Aviation Security
Progress Made, but Challenges Persist in Meeting the Screening Mandate for Air Cargo Gao ID: GAO-11-413T March 9, 2011The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the air cargo system. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010. GAO reviewed TSA's progress in meeting the act's screening mandate, and any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for the United States). This statement is based on prior reports and testimonies issued from April 2007 through December 2010 addressing the security of the air cargo transportation system and selected updates made in February and March 2011. For the updates, GAO obtained information on TSA's air cargo security programs and interviewed TSA officials.
As of August 2010, TSA reported that it met the mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo, but as GAO reported in June 2010, TSA lacked a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data used to make this determination. TSA took several actions in meeting this mandate for domestic cargo, including creating a voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout the air cargo supply chain; taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo; and expanding its explosives detection canine program, among other things. However, in June 2010 GAO reported that TSA did not have a mechanism to verify screening data and recommended that TSA establish such a mechanism. TSA partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that verifying such data would be challenging. As GAO reported in June 2010, data verification is important to provide reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels. As GAO further reported in June 2010, there is no technology approved or qualified by TSA to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container--both of which are common means of transporting domestic air cargo on passenger aircraft. As a result, questions remain about air carriers' ability to effectively screen air cargo on such aircraft. TSA has also taken a number of steps to enhance the security of inbound air cargo, but also faces challenges that could hinder its ability to meet the screening mandate. TSA moved its deadline for meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo to the end of 2011, up 2 years from when the TSA administrator previously reported the agency would meet this mandate. According to TSA officials, the agency determined it was feasible to accelerate the deadline as a result of trends in air carrier reported screening data and discussions with air cargo industry leaders regarding progress made by industry to secure cargo on passenger aircraft. TSA also took steps to enhance the security of inbound cargo following the October 2010 Yemen air cargo bomb attempt--such as requiring additional screening of high-risk cargo prior to transport on an all-cargo aircraft. However, TSA continues to face challenges GAO identified in June 2010 that could impact TSA's ability to meet this screening mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo. For example, GAO reported that TSA's screening percentages were estimates and were not based on actual data collected from air carriers or other entities, such as foreign governments, and recommended that TSA establish a mechanism to verify the accuracy of these data. TSA partially agreed, and required air carriers to report inbound cargo screening data effective May 2010. However, TSA officials stated while current screening percentages are based on actual data reported by air carriers, verifying the accuracy of the screening data is difficult. It is important for TSA to have complete and accurate data to verify that the agency can meet the screening mandate. GAO will continue to monitor these issues as part of its ongoing review of TSA's efforts to secure inbound air cargo, the final results to be issued later this year. GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen air cargo screening. Although not fully concurring with all recommendations, TSA has taken or has a number of actions underway to address them. Continued attention is needed to ensure some recommendations are addressed, such as establishing a mechanism to verify screening data. TSA provided technical comments on the information in this statement, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-413T, Aviation Security: Progress Made, but Challenges Persist in Meeting the Screening Mandate for Air Cargo
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 9, 2011:
Aviation Security:
Progress Made, but Challenges Persist in Meeting the Screening Mandate
for Air Cargo:
Statement of Steve Lord, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-11-413T:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-413T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is the federal agency with primary responsibility
for securing the air cargo system. The Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to
screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August
2010. GAO reviewed TSA‘s progress in meeting the act‘s screening
mandate, and any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo
transported within and from the United States) and inbound cargo
(cargo bound for the United States). This statement is based on prior
reports and testimonies issued from April 2007 through December 2010
addressing the security of the air cargo transportation system and
selected updates made in February and March 2011. For the updates, GAO
obtained information on TSA‘s air cargo security programs and
interviewed TSA officials.
What GAO Found:
As of August 2010, TSA reported that it met the mandate to screen 100
percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo, but as GAO
reported in June 2010, TSA lacked a mechanism to verify the accuracy
of the data used to make this determination. TSA took several actions
in meeting this mandate for domestic cargo, including creating a
voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout the air cargo
supply chain; taking steps to test technologies for screening air
cargo; and expanding its explosives detection canine program, among
other things. However, in June 2010 GAO reported that TSA did not have
a mechanism to verify screening data and recommended that TSA
establish such a mechanism. TSA partially concurred with this
recommendation and stated that verifying such data would be
challenging. As GAO reported in June 2010, data verification is
important to provide reasonable assurance that screening is being
conducted at reported levels. As GAO further reported in June 2010,
there is no technology approved or qualified by TSA to screen cargo
once it is loaded onto a pallet or container”both of which are common
means of transporting domestic air cargo on passenger aircraft. As a
result, questions remain about air carriers‘ ability to effectively
screen air cargo on such aircraft.
