Nuclear Nonproliferation
National Nuclear Security Administration Has Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining Concerns Gao ID: GAO-09-949 September 17, 2009Worldwide, about 165 research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program to make security upgrades at foreign research reactors whose security did not meet guidelines established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NNSA's efforts to secure foreign research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected foreign research reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA's security guidelines, and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates the GRRS program with other countries and the IAEA. GAO reviewed NNSA and IAEA documents and visited five of the 22 research reactors in the GRRS program, which were selected on the basis of when upgrades had been completed and because the reactors still possess HEU.
As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete physical security upgrades at the remaining reactors by 2010 at an additional cost of $6 million. Security upgrades that GAO observed during its site visits include heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel, motion detector sensors and security cameras to detect unauthorized access, and fortified central alarm stations that allow on-site guards the ability to monitor alarms and security cameras and communicate with response forces. Foreign research reactors that have received NNSA upgrades where GAO conducted site visits generally meet IAEA security guidelines; however, in some cases, critical security weaknesses remain. At four of the five reactors visited, GAO identified security conditions that did not meet IAEA guidelines. For example, (1) at two reactors, no emergency response exercises had been conducted between the on-site guard force and off-site emergency response force, and one of these reactors lacked any formal response plans for emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel; and (2) personnel at one research reactor did not search visitors or their belongings before granting them access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present. Furthermore, the government agency charged with regulating the operation of one research reactor has neither developed safety and security regulations nor has the country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories officials responsible for making security upgrades at these reactors acknowledged that these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security at these reactors. Although the officials stressed the importance of NNSA continuing to work with these countries, there are no specific plans to do so after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are completed in 2010. NNSA officials coordinate with foreign government research reactor operators to design, install, and sustain security upgrades. Because the GRRS program is a voluntary and cooperative program, in some cases, NNSA faces challenges obtaining foreign governments' commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one country GAO visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years due to foreign government reluctance in accepting NNSA assistance and delays approving the designed security upgrades. Recently, NNSA has begun working with IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security to establish a sustainability program to help ensure the continued effectiveness of NNSA-funded security upgrades and to help research reactor operators implement security procedures. IAEA plans to conduct pilot programs at three research reactors in 2009 and then expand the program. NNSA will continue to support sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the completion of security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-949, Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Nuclear Security Administration Has Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining Concerns
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-949
entitled 'Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Nuclear Security
Administration Has Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global
Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining
Concerns' which was released on September 17, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2009:
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
National Nuclear Security Administration Has Improved the Security of
Reactors in its Global Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed
to Address Remaining Concerns:
GAO-09-949:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-949, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Worldwide, about 165 research reactors use highly enriched uranium
(HEU) fuel. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Global
Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program to make security upgrades at
foreign research reactors whose security did not meet guidelines
established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). GAO was
asked to assess (1) the status of NNSA‘s efforts to secure foreign
research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected foreign research
reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA‘s security guidelines,
and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates the GRRS program with
other countries and the IAEA. GAO reviewed NNSA and IAEA documents and
visited five of the 22 research reactors in the GRRS program, which
were selected on the basis of when upgrades had been completed and
because the reactors still possess HEU.
What GAO Found:
As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18
of the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost
of approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete physical security
upgrades at the remaining reactors by 2010 at an additional cost of $6
million. Security upgrades that GAO observed during its site visits
include heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel, motion detector
sensors and security cameras to detect unauthorized access, and
fortified central alarm stations that allow on-site guards the ability
to monitor alarms and security cameras and communicate with response
forces.
Foreign research reactors that have received NNSA upgrades where GAO
conducted site visits generally meet IAEA security guidelines; however,
in some cases, critical security weaknesses remain. At four of the five
reactors visited, GAO identified security conditions that did not meet
IAEA guidelines. For example, (1) at two reactors, no emergency
response exercises had been conducted between the on-site guard force
and off-site emergency response force, and one of these reactors lacked
any formal response plans for emergencies involving attempts to steal
HEU fuel; and (2) personnel at one research reactor did not search
visitors or their belongings before granting them access to restricted
areas where nuclear material is present. Furthermore, the government
agency charged with regulating the operation of one research reactor
has neither developed safety and security regulations nor has the
country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear
facilities. NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories officials responsible
for making security upgrades at these reactors acknowledged that these
continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security at these
reactors. Although the officials stressed the importance of NNSA
continuing to work with these countries, there are no specific plans to
do so after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are completed
in 2010.
NNSA officials coordinate with foreign government research reactor
operators to design, install, and sustain security upgrades. Because
the GRRS program is a voluntary and cooperative program, in some cases,
NNSA faces challenges obtaining foreign governments‘ commitment to
complete security upgrades in a timely manner. For example, progress to
secure a research reactor in one country GAO visited has been delayed
by as many as 4 years due to foreign government reluctance in accepting
NNSA assistance and delays approving the designed security upgrades.
Recently, NNSA has begun working with IAEA‘s Office of Nuclear Security
to establish a sustainability program to help ensure the continued
effectiveness of NNSA-funded security upgrades and to help research
reactor operators implement security procedures. IAEA plans to conduct
pilot programs at three research reactors in 2009 and then expand the
program. NNSA will continue to support sustainability efforts through
the IAEA after the completion of security upgrades at the remaining
reactors in 2010.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to help NNSA improve security procedures
and encourage the development of national security laws and regulations
in countries with HEU-fueled research reactors.
