Border Security
Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest Border Technology Programs Gao ID: GAO-11-448T March 15, 2011Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens, contraband, terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, is a long-term challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched the Secure Border Initiative network (SBInet)--a program which was to provide the Border Patrol, within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), with the tools to detect breaches and make agent deployment decisions by installing surveillance systems along the border. Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology is DHS's new plan to deploy a mix of technology to protect the border. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work conducted for the House Committee on Homeland Security and provides preliminary observations on (1) the status of SBInet and user views on its usefulness, and (2) the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and associated costs. GAO reviewed planning, budget, and system documents, observed operations along the southwest border, and interviewed DHS officials.
In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed CBP to end the SBInet program as originally conceived because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards, and to instead focus on developing terrain- and population-based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such as camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region. According to DHS, the Secretary's decision on SBInet was informed by (1) an independent analysis of alternatives (AOA) to determine the program's cost-effectiveness; (2) a series of operational tests and evaluations by the U.S. Army's Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability; and (3) an operational assessment by the Border Patrol to provide user input. The Secretary also stated that while the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan should include elements of the former SBInet program where appropriate, she did not intend for DHS to use the current contract to procure any technology systems under the new plan, but rather would solicit competitive bids. SBInet's current surveillance capability continues to be used in Arizona. Specifically, there are 15 sensor towers (with cameras and radar) and 10 communication towers (which transmit the sensor signals to computer consoles for monitoring), currently deployed in the Border Patrol's Tucson Sector. In addition, on the basis of user feedback, the Border Patrol considers the current SBInet capability to be useful, including providing continuous surveillance in border areas where none existed before and enhancing agent safety when responding to potential threats. There are certain shortcomings including coverage gaps and radar performance limitations in adverse weather. The Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan is to incorporate a mix of technology, including an Integrated Fixed Tower surveillance system similar to that used in the current SBInet capability, beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. But, due to a number of reasons, the cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness and suitability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system is not yet clear. First, the AOA cited a range of uncertainties, and it is not clear how the AOA analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology deployments in Arizona. Second, the ATEC independent analyses were not complete at the time of the Secretary's decision, thus any results on SBInet's operational effectiveness and suitability could not inform the decisions to proceed with the Integrated Fixed Tower system. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request calls for $242 million to fund three of five future deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower systems in Arizona, although, depending on funding, the earliest DHS expects the deployments to begin is March 2013 with completion anticipated by 2015 or later. Consistent with its intent to solicit competitive bids, CBP has initiated a new acquisition cycle, asking industry for information about the commercial availability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system. GAO will continue to assess this issue and report the final results later this year. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has made prior recommendations to strengthen SBInet. While DHS generally agreed most information in this statement, it did not agree with GAO's observations on the AOA and the potential usefulness of ATEC's analyses. GAO continues to believe its observations are valid. DHS also provided technical comments which were incorporated, as appropriate.
GAO-11-448T, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest Border Technology Programs
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011:
Border Security:
Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest Border
Technology Programs:
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-11-448T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-448T, testimony before the Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Securing the nation‘s borders from illegal entry of aliens,
contraband, terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, is a long-term
challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
launched the Secure Border Initiative network (SBInet)”a program which
was to provide the Border Patrol, within DHS‘s U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), with the tools to detect breaches and make agent
deployment decisions by installing surveillance systems along the
border. Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology is DHS‘s new plan to
deploy a mix of technology to protect the border. This testimony is
based on GAO‘s ongoing work conducted for the House Committee on
Homeland Security and provides preliminary observations on (1) the
status of SBInet and user views on its usefulness, and (2) the
Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and associated costs.
GAO reviewed planning, budget, and system documents, observed
operations along the southwest border, and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found:
In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed CBP to
end the SBInet program as originally conceived because it did not meet
cost-effectiveness and viability standards, and to instead focus on
developing terrain- and population-based solutions utilizing existing,
proven technology, such as camera-based surveillance systems, for each
border region. According to DHS, the Secretary‘s decision on SBInet
was informed by (1) an independent analysis of alternatives (AOA) to
determine the program‘s cost-effectiveness; (2) a series of
operational tests and evaluations by the U.S. Army‘s Test and
Evaluation Command (ATEC) to determine its operational effectiveness
and suitability; and (3) an operational assessment by the Border
Patrol to provide user input. The Secretary also stated that while the
Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan should include elements
of the former SBInet program where appropriate, she did not intend for
DHS to use the current contract to procure any technology systems
under the new plan, but rather would solicit competitive bids. SBInet‘
s current surveillance capability continues to be used in Arizona.
