Defense Management
DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force Gao ID: GAO-10-504 April 15, 2010Originally established in 2002 to fight terrorism, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, is the military's main operational presence in Africa. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), created in 2007 to focus on stability in Africa, has been assessing existing activities--as well as CJTF-HOA--against its mission of sustained security engagement in Africa. This report discusses: (1) AFRICOM's decisions on CJTF-HOA's future and whether CJTF-HOA's activities align with the command's mission, and (2) benefits of the task force and challenges it faces. For its review, GAO analyzed AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA guidance, conducted interviews at the command's and task force's headquarters, and obtained perspectives from U.S. embassies in the region.
AFRICOM has been evaluating CJTF-HOA, but it has not yet made decisions on the future of the task force--including whether CJTF-HOA should continue to exist as a joint task force, and if so, whether changes are needed to the task force's mission, structure, and resources to best support the command's mission of sustained security engagement in Africa. AFRICOM officials said that decisions are pending but did not share details of their evaluation or provide a target date for decisions. Since the task force moved under AFRICOM, its status has not changed significantly. As of March 2010, CJTF-HOA had about 1,650 personnel. The Navy continues to fund the majority of its approximately $80 million budget as well as most of Camp Lemonnier's $238 million budget. The task force's activities have evolved over the years to focus on building relationships and fostering stability; for example, about 60 percent of its activities are civil affairs projects, such as community medical care and bridge construction. Other activities include military-to-military activities, peace support operations, personnel recovery, and counter-piracy activities. However, CJTF-HOA is currently not performing long-term follow up on activities to determine whether they are having their intended effects or whether modifications are needed to best align with AFRICOM's mission. Additionally, the task force is generally not setting specific, achievable, and measurable goals for activities. Some activities, such as military-to-military efforts, appear to support AFRICOM's mission. Others, such as a school built by CJTF-HOA but later found dilapidated, could have unintended consequences. Without long-term assessments of activities, it is difficult for AFRICOM to determine the effectiveness of CJTF-HOA, which is critical for overall planning efforts and decisions on the task force's future. CJTF-HOA's force presence in the Horn of Africa provides several benefits, but the task force also faces challenges carrying out activities. CJTF-HOA's presence in Africa offers benefits such as its ability to respond to contingencies, provide forces for AFRICOM activities, and build U.S.-African relationships. However, the task force's sustainability is uncertain because AFRICOM, in concert with the Department of Defense or the Navy, has not developed options for funding the task force over the long term. It currently relies on overseas contingency operations appropriations, and GAO has previously encouraged that the projected costs of such ongoing operations be included in the military's base budget requests. Moreover, task force staff have made cultural missteps because they did not understand local religious customs and may have unintentionally burdened embassies that must continuously train new staff on procedures. These problems may be exacerbated by limited training and compounded by short tour lengths (generally 4-12 months). Should AFRICOM opt to retain the task force, addressing challenges associated with long-term funding and staff skills would help ensure that it is effectively supporting U.S. efforts in Africa with the appropriate resources and trained personnel.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: John H. Pendleton Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (404) 679-1816GAO-10-504, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force
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Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Defense Management:
DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force:
GAO-10-504:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-504, a report to the Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Originally established in 2002 to fight terrorism, the Combined Joint
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based at Camp Lemonnier,
Djibouti, is the military‘s main operational presence in Africa. The
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), created in 2007 to focus on stability
in Africa, has been assessing existing activities”as well as CJTF-HOA”
against its mission of sustained security engagement in Africa. This
report discusses: (1) AFRICOM‘s decisions on CJTF-HOA‘s future and
whether CJTF-HOA‘s activities align with the command‘s mission, and
(2) benefits of the task force and challenges it faces. For its
review, GAO analyzed AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA guidance, conducted
interviews at the command‘s and task force‘s headquarters, and
obtained perspectives from U.S. embassies in the region.
What GAO Found:
AFRICOM has been evaluating CJTF-HOA, but it has not yet made
decisions on the future of the task force”including whether CJTF-HOA
should continue to exist as a joint task force, and if so, whether
changes are needed to the task force‘s mission, structure, and
resources to best support the command‘s mission of sustained security
engagement in Africa. AFRICOM officials said that decisions are
pending but did not share details of their evaluation or provide a
target date for decisions. Since the task force moved under AFRICOM,
its status has not changed significantly. As of March 2010, CJTF-HOA
had about 1,650 personnel. The Navy continues to fund the majority of
its approximately $80 million budget as well as most of Camp Lemonnier‘
s $238 million budget. The task force‘s activities have evolved over
the years to focus on building relationships and fostering stability;
for example, about 60 percent of its activities are civil affairs
projects, such as community medical care and bridge construction.
Other activities include military-to-military activities, peace
support operations, personnel recovery, and counter-piracy activities.
However, CJTF-HOA is currently not performing long-term follow up on
activities to determine whether they are having their intended effects
or whether modifications are needed to best align with AFRICOM‘s
mission. Additionally, the task force is generally not setting
specific, achievable, and measurable goals for activities. Some
activities, such as military-to-military efforts, appear to support
AFRICOM‘s mission. Others, such as a school built by CJTF-HOA but
later found dilapidated, could have unintended consequences. Without
long-term assessments of activities, it is difficult for AFRICOM to
determine the effectiveness of CJTF-HOA, which is critical for overall
planning efforts and decisions on the task force‘s future.
CJTF-HOA‘s force presence in the Horn of Africa provides several
benefits, but the task force also faces challenges carrying out
activities. CJTF-HOA‘s presence in Africa offers benefits such as its
ability to respond to contingencies, provide forces for AFRICOM
activities, and build U.S.-African relationships. However, the task
force‘s sustainability is uncertain because AFRICOM, in concert with
the Department of Defense or the Navy, has not developed options for
funding the task force over the long term. It currently relies on
overseas contingency operations appropriations, and GAO has previously
encouraged that the projected costs of such ongoing operations be
included in the military‘s base budget requests. Moreover, task force
staff have made cultural missteps because they did not understand
local religious customs and may have unintentionally burdened
embassies that must continuously train new staff on procedures. These
problems may be exacerbated by limited training and compounded by
short tour lengths (generally 4-12 months). Should AFRICOM opt to
retain the task force, addressing challenges associated with long-term
funding and staff skills would help ensure that it is effectively
supporting U.S. efforts in Africa with the appropriate resources and
trained personnel.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that AFRICOM, as part of its planning efforts, complete
its evaluation of CJTF-HOA and determine the task force‘s future. If
the Department of Defense determines that sustaining the task force is
consistent with its goals, GAO recommends long-term activity
assessments, a funding plan, and training guidance for the task force.
The Department of Defense generally agreed with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504] or key
components. For more information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202)
512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
AFRICOM Has Not Determined the Future of CJTF-HOA and Lacks
Information on Long-term Effects of Activities:
CJTF-HOA's Presence in Africa Offers Benefits, but the Task Force Also
Faces Challenges Carrying Out Activities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Fiscal Year 2010
Spend Plan:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Fiscal Year 2010
Spend Plan:
Figures:
Figure 1: CJTF-HOA's Combined Joint Operational Area and Areas of
Interest:
Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2010 Funding for CJTF-HOA and Camp Lemonnier:
Figure 3: CJTF-HOA Activities:
Figure 4: Housing at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (2008):
Abbreviations:
AFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
CJTF-HOA: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa:
DOD: Department of Defense:
TCA: Traditional Commander's Activities:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 15, 2010:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
When U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established as the military's
newest combatant command, it inherited the Combined Joint Task Force-
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)--the military's main operational presence in
Africa. After the President announced the creation of AFRICOM in 2007,
[Footnote 1] the command initially focused its efforts on preparing to
assume responsibility for all existing Department of Defense (DOD)
activities in Africa. As the command has matured, it has begun to plan
and prioritize its activities, as well as undertake an evaluation of
CJTF-HOA, to align with its mission. Broadly, AFRICOM has defined this
mission as conducting sustained security engagement in Africa, with a
focus on conflict and crisis prevention through a persistent presence
on the continent.
CJTF-HOA was originally established in 2002 under U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) as part of DOD's effort to fight the Global War on
Terrorism. While AFRICOM is also supported by military service
component commands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force) and a theater
special operations command, CJTF-HOA is the command's only task force
located in Africa that has assigned forces.[Footnote 2] CJTF-HOA
consists mostly of U.S. military servicemembers but also includes
representatives of coalition and partner countries. The task force
operates from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, and its personnel work in
regions fraught with security challenges, including territorial
disputes, threats from violent extremists, piracy activities, and
attacks against U.S. interests--such as the bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and of the USS Cole. CJTF-HOA's
mission is intended to foster regional stability, build security
capacity, and forge relationships using an indirect approach to
counter violent extremism in the region. This is an evolution of the
task force's original warfighting--or kill or capture--mission.
Given regional instabilities and opportunity for persistent
engagement, the responsibilities of CJTF-HOA have received
considerable congressional interest. For example, the Senate Armed
Services Committee directed DOD to report by April 2010 on, among
other matters, the specific responsibilities of CJTF-HOA within
AFRICOM.[Footnote 3] Furthermore, we have previously issued a report
and testimony on DOD's establishment of AFRICOM.[Footnote 4] We
reported on difficulties that AFRICOM has faced since its
establishment about its presence on the continent, with federal
partners worried about the potential to militarize U.S. foreign policy
and African nations concerned over greater U.S. influence and a
perceived increase in U.S. military troops in the region. Our work
made recommendations to help AFRICOM address challenges it faces with
respect to communicating its mission, integrating personnel from other
agencies ("interagency personnel") into the command, and determining
the total costs for establishing a permanent headquarters and offices
in Africa. In addition, we are conducting an ongoing review of
AFRICOM's processes for planning and executing activities. As part of
that ongoing review, you asked us to report specifically on the task
force's status and its relationship to AFRICOM's mission of sustained
security engagement. Specifically, this report discusses (1) the
extent to which AFRICOM has made decisions on CJTF-HOA's future and
whether CJTF-HOA's activities align with the command's mission, and
(2) benefits of the task force and challenges it faces in carrying out
activities.