In commenting on this report, NNSA agreed with the findings and
outlined the actions that it plans to take to address the report‘s
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-949] or key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841
or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Background:
NNSA Has Improved the Security of Research Reactors and Plans to
Continue Upgrading the Security of Additional Reactors:
Although Reactors We Visited Generally Met IAEA Guidelines, Some
Security Weaknesses Remain That Could Undermine NNSA-Funded Upgrades:
NNSA Coordinates Security Upgrades with Other Countries and IAEA, but
Additional Cooperation is Needed to Implement Security Procedures
Provided for in IAEA Guidelines:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Foreign Research Reactors in the GRRS Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: Interior of a Soviet-Built HEU Research Reactor:
Figure 2: Newly Built Fortified Central Alarm Station at a HEU Research
Reactor:
Figure 3: Upgraded Alarm Display and Closed Circuit Television Monitors
Inside a Central Alarm Station at a HEU Research Reactor:
Abbreviations:
DBT: Design Basis Threat:
DOE: Department of Energy:
GRRS: Global Research Reactor Security:
GTRI: Global Threat Reduction Initiative:
HEU: highly enriched uranium:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency:
LEU: low enriched uranium:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
NRC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 17, 2009:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Nuclear research reactors are used for research, training, and
development in many scientific fields, including nuclear engineering,
physics, and medicine. According to the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the
Department of Energy (DOE),[Footnote 1] there are about 165 operating
research reactors worldwide that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as
fuel.[Footnote 2] Concerns exist that terrorists may target research
reactors to steal HEU fuel for use in a nuclear bomb. As little as 25
kilograms of HEU are needed to construct a nuclear bomb. According to
the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on the Terrorist Threat to U.S.
Homeland Security, al-Qaeda continues to seek materials for nuclear and
radiological weapons and would not hesitate to use them. Furthermore,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides
guidelines for the safety and physical security of civilian nuclear
reactors including research reactors, has determined that the threat of
nuclear terrorism remains undiminished and has concluded that the
consequences of a malicious act involving a nuclear explosive device
would be catastrophic.[Footnote 3] In a January 2009 strategic plan for
reducing nuclear and radiological threats worldwide, NNSA stated that
President Obama has identified preventing terrorists from acquiring
nuclear or radiological weapons as the number one national security
priority of his administration.[Footnote 4]
Starting in 1953, through the Atoms for Peace program, the United
States supplied research reactors and the fuel needed to operate them
to many countries around the world. Similarly, the Soviet Union also
assisted several nations in building research reactors and also
supplied them with fuel. Nuclear technology was provided to these
foreign counties in exchange for a commitment not to develop nuclear
weapons. Initially, the research reactors supplied by the Atoms for
Peace program used low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which cannot be
used in a nuclear bomb, but many reactors were gradually switched from
LEU to HEU fuel. At the time many of these reactors were built, or
subsequently converted to use HEU, LEU fuels were not capable of
producing many of the desired conditions in research reactors. HEU fuel
lasted longer and was less expensive over time than LEU fuel because
the reactors did not need to be refueled as often. Because of concerns
about the threats posed by the potential theft or diversion of HEU for
use in a nuclear bomb, new, more effective LEU fuels have been and are
being developed, which would allow research reactors to convert from
HEU to LEU fuel.
The purpose of DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is to
protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material at civilian sites
worldwide, including research reactors. Administered by NNSA, GTRI has
three goals: (1) to convert research reactors and isotope production
facilities from using HEU to using LEU, (2) to remove and dispose of
excess nuclear and radiological materials, and (3) to protect high-
priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft and sabotage. We
reported on DOE's progress in achieving the first two goals in 2004.
[Footnote 5]
NNSA seeks to achieve GTRI's third goal at research reactors worldwide
through its Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program, which is a
voluntary and cooperative program that depends on countries accepting
NNSA assistance to make security improvements. The GRRS program
assesses security, designs security systems, and provides funding for
security upgrades in order to protect vulnerable nuclear material at
research reactors. These upgrades are needed to secure HEU fuel until
permanent threat reduction solutions can be achieved, such as
converting the reactors to LEU fuel and removing the HEU fuel.
Each nation that possesses a research reactor is responsible for the
security of its own research reactors. Since 1972, IAEA has provided
its member states with guidelines for the physical protection of
nuclear material, most recently in 1999.[Footnote 6] These guidelines
contain administrative and technical measures designed to prevent the
sabotage of nuclear facilities and the theft or other unauthorized
diversions of nuclear material. According to IAEA's guidelines, a
comprehensive physical protection system to secure nuclear material
should include, among other things,
* technical measures such as vaults, perimeter barriers, intrusion
sensors, and alarms;
* material control procedures; and:
* adequately equipped and appropriately trained guard and emergency
response forces.
According to IAEA's guidelines, member states should ensure that their
national laws ensure the proper implementation of physical protection
and verify continued compliance with physical protection regulations.
Although these IAEA guidelines are not binding on IAEA member states,
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews applications for
the export of nuclear material, including HEU fuel to foreign research
reactors, to ensure that the recipient country's physical security
measures are at least comparable to IAEA guidelines for the physical
protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In addition,
NNSA has adopted the IAEA guidelines as a tool to help it determine
what security upgrades are necessary at research reactors in the GRRS
program. Using IAEA's guidelines, NNSA has developed a GTRI Design
Basis Threat (DBT)--an analysis of the number of adversaries that
security forces may face and how the adversaries may be equipped--that
the GRRS program uses to develop security upgrades at research
reactors. Security upgrades are designed to assist guard forces at
research reactors to implement an "alert and notify" strategy, which
relies on off-site response forces to supplement on-site forces to
contain, locate, and neutralize adversaries before they can
successfully sabotage the reactor or steal nuclear material. The alert
and notify strategy is not as stringent as the costly "denial"
strategy, which is used primarily in settings where nuclear weapons or
significant nuclear components are present. With a denial strategy, the
security system and on-site guard forces must detect, delay, respond
to, and defeat adversaries before they gain access to nuclear weapons
or components.
