Coast Guard
Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders Gao ID: GAO-12-254T December 1, 2011The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, combined with an expected increase in human activity--shipping traffic, oil and gas exploration, and tourism in the Arctic region--has increased the strategic interest that the United States and other nations have in the Arctic. As a result, the U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has responsibilities in the Arctic, which are expected to increase. This testimony provides an update of: (1) the extent to which the Coast Guard has taken actions to identify requirements for future Arctic operations; (2) issues related to the U.S. icebreaking fleet; and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard is coordinating with stakeholders on Arctic issues. This statement is based on GAO-10-870, issued in September 2010, and includes selected updates. For the selected updates, GAO analyzed Coast Guard, Department of Defense (DOD,) and other related documents on Arctic operations and capabilities. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard and DOD officials about efforts to identify Arctic requirements and coordinate with stakeholders.
The Coast Guard has taken a variety of actions--from routine operations to a major analysis of mission needs in the polar regions--to identify its Arctic requirements. The routine operations have helped the Coast Guard to collect useful information on the capability of its existing assets to operate in cold climates and strategies for overcoming logistical challenges presented by long-distance responses to incidents, among other things. Other operational actions intended to help identify Arctic requirements include the establishment of temporary, seasonal operating locations in the Arctic and seasonal biweekly Arctic overflights, which have helped the Coast Guard to identify performance requirements and test personnel and equipment capabilities in the Arctic. The Coast Guard's primary analytical effort to identify Arctic requirements is the High Latitude Study, a multivolume analysis that is intended to, in part, identify the Coast Guard's current Arctic capability gaps and assess the degree to which these gaps will impact future missions. This study also identifies potential solutions to these gaps and compares six different options--identified as Arctic force mixes--to a baseline representing the Coast Guard's current Arctic assets. However, given current budget uncertainty and the Coast Guard's recent acquisition priorities, it may be a significant challenge for the agency to acquire the assets that the High Latitude Study recommends. The most significant issue facing the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet is the growing obsolescence of these vessels and the resulting capability gap caused by their increasingly limited operations. In 2010, Coast Guard officials reported challenges fulfilling the agency's statutory icebreaking mission. Since then, at least three reports--by the DHS Inspector General and Coast Guard contractors--have further identified the Coast Guard's challenges to meeting its current and future icebreaking mission requirements in the Arctic with its existing polar icebreaker fleet. Prior GAO work and these reports also identify budgetary challenges the agency faces in acquiring new icebreakers. Given these issues and the current budgetary climate, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to fund the acquisition of new icebreakers through its own budget, or through alternative financing options. Thus, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet to meet its statutory requirements, and it may be a significant challenge for it to just maintain its existing level of icebreaking capabilities due to its aging fleet. In 2010, GAO reported the Coast Guard coordinates with various stakeholders on Arctic operations and policy, including foreign, state, and local governments, Alaskan Native governments and interest groups, and the private sector. GAO also reported that the Coast Guard coordinates with federal agencies, such as the National Science Foundation, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and DOD. More recently, the Coast Guard has partnered with DOD through the Capabilities Assessment Working Group--an interagency coordination group established in May 2011--to identify shared Arctic capability gaps as well as opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to include making recommendations for near-term investments. The establishment of this group helps to ensure collaboration between the Coast Guard and DOD addresses near-term capabilities in support of current planning and operations. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO previously recommended that the Coast Guard communicate with key stakeholders on the process and progress of its Arctic planning efforts. DHS concurred with this recommendation and is in the process of taking corrective action.
GAO-12-254T, Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House
of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 11:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, December 1, 2011:
Coast Guard:
Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination
with Stakeholders:
Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
GAO-12-254T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-12-254T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, combined with an expected
increase in human activity––shipping traffic, oil and gas exploration,
and tourism in the Arctic region––has increased the strategic interest
that the United States and other nations have in the Arctic. As a
result, the U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), has responsibilities in the Arctic, which are expected
to increase. This testimony provides an update of: (1) the extent to
which the Coast Guard has taken actions to identify requirements for
future Arctic operations; (2) issues related to the U.S. icebreaking
fleet; and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard is coordinating
with stakeholders on Arctic issues.
This statement is based on GAO-10-870, issued in September 2010, and
includes selected updates. For the selected updates, GAO analyzed
Coast Guard, Department of Defense (DOD,) and other related documents
on Arctic operations and capabilities. GAO also interviewed Coast
Guard and DOD officials about efforts to identify Arctic requirements
and coordinate with stakeholders.
What GAO Found:
The Coast Guard has taken a variety of actions”from routine operations
to a major analysis of mission needs in the polar regions”to identify
its Arctic requirements. The routine operations have helped the Coast
Guard to collect useful information on the capability of its existing
assets to operate in cold climates and strategies for overcoming
logistical challenges presented by long-distance responses to
incidents, among other things. Other operational actions intended to
help identify Arctic requirements include the establishment of
temporary, seasonal operating locations in the Arctic and seasonal
biweekly Arctic overflights, which have helped the Coast Guard to
identify performance requirements and test personnel and equipment
capabilities in the Arctic. The Coast Guard‘s primary analytical
effort to identify Arctic requirements is the High Latitude Study, a
multivolume analysis that is intended to, in part, identify the Coast
Guard‘s current Arctic capability gaps and assess the degree to which
these gaps will impact future missions. This study also identifies
potential solutions to these gaps and compares six different options”
identified as Arctic force mixes”to a baseline representing the Coast
Guard‘s current Arctic assets. However, given current budget
uncertainty and the Coast Guard‘s recent acquisition priorities, it
may be a significant challenge for the agency to acquire the assets
that the High Latitude Study recommends.
The most significant issue facing the Coast Guard‘s icebreaker fleet
is the growing obsolescence of these vessels and the resulting
capability gap caused by their increasingly limited operations. In
2010, Coast Guard officials reported challenges fulfilling the
agency‘s statutory icebreaking mission. Since then, at least three
reports”by the DHS Inspector General and Coast Guard contractors”have
further identified the Coast Guard‘s challenges to meeting its current
and future icebreaking mission requirements in the Arctic with its
existing polar icebreaker fleet. Prior GAO work and these reports also
identify budgetary challenges the agency faces in acquiring new
icebreakers. Given these issues and the current budgetary climate, it
is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to fund the acquisition
of new icebreakers through its own budget, or through alternative
financing options. Thus, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be
able to expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet to meet its statutory
requirements, and it may be a significant challenge for it to just
maintain its existing level of icebreaking capabilities due to its
aging fleet.
In 2010, GAO reported the Coast Guard coordinates with various
stakeholders on Arctic operations and policy, including foreign,
state, and local governments, Alaskan Native governments and interest
groups, and the private sector. GAO also reported that the Coast Guard
coordinates with federal agencies, such as the National Science
Foundation, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and DOD.