To address these objectives, we analyzed AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA
guidance, strategic documents, and other documentation and held
discussions with AFRICOM, CJTF-HOA, host nation, and U.S. embassy
officials to gain their perspectives. To review the extent to which
AFRICOM has made decisions on CJTF-HOA's future and whether CJTF-HOA's
activities align with the command's mission, we reviewed CJTF-HOA's
operational order; draft regional engagement plan; budget
documentation; and information on staff, force structure, and
activities. We also held discussions with AFRICOM officials to obtain
their views on CJTF-HOA's status and potential future
responsibilities. To review CJTF-HOA's benefits to AFRICOM, the U.S.
embassies, and partner nations, we conducted interviews with CJTF-HOA,
AFRICOM, U.S. embassy, Djiboutian government, and U.S. Joint Forces
Command officials. To identify challenges CJTF-HOA faces in supporting
AFRICOM's mission of sustained security engagement in Africa, we
reviewed AFRICOM's strategic guidance, including its theater strategy,
theater campaign plan, posture statement, and baseline assessment
tool; and we analyzed CJTF-HOA's operational order, draft regional
engagement plan, and activities in relation to AFRICOM's guidance. We
met with AFRICOM officials in Stuttgart, Germany, in June 2009 and
held follow-up meetings to obtain their views on CJTF-HOA's mission,
activities, assessments, staffing, and funding. We visited Camp
Lemonnier in October 2009 to interview CJTF-HOA officials about their
perspectives of CJTF-HOA's activities, and we observed an academic
training and mission rehearsal exercise for incoming CJTF-HOA staff in
January 2010 in Suffolk, Virginia. In addition, we visited the U.S.
embassies in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti in October 2009, and we
contacted U.S. embassy officials from Burundi, Chad, Comoros,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, and Yemen about their
perspectives on and relationships with CJTF-HOA within their
respective countries. More details about our scope and methodology are
included in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to April 2010, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
DOD operates geographic combatant commands that conduct activities
within assigned areas of responsibility around the world. DOD's newest
geographic command, AFRICOM, was designated fully operational on
September 30, 2008. Consolidating the responsibility for DOD
activities in Africa that had previously been shared by the U.S.
Central, European, and Pacific Commands, AFRICOM is intended to
provide a single focus and therefore a more strategic, holistic
approach to U.S. military activities in Africa.[Footnote 5] AFRICOM is
supported by military service component commands (Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, Air Force), a theater special operations command (Special
Operations Command, Africa), and a task force, CJTF-HOA. With the
exception of CJTF-HOA, each of AFRICOM's component commands is located
in Europe and does not have assigned forces.[Footnote 6] AFRICOM's
Navy and Marine Corps components were designated as fully operational
on October 1, 2008, and its Air Force, Army, and special operations
command on October 1, 2009. To date, all have begun carrying out
activities under AFRICOM. At least once a year, AFRICOM organizes an
activity planning conference that brings together all of its component
and subordinate commands as well as officials from DOD, the Department
of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S.
embassies in Africa.
AFRICOM stated that it takes a long-term approach to sustained
security engagement in Africa through military-to-military programs
focused on conflict and crisis prevention. The command intends to
build partner security capacity; work with interagency, international,
and African partners; promote strategic relations; address
transnational challenges such as terrorism and drug and arms
trafficking; and respond to crises as directed. Many of AFRICOM's
activities focus on DOD's shift toward emphasizing the importance of
stability operations, DOD's overarching term encompassing various
military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United
States in coordination with other instruments of national power to
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide
essential government services, emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[Footnote 7] AFRICOM
emphasizes that it conducts its stability activities in support of
U.S. foreign policy objectives identified by the Department of State
and that interagency efforts are of critical importance to the
command's success.
According to DOD guidance,[Footnote 8] joint task forces are
established on a geographical area or functional basis when the
mission has a specific, limited objective. Normally, a joint task
force is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which
it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.
Some recent joint task forces have evolved to semipermanent task
forces which stay behind to maintain end-state conditions or
accomplish a specified follow-on or modified mission for an
undetermined period. CJTF-HOA was originally established in 2002 under
the Marine Corps, Central Command, at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, as
part of DOD's effort to fight the Global War on Terrorism. During its
infancy, CJTF-HOA operated from the Navy vessel Mount Whitney. In
2003, the task force moved to its current location at Camp Lemonnier
in Djibouti City, Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa. In 2006, CJTF-HOA
and Camp Lemonnier were transitioned to fall under Naval Forces,
Central Command. In 2008, after AFRICOM's establishment, CJTF-HOA was
realigned in support of AFRICOM. As Combatant Command Support Agent
for CJTF-HOA, the Department of the Navy provides funds for
administrative control of CJTF-HOA through the Navy's U.S. Fleet
Forces Command.
CJTF-HOA is the largest tenant operating out of Camp Lemonnier, which
is leased from the Djiboutian government for $30 million annually. The
camp's fiscal year 2010 budget is about $238 million, and as of March
2010, it supported 3,200 personnel. Camp Lemonnier also hosts other
U.S. and international tenants, but about 52 percent of the camp's
personnel are affiliated with CJTF-HOA. In addition to Camp Lemonnier,
CJTF-HOA also uses forward-operating locations in Manda Bay, Kenya;
Isiolo, Kenya; and Kasenyi, Uganda.[Footnote 9]
CJTF-HOA's "combined joint operational area" consists of 7 countries:
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan.
[Footnote 10] In addition, it has named another 11 countries as "areas
of interest:" Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Yemen. According to CJTF-HOA officials, the task force's area-of-
interest countries were chosen because they are in close proximity to
the countries within the task force's operating area. They said that
both the operating area and areas of interest were agreed upon with
AFRICOM and the U.S. embassies. CJTF-HOA also has a limited maritime
area of interest, although CENTCOM is primarily responsible for
counter-piracy activities in the region (see figure 1). AFRICOM
permits CJTF-HOA to conduct activities independently, with U.S.
embassy approval, in countries within its combined joint operational
area but must seek permission from AFRICOM to carry out new activities
or change existing activities in its area-of-interest countries.
Figure 1: CJTF-HOA's Combined Joint Operational Area and Areas of
Interest:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
Map of Africa with specific identification of the following:
CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Operational Area:
Djibouti;
Eritrea;
Ethiopia;
Kenya;
Seychelles;
Somalia;
Sudan.
CJTF-HOA Area of Interest:
Burundi;
Chad;
Comoros;
Democratic Republic of the Congo;
Madagascar;
Mauritius;
Mozambique;
Rwanda;
Tanzania;
Uganda;
Yemen.
CJTF HOA Maritime Area of Interest:
Burundi;
Comoros;
Djibouti;
Eritrea;
Kenya;
Madagascar;
Mauritius;
Mozambique;
Rwanda;
Somalia;
Tanzania;
Uganda;
Yemen.
Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; Copyright © Corel Corp. All
rights reserved (map).
[End of figure]
AFRICOM Has Not Determined the Future of CJTF-HOA and Lacks
Information on Long-term Effects of Activities:
As AFRICOM has been planning and prioritizing its inherited
activities, it has been evaluating CJTF-HOA, but it has not yet made
decisions on the future of the task force--including whether CJTF-HOA
should continue to exist as a joint task force, and if so, whether
changes are needed to CJTF-HOA's mission, structure, and resources to
best support the command's mission of sustained security engagement in
Africa. Moreover, CJTF-HOA is currently not performing long-term
follow up on activities to determine whether they are having their
intended effects or whether modifications to activities need to be
made to best align with AFRICOM's mission.
Decisions Have Not Yet Been Made on CJTF-HOA:
AFRICOM has been evaluating CJTF-HOA, including its structure and
activities, but at the time of this report, no decisions had been made
on the future of the task force and whether it is appropriately
aligned to support AFRICOM's mission of sustained security engagement,
and no specific time frames had been set for such decisions. According
to AFRICOM officials, the completion of the command's review is
pending. Our prior work has emphasized the importance of ensuring a
common outcome or purpose that is consistent with an organization's
goals and mission.[Footnote 11] Since becoming fully operational on
September 30, 2008, AFRICOM has published several strategic documents--
including a theater strategy, theater campaign plan, baseline
assessment tool, and posture statement--which outline the command's
goals and objectives and help guide its activities in Africa. In
addition, it has been creating a regional engagement plan for the East
region of Africa. While AFRICOM has stated that CJTF-HOA's mission of
countering violent extremism and its location at Camp Lemonnier remain
important, particularly given terrorist threats in the region, it has
not yet made decisions about the future of CJTF-HOA. We requested but
AFRICOM officials did not provide us with documents pertaining to its
evaluation of CJTF-HOA, stating that its review was ongoing and any
documentation was preliminary and subject to significant change.
Regardless of the future of CJTF-HOA, AFRICOM officials described Camp
Lemonnier as an enduring base.
