Defense Infrastructure
DOD Needs to Determine and Use the Most Economical Building Materials and Methods When Acquiring New Permanent Facilities Gao ID: GAO-10-436 April 30, 2010To meet the challenges associated with a threefold increase in the Army's military construction program between fiscal years 2005 and 2009, the Army adopted numerous changes, including the expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods, designed to reduce building costs and timelines for new facilities. With the changes, the Army set goals to reduce building costs by 15 percent and timelines by 30 percent. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have also faced challenges associated with incorporating both antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design ("green") goals into new facilities. GAO was asked to (1) assess the Army's progress in meeting its goals, (2) evaluate the merits from the Army's expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods, and (3) examine potential conflicts between antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals. GAO reviewed relevant documentation, interviewed cognizant service officials, analyzed selected construction project data, and visited five Army installations to review facilities built with alternative materials and methods.
The Army set goals to reduce its estimated construction costs by 15 percent and building timelines by 30 percent, but it did not monitor goal achievement and thus did not know to what extent the goals had been met or whether changes made to its military construction program resulted in actual reductions in facility costs. GAO's review of selected project information showed that the Army did reduce the estimated cost of some facility construction projects and shortened building timelines during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, but it did not meet its overall stated goals. For example, GAO found that the average building timeline for one key measurement (design start to ready for occupancy) was reduced by about 11 percent--an improvement, but less than the 30 percent goal. The Army discontinued the numerical goals in fiscal year 2010, and Army officials stated that, although the specific goals might not have been achieved, they believed that the Army's efforts were successful in dampening the escalation of Army facilities' costs and would continue to help ensure cost-effective and timely facilities in future years. The Army appears to have achieved some savings in selected construction projects by expanding the use of wood materials and modular construction methods for some of its facilities, but GAO found little quantitative data on whether the use of these materials and methods will result in savings over the long term compared to the traditional use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site building methods. Without long-term or life-cycle analyses that consider not only initial construction costs but also possible differences in facility service lives and annual operating and maintenance costs between the construction alternatives, it is not clear that the Army's expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods will achieve the Army's intended purpose of reduced facility costs over the long term. The Navy and the Air Force generally disagreed with the Army's view and believed that the use of wood materials and modular construction will result in facilities with shorter service lives and higher life-cycle costs. However, none of the services had the analyses to support its views. Without additional study and analysis, DOD will not know whether military construction program guidance needs to be changed to ensure that facilities are constructed with materials and methods that meet needs at the lowest cost over the long term. Conflicts between antiterrorism building standards and sustainable design goals exist, but military service officials stated that the conflicts are considered to be manageable. GAO's review of 90 Army, Navy, and Air Force military construction projects, approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, showed that although incorporating the standards and the goals in new facilities added to construction costs, 80 of the projects required no special steps or workarounds to meet both the standards and the goals. However, service officials noted that achieving higher levels of sustainability in future construction projects while still meeting the antiterrorism standards would further increase initial facility costs and create additional design challenges.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Brian J. Lepore Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-4523GAO-10-436, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Determine and Use the Most Economical Building Materials and Methods When Acquiring New Permanent Facilities
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Defense Infrastructure:
DOD Needs to Determine and Use the Most Economical Building Materials
and Methods When Acquiring New Permanent Facilities:
Defense Infrastructure:
GAO-10-436:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-436, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
To meet the challenges associated with a threefold increase in the Army‘
s military construction program between fiscal years 2005 and 2009,
the Army adopted numerous changes, including the expanded use of wood
materials and modular building methods, designed to reduce building
costs and timelines for new facilities. With the changes, the Army set
goals to reduce building costs by 15 percent and timelines by 30
percent. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have also faced challenges
associated with incorporating both antiterrorism construction
standards and sustainable design (’green“) goals into new facilities.
GAO was asked to (1) assess the Army‘s progress in meeting its goals,
(2) evaluate the merits from the Army‘s expanded use of wood materials
and modular building methods, and (3) examine potential conflicts
between antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design
goals. GAO reviewed relevant documentation, interviewed cognizant
service officials, analyzed selected construction project data, and
visited five Army installations to review facilities built with
alternative materials and methods.
What GAO Found:
The Army set goals to reduce its estimated construction costs by 15
percent and building timelines by 30 percent, but it did not monitor
goal achievement and thus did not know to what extent the goals had
been met or whether changes made to its military construction program
resulted in actual reductions in facility costs. GAO‘s review of
selected project information showed that the Army did reduce the
estimated cost of some facility construction projects and shortened
building timelines during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, but it did
not meet its overall stated goals. For example, GAO found that the
average building timeline for one key measurement (design start to
ready for occupancy) was reduced by about 11 percent”an improvement,
but less than the 30 percent goal. The Army discontinued the numerical
goals in fiscal year 2010, and Army officials stated that, although
the specific goals might not have been achieved, they believed that
the Army‘s efforts were successful in dampening the escalation of Army
facilities‘ costs and would continue to help ensure cost-effective and
timely facilities in future years.
The Army appears to have achieved some savings in selected
construction projects by expanding the use of wood materials and
modular construction methods for some of its facilities, but GAO found
little quantitative data on whether the use of these materials and
methods will result in savings over the long term compared to the
traditional use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site
building methods. Without long-term or life-cycle analyses that
consider not only initial construction costs but also possible
differences in facility service lives and annual operating and
maintenance costs between the construction alternatives, it is not
clear that the Army‘s expanded use of wood materials and modular
building methods will achieve the Army‘s intended purpose of reduced
facility costs over the long term. The Navy and the Air Force
generally disagreed with the Army‘s view and believed that the use of
wood materials and modular construction will result in facilities with
shorter service lives and higher life-cycle costs. However, none of
the services had the analyses to support its views. Without additional
study and analysis, DOD will not know whether military construction
program guidance needs to be changed to ensure that facilities are
constructed with materials and methods that meet needs at the lowest
cost over the long term.
Conflicts between antiterrorism building standards and sustainable
design goals exist, but military service officials stated that the
conflicts are considered to be manageable. GAO‘s review of 90 Army,
Navy, and Air Force military construction projects, approved during
fiscal years 2007 through 2009, showed that although incorporating the
standards and the goals in new facilities added to construction costs,
80 of the projects required no special steps or workarounds to meet
both the standards and the goals. However, service officials noted
that achieving higher levels of sustainability in future construction
projects while still meeting the antiterrorism standards would further
increase initial facility costs and create additional design
challenges.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) determine the
merits and long-term costs from the use of alternative building
materials and methods and subsequently revise its military
construction guidance, as deemed appropriate. DOD generally agreed
with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-436] or key
components. For more information, contact Brian Lepore, 202-512-4523
or leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Army Did Not Measure the Achievement of Goals to Reduce Military
Construction Costs and Timelines:
Questions Remain about Whether the Use of Alternative Building
Materials and Methods Will Yield Long-term Savings:
Conflicts Exist between Antiterrorism Building Standards and
Sustainable Goals, but the Services Consider the Conflicts to Be
Manageable:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: DOD Construction Practices:
Appendix III: DOD's Antiterrorism Construction Standards:
Appendix IV: DOD's Sustainable Design Goals:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Achievement of the Army's Cost Goal in Selected Projects:
Table 2: Change in Average Army Building Timelines--Design Start to
Ready for Occupancy:
Table 3: Change in Average Army Building Timelines--Construction Start
to Ready for Occupancy:
Table 4: Types of Construction and Materials Allowed by the
International Building Code:
Table 5: DOD's Antiterrorism Construction Standards:
Table 6: Rating System's Prerequisites, Credits, and Points for New
Buildings:
Figures:
Figure 1: Army Military Construction Program by Type of Funding
between Fiscal Years 2005 and 2010:
Figure 2: Wood-Frame Barracks at Fort Carson, Colorado:
Figure 3: Wood-Frame Barracks at Fort Meade, Maryland:
Figure 4: Privatized Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Project in
Norfolk, Virginia:
Figure 5: Privatized Senior Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Project at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina:
Figure 6: Use of Modular Construction to Build a Barracks at Fort
Bliss, Texas:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 30, 2010:
The Honorable Solomon Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Army has been faced with a significant challenge to meet the
facility needs associated with several recent initiatives, such as the
transformation of the Army's force structure, the permanent relocation
of thousands of overseas military personnel back to the United States,
the implementation of Base Realignment and Closure actions, and the
planned increase in the Army's active-duty end strength. Taken
together, the Army estimated that these initiatives would result in a
threefold increase in the Army's military construction program with
appropriated funding increasing from about $3.4 billion in fiscal year
2005 to a peak of about $10.7 billion in fiscal year 2009 before
beginning to decrease back to more historical levels.
The Army concluded that if it continued to use traditional military
construction acquisition and building practices then it could not
successfully meet the challenges associated with such a large increase
in the volume and costs of facility construction, as well as the need
to complete new required facilities in time to meet planned movements
of organizations and personnel. Thus, in 2006, the Army adopted a
strategy, known as military construction transformation, which
included numerous changes to its traditional practices that were
designed to reduce facility acquisition costs and construction
timelines. Among the changes were the development of standard designs
for common facility types, the use of a standardized format to obtain
contractor bids for facility construction projects, a transition from
"design-bid-build" to "design-build" project delivery,[Footnote 1] and
a change from including detailed, prescriptive construction
requirements in facility solicitations to the use of performance-based
criteria that focused on what the Army needed rather than on how to
meet the needs. Another change in the Army's strategy was the expanded
use of all types of construction materials and methods allowed by
Department of Defense (DOD) building guidance. This included greater
use of wood materials and modular building methods, as compared to the
use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site building
methods traditionally used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force for larger
permanent facilities, such as administrative buildings and barracks.
In view of the expected results from the implementation of its new
military construction transformation strategy, the Army established
goals to reduce its military construction costs by 15 percent and
facility construction timelines by 30 percent beginning in fiscal year
2007. The Army planned to implement the cost reduction goal by having
project planners reduce the estimated cost of planned facilities by 15
percent and then request funding from the Congress for the reduced
amount. Thus, the cost goal was not directly related to actual
facility costs but rather to estimated facility costs. While
continuing to apply the strategy to its military construction program,
the Army discontinued these numerical goals in fiscal year 2010,
stating that most cost and timeline reduction benefits from the
strategy had been obtained by the end of fiscal year 2009.
In addition to facing challenges from the significant growth in its
military construction program, the Army, as well as the Navy and the
Air Force, has also faced challenges associated with incorporating
both antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals
into new facilities.[Footnote 2] As required by Section 2859 of Title
10, DOD has developed and implemented antiterrorism construction
standards designed to reduce facility vulnerability to terrorist
attack and improve the security of facility occupants.[Footnote 3] The
standards include 22 mandatory standards, such as requiring open areas
around new facilities to keep explosives at a distance from the
facilities, and 17 recommended but optional measures, such as avoiding
exterior hallway configurations for inhabited facilities. For decades,
the federal government has attempted to improve energy efficiency and
energy and water conservation at federal facilities and, in January
2006, DOD joined 16 other federal agencies in signing a memorandum of
understanding that committed the agency to leadership in designing,
constructing, and operating high-performance and sustainable
buildings.[Footnote 4] Challenges from incorporating the antiterrorism
standards and sustainable goals into new facilities include not only
increased costs, but also dealing with potential conflicts between the
standards and the goals, such as providing required open areas around
new facilities, which reduces development density, while recognizing
sustainable design goals related to increasing development density.
You asked us to assess the Army's progress in meeting its military
construction cost and timeline reduction goals, evaluate the Army's
expanded use of nontraditional construction materials and methods, and
review potential conflicts and costs from incorporating antiterrorism
standards and sustainable design goals in new military facilities.
Thus, this report (1) assesses the Army's measurement and achievement
of its military construction cost and timeline reduction goals, (2)
evaluates the merits and economic impacts from the Army's expanded use
of wood materials and modular building methods for permanent
facilities, and (3) discusses potential conflicts between
antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals and
the costs to incorporate the standards and goals in new facilities.