TSA has also taken a number of steps to enhance the security of
inbound air cargo, but also faces challenges that could hinder its
ability to meet the screening mandate. TSA moved its deadline for
meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as it applies to inbound air
cargo to the end of 2011, up 2 years from when the TSA administrator
previously reported the agency would meet this mandate. According to
TSA officials, the agency determined it was feasible to accelerate the
deadline as a result of trends in air carrier reported screening data
and discussions with air cargo industry leaders regarding progress
made by industry to secure cargo on passenger aircraft. TSA also took
steps to enhance the security of inbound cargo following the October
2010 Yemen air cargo bomb attempt”such as requiring additional
screening of high-risk cargo prior to transport on an all-cargo
aircraft. However, TSA continues to face challenges GAO identified in
June 2010 that could impact TSA‘s ability to meet this screening
mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo. For example, GAO reported
that TSA‘s screening percentages were estimates and were not based on
actual data collected from air carriers or other entities, such as
foreign governments, and recommended that TSA establish a mechanism to
verify the accuracy of these data. TSA partially agreed, and required
air carriers to report inbound cargo screening data effective May
2010. However, TSA officials stated while current screening
percentages are based on actual data reported by air carriers,
verifying the accuracy of the screening data is difficult. It is
important for TSA to have complete and accurate data to verify that
the agency can meet the screening mandate. GAO will continue to
monitor these issues as part of its ongoing review of TSA‘s efforts to
secure inbound air cargo, the final results to be issued later this
year.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen air cargo
screening. Although not fully concurring with all recommendations, TSA
has taken or has a number of actions underway to address them.
Continued attention is needed to ensure some recommendations are
addressed, such as establishing a mechanism to verify screening data.
TSA provided technical comments on the information in this statement,
which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-413T] or key
components. For more information, contact Steve Lord at (202) 512-4379
or lords@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the security of the nation's air cargo system. In 2009, about
6.5 billion pounds of cargo were transported on U.S. passenger
flights--approximately 56 percent of which was transported
domestically (domestic cargo) and 44 percent of which was transported
on flights arriving in the United States from a foreign location
(inbound cargo).[Footnote 1] The October 2010 discovery of explosive
devices in air cargo packages bound for the United States from Yemen,
and the 2009 Christmas Day plot to detonate an explosive device during
an international flight bound for Detroit, provide vivid reminders
that civil aviation remains a key terrorist target. According to the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the security threat
posed by terrorists introducing explosive devices in air cargo
shipments is significant, and the risk and likelihood of such an
attack directed at passenger aircraft is high.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted into law
shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, established
TSA and gave the agency responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation, including the nation's civil aviation system, which
includes air carrier operations (domestic and foreign) to, from, and
within the United States.[Footnote 2] For example, ATSA requires that
TSA provide for the screening of all passengers and property,
including cargo, transported on passenger aircraft.[Footnote 3] ATSA
further requires that a system be in operation, as soon as practicable
after ATSA's enactment (on November 19, 2001), to screen, inspect, or
otherwise ensure the security of the cargo transported by all-cargo
aircraft--generally, aircraft that carry only cargo and no passengers--
to, from, and within the United States.[Footnote 4] To help enhance
the security of air cargo, the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) mandated the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a system to screen
100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft--including the domestic and
inbound flights of foreign and U.S. passenger operations--by August
2010.[Footnote 5] The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening for
purposes of the air cargo screening mandate as a physical examination
or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to
transportation security. [Footnote 6] The act further requires that
such a system provide a level of security commensurate with the level
of security for the screening of checked baggage. According to TSA,
the mission of its air cargo security program is to secure the air
cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of
commerce. Although the mandate is applicable to both domestic and
inbound cargo, TSA stated that it must address the mandate for
domestic and inbound cargo through separate systems because of
limitations in its authority to regulate international air cargo
industry stakeholders operating outside the United States.