More recently, the Coast Guard has partnered with DOD through the
Capabilities Assessment Working Group-”an interagency coordination
group established in May 2011-”to identify shared Arctic capability
gaps as well as opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to
include making recommendations for near-term investments. The
establishment of this group helps to ensure collaboration between the
Coast Guard and DOD addresses near-term capabilities in support of
current planning and operations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO
previously recommended that the Coast Guard communicate with key
stakeholders on the process and progress of its Arctic planning
efforts. DHS concurred with this recommendation and is in the process
of taking corrective action.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-254T]. For more
information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610, or
caldwells@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's efforts to
identify Arctic requirements and to coordinate with stakeholders on
Arctic issues and operations. The retreat of sea ice, combined with an
expected increase in human activity--shipping traffic and oil and gas
exploration--has increased the strategic interest that the United
States and other nations have in the Arctic region. For example, in
2011, northern shipping routes opened during the summer months, which
permitted more than 40 vessels to transit between June and October
2011. As a result of these and other anticipated changes in the
Arctic, the Coast Guard is expected to face increasing
responsibilities in the waters off of Alaska's 44,000 miles of coast.
In addition, the United States has developed national-level policies
that guide the actions of the Coast Guard and other stakeholders.
These policies indicate that the United States has an enduring
interest in working collaboratively with other nations to address the
emerging challenges arising from the effects of climate change and
globalization in the Arctic, and they identify Arctic national
security needs including protecting the environment, managing
resources, and supporting scientific research.[Footnote 1]
Since the Arctic is primarily a maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays
a significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement.
The Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that has responsibilities
including maritime safety, security, environmental protection, and
national defense, among other missions.[Footnote 2] As more navigable
ocean water emerges in the Arctic and human activity increases, 9 of
the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions will take on additional
importance, including Defense Readiness, Ice Operations, and Marine
Environmental Protection.
The Coast Guard currently has limited capacity to operate in the
waters immediately below the Arctic Circle, such as the Bering Sea.
Increasing responsibilities in an even larger geographic area,
especially in the harsh and remote conditions of the northern Arctic,
will further stretch the agency's capacity. See appendix I for a map
of the Arctic boundary and the Arctic Circle line of latitude.
[Footnote 3]
Presently, all of the Coast Guard's assets are based well below the
Arctic Circle, so Coast Guard operations above the Arctic Circle are
constrained by several factors, including long transit times for
surface vessels and aircraft to cover vast distances to reach the
Arctic Circle. When the Coast Guard is able to respond to an incident,
its surface and air assets are also limited by fuel capacity and the
distance to fuel sources. Figure 1 compares the State of Alaska to the
lower 48 states to illustrate the large distances between Coast Guard
assets and Point Barrow (the northernmost point of land in Alaska).
Figure 1: Coast Guard Facilities and Assets in the State of Alaska
Superimposed on the Lower 48 States:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
Anchorage;
Attu;
Barrow[A];
Bering Sea;
Cold Bay[A];
Dutch Harbor;
Homer;
Juneau;
Kenai;
Ketchikan;
Kodiak;
Nome[A];
Petersburg;
St. Paul[A];
Seward;
Sitka;
Valdez.
[A] Seasonal.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
My statement today discusses (1) the extent to which the Coast Guard
has taken actions to identify and report on requirements for future
Arctic operations; (2) issues related to the U.S. icebreaking fleet;
and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard is coordinating with
stakeholders on Arctic issues.
This statement is based on our September 2010 report on the Coast
Guard's coordination with stakeholders on Arctic policy and efforts to
identify Arctic requirements and capability gaps, along with selected
updates we obtained in November 2011.[Footnote 4] For our September
2010 report, we interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, other
federal entities, and the International Maritime Organization, as well
as state, local, and Alaska Native stakeholders. We also reviewed
Coast Guard documents related to coordination with stakeholders on
Arctic issues, efforts to plan for increased Arctic activity, and
challenges and factors affecting the Coast Guard's Arctic operations.
More detailed information on the scope and methodology for our
September 2010 report can be found in that report. For the selected
updates, we analyzed Coast Guard, Department of Defense (DOD,) and
other related documents on Arctic operations and capabilities. We
interviewed Coast Guard and DOD officials about efforts to identify
Arctic requirements and coordinate with stakeholders. We also reviewed
how a recent effort aligns with key practices we have identified for
enhancing and sustaining interagency coordination.[Footnote 5] For new
information that was based on work not previously reported, we
obtained Coast Guard views on our findings and incorporated technical
comments where appropriate. We conducted the performance audit work
that supports this statement in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Background:
Diminishing Ice Opens Potential for Increased Human Activity in the
Arctic:
Scientific research and projections of the changes taking place in the
Arctic vary, but there is a general consensus that Arctic sea ice is
diminishing and some scientists have projected that the Arctic will be
ice-diminished for periods of time in the summer by as soon as
2040.[Footnote 6] As recently as September 2011, scientists at the
U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center reported that the annual Arctic
minimum sea ice extent for 2011 was the second lowest in the satellite
record, and 938,000 square miles less than the 1979 to 2000 average
annual minimum. These environmental changes in the Arctic are making
maritime transit more feasible and are increasing the likelihood of
human activity including tourism, oil and gas extraction, commercial
shipping, and fishing in the region.[Footnote 7] Despite these
changes, however, several enduring characteristics still provide
challenges to surface navigation in the Arctic, including large
amounts of winter ice and increased movement of ice from spring to
fall. Increased movement of sea ice makes its location less
predictable, which is likely to increase the risk for ships to become
trapped or damaged by ice impacts.
Coast Guard Faces Challenges to Arctic Operations:
As we reported in September 2010, the Coast Guard faces challenges to
Arctic operations including limited maritime domain awareness, assets,
and infrastructure.[Footnote 8] In a 2008 report to Congress, the
Coast Guard stated that maritime domain awareness in the Arctic is
critical to effective engagement in the Arctic as activity
increases.[Footnote 9] However, several factors--including (1)
inadequate Arctic Ocean and weather data, (2) lack of communication
infrastructure, (3) limited intelligence information, and (4) lack of
a physical presence in the Arctic--create challenges for the Coast
Guard in achieving maritime domain awareness in the Arctic. The Coast
Guard also faces limitations in assets and infrastructure in the
Arctic. These include (1) an inadequate portfolio of small boats for
Arctic operations, (2) the environmental impact of Arctic conditions
on helicopters and airplanes, and (3) a lack of cutter resources for
Arctic patrols.[Footnote 10]
Coast Guard Is Identifying Arctic Requirements, but Funding Is
Uncertain:
Coast Guard's Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements:
The Coast Guard has taken a variety of actions to identify its Arctic
requirements. As we reported in September 2010, these encompass a
range of efforts including both routine mission operations and other
actions specifically intended to help identify Arctic requirements.