To address these objectives, we reviewed applicable documentation on
how the Army implemented and monitored its 15 percent construction
cost and 30 percent building time frame reduction goals and
interviewed Army officials and analyzed Army data for a non-
probability sample of 75 Army projects approved in fiscal years 2007
through 2009 to determine whether the projects met the cost reduction
goal. The projects selected represented a range of facility types and
geographic locations and were in the categories of facilities subject
to the cost goal. We also determined whether the Army met its building
timeline reduction goal by comparing actual building timelines for all
completed projects before and after the goals were established. In
addition, we interviewed Army, Navy, and Air Force officials and
reviewed documentation, policies, and construction guidance on the
Army's expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods;
obtained information about how different building materials and
methods affect initial construction costs, long-term costs, and
durability of new military facilities; summarized studies from
construction industry groups on how different building materials
affect construction costs; visited five Army installations to review
recent construction projects and discuss with local officials the use
of wood materials and modular building methods; and met with
developers of two military privatized, unaccompanied personnel housing
projects to discuss the building materials and methods used in those
projects. Further, we reviewed applicable DOD policies, guidance, and
goals related to incorporating antiterrorism construction standards
and sustainable design goals in new military facilities; interviewed
military service officials about how antiterrorism standards and
sustainable design goals affect construction costs and how potential
conflicts between the standards and goals are addressed; and followed
up with project planners on a non-probability sample of 90 Army, Navy,
and Air Force military construction projects from fiscal years 2007
through 2009 to obtain details on any conflicts encountered when
incorporating the standards and goals in the projects. We selected
projects from a list of all Army, Navy, and Air Force military
construction projects approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009
to represent a range of facility types and geographic locations and
included 10 Army, 10 Navy, and 10 Air Force projects approved in each
of the 3 years. Although we did not independently validate
construction cost and building timeline data provided by the military
services, we discussed with the officials steps they have taken to
ensure reasonable accuracy of the data. As such, we determined the
data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to February 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further
details on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Army set goals to reduce its estimated construction costs by 15
percent and building timelines by 30 percent, but it did not monitor
goal achievement and therefore did not know to what extent the goals
were met or whether changes adopted under its military construction
transformation strategy resulted in actual reductions in facility
costs. However, our review of selected project information showed that
the Army did reduce the estimated cost of some facility construction
projects and shortened building timelines during fiscal years 2007
through 2009, but it did not meet its overall stated goals. Effective
management practices call for not only setting program goals but also
for monitoring goal achievement so that results can be measured and
adjustments can be made to programs, if needed, to better achieve
goals. Yet, the Army did not establish a framework to measure changes
in facility construction costs and building timelines when it
established goals to reduce costs and timelines beginning in fiscal
year 2007, and as a result, the Army was not in a position to make
adjustments in its application of these goals. Furthermore, we found
that the Army did not subject all Army facility projects to the 15
percent cost reduction goal during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. To
illustrate, the Army decided to only subject projects funded by the
base realignment and closure program to the goal in fiscal year 2007
and, in fiscal year 2009, the Army decided to only apply the goal
reduction to five types of facilities--brigade, battalion, and company
headquarters buildings, barracks, and dining facilities. To obtain
some insight into the Army's attainment of its cost goal, we reviewed
the estimated cost of 75 facility projects in the categories that were
subject to the goal and found that the goal was met in 31 (41 percent)
of the facilities, but not met in 44 ( 59 percent) of the facilities.
[Footnote 5] However, some reduction, but less than 15 percent, was
made in the estimated cost of 24 of the 44 facilities that did not
meet the goal. To obtain some insight into the Army's attainment of
its 30 percent building timeline reduction goal, we compared actual
Army building timelines for all projects before and after the goal was
established. We found that the average building timeline for one key
Army timeline measurement (design start to ready for occupancy) was
reduced by about 11 percent--an improvement, but less than the Army's
30 percent goal. The Army discontinued these numerical goals in fiscal
year 2010, and Army officials stated that, although the specific goals
might not have been achieved, they believed that the Army's efforts to
transform its military construction acquisition and building practices
were successful in dampening the escalation of Army facilities' costs
and would continue to help ensure cost-effective and timely facilities
in future years.
Although the Army appears to have achieved some savings in initial
construction costs by expanding the use of wood materials and modular
construction methods for some permanent facilities, we found little
quantitative information on whether the use of these materials and
methods will result in savings over the long term compared to the
traditional use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site
building methods. Without long-term or life-cycle analyses that
consider not only initial construction costs but also possible
differences in facility service lives and annual operating and
maintenance costs between the construction alternatives, it is not
clear that the Army's expanded use of wood materials and modular
building methods will achieve the Army's intended purpose of reduced
facility costs over the long term. Navy and Air Force officials
generally disagreed with the Army's view saying that the use of wood
materials and modular construction--as compared to the use of steel,
concrete, and masonry materials and on-site construction methods--
would result in facilities with shorter service lives and higher, not
lower, life-cycle costs. However, none of the services had substantial
quantitative information or analyses to support its views. Also,
during visits to private organizations that represented the interests
of wood, modular building, and concrete and masonry industries, we
found various views and opinions on the long-term merits and economic
benefits from the use of alternative construction materials and
building methods, but did not find documented analyses comparing the
actual life-cycle costs of facilities constructed with alternative
materials and methods. We did find that the Army apparently achieved
initial construction cost savings by using wood-frame construction in
several barracks projects that were initially designed to be built
with steel, concrete, and masonry. For example, Army officials noted
that a fiscal year 2006 Fort Carson, Colorado, barracks project was
estimated to cost about $35 million based on actual contract bids and
the use of steel, concrete, and masonry construction materials.
However, after switching the design to wood-frame construction, the
project was subsequently awarded for about $24 million, a savings of
about $11 million (31 percent) in estimated costs. Nonetheless, unless
the services perform additional study and analysis to determine the
relative merits and long-term economic impacts from the use of
alternative construction materials and methods, DOD will not know
whether the use of wood materials and modular building methods results
in the most economical long-term building approach or whether DOD's
military construction program guidance needs to be changed to ensure
that new facilities are constructed with materials and methods that
meet requirements at the lowest cost over the long term. Thus, we are
recommending that DOD determine the merits and long-term costs from
the use of alternative construction materials and methods for new
common facilities where alternative materials may be appropriate, such
as administrative buildings and barracks, and subsequently revise its
military construction guidance, as deemed appropriate.
Although areas of conflict exist when designing facilities that meet
both antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design
goals, military service officials stated that the conflicts are
manageable and facilities are routinely designed and built that meet
both the standards and the goals. For example, the antiterrorism
mandatory building standard to provide standoff distances around new
facilities reduces development density and thus conflicts with a
sustainable design goal to increase development density. Similarly, a
sustainable design goal related to greater use of windows to increase
natural lighting conflicts with the recommended antiterrorism building
measure related to minimizing hazards from flying glass fragments from
windows. To help deal with such conflicts, DOD uses a facility
planning tool that identifies and addresses the potential conflicts
from integrating required antiterrorism standards with sustainable
design goals. Military service officials stated that with use of the
tool and a comprehensive design approach, they were able to develop
successful building solutions that ensured both secure and high-
performance facilities. The officials also noted that their goal was
to design and construct all new major military construction facilities
to meet sustainable standards established by the U.S. Green Building
Council's Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green Building
Rating System, while still meeting the mandatory antiterrorism
building standards.[Footnote 6] To assess how the services were
dealing with the conflicts, we followed up with the project planners
responsible for 90 military construction projects from a non-
probability sample of Army, Navy, and Air Force projects approved
during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. According to the planners, 80
(89 percent) of the 90 projects required no special steps or
workarounds to meet both antiterrorism standards and sustainable
design goals. For the projects where special steps or workarounds were
needed, most issues related to required building standoff distances
and facility windows. The planners also reported that, primarily
because of the required standoff distances, 18 (20 percent) of the 90
projects resulted in additional land use, community decentralization,
or installation development sprawl.[Footnote 7] For example, planners
of a fiscal year 2008 instruction building at Fort Huachuca, Arizona,
reported that, because of the antiterrorism standoff distance
standards, the building site was approximately 50 percent larger than
required if there were no standoff requirements. According to service
officials, as well as our review of cost estimates from the 90 sample
projects, incorporating antiterrorism standards in new facilities
typically adds about 1 to 5 percent to construction costs and
incorporating sustainable design building features typically adds
about 2 percent to construction costs. Service officials noted that
achieving higher levels of sustainability while still meeting the
antiterrorism standards would increase initial facility costs and
create additional design challenges.
In oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with
our recommendations and stated that it had already begun steps to
implement them. We discuss DOD's comments in detail later in this
report.
Background:
The Army has been faced with a significant challenge to meet the
facility needs associated with several recent initiatives, such as the
transformation of the Army's force structure, the permanent relocation
of thousands of overseas military personnel back to the United States,
the implementation of Base Realignment and Closure actions, and the
planned increase in the Army's active-duty end strength. As shown in
figure 1, the Army estimated that taken together these initiatives
resulted in a threefold increase in the Army's military construction
program with appropriated funds increasing from about $3.4 billion in
fiscal year 2005 to a peak of about $10.7 billion in fiscal year 2009
before beginning to decline in fiscal year 2010.
Figure 1: Army Military Construction Program by Type of Funding
between Fiscal Years 2005 and 2010 (Dollars in billions):
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked multiple line graph]
Fiscal year 2005:
Military Construction Army: $1.777;
Base Realignment and Closure: $0;
Army National Guard: $0.394;
Army Reserve: $0.076;
Army Family Housing: $0.36;
Supplemental Funding: $0.776.
Fiscal year 2006:
Military Construction Army: $1.546;
Base Realignment and Closure: $0.803;
Army National Guard: $1.033;
Army Reserve: $0.132;
Army Family Housing: $0.351;
Supplemental Funding: $0.177.
Fiscal year 2007:
Military Construction Army: $1.737;
Base Realignment and Closure: $2.819;
Army National Guard: $0.392;
Army Reserve: $0.144;
Army Family Housing: $0.417;
Supplemental Funding: $0.93.
Fiscal year 2008:
Military Construction Army: $3.507;
Base Realignment and Closure: $2.55;
Army National Guard: $0.47;
Army Reserve: $0.134;
Army Family Housing: $0.057;
Supplemental Funding: $1.029.
Fiscal year 2009:
Military Construction Army: $4.488;
Base Realignment and Closure: $3.618;
Army National Guard: $0.803;
Army Reserve: $0.265;
Army Family Housing: $0.246;
Supplemental Funding: $1.258.
Fiscal year 2010:
Military Construction Army: $3.46;
Base Realignment and Closure: $2.427;
Army National Guard: $0.392;
Army Reserve: $0.375;
Army Family Housing: $0.05;
Supplemental Funding: $0.828.
Source: GAO analysis of appropriated funding data provided by the Army.
Note: Figure does not include $264 million of American Reinvestment
and Recovery Act funds appropriated for Army and Army National Guard
military construction and Army family housing construction in fiscal
year 2009.
[End of figure]
The Army Adopted Changes to Its Military Facility Acquisition and
Construction Practices:
To meet the challenges associated with the large increase in its
military construction program and ensure that required new facilities
would be completed in time to meet planned movements of organizations
and personnel, the Army concluded that it could not continue to rely
on its traditional military facility acquisition and construction
practices. The Army's solution was the adoption of a new strategy in
2006 that the Army termed military construction transformation. The
strategy included numerous changes to the Army's traditional practices
that were designed to reduce facility acquisition costs and
construction timelines. Included among the changes were the following:
* The development of clear requirements that need to be met in 43
different types of Army facilities and the creation of standard
designs for 24 common facility types, such as headquarters buildings,
company operations and tactical equipment maintenance facilities,
barracks, dining facilities, and child care centers.