My statement today addresses TSA's progress and challenges in meeting
the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen air cargo on passenger
flights, both domestic cargo and cargo transported from a foreign
location to the United States, known as inbound air cargo. My comments
are based primarily on our prior reports and testimonies issued from
April 2007 through December 2010 addressing the security of the air
cargo transportation system, with selected updates in February and
March 2011.[Footnote 7] For these reports, we reviewed documents such
as TSA's air cargo security policies and procedures and conducted site
visits to four category X airports and one category I airport in the
United States that process domestic and inbound air cargo.[Footnote 8]
We selected these airports based on airport size, passenger and air
cargo volumes, location, and participation in TSA's screening program.
For the updates, we obtained information on TSA's air cargo security
programs and interviewed senior TSA officials regarding plans,
strategies, and steps taken to meet the 100 percent screening mandate
since December 2010. More detailed information about our scope and
methodology is included in our reports and testimonies. We conducted
this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. We shared the information in this statement with TSA
officials who provided technical comments that were incorporated as
appropriate.
TSA Reports that It Met the Screening Mandate as It Applies to
Domestic Cargo, but Previously Identified Data Limitations and Other
Challenges Persist:
TSA took several actions to address the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to
screen 100 percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo
transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As of August 2010,
TSA reported that it met the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen 100
percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo, although in June
2010 we reported that TSA lacked a mechanism to verify the accuracy of
the data used to make this determination.
To help meet the mandate, TSA took several actions, among them:
TSA created a voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout the
air cargo supply chain. Since TSA concluded that relying solely on air
carriers to conduct screening would result in significant cargo
backlogs and flight delays, TSA created the voluntary Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP) to allow screening to take place earlier in
the shipping process, prior to delivering the cargo to the air
carrier. Under the CCSP, facilities at various points in the air cargo
supply chain, such as shippers, manufacturers, warehousing entities,
distributors, third-party logistics companies, and freight forwarders
that are located in the United States, may voluntarily apply to TSA to
become certified cargo screening facilities (CCSF).[Footnote 9] TSA
initiated the CCSP at 18 U.S. airports that process high volumes of
air cargo, and then expanded the program to all U.S. airports in early
2009.
TSA is taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo. To
test select screening technologies among CCSFs, TSA created the Air
Cargo Screening Technology Pilot in January 2008, and selected some of
the nation's largest freight forwarders to use these technologies and
report on their experiences.[Footnote 10] In a separate effort, in
July 2009, DHS's Directorate for Science and Technology completed the
Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program that tested the
performance of select baggage screening technologies for use in
screening air cargo at three U.S. airports. In March 2009, TSA
initiated a qualification process to test these and other technologies
for air carriers and CCSP participants to use in meeting the screening
mandate against TSA technical requirements. In December 2009, TSA
issued to air carriers and CCSFs its first list of qualified
technologies which included X-ray and explosives detection systems
(EDS) models that the agency approved for screening air cargo under
the 9/11 Commission Act. Over the past several years, TSA has
evaluated and qualified additional technologies and has issued
subsequent lists, most recently in February 2011. These technologies
were in addition to the canine and physical search screening methods
permitted by TSA.
TSA expanded its explosives detection canine program. As of February
2011, TSA officials stated that the agency had 113 dedicated air cargo
screening canine teams--operating in 20 airports--and was in the
process of adding 7 additional canine teams. TSA headquarters
officials explained that two CCSFs are participating in a pilot
program to test the feasibility of using private canine teams--that
meet TSA standards--to inspect air cargo. Officials stated that the
pilot is expected to continue through summer 2011.
Even with these actions, TSA continues to face challenges that, among
other things, could limit the agency's ability to provide reasonable
assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels. Among
the challenges and recommendations previously identified in our June
2010 report are the following.
* Reported screening data. TSA does not have a mechanism to verify
screening data--which are self-reported by industry representatives.
In our June 2010 report, we recommended that TSA develop a mechanism
to verify the accuracy of all screening data through random checks or
other practical means.[Footnote 11] TSA partially concurred with our
recommendation, and stated that verifying the accuracy of domestic
screening data will continue to be a challenge because there is no
means to cross-reference local screening logs--which include screening
information on specific shipments--with screening reports submitted by
air carriers to TSA that do not contain such information. Given that
the agency uses these data to report to Congress its compliance with
the screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, we continue to
believe that verifying the accuracy of the screening data is important
so that TSA will be better positioned to provide reasonable assurance
that screening is being conducted at reported levels.