Through routine mission operations, the Coast Guard has been able to
collect useful information on the capability of its existing assets to
operate in cold climates, strategies for overcoming logistical
challenges presented by long-distance responses to incidents, and the
resources needed to respond to an oil spill in a remote and cold
location, among other things.[Footnote 11] We also reported that the
Coast Guard had efforts underway specifically designed to inform its
Arctic requirements, including the establishment of seasonal,
temporary operating locations in the Arctic and biweekly Arctic
overflights. The temporary operating locations were established during
the summers of 2008 through 2010, and have helped the Coast Guard
identify performance requirements and obstacles associated with the
deployment of small boats, aircraft, and support staff above the
Arctic Circle. The seasonal (March-November) biweekly Arctic
overflights were initiated in October 2007 to increase the agency's
maritime domain awareness, test personnel and equipment capabilities
in the Arctic, and inform the Coast Guard's Arctic requirements, among
other things.[Footnote 12] As we reported in September 2010,[Footnote
13] these efforts addressed elements of three key practices for
agencies to better define mission requirements and desired outcomes:
(1) assessing the environment; (2) involving stakeholders; and (3)
aligning activities, core processes, and resources.[Footnote 14]
High Latitude Study Identifies Arctic Requirements:
The Coast Guard's primary analytical effort to identify and report on
Arctic requirements, the High Latitude Study (the Study), identifies
the Coast Guard's responsibilities in the Polar regions, discusses the
nature of the activities it must perform over the next 30 years, and
concludes with a high-level summary of the Coast Guard's material and
nonmaterial needs to meet the requirements.[Footnote 15] Specifically,
the Study identifies the Coast Guard's current capability gaps in the
Arctic and assesses the degree to which these gaps will impact future
missions. Of the Coast Guard's 11 mission areas, 9 are expected to
experience future demand in the Arctic region. The Study identifies
several current capability gaps that affect the majority of these
mission areas. Specifically, gaps in communications capabilities
affect all 9 mission areas, while deficiencies in the information
available about sea ice coverage in the Arctic affects 8 mission
areas.[Footnote 16] The other major gaps that affect the majority of
mission areas are related to the lack of polar icebreaking capacity,
which will be discussed later in this statement.
Of the 9 mission areas that the Coast Guard will need to carry out in
the Arctic, the Study identifies 7 mission areas expected to be
significantly or moderately impacted by current capability gaps. In
general, these missions all address the protection of important
national interests in the Arctic or the safety of mariners and the
environment. See appendix II for more detail about the degree of
impact that current capability and capacity gaps are expected to have
on future Coast Guard mission performance.
The Study then identifies potential solutions to specifically address
gaps in communications and electronic navigation capabilities,
recommending that the Coast Guard acquire more than 25 additional
communication or navigation facilities for Arctic operations. In
addition to these capabilities, the Study compares six different
options--identified as Arctic force mixes--to a baseline representing
the Coast Guard's current Arctic assets. These force mixes add assets
to the existing baseline force mix, and contain different combinations
of cutters (including icebreakers), aircraft, and forward operating
locations and are designed to mitigate the mission impacts caused by
current capability gaps. See appendix III for a description of the
assets included in each Arctic force mix.
The High Latitude Study also includes a risk analysis that compares
the six Arctic force mixes in terms of the ability of each force mix
to reduce the risk that is expected to exist in the future Arctic
environment. Risk reduction is determined in part by (1) identifying a
list of potential Arctic maritime incidents requiring Coast Guard
support, such as maritime accidents resulting in multiple casualties
or a major oil spill, or both; (2) quantifying the likelihood that
these search and rescue and maritime environmental protection
incidents could occur and the resulting impact should they occur; and
(3) assessing the relative effectiveness, or risk reduction, of force
packages the Coast Guard may employ to respond to those incidents.
[Footnote 17] The intent of the analysis is to provide information on
risk-reduction alternatives to inform the acquisition process.
According to the Study, the baseline Arctic force mix reduces less
than 1 percent of risk in the Arctic because this patrol capability
cannot reasonably respond to northern area incidents, while the six
other Arctic force mixes reduce between 25 and 92 percent of risk
annually, though the amount of risk reduced varies by season. See
appendix III for the amount of annual risk in the Arctic reduced by
each force mix.
Funding for Identified Arctic Requirements Is Challenging and
Uncertain:
As we reported in September 2010, administration budget projections
indicated that DHS's annual budget was expected to remain constant or
decrease over the next 10 years. Moreover, senior Coast Guard
officials, based in Alaska, reported that resources for Arctic
operations had already been reduced and were inadequate to meet
existing mission requirements in Alaska, let alone expanded Arctic
operations. These officials also reported a more than 50 percent year-
to-year reduction between 2005 and 2009 in the number of large cutters
available for operations in their region. Officials also expressed
concern that the replacement of the 12 older high-endurance cutters
with 8 new cutters may exacerbate this challenge. Given the reductions
that have already taken place, as well as the anticipated decrease in
DHS's annual budget, the long-term budget outlook for Coast Guard
Arctic operations is uncertain. The challenge of addressing Arctic
resource requirements in a flat or declining budget environment is
further underscored by recent budget requests that have identified the
Coast Guard's top priority as the recapitalization of cutters,
aircraft, communications, and infrastructure--particularly with regard
to its Deepwater program.[Footnote 18] Recent budget requests also
have not included funding for Arctic priorities, aside from the annual
operating costs associated with existing icebreakers.
This budget challenge is exacerbated when the costs of the High
Latitude Study's proposed resource requirements are taken into
account. Specifically, the Study estimates that the cost of acquiring
the assets associated with each of the six Arctic force mixes would
range from $1.01 billion to $6.08 billion, and their corresponding
annual operating costs would range from $72.3 million to $411.3
million. See appendix III for the estimated acquisition cost of each
Arctic force mix. Additionally, the estimated cost for the recommended
communications and electronic navigation capabilities for Arctic
operations is about $23.4 million. Given current budget uncertainty
and the Coast Guard's recent acquisition priorities, it may be a
significant challenge for the Coast Guard to acquire the assets that
the Study recommends.