In January 2008, we reported on the security of research reactors in
the United States that are regulated by NRC.[Footnote 7] In response to
your request, this report focuses on NNSA's efforts to improve security
of research reactors worldwide. Specifically, we examined (1) the
status of NNSA's efforts to secure foreign research reactors, (2) the
extent to which selected research reactors with NNSA security upgrades
meet IAEA's security guidelines, and (3) the extent to which NNSA
coordinates its GRRS program with other countries and the IAEA.
Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant NNSA and IAEA policy,
guidelines, and planning documents. For NNSA, we examined its
Protection and Sustainability Criteria Document, which describes the
DBT--the baseline threat for which security measures should be
developed at research reactors in the GRRS program. In addition, we
reviewed NNSA's strategic plans for the GRRS program and work schedules
for conducting and completing security work activities. We also met
with NNSA officials responsible for implementing the GRRS program and
with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) technical experts who
provide assistance to NNSA in implementing the program. We also met
with IAEA officials from IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security, Division of
Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology, and IAEA's Department of
Safeguards.
We reviewed security upgrades at a nonprobability sample of five
research reactors in five different countries--Czech Republic, Hungary,
Mexico, Romania, and Serbia. This sample cannot be used to generalize
findings from these countries to all countries in the program. We
selected these reactors based upon whether the reactors still use or
store HEU fuel and when NNSA had completed physical protection
upgrades. Four of the five reactors had already received security
upgrades, while work was ongoing at the fifth reactor. In the course of
our work, we visited each of these five reactors to tour the facilities
and inspect security upgrades that had been made or were in process.
During our visits, we interviewed officials managing the reactors, on-
site security officials, police, and other law enforcement officials
responsible for responding to security incidents, as well as government
officials responsible for regulating security at these reactors. At
each of these reactors, we conducted interviews with a standard set of
questions concerning the physical protection of the facility, the
security upgrades that were being made, and the extent of the
facility's coordination with NNSA and IAEA. We also compared the
security systems at the facilities with IAEA guidelines--particularly
INFCIRC 225, Rev. 4, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities. We also reviewed NNSA documents about each reactor,
including reactor visit reports and vulnerability assessments.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Research reactors are generally smaller than nuclear power reactors,
ranging in size from less than 1 megawatt to as high as 250 megawatts,
compared with the 3,000 megawatts found for a typical commercial
nuclear power reactor. In addition, unlike power reactors, many
research reactors use HEU fuel instead of LEU. Although some research
reactors have shut down or converted to LEU fuel and returned their HEU
fuel to the United States or Russia, about 165 research reactors
throughout the world continue to use HEU. NNSA efforts to convert
reactors from HEU to LEU fuel use and return HEU fuel to the United
States and Russia has led to the conversion of 57 reactors, the
shutdown of 7 reactors, the return of HEU from 59 reactors, and the
elimination of all HEU from 46 reactor facilities. NNSA plans to
continue converting reactors and returning HEU fuel to its country of
origin. However, because it will take several years to convert reactors
to LEU fuel use and return the HEU fuel, in the interim security needs
to be ensured at these reactors. Figure 1 shows the interior of a
research reactor in an Eastern European country that still uses Russian
supplied HEU.
Figure 1: Interior of a Soviet-Built HEU Research Reactor:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Reactor Operator.
[End of figure]
As NNSA and its predecessor agencies recognized the threat posed by the
theft or diversion of nuclear materials--including HEU research reactor
fuel--for nuclear weapons' purposes, it initiated a number of efforts
to address this threat. First, since 1974, DOE has supported a program
to determine whether nuclear material provided by the United States to
other countries for peaceful purposes is adequately protected. Managed
by NNSA's Division of Nonproliferation and International Security, this
program prioritizes and selects facilities for physical protection
assessment visits, leads such visits to determine if the facility meets
IAEA guidelines for security, and, in the cases where the visited
facility does not meet IAEA guidelines, makes recommendations to
improve security. However, unlike the GRRS program, NNSA's Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security does not fund or install
security upgrades at research reactors overseas. Second, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, DOE established the Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting program in 1995 to install improved security
systems for nuclear material at civilian nuclear sites (including
research reactors), naval fuel sites, and nuclear weapons laboratory
sites in Russia and nations in the former Soviet Union. Third, prior to
the establishment of NNSA, DOE established the GRRS program in 1993 to
improve the security of research reactors that are in countries that
NNSA considers in need of assistance, as well as research reactors in
countries that are not included in other DOE/NNSA programs. As shown in
Table 1, the GRRS program has identified 22 research reactors in 16
different countries in need of assistance that are not included in
other DOE/NNSA programs. Originally managed by NNSA's Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security, the GRRS program was
transferred to the GTRI in 2005. The GRRS program is also beginning to
provide security enhancements at research reactors located at
universities in the United States, as requested by the Department of
Homeland Security and the NRC. NNSA officials told us that they believe
the decision to assist in upgrading the security of these reactors was
based partly on our January 2008 report, which found potential security
weaknesses at domestic research reactors regulated by NRC.[Footnote 8]
Table 1: Foreign Research Reactors in the GRRS Program:
Country: Chile;
Reactor: RECH-1, La Reina;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Chile;
Reactor: RECH-2, Lo Aquirre;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Czech Republic;
Reactor: LVR-15, NRIRez;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Greece;
Reactor: GRR-1, Demokritos;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Hungary;
Reactor: BRR;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Indonesia;
Reactor: RSG-GAS, Serpong;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Indonesia;
Reactor: TRIGA II, Bandung;
Fuel material: LEU.
Country: Indonesia;
Reactor: Kartini P3TM, Yogyakarta;
Fuel material: LEU.
Country: Jamaica;
Reactor: Slowpoke UWI CNS;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Libya;
Reactor: IRT-1 and IRT-1 CA, Tajoura;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Mexico;
Reactor: TRIGA MK-III (ININ), Salazar;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Peru;
Reactor: RP-0;
Fuel material: LEU.
