Department of Energy

With the end of the Cold War, secret weapons research at the Energy Department's weapons laboratories has waned while unclassified cooperative research with various nations is rising. With this research has come an increase in the number of foreign visitors at the laboratories. DOE has various controls to minimize the risk of foreign espionage, but earlier work by GAO and the U.S. intelligence community has cited shortcomings in these controls. This report discusses (1) DOE's procedures for background checks on foreign visitors and controlling the dissemination of sensitive information to them, (2) security controls over foreign visitor's access to sensitive areas and information within the laboratories, and (3) counterintelligence programs for mitigating the potential threat posed by foreign visitors.

GAO noted that: (1) DOE's procedures for obtaining background checks and controlling the dissemination of sensitive information are not fully effective; (2) DOE has procedures that require obtaining background checks, but these procedures are not being enforced; (3) at two of the laboratories, background checks are conducted on only about 5 percent of the foreign visitors from countries that DOE views as sensitive; (4) GAO's review of available data from DOE and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showed that some of the individuals without background checks have suspected foreign intelligence connections; (5) furthermore, DOE's procedures lack clear criteria for identifying visits that involve sensitive subjects and process controls to help ensure that these visits are identified; (6) as a result, sensitive subjects may have been discussed with foreign nationals without DOE's knowledge and approval; (7) DOE's security controls, such as access restrictions, in the areas most visited by foreign nationals do not preclude their obtaining access to sensitive information, and problems with the control of this information--such as sensitive information being left in an open hallway accessible to foreign visitors--have occurred at the laboratories; (8) furthermore, DOE has not evaluated the effectiveness of the security controls over this information in those areas most frequented by foreign visitors; (9) the DOE headquarters and laboratory counterintelligence programs are key activities for identifying and mitigating foreign intelligence efforts, but these programs have lacked comprehensive threat assessments, which identify likely facilities, technologies, and programs targeted by foreign intelligence; (10) such assessments are needed as a critical component of a more sophisticated security strategy that is consistent with the laboratories' more open missions; (11) furthermore, DOE could use these assessments to develop the performance measures needed to guide the laboratories' counterintelligence programs and to gauge their effectiveness; and (12) currently, DOE has not developed such performance measures or evaluated the effectiveness of its counterintelligence programs.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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