Coast Guard Continues to Face Challenges Related to Icebreakers:
The most significant issue facing the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet
is the growing obsolescence of these vessels and the resulting
capability gap caused by their increasingly limited operations. As we
noted in our 2010 report, Coast Guard officials reported challenges
fulfilling the agency's statutory icebreaking mission, let alone its
standing commitment to use the icebreakers to support the Navy as
needed.[Footnote 19] Since then, at least three reports have further
identified the Coast Guard's challenges to meeting its current and
future icebreaking mission requirements in the Arctic with its
existing polar icebreaker fleet, as well as the challenges it faces to
acquire new icebreakers. The Coast Guard's existing fleet includes
three icebreakers that are capable of operating in the Arctic:
* Polar Sea (inoperative since 2010): The Polar Sea is a heavy
icebreaker[Footnote 20] commissioned in 1978 with an expected 30-year
lifespan. A major service life extension[Footnote 21] project,
completed in 2006, was expected to extend the Polar Sea's service life
through 2014. However, in 2010, the Polar Sea experienced major engine
problems and is now expected to be decommissioned in 2011. According
to a Coast Guard budget official, this will allow its resources to be
redirected toward the ongoing service life extension of the Polar
Star. Figure 2 below shows the Polar Sea in dry dock.
* Polar Star (inoperative since 2006): The Polar Star is a heavy
icebreaker commissioned in 1976 with an expected 30-year lifespan. The
Polar Star is currently undergoing a $62.8 million service life
extension, and is expected to return to service in 2013. The ongoing
service life extension is expected to extend the Polar Star's service
life through at least 2020.
* Healy (operative): The Healy is a medium icebreaker, commissioned in
2000, with an expected 30-year lifespan. The Healy is less capable
than the heavy icebreakers and is primarily used for scientific
missions in the Arctic. As a medium icebreaker, the Healy does not
have the same icebreaking capabilities as the Polar Sea and Polar
Star. Because of this, it cannot operate independently in the ice
conditions in the Antarctic or ensure timely access to some Arctic
areas in the winter.
Figure 2: Polar Sea in Dry Dock:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Three Studies Detail Icebreaking Issues:
Since we reported on Coast Guard's Arctic operations in September
2010, at least three reports have further identified the Coast Guard's
challenges to meeting its current and future icebreaking mission
requirements in the Arctic with its existing polar icebreaker fleet,
as well as the challenges it faces to acquire new icebreakers.
* DHS-OIG Report on the Coast Guard's Polar Icebreakers.[Footnote 22]
The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that the Coast
Guard and other U.S. agencies are unable to meet their current Arctic
mission requirements with existing icebreaking resources. This January
2011 report noted that the Coast Guard's icebreaking resources are
unlikely to meet future demands as well, in part because the agency
has not followed its life cycle replacement plan, which requires
replacement of icebreaking ships after 30 years of service. Further,
between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2009, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) had budgetary authority over the Coast Guard's
icebreaker fleet. Among other things, the Inspector General reported
that this funding arrangement resulted in deferred maintenance on the
icebreakers, which has affected their long-term operability. The
report concludes that without funding for new icebreakers or major
service life extensions of existing ones, the U.S. will lose all polar
icebreaking capabilities by 2029.[Footnote 23] The OIG report included
four recommendations related to the Arctic.[Footnote 24]
* U.S. Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Report.[Footnote 25] The
Coast Guard provided a report to Congress[Footnote 26] on the
recapitalization of the U.S. Polar icebreakers (Recapitalization
report), which assessed options for recapitalizing its existing
icebreaker fleet, including building new icebreakers, or
reconstructing the Polar Sea and Polar Star to meet mission
requirements, among other options.[Footnote 27] This October 2011
report found that the most cost-effective option would be to build two
new heavy icebreakers, while performing minimal maintenance to keep
the existing icebreakers operational while construction is taking
place. In addition to having the lowest acquisition cost of any
option--at $2.12 billion--this option also has the lowest risk due to
the complexity (and therefore risk) associated with the other options
of performing major service life extensions or reconstructing the
Polar Sea and Polar Star. The risk associated with these options is
driven by high levels of uncertainty in terms of cost, scheduling, and
technical feasibility for reconstructing the existing fleet. Given the
time frames associated with building new icebreakers, the
Recapitalization report concluded that the Coast Guard must begin
planning and budgeting immediately.
* High Latitude Study.[Footnote 28] This report included a separate
and broader analysis of the Coast Guard's icebreaker needs, while the
findings of the first two reports were limited to an analysis of the
existing Coast Guard polar class icebreakers. The Coast Guard provided
the Study to Congress in July 2011. It found that the common and
dominant contributor to the significant mission impacts in the Arctic
discussed above is the gap in polar icebreaking capability, and that
the existing icebreaker fleet is insufficient to meet the Coast
Guard's statutory mission requirements in both the Arctic and
Antarctic, even if two new icebreakers are built. To fulfill these
mission requirements, the study found that the Coast Guard needs a
minimum of six icebreakers (three heavy and three medium icebreakers).
Further, if Navy presence requirements are taken into account, the
Coast Guard would require three additional heavy icebreakers and one
additional medium icebreaker for a total of ten icebreakers (six heavy
and four medium icebreakers).[Footnote 29] The Study does provide cost
estimates for acquiring the recommended icebreakers, but it does not
directly assess the feasibility of its recommendations.[Footnote 30]
Funding Limitations Remain the Main Challenge Related to Icebreakers:
As mentioned above, the Coast Guard faces budget uncertainty and it
may be a significant challenge for the Coast Guard to obtain Arctic
capabilities, including icebreakers. Given our analysis of the
challenges that the Coast Guard already faces in funding its existing
acquisition programs, it is unlikely that the agency's budget could
accommodate the level of additional funding (estimated by the High
Latitude Study to range from $4.14 billion to $6.9 billion) needed to
acquire new icebreakers or reconstruct existing ones. The
Recapitalization report similarly concludes that the recapitalization
of the polar icebreaker fleet cannot be funded within the existing or
projected Coast Guard budget.[Footnote 31] All three reports reviewed
alternative financing options, including the potential for leasing
icebreakers, or funding icebreakers through the NSF or DOD. The
Recapitalization report noted that a funding approach similar to the
approach used for the Healy, which was funded through the fiscal year
1990 DOD appropriations, should be considered.[Footnote 32] However,
the Coast Guard has a more immediate need than DOD to acquire Arctic
capabilities, including icebreakers, making it unlikely that a similar
funding approach would be feasible at this time. For more details on
Coast Guard funding challenges and options specific to icebreakers,
see appendix IV.