Country: Peru;
Reactor: RP-10l;
Fuel material: LEU.
Country: Poland;
Reactor: Maria, Swierk;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Poland;
Reactor: ZUOP (Eva spent fuel), Swierk;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Portugal;
Reactor: RPI; Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Romania;
Reactor: TRIGA II, Pitesti;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Romania;
Reactor: VVR-s, Magurele;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Serbia;
Reactor: Vinca;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: South Africa;
Reactor: SAFARI-1, Pelindaba;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Turkey;
Reactor: TR-2 Cekmece;
Fuel material: HEU.
Country: Vietnam;
Reactor: TRIGA Mark II, Dalat;
Fuel material: HEU.
Source: NNSA.
Notes:
(1) Two reactors in Indonesia and two reactors in Peru that use LEU
fuel--which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb but are potential
targets of sabotage to release radioactivity into the area surrounding
a reactor--have received security upgrades because of high levels of
terrorist activities in regions where the reactors are located or
because of their proximity to U.S. installations.
(2) Subsequent to the installation of security upgrades by the GRRS
program, NNSA has converted and removed all HEU from 4 reactors--GRR-1
in Greece, RPI in Portugal, Pitesti in Romania, and Magurele in
Romania.
[End of table]
NNSA Has Improved the Security of Research Reactors and Plans to
Continue Upgrading the Security of Additional Reactors:
As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18
of the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost
of approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete upgrades or remove
all HEU prior to making upgrades at the remaining 4 reactors and to
make further upgrades at some reactors where initial upgrades have
already been made, spending an additional $6 million before ending
physical security upgrades in 2010. For example, at one research
reactor we visited, NNSA has already spent $760,000 on security
upgrades and plans to spend $650,000 to pay for additional security
upgrades, which will enable the facility to meet IAEA guidelines for
security. NNSA also plans to spend an additional $378,000 for
maintenance and sustainability of the security system at this facility
over the next several years. NNSA is planning to complete all physical
protection upgrades at GRRS reactors by the end of 2010.
NNSA prioritizes its schedule for upgrading the security of research
reactors depending on the amount and type of nuclear or radioactive
material at the reactor and other threat factors, such as the
vulnerability condition of sites, country-level threat, and proximity
to strategic assets. To make security upgrades, NNSA works with Sandia
security experts to assess security needs at reactor facilities, design
security upgrades and systems, assists foreign reactor operators in
making improvements, and review security upgrades once they have been
made. With NNSA approval, Sandia works with local firms specializing in
installing security systems to make security upgrades. Security
upgrades we observed during our visits to reactors in the GRRS program
included, among other things,
* construction of new, heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel;
* installation of motion detector sensors and security cameras to
detect unauthorized entry into reactor buildings and provide the
ability to remotely monitor activities in those buildings;
* replacement of glass entry doors with hardened steel doors equipped
with magnetic locks and controlled by card readers or keypads; and:
* upgrades or construction of new fortified central alarm stations that
allow on-site guards to monitor alarms and security cameras, and
communicate with response forces.[Footnote 9]
Figure 2 shows a newly built fortified central alarm station at a HEU
research reactor. Figure 3 shows the upgraded alarm display and closed
circuit television monitors inside a central alarm station at another
HEU reactor.
Figure 2: Newly Built Fortified Central Alarm Station at a HEU Research
Reactor:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: NNSA.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Upgraded Alarm Display and Closed Circuit Television Monitors
Inside a Central Alarm Station at a HEU Research Reactor:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: NNSA.
[End of figure]
In addition, NNSA works with officials in countries included in the
GRRS program to develop emergency plans and training exercises with on-
site guard forces as well as local, regional, and national law
enforcement agencies. For example, at one facility we visited, NNSA
officials had worked with the reactor managers to develop emergency
plans, and the managers routinely test these plans with different
elements of the national emergency responders including the facility
guard force, local police, regional police, and the national-level law
enforcement including special assault teams. IAEA guidelines state that
coordination between facility guards and off-site response forces
should be regularly exercised. In addition, NNSA's alert and notify
strategy relies on off-site response forces to supplement the on-site
guard force to contain, locate, and neutralize adversaries before they
can successfully steal nuclear material or sabotage the reactor.
The focus of NNSA's program has been on protecting reactors that use or
store HEU fuel that could potentially be used in an improvised nuclear
device where security does not meet IAEA guidelines. In addition, some
research reactors using LEU fuel--which cannot be used to make a
nuclear bomb but are potential targets of sabotage to release
radioactivity into the area surrounding a reactor--have received
security upgrades because of high levels of terrorist activities in
regions where the reactors are located or because of their proximity to
U.S. installations.
Although Reactors We Visited Generally Met IAEA Guidelines, Some
Security Weaknesses Remain That Could Undermine NNSA-Funded Upgrades:
The foreign research reactors we visited that have received NNSA
assistance generally met IAEA physical protection guidelines; however,
in some cases, critical security weaknesses remained. The focus of the
GRRS program is to make physical security upgrades in accordance with
IAEA guidelines. For example, IAEA guidelines recommend that nuclear
facilities possessing the highest-risk nuclear materials have intrusion
detection equipment and that all intrusion sensors and alarms should be
monitored in a central alarm station that is staffed continuously to
initiate appropriate responses to alarms. At all four of the research
reactors we visited where NNSA upgrades have been completed, NNSA
installed intrusion detection sensors on all entrances and infrared
motion detectors in areas where nuclear material is stored to detect
unauthorized access. In addition, at these reactors NNSA provided
assistance to construct fortified central alarm stations that are
staffed continuously by on-site security personnel to monitor alarms
triggered by these sensors. NNSA is in the process of providing these
same upgrades at the fifth reactor we visited. Despite these upgrades,
the GRRS program has not focused on whether security planning,
procedures, and regulations meet IAEA guidelines at international
research reactors. In contrast, in the United States, the GRRS program
has assisted research reactors to ensure that security planning,
procedures, and regulations meet IAEA guidelines. For example, to meet
IAEA's guidelines that emergency plans be regularly exercised, the
program has provided emergency first responders with training and
conducted table top exercises simulating emergency conditions. At four
of the five reactors that we visited, we identified the following
potential vulnerabilities that can undermine NNSA-funded upgrades.