Specifically, there are 15 sensor towers (with cameras and radar) and
10 communication towers (which transmit the sensor signals to computer
consoles for monitoring), currently deployed in the Border Patrol‘s
Tucson Sector. In addition, on the basis of user feedback, the Border
Patrol considers the current SBInet capability to be useful, including
providing continuous surveillance in border areas where none existed
before and enhancing agent safety when responding to potential
threats. There are certain shortcomings including coverage gaps and
radar performance limitations in adverse weather.
The Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan is to incorporate a
mix of technology, including an Integrated Fixed Tower surveillance
system similar to that used in the current SBInet capability,
beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. But, due to a number of
reasons, the cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness and
suitability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system is not yet clear.
First, the AOA cited a range of uncertainties, and it is not clear how
the AOA analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and
budget decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology deployments
in Arizona. Second, the ATEC independent analyses were not complete at
the time of the Secretary‘s decision, thus any results on SBInet‘s
operational effectiveness and suitability could not inform the
decisions to proceed with the Integrated Fixed Tower system. The
President‘s fiscal year 2012 budget request calls for $242 million to
fund three of five future deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower
systems in Arizona, although, depending on funding, the earliest DHS
expects the deployments to begin is March 2013 with completion
anticipated by 2015 or later. Consistent with its intent to solicit
competitive bids, CBP has initiated a new acquisition cycle, asking
industry for information about the commercial availability of the
Integrated Fixed Tower system. GAO will continue to assess this issue
and report the final results later this year.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has
made prior recommendations to strengthen SBInet. While DHS generally
agreed most information in this statement, it did not agree with GAO‘s
observations on the AOA and the potential usefulness of ATEC‘s
analyses. GAO continues to believe its observations are valid. DHS
also provided technical comments which were incorporated, as
appropriate.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T] or key
components. For more information, contact Richard M Stana at (202) 512-
8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) key technology programs for the southwest
border. The Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) technology
program was intended to provide the Office of Border Patrol (Border
Patrol) within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with
integrated imagery and related tools and information to detect
security breaches and make agent deployment decisions by placing
surveillance systems along U.S. borders, beginning with the southwest
border with Mexico. Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has received about
$4.4 billion in appropriations for SBI, of which it has allocated
about $1.5 billion for SBInet and $2.9 billion for fencing and other
tactical infrastructure along the southwest border. In January 2010,
DHS initiated an internal assessment of the SBInet program and, as
discussed below, in January 2011 the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced her decision to end the program as originally conceived
because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards and
proceed with a new technology program to secure the nation's land
borders.
The department's new technology deployment plan is called Alternative
(Southwest) Border Technology. Under this plan, DHS is to deploy a mix
of technologies, including Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS)
[Footnote 1], Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS)[Footnote 2], and hand-
held equipment for use by Border Patrol agents. It also is to include
a new Integrated Fixed Tower[Footnote 3] system, similar to that
currently being used in SBInet, which is slated for deployment along
the border where the Border Patrol deems it appropriate beginning with
five high-risk areas in Arizona at an estimated cost of $570 million.
The Border Patrol is the federal agency with primary responsibility
for securing the border between the U.S. ports of entry.[Footnote 4]
CBP has divided geographic responsibility for southwest border miles
among nine Border Patrol sectors. Within CBP, the Office of Technology
Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA) has been responsible for overseeing
the SBInet program. DHS reports that the southwest border continues to
be especially vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, including
the smuggling of humans and illegal narcotics. CBP reported spending
about $3 billion to support the Border Patrol's efforts on the
southwest border in fiscal year 2010, and Border Patrol reported
apprehending over 445,000 illegal entries and seizing over 2.4 million
pounds of marijuana.
My statement today is based on preliminary observations and analyses
from our ongoing work regarding these programs and activities for the
House Committee on Homeland Security. We plan to issue a final report
on this work later this year. As requested, my testimony will cover
the following issues:
1. the status of the SBInet program and user views on the usefulness
of its technology, and:
2. the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and costs
associated with these plans.