* A transition from "design-bid-build" project delivery, where a
project's design and construction are normally awarded via separate
contracts, to "design-build" project delivery, where a project's
design and construction are awarded to a single contractor. By using
one contractor and overlapping the design and construction phases, the
design-build approach attempts to reduce project risk and construction
timelines.
* The development of a standard solicitation approach for most common-
type facilities that used performance-based criteria focused on what
the Army needed rather than on detailed, prescriptive criteria that
focused on how the Army's requirements should be met. Under the
approach, the Army revealed to potential bidders the available funding
for the project and tasked project bidders to provide an innovative
proposal that meets the performance-based criteria while maximizing
quality, sustainability, and energy conservation.
Army officials stated that its new standard solicitation approach
encouraged potential bidders to develop design solutions that
considered the use of all types of construction materials and methods
allowed by DOD building guidance. This included the use of wood
materials and modular building methods in addition to the use of
steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site building methods
traditionally used by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force for
permanent facilities, such as administrative buildings and barracks.
As a result, under its military construction transformation strategy,
the Army expanded the use of wood materials and modular building
methods for some permanent facilities. Appendix II contains further
details on the various categories of construction materials and
methods allowed by DOD guidance.
Because the Army believed that the changes it made to its facility
acquisition and building practices under its transformation strategy
would result in lower construction costs and shorter building
timelines, the Army established goals to reduce its military
construction costs by 15 percent and facility construction timelines
by 30 percent beginning in fiscal year 2007. The Army planned to
implement the cost reduction goal by having project planners reduce
the estimated cost of planned facilities by 15 percent, requesting
funding from the Congress for the reduced amount, and then attempting
to award and complete the project within the approved funding amount.
Thus, the goal was not directly related to actual facility costs but
rather to estimated facility costs. While continuing to apply the
strategy to its military construction program, the Army discontinued
these numerical goals in fiscal year 2010, stating that most cost and
timeline reduction benefits from its strategy would have been obtained
by the end of fiscal year 2009.
DOD Antiterrorism Construction Standards and Sustainable Design Goals:
As required by Section 2859 of Title 10, DOD has developed and
implemented antiterrorism construction standards designed to reduce
facility vulnerability to terrorist attack and improve the security of
facility occupants.[Footnote 8] The standards include 22 mandatory
standards, such as requiring open areas around new facilities to keep
explosives at a distance from the facilities, and 17 recommended but
optional measures, such as avoiding exterior hallway configurations
for inhabited facilities. Appendix III contains further details on the
standards and measures.
For decades, the federal government has attempted to improve energy
efficiency and energy and water conservation at federal facilities.
Over the past few years, several laws, executive orders, and other
agreements added new energy efficiency and energy and water
conservation requirements for federal facilities[Footnote 9]. In
particular, in January 2006, DOD joined 16 other federal agencies in
signing a memorandum of understanding that committed the agency to
leadership in designing, constructing, and operating high-performance
and sustainable building[Footnote 10]s. The main goals of sustainable
design are to avoid resource depletion of energy, water, and raw
materials; prevent environmental degradation caused by facilities and
infrastructure; and create facilities that are livable, comfortable,
safe, and productive.
To help measure the sustainability of new military buildings, DOD uses
the U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design Green Building Rating System.[Footnote 11] The
system defines sustainable features for buildings and includes a set
of performance standards that can be used to certify the design and
construction of buildings. The standards are categorized under five
major topics--sustainable sites, water efficiency, energy and
atmosphere, materials and resources, and indoor environmental quality.
By meeting the standards during facility design and construction,
builders can earn credits and become certified in accordance with an
established four-level scale--certified, silver, gold, and platinum.
For fiscal year 2009, DOD set a goal that at least 70 percent of
military construction projects would be silver-level certifiable,
which is the second level on the four-level scale with platinum being
the highest rating. Appendix IV contains additional details on DOD's
sustainable design goals.
Responsibilities for DOD's Military Construction Program:
The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment has responsibility for DOD's installations and
facilities. The office is responsible for establishing policy and
guidance for DOD's military construction program and monitoring the
execution of the services' military construction projects. The United
States Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command have primary responsibility for planning and executing
military construction projects for the Army and the Navy,
respectively. Air Force officials stated that the Air Force Center for
Engineering and the Environment has primary responsibility for
planning and overseeing the construction of Air Force military
construction projects, although the Army Corps of Engineers or the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command normally executes the individual
projects for the Air Force and DOD guidance provides these
organizations with a role in design and construction.
Prior GAO Reports:
Since 1997, we have identified management of DOD support
infrastructure as a high-risk area because infrastructure costs have
affected the department's ability to devote funds to other more
critical programs and needs. In a January 2009 update to our high-risk
series, we noted that although DOD has made progress in managing its
support infrastructure in recent years, a number of challenges remain
in managing its portfolio of facilities and in reducing unneeded
infrastructure while providing facilities needed to support several
simultaneous force structure initiatives.[Footnote 12] Further, we
noted that because of these issues, DOD's management of support
infrastructure remains a high-risk area.
We have issued several reports over the past few years that
highlighted aspects of DOD's military construction program and
challenges in managing the program. For example, in a 2003 report, we
found that opportunities existed to reduce the construction costs of
government-owned barracks through greater use of residential
construction practices, which included the use of wood materials.
However, we also found that questions remained concerning the
durability of wood-frame barracks and the ability of wood-frame
barracks to meet all antiterrorism force protection
requirements.[Footnote 13] We recommended that engineering studies be
undertaken to resolve these questions. DOD concurred with our
recommendation and subsequently the Army determined that wood-frame
barracks could be built in a manner that met all antiterrorism
construction standards. However, DOD did not undertake studies on the
durability of wood-frame barracks. In a 2004 report, we found that
while DOD had taken a number of steps to enhance the management of the
military construction program, opportunities existed for further
improvements. Among other things, we recommended that DOD complete
management tools for standardizing military construction practices and
costs. DOD agreed and subsequently took steps to provide a more
consistent approach to managing facilities and planning construction
projects and costs.[Footnote 14] Further, in a September 2007 report,
we discussed the complex implementation challenges faced by the Army
to meet the infrastructure needs associated with the growth of
personnel assigned to many installations as a result of base
realignment and closure, overseas force rebasing, and force modularity
actions.[Footnote 15] Also, in October 2009, we issued a report that
discussed agencies' progress toward implementing sustainable design
and high-performance federal building requirements found in the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007.[Footnote 16] This report also
addressed the key challenges agencies may encounter when implementing
federal building requirements for reducing energy use and managing
storm water runoff. Further, in a January 2009 testimony before the
House of Representatives' Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, we noted that investment in infrastructure could
reduce energy and operations and maintenance costs and address
important energy and water conservation measures as well as other
measures outlined within the Energy Independence and Security act of
2007.[Footnote 17] A list of these reports can be found at the end of
this report in the Related GAO Products section.
The Army Did Not Measure the Achievement of Goals to Reduce Military
Construction Costs and Timelines:
Because the Army did not measure the achievement of its goals to
reduce military construction costs and timelines, the Army did not
know to what extent the goals were met nor whether its military
construction transformation strategy resulted in actual reductions in
facility costs. Our review of selected project information showed that
the Army did reduce the estimated cost of some facility construction
projects and shortened building timelines during fiscal years 2007
through 2009, but it did not meet its overall stated goals. We also
found that the Army did not consistently apply the cost reduction goal
to all facility projects during fiscal years 2007 through 2009.
Although the Army discontinued these numerical goals in 2010, Army
officials believed its efforts to transform its military construction
acquisition and building practices were successful in dampening the
escalation of Army facilities' costs and would continue to help ensure
cost-effective and timely facilities in future years.
The Army Set Goals to Reduce Construction Costs and Timelines but Did
Not Monitor Its Level of Achievement:
When the Army set goals to reduce construction costs and building
timelines, it did not establish a framework for monitoring the
achievement of these goals. Effective management practices call not
only for setting program goals but also for monitoring goal
achievement so that results can be measured and adjustments can be
made to programs, if needed, to better achieve the goals. According to
internal control standards for federal agencies, activities need to be
established to monitor performance measures and indicators and
managers need to compare actual performance to planned or expected
results so that analyses of the relationships can be made and
appropriate actions taken.[Footnote 18] During our review, senior Army
headquarters officials acknowledged that a framework to measure goal
achievement should have been established when the cost and timeline
goals were instituted. The officials also stated that the only
explanation for not monitoring the goals was that they were so
involved in implementing the many changes adopted under the Army's
military construction transformation strategy that no one took the
time to monitor and track the results being achieved from the changes.
The Army Did Not Subject All Facility Projects to the Cost Goal:
During our review, we found that the Army did not subject all Army
facility projects to its 15 percent cost reduction goal. According to
Army officials, the Army planned to implement the cost goal by having
project planners reduce the estimated cost of planned facilities by 15
percent, requesting funding from the Congress for the reduced amount,
and then attempting to award and complete the project within the
approved funding amount.[Footnote 19] Thus, the cost goal was not
directly related to actual facility costs but rather to estimated
facility costs. However, all facility projects were not subjected to
the reduction in estimated costs, as the following examples illustrate:
* For fiscal year 2007, Army officials stated that the 15 percent cost
goal only applied to military construction facility projects that were
budgeted for under the base realignment and closure program.
Reductions were not required in the estimated costs of facility
projects budgeted under the Army's regular military construction
program. According to Army officials, reduced funding was not
requested for the regular military construction program projects
because the project estimates for the regular program were already
complete before the reduction goal was announced, and the Army did not
have sufficient time to recalculate the project estimates at the
reduced amount before the budget request had to be submitted.
* For fiscal year 2008, Army officials stated that all Army facility
cost estimates were subject to the 15 percent cost reduction goal,
regardless of the funding source or type of facility. However, while
all fiscal year 2008 projects were subject to the goal, Army officials
stated that the 15 percent cost reduction in estimated costs was
mandatory only for brigade, battalion, and company headquarters
buildings, barracks, and dining facilities. For other types of
facilities, if project planners believed that a 15 percent cost
reduction could not be achieved when construction bids were ultimately
solicited, the planners could submit a justification stating the
reasons that a reduction was not made to the facility's estimated cost.
* For fiscal year 2009, Army officials stated that the 15 percent
reduction goal was applied only to five specific types of facilities--
brigade, battalion, and company headquarters buildings, barracks, and
dining facilities. Cost estimates for all other types of facilities
were not subjected to the goal. According to Army officials, general
cost increases in the construction industry indicated that a 15
percent cost reduction could not be achieved for most fiscal year 2009
facilities. However, because of the changes incorporated under the
Army's military construction transformation strategy, the officials
believed that reductions could be achieved for the five specified
facility types.
The Army Achieved Some Reductions in Estimated Costs but Did Not Meet
Its Overall Goal:
Because the Army had not monitored and thus did not know to what
extent it had met its cost goal, we performed an analysis and found
that, while the Army reduced the estimated cost and met its goal on
some facility projects, it did not meet the goal on other projects.
Specifically, we reviewed the construction cost estimates for a non-
probability sample of 75 facility projects that were in the categories
subject to the goal to determine whether a 15 percent reduction was
taken in the estimated cost of the facilities, as reported in each
facility's project justification. The 75 facilities included 15 fiscal
year 2007 facilities funded under the base realignment and closure
program, 30 projects from fiscal year 2008, and 30 projects from
fiscal year 2009 for the five facility types subject to the goal. As
shown in table 1, we found that the Army met its goal in 31 of the
facilities (41 percent) and did not meet its goal in 44 of the
facilities (59 percent). However, some reduction, but less than 15
percent, was made in the estimated cost of 24 of the 44 facilities
that did not meet the goal. Although the Army had information on the
actual costs of completed military construction projects, the Army did
not routinely document the actual costs of the individual facilities
included in the projects. For this reason, we could not determine
whether any of these facilities resulted in actual savings compared to
cost estimates based on DOD cost estimating guidance.
