Homeland Security
New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts Gao ID: GAO-02-924T July 9, 2002Title III of the proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 would transfer responsibility for certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear research and development programs and activities to the new department. The proposed Department of Homeland Security would develop national policy for, and coordination of, the federal government's civilian research and development efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Although the new department could improve coordination of existing research and development programs, the proposed transfer of control and priority setting for research from the organizations where the research would be conducted could be disruptive. Transferring control over these programs, including priority setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health. The President's proposal is not clear on how both the homeland security and the biomedical research objectives would be accomplished. However, if an agency's mission fits with homeland security, its transfer to the new department is appropriate.
GAO-02-924T, Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-02-924T
entitled 'Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical
R&D Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts' which was
released on July 9, 2002.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 9:00 a.m.
Tuesday, July 9, 2002:
Homeland Security:
New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D Coordination but May
Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts:
Statement of Janet Heinrich:
Director, Health Care”Public Health Issues:
GAO-02-924T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss one component”
the potential effect on biomedical research”of the proposed creation of
the Department of Homeland Security. Since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax incidents, there has been
concern about the ability of the federal government to prepare for and
coordinate an effective public health response to such events, given the
broad distribution of responsibility for that task at the federal
level. Our earlier work found, for example, that more than 20 federal
departments and agencies carry some responsibility for bioterrorism
research, preparedness, and response and that these efforts are
fragmented. [Footnote 1]
The President‘s proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 [Footnote 2]
would bring many of the federal entities with homeland security
responsibilities, including biomedical research and development, into
one department. Title III of the proposed legislation would transfer
responsibility for certain chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear research and development programs and activities to the new
department. [Footnote 3] Much of the research in these areas is
sponsored by or conducted at the Department of Health and Human
Services‘ (HHS) National Institutes of Health (NIH). The proposal would
also transfer the Laboratory Registration/Select Agent Transfer
Program”which controls biological agents with the potential for use in
bioterrorism”from HHS‘s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) to the new department.
In order to assist the Subcommittee in its consideration of this
extensive reorganization of our government, my remarks will focus on
the potential effects of a reorganization on biomedical research under
Title III of the President‘s proposal. My testimony today is based
largely on our previous and ongoing work on homeland security,
[Footnote 4] as well as a review of the proposed legislation.
In summary, the proposed Department of Homeland Security would be
tasked with developing national policy for and coordination of the
federal government‘s civilian research and development efforts to
counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. GAO has
consistently stated that there is a need for a strategic plan and better
coordination of existing research and development programs. The new
department could improve coordination of the biomedical research and
development efforts. We are concerned, however, that the proposed
transfer of control and priority setting for research from the
organizations where the research would be conducted could be disruptive
to dual-purpose programs, [Footnote 5] which have important synergies
that need to be maintained. Transferring control over these programs,
including priority setting, to the new department has the potential to
disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health
responsibility. The President‘s proposal is not sufficiently clear on
how both the homeland security and the biomedical research objectives
would be accomplished. Because the select agent program‘s mission fits
with homeland security, its transfer to the new department is
appropriate.
Background:
In response to global challenges the government faces in the coming
years, we have a unique opportunity to create an extremely effective and
performance-based organization that can strengthen the nation‘s ability
to protect its borders and citizens against terrorism. There is likely
to be considerable benefit over time from restructuring some of the
homeland security functions, including reducing risk and improving the
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of these consolidated agencies
and programs. Realistically, however, in the short term, the magnitude
of the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require
substantial time and effort, and will take additional resources to make
it fully effective.
The Comptroller General has testified that the Congress should consider
several very specific criteria in its evaluation of whether individual
agencies or programs should be included or excluded from the proposed
department. [Footnote 6] Those criteria include the following:
* Mission Relevancy: Is homeland security a major part of the agency or
program mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program?
* Similar Goals and Objectives: Does the agency or program being
considered for the new department share primary goals and objectives
with the other agencies or programs being consolidated?