To conduct our work, we reviewed our prior reports on the SBInet
program, analyzed documents such as system descriptions, acquisition
plans and proposals, budget requests and justifications, cost-
effectiveness and system-effectiveness and -suitability plans and
analyses. Further, we observed various types of technology operating
at command centers at the Tucson Sector and its Tucson, Ajo, and
Nogales stations. Also, we interviewed relevant DHS (Border Patrol,
OTIA) and prime contractor[Footnote 5] officials about matters such as
the decision to end the SBInet program, its implications for the
future of the program, cost-effectiveness and operational
effectiveness and suitability analyses, and budget requests. We
selected the Tucson, Ajo, and Nogales stations because they are
located in high-risk areas along the Arizona border with Mexico and
also because the Border Patrol has deployed various types of
surveillance technology in these areas, including SBInet. We did our
work for this statement from December 2010 to March 2011. We are not
making any new recommendations in this statement but we have made
prior recommendations to strengthen the SBInet program. While DHS
generally agreed with the approach and status described in this
statement, it did not agree with our observations on the AOA and the
potential usefulness of ATEC's analyses to inform future technology
deployment decisions. GAO continues to believe its observations are
valid and will address these issues as our study proceeds. DHS also
provided technical comments which were incorporated, as appropriate.
We are conducting our ongoing work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions, based on our audit objectives.
DHS Has Ended the SBInet Program But Not the Contract or Key
Technology Capability Which Users Consider Useful:
After an internal assessment initiated in January 2010, the Secretary
of Homeland Security announced in January 2011 that she had directed
CBP to end the SBInet program as originally conceived. According to
DHS, the Secretary's decision was informed by an independent analysis
of cost-effectiveness, a series of operational tests and evaluations,
and Border Patrol input. The prime contractor is to continue limited
performance under the SBInet contract using a 1-year option for SBInet
operations and maintenance services in Arizona beginning on April 1,
2011, with a possible 6-month extension. Further, according to CBP and
the contractor, following a March 2010 decision by the Secretary
halting further deployment of SBInet beyond the Tucson and Ajo Border
Patrol stations, no additional SBInet deployments are expected.
In addition, the Secretary's decision to end the SBInet program
limited Block 1 deployments to the Tucson and Ajo stations in the
Tucson Sector, but did not affect the current SBInet Block 1
capability, which was developed based on updated requirements from the
Border Patrol. The Block 1 capability consists of 15 sensor towers
(with day/night cameras and radar) and 10 communication towers, which
transmit surveillance signals to the Common Operating Pictures (COP)
at station command centers. This capability remains deployed and
operational in Arizona, as part of the Border Patrol Tucson Sector's
overall technology portfolio. According to contractor and Border
Patrol officials, there were several original SBInet concepts that
were not included in the Block 1 capability due to early design/cost
trade-offs and Border Patrol agent feedback that they did not need
them to perform their mission. Also, certain elements proved
technically difficult and costly to include in the Block 1 capability.
For example, the concepts to integrate transmissions from RVSS and MSS
units into the COP, transmitting COP images into agents' laptops in
their vehicles and tracking Border Patrol agent deployments on the
geographic display were not included.
OTIA and Border Patrol Consider Current SBInet Capability Useful:
OTIA and Border Patrol officials told us that the SBInet program's
Block 1 capability has been useful since being deployed in February
2010 at the Tucson station and August 2010 at the Ajo station. For
example, a shift commander at the Tucson station described the
capability as considerably better than the technology that was
available at the sector prior to the SBInet deployment. Further,
according to COP operators in Tucson, the current SBInet sensor
package is responsive to key mission requirements by giving them the
capability to achieve persistent wide-area surveillance and
situational awareness.
Officials at Border Patrol headquarters stated that the Block 1
capability gave them a capability they did not have before. These
officials also stated that, most importantly, the Block 1 capability
helped them achieve persistent surveillance and situational awareness
to enable an appropriate response to border intrusions and choose the
location of interdiction, which they described as a tactical
advantage. They also noted that the height of the towers allows for
additional surveillance into terrain and brush thereby allowing the
Border Patrol to shift personnel to gap areas where surveillance does
not exist.
Other examples of system usefulness offered by Border Patrol officials
included a centralized point of data integration (through the COP),
increased probability of arrest upon detection (by controlling the
point of interdiction by means of camera and radar), improved agent
safety when responding to potential threats, verification of whether a
ground-sensor indicated a threat or not, efficiency and effectiveness
in directing agent responses, and a tiered deployment of technology.
For example, at the Ajo Station, a Border Patrol official explained
that tiered deployment included mobile technology units that are
positioned at the border line, and Block 1 sensor towers that are
deployed off the line where they can monitor intruders who might have
eluded interdiction at the border.