CJTF-HOA moved from CENTCOM to AFRICOM on October 1, 2008, but its
status has not significantly changed since the transition. As of March
2010, CJTF-HOA had about 1,650 total personnel--about 360 staff and
1,290 assigned forces--plus several helicopters and access to other
DOD air assets to conduct its activities. Its staff includes executive-
level personnel and staff who work in its directorates[Footnote 12] as
well as officials stationed at U.S. embassies. The CJTF-HOA staff are
predominantly Navy personnel, with all of its executive-level staff
serving in the Navy--with the exceptions of the deputy commander who
serves in the Army and the political advisor who is a Department of
State civilian official. The task force also includes representatives
from coalition countries, liaison officers from AFRICOM headquarters
and some of AFRICOM's military service components, and advisors from
the Department of State and USAID. CJTF-HOA's assigned forces come
from each of the military services--with the largest percentage coming
from the Army--that deploy to countries in which CJTF-HOA operates to
seek and carry out activities. As of March 2010, about 50 percent of
CJTF-HOA's personnel were active duty military servicemembers, and 50
percent were reservists. Tour rotations generally range from 4 months
to 1 year, and are unaccompanied--that is, personnel cannot bring
their families.
The Navy, as CJTF-HOA's Combatant Command Support Agent, continues to
fund the majority of CJTF-HOA's budget since the task force has
transitioned under AFRICOM, and these funds are provided largely
through overseas contingency operations appropriations, which are not
included in DOD's base budget. CJTF-HOA plans to spend a total of
about $80 million in fiscal year 2010 (see appendix II), about 75
percent (over $60 million) of which comes from the Navy. The Navy also
funds most of Camp Lemonnier's $238 million fiscal year 2010 budget,
also through overseas contingency operations appropriations. The
remaining 25 percent (about $20 million) of CJTF-HOA's funding
generally comes from AFRICOM and its military service components,
which fund the cost of their deployed servicemembers. According to
CJTF-HOA officials, the task force's actual spending may differ from
the proposed plan based on other priorities and requirements from
AFRICOM and the military service components. A small portion of CJTF-
HOA's funding for humanitarian civic assistance activities--about $1.8
million or about 2 percent of the task force's spend plan--that was
provided by the Navy prior to fiscal year 2010 is now expected to be
provided by AFRICOM. CJTF-HOA officials explained that under AFRICOM,
the task force will be required to compete with AFRICOM's military
service components for humanitarian civic assistance funds. In
addition, the officials said that CJTF-HOA requested that it have
immediate access to some AFRICOM funds, as it did when the funds came
from the Navy, to avoid delays with activities. However, AFRICOM
officials told us that the command needs oversight of CJTF-HOA
activities and thus deferred CJTF-HOA's request until the activities
could be evaluated against AFRICOM's theater campaign plan and other
activities proposed by its military service components.
Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2010 Funding for CJTF-HOA and Camp Lemonnier:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and associated data]
Total funding: $318 million:
Camp Lemonnier: $238 million;
CJTF-HOA: $80 million.
CJTF-HOA Major Funding Sources[A]:
Category: Navy, Operation and Maintenance;
Approximate Amount: $60 million.
Category: Other Military Services, Operation and Maintenance;
Approximate Amount: $16 million.
Category: Humanitarian Civic Assistance;
Approximate Amount: $2 million.
Category: Humanitarian Assistance[B];
Approximate Amount: $2 million.
Source: GAO presentation of CJTF-HOA and Camp Lemonnier data.
Note: All numbers are approximate amounts. It is important to note
that CJTF-HOA comprises about 52 percent of Camp Lemonnier's tenants.
The camp also hosts other U.S. and international tenants.
[A] See appendix II for detailed CJTF-HOA budget information.
[B] These funds span fiscal years 2009 through 2011.
[End of figure]
During our October 2009 visit to CJTF-HOA, officials told us that
AFRICOM, its military service components, and CJTF-HOA had held an
executive board meeting earlier that month to discuss CJTF-HOA's
future. Options pertaining to CJTF-HOA's future role were discussed
with AFRICOM's commander, ranging from CTJF-HOA narrowing its focus on
counterterrorism activities to maintaining its current mission to
broadening its focus on theater security cooperation activities.
AFRICOM said that CJTF-HOA's activities support some of the command's
theater strategic objectives. AFRICOM also cited a continuous need for
CJTF-HOA, as well as Camp Lemonnier, for the foreseeable future, given
regional security threats. However, until AFRICOM completes it
evaluation of CJTF-HOA, it cannot determine whether it should sustain
the task force, and if so, whether changes are needed to CJTF-HOA's
mission, structure, or resources to better support the command's
mission.
CJTF-HOA Continues to Carry Out Activities, but Long-term Effects Are
Unknown:
AFRICOM has stated that CJTF-HOA's activities have been especially
important as the command and its military service components are
maturing. However, it is uncertain whether the task force's full range
of activities support AFRICOM's mission of sustained security
engagement because the task force is generally not conducting long-
term follow up on activities.
CJTF-HOA Conducting Activities under AFRICOM:
CJTF-HOA has continued to carry out activities after transitioning
under AFRICOM. CJTF-HOA told us that while AFRICOM has not yet made a
decision about the future of these activities, the task force
officials believed that some of their military-to-military activities
[Footnote 13] may migrate to the military service components and that
CJTF-HOA may focus on countering violent extremism through civil
affairs projects, engineering projects, and other work. Moreover,
AFRICOM has stated that, as the capabilities of its military service
components become mature, the command will determine the best course
of action to transfer CJTF-HOA activities to the components as
necessary to ensure sustained security engagement with African
countries in CJTF-HOA's operating area.
When we met with CJTF-HOA officials in October 2009, they estimated
that, in addition to other tasks, about 60 percent of the task force's
activities focus on civil affairs projects. To conduct these quick,
short-term projects, CJTF-HOA has established small civil affairs
teams (for example, five or six personnel) who deploy to remote areas
to engage the local communities and perform activities such as medical
and veterinary care for local communities. While deployed, the teams
generally nominate project proposals based on assessments they conduct
as to what the communities need. The proposals are reviewed for
approval by USAID, the embassy, CJTF-HOA, and AFRICOM prior to
execution. During our October 2009 visit to the U.S. embassy in
Ethiopia, we learned of several project proposals from civil affairs
teams deployed in the country, ranging from under $10,000 to about
$200,000--including the construction of a teaching farm, school
renovations, training for local mechanics, construction of an
orphanage, and renovation of a bridge. None of the project proposals
in Ethiopia had been approved at the time of our visit. CJTF-HOA
officials told us that the project approval process can be lengthy,
potentially lasting an entire year. This is generally longer than the
tour rotations of some CJTF-HOA civil affairs team personnel.
Figure 3: CJTF-HOA Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
1) CJTF-HOA and Uganda People‘s Defense Force work to construct a
bridge foundation;
2) A search and recovery operation in Africa‘s Lake Victoria.
Source: CJTF-HOA.
[End of figure]
Examples of other current activities include military-to-military
activities, participation in peace support operations, personnel
recovery efforts, and counter-piracy activities. For example, in
October 2009, CJTF-HOA personnel participated in AFRICOM's Natural
Fire exercise to prepare U.S. and East African forces for possible
future humanitarian civic assistance and disaster relief operations.
CJTF-HOA has also participated in the Department of State-led Africa
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program to provide
African militaries training on peace support operations. In addition,
when directed, CJTF-HOA also recovers and returns DOD, Department of
State, and USAID personnel; American citizens; coalition personnel;
and others within the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, CJTF-HOA is
coordinating with the Navy and coalition partners in CENTCOM's
Coalition Task Force 151, which conducts maritime security operations
to protect shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian
Sea, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean. AFRICOM has also established a socio-
cultural research and advisory team on a semipermanent basis at Camp
Lemonnier. The team consists of one to five social scientists who
conduct research and provide cultural advice to the command.
While CJTF-HOA continues to conduct most of its activities within its
operating area and area-of-interest countries, task force officials
told us that their forces also conduct some activities outside these
areas upon AFRICOM's request. For example, CJTF-HOA helped train non-
commissioned officers in Liberia and performed explosive ordnance
disposal and other training in Swaziland. AFRICOM officials said that
the command considers CJTF-HOA forces as an option available to carry
out AFRICOM activities across Africa depending on the specific skills
needed, availability of forces, and other factors. However, they
acknowledged that some of CJTF-HOA's activities could be delayed or
under-staffed if AFRICOM sends CJTF-HOA forces elsewhere.
Long-term Activity Assessments Not Currently Conducted:
CJTF-HOA is not currently conducting long-term follow up on activities
to determine whether they are having their intended effects or whether
modifications to activities need to be made to best align with
AFRICOM's mission. Additionally, AFRICOM told us that the task force
is generally not setting specific, achievable, and measurable goals
for its activities that tie to specific missions or desired effects.
Some CJTF-HOA activities appear to support AFRICOM's mission.
AFRICOM's posture statement asserts that military-to-military
engagement is the foundation of building security capacity in the East
African region. DOD's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review also states that
the U.S. military will partner with sub-regional security
organizations in Africa to conduct capacity building and address
humanitarian crises. Moreover, Department of State and U.S. embassy
officials said that peacekeeping and military-to-military training
activities help support embassy goals and U.S. foreign policy
objectives in the partner nations. For example, in fall 2009, the task
force provided support to the Djibouti military for a training
exercise with the African Union's Eastern Africa Standby Brigade. In
addition, it has developed courses for African navies and coast guards
to provide operational-level training on topics such as piracy, drug
trafficking, illegal fishing, and environmental issues as part of its
Maritime Center of Excellence initiative. CJTF-HOA forces also have
helped train peacekeeping forces in Rwanda and Uganda through an
activity managed by the Department of State and supported by AFRICOM
to improve the ability of African militaries to respond quickly to
crises.
Other CJTF-HOA proposed activities may not consider the full range of
possible effects or may not be clearly aligned with AFRICOM's mission.
