigned to
the new USSTRATCOM in October 2002.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2900 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2900:
International Security POLICY:
August 16, 2006:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities & Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-06-847, "Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed
by U.S. Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many
Missions and New Organization," dated July 18, 2006 (GAO Code 350628).
The Department concurs with the first three recommendations made in the
report. However, the Department does not concur with recommendations
four through seven of the report. We believe measures are already in
place that address the issues raised by the report. A detailed response
to the report's recommendations is included.
My point of contact for the report is Commander Erik Fino at (703) 571-
9627 or via email at erik.fino@osd.mil:
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Brian Green:
Attachment:
GAO recommendations and DoD responses:
GAO Draft Report-Dated July 18, 2006 GAO CODE 350682/GAO-06-847:
"Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by U.S. Strategic
Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions and New
Organization"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to fully identify and
request, in a timely manner, the long-term services and resources
required from the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center
to support the Command's program and to reach agreement with the U.S.
Joint Forces Command on the support to be provided.
DOD Response: Concur. Prior to the beginning of the FY06 U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) Global exercise series, the U.S. Joint Forces
Command's Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) provided limited exercise
planning, execution and assessment support to the USSTRATCOM annual
joint training program. JWFC's limited experience in nuclear operations
and difficulty in obtaining requisite security clearances were often
major roadblocks for USSTRATCOM to fully utilize JWFC's services. As
the Command's new mission areas emerged and the Global exercise series
developed, USSTRATCOM became more involved with other Commands'
exercises that had an established, long-term working relationship with
JWFC. USSTRATCOM's exercise planning and collaboration with these
Commands highlighted the capabilities that JWFC could contribute to
USSTRATCOM's joint training plan.
Over the past year, USSTRATCOM has steadily built a relationship with
JWFC to obtain their support for all severs Command mission areas,
including its nuclear mission, As an example, on relatively short
notice and with personnel/budget constraints, JWFC provided quality
observer/trainer support, World News Network, and a Maritime Common
Operating Picture feed w Global Thunder 06 exercise execution,
enhancing the fidelity of the exercise. JWFC is also working with
USSTRATCOM to provide necessary support to Global lightning 07 and
Global Thunder 07.
USSTRATCOM and JWFC are jointly solving problems that hindered JWFC
support to previous USSTRATCOM exercises. USSTRATCOM now has two JWFC
support element personnel permanently assigned to its Directorate of
Joint Exercises and Training to assist in identifying and obtaining
JWFC support. Additionally, JWFC has a full time government civilian
serving as the USSTRATCOM Desk Officer, and two contractors supporting
USSTRATCOM interests at the JWFC. Likewise, USSTRATCOM is
negotiating for out-year JWFC exercise support and should have full
sustainment within the next three to five years based on JWFC's current
commitments. To realize near-term economies of effort, USSTRATCOM will
link, where possible, its FY07-08 exercises with other Combatant
Command exercises supported by JWFC.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the near term, to make any
possible adjustments among the Joint Warfighting Center's current
resources to more fully support U.S. Strategic Command's exercise
program.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is currently
conducting an in depth review of joint training programs with the
objective of providing better flexibility and synergism in joint
training investments. However, U.S. Strategic Command's joint training
requirement will compete against and be prioritized with the other
competing priorities for joint training funding.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the long term, incorporate
U.S. Strategic Command's requirements for support in the [Joint
Warfighting] Center's plans to provide the full range of assistance
necessary to help the U.S. Strategic Command execute a robust exercise
program.
DOD Response: Concur. The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness is currently conducting an in depth
review of Joint training programs. The training support to Combatant
Commands, including those provided by U.S. Joint Forces Command, is
included in that review. The intent of this review is to match, to the
greatest extent possible, joint training requirements and resources. As
noted in the GAO report on Page 14 ". . the center has committed to
supporting both of its U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM's) annual
Global Lightning and Global Thunder exercises for FY07 [bringing the
Joint Warfighting Center's support of USSTRATCOM on par with the
support it provides the Regional Combatant Commands]" and that ". . in
the long-term, a center official told us that that while the center
plans to provide greater support to USSTRATCOM, the center can better
plan and make resources available if its provided with well-defined
requirements 3 to 5 years in advance. . ." Finally as stated above,
there are many demands for joint training funding, USSTRATCOM's joint
training requirements must compete with the other priorities for joint
training funding.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command to provide clear and
complete guidance to the joint functional component commands for space
and global strike, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and
network warfare, and the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction that clearly defines full operating
capability and provides specific, common criteria for determining what
is required and. how it will be assessed, This guidance should be
developed in consultation with these organizations, before each
organization declares full operating capability.