Coast Guard Coordinates with Numerous Stakeholders on Arctic
Operations:
The Coast Guard continues to coordinate with various stakeholders on
Arctic operations and policy, including foreign, state, and local
governments, Alaskan Native governments and interest groups, and the
private sector. In September 2010, we reported that the Coast Guard
has been actively involved in both bilateral and multilateral
coordination efforts such as the Arctic Council.[Footnote 33] The
Coast Guard also coordinates with state, local, and Alaskan Native
governments and interest groups; however, some of these stakeholders
reported that they lack information on both the Coast Guard's ongoing
planning efforts and future approach in the Arctic. In response to
these concerns, in 2010 we recommended that the Commandant of the
Coast Guard ensure that the agency communicates with these
stakeholders on the process and progress of its Arctic planning
efforts.[Footnote 34] The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation
and is in the process of taking corrective action. For example, in
April 2011, the Coast Guard issued a Commandant Instruction that
emphasizes the need to enhance partnerships with Arctic stakeholders.
Additionally, in August 2011, the Commandant participated in a field
hearing in Alaska which included discussion about the Coast Guard's
Arctic capability requirements.
The Coast Guard also coordinates with federal agencies, such as the
NSF, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and DOD,
and is involved with several interagency coordination efforts that
address aspects of key practices we have previously identified to help
enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies.[Footnote 35]
For example, as discussed above, the Coast Guard collaborates with the
NSF to manage the nation's icebreaker fleet, including scheduling
icebreaker time for research activities,[Footnote 36] while NOAA
provides the Coast Guard with weather forecasts and warnings, as well
as information about ice concentration and type. Additionally, the
Coast Guard is involved with interagency efforts such as the
Interagency Policy Committee on the Arctic, created in March 2010 to
coordinate governmentwide implementation of National Security
Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive
25.[Footnote 37]
Since our September 2010 report, the Coast Guard has partnered with
DOD on another interagency coordination effort, the Capabilities
Assessment Working Group. DHS and DOD established the working group in
May 2011 to identify shared Arctic capability gaps as well as
opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to include making
recommendations for near-term investments. DHS assigned the Coast
Guard lead responsibility for the working group, which was directed to
focus on four primary capability areas when identifying potential
collaborative efforts to enhance Arctic capabilities, including near-
term investments. Those capability areas include maritime domain
awareness, communications, infrastructure, and presence. The working
group was also directed to identify overlaps and redundancies in
established and emerging DOD and DHS Arctic requirements. This working
group will address several of the key practices we have identified--
articulating a common outcome; identifying and addressing needs by
leveraging resources; and reinforcing agency accountability for the
effort through a jointly developed report containing near-term
investment recommendations. The establishment of the working group
helps to ensure that collaboration between the Coast Guard and DOD is
taking place to address near-term capabilities in support of current
planning and operations; however, upon the completion of the report in
January 2012, the working group is expected to be dissolved.
GAO is also conducting an ongoing review of DOD's May 2011 Report to
Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage that was
directed by the House Committee on Armed Services[Footnote 38] and
will report on our results in January of next year. That report will
assess the extent to which DOD's Arctic Report addressed congressional
requirements and DOD's efforts to identify and prioritize the
capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the
Arctic, including through collaboration with the Coast Guard.
Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For information about this statement please contact Stephen L.
Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-9610,
or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
statement. Other individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Kowalewski
(Analyst-In-Charge), Christopher Currie, Katherine Davis, Geoffrey
Hamilton, Adam Hoffman, John Pendleton, Timothy Persons, Steven
Putansu, Jodie Sandel, David Schmitt, Amie Steele, Esther Toledo, and
Suzanne Wren.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Map of the Arctic Boundary:
This appendix provides a map of the Arctic boundary, as defined by the
Arctic Research and Policy Act. As discussed in the report, the Coast
Guard currently has limited capacity to operate in the waters
immediately below the Arctic Circle, such as the Bering Sea.
Increasing responsibilities in an even larger geographic area,
especially in the harsh and remote conditions of the northern Arctic,
will further stretch the agency's capacity.
Figure 3: Map of the Arctic Boundary as Defined by the Arctic Research
and Policy Act:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
Source: Created by the National Science Foundation for the U.S. Arctic
Research Commission.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Impact of Capability Gaps on Coast Guard Mission
Performance:
This appendix provides information on the degree to which the Coast
Guard's existing capability gaps in the Arctic are expected to impact
future mission performance. Of the Coast Guard's 11 mission areas, 9
are expected to experience future demand in the Arctic, and the degree
to which existing capability gaps are expected to impact these
missions has been classified as Significant, Moderate, or Low.
Examples of how these gaps are expected to impact each mission are
also included below.
Figure 4: Impact of Existing Capability Gaps on Future Coast Guard
Mission Performance in the Arctic:
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
Degree of impact on mission performance: Significant;
Coast Guard mission area: Defense readiness;
Example of mission impact: Arctic capability gaps limit the Coast
Guard's ability to provide a surface presence and project sovereign
power in the Arctic.
Coast Guard mission area: Ice operations;
Example of mission impact: The lack of icebreaker capability will
limit the Coast Guard's ability to provide assistance to commercial
oil and gas activities in extreme or unpredicted ice conditions.
Coast Guard mission area: Marine environmental protection;
Example of mission impact: The lack of Arctic assets will limit the
Coast Guard's environmental inspection and compliance activities, as
well as their ability to respond to a major environmental incident,
such as an oil spill.
Coast Guard mission area: Ports, waterways, and coastal security;
Example of mission impact: The lack of a vessel tracking system
hinders the Coast Guard's ability to identify ships in U.S. Arctic
waters.
Degree of impact on mission performance: Moderate;
Coast Guard mission area: Aids to navigation;
Example of mission impact: Gaps in navigation capacity and the
presence of ice, fog, wind, and high sea states in shallow water will
threaten the safety of an increasing number of mariners.
Coast Guard mission area: Search and rescue;
Example of mission impact: The lack of icebreaker capability will
limit the Coast Guard's ability to respond to an increasing need for
emergency maritime search and rescue due to greater human activity.
Coast Guard mission area: Other law enforcement;
Example of mission impact: The lack of assets in the Arctic limits the
Coast Guard's ability to close illegal fishing areas.
Degree of impact on mission performance: Low;
Coast Guard mission area: Living marine resources;
Example of mission impact: Gaps in Arctic capabilities limit the Coast
Guard's ability to enforce fishing regulations and deter potential
illegal fishing.
Coast Guard mission area: Marine safety;
Example of mission impact: The lack of assets in the Arctic limits the
Coast Guard's ability to enforce the restriction or closure of
waterways.
Source: Coast Guard, High Latitude Study.
Note: Two Coast Guard missions - Drug Interdiction and Migrant
Interdiction - are not expected to be impacted by capability gaps in
the Arctic.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Arctic Force Mixes:
This appendix provides information on potential solutions to the Coast
Guard's existing capability gaps in the Arctic. The High Latitude
Study compares six Arctic force mixes in terms of the ability of each
force mix to reduce the risk that is expected to exist in the future
Arctic environment. The force mixes add assets to the baseline force
mix (which represents the Coast Guard's current Arctic assets) and
include different combinations of cutters (including icebreakers),
aircraft, and forward operating locations. The specific asset
combinations for each force mix are described below. The estimated
acquisition cost for each Arctic force mix and the percent of risk the
force mix is expected to reduce in the Arctic is also shown below.