Table 1: Achievement of the Army's Cost Goal in Selected Projects:
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of facilities reviewed: 15;
Facilities that met goal: Number: 7;
Facilities that met goal: Percent: 47;
Facilities that did not meet goal: Number: 8;
Facilities that did not meet goal: Percent: 53.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of facilities reviewed: 30;
Facilities that met goal: Number: 10;
Facilities that met goal: Percent: 33;
Facilities that did not meet goal: Number: 20;
Facilities that did not meet goal: Percent: 67.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number of facilities reviewed: 30;
Facilities that met goal: Number: 14;
Facilities that met goal: Percent: 47;
Facilities that did not meet goal: Number: 16;
Facilities that did not meet goal: Percent: 53.
Fiscal year: Total;
Number of facilities reviewed: 75;
Facilities that met goal: Number: 31;
Facilities that met goal: Percent: 41;
Facilities that did not meet goal: Number: 44;
Facilities that did not meet goal: Percent: 59.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD project justification data.
[End of table]
The following examples illustrate the achievement of the Army's cost
goal in selected projects we reviewed:
* A fiscal year 2008 Army military construction project at Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii, included a barracks. According to DOD military
construction cost estimating guidance for that year, the project
planners should have estimated $24.7 million for the cost of this
barracks. However, according to the project's justification, the
barracks' estimated cost was $20.9 million, which was the amount
requested for funding. Because the barracks' estimated cost was about
$3.8 million, or about 15 percent, less than the amount based on DOD
guidance, the Army achieved its goal in this case.
* A fiscal year 2009 Army military construction project at Fort Lee,
Virginia, included a dining facility. According to DOD military
construction cost estimating guidance for that year, the project
planners should have estimated $5.8 million for the cost of this
facility. However, according to the project's justification, the
dining facility's estimated cost was $5.4 million, which was the
amount requested for funding. In this case, the facility's estimated
cost was $400,000 (7 percent) less than the amount based on DOD
guidance. Thus, the Army achieved some reduction in the estimated cost
of this facility but did not meet the 15 percent goal.
* A fiscal year 2009 Army military construction project at Fort
Stewart, Georgia, included a barracks. According to DOD military
construction cost estimating guidance for that year, the project
planners should have estimated $82.0 million for the cost for this
facility. However, according to the project's justification, the
barracks' estimated cost was $86.4 million, which was the amount
requested for funding. In this case, the barracks estimated cost was
about $4.4 million (5 percent) greater than the amount based on DOD
guidance. Thus, the Army did not meet the 15 percent goal and actually
requested more funding than it would have requested based on DOD
guidance.
Army officials stated that the cost goal was not met in some projects
because the projects' planners believed that a 15 percent cost
reduction could not realistically be achieved when bids for the
project were solicited because of local construction market
conditions. In addition, the officials stated that, although the 15
percent goal might not have been achieved for all projects, they
believed that the Army's efforts to transform its military
construction acquisition and building practices were successful in
dampening the escalation of Army facility costs.
The Army Shortened Some Building Timelines but Did Not Meet Its
Overall Goal:
Because the Army had not monitored and thus did not know to what
extent it had met its 30 percent building timeline reduction goal, we
performed an analysis to assess goal accomplishment and found that,
while the Army shortened some building timelines, the overall goal was
not achieved. Specifically, our analysis compared the actual average
lapsed time between key building milestones for all completed projects
approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009 with the average lapsed
times for the same milestones for completed projects approved in
fiscal years 2004 through 2006--the 3 years before the implementation
of the Army's military construction transformation strategy. To
illustrate, one key Army building timeline measure is the lapsed time
between the date that a project's design begins and the date that the
project is ready for occupancy. As shown in table 2, we found that the
Army's average lapsed time for this timeline measure was reduced by
about 11 percent during fiscal years 2007 through 2009--an
improvement, but less than the Army's 30 percent goal.
Table 2: Change in Average Army Building Timelines--Design Start to
Ready for Occupancy:
Project cost: Less than $5 million;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 65;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 1,073;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 11;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 975;
Change in average lapsed days: Number of days: -98;
Change in average lapsed days: Percent: -9.
Project cost: $5 million to $20 million;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 80;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 1,207;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 100;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 1,095;
Change in average lapsed days: Number of days: -112;
Change in average lapsed days: Percent: -9.
Project cost: More than $20 million;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 81;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 1,649;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 194;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 1,229;
Change in average lapsed days: Number of days: -420;
Change in average lapsed days: Percent: -25.
Project cost: All projects;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 226;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 1,327;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 305;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 1,176;
Change in average lapsed days: Number of days: -151;
Change in average lapsed days: Percent: -11.
Source: GAO analysis of Army project data.
[End of table]
Another key Army building timeline measure is the lapsed time between
the date that the Army notifies the building contractor to begin
construction and the date that the project is ready for occupancy. As
shown in table 3, we found that the Army's average lapsed time for
this timeline measure was reduced by about 5 percent during fiscal
years 2007 through 2009--also an improvement, but also less than the
Army's 30 percent goal.
Table 3: Change in Average Army Building Timelines--Construction Start
to Ready for Occupancy:
Project cost: Less than $5 million;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 74;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 485;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 13;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 526;
Change in average lapsed days: Number of days: 41;
Change in average lapsed days: Percent: 8.
Project cost: $5 million to $20 million;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 96;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 662;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 105;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 557;
Change in average lapsed days: Number of days: -105;
Change in average lapsed days: Percent: -16.
Project cost: More than $20 million;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 89;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 858;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 203;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 700;
Change in average lapsed days: Number of days: -158;
Change in average lapsed days: Percent: -18.
Project cost: All projects;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 259;
Fiscal years 2004 to 2006 before the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 679;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Number of
projects: 321;
Fiscal years 2007 to 2009 after the reduction goal: Average lapsed
days: 646;
Change in average lapsed days: Number of days: -33;
Change in average lapsed days: Percent: -5.
Source: GAO analysis of Army project data.
[End of table]
Army officials stated that they were pleased that average building
timelines had been reduced even if the 30 percent goal was not
achieved.
The Army Discontinued Its Construction Cost and Timeline Reduction
Goals in Fiscal Year 2010:
During our review, Army officials stated that the Army decided to
discontinue its construction cost and timeline reduction goals
beginning in fiscal year 2010. The officials stated that, although the
Army did not know to what extent cost and timeline reductions had been
achieved, they believed that most of the cost and timeline reduction
benefits from the Army's military construction transformation strategy
had been obtained by the end of fiscal year 2009. The officials also
stated that, although the specific cost and timeline goals were
discontinued, the numerous changes made to the Army's facility
acquisition and construction processes under the military construction
transformation strategy would help ensure the continued delivery of
cost-effective and timely facilities in the future.
Questions Remain about Whether the Use of Alternative Building
Materials and Methods Will Yield Long-term Savings:
DOD guidance allows the use of various building materials and methods
and the Army appears to have achieved some savings in initial
construction costs by expanding the use of wood materials and modular
construction methods for some permanent facilities. However, DOD has
not determined whether the use of these materials and methods also
will result in savings over the long term compared to the traditional
use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site building
methods.
DOD Guidance Permits the Use of Various Building Materials and Methods:
Over the past several years, DOD has taken several steps to bring
uniformity among the military services in the criteria, standards, and
codes used to design and construct military facilities. This has
included the development of DOD's unified facilities criteria and
unified facilities guide specification system of guidance for the
design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization of
all DOD facilities.[Footnote 20] For example, in 2007, DOD issued
guidance--the Unified Facilities Criteria 1-200-01, "General Building
Requirements"--which applies to the design and construction of all new
and renovated facilities throughout DOD. The guidance states that the
2006 International Building Code, with some modifications and
exceptions, is the building code for DOD. Among other things, the
International Building Code defines several allowable types of
construction based, in part, on the materials used in the construction
and the materials' potential to be a fuel source in case of a fire.
For example, type I and type II construction use materials such as
steel, concrete, and masonry that, in accordance with applicable
testing standards, are classified as noncombustible. Type V
construction allows the use of various materials, including
combustible materials, and typically includes facilities built with
wood framing. Although the code allows the use of many construction
materials, the military services have traditionally used types I and
II construction consisting of steel, concrete, and masonry when
building permanent common facilities, such as administrative
buildings, barracks, and dining facilities. Appendix II contains
further details on DOD's building materials and methods, including
descriptions of types III and IV construction.
Substantial Quantitative Information Is Lacking on the Relative Merits
from the Use of Alternative Construction Materials and Methods:
During our review, we identified little quantitative information that
compared the relative merits and economic impacts from the use of wood
materials and modular construction methods with steel, concrete and
masonry materials and on-site construction methods. The Army's
decision to expand its consideration and use wood materials and
modular construction for some permanent facilities was primarily based
on the Army's desire to reduce military construction costs and
building timelines in view of the significant increase in the Army's
construction requirements beginning in fiscal year 2006. According to
Army officials, the Army believed that the increased use of wood
framing and modular construction would reduce initial construction
costs and building timelines for new facilities, result in facilities
that met the Army's needs, and also result in lower facility life-
cycle costs. However, the Army did not have substantial quantitative
information or analyses to support its view on lower life-cycle costs.
For example, according to Army officials, the Army had performed only
two analyses that compared the life-cycle costs of permanent
facilities built with alternative construction materials and building
methods. One analysis compared the life-cycle cost of a barracks built
with wood materials with the life-cycle costs of a similar barracks
built with steel, concrete, and masonry. Although this analysis
estimated that the barracks constructed with wood would have lower
life-cycle costs, the analysis was not based on actual costs. Instead,
the analysis used cost estimates which might or might not provide a
reliable prediction of actual costs over the long term. In addition,
our review of the analysis found other flaws and data errors, such as
understating the square footage of one of the projects by 39 percent,
which affected the outcome of the analysis and cast further doubt on
the reliability of the analysis. The other Army analysis assessed life-
cycle costs for several types of construction materials and methods.
However, it also was not based on actual costs but rather on estimates
obtained in planning documents.
The Navy and the Air Force generally disagreed with the Army's views
on the benefits from expanded use of wood materials and modular
building methods. Senior officials with the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the
Environment stated that they believed that use of wood materials and
modular methods instead of steel, concrete, and masonry would result
in facilities with shorter service lives and higher, not lower, life-
cycle costs. To illustrate, the officials noted that features
sometimes used in wood-frame construction could result in higher
maintenance costs. For example, a wood-frame building finished with a
shingle roof might have higher maintenance costs over the long term
compared to a building finished with a steel roof because the shingles
would have to be replaced periodically over the life of the building.
While their views differed with the Army, Navy and Air Force officials
stated that they had little quantitative support for their views and
had performed no analyses that compared the long-term costs of
facilities built with wood materials versus steel, concrete, and
masonry materials.
During our visits to private organizations that represented the
interests of wood, modular building, and concrete and masonry
industries, we found various views and opinions on the long-term
merits and economic benefits from the use of alternative construction
materials and building methods. However, we did not find documented
analyses comparing the actual life-cycle costs of facilities
constructed with alternative materials and methods.
Wood-Frame Construction Can Result in Lower Initial Construction Costs:
To gain some insight into the economic merits of the Army's increased
use of wood materials and modular construction, we reviewed available
information related to initial facility construction costs depending
on the materials and methods used to construct new buildings. We found
evidence that the use of wood-frame construction can result in lower
initial building costs. For example, we found that the Army apparently
had achieved construction cost savings by using wood-frame
construction in several barracks projects that were initially designed
to be built with steel, concrete, and masonry. To illustrate,
according to Army officials, a fiscal year 2006 project at Fort Carson
to construct a barracks and company operations facility was estimated
to cost about $35 million based on actual contract bids and the use of
steel, concrete, and masonry construction. After switching the
barracks' design to wood-frame construction and resoliciting the
project, the officials stated that the project was subsequently
awarded for about $24 million, a savings of about $11 million, or 31
percent in estimated costs (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Wood-Frame Barracks at Fort Carson, Colorado:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Photograph on left shows exterior of the barracks and the
photograph on right shows an interior corridor.