Specifically,
* IAEA security guidelines state that coordination between on-site
guards and off-site response forces should be regularly exercised. At
two reactors, however, no emergency response exercises had been
conducted between the on-site guard force and off-site response forces,
such as the national police, potentially limiting the effectiveness of
these forces in an actual emergency. In addition, one of these reactors
lacked any formal plans for emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU
fuel or to sabotage reactors.
* IAEA security guidelines state that all persons entering or leaving
reactor inner areas should be subject to a search to prevent the
unauthorized removal of nuclear material. However, personnel at one
research reactor we visited did not search visitors or their belongings
before granting them access to restricted areas where nuclear material
is present, thereby potentially compromising the security upgrades made
through NNSA assistance.
* IAEA security guidelines also state that all vehicles entering or
leaving the protected areas should be subject to search. However, at
another reactor that we visited personnel did not search vehicles that
were allowed onto the site or vehicles exiting the site for potentially
stolen nuclear material or other contraband.
* IAEA security guidelines state that the ceilings, walls, and floors
of areas containing vulnerable nuclear material should be constructed
to delay potential adversaries from accessing the material. However, at
one facility, we discovered that protective covers over storage pools
that contain HEU were not being used. These covers, which typically
weigh hundreds of kilograms and must be moved using a crane, provide
important protection for stored HEU by significantly increasing the
time required for a potential adversary to access nuclear material.
Although NNSA officials told us that these covers are not part of the
security system, the covers would delay potential adversaries from
accessing the HEU stored in the pool. Furthermore, the four entrance
doors to another research reactor--which still had HEU fuel at the time
that we visited, but has subsequently returned its HEU fuel--were not
upgraded and provided only limited access delay. These doors were made
of wood that is only approximately 1 inch thick. In addition, the locks
on these doors are not designed to prevent a determined attempt to
access the research reactor facility. Officials at this facility told
us that they had requested NNSA funding to replace the doors with
hardened steel doors. However, NNSA did not agree to pay for hardened
steel doors because it decided that the HEU fuel was sufficiently
secured in a storage pool with heavy concrete covers.
* NNSA program guidance states that establishing and maintaining a
reliable nuclear material inventory and tracking system are important
elements for ensuring adequate security for these materials. However,
at one reactor we learned that the operators of the reactor did not
have an effective system of nuclear material control and accounting for
the HEU fuel. For example, the operators of this reactor neither
performed routine inventory checks on HEU fuel, nor had an exact
accounting of the spent HEU fuel stored at the facility. In this case,
NNSA officials told us that a lack of effective nuclear material
accounting at this facility is due to the poor condition of the reactor
fuel storage pool, which is contaminated with cesium that has leaked
from fuel. These officials told us that an inventory will be conducted
as HEU fuel is prepared for shipment back to its country of origin.
* IAEA security guidelines state that unescorted access to protected
areas should be limited to those persons whose trustworthiness has been
determined. However, at another reactor we visited, background checks
were not conducted on personnel with access to areas where nuclear
materials are present.
* At the same reactor, according to foreign government officials, the
government agency charged with regulating the operation of the research
reactor had neither developed safety and security regulations, nor had
the country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of
nuclear facilities--including licensing, inspections, and emergency
exercise procedures--as called for by IAEA guidelines.
NNSA and Sandia officials responsible for making security upgrades at
these reactors acknowledged that, even with NNSA-funded upgrades, these
continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security. These
officials stressed the importance of NNSA continuing to work with these
countries to ensure that research reactors have effective and
comprehensive physical protection systems and procedures consistent
with IAEA guidelines. Furthermore, they expressed the need to
eventually convert these reactors to LEU and return the HEU fuel to its
country of origin, as well as to develop national laws and regulations
to ensure the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. In
addition, Sandia officials commented that there is no substitute for
NNSA and Sandia visits to reactors that have received physical security
upgrades to determine whether the upgrades have been installed,
function as designed, and are properly maintained. However, these
visits generally have not been used to assist the facilities in
developing security policy and procedures that comply with IAEA
security guidelines, and there are no specific plans to continue these
visits after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are completed
in 2010.
NNSA Coordinates Security Upgrades with Other Countries and IAEA, but
Additional Cooperation is Needed to Implement Security Procedures
Provided for in IAEA Guidelines:
NNSA coordinates with research reactor operators to design, install,
and sustain security upgrades. However, because the GRRS program is
voluntary, NNSA faces challenges in obtaining consistent and timely
cooperation from other countries to address remaining security
weaknesses. With regard to IAEA, NNSA coordinates with the agency to
identify research reactors that are in need of security upgrades and
assistance. In addition, NNSA and IAEA have begun coordinating on a
sustainability project to help ensure that research reactor operators
adequately maintain NNSA funded upgrades by assisting in the
development of equipment testing and maintenance procedures and the
development of emergency response plans.