* Leverage Effectiveness: Does the agency or program being considered
for the new department promote synergy and help to leverage the
effectiveness of other agencies and programs or the new department as a
whole? In other words, is the whole greater than the sum of the parts?
* Gains Through Consolidation: Does the agency or program being
considered for the new department improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of homeland security missions through eliminating
duplications and overlaps, closing gaps, and aligning or merging common
roles and responsibilities?
* Integrated Information Sharing/Coordination: Does the agency or
program being considered for the new department contribute to or
leverage the ability of the new department to enhance the sharing of
critical information or otherwise improve the coordination of missions
and activities related to homeland security?
* Compatible Cultures: Can the organizational culture of the agency or
program being considered for the new department effectively meld with
the other entities that will be consolidated? Field structures and
approaches to achieving missions vary considerably between agencies.
* Impact on Excluded Agencies: What is the impact on departments losing
components to the new department? What is the impact on agencies with
homeland security missions left out of the new department?
In the President‘s proposal, the new Department of Homeland Security
would be responsible for conducting a national scientific research and
development program, including developing national policy and
coordinating the federal government‘s civilian efforts to counter
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons or other
emerging terrorist threats. The new department would carry out its
civilian health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease
defense research and development through agreements with HHS, unless
otherwise directed by the President. As part of this responsibility,
the new department would establish priorities and direction for
programs of basic and applied research on the detection, treatment, and
prevention of infectious diseases such as those programs conducted by
NIH.
NIH supports and carries out biomedical research to study, prevent, and
treat infectious and immunologic human diseases. Infectious diseases
include those caused by new, emerging, and reemerging infectious agents,
including those that are intentionally introduced as an act of
bioterrorism. The emphasis of antiterrorism research supported by NIH
has been in four areas: (1) design and testing of new diagnostic tools;
(2) design, development, and clinical evaluation of therapies; (3)
design, development, and clinical evaluation of vaccines; and (4) other
basic research, including genome sequencing. [Footnote 7]
The President‘s proposal also would transfer the select agent program
from HHS to the new department. Currently administered by CDC, this
program‘s mission is ensuring the security of those biologic agents that
pose a severe threat to public health and safety and could be used by
terrorists. The proposal provides for the new department to consult with
appropriate agencies, which would include HHS, in maintaining the select
agent list and to consult with HHS in carrying out the program.
Proposed Department Could Improve Coordination of Research and
Development Programs:
The proposed Department of Homeland Security would be tasked with
developing national policy for and coordinating the federal government‘s
civilian research and development efforts to counter chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. The new department also
could improve coordination of biomedical research and development
efforts. In addition to coordination, the role of the new department
would need to include forging collaborative relationships with programs
at all levels of government and developing a strategic plan for
research and development.
We have previously reported that the limited coordination among federal
research and development programs may result in a duplication of
efforts. [Footnote 8] Coordination is hampered by the extent of
compartmentalization of efforts because of the sensitivity of the
research and development programs, security classification of research,
and the absence of a single coordinating entity to help prevent
duplication. For example, the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency was unaware of U.S. Coast Guard plans
to develop methods to detect a biological agent on an infected cruise
ship and therefore was unable to share information on its research to
develop biological detection devices that could have been applicable to
buildings infected this way.
The new department would need to develop mechanisms to coordinate
and integrate information about ongoing research and development being
performed across the government related to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear terrorism, as well as harmonize user needs.
Although the proposal tasks the new department with coordinating the
federal government‘s ’civilian efforts“ only, the new department also
would need to coordinate with DOD because DOD conducts biomedical
research and development efforts designed to detect and respond to
weapons of mass destruction. Although DOD‘s efforts are geared toward
protecting armed services members, they may also be applicable to the
civilian population. Currently, NIH is working with DOD on biomedical
research and development efforts, and it is important for this
collaboration to continue. An example of NIH and DOD‘s efforts is their
support of databases to compare the sequences and functions of poxvirus
genes. These searchable databases enable researchers to select targets
for designing antiviral drugs and vaccines, and serve as repositories
for information on well documented poxvirus strains to aid in detection
and diagnosis.