The Secretary's January 2011 announcement also stated that the SBInet
capability had generated some advances in technology that had improved
Border Patrol agents' ability to detect, identify, track, deter, and
respond to threats along the border. It further stated that the new
border technology deployment plan would also include, where deemed
appropriate by the Border Patrol, elements of the now-ended SBInet
program that have proven successful.
On the basis of limited data, the operational availability of deployed
SBInet components has been consistent with the relevant requirement
that expects SBInet to be operationally available 85 percent of the
time. According to prime contractor operations and maintenance
statistics for a 1-week period in January 2011, SBInet in the Tucson
and Ajo Stations was operational over 96 percent of the time.
According to the contractor's logistics manager who oversees the
operation and maintenance of SBInet, since the deployment is
relatively recent, a full year's worth of data would be needed to make
conclusive determinations about long-term operational reliability and
identify areas of persistent problems. The times that SBInet was not
available were due primarily to camera malfunctions and power failures.
According to Border Patrol and prime contractor officials, the SBInet
Block 1 capability is receiving new features from the contractor in
response to ongoing user input and feedback. These features include
adding an "eye-safe" laser target illuminator (the eye-safe feature
minimizes the potential for injury to a person exposed to the laser),
adding a "standby" mode to the radar (wherein scanning is suspended
until needed), and integrating the next-generation unattended ground
sensors[Footnote 6] into the COP. However, this applies only to new
sensors intended for Block 1--the Border Patrol has not selected a
vendor for next-generation sensors for elsewhere along the border and
outside of SBInet.
The usefulness of SBInet's Block 1 capability notwithstanding, OTIA
and Border Patrol officials told us that it has certain shortcomings.
These shortcomings include not having the mobility to respond to
shifts in risk, facing terrain coverage (line-of-sight) gaps, some of
which are mitigated through other technologies, and performing poorly
in adverse weather. Further, according to OTIA, the SBInet capability
as configured by the prime contractor is a proprietary and not an open
architecture. Thus, it is unable to incorporate, for example, next-
generation radar and cameras without significant integration work and
cost.
In addition, the SBInet capability has been costly to deploy and
maintain. Specifically, the total task-order cost for the Block 1
deployment in Arizona was about $164 million. The operations and
maintenance costs for the deployment are estimated to be up to about
$1.5 million per month, or about $18 million per year.
Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology Is Slated for Deployment,
but Cost-and Operational Effectiveness and Suitability of the
Integrated Fixed Tower System Are Not Yet Clear:
DHS is implementing a new approach for acquiring and deploying border
security technology called "Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology"
to replace the SBInet program. As part of this approach DHS is to
deploy a mix of technologies, including RVSS, MSS, and hand-held
equipment for use by Border Patrol agents. It also is to include a new
Integrated Fixed Tower system that is slated for deployment along the
border where the Border Patrol deems it appropriate, beginning with
five high-risk areas in Arizona at an estimated cost of $570 million.
While other elements of the plan may be deployed sooner, the
deployment schedule for the Integrated Fixed Towers envisioned by OTIA
and the Border Patrol is planned to begin in 2013, depending on
funding availability. This plan suggests that OTIA and the Border
Patrol have determined that the Integrated Fixed Tower system is a
cost-effective solution in certain locations. However, due to the
questions we have about how the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
[Footnote 7] analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and
budget decisions, the basis for DHS's technology deployment plan is
not yet clear. Further, the results of independent analyses were not
complete at the time of the Secretary's decision to end the SBInet
program, thus any results on SBInet's operational effectiveness could
not inform the decisions to proceed with a possibly similar Integrated
Fixed Tower system.
DHS Implementing Broader Border-Security Technology Approach to
Include Deploying a New Integrated Fixed Tower System:
According to the Border Patrol, its operational assessment for Arizona
calls for deploying Integrated Fixed Tower systems to five high-threat
areas in the state, beginning with the Nogales, Douglas, and Casa
Grande Stations as part of this approach. These deployments will
include 52 sensor towers, which is less than the 91 sensor towers
envisioned under the original SBInet deployment plan. Border Patrol
officials explained that they reviewed the contractor's original
analysis of where to put the towers and determined that other
solutions, such as RVSSs and MSSs, were more appropriate due to
terrain and other factors such as population density.