NNSA Coordinates with Other Countries to Implement Upgrades but Faces
Challenges in Addressing Security Weaknesses at Some Research Reactors:
NNSA officials and the physical security experts at Sandia coordinate
with foreign government research reactor operators to design, install,
and sustain physical security upgrades. To design security systems,
NNSA and Sandia officials assess a research reactor's current security
condition to identify security weaknesses and verify the amount, type,
and location of nuclear material at the facility. The officials then
work with foreign research reactor operators to design upgrades and use
either the DBT established by the foreign government or a DBT developed
by NNSA if the country has not developed its own DBT for nuclear
facilities. Security upgrades are generally focused on the electronic
elements of the security system used to detect unauthorized access and
alert response forces, as well as access delay features such as
hardened steel doors and storage vaults, instead of on the development
of security policies and procedures provided for in IAEA guidelines.
Sandia officials also work with foreign government research reactor
operators by overseeing the installation of security upgrades. In
general, Sandia works with a security company that is then responsible
for procuring and installing the designed security upgrades. To help
ensure that the security upgrades are being installed properly, Sandia
requires the security company and the foreign research reactor
operators to periodically submit status reports and equipment lists for
Sandia's review. In some instances, countries will share the cost of
installing the upgrades with NNSA. For example, the government of the
Czech Republic provided $800,000 to upgrade the security at one of its
research reactors. Once the security contractor completes the
installation, NNSA and Sandia officials and foreign government research
reactor operators inspect the upgrades and determine if they were
installed and are functioning as designed.
To help ensure that the upgrades are sustained, NNSA and Sandia
officials periodically visit research reactors to review the condition
of upgrades and to determine if supplemental upgrades are needed.
According to NNSA and Sandia officials, these visits are crucial to
maintaining a collaborative relationship with foreign research reactor
operators to help ensure that security upgrades are sustained over the
long term. As a result of recent security assessment visits, NNSA
officials said that they are planning additional upgrades at three
reactors we visited where security upgrades had already been completed.
These additional upgrades are to include, among other things, new
closed circuit television cameras, a device used to provide emergency
electrical power, and replacement door locks; they do not include
assistance in developing security policies and procedures provided for
in IAEA guidelines. NNSA officials determined that supplemental
upgrades at the fourth reactor were not needed because they planned to
return the reactor's HEU to Russia in the summer of 2009, which was 7
months after the assessment was made.[Footnote 10]
NNSA has also been purchasing warranty and maintenance contracts for
recently installed upgrades and for certain reactors where upgrades are
several years old and foreign government research reactor operators
lack sufficient funding for maintenance activities. NNSA requires the
countries or reactor operators who receive these warranty and
maintenance contracts to provide written assurance that they will
continue to sustain the upgrades at their own expense after the
contract expires, although NNSA will consider providing additional
coverage on a case-by-case basis. In addition, NNSA is working with
IAEA and governments in each of the countries that received security
upgrades at research reactors to develop a long-term sustainability
plan for security systems.
Because the GRRS program is voluntary and cooperative, NNSA officials
told us that in some cases they face challenges in obtaining foreign
governments' commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely
manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one
country we visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years for two
reasons. First, the country was initially reluctant to accept NNSA
assistance and took 2 years to decide whether to accept funding for
security improvements. Second, security upgrades were further delayed
at this reactor because of the country's delay in approving the design
of the security upgrades and authorizing contractors to work at the
reactor site. As a result, a number of security weaknesses at this
facility have not yet been addressed--some of which NNSA identified as
early as 2002. According to NNSA officials, the agency has been working
with the Department of State to overcome these obstacles.
NNSA officials also told us that they have experienced situations where
a foreign government has refused its assistance to make security
upgrades. Specifically, one country has refused NNSA's multiple offers
to upgrade a research reactor facility during the past 9 years. NNSA
officials said that they have continued to offer this assistance
through both direct bilateral negotiations and through IAEA. However,
this foreign government has yet to accept NNSA assistance, and NNSA has
concerns that known security weaknesses have not been addressed. In
addition, NNSA has experienced two situations where the foreign
government would not accept security upgrade assistance until
agreements were reached with the United States on other issues related
to nuclear energy and security. For example, NNSA assistance at one
research reactor was delayed until the United States ratified an
agreement with the foreign government authorizing and setting the
conditions for transfers of U.S. civil nuclear technology and material
to that government.[Footnote 11] These issues have been resolved with
both foreign governments. Due to the terrorist threat level in the
areas where these reactors are located, NNSA has decided to forgo
making security upgrades because it would take too long to design and
install new security systems. Instead, NNSA is planning to remove the
HEU fuel that is at these two reactors and return it to its country of
origin this year.
NNSA Coordinates with the IAEA to Identify Research Reactors for the
GRRS Program, and Further Cooperation Is Needed to Sustain Upgrades and
Implement Security Procedures Provided for in IAEA Guidelines:
NNSA coordinates with the IAEA to identify research reactors in need of
security upgrades that could be included in the GRRS program. Fourteen
of the 19 research reactors that received NNSA-funded security upgrades
were previously reviewed by an IAEA team, which recommended security
improvements. According to IAEA officials, if a nation is unable to
make the recommended security improvements itself, IAEA will recommend
that it seek assistance from the GRRS program. In addition, NNSA works
with IAEA to ensure security upgrades are complementary when both
organizations are providing assistance at the same research reactor.
For example, at one reactor we visited, NNSA upgraded the reactor's
central alarm station and installed new intrusion sensors and cameras.
At the same facility, IAEA is planning to install an X-ray machine and
metal detector at the reactor's entrance to monitor personnel and
packages entering and leaving the facility. In addition, NNSA officials
implementing efforts to secure research reactors interact regularly
with IAEA officials by holding quarterly coordination meetings.
Furthermore, NNSA makes an annual financial pledge of between $1.6 and
$1.9 million to IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, which supports IAEA's
Office of Nuclear Security activities, such as security reviews of
international research reactors and other nuclear facilities.