[End of figure]
Similarly, a fiscal year 2001 barracks project at Fort Meade,
Maryland, called for the construction of eight three-story barracks
buildings with a total of 576 private sleeping rooms. On the basis of
the project's initial design using steel, concrete, and masonry, the
Army estimated that the project would cost about $48 million, which
was more than the amount approved for the project. In an effort to
reduce the cost, the project was redesigned to specify the use of wood
materials and residential construction practices. Subsequently, the
project was constructed at a cost of about $39 million, or about $9
million (19 percent) less than the original estimated cost (see figure
3).
Figure 3: Wood-Frame Barracks at Fort Meade, Maryland:
[Refer to PDF for image 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Photograph on left shows the project under construction using
wood materials in 2003 and the photograph on right shows a portion of
the completed project.
[End of figure]
Sources outside of DOD also have noted that the use of wood-frame
construction can result in lower initial building costs. For example,
an August 2009 building valuation guide published by the International
Code Council reported that the use of residential building methods,
including wood-frame construction, for several types of facilities
resulted in a 19 percent to 25 percent construction cost savings
compared to the use of commercial construction methods, including the
use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials.[Footnote 21] Also, a
2005 study collected information from cities across the United States
to develop a construction cost model to accurately evaluate the
relative construction costs of a multifamily building constructed
using five different construction materials. Information collected
during the study showed that the use of wood-frame construction could
result in an average 6 percent to 7 percent construction cost savings
compared to the use of masonry construction.[Footnote 22]
Some Information Suggests That the Use of Wood Building Materials
Might Result in Lower Long-term Costs:
Although we found little quantitative information on the long-term
economic merits from the use of alternative building materials and
methods, we found some evidence suggesting that the long-term costs of
facilities built with wood-frame materials might result in lower or
equal long-term costs compared to similar facilities built with steel,
concrete, and masonry materials. For example, we reviewed the annual
maintenance costs associated with two wood-frame barracks projects
constructed in 2003 and 2006 at Fort Meade and Fort Detrick, Maryland,
respectively. These facilities are the Army's initial two modern,
permanent barracks constructed with wood frame. During fiscal years
2007 and 2008, the annual maintenance costs of the wood-frame barracks
on a square-foot basis was significantly less than the annual
maintenance costs of other barracks at each installation constructed
with steel, concrete, and masonry methods. However, the wood-frame
barracks were newer by several years compared to the concrete and
masonry barracks, which could account for the difference in
maintenance costs. Still, local officials responsible for barracks
maintenance at each installation stated that based on experience to
date they believed that even in the long term the annual maintenance
costs of the wood-frame barracks would be no greater than the annual
maintenance costs of the installations' concrete and masonry barracks.
As another illustration, we visited two privatized housing projects
for unmarried servicemembers where service officials stated that
private developers were responsible for constructing, owning,
operating, and maintaining the housing for 50 years in one case and 46
years in the other. During each visit, the developers stated that wood-
frame construction was being used because the developers believed
that, based on their internal long-term cost analyses, this type of
construction would result in the most economical project over the long
term. For example, the Navy partnered with a developer to build a
pilot privatized housing project for unaccompanied personnel in the
Norfolk, Virginia, area. The project includes the construction of 755
rooms in a six-story midrise building and 435 rooms in 87 separate
housing units. The developer stated that the midrise building used
noncombustible materials, such as concrete, and the 87 separate
housing units used wood-frame materials.[Footnote 23] The developer
stated that the type of construction used for each type of building
was based on the most cost-effective type of construction, considering
life-cycle costs, to provide the lowest total cost over a 50-year
period. Further, the developer also stated that, because the exterior
surfaces and interior finishes for both the midrise building and
separate housing units were very similar, no difference in operation
and maintenance costs was anticipated with regard to the different
types of construction (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Privatized Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Project in
Norfolk, Virginia:
[Refer to PDF for image 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Photograph on the left shows a midrise building being
constructed with noncombustible materials and the photograph on right
shows a separate housing unit built with wood-frame construction.
[End of figure]
In the other project visited, the Army had partnered with a developer
to build, own, and operate a privatized housing project for senior
unmarried servicemembers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for 46 years.
The project includes 13 apartment-style buildings with a mix of 312
one-and two-bedroom apartments. The developer stated that wood-frame
construction was used in the project because, compared to the use of
noncombustible materials and building methods, wood-frame construction
resulted in lower initial construction costs and, based on the
developer's long-term analyses, was expected to also result in lower
life-cycle costs (see figure 5).
Figure 5: Privatized Senior Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Project at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: The photographs show exterior and interior views of the housing
built with wood-frame construction.
[End of figure]
Questions Remain about the Service Life and Durability of Facilities
Constructed with Wood Materials and Modular Methods:
Determining the relative merits and economic impacts of alternative
building materials and methods over the long term requires the
consideration of possible differences in facility service life and
durability resulting from the use of different building materials and
methods. Although we found no DOD studies or definitive analyses
assessing possible service life and durability differences and any
associated impact on life-cycle costs, we discussed opinions on the
issue with service headquarters officials and local officials at five
Army installations we visited.
Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters officials expressed the opinion
that steel, concrete, and masonry facilities generally had longer
service lives and were more durable than wood-frame facilities.
However, we found that the services had different opinions on the
importance of durability. For example, although Army officials agreed
with the opinion of Navy and Air Force officials that the use of
steel, concrete, and masonry generally resulted in more durable
facilities, the Army's opinion differed from the other services'
opinions on whether greater durability also meant that such facilities
were more desirable. Army officials stated that because missions,
requirements, and standards change over time, facilities constructed
today will be outdated in 20 to 25 years and will require major
renovation or possibly conversion to other uses to meet needs in the
far outyears. Thus, Army officials stated that considering facility
use beyond 25 years is not productive and facilities built with wood-
frame materials and modular building methods will meet the Army's
needs even if they do not last as long as facilities constructed with
steel, concrete, and masonry.
Officials at the Army installations we visited had various opinions on
the expected service life and durability of facilities constructed
with wood materials and modular building methods. Officials at Fort
Meade and Fort Detrick, for example, stated that they were satisfied
with the durability of wood-frame barracks constructed on-site at
their installations and would not seek to use steel, concrete, and
masonry even if they had the opportunity to rebuild the facilities.
With respect to wood modular construction, we found the following
concerns expressed by officials at Fort Bliss and Fort Carson:
* Fort Bliss officials noted that because modular units were
constructed off-site and then transported in some cases over 1,000
miles to the installation for assembly, the vibrations experienced
during transportation might affect the units' structures and result in
durability issues. The modular industry, however, contends that
modular units are constructed to withstand such transportation
stresses.
* Fort Carson officials expressed concern that temperature changes
would cause the expansion and contraction of the joints where modular
units were joined, which might adversely affect durability in the long
term.
* Fort Bliss and Fort Carson officials expressed concerns that
settling of the different sections of modular facilities might show
stress where they join together, resulting in additional maintenance
requirements in the long term.
* Officials at Fort Bliss and Fort Carson also said that reconfiguring
modular-built facilities for other uses, if needed in the future,
might be more difficult compared to wood-frame facilities built on-
site, and thus result in a shorter facility service life.
Figure 6 shows a Fort Bliss barracks under construction using modular
building methods.
Figure 6: Use of Modular Construction to Build a Barracks at Fort
Bliss, Texas:
[Refer to PDF for image: 6 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Photographs beginning with top left: modular-constructed units
on transportation trailer, moving units from trailers, barracks
foundation ready for unit placement, assembled units before exterior
finishing, exterior of nearly completed barracks, interior hallway of
completed barracks.
[End of figure]
Fort Bliss officials added that, although they had some concerns about
the durability of modular construction, the use of modular
construction methods resulted in faster building timelines compared to
steel, concrete, and masonry construction, which would help ensure the
timely completion of facilities needed to accommodate the large number
of soldiers reporting to the installation over the next few years.
Although officials at some installations we visited expressed concerns
over the durability of facilities built with modular building methods,
other sources have reported information that supports the durability
of modular facilities. For example, after Hurricane Andrew hit Florida
in 1992, a team from the Federal Emergency Management Agency conducted
a study of various building types and how well they weathered the
storm. On the basis of its observations, the team concluded that, in
general, both masonry buildings and wood-framed modular buildings
performed relatively well.[Footnote 24]
Conflicts Exist between Antiterrorism Building Standards and
Sustainable Goals, but the Services Consider the Conflicts to Be
Manageable:
Although there are areas of conflict when designing facilities that
meet both antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design
goals, military service officials stated that the conflicts are
considered to be manageable and not a significant obstacle to the
design and construction of new facilities. Service officials noted,
however, that achieving higher levels of sustainability in future
construction projects while still meeting the antiterrorism standards
would further increase initial facility costs and create additional
design challenges.
DOD Has Recognized and Routinely Manages the Conflicts between
Antiterrorism Building Standards and Sustainable Design Goals:
DOD has recognized that areas of conflict exist between DOD's
antiterrorism building standards and sustainable design goals and has
developed approaches to help deal with the conflicts. To illustrate,
military service officials noted that the antiterrorism mandatory
building standard to provide standoff distances around new facilities
to keep potential explosives at a distance reduces development density
and conflicts with a sustainable design goal to increase development
density. Similarly, some officials stated that sustainable design
goals related to greater use of windows to increase natural lighting
conflicts with the recommended antiterrorism building measure related
to minimizing hazards from flying glass fragments from windows.
To help deal with such conflicts, a facility planning tool was
developed that identifies and addresses the potential conflicts from
integrating required antiterrorism standards with sustainable design
goals. The tool uses a color-coded matrix to identify the relationship
between the antiterrorism standards and sustainable design goals.
Conflicting or possibly conflicting relationships are coded red and
yellow, respectively, and the tool provides additional information to
aid project designers in dealing with these areas.
The services do not consider the conflicts between antiterrorism
building standards and sustainable goals to be a significant obstacle
when designing and building new military facilities. Service officials
stated that with use of the facility planning tool and a comprehensive
design approach, project designers are able to develop successful
building solutions that ensure both secure and high-performance
facilities. In particular, officials in each military service stated
that the services had set a goal that beginning in fiscal year 2009
all new major military construction buildings would be designed and
constructed to be silver-level certifiable under the U.S. Green
Building Council's Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green
Building Rating System. This 100 percent goal was higher than the DOD-
wide goal for fiscal year 2009, which called for 70 percent of new
buildings to be silver-level certifiable.[Footnote 25] Further,
service officials stated that in some cases military buildings have
been constructed that met the rating system's next higher sustainable
design level--the gold level--while still complying with all
antiterrorism standards. However, service officials also noted that
achieving higher levels of sustainability while still meeting all
antiterrorism standards increases initial facility costs and creates
additional design challenges.
To obtain additional details on how the services were dealing with the
conflicts between the standards and the goals, we followed up with the
project planners responsible for 90 military construction projects
from a non-probability sample of Army, Navy, and Air Force projects
approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. According to the
planners, 80 of the 90 projects (89 percent) required no special steps
or workarounds to meet both antiterrorism standards and sustainable
design goals. For the projects where special steps or workarounds were
needed, most issues related to facility windows and the required
building standoff distances. For example, the planners of a fiscal
year 2007 child development center at Fort Lewis, Washington, reported
that special steps or workarounds were needed to simultaneously meet
antiterrorism standards and sustainable goals. According to the
planners, both the child care program and sustainable design goals
encouraged large window areas on the exterior of the building for
daylighting and child-height window views on both the building's
exterior and interior. However, the antiterrorism standards and
recommendations encourage reduced window sizes with specific window
glazing techniques to minimize hazards from flying glass fragments and
the use of reflective glazing to prevent views of a building's
interior. The planners stated that an acceptable design solution was
developed, but the result significantly increased the cost of the
facility's windows.