The President‘s proposal could help improve coordination of federal
research and development by giving one person the responsibility for a
single national research and development strategy that could address
coordination, reduce potential duplication, and ensure that important
issues are addressed. In 2001, we recommended the creation of a unified
strategy to reduce duplication and leverage resources, and suggested
that the plan be coordinated with federal agencies performing the
research as well as with state and local authorities. [Footnote 9] Such
a plan would help to ensure that research gaps are filled, unproductive
duplication is minimized, and that individual agency plans are
consistent with the overall goals.
Transfer of Control Over Dual-Purpose Research and Development Raises
Concern:
We are concerned about the implications of the proposed transfer of
control and priority setting for dual-purpose research programs. For
example, some research programs have broad missions that are not easily
separated into homeland security research and research for other
purposes. We are concerned that such dual-purpose research activities
may lose the synergy arising from their current placement.
The President‘s proposal would transfer the responsibility for civilian
biomedical defense research and development programs to the new
department, but the programs would continue to be carried out through
HHS. These programs, now primarily sponsored by NIH, include a variety
of efforts to understand basic biological mechanisms of infection and to
develop and test rapid diagnostic tools, vaccines, and antibacterial and
antiviral drugs. These efforts have dual-purpose applicability. The
scientific research on biologic agents that could be used by terrorists
cannot be readily separated from research on emerging infectious
diseases. For example, research being carried out on antiviral drugs in
the NIH biodefense research program is expected to be useful in the
development of treatments for hepatitis C. NIH biodefense research on
enhanced immunologic responses to protect against infection and disease
is critical in the development of interventions against both naturally
occurring and man-made pathogens.
The proposal to transfer to the new department responsibility for
research and development programs that would continue to be carried out
by HHS raises many concerns. Although there is a clear need for the new
department to have responsibility for setting policy, developing a
strategy, providing leadership, and coordinating research and
development efforts in these areas, we are concerned that control and
priority-setting responsibility will not be vested in those programs
best positioned to understand the potential of basic research efforts
or the relevance of research being carried out in other, nonbiodefense
programs. For example, NIH-funded research on a drug to treat
cytomegalovirus complications in patients with HIV is now being
investigated as a prototype for developing antiviral drugs against
smallpox.
There is the potential that the proposal would allow the new department
to direct, fund, and conduct research related to chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and other emerging threats on its own. This
raises the potential for duplication of effort, lack of efficiency, and
an increased need for coordination with other departments that would
continue to carry out relevant research. Design and implementation of a
research agenda is most efficient at the level of the mission agency
where scientific and technical expertise resides. Building and
duplicating the existing facilities and expertise in the current
federal laboratories needed to conduct this research would be
inefficient.
Mission of Select Agent Program Is Aligned with New Department:
The proposal would transfer the Laboratory Registration/Select Agent
Transfer Program from HHS to the new department. The select agent
program, recently revised and expanded by the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, [Footnote 10]
generally requires the registration of persons and laboratory
facilities possessing specific biologic agents and toxins”called select
agents”that have the potential to pose a serious threat to public
health and safety. Select agents include approximately 40 viruses,
bacteria, rickettsia, fungi, and toxins. Examples include Ebola,
anthrax, botulinum, and ricin. The 2002 act expanded the program‘s
requirements to include facilities that possess the agents as well as
the facilities that transfer the agents.
The mission of the select agent program appears to be closely aligned
with homeland security. As we stated earlier, one key consideration in
evaluating whether individual agencies or programs should be included or
excluded from the proposed department is the extent to which homeland
security is a major part of the agency or program mission. By these
criteria, the transfer of the select agent program would enhance
efficiency and accountability.