Further cooperation is needed to sustain NNSA-funded upgrades and
implement security procedures provided for in IAEA guidelines. While
NNSA is planning to complete all physical protection upgrades at GRRS
reactors by the end of 2010, GRRS officials are still concerned about
the continued effectiveness of upgrades and any shortcomings related to
security procedures and planning. Consequently, NNSA has recently begun
working with IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security to establish a
sustainability program. The purpose of the sustainability program is to
help ensure that NNSA-funded security upgrades are properly maintained
and to help research reactor operators implement security procedures
and planning. To date, NNSA has provided IAEA with $550,000 and paid
for a security expert from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to
administer the sustainability program. Under the sustainability
program, IAEA will help research reactor operators develop:
* capabilities for properly maintaining and testing installed security
equipment, which will help ensure the future effectiveness of NNSA-
funded upgrades;
* capabilities to ensure that security procedures are designed,
implemented, and followed by research reactor management and personnel;
and:
* emergency response plans and agreements and procedures with a robust
dedicated off-site response force for assistance in responding to
emergency situations at the research reactor.
In addition, the sustainability program is expected to help foreign
governments strengthen their nuclear security laws and regulations, as
well as the nuclear security inspection process and procedures. For
example, IAEA plans to work with a country to ensure it has an
appropriate nuclear regulatory agency with the legal basis, as well as
inspection and enforcement capabilities, to establish and oversee
security requirements at nuclear facilities. IAEA plans to conduct
pilot projects of the sustainability program at three research reactors
in 2009, evaluate the results of the pilot projects, and then
potentially expand the program in 2010 to all reactors in the GRRS
program that still possess HEU. NNSA will continue to support
sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the completion of
security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010.
Conclusions:
Nuclear research reactors throughout the world continue to play an
important role in research, education, science, and medicine. However,
as long as some of these reactors continue to use HEU fuel or have HEU
fuel stored on-site, they must be adequately protected from terrorists
targeting them to steal the material or sabotage the reactors. NNSA's
efforts to secure research reactors in the GRRS program have resulted
in physical security upgrades such as heavily-reinforced vaults to
store HEU fuel and new or improved alarms and intrusion detection
sensors. However, security weaknesses remain at some research reactors
in the GRRS program, many of which are the result of weaknesses in
security procedures and emergency planning. NNSA's efforts have, to
date, generally not included encouraging the development of effective
security procedures or the development of laws and regulations ensuring
the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities.
NNSA has taken the first steps toward addressing these security
deficiencies and is starting to work with IAEA to implement a
comprehensive sustainability program to ensure that new security
upgrades installed at these reactors undergo periodic maintenance and
repair. These efforts must continue, even after NNSA completes
installing physical security upgrades at the remaining reactors and
ends the GRRS program in 2010. Because NNSA is working with foreign
countries, it is also important that NNSA work cooperatively with these
countries' governments and IAEA to develop rigorous policies and
procedures governing security at these sites. Ultimately, the most
effective security improvement that can be made at these research
reactors is to convert them to use LEU and to return all HEU fuel to
the material's country of origin, thereby eliminating the reactors'
attractiveness to terrorists seeking material to make an improvised
nuclear device. We support the effort that NNSA is now taking to
accelerate the schedule to convert reactors to LEU fuel use and return
HEU fuel to its country of origin. The timely removal of this material
from at-risk reactors will be, in the end, the most effective security
improvement NNSA can make.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To resolve remaining security weaknesses at foreign research reactors
that use HEU fuel, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the
Administrator of NNSA to take the following three actions:
* While continuing to emphasize and accelerate NNSA efforts to convert
reactors to LEU fuel use and return HEU fuel to its country of origin,
we recommend that NNSA work with foreign government officials and
research reactor operators in countries where security upgrades are in
progress or have been completed to (1) take immediate action to address
any remaining security weaknesses, including those that we identified
in this report; and (2) ensure that security policies and procedures,
including those for emergency response to security incidents, fully
meet IAEA guidelines.
* In addition, in cooperation with IAEA's Office of Nuclear Safety, we
recommend that NNSA work with foreign regulatory agencies to encourage
the development, where needed, of national security laws and
regulations to ensure the safe and secure operation of research
reactors, including licensing, inspection, and emergency exercise
procedures, as called for in IAEA guidelines.
Agency Comments:
We provided NNSA with a draft of this report for its review and
comment. In its written comments, NNSA states that our report is fair
and properly reflects the progress of the GRRS program to make security
upgrades at vulnerable, high risk research reactors worldwide. NNSA
also outlined the actions that it plans to take to address the report's
recommendations to further improve research reactor security. The
complete text of NNSA's comments are presented in appendix I. NNSA also
provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the
report as appropriate.
To address the report's recommendations, NNSA stated that it plans to
assist countries in meeting security obligations by 1) ensuring that
its security policies and procedures, including those for emergency
response to security incidents, fully meet IAEA guidelines and 2)
working in cooperation with IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security to
encourage the development, where needed, of national security laws and
regulations to ensure the safe and secure operation of research
reactors:
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator of NNSA; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. The report will also be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in Appendix II.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration:
Department of Energy:
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Washington, DC 20585:
September 3, 2009:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
draft report, GAO-09-949, Nuclear Nonproliferation: NNSA Has Improved
the Security of Research Reactors in its Global Research Reactor
Security Program, but Further Action is Needed to Address Remaining
Concerns. We understand that this work was done at the request of the
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives
to review the risks to the United States national security of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) used in research reactors in countries of
proliferation concerns.
Overall, NNSA believes the report is fair and properly reflects the
significant progress the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has
made to complete sustainable security upgrades at vulnerable, high risk
research reactors worldwide. We agree with the conclusion that the most
effective security improvements that can be made at these research
reactors is to convert them to the use of low enriched uranium and to
remove the HEU from the site.