* Screening technology. TSA has not approved or qualified any
equipment to screen cargo transported on unit-load device (ULD)
pallets or containers--both of which are common means of transporting
air cargo on wide-body passenger aircraft--both domestic and inbound
aircraft.[Footnote 12] Cargo transported on wide-body passenger
aircraft makes up 76 percent of domestic air cargo shipments
transported on passenger aircraft. The maximum size cargo
configuration that may be screened is a 48-by-48-by-65-inch skid--much
smaller than the large pallets that are typically transported on wide-
body passenger aircraft. Prior to May 1, 2010, canine screening was
the only screening method, other than physical search, approved by TSA
to screen such cargo configurations. However, effective May 1, 2010,
the agency no longer allows canine teams to screen ULD pallets and
containers given TSA concerns about the effectiveness of this
screening method for those cargo configurations. In addition, TSA is
working to complete qualification testing of additional air cargo
screening technologies; thus, until all stages of qualification
testing are concluded, the agency may not have reasonable assurance
that the technologies that air carriers and program participants are
currently allowed to use to screen air cargo are effective. TSA is
conducting qualification testing to determine which screening
technologies are effective at the same time that air carriers are
using these technologies to meet the mandated requirement to screen
air cargo transported on passenger aircraft. While we recognize that
certain circumstances, such as mandated deadlines, require expedited
deployment of technologies, our prior work has shown that programs
with immature technologies have experienced significant cost and
schedule growth.[Footnote 13]
* Inspection resources. As we reported in June 2010, for domestic air
cargo, TSA amended its inspections plan to include inspections of CCSP
participants, but the agency had not completed its staffing study to
determine how many inspectors will be necessary to provide oversight
of the additional program participants that would support the
screening mandate. In our June 2010 report, we recommended that TSA
create milestones to help ensure completion of the staffing study. TSA
concurred and stated that as part of the staffing study, the agency is
working to develop a model to identify the number of required
transportation security inspectors and that this effort would be
completed in the fall of 2010. As of February 2011, TSA officials
stated that the study was in the final stages of review.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance the Security of Inbound Air Cargo, but
Previously Identified Screening Data Limitations and Other Challenges
Persist:
TSA has taken a number of steps to enhance the security of inbound air
cargo, as discussed below.
TSA moved its deadline for meeting the 100 percent screening mandate
as it applies to inbound air cargo. TSA officials stated that they
plan to meet the 9/11 Commission Act mandate as it applies to inbound
air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by December 2011--2 years
earlier than the TSA administrator reported to Congress in November
2010. According to TSA officials, the agency determined it was
feasible to require air carriers to meet a December 2011 screening
deadline as a result of trends in carrier reported screening data and
discussions with air cargo industry leaders regarding progress made by
industry to secure inbound cargo on passenger aircraft.
Effective May 1, 2010, air carriers were required to submit inbound
screening data to TSA. According to TSA officials, in analyzing this
self-reported screening data, TSA found that carriers were screening a
higher percentage of air cargo than TSA had initially estimated. For
example, TSA previously estimated that 65 percent of inbound cargo by
weight would be screened by August 2010. Based on data submitted to
TSA by the air carriers, TSA officials stated that the agency
estimates that about 80 percent of inbound cargo by weight was
screened for the same time period. In addition to requiring air
carriers to submit screening data to TSA, in May 2010, TSA also
required air carriers to screen a certain percentage of shrink-wrapped
and banded inbound cargo.[Footnote 14] TSA officials stated that in
implementing this requirement, air carriers determined that it was
more efficient to screen larger groupings of cargo at the point of
origin, which resulted in more than the required percentage being
screened. Therefore, according to TSA officials, continued progress
made by industry will help TSA to meet its December 31, 2011, deadline
to screen 100 percent of inbound passenger cargo.
TSA is working with foreign governments to draft international air
cargo security standards and to harmonize standards with foreign
partners.[Footnote 15] According to TSA officials, the agency has
worked with foreign counterparts over the last 3 years to draft
Amendment 12 to the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO)
Annex 17, and to generate support for its adoption by ICAO members.