Although the project planners stated that 80 of the 90 projects in our
sample required no special steps or workarounds to meet both
antiterrorism standards and sustainable design goals, the planners
also reported that in some cases meeting both the standards and goals
resulted in additional land use, community decentralization, or
installation development sprawl.[Footnote 26] Specifically, project
planners reported that, primarily because of the required standoff
distances around new facilities, 18 (20 percent) of the 90 projects we
reviewed resulted in additional land use, community decentralization,
or installation development sprawl. For example, planners of a fiscal
year 2008 instruction building at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, reported
that because of the antiterrorism standoff distance standard, the
building site was approximately 50 percent larger than required if
there were no standoff requirements. Similarly, project planners of a
fiscal year 2009 unit maintenance facilities project at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, stated that complying with the antiterrorism standoff
distance standard resulted in additional land use, including the
construction of an additional parking lot situated across the street
from the facilities.
Antiterrorism Building Standards and Sustainable Design Features Add
to Facility Construction Costs:
According to service officials, incorporating antiterrorism standards
in new facilities typically adds about 1 to 5 percent to construction
costs and incorporating sustainable design building features typically
adds about 2 percent to construction costs. The officials noted,
however, that each project is unique and the estimated cost to
incorporate antiterrorism standards and sustainable design features
can vary significantly among military construction projects.
To obtain additional details on the costs of incorporating
antiterrorism standards and sustainable design features in new
facilities, we reviewed information contained in the project
justifications for the 90 military construction projects included in
our non-probability sample of Army, Navy, and Air Force projects
approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. The review showed that
the average estimated cost to incorporate antiterrorism standards in
the projects was about 2.0 percent of a project's total cost with the
range varying from 0.3 percent to 6.6 percent.[Footnote 27] The review
also showed that the average estimated cost of the sustainable design
features was about 1.6 percent of a project's total cost with the
range varying from 0.7 percent to 2.6 percent.[Footnote 28] According
to the project planners, the actual costs of incorporating
antiterrorism standards and sustainable design features in new
projects was not available because contractors normally do not
separately identify these costs in their bids responding to
solicitations for project construction.
Conclusions:
Although the Army appears to have achieved some savings in initial
construction costs by expanding the use of wood materials for some
permanent facilities, the military services had little quantitative
information on whether the use of wood materials and modular building
methods will also result in lower long-term costs compared to the
traditional use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site
building methods. Determining the relative merits and economic impacts
from the use of alternative construction materials and methods is an
important issue for the military services to resolve to help ensure
that DOD's military construction program meets requirements at the
lowest cost over the long term. Unless the services perform additional
study and analysis to determine the relative merits and long-term
economic impacts from the use of alternative construction materials
and methods, DOD will not know whether the use of wood materials and
modular building methods will result in the most economical long-term
building solution or whether DOD's unified facilities criteria, or
other military construction program guidance, needs to be changed so
that new facilities are constructed with materials and methods that
meet requirements at the lowest cost over the long term.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To address unanswered questions about the merits and long-term costs
from the use of alternative construction materials and methods for new
common facilities, such as administrative buildings and barracks, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to commission a
tri-service panel that would be responsible for determining and
comparing the estimated life-cycle costs of facilities built with
alternative construction materials and methods, including a mix of
wood and steel, concrete, and masonry construction materials and on-
site and modular construction methods.
We also recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment) use the results from the tri-service
panel's determinations to revise DOD's unified facilities criteria or
other appropriate military construction guidance, as deemed
appropriate, to ensure that new facilities are constructed with the
materials and methods that meet requirements at the lowest cost over
the long term.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Officials from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment) provided oral comments on a draft of
this report. In the comments, DOD stated that it agreed with our
recommendation to commission a tri-service panel that would be
responsible for determining and comparing the estimated life-cycle
costs of facilities built with alternative construction materials and
methods. DOD stated that the department needed to better understand
the life-cycle cost implications of different building materials and
methods and to use this knowledge in evaluating and comparing total
life-cycle cost alternatives. In view of the questions raised during
the course of our review, DOD stated that it had already initiated a
tri-service panel to develop a template that will objectively evaluate
the relative life-cycle costs between competing construction proposals
in the facilities acquisition process. When complete, the template is
expected to allow prospective project designers to propose alternative
construction materials and methods, among other design considerations,
to achieve lower life-cycle costs or best overall value. DOD stated
that this approach would recognize that the department cannot be
solely responsible for determining the life-cycle cost implications of
each possible alternative and needs to consider the best available
industry knowledge, expertise, and innovation for any particular
facility requirement. Nonetheless, DOD stated that it expects to
monitor the performance of alternative materials and methods to better
inform this process over time. We believe that DOD's actions, once
implemented, will address the intent of the recommendation.
DOD stated that it partially agreed with our recommendation that the
department use the results of the tri-service panel's determinations
to revise DOD's unified facilities criteria or other appropriate
military construction guidance, as deemed appropriate, to ensure that
new facilities are constructed with the materials and methods that
meet requirements at the lowest cost over the long term. DOD stated
that it agreed with the general concept that lessons learned should be
incorporated into facilities criteria and specifications to the extent
practical. However, DOD also stated that in some cases, such as to
minimize adverse environmental impacts, facilities might be built with
materials or methods that do not result in the lowest cost but in the
best value for the department. In short, DOD stated that the use of
the lowest-cost materials and methods should be an important
consideration in facilities acquisition, but not the overriding goal.
Our recommendation was not intended to restrict DOD in its efforts to
achieve the best value, but rather to ensure adequate consideration of
the long-term merits and economic impacts from building alternatives.
We continue to believe that when all costs are considered over the
long term, including environmental costs, the best value to DOD will
normally be the construction alternative with the lowest life-cycle
cost. Further, as stated in our recommendation, when revising its
construction guidance based on the tri-service panel's determinations,
we believe that DOD should only make revisions that it deems to be
appropriate. As a result, we believe DOD's plan to incorporate the tri-
service panel's findings into its guidance will address the intent of
the recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant
of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff
have any questions on the information discussed in this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Army's measurement and achievement of its military
construction cost and timeline reduction goals, we interviewed Army
headquarters and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials and reviewed
applicable documentation concerning the Army's military construction
transformation strategy and the associated establishment and
implementation of the Army's goals to reduce construction costs and
building timelines. We also reviewed guidance for internal controls
and effective management practices that call for the monitoring of
performance goals and discussed with Army officials the reasons that
the Army did not establish a framework to monitor the achievement of
its construction cost and building timeline reduction goals. To obtain
some insight into the Army's accomplishment of its cost goal, we
reviewed the construction cost estimates for a non-probability sample
of 75 facility projects to determine whether a 15 percent reduction
was taken in the estimated cost of the facilities, as called for
according to the Army's plan for implementing the goal. We selected
projects for review from a list of all Army military construction
projects approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. The projects
selected represented a range of facility types and geographic
locations and were in the categories of facilities subject to the cost
reduction goal. More specifically, the 75 facilities included 15
fiscal year 2007 facilities funded under the base realignment and
closure program, 30 projects from fiscal year 2008, and 30 projects
from fiscal year 2009 for five facility types subject to the goal. The
construction cost estimates were included in the project
justifications submitted to the Congress as part of the Army's funding
request. To obtain some insight into the Army's accomplishment of its
building timeline goal, we used actual Army project timeline
information to compare the average lapsed time between key building
milestones for all completed projects approved during fiscal years
2007 through 2009 with the lapsed times for the same milestones for
completed projects approved in fiscal years 2004 through 2006--the 3
years before the implementation of the Army's military construction
transformation strategy. Although we did not independently validate
the Army's building timeline data, we discussed with the officials
steps they had taken to ensure reasonable accuracy of the data. As
such, we determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report.
To evaluate the merits and economic impacts from the Army's expanded
use of wood materials and modular building methods for permanent
facilities, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army,
Navy, and Air Force officials and reviewed related documentation,
policies, and construction guidance on the use of construction
materials and building methods for military facilities. We also
discussed how various construction materials and building methods
could affect initial construction costs, long-term costs, service
life, and durability of new military facilities and reviewed available
documentation on the issue from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the Air Force Center for
Engineering and the Environment, and from representatives of three
industry groups--the American Wood Council, the Modular Building
Institute, and the National Concrete and Masonry Association. To
observe the use of alternative construction materials and methods and
discuss the issue with local military officials, we visited five Army
installations--Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort
Carson, Colorado; Fort Detrick, Maryland; and Fort Meade, Maryland--
where wood materials or modular building methods had been used to
construct permanent facilities. During the visits, we obtained
opinions and reviewed available information on the relative merits and
economic impacts from using alternative construction materials and
building methods. We also met with the developers of two military
privatized unaccompanied personnel housing projects to discuss the
reasons that the building materials and methods used in the projects
were chosen. One privatized project was associated with the Navy and
was located in the Norfolk, Virginia, area and the other project was
associated with the Army and was located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
To review potential conflicts between antiterrorism construction
standards and sustainable design goals and the costs to incorporate
the standards and goals in new facilities, we reviewed applicable
Department of Defense (DOD) policies, guidance, goals, and costs
related to incorporating antiterrorism construction standards and
sustainable design goals in new military facilities. We also
interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment
concerning how potential conflicts between the standards and the goals
are identified and addressed and how incorporating the standards and
goals affects the cost of new facilities. To obtain additional details
on how the services were dealing with potential conflicts between the
standards and the goals, we followed up with the project planners
responsible for 90 military construction projects selected from a non-
probability sample of Army, Navy, and Air Force projects approved
during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. We selected projects for review
from a list of all Army, Navy, and Air Force military construction
projects approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. We also
selected projects to represent a range of facility types and
geographic locations and included 10 Army, 10 Navy, and 10 Air Force
projects approved in each of the three fiscal years--for a total of 30
projects approved in each fiscal year. During the follow up, we asked
the project planners whether the projects required any special steps
or workarounds to meet both antiterrorism standards and sustainable
design goals and whether the projects resulted in additional land use,
community decentralization, or installation development sprawl. We did
not independently verify the information provided by the project
planners. In addition, to obtain additional details on the costs of
incorporating antiterrorism standards and sustainable design features
in new facilities, we reviewed information contained in the project
justification of each of the 90 projects. The justifications included
the estimated cost to incorporate antiterrorism standards in the
project and, for fiscal year 2009 projects, the justifications also
included the estimated cost to incorporate sustainable design goals.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to February 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOD Construction Practices:
In 2007, DOD issued guidance--the Unified Facilities Criteria 1-200-
01, General Building Requirements--that applies to the design and
construction of all new and renovated facilities throughout DOD. The
guidance adopted the 2006 International Building Code, with some
modifications and exceptions, as the building code for DOD. The
International Building Code defines allowable types of construction
based on factors such as the size, configuration, and planned facility
use and categorizes planned buildings into five construction types.
The construction type classifications are based on the fire-resistive
capabilities of the predominant materials used in the construction
progressing from type I, the most fire-resistive, to type V, the least
fire-resistive. More specifically, types I and II construction
incorporate materials such as steel, concrete, and masonry which, in
accordance with applicable testing standards, are classified as
noncombustible. Types III and V construction incorporate the use of
any material permitted by the code to include combustible materials
such as wood products and plastics. Type IV construction is related to
the use of heavy timber. Table 4 illustrates the materials that are
allowed to be used in the building elements--i.e., the structural
frame, bearing walls, nonbearing walls, floor, and roof--of a facility
built according to each type of construction.
Table 4: Types of Construction and Materials Allowed by the
International Building Code:
Type[A]: I & II;
Building element and permitted material: Structural frame:
Noncombustible[B];
Building element and permitted material: Bearing walls: Noncombustible;
Building element and permitted material: Nonbearing walls:
Noncombustible;
Building element and permitted material: Floor construction:
Noncombustible;
Building element and permitted material: Roof construction:
Noncombustible.