According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, depending on the
availability of funding, the deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower
system component of the Arizona technology plan are expected to begin
around March 2013 and be completed by the end of 2015 (or possibly
early 2016), with other sector deployments sequentially following the
Arizona sector. OTIA estimates that the entire Integrated Fixed Tower
system acquisition for Arizona would cost about $570 million,
including funding for design and development, equipment procurement,
production and deployment, systems engineering and program management,
and a national operations center. In this regard, the President's
fiscal year 2012 DHS budget request for BSFIT calls for $242 million
to fund the first three Integrated Fixed Tower system deployments for
Arizona, which include 36 sensor towers.
Border Patrol officials told us that the existing SBInet capability
and the requested Integrated Fixed Tower systems are intended to form
the "baseline or backbone" of its evolving technology portfolio, where
appropriate in high-risk areas in Arizona, with some exceptions. For
example, in the urban areas of the Douglas and Naco Stations, RVSS
units would likely be considered the backbone because they are better
suited for populated areas where SBInet's radar capability is not as
effective. A Border Patrol official said that Integrated Fixed Tower
systems could be an important technology component in additional areas
along the southwest border, but that the agency had not yet made those
determinations, pending the outcome of forthcoming operational
assessments.
DHS Has Initiated Actions to Acquire an Integrated Fixed Tower System
Capability:
In one of its first actions following the Secretary of Homeland
Security's announcement to end SBInet, DHS issued a Request for
Information (RFI) in January 2011 to industry regarding the commercial
availability of surveillance systems based on the Integrated Fixed
Tower system concept, consistent with its stated intent to acquire
future border technologies in its new plan through full and open
competitions. OTIA and Border Patrol officials explained that the RFI
would engender competition and better options for the government, in
terms of finding out about state-of-the-art industry capabilities and
obtaining feedback on requirements to help refine them. However, they
expect similar benefits in terms of capability, performance, and cost
that such competition would yield, as compared to the SBInet Block 1
capability. For example, OTIA and Border Patrol officials acknowledged
that the surveillance system sought by the RFI is essentially the same
as the one deployed in Block 1 in terms of expected capability and
performance in meeting operational and effectiveness requirements.
In February 2011, DHS conducted an "Industry Day" to provide potential
vendors with a better understanding of Border Patrol's technology
needs on the southwest border and collect information about potential
capabilities. During the session, DHS provided information on
potential procurements for Integrated Fixed Tower systems and a range
of other surveillance technology, such as RVSS and unattended ground
sensors.
Following its information-collection activities, should DHS decide to
move forward with requests for proposal for various types of
technology, including the Integrated Fixed Tower system, these actions
should be timed in such a way as to make maximum use of the results
from the cost-effectiveness analyses discussed below. While the
initial deployment actions will be in Arizona, it is envisioned that
the contracts could be used to deploy technology anywhere on the
southwest border. However, to accomplish this, DHS will need to ensure
that the requirements specified in the request for proposal are
sufficient for deployment not just in Arizona but throughout the
border.
Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for the Integrated Fixed Tower
System Raises Questions:
According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, the Secretary's
decision on the future of SBInet and the Integrated Fixed Tower system
was informed by an AOA that analyzed the cost-effectiveness of four
options--mobile (e.g., MSS), fixed (Integrated Fixed Towers), agent
(e.g., hand-held equipment), and aviation (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).
On the basis of our review of available information about the AOA to
date, there are several areas that raise questions about how the AOA
results were used to inform Border Patrol judgments about moving
forward with technology deployments, including the Integrated Fixed
Tower system. As we continue our work for the committee, we plan to
examine each of the following areas in detail to obtain additional
insights into DHS's decision making regarding the cost-effectiveness
of a range of border technology options. Specifically,
* It is not clear how DHS used the AOA results to determine the
appropriate technology plans for Arizona. For instance, the AOA
identified uncertainties in costs and effectiveness of the four
technology alternatives in each of the four geographic analysis areas,
meaning that there was no clear-cut cost-effective technology
alternative for any of the analysis areas. Yet, the AOA observed that
a fixed tower alternative may represent the most effective choice only
in certain circumstances.
* Because of the need to complete the first phase of the AOA in 6
weeks, the AOA was limited in its scope. For instance, the AOA did not
consider the combination of technology approaches in the same
geographic area and did not consider technology solutions, such as
RVSS units. Urban areas were outside the scope of the AOA. Hence, it
is unclear how DHS made decisions for proposed technology deployments
in such areas. Further, the first AOA did not examine as an
alternative the use of only existing Border Patrol equipment and
agents without the addition of any new technology approaches. The AOA
should have assessed the technology approaches based on the
incremental effectiveness provided above the baseline technology
assets in the geographic areas evaluated. According to study
officials, the omission of a baseline alternative was corrected in the
second AOA and did not change the conclusions of the first AOA.