Concluding Observations:
The President‘s proposal would address some shortcomings noted earlier
in this statement. Better coordination could reduce wasteful duplication
and increase efficiency. The mission of the select agent program is
aligned with the new department and, therefore, the transfer of the
program would enhance efficiency and accountability. However, we are
concerned about the broad control the proposal grants to the new
department for biomedical research and development. Although there is a
need to coordinate these activities with the other homeland security
preparedness and response programs that would be brought into the new
department, there is also a need to maintain the priorities for current
dual-purpose biomedical research. The President‘s proposal does not
adequately address how to accomplish both objectives or how to maintain
a priority-setting role for those best positioned to understand the
relevance of biomedical research. We are also concerned that the
proposal has the potential to create an unnecessary duplication of
federal research capacity.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-7118. Robert Copeland, Marcia Crosse, and Deborah Miller also
made key contributions to this statement.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Security:
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will
Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-901T. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002.
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will
Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-900T. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2002.
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will
Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2002.
Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but
Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington,
D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T. Washington,
D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving
National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership
Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,
2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA‘s Role in Strengthening Federal
Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-
150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation‘s Efforts. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Public Health:
Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention‘s Role in
Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15,
2001.
Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs. GAO-02-
149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.
Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T. Washington,
D.C.: October 5, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-
915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory
Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.: September 28,
2001.
West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.
GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington, D.C.:
August 16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public
Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
1999.
Combating Terrorism:
National Preparedness: Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings. GAO-02-
687T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private
Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for
Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development
of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-
550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.
Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2002.
Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Should Clarify Expectations for
Medical Readiness. GAO-02-219T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001.
Anthrax Vaccine: Changes to the Manufacturing Process. GAO-02-181T.
Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify Expectations for
Medical Readiness. GAO-02-38. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO-02-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism
Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.:
September 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President‘s
Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington,
D.C.: May 9, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further
Improvement. GAO-01-666T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, DC: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further
Improvement. GAO-01-463. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and
National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating
Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied
Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01-14.
Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of
Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March 21,
2000.
Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are
Poorly Managed. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-59. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are
Poorly Managed. GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36. Washington, D.C.: October 29,
1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and
Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20,
1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments
of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 1999.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical
and Biological R&D Programs. GAO/NSIAD-99-160. Washington, D.C.: August
16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs. GAO/T-
NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment
and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.: June 9,
1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear.
GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:
November 12, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: October 2,
1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. GAO/TNSIAD-
98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:
April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.:
December 1, 1997.
Disaster Assistance:
Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration
Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. Washington,
D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States
for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. Washington,
D.C.: July 9, 2001.
Budget and Management:
Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP.
Washington, D.C.: August 2001.
Managing for Results: Federal Managers‘ Views on Key Management Issues
Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: May 25,
2001.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.
GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.
Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission
Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO-AIMD-97-146. Washington, D.C.:
August 29, 1997.
Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal
Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7,
1995.
Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles. GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-
166. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995.
Grant Design:
Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and
Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22,
1998.
Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go
Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.
Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. GAO/AIMD-
95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Federal Research and
Preparedness Activities, GAO-01-915 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2001).
[2] H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002).
[3] These changes are primarily covered by Sections 301, 302, and 303
of the President‘s proposed legislation.
[4] See Related GAO Products at the end of this testimony.
[5] In this testimony, dual-purpose programs refer to biomedical
research and development programs that are applicable to both
bioterrorism and other health research. For example, NIH supports
research to expand knowledge of factors that play a decisive role in
determining antibiotic resistance, virulence, and invasiveness of
pathogens, as well as those events or processes critical to initiating
infection or influencing the severity of disease. This knowledge is
useful for both intentional and naturally occurring diseases.
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for
Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but Implementation Will Be Pivotal to
Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).
[7] Genome sequencing reveals the lineup of paired chemical bases that
make up a pathogen‘s DNA, which contains the genetic code and transmits
the hereditary pattern. Sequence information can be exploited in many
ways, including demarcating genes, locating therapeutic targets, and
identifying mutations that contribute to drug resistance.
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations,, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001).
[9] GAO-01-822.
[10] Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 201-204, 116 Stat. 594, 637-647 (2002).
[End of section]
GAO‘s Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO‘s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO‘s Web site [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov] contains abstracts and fulltext files of current
reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older products. The
Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents using
key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety,
including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as ’Today‘s Reports,“ on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select ’Subscribe to daily E-mail
alert for newly released products“ under the GAO Reports heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