Type[A]: III;
Building element and permitted material: Structural frame: Any
material permitted by code;
Building element and permitted material: Bearing walls: Exterior walls
are noncombustible; Interior elements are any material permitted by
code;
Building element and permitted material: Nonbearing walls: Exterior
walls are noncombustible; Interior elements are any material permitted
by code;
Building element and permitted material: Floor construction: Any
material permitted by code;
Building element and permitted material: Roof construction: Any
material permitted by code.
Type[A]: IV;
Building element and permitted material: Structural frame: Heavy
timber;
Building element and permitted material: Bearing walls: Exterior walls
are noncombustible;
Building element and permitted material: Nonbearing walls: Heavy
timber;
Building element and permitted material: Floor construction: Heavy
timber;
Building element and permitted material: Roof construction: Heavy
timber.
Type[A]: V;
Building element and permitted material: Structural frame: Any
material permitted by code;
Building element and permitted material: Bearing walls: Any material
permitted by code;
Building element and permitted material: Nonbearing walls: Any
material permitted by code;
Building element and permitted material: Floor construction: Any
material permitted by code;
Building element and permitted material: Roof construction: Any
material permitted by code.
Source: GAO analysis of the International Building Code.
[A] Dependent upon a building's planned use and occupancy, a
building's height, floor area, and total area are restricted by the
type of construction used. In general, Type I construction is the
least restricted and Type V is the most restricted, per Section 503 of
the International Building Code.
[B] Noncombustible materials are to be tested in accordance with
methods established by the American Society for Testing and Materials,
per Section 704 of the International Building Code. Noncombustible
materials include but are not limited to concrete, masonry, and steel.
[End of table]
In each of the construction types, the intended level of fire
protection is achieved by assembling building elements to achieve fire-
resistance ratings established by the International Building Code.
[Footnote 29] In a type I steel-frame building, for example, spray-
applied fire-resistive material can be used to enable the structural
frame to achieve the 3-hour fire-resistance rating required by the
code, and in a type V wood-frame building, covering exposed wood with
drywall allows the affected building elements to achieve the 1-hour
fire-resistance rating required by the code. In addition to the fire
protection provided by the assembly of building elements, the code
establishes requirements for use of automatic fire sprinkler systems
based on factors to include the planned use and size of a facility and
the planned number of occupants.
The International Building Code also serves to limit building size
based on the level of fire protection provided by its construction.
Because type I construction is the most fire-resistive of the
construction types, the code places minimal limits on the dimensions
of type I buildings. To account for the comparatively lower level of
fire protection provided by type II through type V construction types,
the code establishes limits on building dimensions. For example, a
type V barracks building that is protected with an automatic sprinkler
system is limited under the code to a maximum height of 4 stories, or
60 feet, with each story having maximum floor area of 36,000 square
feet.
DOD has traditionally built permanent buildings using on-site
construction where materials are delivered to the construction site
and the materials are then assembled into a finished facility.
However, as part of its military construction transformation strategy,
the Army has allowed, among other alternative construction techniques,
the use of modular construction. In this method of construction,
building sections are fabricated off-site in a factory environment,
transported to the construction site, and then connected to other
building sections to assemble the facility. Although some on-site
construction is normally needed to complete the facility, the Modular
Building Institute reports that in a typical modular construction
project between 80 and 95 percent of the total construction is
completed at an off-site factory. Because the off-site construction
can proceed under controlled conditions at the same time that on-site
foundation and other work is being completed, modular construction
projects can potentially be completed with less material waste and in
less time compared to projects built with on-site construction methods.
[End of section]
Appendix III: DOD's Antiterrorism Construction Standards:
DOD's minimum antiterrorism construction standards are contained in
DOD's Unified Facilities Criteria 4-010-01, DOD Minimum Antiterrorism
Standards for Buildings. The standards include 22 mandatory standards
and 17 recommended, but not required, measures designed to mitigate
antiterrorism vulnerabilities and terrorist threats in inhabited
buildings. Mandatory standards 1 through 5 are considered site
planning standards. These standards note that operational, logistic,
and security requirements must be integrated into the overall design
of buildings, equipment, landscaping, parking, roads, and other
features and that the most cost-effective solution for mitigating
explosive effects on buildings is to keep explosives as far as
possible from the buildings. Standards 6 through 9 are considered
structural design standards. These standards require that additional
structural measures be incorporated into building designs to ensure
that buildings do not experience progressive collapse or otherwise
experience disproportionate damage even if required standoff distances
can be achieved. Standards 10 through 15 are considered architectural
design standards. These standards cover many aspects of building
layout that must be incorporated into designs to improve overall
protection of personnel inside buildings. Standards 16 through 22 are
considered electrical and mechanical design standards. These standards
address limiting damage to critical infrastructure; protecting
building occupants against chemical, biological, and radiological
threats; and notifying building occupants of threats or hazards.
Concerning the 17 recommended measures, DOD states that incorporating
these measures can enhance site security and building occupants'
safety with little increase in cost and should be considered for all
new and existing inhabited buildings. Table 5 provides a brief summary
description of each mandatory standard and recommended measure.
Table 5: DOD's Antiterrorism Construction Standards:
Mandatory standards: 1. Standoff distances;
Brief description: Specified standoff distances must be coupled with
appropriate building hardening to provide the necessary level of
protection to building occupants.
Mandatory standards: 2. Unobstructed space;
Brief description: Ensure that obstructions within 33 feet of
inhabited buildings do not allow for concealment of explosive devices
from observation.
Mandatory standards: 3. Drive-up/drop-off areas;
Brief description: Ensure that, where required, drive-up or drop-off
areas are clearly defined and marked and prevent parking of vehicles
in those areas.
Mandatory standards: 4. Access roads;
Brief description: Ensure that control measures are implemented to
prohibit unauthorized use of necessary access roads, including those
required for fire department access.
Mandatory standards: 5. Parking;
Brief description: Eliminate parking beneath inhabited buildings or on
rooftops of inhabited buildings.
Mandatory standards: 6. Progressive collapse avoidance;
Brief description: Design the superstructure of inhabited buildings of
3 stories or more to sustain local damage with the structural system
as a whole remaining stable.
Mandatory standards: 7. Structural isolation;
Brief description: Design all additions to existing buildings to be
structurally independent from the adjacent existing building.
Mandatory standards: 8. Building overhangs;
Brief description: Avoid building overhangs with inhabited spaces
above them where access is possible to the area underneath the
overhang.
Mandatory standards: 9. Exterior masonry walls;
Brief description: Unreinforced masonry walls are prohibited for the
exterior walls of new buildings.
Mandatory standards: 10. Windows and skylights;
Brief description: Take various measures to minimize hazards from
flying glass fragments from windows and skylights.
Mandatory standards: 11. Building entrance layout;
Brief description: Ensure that the main building entrance does not
face an installation perimeter or other uncontrolled vantage points
with direct lines of sight to the entrance.
Mandatory standards: 12. Exterior doors;
Brief description: Ensure that all exterior doors into inhabited areas
open outwards.
Mandatory standards: 13. Mail rooms;
Brief description: Locate mail rooms on the perimeter of the building
and as far as possible from heavily populated areas of the building
and critical infrastructure;
ensure that mail rooms are well sealed to limit migration of airborne
chemical, biological, and radiological agents.
Mandatory standards: 14. Roof access;
Brief description: Control access to roofs to minimize the possibility
of aggressors placing explosives or chemical, biological, or
radiological agents there.
Mandatory standards: 15.Overhead mounted architectural features;
Brief description: Ensure that overhead mounted features above a
specified weight are mounted to minimize the likelihood that they will
fall and injure building occupants.
Mandatory standards: 16. Air intakes;
Brief description: Locate all outside air intakes that distribute air
throughout the building at least 10 feet above the ground.
Mandatory standards: 17. Mail room ventilation;
Brief description: Provide separate, dedicated air ventilation systems
for mail rooms.
Mandatory standards: 18. Emergency air distribution shutoff;
Brief description: Provide an emergency shutoff switch that can
immediately shut down the air distribution system throughout the
building.
Mandatory standards: 19. Utility distribution and installation;
Brief description: Route critical or fragile utilities so that they
are not on exterior walls or on walls shared with mail rooms;
locate redundant utilities and emergency backup systems in a manner
that will minimize the possibility that both systems will be adversely
affected by a single event.
Mandatory standards: 20. Equipment bracing;
Brief description: Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures
above a specified weight to minimize the likelihood that they will
fall and injure building occupants.
Mandatory standards: 21. Under building access;
Brief description: Ensure that access to crawl spaces, utility
tunnels, and other means of under-building access is controlled.
Mandatory standards: 22. Mass notification;
Brief description: All inhabited buildings must have a timely means to
notify occupants of threats and instruct them what to do in response
to those threats.
Recommended measures: 1. Vehicle access points;
Brief description: Keep the number of vehicle access points around
buildings to the minimum necessary.
Recommended measures: 2. High-speed vehicle approaches;
Brief description: Ensure that there are no unobstructed vehicle
approaches perpendicular to inhabited buildings.
Recommended measures: 3. Vantage points;
Brief description: Identify and eliminate or mitigate vantage points
outside the control of building personnel.
Recommended measures: 4. Drive-up/drop off areas;
Brief description: Locate drive-up/drop off areas away from large
window areas of buildings.
Recommended measures: 5. Building location;
Brief description: Maximize separation distance between inhabited
areas of buildings and areas with large visitor populations.
Recommended measures: 6. Railroad location;
Brief description: Avoid sites for inhabited buildings that are close
to railroads.
Recommended measures: 7. Access for family housing;
Brief description: Provide space for controlling access at the
perimeter of the housing area.
Recommended measures: 8. Standoff for family housing;
Brief description: Maintain a specified standoff distance from
installation perimeters and roads external to housing areas.
Recommended measures: 9. Minimize secondary debris;
Brief description: Eliminate unreinforced barriers that are accessible
to vehicle traffic.
Recommended measures: 10. Building separation;
Brief description: Ensure that billeting, high occupancy family
housing, and primary gathering buildings are separated from adjacent
inhabited buildings by at least 10 meters.
Recommended measures: 11. Structural redundancy;
Brief description: Use highly redundant structural systems.
Recommended measures: 12. Internal circulation;
Brief description: Design building circulation to facilitate visual
detection of unauthorized personnel approaching controlled or occupied
areas.
Recommended measures: 13. Visitor control;
Brief description: Keep visitor access control locations away from
sensitive or critical building areas and areas with large population
densities.
Recommended measures: 14. Asset location;
Brief description: Locate critical assets and mission-critical
personnel away from the building exterior.
Recommended measures: 15. Room layout;
Brief description: Position personnel and critical equipment to
minimize exposure to direct blast effects.
Recommended measures: 16. External hallways;
Brief description: Avoid exterior hallway configurations for inhabited
structures.
Recommended measures: 17. Windows;
Brief description: Minimize the size and number of windows.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: DOD's Sustainable Design Goals:
Sustainable design, or development, generally refers to efforts to
design, construct, maintain, and remove facilities in ways that
efficiently use energy, water, and materials; improve and protect
environments; and provide long-term benefits for occupant health,
productivity, and comfort. Sustainable design efforts are generally
grouped under six fundamental principles--optimize site potential,
optimize energy use, protect and conserve water, use environmentally
preferable products and practices, enhance indoor environmental
quality, and optimize operational and maintenance practices. Within
the building industry, sustainable design is also known by such terms
as green, high performance, or environmentally friendly.
DOD sustainable design requirements are contained in DOD's Unified
Facilities Criteria 4-030-01, Sustainable Development. The document
provides instruction, requirements, and references for DOD facility
professionals and architect/engineer and construction contractors to
apply sustainable development principles and strategies consistently
in DOD facilities throughout their life cycle--from planning to
programming and securing of funds; to site selection, design, and
construction; to documentation and operations and maintenance; and to
reuse or deconstruction and removal. The document's purpose is to help
produce and maintain DOD facilities that comply with existing service
policies and federal mandates for sustainable design, energy
efficiency, and procurement of environmentally preferable materials.
Further, the document provides guidance to help reduce the total cost
of facility ownership, while minimizing negative impacts on the
environment and promoting productivity, health, and comfort of
building occupants.