DOD Response: Nonconcur. Commander, U.S. Strategic Command has provided
specific guidance to each of his subordinate commands in the form of a
tailored Implementation Directive (ID). The ID assigns specific duties,
responsibilities, tasks and authorities for the respective component.
The ID also assigns target dates for achieving initial and full
operating capability (IOC and FOC) status. The business model
implemented by Commander, U.S. Strategic Command acknowledges the
differing levels of operational maturity and assigned resources for
each of the distinct mission areas. The Commander continues to work
closely with component commanders to develop, implement and assess the
measures of progress by which FOC will be declared. When achieved, FOC
for each mission area will be reported to the Secretary of Defense.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command to: (1) develop a
comprehensive, results-oriented management process for continually
assessing and benchmarkiag the Command's overall progress in achieving
desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to enhance the
Command's efforts to implement and integrate its missions; (2) develop
or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate performance
results and that those measures cascade down throughout the Command;
(3) assign clear leadership with accountability and authority to
implement and sustain the process; (4) develop and ensure that goals
and objectives are clear and achievable and timelines are established;
and (5) set a specific time frame for completing development of this
process.
DOD Response: Nonconcur. The business model implemented by Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command acknowledges the differing levels of operational
maturity and assigned resources for each of the distinct mission areas.
The Commander continues to work closely with component commanders to
develop, implement and assess the measures of progress by which full
operating capability will be declared. A variety of directives,
including concepts of operations, articulate the command and component
goals and objectives. Periodic exercises, external inspections and in-
progress reviews are being used to help assess the command's
effectiveness in operationalizing the assigned mission areas and
achieving stated objectives. This process is inherent in U.S. Strategic
Command's management approach and remains a sustained and ongoing
activity.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command to: (1) provide additional
guidance to the Command's service components that clearly defines and
provides more specific information about their responsibilities,
requirements, relationships, and expectations for supporting the
Command's headquarters and subordinate mission organizations; and (2)
set a specific time frame for approval of this guidance.
DOD Response: Nonconcur. Duties and responsibilities for U.S. Strategic
Command and its Service components are documented in Joint Publication
0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Day-to-day Combatant
Commander to Service liaison is maintained via each Service component's
on site representative.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command to develop and implement a
command-wide communications strategy to: (1) guide and coordinate U.S.
Strategic Command's efforts to conduct outreach with other Combatant
Commands and Defense and other organizations to develop effective
relationships and communications; (2) promote and educate others about
the value of its mission and capabilities; and (3) obtain information
on how the Command can best support other commands and organizations.
This strategy should include the Command's rationale, specific
objectives, desired outcomes, and strategies for conducting outreach
with other commands and organizations, and criteria against which the
Command can evaluate the success of its efforts.
DOD Response: Nonconcur. U.S. Strategic Command provides and promotes
insight to all Strategic Command activities via the Strategic Knowledge
Integration Web (SkiWeb), available to all Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRNET) subscribers. U.S. Strategic Command also
maintains a senior officer representative at each Combatant Commander
headquarters and with the Joint Staff: Web-based mission area training
for U.S. Strategic Command's missions is available via Joint Forces
Command's Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability
(JKDDC) website. U.S. Strategic Command is primarily a supporting
commander. As such, liaison with other Combatant Commanders is
conducted on a continuous basis.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe,
Assistant Director; Alissa H. Czyz; David G. Hubbell; Amanda M.
Leissoo; Kevin L. O'Neill; Roderick W. Rodgers; and Mark J.
Wielgoszynski, Analyst-in-Charge, made key contributions to this
report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] A previous unified command, also called U.S. Strategic Command, had
been established in 1992 and had primary responsibility for strategic
nuclear forces. The new USSTRATCOM was formed from combining the
nuclear deterrence mission of the previous command and the space and
computer network operations missions of the also disestablished U.S.
Space Command.
[2] DOD's New Triad concept is intended to bring together nuclear and
conventional offensive strike, active and passive defense, enhanced
command and control, planning, and intelligence capabilities and a
revitalized defense infrastructure to provide the President and
Secretary of Defense with a broad array of military options to better
address the spectrum of potential opponents and contingencies that may
arise in the coming decades. We issued a report on the New Triad that
discusses the progress made by DOD in determining and allocating
resources needed to implement the concept today and in the future. See,
GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach, GAO-05-540 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).