The amendment, which was adopted by the ICAO Council in November 2010,
will set forth new standards related to air cargo such as requiring
members to establish a system to secure the air cargo supply chain
(the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers). TSA has also
supported the International Air Transport Association's (IATA) efforts
to establish a secure supply chain approach to screening cargo for its
member airlines and to have these standards recognized
internationally. Moreover, following the October 2010 bomb attempt in
cargo originating in Yemen, DHS and TSA, among other things, reached
out to international partners, IATA, and the international shipping
industry to emphasize the global nature of transportation security
threats and the need to strengthen air cargo security through enhanced
screening and preventative measures. TSA also deployed a team of
security inspectors to Yemen to provide that country's government with
assistance and guidance on their air cargo screening procedures.
In November 2010, TSA officials stated that the agency is coordinating
with foreign countries to evaluate the comparability of their air
cargo security requirements with those of the United States. According
to TSA officials, the agency has developed a program, the National
Cargo Security Program (NCSP), that would recognize the air cargo
security programs of foreign countries if TSA deems those programs
provide a level of security commensurate with TSA's programs. TSA
plans to coordinate with the top 20 air cargo volume countries, which,
according to TSA officials, export about 90 percent of the air cargo
transported to the United States on passenger aircraft. According to
officials, TSA has completed a review of one country's air cargo
security program and has determined that its requirements are
commensurate with those of the United States. TSA considers air
carriers adhering to NCSP approved programs as being in compliance
with TSA air cargo security requirements, according to TSA officials.
As of February 2011, TSA continues to evaluate the comparability of
air cargo security programs for several other countries. TSA officials
stated that although the December 31, 2011, deadline to achieve 100
percent screening is independent of this effort, the agency plans to
recognize as many commensurate programs as possible by the deadline.
TSA implemented additional security measures following the October
2010 Yemen air cargo bomb attempt. On November 8, 2010, DHS announced
security measures in response to the Yemen incident. TSA banned cargo
originating from Yemen and Somalia from transport into the United
States; banned the transport of cargo deemed high risk on passenger
aircraft; prohibited the transport of toner and ink cartridges
weighing 16 ounces or more on passenger aircraft in carry-on and
checked luggage; and required additional screening of high-risk cargo
prior to transport on an all-cargo aircraft. In addition, TSA is
working closely with CBP, industry and international partners to
expedite the receipt of advanced cargo data for international flights
to the United States prior to departure in order to more effectively
identify and screen items based on risk and current intelligence.
Further, in December 2010, TSA, CBP, and the air cargo industry
launched a new joint technology pilot project referred to as the air
cargo advance screening program to enhance the sharing of electronic
shipping information to improve the identification of high-risk cargo.
In February 2011, TSA officials stated that this effort is currently
focused on all-cargo carriers and will expand to passenger carriers in
the future.
Even with these steps to improve the security of inbound air cargo, as
we previously reported in June 2010, TSA faces challenges that could
hinder its ability to meet the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate
as it applies to inbound cargo.
TSA lacks a mechanism to verify data on screening conducted on inbound
air cargo. As we reported in June 2010, questions exist about the
reliability of TSA's reported screening data for inbound cargo because
TSA does not have a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data
reported by industry. In June 2010, we reported that TSA's screening
percentages were estimated based on screening requirements of certain
countries and were not based on actual data collected from air
carriers or other entities, such as foreign governments. In this
report, we recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to verify the
accuracy of all screening data through random checks or other
practical means and obtain actual data on all inbound screening. TSA
concurred in part with our recommendation and issued changes to air
carriers' standard security programs that required air carriers to
report inbound cargo screening data to TSA. However, these
requirements apply to air carriers and the screening that they conduct
or that may be conducted by a foreign government, but does not reflect
screening conducted by other entities throughout the air cargo supply
chain. As of March 2011, TSA officials stated that current screening
percentages are based on actual data reported by air carriers, but
stated that it is difficult to verify the accuracy of the screening
data reported by air carriers. Given that TSA now plans to meet the
9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to inbound air
cargo by December 2011, it will be important for TSA to have complete
and accurate data in hand to verify that this mandate is being met.
TSA has limited authority to regulate foreign governments or entities.
TSA may require that foreign air carriers with operations to, from, or
within the United States comply with any applicable requirements,
including TSA-issued emergency amendments to air carrier security
programs, but foreign countries, as sovereign nations, generally
cannot be compelled to implement specific aviation security standards
or mutually accept other countries' security measures. International
representatives have noted that national sovereignty concerns limit
the influence the United States and its foreign partners can have in
persuading any country to participate in international harmonization
efforts, or make specific changes in their screening procedures. Thus,
TSA authority abroad is generally limited to regulating air carrier
operations, including the transport of cargo, into the United States.