For example, Department of State and USAID officials we contacted at
one U.S. embassy expressed concern that some of the activities that
CJTF-HOA had previously proposed, such as building schools for the
partner nation, did not appear to fit into a larger strategic
framework, and said that they did not believe CJTF-HOA was monitoring
its activities as needed to enable it to demonstrate a link between
activities and mission. These officials told us that instead of
leveraging long-term data to guide future activity planning, CJTF-HOA
may be proposing activities without considering the full range of
potential consequences. The embassy officials cited a past example
where CJTF-HOA had proposed drilling a well without considering how
its placement could cause conflict in clan relationships or affect
pastoral routes. Officials at other embassies described similar
problems with CJTF-HOA proposals. To mitigate such issues, U.S.
embassies have steered CJTF-HOA toward contributing to projects
identified by USAID, which are better aligned with embassy and U.S.
foreign policy goals. Moreover, some CJTF-HOA activities appear to be
sporadic, short-term events that may not promote sustained or long-
term security engagement. A senior official within Djibouti's Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation said that while he
appreciated the projects conducted by CJTF-HOA's civil affairs teams,
his government would like the U.S. military to focus on long-term
activities that build the Djiboutian military's capacity. For example,
it is uncertain whether CJTF-HOA's Maritime Center of Excellence will
become an enduring institution. CJTF-HOA has offered a few maritime
training sessions to African navies and coast guards, but it has been
unable to make it an enduring activity because additional funding has
not yet been secured. U.S. embassy officials stated that feedback from
participants at the training sessions was positive, but that the
participants' expectations have been dampened because they had
anticipated a permanent institution. The officials added that creating
a permanent Center of Excellence would advance the one-time benefit of
the training toward a lasting benefit for the East African partner
nations and in turn would support AFRICOM's mission of sustained
security engagement.
Our prior work has highlighted the importance of developing mechanisms
to monitor, evaluate, and report on results,[Footnote 14] and we have
previously reported that U.S. agencies cannot be fully assured that
they have effectively allocated resources without establishing an
assessment process.[Footnote 15] The Government Performance and
Results Act also emphasizes that agencies should measure performance
toward the achievement of goals. AFRICOM's theater campaign plan
requires assessments of theater security cooperation activities, and
CJTF-HOA's draft regional engagement plan requires it to conduct
activity assessments during the first month, 3 months, 6 months, 9
months, and yearly following the completion of an activity. In
addition, AFRICOM has developed a robust tool to measure progress in
meeting its strategic objectives and determining whether changes are
needed to its strategic guidance and priorities for activities. The
tool measures objective (e.g., number of identified al Qaeda members
in a country), subjective (e.g., likelihood of an imminent terrorist
attack), and perceptive (e.g., the level of protection against
terrorism Africans expect their governments can provide) factors.
However, AFRICOM officials told us that this tool is used primarily
for strategic planning purposes and not for follow up on individual
activities. Similarly, CJTF-HOA has also developed a tool that
identifies objective, subjective, and perceptive factors and measures
progress toward meeting AFRICOM's regional objectives for six
countries, but our analysis indicates that this tool is used for
strategic planning and not for specific activity assessment.
In some instances, CJTF-HOA has conducted short-term follow up on
activities. For example, the task force is required to produce after-
action reports 30 days following an activity, which consist of
information such as project description, number of participants,
costs, and lessons learned. While these reports may be important
measures of the immediate results of activities, we found general
consensus among AFRICOM, CJTF-HOA, and U.S. embassy personnel that
long-term follow up on CJTF-HOA's activities generally does not occur.
For example, a CJTF-HOA embassy liaison official told us that the task
force's civil affairs teams might follow up on past activities if they
are still deployed to the area in which the activity occurred, but
there is no requirement for the teams to return to the area for the
sole purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of activities. When we
asked AFRICOM officials about whether the command was following up on
CJTF-HOA's activities as part of their activity planning efforts, the
officials said that AFRICOM does not conduct specific assessments of
CJTF-HOA activities; rather, the command has begun to perform general
strategic assessments across Africa that provide information that can
help determine whether AFRICOM is meeting its theater security
objectives. They noted that AFRICOM is working to create plans to
assess activities, and that effort could guide the command's annual
strategic activity planning process with its military service
components, special operations command, CJTF-HOA, and interagency
partners. An AFRICOM official also said that CJTF-HOA is working to
implement a process by which information on past activities can be
assessed. However, according to the AFRICOM officials, CJTF-HOA has
not historically been focused on performing long-term follow up on
activities to determine whether they are having their intended effects
or whether modifications to activities need to be made.
We also found instances in which CJTF-HOA was either unaware of or did
not follow up on some infrastructure activities. At a training
exercise for incoming CJTF-HOA officials, discussion was raised
concerning CJTF-HOA's recent discovery of a dilapidated school in
Kenya with a placard stating "donated by CJTF-HOA"; current staff had
been unaware of the school's existence. Department of State and USAID
officials at one U.S. embassy also stated that CJTF-HOA had built a
well for a local community, but the staff did not teach the community
how to maintain it. While some of CJTF-HOA's activities may promote
temporary benefits for the participants, their short-term nature or
unintended long-term effects could potentially promote unfavorable
views of the U.S. military among partner nations. In recognition of
this issue, CJTF-HOA recently added an area to its project nomination
process form that would require civil affairs teams to identify what
party (e.g., the host nation) will sustain the proposed project.
However, without requiring long-term assessments of activities, it is
difficult for AFRICOM to determine the effectiveness of CJTF-HOA,
which is critical for overall planning efforts and its decisions on
the task force's future.
CJTF-HOA's Presence in Africa Offers Benefits, but the Task Force Also
Faces Challenges Carrying Out Activities:
CJTF-HOA's force presence in the Horn of Africa provides several
benefits to AFRICOM, U.S. embassies, and partner nations, but the task
force faces challenges in carrying out activities. CJTF-HOA's benefits
are important for AFRICOM to consider in its evaluation of CJTF-HOA
and deciding on its future. In addition, CJTF-HOA has conducted some
activities that have been viewed favorably by U.S. embassies and
partner nations. However, until challenges are addressed, AFRICOM
cannot ensure that CJTF-HOA is most effectively carrying out its
activities in support of the command.
CJTF-HOA's Presence in the Horn of Africa Provides Several Benefits:
We found that the presence of CJTF-HOA forces in the Horn of Africa
provides several benefits to AFRICOM, U.S. embassies, and partner
nations. These benefits include the ability to (1) respond to
contingencies within the Horn of Africa, (2) provide some in-theater
personnel for AFRICOM activities, (3) provide additional resources to
U.S. embassies in the task force's operating area and area-of-interest
countries, and (4) build U.S.-African relationships by enhancing
goodwill with government officials in Djibouti and other countries in
which its activities are held. Moreover, AFRICOM has stated that CJTF-
HOA's location at Camp Lemonnier is important given regional terrorist
threats.
* Response to Contingencies. CJTF-HOA's location within Africa
provides the potential for it to quickly respond to contingencies in
its close proximity. Some forces within CJTF-HOA are available to
serve, when directed, as part of AFRICOM's Quick Response Forces,
which can deploy on short notice for contingency response, such as to
a terrorist incident. In the case of a contingency in Africa, the
Secretary of Defense can approve the use of these forces to respond.
For example, in March 2007, CJTF-HOA was able to send a rescue mission
to a remote area in Ethiopia within 4-1/2 hours following the crash of
a vehicle carrying three U.S. soldiers. Additionally, an official from
the U.S. embassy in Yemen told us that CJTF-HOA forces are responsible
for supporting U.S. embassy officials in Yemen in medical or emergency
evacuations if called upon for those missions.
* Ready Access to Some In-Theater Personnel for Activities. Because
CJTF-HOA is located in Africa and has its own assigned forces, AFRICOM
can potentially leverage some of these in-theater personnel forces to
carry out security cooperation activities. AFRICOM officials told us
that the command would benefit from having assigned forces for its
military service components to conduct activities on the continent.
Currently, AFRICOM's military service components do not have assigned
forces. To conduct their activities, forces must be requested through
a formal Joint Staff process. Force planning currently occurs within
the Joint Staff 2 years prior to the designated fiscal year; forces
needed for emergent requirements must typically be requested 120 days
in advance. AFRICOM officials told us that the command must request
forces and equipment for its military service components to carry out
any type of activity in Africa--whether it be a large-scale operation
or additional personnel needed to travel to the continent to plan a
future program.[Footnote 16] Moreover, they said that AFRICOM does not
always receive the forces or equipment it requests for an activity
because DOD may have higher priority needs. From the AFRICOM and some
military service components' perspective, having to formally request
forces for all activities may impact AFRICOM's effectiveness if there
are greater DOD priorities. However, AFRICOM has occasionally used
CJTF-HOA forces with appropriate skill sets outside of its operating
area and area-of-interest countries, such as in Liberia and Swaziland,
and these forces could potentially be leveraged for other activities.
* Additional Resources for U.S. Embassies. The majority of U.S.
embassies that engage with CJTF-HOA stated that they appreciate the
resources that CJTF-HOA provides them and their respective host
nations. Several Department of State and U.S. embassy officials said
that they are under-resourced and that the military presence provides
additional resources. For example, U.S. embassy officials in Djibouti
described CJTF-HOA as providing valuable resources to the embassy and
Djibouti. The U.S. embassy for Seychelles and Mauritius described the
CJTF-HOA liaison officer as becoming integral to the embassy's daily
operations. In Uganda, U.S. embassy officials noted that CJTF-HOA's
civil affairs teams are providing valuable support to USAID in
conducting security assistance aspects of development activities.