* A more robust AOA could result in conclusions that differ not just
in the Border Patrol sectors yet to be evaluated in future AOAs, but
also in the Tucson and Yuma sectors considered in the first AOA. While
the primary purpose of the second phase of the AOA was to expand the
analysis to three additional Border Patrol sectors (San Diego, El
Paso, and Rio Grande Valley), being able to conduct the analysis over
several months allowed the study team more time to consider additional
measures of effectiveness and technology options. DHS plans to conduct
another AOA that would cover the remainder of the southwest border.
According to study officials, while the potential for different
results existed, the results from the second AOA did not significantly
affect the findings from the first AOA.
Further, we have questions about how the AOA analyses and conclusions
were factored into planning and budget decisions regarding the optimal
mix of technology deployments in Arizona. Specifically, according to
OTIA and Border Patrol officials, the AOA was used to develop the
Arizona technology deployment plan and related procurement plans and
to provide cost data to be used for the Border Patrol's operational
assessment and the fiscal year 2012 budget request for Integrated
Fixed Tower systems. However, because AOA results were somewhat
inconclusive, it is not yet clear to us the basis for including three
of the four alternatives in the manner prescribed in the budget
request (the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle alternative was not). For a
program of this importance and cost, the process used to assess and
select technology needs to be transparent. The uncertainties noted
above raise questions about the decisions that informed the budget
formulation process. We have not yet examined the Border Patrol's
operational assessment to determine how the results of the AOA were
considered in developing technology deployment planning in Arizona
and, in turn, the fiscal year 2012 budget request.
Independent Evaluation of Test Results to Determine Operational
Effectiveness and Suitability Not Yet Completed:
The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) was to independently test
SBInet's Block 1 capability and evaluate the results to determine its
operational effectiveness and suitability (i.e., the extent to which
the system fits it its operational environment and is useful to Border
Patrol to meet the agency's mission). Because the Integrated Fixed
Tower system could be similar to the sensor towers and COP used in
SBInet Block 1, the ATEC could inform DHS's decision about moving
forward with technology deployments. However, the testing and
evaluation was not complete at the time DHS reached its decision
regarding the future of SBInet or requested fiscal year 2012 funding
to deploy the new Integrated Fixed Tower systems, as discussed
earlier. An initial briefing on the emerging results from the testing
was provided to DHS on March 2, 2011, with a final report due sometime
in April 2011.
As our work proceeds, we will further address the questions raised
about the AOA process, the test and evaluation results, and CBP's
proposed new acquisition strategy. We will also continue to assess the
status of the SBInet program in light of the Secretary's decision and
the actions emanating from this decision.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and members of the
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you may have.
[End of section]
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Richard M. Stana at
(202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this
statement included Seto J. Bagdoyan, Charles W. Bausell, Jr., Courtney
Catanzarite, Justin Dunleavy, Christine Hanson, Michael Harmond,
Richard Hung, Robert Rivas, and Ronald Salo.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] An RVSS is a remotely controlled system of daylight and infrared
cameras mounted to a permanent structure. The camera images are
transmitted to and monitored and recorded at a central location.
[2] An MSS consists of camera and radar systems mounted on a truck,
with images being transmitted to and monitored on a computer screen in
the truck's passenger compartment.
[3] An Integrated Fixed Tower "system" consists of various components
and program support activities. The components include fixed towers,
sensors (cameras and radar), a data communications network, facilities
upgrades, information displays, and an information management system.
Program support activities include those performed to design, acquire,
deploy, and test the system; and manage government and contractor
efforts.
[4] A Port of Entry is an officially designated location (seaports,
airports, or land border locations) where CBP officers or employees
are assigned to accept entries of merchandise, clear passengers,
collect duties, and enforce the various provisions of CBP and related
laws.
[5] On September 21, 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing
Company for 3 years, with 3 additional 1-year options. As the prime
contractor, Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and
sustaining selected SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure
projects, and for supply chain management for selected tactical
infrastructure projects.
[6] Unattended ground sensors are sensors buried in the ground and are
intended to detect motion and transmit a signal to a central
monitoring location.
[7] The AOA process is a key first step in the acquisition process
intended to assess the operational effectiveness, costs and risks of
alternative system solutions for addressing a validated mission need.
[End of section]
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