To help measure the sustainability of new military buildings, DOD uses
the U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design Green Building Rating System. Created in 1998,
the rating system represents the Council's effort to provide a
nationally accepted benchmark for the design, construction, and
operation of high-performance green buildings. The system also
provides for a certification program for new construction projects by
identifying a set of prerequisites and credits categorized under
several environmental categories. The prerequisites are required tasks
in order to be considered for a certification. The credits are tasks,
steps, or measures that could be incorporated into a construction
project and include a variable number of points--some based on
performance levels and some based on addressing distinct measures
related to an overarching sustainable concept. The United States Green
Building Council can award a specific certification level to a new
building depending on the total number of points achieved in the
design and construction of the building. The certification levels for
new construction and renovation projects under the 2009 rating system
include: certified (40 to 49 points), silver (50 to 59 points), gold
(60 to 79 points), and platinum (80 points and above). For fiscal year
2009, DOD set a goal that at least 70 percent of DOD's new buildings
would be silver-level certifiable. However, each of the military
services set a goal that beginning in fiscal year 2009 all new major
military construction buildings would be designed and constructed to
be silver-level certifiable.
Table 6 below shows by category the prerequisites, credits, and
available points under the U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design Green Building Rating System.
Table 6: Rating System's Prerequisites, Credits, and Points for New
Buildings:
Category: Sustainable sites;
Prerequisites and credits: Prerequisite: Construction activity
pollution prevention;
Points: (26 possible points);
Credits:
Site selection; Points: 1.
Development density and community connectivity; Points: 5.
Brownfield redevelopment; Points: 1.
Alternative transportation--public transportation access; Points: 6.
Alternative transportation--bicycle storage and changing rooms;
Points: 1.
Alternative transportation--low-emitting and fuel-efficient vehicles;
Points: 3.
Alternative transportation--parking capacity; Points: 2.
Site development--protect or restore habitat; Points: 1.
Site development--maximize open space; Points: 1.
Storm water design--quantity control; Points: 1.
Storm water design--quality control; Points: 1.
Heat island effect--nonroof; Points: 1.
Heat island effect--roof; Points: 1.
Light-pollution reduction; Points: 1.
Category: Water efficiency;
Prerequisites and credits: Prerequisite: Water-use reduction;
Points: (10 possible points);
Credits:
Water-efficient landscaping; Points: 2 to 4.
Innovative wastewater technologies; Points: 2.
Water-use reduction; Points: 2 to 4.
Category: Energy and atmosphere;
Prerequisites and credits: Prerequisites: Fundamental commissioning of
building energy systems; Minimum energy performance; Fundamental
refrigerant management;
Points: (35 possible points);
Credits:
Optimize energy performance; Points: 1 to 19.
On-site renewable energy; Points: 1 to 7.
Enhanced refrigerant management; Points: 2.
Enhanced commissioning; Points: 2.
Measurement and verification; Points: 3.
Green power; Points: 2.
Category: Materials and resources;
Prerequisites and credits: Prerequisite: Storage and collection of
recyclables;
Points: (14 possible points);
Credits:
Building reuse--maintain existing walls, floors and roof; Points: 1 to
3.
Building reuse--maintain existing interior nonstructural elements;
Points: 1.
Construction waste management; Points: 1 to 2.
Materials reuse; Points: 1 to 2.
Recycled content; Points: 1 to 2.
Regional materials; Points: 1 to 2.
Rapidly renewable materials; Points: 1.
Certified wood; Points: 1.
Category: Indoor environmental quality;
Prerequisites and credits: Prerequisites: Minimum indoor air quality
performance; Environmental tobacco smoke control;
Points: (15 possible points);
Credits:
Outdoor air delivery monitoring; Points: 1.
Increased ventilation; Points: 1.
Construction indoor air quality management plan--during construction;
Points: 1.
Construction indoor air quality management plan--before occupancy;
Points: 1.
Low-emitting materials--adhesives and sealants; Points: 1.
Low-emitting materials--paints and coatings; Points: 1.
Low-emitting materials--flooring systems; Points: 1.
Low-emitting materials--composite wood and agricultural fiber products;
Points: 1.
Indoor chemical and pollutant source control; Points: 1.
Controllability of systems--lighting; Points: 1.
Controllability of systems--thermal comfort; Points: 1.
Thermal comfort--design; Points: 1.
Thermal comfort--verification; Points: 1.
Daylight and views--daylight; Points: 1.
Daylight and views--views; Points: 1.
Category: Innovation in design;
Prerequisites and credits: Credits:
Points: (6 possible points);
Innovation in design; Points: 1 to 5.
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design accredited professional;
Points: 1.
Source: GAO summary of U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design Green Building Rating System
information.
Note: Also available are from 1 to 4 regional priority bonus points
which acknowledge the importance of local conditions in determining
best environmental design and construction practices.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Terry Dorn, Director; Michael
Armes, Assistant Director; Laura Durland, Assistant Director; Grace
Coleman; George Depaoli; Tobin McMurdie; Jeanett Reid; and Gary
Phillips made significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Federal Energy Management: Agencies are Taking Steps to Meet High-
Performance Federal Building Requirements, but Face Challenges and
Need to Clarify Roles and Responsibilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-22]. Washington D.C.: October 30,
2009.
Real Property: Infrastructure Investment Presents Opportunities to
Address Long-standing Real Property Backlogs and Reduce Energy
Consumption. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-324T].
Washington D.C.: January 22, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January
2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1007]. Washington, D.C.: September
13, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military
Construction Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-288]. Washington, D.C.: February
24, 2004.
Military Housing: Opportunities That Should Be Explored to Improve
Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Servicemembers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-602]. Washington, D.C.:
June 10, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Design-bid-build is a project delivery method where a project's
design is contracted out and, after the design is completed, the
project's construction is solicited and normally awarded to a separate
entity. Design-build is a delivery method where the design and
construction are contracted out to a single entity. By using one
contractor and overlapping a project's design and construction phases,
this approach attempts to reduce project risk and construction
timelines.
[2] Sustainable design goals, sometimes referred to as "green"
building goals, include facility design and construction goals to
avoid resource depletion of energy, water, and raw materials; prevent
environmental degradation caused by facilities and infrastructure; and
create and build environments that are livable, comfortable, safe, and
productive.
[3] 10 U.S.C. § 2859(a)(2).
[4] See Memorandum Of Understanding, Federal Leadership in High
Performance and Sustainable Buildings (Jan. 24, 2006).
[5] The Army implemented the cost reduction goal by having project
planners reduce the estimated cost of planned facilities by 15
percent, requesting funding from the Congress for the reduced amount,
and then attempting to award and complete the project within the
approved funding amount. Although the Army had information on the
actual costs of completed military construction projects, the Army did
not routinely document the actual costs of the individual facilities
included in the projects. For this reason, we could not determine
whether any facilities subject to the Army's cost reduction goal
resulted in actual savings compared to cost estimates based on DOD
cost estimating guidance.
[6] The U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design Green Building Rating System defines sustainable
features for buildings and includes a set of performance standards
which can be used to certify the design and construction of buildings.
By meeting the standards during facility design and construction,
builders can earn credits and become certified in accordance with an
established four-level scale--certified, silver, gold, and platinum.
The military services' goal in fiscal year 2009 was for all new major
military construction buildings to be silver-level certifiable, which
is the second level on the four-level scale.
[7] In its June 18, 2009 report on the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (H.R. Rep. No. 111-166), the House Armed
Services Committee expressed concern about low-density development at
military installations caused by compliance with antiterrorism
construction requirements. The committee directed the Secretary of
Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report
that reviews current antiterrorism/force-protection measures and
possible alternative measures, considering community-based sustainable
design techniques.
[8] 10 U.S.C. § 2859(a)(2).
[9] The Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58 (2005), among
other things, set energy reduction and efficiency requirements for
federal facilities. Executive Order 13423, "Strengthening Federal
Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management," was issued in
January 2007 and, among other things, directed that all new building
construction and major renovations incorporate sustainable practices
and comply with the guiding principles established in the 2006 Federal
Leadership in High Performance and Sustainable Buildings Memorandum of
Understanding. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-140, among other things, established new energy and water
management requirements and standards for federal buildings and
required that sustainable design principles be applied to the siting,
design, and construction of federal buildings. Executive Order 13514,
Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance,
was issued in October 2009 and, among other things, directed agencies
to establish reduction targets for certain greenhouse gas emissions.
[10] See Memorandum Of Understanding, Federal Leadership in High
Performance and Sustainable Buildings (Jan. 24, 2006).
[11] See DOD, Unified Facilities Criteria: Sustainable Development,
UFC 4-030-01 (Dec. 21, 2007).
[12] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2009).
[13] GAO, Military Housing: Opportunities That Should Be Explored to
Improve Housing and Reduce Costs for Unmarried Junior Servicemembers,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-602] (Washington, D.C.:
June 10, 2003).
[14] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the
Military Construction Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-288] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24,
2004).
[15] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for
Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations
Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1007] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13,
2007).
[16] GAO, Federal Energy Management: Agencies are Taking Steps to Meet
High-Performance Federal Building Requirements, but Face Challenges
and Need to Clarify Roles and Responsibilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-22] (Washington D.C.: Oct. 30,
2009).
[17] GAO, Real Property: Infrastructure Investment Presents
Opportunities to Address Long-standing Real Property Backlogs and
Reduce Energy Consumption, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-324T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22,
2009).
[18] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington D.C.: Nov.
1999).
[19] To assist the services in preparing their military construction
budget estimates, DOD issues military construction project cost
estimating guidance each year. The guidance establishes a unit cost
amount, such as $2,099 per square meter for a barracks to be built in
fiscal year 2009, for the various facility types based on prior-year
actual contract amounts. The military services are to use the guidance
to estimate the cost of their planned military construction projects
and then submit the estimates to the Congress for funding. Army
officials stated that to implement its 15 percent cost reduction goal
beginning in fiscal year 2007, the Army planned to reduce the unit
cost amount contained in the DOD guidance by 15 percent, estimate the
cost of its planned projects using the reduced unit cost amount, and
then request the reduced project amount for funding in its budget
request.
[20] See DOD Standard Practice for Unified Facilities Criteria and
Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (Military Standard 3007F, Dec.
13, 2006). The Standard Practice states that unified facilities
criteria and unified facilities guide specifications are developed
jointly by the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and other defense
agencies and apply to all DOD components.
[21] International Code Council, Building Valuation Data (Washington,
D.C., Aug. 2009).
[22] See Fire Safe Construction Cost Comparison Study: Executive
Summary Report (Commission Number 05119, Nov. 2, 2005), sponsored by
New England/New York Fire Safety Construction Advisory Council,
Pennsylvania Fire Safe Construction Advisory Council, Mid-Atlantic
Fire Safety Construction Advisory Council, and Northeast Cement
Shippers Association.
[23] According to the International Building Code, buildings over four
stories must be constructed with noncombustible materials, such as
steel, concrete, and masonry.
[24] See Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Insurance
Administration, Building Performance: Hurricane Andrew In Florida
Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance, FIA-22
(Washington, D.C., Dec. 21, 1992).
[25] We did not determine the extent to which these goals were met
because it was outside the scope of our review.
[26] See note 7.
[27] Two of the 90 project justifications did not separately identify
the estimated cost of the antiterrorism features included in the
projects' total cost. Thus, the average and range of percentages is
for the 88 project justifications that did separately identify the
estimated cost of the antiterrorism features.
[28] Project justifications did not begin to provide separate
estimates of the cost to incorporate sustainable design features until
fiscal year 2009. Thus, the average and range of estimated sustainable
costs reflects the 30 fiscal year 2009 projects included in our sample.
[29] Fire-resistance rating is the period of time, expressed in hours,
that a building element, component, or assembly maintains the ability
to confine a fire and retain its structural integrity. Fire ratings
are assigned on the basis of testing standards promulgated by the
American Society for Testing and Materials.
[End of section]
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