Figure 5: Arctic Force Mixes:
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
Arctic Force Mix: Baseline;
Percent of risk reduced in the Arctic: 1%;
Icebreakers and cutters:
* One high-endurance cutter deployed in the Bering Sea, carrying a
short range helicopter;
Forward Operating Locations (FOL) with medium range helicopters:
* Two medium range helicopters located at Kodiak in the Gulf of Alaska;
* Seasonal medium range helicopters at Cold Bay and St. Paul, Alaska.
Each force mix below contains the baseline assets:
Arctic Force Mix: Force Mix 1;
Estimated acquisition cost: $3.1 billion;
Percent of risk reduced in the Arctic: 58%;
Icebreakers and cutters:
* One icebreaker deployed North of Alaska, carrying two medium range
helicopters;
Forward Operating Locations (FOL) with medium range helicopters:
* One forward operating location on the North Slope.
Arctic Force Mix: Force Mix 2;
Estimated acquisition cost: $3.1 billion;
Percent of risk reduced in the Arctic: 65%;
Icebreakers and cutters:
* One icebreaker deployed North of Alaska, carrying two medium range
helicopters;
Forward Operating Locations (FOL) with medium range helicopters:
* One forward operating location in Northwest Alaska.
Arctic Force Mix: Force Mix 3;
Estimated acquisition cost: $3.17 billion;
Percent of risk reduced in the Arctic: 66%;
Icebreakers and cutters:
* One icebreaker deployed North of Alaska, carrying two medium range
helicopters;
Forward Operating Locations (FOL) with medium range helicopters:
* One forward operating location on the North Slope;
* One forward operating location in Northwest Alaska.
Arctic Force Mix: Force Mix 4;
Estimated acquisition cost: $3.1 billion;
Percent of risk reduced in the Arctic: 50%;
Icebreakers and cutters:
* One icebreaker deployed North of the Bering Strait, carrying two
medium range helicopters;
Forward Operating Locations (FOL) with medium range helicopters:
* One forward operating location on the North Slope.
Arctic Force Mix: Force Mix 5;
Estimated acquisition cost: $1.01 billion;
Percent of risk reduced in the Arctic: 25%;
Icebreakers and cutters: [Empty];
Forward Operating Locations (FOL) with medium range helicopters:
* One forward operating location on the North Slope;
* One forward operating location in Northwest Alaska.
Arctic Force Mix: Force Mix 6;
Estimated acquisition cost: $6.08 billion;
Percent of risk reduced in the Arctic: 92%;
Icebreakers and cutters:
One icebreaker deployed North of the Bering Strait, carrying two
medium range helicopters;
• One icebreaker deployed in the Chukchi Sea, carrying two medium
range helicopters;
• One icebreaker deployed North of Alaska (in the Beaufort Sea),
carrying two medium range helicopters;
Forward Operating Locations (FOL) with medium range helicopters:
[Empty].
Source: Coast Guard, High Latitude Study.
Note: Risk and risk reduction vary by season, because winter ice
coverage affects accessibility. For example, the cruise industry is
responsible for most of the risk present in the Arctic in the spring,
summer, and fall, but does not contribute any risk during the winter.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Funding Limitations Related to Icebreakers:
This appendix provides an overview of the funding challenges the Coast
Guard faces related to icebreakers. These include limitations in the
Coast Guard's existing and projected budget, as well as alternative
financing options.
Coast Guard Budget Limitations:
The Coast Guard faces overall budget uncertainty, and it may be a
significant challenge for the Coast Guard to obtain Arctic capable
resources, including icebreakers. For more than 10 years, we have
noted Coast Guard difficulties in funding major acquisitions,
particularly when acquiring multiple assets at the same time. For
example, in our 1998 report on the Deepwater program, we noted that
the agency could face major obstacles in proceeding with that program
because it would consume virtually all of the Coast Guard's projected
capital spending.[Footnote 39] In our 2008 testimony on the Coast
Guard budget, we again noted that affordability of the Deepwater
acquisitions would continue to be a major challenge to the Coast Guard
given the other demands upon the agency for both capital and
operations spending.[Footnote 40] In our 2010 testimony on the Coast
Guard budget, we noted that maintaining the Deepwater acquisition
program was the Coast Guard's top budget priority, but would come at a
cost to operational capabilities.[Footnote 41] This situation, of the
Deepwater program crowding out other demands, continued, and in our
report of July this year we noted that the Deepwater program of record
was not achievable given projected Coast Guard budgets.[Footnote 42]
Given the challenges that the Coast Guard already faces in funding its
Deepwater acquisition program, it unlikely that the agency's budget
could accommodate the level of additional funding (estimated by the
High Latitude Study to range from $4.14 billion to $6.9 billion)
needed to acquire new icebreakers or reconstruct existing ones.
The U.S. Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Report contains an analysis
of the Coast Guard's budget which also concludes that the
recapitalization of the polar icebreaker fleet cannot be funded within
the existing or projected Coast Guard budget.[Footnote 43] This
analysis examined the impact that financing a new polar icebreaker
would have on Coast Guard operations and maintenance activities, among
others. The report found that given the Coast Guard's current and
projected budgets, as well as its mandatory budget line items, there
are insufficient funds in any one year to fully fund one new polar
icebreaker. Additionally, though major acquisitions are usually funded
over several years, the incremental funding obtained from reducing or
delaying existing acquisition projects would have significant adverse
impact on all Coast Guard activities.
This means that it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to
expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet to meet its statutory requirements as
identified by the High Latitude Study. As we reported in 2010,
[Footnote 44] the Commandant of the Coast Guard has recognized these
budgetary challenges, noting that the Coast Guard would need to
prioritize resource allocations, while accepting risk in areas where
resources would be lacking. Given that it takes 8-10 years to build an
icebreaker, and the Coast Guard has not yet begun the formal
acquisition process, the Coast Guard has already accepted some level
of risk that its statutory mission requirements related to icebreakers
will continue to go unmet.
Limitations on Alternative Financing Options:
The three reports discussed earlier in this statement all identify
funding as a central issue in addressing the existing and anticipated
challenges related to icebreakers. In addition to the Coast Guard
budget analysis included in the Recapitalization report, all three
reports reviewed alternative financing options, including the
potential for leasing icebreakers, or funding icebreakers through the
National Science Foundation (NSF) or the Department of Defense (DOD).