[3] The new organizations are the Joint Functional Component Command
for Space and Global Strike; Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense; Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Joint Functional
Component Command for Network Warfare; and USSTRATCOM Center for
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.
[4] We have issued several reports addressing best practices followed
by federal government agencies and private-sector organizations in
implementing successful mergers and transformations and building high-
performance organizations. These reports include GAO, Highlights of a
GAO Forum on High-Performing Organizations: Metrics, Means, and
Mechanisms for Achieving High Performance in the 21st Century Public
Management Environment, GAO-04-343SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004);
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned
for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-
03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); 21st Century Challenges:
Transforming Government to Meet Current and Emerging Challenges, GAO-05-
830T (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005); and Results- Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[5] The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Unified Action Armed Forces, Joint
Publication 0-2, defines a service component command as a command
consisting of the service component commander and all those service
forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and
installations under the command, including the support forces that have
been assigned to a combatant command. Service component commands report
directly to the Commander, USSTRATCOM. A supporting commander, in the
context of a support command relationship, is a commander who aids,
protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and is
responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported
commander.
[6] Appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM service
component commands and other supporting agencies are not managed by the
command in performing its operations, and are therefore not part of the
command's annual budgets.
[7] USSTRATCOM's authorized personnel levels are defined as the number
of authorized positions for civilian and uniformed military personnel
that are funded by the services and assigned to the command.
[8] The U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center assists
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commanders, and
chiefs of the services in their preparation for joint warfare both in
the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and
future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint exercises and
training. It provides the core expertise to assist in the planning,
execution, and assessment of joint exercises and training activities.
[9] For example, GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons
Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005) and Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001).
[10] DOD, Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2006).
[11] Although the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction was established in August 2005, after the initial
implementation guidance was issued, the center followed the same
implementation process as the other four new organizations.
[12] See GAO, Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework
Needed to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts, GAO-06-232
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2006).
[13] GAO-06-232.
[14] GAO-06-232.
[15] The use of collaborative planning intends to create an environment
that allows commanders to share planning data and generate integrated
lists of courses of action in greatly compressed time frames, making
options and recommendations readily available to the Secretary of
Defense and the President.
[16] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint
Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2001).
[17] GAO-03-669.
[18] Nonkinetic capabilities are those capabilities that produce
effects without the direct use of the force or energy of moving
objects, including such means as information operations,
electromagnetic radiation, and directed energy.
[19] DOD's December 2001 report on the results of its Nuclear Posture
Review introduced the concept of a New Triad of strategic capabilities
that include a mix of nuclear and nonnuclear strike forces; defenses,
including missile defense; and a responsive infrastructure, which are
all enhanced by an integrated and adaptive approach to intelligence,
planning, and command and control. As reflected in its expanding set of
mission responsibilities, USSTRATCOM has a significant role in
implementing the New Triad.
[20] USSTRATCOM's authorized military and civilian personnel level is
the number of authorized positions for service members and civilians
that are funded by the services and assigned to the command.
[21] Military skills refer to personnel designations developed by each
of the military services. In this report, "skill" refers to specific
Air Force Specialty Codes, Army Areas of Concentration (officer) and
Military Occupational Specialties (warrant officer and enlisted), Navy
Billet Designator Codes (officer) and General Ratings (enlisted), and
Marine Corps Military Occupational Specialties.
[22] The space and global strike joint functional component command
also has positions assigned to other locations, including the Cheyenne
Mountain Operations Center, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and U.S. Joint
Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia.
[23] In addition to its headquarters and mission organizations,
USSTRATCOM has authorized personnel assigned with the National Airborne
Operations Center, Nebraska; Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center,
Colorado; various combined task forces; Atlantic and Pacific cruise
missile support activities; liaison offices; and national laboratories.
[24] Our prior work on organizational transformation includes GAO,
Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information
for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2005); GAO-03-293SP; GAO-03-669; and Homeland Security: Transformation
Strategy Needed to Address Challenges Facing the Federal Protective
Service, GAO-04-537 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004).
[25] See for example, GAO-03-293SP, GAO-03-669, and GAO, Defense
Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD Business
Operations, GAO-05-629 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005).
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