There are two points in the report that we believe are in need of
clarification. The first clarification is that improved security is
achieved either through physical protection upgrades or timely removal
of HEU from the site. This is reflected in the text from page 10 of the
report that states "NNSA plans to complete upgrades or remove all HEU
prior to upgrades at the remaining four reactors and to make further
upgrades at some reactors where some upgrades have already been made,
spending an additional $6 million before ending the program in 2010".
However, the second sentence of the summary states that "NNSA plans to
complete the program by upgrading the remaining reactors by 2010 at an
additional cost of $6 million." We suggest the second sentence in the
summary be revised as follows in order to more accurately reflect the
state of the program: "NNSA plans to complete upgrades or remove all
HEU prior to upgrades at the remaining four reactors and to make
further upgrades at some research reactors where some upgrades have
already been made, spending an additional $6 million before ending
physical security upgrades in 2010."
The second clarification is that the GRRS program will not end in 2010
due to continued efforts to sustain the upgrades already implemented.
Thus it is more accurate to state that physical protection upgrades
will end in 2010 and efforts to sustain these upgrades will continue
after 2010. On page 21-22 of the GAO report, its states that "...under
its current plans, NNSA plans to complete upgrades at the remaining
reactors and end the Global Research Reactors Security (GRRS) program
in 2010..." This generality is not consistent with GTRI's work plans or
other statements that GAO makes in the report:
* "Recently, NNSA has begun working with IAEA's Office of Nuclear
Security to establish a sustainability program to help ensure the
continued effectiveness of NNSA-funded security upgrades and to help
research reactor operators implement security procedures." (summary)
* "NNSA and IAEA have begun coordinating on a sustainability project to
help ensure that research reactor operators adequately maintain NNSA
funded upgrades by assisting in the development of equipment testing
and maintenance procedures and the development of emergency plans."
(page 17)
* "NNSA also plans to spend an additional $378,000 for maintenance and
sustainability of the security system at this facility over the next
several years" (page 11)
* "In addition, NNSA works with officials in countries included in the
GRRS program to develop emergency plans and training exercises with on-
site guard forces as well as local, regional, and national law
enforcement agencies" (page 13 and then goes on to give a detailed
example)
* "To help ensure that the upgrades are sustained, NNSA and Sandia
officials periodically visit research reactors to review the condition
of upgrades and to determine if supplemental upgrades are needed" (page
18)
* "NNSA has also been purchasing warranty and maintenance contracts for
recently installed upgrades and for certain reactors where upgrades are
several years old and foreign government research reactor operators
lack sufficient funding for maintenance activities. NNSA requires the
countries or reactor operators who receive these warranty and
maintenance contracts to provide written assurances that they will
continue to sustain the upgrades at their own expense after the
contract expires, although NNSA will consider providing additional
coverage on a case-by-case basis. In addition, NNSA is working with the
IAEA and governments in each of the countries that received security
upgrades at research reactors to develop a long-term sustainability
plan for security systems." (page 19)
This change should also be made in the last sentence of summary page
since the program does not end in 2010. We suggest the last sentence be
revised to state the following: "NNSA will continue to support
sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the completion of
security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010."
With regards to the recommendation, we recognize that even good
programs can get better, and we are committed to quickly and
effectively addressing GAO's recommendations for further improvement.
We agree with the GAO statement that "Each nation that possesses a
research reactor is responsible for the security of its own research
reactors." We plan to assist these countries in meeting their security
obligations by:
* Ensuring that their security policies and procedures, including those
for emergency response to security incidents, fully meet IAEA
guidelines as GTRI currently is doing at research reactors
domestically; and,
* Working in cooperation with the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security to
encourage the development, where needed, of national security laws and
regulations to ensure the safe and secure operation of research
reactors.
We thank the GAO team for providing an independent validation that
NNSA/GTRI has improved security of this vulnerable, high risk nuclear
material. GAO has provided constructive recommendations to further
ensure these improvements are sustained. We also appreciate GAO's
recognition of GTRI's efforts to accelerate reactor conversions and the
HEU returns.
Should you have any questions related to this response, please contact
JoAnne Parker, Acting Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management
at 202-586-1913.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael C. Kane:
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration:
cc: Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant
Director; Patrick Bernard; Omari Norman; Tim Persons; Ramon Rodriguez;
Peter Ruedel; Rebecca Shea; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Jeanette
Soares made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999), with responsibility for
the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors
programs.
[2] HEU, which can be used in nuclear weapons, is uranium enriched in
the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or greater. In contrast, low
enriched uranium, contains less than 20 percent uranium-235.
[3] IAEA, an autonomous international organization affiliated with the
United Nations, was established in Vienna, Austria, in 1957. The agency
has the dual role of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by
transferring nuclear safety and technical cooperation programs, and
verifying, through its safeguards program, that nuclear materials
subject to safeguards are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other
proscribed purposes.
[4] NNSA, Global Threat Reduction Initiative Strategic Plan: Reducing
Nuclear and Radiological Threats Worldwide (Washington, D.C., Jan. 22,
2009).
[5] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further
Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-807] (Washington, D.C.:
July 30, 2004); and GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to
Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium
from Other Countries to the United States and Russia, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-57] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19,
2004).
[6] IAEA, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Facilities, INFCIRC 225 Rev. 4., (1999).
[7] GAO, Nuclear Security: Action May Be Needed to Reassess the
Security of NRC-Licensed Research Reactors, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-403] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2008).
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-403].
[9] The purpose of the central alarm station is to monitor the
employees, general public, and environment of the entire reactor
complex. In addition, the central alarm station serves as a single,
central contact during emergency situations.
[10] In June 2009, NNSA announced that all HEU from this reactor was
returned to Russia.
[11] Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended (42 U.S.C
§ 2153) establishes the requirements for the United States to engage in
civil nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign governments.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