Although DOD has used leases and charters in the past when procurement
funding levels were insufficient to address mission requirements and
capabilities, both the Recapitalization report and the High Latitude
Study determined that the lack of existing domestic commercial vessels
capable of meeting the Coast Guard's mission requirements reduces the
availability of leasing options for the Coast Guard. Additionally, an
initial cost-benefit analysis of one type of available leasing option
included in the Recapitalization report and the High Latitude Study
suggests that it may ultimately be more costly to the Coast Guard over
the 30-year icebreaker lifespan. Another alternative option addressed
by the Recapitalization report would be to fund new icebreakers
through the NSF. However, the analysis of this option concluded that
funding a new icebreaker through the existing NSF budget would have
significant adverse impacts on NSF operations and that the capability
needed for Coast Guard requirements would exceed that needed by the
NSF.
The Recapitalization report noted that a funding approach similar to
the approach used for the Healy, which was funded through the fiscal
year 1990 DOD appropriations, should be considered.[Footnote 45]
However, the report did not analyze the feasibility of this option. We
have previously reported that because of the Coast Guard's statutory
role as both a federal maritime agency and a branch of the military,
it can receive funding through both the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and DOD.[Footnote 46] For example, as we previously
reported, although the U.S. Navy is not expressly required to provide
funding to the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard receives funding from the
Navy to purchase and maintain equipment, such as self-defense systems
or communication systems, because it is in the Navy's interest for the
Coast Guard systems to be compatible with the Navy's systems when the
Coast Guard is performing national defense missions in support of the
Navy. However, according to a Coast Guard budget official, the Coast
Guard receives the majority of its funding through the DHS
appropriation, with the exception of reimbursements for specific
activities.[Footnote 47] Also, as the Recapitalization plan
acknowledges, there is considerable strain on the DOD budget. A recent
DOD report on the Arctic[Footnote 48] also notes budgetary challenges,
stating that the near-term fiscal and political environment will make
it difficult to support significant new U.S. investments in the
Arctic. Furthermore, DOD and the Coast Guard face different mission
requirements and timelines. For example, DOD's recent report states
that the current level of human activity in the Arctic is already of
concern to DHS, whereas the Arctic is expected to remain a peripheral
interest to much of the national security community for the next
decade or more. As a result, the Coast Guard has a more immediate need
than DOD to acquire Arctic capabilities, such as icebreakers. For
example, with preliminary plans for drilling activity approved in
2011, the Coast Guard must be prepared to provide environmental
response in the event of an oil spill. Similarly, as cruise ship
traffic continues to increase, the Coast Guard must be prepared to
conduct search and rescue operations should an incident occur. For
these reasons, it is unlikely that an approach similar to the one that
was used to build the Healy would be feasible at this time.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program Remains
Unachievable, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-743],
Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.
Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but
More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870], Washington, D.C.:
September 15, 2010.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Requested Fiscal Year 2011 Budget,
Past Performance, and Current Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-411T], Washington, D.C.: February
25, 2010.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget and Related
Performance and Management Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-810T], Washington, D.C.: July 7,
2009.
Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support
Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-311], Washington, D.C.: April 16,
2008.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent
Performance, and Related Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-494T], Washington, D.C.: March 6,
2008.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October 21,
2005.
Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's Justification
and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-99-6], Washington, D.C.: October
26, 1998.
Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance
and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118], Washington D.C.: June
1996.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 25, Arctic Region Policy (Jan. 9, 2009);
National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: May 2010).
[2] The Coast Guard's 11 statutory mission areas include: Aids to
Navigation; Defense Readiness; Drug Interdiction; Ice Operations;
Living Marine Resources; Marine Environmental Protection; Marine
Safety; Migrant Interdiction; Other Law Enforcement; Ports, Waterways,
and Coastal Security; and Search and Rescue.
[3] Arctic stakeholders do not define the Arctic geographical area the
same way. The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 for example,
defines the Arctic as all U.S. and foreign territory north of the
Arctic Circle, all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary
formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers, and all
contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering,
and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain. Pub. L. No. 98-373, 98 Stat.
1242, 1248 (1984). For the purposes of this statement, we are limiting
our analysis to a more specific definition of the Arctic--the more
remote region above the Arctic circle.
[4] GAO, Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are
Ongoing, but More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be
Beneficial, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2010).
[5] See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[6] A Joint Coast Guard/U.S. Navy Statement on Arctic ice terminology
supports usage of the term "ice diminished" rather than "ice free"
because both agencies recognize that the region will continue to
remain ice-covered during the wintertime through the end of this
century and the current and projected decline in Arctic sea ice is
highly variable from year to year. The term "ice-diminished" refers to
sea ice concentrations of up to 15 percent ice in the area.
[7] In August 2011, the Department of the Interior approved
preliminary plans for one operator to drill for oil and gas in the
Arctic pending receipt of the operator's well containment plan and
other requirements.
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870].
[9] According to the Coast Guard, maritime domain awareness is an
effort to achieve an understanding of anything in the maritime
environment that can affect the security, safety, economy, or
environment of the United States. The process of achieving maritime
domain awareness includes: (1) collection of information, (2) fusion
of information from different sources, (3) analysis through the
evaluation and interpretation of information, and (4) dissemination of
information to decision makers, with the goal of identifying risks and
threats before they turn into catastrophic events.
[10] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870] for a
detailed discussion of these challenges to the Coast Guard's Arctic
operations.
[11] For more details on these efforts, see GAO-10-870, app. V.
[12] For example, the Coast Guard has also partnered with the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to track methane and
carbon dioxide emissions over Alaska during Arctic domain awareness
flights.
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870].
[14] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington D.C.: June
1996). For more information on how the Coast Guard's efforts addressed
the three key practices, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870].
[15] ABS Consulting, High Latitude Study Mission Analysis Report,
prepared for the United States Coast Guard, (July 2010). The Coast
Guard provided this study to Congress in July 2011. The High Latitude
Study comprises three volumes: (1) Polar Icebreaking Needs (in both
the Arctic and Antarctic regions); (2) Arctic Mission Area Needs; and
(3) Antarctic Mission Area Needs. Volumes 1 and 2 are intended, in
part, to provide decision-makers with options for meeting the Coast
Guard's mission requirements in the Arctic. According to Coast Guard
officials, the High Latitude Study was not a part of the formal
acquisitions process, and would instead be used to inform a more
detailed future analysis that will serve as the first step in the
icebreaker acquisition process.
[16] The National Ice Center provides information about sea ice
coverage to the Coast Guard, but the High Latitude Study notes that
the products that the National Ice Center provides are not well-suited
for Coast Guard use.
[17] The types of risk addressed by the analysis are those to public
safety and property that are addressed by Coast Guard Search and
Rescue and Marine Environmental Protection missions. Requirements
under the Coast Guard's Defense Readiness mission area were excluded
from the risk analysis, because identifying and assessing potential
defense incidents was beyond the scope of the study.