* Building U.S.-African Relationships. Conducting activities in Africa
provides the opportunity for CJTF-HOA to generate a positive image of
the U.S. military and build U.S.-African relationships. Government and
military officials in Djibouti told us that they appreciated having
CJTF-HOA conduct activities, and U.S. embassy officials in CJTF-HOA's
operating area and area-of-interest countries also indicated that
African officials appreciated CJTF-HOA's presence. A senior official
in Djibouti's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation told us that the Djiboutian government recognizes that the
U.S. military presence has been extremely beneficial for Djibouti,
highlighting CJTF-HOA's activities such as equipment donations and
support for the training of Somali security forces in Djibouti.
Djiboutian military officers also told us that their military has a
positive relationship with CJTF-HOA and that they appreciate the U.S.
military's presence in their country. Additionally, a U.S. embassy
official in Tanzania said that Tanzanian political, administrative,
civil society, and religious leaders continuously assert their
appreciation for CJTF-HOA's civil affairs team.
CJTF-HOA Faces Challenges in Supporting AFRICOM's Mission:
CJTF-HOA faces challenges in supporting AFRICOM's mission of sustained
security engagement in Africa. These challenges include uncertainty of
CJTF-HOA's future funding if the task force does not continue to
receive overseas contingency operations appropriations, as well as
difficulties implementing activities--including applying funding to
activities, addressing African cultural issues, and working with
interagency partners. As these challenges are addressed, CJTF-HOA may
be better positioned to support the command.
Future Funding Is Uncertain:
While AFRICOM has not yet made decisions on CJTF-HOA, the task force's
sustainability may nonetheless be uncertain because AFRICOM, in
concert with DOD or the Navy, has not developed viable long-term
funding options to address how, and in what form, CJTF-HOA can be
funded over the long term. AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA officials told us that
they are uncertain how CJTF-HOA will be funded if overseas contingency
operations appropriations--upon which CJTF-HOA relies heavily and
which are separate from DOD's base budget--are eliminated. As it
stands, it is highly uncertain whether the Navy would be able or
willing to absorb CJTF-HOA, with its current budget and composition,
into its base budget without making difficult trade-off decisions. In
addition, we have previously reported that DOD needs to determine the
full costs associated with AFRICOM[Footnote 17]. When AFRICOM
inherited CJTF-HOA from CENTCOM, the task force's budget was not
altered significantly.
We have previously reported that past DOD supplemental funding
requests have generally been used to support the initial or unexpected
costs of contingency operations.[Footnote 18] Once a limited and
partial projection of costs has been made, past DOD administrations
have generally requested further funding in their base budget
requests. We have encouraged DOD to include known or likely projected
costs of ongoing operations related to the war on terrorism in DOD's
base budget requests. In fiscal year 2010, DOD shifted about $7.8
billion in funding from overseas contingency operations appropriations
to the base budget request, representing about 6 percent of the fiscal
year 2010 overseas contingency operations appropriations; however,
according to DOD officials, consistent with Office of Management and
Budget guidance, the majority of funding for CJTF-HOA and Camp
Lemonnier has continued to be requested through the department's
overseas contingency operations funding requests.
While decisions about CJTF-HOA's future, including its long-term
funding, have not yet been made, Camp Lemonnier continues to grow even
though when the Marine Corps first moved to Camp Lemonnier in 2003, it
was intended to be a temporary or expeditionary camp. Camp Lemonnier's
planned expansion began under CENTCOM, which had set a requirement
that the camp be capable of expanding from 2,000 personnel during
normal operations to the accommodation of 4,000 personnel during a
surge, and of supporting 12 fixed-wing aircraft. In 2005, the U.S. and
Djiboutian governments reached an agreement to obtain 500 additional
acres of land for the camp and to return a small portion of the camp's
current land to Djibouti. As of March 2010, the camp had completed an
expansion of an aircraft parking apron and taxiway system and was
pursuing other projects, such as establishing a new dining facility
and further developing the utility and network infrastructure system.
The camp has also budgeted $41.8 million in fiscal year 2010 for four
other infrastructure projects: an ammunition supply point, security
fencing around the camp's perimeter, pavement of several internal base
roads, and construction of a fire station.
Figure 4: Housing at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA officials told us that Camp Lemonnier and CJTF-
HOA are separate entities and that the camp could very well endure
even if the task force does not, but the two are integrally linked.
CJTF-HOA personnel make up about 52 percent of Camp Lemonnier's
tenants, and CJTF-HOA forces provide security for the camp. While
increasing counter-piracy efforts could potentially expand the number
of other DOD and international tenants at Camp Lemonnier, CJTF-HOA
personnel will likely continue to draw the majority of the camp's
resources. Furthermore, Camp Lemonnier, like CJTF-HOA, is mostly
funded from overseas contingency operations appropriations. These
uncertainties, coupled with the large amount of resources that
continue to be invested in CJTF-HOA and Camp Lemonnier, underscore
AFRICOM's need to determine CTJF-HOA's future so that it is can ensure
that resources are being spent appropriately. Moreover, without a
solution for CJTF-HOA's long-term funding, AFRICOM will be challenged
to sustain the task force, if it chooses to do so.
Some Personnel Lack Needed Skills:
While CJTF-HOA has been implementing activities under AFRICOM, we
found that some personnel lack needed skills for (1) applying funding
to activities, (2) understanding African cultural issues, and (3)
working with interagency partners at U.S. embassies.
* Funding for Activities. CJTF-HOA's budget staff have difficulty
effectively applying funding to activities, particularly when the
staff first arrive. DOD has highlighted similar issues, stating in its
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review that America's security assistance
efforts are constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities and
unwieldy processes. Moreover, Joint Publication 1-06 states that
funding a joint operation can present a challenge because of diverse
fiscal requirements, sources, and authorities of funds. Multiple
funding sources (e.g., DOD, Department of State, United Nations) may
have to be used to accommodate the constraints imposed by fiscal law.
[Footnote 19] However, Joint Publication 1-04 also emphasizes the need
for properly establishing, staffing, training, and equipping legal
support to joint task forces. To ensure unity of effort, personnel
need a common understanding of who is responsible for performing which
tasks and how those tasks are performed.[Footnote 20] There are nine
DOD and three Department of State funding accounts for CJTF-HOA
activities. According to CJTF-HOA officials, the task force's budget
staff have a steep learning curve to understand the provisions
associated with these funding accounts because the CJTF-HOA
comptroller and deputy comptroller are not financial specialists,
generally do not work on military comptroller issues full time, and
have short tour lengths. This steep learning curve can result in
delays in conducting activities, as CJTF-HOA staff described spending
extra time and resources understanding how to apply funding to
activities. Moreover, AFRICOM stated that command staffing and tour
lengths contribute to the difficulties in learning and maintaining
knowledge of funding for CJTF-HOA activities. For example, CJTF-HOA
staff had intended to continue providing training for senior enlisted
Ethiopian military members through one type of funding authorization,
but they later found that the account did not allow training of
foreign military members. Consequently, the staff had to revise their
program from one of training officers to one of providing feedback to
Ethiopian instructors. While CJTF-HOA staff may eventually correctly
identify funding accounts for their activities, their limited skills
in applying funding may result in difficulties in implementing
activities. CJTF-HOA officials told us that financial training for
program staff would be beneficial.
* African Cultural Issues. AFRICOM's posture statement identifies
cultural awareness and regional expertise as core competencies for
AFRICOM. However, we found instances in which CJTF-HOA was not able to
conduct activities as effectively as possible due to limited
understanding of cultural issues, such as the time required to conduct
activities in African villages or local religious customs. In one
case, according to a U.S. embassy official, CJTF-HOA provided 3 days
notice to the host nation that it would conduct a medical clinic in a
remote village in Djibouti. However, because the villagers are nomads,
it was difficult to get participants due to the short amount of
notice. U.S. embassy officials also shared with us an instance in
which CJTF-HOA's proposal for a 1-day veterinary vaccination event
could have actually harmed the livestock by having them travel when
they were weakened from a recent drought. As another example, CJTF-HOA
distributed used clothing to local Djibouti villagers during Ramadan,
which offended the Muslim population. However, a couple of U.S.
embassies acknowledged that CJTF-HOA is working to improve its
expertise in African issues. In Tanzania, for example, a U.S. embassy
official said that the CJTF-HOA team members had become proficient in
Swahili, helping them to develop relationships. Getting to know the
language, culture, and the people in the region, the embassy official
said, has contributed to the success in developing a Tanzanian-
American partnership in a region where extremists are known to
operate. According to AFRICOM, the command is drafting guidance that
will address cultural training, which it expects to issue in spring
2010. More widespread and robust cultural understanding of its partner
nations could help CJTF-HOA avoid potentially unfavorable views of
itself among the Africans and risk straining relations between partner
nations and the U.S. government.
* Interagency Collaboration. CJTF-HOA stations officials in U.S.
embassies to facilitate coordination with the Department of State and
USAID; however, several embassy officials said that CJTF-HOA's embassy
liaisons may take several months to understand their roles in the
embassy, and embassy staff must continually train incoming CJTF-HOA
staff as they rotate in. We found several instances in which CJTF-HOA
personnel did not always understand embassy procedures for interacting
with African partner nations. For example, at times CJTF-HOA personnel
would approach the Djiboutian government ministries directly with
concepts for activities rather than follow the established procedure
of having the U.S. embassy initiate the contact. In another instance,
a CJTF-HOA civil affairs team operating in Uganda was not aware of the
U.S. embassy's requirement that they wear their military uniforms
while carrying out activities. Our prior work has highlighted issues
associated with interagency efforts in Africa. Specifically, in
reporting on the U.S. government's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership initiative in northwest Africa, we have recommended that a
comprehensive strategy be developed to increase agencies' ability to
collaborate in working to combat terrorism. The Department of State
and USAID agreed with the recommendation, with USAID noting that our
report reinforced its efforts to encourage interagency collaboration
and create efficiencies in implementation.[Footnote 21] Similarly,
without greater skills in working with embassy partners, CJTF-HOA may
have difficulty leveraging resources with Department of State and
USAID personnel, potentially slowing the process for conducting
activities effectively or supporting U.S. interests in the region.