It has no other authority to require foreign governments or entities
to, for example, screen a certain percentage of air cargo or screen
cargo using specific procedures.
No technology is currently approved or qualified by TSA to screen
cargo once it is loaded onto a unit-load device. As we noted earlier
for domestic air cargo, TSA has not approved any equipment to screen
cargo transported on unit-load device (ULD) pallets or containers--
both of which are common means of transporting air cargo on wide-body
passenger aircraft--on both domestic and inbound aircraft. As a
result, questions remain about air carriers' ability to effectively
and efficiently screen air cargo bound for the United States. This is
particularly important because, as we reported in June 2010, about 96
percent of inbound air cargo arrives on wide-body aircraft, and TSA
has limited authority to oversee the screening activities of foreign
governments or entities. We will be examining these issues as part of
our ongoing review of TSA's efforts to secure inbound air cargo for
the House Committee on Homeland Security and Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. We plan to issue the final
results later this year.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to answering
any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have.
For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen M. Lord at
(202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony are Steve D. Morris, Assistant Director; Joel Aldape;
Carissa Bryant; Labony Chakraborty; Tom Lombardi; Linda S. Miller;
Rebecca Kuhlman Taylor; and Meg Ullengren.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For the purposes of this statement, domestic cargo refers to cargo
transported by air within the United States and from the United States
to a foreign location by both U.S. and foreign air carriers, and
inbound cargo refers to cargo transported by both U.S. and foreign air
carriers from a foreign location to the United States. These cargo
statistics were provided by the Transportation Security Administration
from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
[2] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[3] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110(b), 115 Stat. at 614-15 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44901).
[4] See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(f) (requiring the system to be in operation
as soon as practicable after the date of enactment--November 19, 2001-
-but without establishing a firm deadline).
[5] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602(a), 121 Stat. 266, 477-79 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)).
[6] Although TSA is authorized to approve additional methods for
screening air cargo beyond the physical examination or nonintrusive
methods listed in the statute, the statute expressly prohibits the use
of methods that rely solely on performing a review of information
about the contents of cargo or verifying the identity of a shipper.
See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(5).
[7] See GAO, Aviation Security: DHS Has Taken Steps to Enhance
International Aviation Security and Facilitate Compliance with
International Standards, but Challenges Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-238T] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2,
2010); Aviation Security: Progress Made but Actions Needed to Address
Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-880T] (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2010); Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Challenges
in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger
Aircraft, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-446]
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2010); Homeland Security: Better Use of
Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of
Passenger Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen
Security, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-401T]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2010); Aviation Security: Foreign Airport
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but
Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-729] (Washington, D.C.: May 11,
2007); and Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air
Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-660] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2007).
[8] There are 462 TSA-regulated airports in the United States. TSA
classifies the airports it regulates into one of five categories (X,
I, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the total number
of takeoffs and landings annually, the extent to which passengers are
screened at the airport, and other special security considerations. In
general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest.
[9] A freight forwarder is a company that consolidates cargo from
multiple shippers onto a master air waybill--a manifest of the
consolidated shipment--and delivers the shipment to air carriers for
transport. For the purpose of this statement, the term freight
forwarder only includes those freight forwarders that are regulated by
TSA, also referred to as indirect air carriers.
[10] Initially, the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot was limited
to high-volume freight forwarders (i.e., freight forwarders processing
at least 200 shipments annually per location that contain cargo
consolidated from multiple shippers). However, in November 2008, TSA
issued a second announcement seeking additional high-volume freight
forwarders and independent cargo screening facilities to apply for the
pilot.
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-880T].
[12] Qualified technologies have undergone a TSA-sponsored test
process. Approved technologies are conditionally approved for
screening operations for a period of 36 months from the date added to
the approved technology list while continuing to undergo further
testing for qualification.
[13] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's
Weapons Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 1, 2009).
[14] Details on TSA's screening requirements are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this statement. Banded cargo is
cargo with heavy-duty metal, plastic, or nylon bands that secure all
sides of the cargo shipment or secure the cargo shipment to a skid.
[15] Harmonization, as defined by DHS, refers to countries' efforts to
coordinate their security standards and practices to enhance security
as well as the mutual recognition and acceptance of existing security
standards and practices aimed at achieving the same security outcome.
[End of section]
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