[18] The Deepwater program is a long-term, multibillion-dollar
acquisition program intended to replace or modernize the Coast Guard's
aging vessels, aircraft, and some communications systems.
[19] The Coast Guard and the Navy have a long-standing memorandum of
agreement regarding the use of the nation's icebreakers--the Coast
Guard operates the nation's icebreakers and uses them, when needed, to
support the Navy. The 1965 U.S. Navy-U.S. Treasury Memorandum of
Agreement was executed to permit consolidation of the icebreaker fleet
under one agency. That rationale was reinforced by a 1982 Roles and
Missions Study which stated that polar icebreakers should be centrally
managed by one agency and that the Coast Guard was the appropriate one
due to the multimission nature of polar ice operations. This
memorandum of agreement was updated in 2008. The signatories were DOD
and DHS and the agreement included an update on responsibilities for
coastal security.
[20] Icebreakers receive different classifications from the
International Maritime Organization based on their icebreaking
capabilities. A heavy icebreaker is classified as a Polar Class 1
vessel, and is capable of conducting year-round operations in the
Arctic and Antarctic. A medium icebreaker is classified as a Polar
Class 3 vessel, and is capable of operating in the Arctic region in
the spring, summer, and fall.
[21] A service life extension is a rehabilitation effort involving
extensive maintenance and repair conducted to extend the service life
of an asset.
[22] DHS Office of the Inspector General, The Coast Guard's Polar
Icebreaker Maintenance, Upgrade, and Acquisition Program, OIG-11-31
(Washington, D.C.: January 2011).
[23] To determine the Healy's lifespan, the DHS-OIG report uses the
date that the Healy was placed "In Commission, Special" status,
whereas we report on the "In Commission, Active" date.
[24] The OIG recommended that the Assistant Commandant for Marine
Safety, Security, and Stewardship: (1) Request budgetary authority for
the operation, maintenance, and upgrade of its icebreakers; (2) in
coordination with DHS, request clarification from Congress to
determine whether Arctic missions should be performed by Coast Guard
assets or contracted vessels; (3) conduct the necessary analysis to
determine whether the Coast Guard should replace or perform service-
life extensions on its two existing heavy-duty icebreaking ships; and
(4) request appropriations necessary to meet mission requirements in
the Arctic and Antarctic.
[25] ABS Consulting, U.S. Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization: A
Comprehensive Analysis and Its Impacts on U.S. Coast Guard Activities,
prepared for the United States Coast Guard, (October 2011).
[26] This report was developed pursuant to a provision in the Coast
Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-281, 124 Stat. 2905,
2928-29 (2010)) mandating, in general, that the Coast Guard require a
non-governmental, independent third party to conduct a comparative
cost-benefit analysis of the recapitalization of the existing fleet of
polar icebreakers.
[27] These options include performing major service life extensions on
the Polar Sea and Polar Star, allowing the Coast Guard to defer new
construction by five years, as well as long-term leasing options. All
options include a major service life extension for the Healy.
[28] ABS Consulting, High Latitude Study Mission Analysis Report.
[29] The High Latitude Study does not detail the icebreaking
capability specifically required to meet statutory mission
requirements in the Arctic. However, the Study does find that
providing year-round icebreaking capability in the Arctic would
require two heavy, two medium, and two light icebreakers. This
capability would be necessary to meet at least one statutory mission
requirement under the Coast Guard's Defense Readiness mission--assured
access to ice-impacted waters through a persistent icebreaker presence
in the Arctic.
[30] For example, the High Latitude Study includes "Rough Order of
Magnitude" estimates that it would cost $4.14 billion to acquire the
three heavy and three medium icebreakers required to meet the Coast
Guard's mission requirements. When the Navy's presence requirements
are taken into account, the estimated cost increases to $6.9 billion.
[31] The report based its assessment on the Coast Guard's Capital
Investment Plan through fiscal year 2016, and longer-term budget
projections through fiscal year 2020 that assumed an increase of no
greater than inflation. However, since the analysis took place, the
Capital Investment Plan has been subject to downward revision.
[32] Pub. L. No 101-165, 103 Stat. 1112, 1121 (1989).
[33] The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum for
promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic
States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and
other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues
of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.
The eight permanent member states include Canada, Denmark
(representing also Greenland and Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.
[34] For more information about the Coast Guard's coordination with
these stakeholders, please see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870].
[35] GAO-06-15 identifies eight key practices that federal agencies
can engage in to enhance and sustain collaborative efforts. These key
practices are: (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2)
establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and
address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and
responsibilities; (5) establish means of operating across agency
boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on
results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts
through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual
accountability for collaborative efforts through performance
management systems.
[36] Between fiscal years 2006 and 2009, the operation and maintenance
of Coast Guard icebreakers was funded through the NSF's budget, which
according to Coast Guard officials and a 2011 report from the OIG,
presented challenges to maintaining the polar icebreaker fleet and
ensuring Coast Guard crews are properly trained. Fiscal years 2010 and
2011 appropriations however, directed the transfer of the $54 million
icebreaker budget from the NSF to the Coast Guard. See, Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, 3145
(2009)) and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Pub. L. No.
112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011)). Additionally, the Coast Guard's fiscal
year 2012 budget request included a request for $39 million to fund
the operational costs of the icebreakers.
[37] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870], appendix
IV for descriptions of other select interagency coordination efforts
and how they address key practices.
[38] H. Rep. No. 112-78, at 291 (2011).
[39] GAO, Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's
Justification and Affordability Need to be Addressed More Thoroughly,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-99-6] (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998).
[40] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget,
Recent Performance, and Related Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-494T] (Washington, D.C.: March 6,
2008).
[41] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2011 Budget,
Recent Performance, and Related Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-411T] (Washington, D.C.: February
25, 2010).
[42] GAO, Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program
Remains Unachievable, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-743] (Washington, D.C.: July 2011).
[43] The report based its assessment on the Coast Guard's Capital
Investment Plan through fiscal year 2016, and longer-term budget
projections through fiscal year 2020 that assumed an increase of no
greater than inflation. However since the analysis took place, the
Capital Investment Plan has been subject to downward revision.
[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870].
[45] Pub.L.No 101-165, 103 Stat. 1112, 1121 (1989).
[46] GAO, Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for
Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008
National Defense Authorization Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-311] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16,
2008).
[47] For example, NSF reimbursed the Coast Guard for polar icebreaker
maintenance from 2006 to 2011, and the Coast Guard receives
reimbursements for certain U.S. Navy related security operations.
[48] DOD, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest
Passage, (Washington, D.C.; May 2011).
[End of section]
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