We found that some of CJTF-HOA personnel's lack of skills in the above
issues may be caused or exacerbated by limited training and guidance
and further compounded by the task force's short tour lengths, which
impose a steep learning curve. According to U.S. embassy officials,
CJTF-HOA personnel's tours often end just as they are beginning to
develop a solid knowledge base. Regarding understanding of funding
accounts, AFRICOM budget staff are available to answer funding
questions posed by CJTF-HOA, but AFRICOM does not provide guidance on
most of CJTF-HOA's funding accounts because officials told us that
CJTF-HOA should receive this guidance from the Navy. Moreover, during
our observation of training provided to incoming CJTF-HOA staff in
January 2010, we observed some instruction on working with the U.S.
embassies. For example, officials discussed embassy leadership, the
role of different federal agencies at embassies, U.S. foreign policy
strategies for host nations, and other topics. However, the majority
of that training was not shared with all staff but rather only with
the CJTF-HOA embassy liaison personnel. In addition, only limited
information on African cultural and political issues was provided at
that training. Upon arrival at Camp Lemonnier, incoming personnel
attend a 2-day introductory course that generally focuses on how to
live and work on the camp and includes some interagency and cultural
awareness topics. CJTF-HOA shared with us six training presentations
identified as covering cultural awareness; however, we found that only
two of those presentations covered Djiboutian and African cultural
awareness topics such as geography, climate, religion, and etiquette.
The remaining presentations focused primarily on staff operations and
organizational structure, and they did not provide comprehensive
information on African cultural issues. Furthermore, because the
cultural training presentations are provided during the beginning of
tours, when personnel are also learning about their new assignments
and daily operations, it is unlikely that the two cultural
presentations provide for comprehensive, effective cultural training.
However, in February 2010, CJTF-HOA created a special advisor position
to, among other duties, help coordinate interagency efforts.
Preliminary findings from our ongoing review of AFRICOM's activity
planning and execution suggest that these difficulties may not be
unique to CJTF-HOA; rather, they may also pose problems for personnel
at AFRICOM headquarters, its military service components, and beyond.
Our prior work on interagency collaboration has highlighted issues,
such as developing a well-trained workforce and understanding cultural
differences, which extend to the entire federal government.[Footnote
22] AFRICOM officials told us that the command does not oversee
training for CJTF-HOA, but it does provide Web-based cultural training
that is available to CJTF-HOA and all of its components. The officials
also said that the command has helped reduce the steep learning curve
of CJTF-HOA personnel by placing CJTF-HOA liaison officials alongside
AFRICOM liaison officials in U.S. embassies, and by staggering the
tour dates of CJTF-HOA's commander with those of other staff.
However, without more fully addressing CJTF-HOA's difficulties such as
effectively applying funding to activities, understanding African
cultural issues, and working with interagency partners at U.S.
embassies, CJTF-HOA will continue to face problems implementing
activities and will struggle to institutionalize knowledge amidst its
frequent personnel rotations.
Conclusions:
As the U.S. military's main operational presence on the African
continent, CJTF-HOA has the potential to play a critical role in
helping the United States develop a more holistic approach to Africa.
However, 18 months after CJTF-HOA was moved under AFRICOM, key
decisions have yet to be made regarding the future of the task force.
While AFRICOM's military service components and special operations
command have all begun carrying out activities, CJTF-HOA continues to
operate in largely the same manner, with generally the same mission,
force composition, and budgetary resources, as it did under CENTCOM.
Moreover, it continues to conduct activities without ensuring that
they are positively affecting African partner nations over the long
term. And, costly infrastructure investments continue to be made to
transform Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti from a temporary site to an
enduring base. CJTF-HOA, as AFRICOM's only task force located in
Africa with assigned forces, has the potential to make valuable
contributions to the U.S. government's efforts on the continent.
However, a key decision in its evaluation and planning of the myriad
of activities it has inherited from other DOD organizations is
determining whether changes are needed to CJTF-HOA--such as the re-
alignment, modification, or possible dissolution of the task force in
favor of other priorities. Should the department decide to sustain the
task force, attention must be turned to addressing challenges that are
hindering its effectiveness in carrying out activities. Until AFRICOM
takes steps to examine feasible long-term funding options and develops
a solution to increase the effectiveness and continuity of efforts
among CJTF-HOA's frequently-rotating staff, the command cannot ensure
that its task force is supporting U.S. efforts in Africa with the
appropriate resources and trained personnel.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
First, to help ensure that personnel and resources are applied most
effectively to enhance U.S. military efforts in Africa, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Africa
Command, to complete its evaluation of CJTF-HOA, determining whether
the task force should be retained, and if so, whether changes are
needed to its mission, structure, and resources to best support the
command's mission.
If DOD determines that sustaining CJTF-HOA is consistent with its long-
term goals, we further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Commander, U.S. Africa Command to take the following four
additional actions:
* Conduct long-term assessments of CJTF-HOA activities to determine
whether the activities are having their intended impact and support
AFRICOM's mission.
* Identify the projected costs for the task force to conduct its
assigned mission and, in concert with DOD or the Navy, develop a
realistic funding plan for the task force's sustainability.
* Take actions to ensure that CJTF-HOA budget personnel have the
expertise and knowledge necessary to make timely and accurate funding
decisions for activities. These actions could include some combination
of training, staffing changes, and/or guidance.
* Develop comprehensive training guidance or a program that augments
assigned personnel's understanding of African cultural awareness and
working with interagency partners. The guidance or program should be
mandatory and mechanisms should be developed to ensure compliance for
the best chances of institutionalizing knowledge among CJTF-HOA
personnel, promote continuity of efforts, and sustain progress as
personnel rotate frequently into and out of Camp Lemonnier.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally
concurred with all of our recommendations and cited some actions that
it was taking to address the issues identified in this report.
Technical comments were provided separately and incorporated as
appropriate. The department's written comments are reprinted in
appendix III.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that AFRICOM complete
its evaluation of CJTF-HOA and, if deciding to retain the task force,
determine whether changes are needed to its mission, structure, and
resources to best support the command's mission. In its response, the
department stated that CJTF-HOA provides an essential capability and
is located in a strategic location to protect American lives and
support U.S. interests in the region. As CJTF-HOA's mission of
countering violent extremism remains a top priority for the task
force, DOD expects CJTF-HOA to continue to carry out activities in the
region for years to come. The department stated that AFRICOM will be
tasked to work with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to determine whether modifications are needed to CJTF-HOA's
mission, structure, activities, and resources to best meet the mission
of countering violent extremism in the region. The department further
stated that much of this evaluation is already in progress, that
AFRICOM regularly evaluates CJTF-HOA's mission, and that the AFRICOM
commander is satisfied with the task force's current structure and
forces assigned to carry out its mission. As our report indicates,
CJTF-HOA has the potential to make valuable contributions to the U.S.
government's efforts in Africa. We agree that it is a good practice
for AFRICOM to conduct ongoing reviews of the task force. However,
DOD's response does not indicate what analyses, if any, the AFRICOM
commander relied upon in order to conclude that the task force's
current structure and forces are most appropriate. Also, as we
previously mentioned in this report, we requested but AFRICOM did not
provide us with details of its ongoing evaluation. Given that CJTF-HOA
was originally established almost 8 years ago under a different
combatant command and that its status has not changed significantly
since it moved under AFRICOM, we support the department's decision to
task AFRICOM to complete its evaluation of CJTF-HOA and determine
whether modifications are needed to the task force's mission,
structure, activities, and resources. We believe that this is a
critical step in determining the future role of CJTF-HOA. Completing
this evaluation in a thorough yet expeditious manner and clearly
articulating any needed changes to CJTF-HOA's mission, structure, and
resources will aid in the command's efforts to plan and prioritize the
many activities it inherited upon its establishment and ensure that
personnel and resources are applied most effectively to enhance U.S.
military efforts in Africa.
In response to our recommendation that AFRICOM conduct long-term
assessments of CJTF-HOA activities, DOD concurred, stating that the
command has established an assessment process and that the task force
has revised its review criteria to consider long-term sustainment in
its activity evaluations. While we acknowledge that AFRICOM's
assessment tool measures progress in meeting the command's strategic
objectives, our review revealed that this tool does not follow up on
specific activities. Additionally, we reported that the task force is
implementing a process to assess past activities. DOD also stated that
AFRICOM is working with CJTF-HOA personnel to put in place an
operational assessment process to continuously evaluate individual
activities and their impact on regional capacity to prevent and deter
terrorist activities, but it did not provide a time frame for
completion. If implemented, this effort has potential to provide CJTF-
HOA with additional information on whether its activities are having
their intended effects or whether modifications are needed. We
continue to believe that until AFRICOM consistently follows up on the
long-term impact of CJTF-HOA's activities, the command will be unable
to effectively determine whether the activities support AFRICOM's
mission of sustained security engagement.
Regarding our recommendation that AFRICOM identify costs associated
with CJTF-HOA and develop a realistic funding plan, DOD concurred with
comment. The department stated that it is working with the Department
of the Navy and the Office of Management and Budget on long-term
funding options for the task force and Camp Lemonnier, and that
AFRICOM will articulate CJTF-HOA's funding requirements to the
appropriate DOD offices. Furthermore, DOD stated that the actual
funding source--whether overseas contingency operations or DOD
baseline funds--is decided at the department and administration
levels, rather than at AFRICOM. While we acknowledge that AFRICOM must
work in concert with DOD, the Department of the Navy, and the Office
of Management and Budget, our review found that AFRICOM officials
remain uncertain as to how the task force would be funded if overseas
contingency operations appropriations are eliminated. DOD's response
also did not provide information on a specific timeline or plan to
determine costs and future funding options for CJTF-HOA. In order to
ensure resources are being spent appropriately and will remain
sufficient to sustain the task force in the future, as AFRICOM
intends, the command should actively work with the department and
other relevant stakeholders to develop a solution for CJTF-HOA's long-
term funding.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that AFRICOM should take actions
to ensure that CJTF-HOA's budget personnel have the appropriate
expertise and knowledge, such as through training, staffing changes,
and/or guidance. In its response, the department stated that AFRICOM
has encouraged CJTF-HOA participation in resource management courses
and has conducted some on-the-job training in the past, which it
intends to continue. The department also responded that AFRICOM has
taken steps to lengthen some tours for personnel with critical skills
and plans to bring key personnel to the command for training prior to
deployment to CJTF-HOA. However, it did not provide specific
information on which personnel's tours would be lengthened, which
personnel would attend and what type of pre-deployment training would
be given at the command, or a timeline for implementing this latter
action. Our review identified that the short tour lengths and steep
learning curves of the budget personnel have remained challenges for
CJTF-HOA, resulting in staff spending extra time and resources
understanding how to apply funding activities and potentially leading
to delays in conducting activities. We believe the steps DOD outlined,
if implemented in a timely and comprehensive manner, could help
augment understanding and expertise associated with applying funding
accounts to activities within CJTF-HOA. Furthermore, we continue to
believe that AFRICOM should identify and complete specific actions--
such as consistently providing additional training or issuing specific
funding guidance--which will aid in institutionalizing knowledge among
CJTF-HOA budget staff.
In response to our recommendation that AFRICOM develop comprehensive
training guidance or a program on African cultural awareness and
working with interagency partners, DOD concurred, stating that AFRICOM
has set up a Joint Force Development and Readiness Directorate to
develop cultural awareness programs and has also participated in a
CJTF-HOA mission rehearsal exercise for incoming core staff. Our
review highlighted AFRICOM's participation in CJTF-HOA's pre-
deployment mission rehearsal exercise; however, as we report, we
observed some training provided on working with U.S. embassies--the
majority of which was not shared with all incoming task force staff--
as well as limited training provided on African cultural and political
issues. Additionally, the department did not address how it would
mandate compliance with any training it develops. Until AFRICOM
develops and mandates the use of training guidance or a program for
its task force that specifically focuses on African cultural awareness
and working with interagency partners, the task force risks strained
relations with partner nations and U.S. embassy personnel and
potentially slowing the process for conducting activities effectively.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days from the issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; and the
Administrator, United States Agency for International Development. The
report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In conducting our work for this report, we analyzed documentation and
conducted interviews with officials at the U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM), Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CTJF-HOA),
Djiboutian government, and U.S. embassies that work with CJTF-HOA. We
met with AFRICOM officials in Stuttgart, Germany, in June 2009 and
held follow-up video-teleconferences in December 2009. As part of our
ongoing review of AFRICOM, we traveled to Uganda, Ethiopia, and
Djibouti in October 2009 to meet with embassy officials and observe
U.S. military operations. We chose to visit Uganda to observe the
AFRICOM-sponsored, U.S. Army Africa-led Natural Fire exercise,
AFRICOM's largest exercise in Africa for 2009; Ethiopia, due to its
proximity to Djibouti and large amount of CJTF-HOA civil affairs team
activity proposals; and Djibouti, due to the location of CJTF-HOA at
Camp Lemonnier. We visited the U.S. embassies in each of these
countries, and we spoke with members of the Djiboutian government.
Additionally, we contacted all U.S. embassies within CJTF-HOA's
operating area and areas of interest. We received either written
responses or held phone conversations with the following embassies:
[Footnote 23] Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Eritrea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan,
Tanzania, and Yemen. In January 2010, we observed and obtained
documentation from an academic training and mission rehearsal exercise
for incoming CJTF-HOA staff in Suffolk, Virginia.
To review the extent to which AFRICOM has made decisions on CJTF-HOA
and determined whether its activities align with the command's
mission, we reviewed AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA guidance and discussed the
task force's status and future plans with officials. Specifically, to
examine CJTF-HOA's mission, we studied its operational order and draft
regional engagement plan, and we received from CJTF-HOA officials
information on activities. Specifically, to review CJTF-HOA's current
personnel, we received from CJTF-HOA information on current staff and
force structure. To review CJTF-HOA's status on funding resources, we
studied budget documentation including CJTF-HOA's spending for fiscal
year 2009, proposed spend plan for fiscal year 2010, and funding
information for Camp Lemonnier from both the camp's and CJTF-HOA's
comptrollers. We also visited Camp Lemonnier in October 2009 to
interview CJTF-HOA officials about the status of the task force. To
gain further information about CJTF-HOA's activities, we visited the
U.S. embassies in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda in October 2009 to
interview Department of State, United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) officials at
embassies, including CJTF-HOA liaison officials stationed in the
embassies. We also asked U.S. embassy officials from Chad, Comoros,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, and Yemen about the
activities conducted by CJTF-HOA in their respective countries. To
address plans for CJTF-HOA's future under AFRICOM, we met with AFRICOM
officials in Stuttgart, Germany, in June 2009 and held follow-up
meetings to obtain their views on CJTF-HOA's status and potential
future responsibilities.
To review CJTF-HOA's benefits and challenges, we reviewed AFRICOM's
strategic guidance including its theater strategy, theater campaign
plan, posture statement, and a briefing on its baseline assessment
tool, and we analyzed CJTF-HOA's operational order, draft regional
engagement plan, incoming staff training presentations, and activities
in relation to AFRICOM's guidance. We also reviewed DOD's 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review to understand DOD's strategy for Africa. We
conducted interviews with AFRICOM, CJTF-HOA, U.S. embassy, Djiboutian
government, and U.S. Joint Forces Command officials. During our
discussions with AFRICOM officials, we obtained information on
AFRICOM's lack of assigned forces and its ability to leverage CJTF-HOA
forces. As part of our visit to Camp Lemonnier in October 2009, we
discussed with task force officials the benefits and challenges of
CJTF-HOA's presence and activities, and we further observed training
for incoming task force staff at the mission rehearsal exercise in
January 2010 in Suffolk, Virginia. We visited or contacted the U.S.
embassies named above to obtain from the Department of State, USAID,
or DOD officials information on CJTF-HOA's benefits in their
respective countries. We met with a senior official in Djibouti's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, as well as
officers from the Djibouti Armed Forces, to gain their perspectives on
working with CJTF-HOA. Additionally, we met with U.S. Joint Forces
Command officials to obtain information on CJTF-HOA's ability to
respond to emergencies and AFRICOM's ability to access forces for
activities.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 to April 2010, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Fiscal Year 2010
Spend Plan:
The following table provides information on CJTF-HOA's spend plan for
fiscal year 2010. According to CJTF-HOA officials, the task force's
actual spending may differ from the proposed plan based on other
priorities and requirements from AFRICOM and the military service
components.
Table 1: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Fiscal Year 2010
Spend Plan (Dollars in thousands):
Operation and Maintenance, Navy;
Description: Funds CJTF-HOA headquarters and forward-operating
location costs as well as certain operating costs of assigned Navy
units;
Amount: $60,150.0.
Operation and Maintenance, Army;
Description: Funds certain operating costs of assigned Army units;
Amount: $15,500.0.
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force;
Description: Funds certain operating costs of assigned Air Force units;
Amount: $315.0.
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps;
Description: Funds certain operating costs of assigned Marine Corps
units;
Amount: $150.0.
Humanitarian Civic Assistance;
Description: Funds provided by AFRICOM for efforts to promote security
interests of the United States and foreign country, promote
operational readiness skills of U.S. forces, and serve basic economic
and social needs of the country's people. Examples include medical or
veterinary assistance;
Amount: $2,013.0.
Official Representation Funds;
Description: Funds various receptions and events to extend courtesies
to guests to maintain prestige and standing of CJTF-HOA;
Amount: v15.5.
Operation and Maintenance Subtotal;
Amount: $78,143.5.
Humanitarian Assistance[A];
Description: Funds provided by AFRICOM, subject to the approval of the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to generally support projects for
basic building and construction;
Amount: $2,162.7[B].
Total;
Amount: $80,306.2.
Source: GAO analysis of CJTF-HOA and AFRICOM information.
Notes: In addition to the amounts shown in this table, the Department
of State provides funding for some CJTF-HOA activities related to
peacekeeping operations, foreign military financing, and international
military education and training.
CJTF-HOA requested $369.7 (dollars in thousands) for Traditional
Commander's Activities (TCA) funds from AFRICOM, but as of March 2010,
none of the funds had been received. TCA funds are for various African
military to U.S. military contacts and security cooperation
activities. The task force is waiting for AFRICOM to confirm whether
or not it will receive any TCA funds in fiscal year 2010.
[A] A small portion of the funds for Humanitarian Assistance may not
be allocated in fiscal year 2010 and may instead be used for
earthquake relief efforts in Haiti.
[B] This figure consists of $1,345.6 for fiscal years 2009 and 2010,
and $817.1 for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 (dollars in thousands).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
International Security Affairs:
2400 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2400:
April 6, 2010:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO 10-504, "Defense Management: DoD needs to Determine the
Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force, "dated March 18, 2010 (GAO
Code 351435). DoD concurs with the four recommendations with
additional comments. Our response to the recommendations is enclosed.
As discussed in the report, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa (CJTFHOA) provides an essential capability and is postured in a
strategic location, well positioned to protect American lives and
support U.S. national interests in the region. In East and Central
Africa, the CJTF-HOA is critical to U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM)
efforts to build partner capacity to counter violent extremists and
address regional security challenges. Its mission to counter violent
extremism and its location at Camp Lemonnier remain of utmost
importance given the rising threat from al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab in
Somalia and al-Qaeda in Yemen. To counter extremist influences and
strengthen partner nation security capability, the CJTF-HOA works in
close coordination with coalition members, Non-government
Organizations, African partners, and other U.S. Government departments
and agencies. CJTF-HOA activities mitigate the underlying stresses
that can contribute to regional instability.
Without Camp Lemonnier and the freedom of movement allowed by the
Government of Djibouti, U.S. operations in support of our national
interests in this region would be extremely difficult. U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) have all identified Camp
Lemonnier as essential to their on-going activities and operations and
as a critical node in the U.S. military's global transportation and
logistics networks.
Our point of contact for this action is Lt Col Stephen Hughes (USAF),
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African
Affairs, commercial phone (703) 571-9426 or electronic mail address:
stephen.hughes@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Illegible, for:
Vicki J. Huddleston:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
Unclassified:
GAO Draft Report ” Dated April 2010:
GAO Code 351435/GA0-10-504:
"Defense Management: DoD Needs to Determine the Future of its Horn of
Africa Task Force"
Recommendation 1: The Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S.
Africa Command (USAFRICOM), to complete its evaluation of Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), determining whether the
task force should be retained, and if so, whether changes are needed
to its mission, structure, and resources to best support the command's
mission.
DOD Response: DoD partially concurs with this recommendation. DoD
identifies a critical need for the task force and its activities in
the Horn of Africa and, therefore, does not need to determine whether
the task force should be retained. The mission of countering violent
extremism remains the top priority for CJTF-HOA and its structure,
resources required and activities in effecting that mission will be at
the forefront of its work for years to come. The business of building
partnership capacity and security force assistance is and will remain
an enduring activity in this region. The military to military
training, professional development, civil affairs, humanitarian
assistance, and other activities performed by CJTF-HOA all directly
respond to this mission and we expect to carry them out for years to
come, in order to further help stabilize this region on the continent
in serving the interests of the U.S.
USAFRICOM will be tasked, however, to continue to work with the Joint
Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to complete the
review of CJTF-FIOA and whether modifications are needed to the CJTF-
HOA mission, structure, activities and resources to best meet the
mission of countering violent extremism in the region.
Much of this evaluative work is already in process. The Commander,
USAFRICOM, as part of the command's mission, regularly evaluates the
mission, activities, and structure of CJTF-HOA, along with other
activities and organizations both in headquarters and on the
continent. As a result of the most recent review, the Commander is
satisfied with the current structure and force assigned to carry out
the CJTF-HOA mission. In addition, USAFRICOM is working with CJTF-HOA
personnel to put in place an operational assessment process, linked to
USAFRICOM's theater security objectives, to continuously evaluate the
individual activities being conducted and their impact on regional
capacity to prevent and deter terrorist activities. The results of
these assessments will inform the overall CJTF-HOA evaluation.
Finally, as the Component Commands continue to mature their capability
over time, USAFRICOM will continue to evaluate the best structure and
best alignment of all command activities on the continent to provide
the most effective influence to counter violent extremism.
Recommendation 2: Conduct long-term assessments of Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) activities to determine whether the
activities are having their intended impact and support U.S. Africa
Command's (USAFRICOM) mission.
DOD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation. USAFRICOM's
internal and subordinate staff assessment processes are ongoing and
are continuing to mature. With each CJTF-HOA personnel rotation,
lessons learned from previous rotations and activities help CJTF-HOA
improve operations. An assessments process has been formally
established at USAFRICOM at the strategic level to measure the effect
on theater campaign objectives from all the operational and tactical
activities on the continent. In addition, CJTF-IIOA is an active
participant with USAFRICOM in planning conferences and is improving
its ability to integrate past activities and results with future
planned activities. Finally, CJTF-HOA has recently revised their
internal activities review criteria to ensure that long-term
sustainment is a critical part of the evaluation process.
Recommendation 3: Identify the projected costs for the task force to
conduct its assigned mission and, in concert with DoD or the Navy,
develop a realistic funding plan for the task force's sustainability.
DOD Response: DoD concurs with comment. DoD is working closely with
the Department of the Navy and with the Office of Management and
Budget on the long-term funding for Camp Lemonier as well as Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTFBOA). U.S. Africa Command
(USAFRICOM) will ensure that the requirements for CJTFHOA are clearly
articulated to the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, in conformance with DoD guidance. It is at the Departmental
and Administration level, rather than at the USAFRICOM level, that the
actual funding source is identified; specifically whether the
activities continue to be addressed as Overseas Contingency Operations
or as baseline DoD requirements.
Recommendation 4: Take actions to ensure that Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-110A) budget personnel have the expertise
and knowledge necessary to make timely and accurate funding decisions
for activities. These actions could include some combination of
training, staffing, changes, and/or guidance.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has already
taken steps to lengthen tours for critical skills to improve
continuity in CJTF-HOA. In addition, USAFRICOM also reviews training
requirements and influences CJTF-HOA member's attendance to courses
such as the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management and
resource management courses. In the past, USAFRICOM organized mobile
training teams to visit CJTF-HOA and conduct on-the-job training, and
intends to continue this practice to ensure the personnel are fully
trained in their areas. In the future, USAFRICOM plans to bring
Defense Travel System personnel and other key personnel to USAFRICOM
headquarters for training prior to deployment to CJTF-HOA.
Recommendation 5: Develop comprehensive training guidance or a program
that augments assigned personnel's understanding of African cultural
awareness and working with interagency partners. The guidance or
program should be mandatory and mechanisms should be developed to
ensure compliance for the best chances of institutionalizing knowledge
among Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-1-10A) personnel,
promote continuity of efforts, and sustain progress as personnel
rotate frequently into and out of Camp Lemonier.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. In part to address this requirement and
other shortfalls in its initial organizational construct, U.S. Africa
Command (USAFRICOM) stood up a Joint Force Development and Readiness
Directorate (JFD) in 2009. The JFD has played a key role in
coordinating with the USAFRICOM staff, service components, and CJTF-
HOA, to develop doctrine and enhance the delivery of cultural
awareness, language, and sensitivity training. Since USAFRICOM's stand
up, the JFD has sent cross functional staff members
to participate in the CJTF-HOA Mission Rehearsal Exercise with the
incoming CJTF-HOA core element prior to the Transfer of Authority.
During this Exercise, the JFD staff spent two weeks engaging the
incoming tour. These and future assessments will enable USAFRICOM to
improve: the knowledge level of incoming personnel through increased
time with the forces currently performing the mission, Transfers of
Authority, continuity of efforts, and to sustain progress during
current and future CJTF-HOA rotations.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;
Alissa Czyz; Lonnie McAllister; Steven Putansu; Jodie Sandel; Erin
Smith; and Cheryl Weissman made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In February 2007, then-President George W. Bush directed DOD to
establish AFRICOM. DOD designated AFRICOM fully operational on
September 30, 2008.
[2] AFRICOM's current headquarters is located in Stuttgart, Germany,
and its military service components and special operations command are
located in Germany or Italy.
[3] Senate Committee on Armed Services Report No. 111-35, at 218-219.
(2009).
[4] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder
Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs
Associated with the U.S. Africa Command, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20,
2009), and Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress
and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-947T] (Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2008).
[5] AFRICOM's area of responsibility includes the African continent
and its island nations, with the exception of Egypt.
[6] On October 1, 2008, Special Operations Command, Africa, assumed
responsibility for the Special Operations Command and Control Element-
Horn of Africa and on May 15, 2009, it assumed responsibility for the
Joint Special Operations Task Force Trans Sahara, which is the special
operations component of Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara.
[7] Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations
(Sept. 16, 2009).
[8] Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and
Procedures (Jan. 13, 1999).
[9] According to CJTF-HOA officials, these forward-operating locations
are not full-scale bases; rather, they are temporary locations that
allow access to foreign air bases. The facilities are owned by the
host nations.
[10] We refer to CJTF-HOA's "combined joint operational area" as
operating area.
[11] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[12] Directorates correspond to the major functions of a command such
as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and so forth.
[13] According to CJTF-HOA, its military-to-military activities
support theater security cooperation through programs designed to
encourage a democratic orientation of African defense establishments
and military forces while supporting AFRICOM's theater objectives.
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[15] GAO, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment
Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy
Objectives, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-188]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2007).
[16] When forces are not provided, AFRICOM may have to delay or cancel
activities or take military service component staff away from other
duties to travel to Africa.
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181].
[18] GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Take Action to
Encourage Fiscal Discipline and Optimize the Use of Tools Intended to
Improve GWOT Cost Reporting, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-68] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6,
2007).
[19] Joint Publication 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint
Operations (Mar. 4, 2008).
[20] Joint Publication 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations
(Mar. 1, 2007).
[21] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance
Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860] (Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2008). The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
initiative is a multiyear, multiagency effort to support diplomacy,
development assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening
country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the
spread of extremist ideology.
[22] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[23] We also contacted but did not receive a response from the U.S.
embassy in Burundi.
[End of section]
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