Border Security
DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders Gao ID: GAO-11-508T March 30, 2011As part of its mission, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) component, is to secure U.S borders against threats of terrorism; the smuggling of drugs, humans, and other contraband; and illegal migration. At the end of fiscal year 2010, DHS investments in border security had grown to $11.9 billion and included more than 40,000 personnel. To secure the border, DHS coordinates with federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners. This testimony addresses DHS (1) capabilities to enforce security at or near the border, (2) interagency coordination and oversight of information sharing and enforcement efforts, and (3) management of technology programs. This testimony is based on related GAO work from 2007 to the present and selected updates made in February and March 2011. For the updates, GAO obtained information on CBP performance measures and interviewed relevant officials.
CBP significantly increased personnel and resources for border security at and between the ports of entry (POE), and reported some success in interdicting illegal cross-border activity; however, weaknesses remain. At the POEs, for example, CBP reported that deployment of imaging technology to detect stowaways or cargo had increased seizures of drugs and other contraband, and between the POEs, increased staffing, border fencing, and technology have resulted in some success in reducing the volume of illegal migration and increasing drug seizures. However, as GAO reported from 2007 through 2011, weaknesses in POE traveler inspection procedures and infrastructure increased the potential that dangerous people and illegal goods could enter the country; and that currency and firearms could leave the country and finance drug trafficking organizations and sponsors of terrorism. CBP used a performance measure to reflect results of its overall border enforcement efforts, which showed few land border miles where they have the capability to deter or apprehend illegal activity at the immediate border in fiscal year 2010. DHS is developing a new methodology and performance measures for border security and plans to implement them in fiscal year 2012. As GAO reported in 2010, federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement partners reported improved DHS coordination to secure the border, but critical gaps exist. For example, interagency forums helped in establishing a common understanding of border security threats, while joint operations helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement response. However, significant gaps remained in sharing information and resources useful for operations, such as daily patrols in vulnerable areas, like National Parks and Forests. As GAO reported, and made related recommendations, improved coordination provides opportunity to enhance border security efforts on the southwest and northern borders, including those to deter alien smuggling. CBP's Border Patrol component is moving ahead with a new technology deployment plan to secure the border, but cost and operational effectiveness and suitability are not yet clear. In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new direction to deploying technology to assist in securing the border. The decision ended the Secure Border Initiative Network technology program--one part of a multiyear, multibillion dollar effort aimed at securing the border through technology such as radar, sensors, and cameras and infrastructure such as fencing. Under a new plan, called Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology, Border Patrol is to develop terrain- and population-based solutions using existing proven technology, such as camera-based surveillance systems. However, the analysis DHS performed to arrive at an appropriate mix of technology in its new plan raises questions. For example, the analysis cited a range of uncertainties in costs and effectiveness, with no clear-cut cost effective technology alternative among those considered, as GAO reported in preliminary observations in March 2011. GAO will continue to assess this issue and report its results later this year. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. However, GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to strengthen border security, including enhancing measures to protect against the entry of terrorists, inadmissible aliens, and contraband; improving interagency coordination; and strengthening technology acquisition and deployment plans. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has actions underway or planned in response.
GAO-11-508T, Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, March 30, 2011:
Border Security:
DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and
Northern Borders:
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-11-508T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-508T, a testimony before the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
As part of its mission, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) component, is to
secure U.S borders against threats of terrorism; the smuggling of
drugs, humans, and other contraband; and illegal migration. At the end
of fiscal year 2010, DHS investments in border security had grown to
$11.9 billion and included more than 40,000 personnel. To secure the
border, DHS coordinates with federal, state, local, tribal, and
Canadian partners. This testimony addresses DHS (1) capabilities to
enforce security at or near the border, (2) interagency coordination
and oversight of information sharing and enforcement efforts, and (3)
management of technology programs. This testimony is based on related
GAO work from 2007 to the present and selected updates made in
February and March 2011. For the updates, GAO obtained information on
CBP performance measures and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found:
CBP significantly increased personnel and resources for border
security at and between the ports of entry (POE), and reported some
success in interdicting illegal cross-border activity; however,
weaknesses remain. At the POEs, for example, CBP reported that
deployment of imaging technology to detect stowaways or cargo had
increased seizures of drugs and other contraband, and between the
POEs, increased staffing, border fencing, and technology have resulted
in some success in reducing the volume of illegal migration and
increasing drug seizures. However, as GAO reported from 2007 through
2011, weaknesses in POE traveler inspection procedures and
infrastructure increased the potential that dangerous people and
illegal goods could enter the country; and that currency and firearms
could leave the country and finance drug trafficking organizations and
sponsors of terrorism. CBP used a performance measure to reflect
results of its overall border enforcement efforts, which showed few
land border miles where they have the capability to deter or apprehend
illegal activity at the immediate border in fiscal year 2010. DHS is
developing a new methodology and performance measures for border
security and plans to implement them in fiscal year 2012.
As GAO reported in 2010, federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian
law enforcement partners reported improved DHS coordination to secure
the border, but critical gaps exist. For example, interagency forums
helped in establishing a common understanding of border security
threats, while joint operations helped to achieve an integrated and
effective law enforcement response. However, significant gaps remained
in sharing information and resources useful for operations, such as
daily patrols in vulnerable areas, like National Parks and Forests. As
GAO reported, and made related recommendations, improved coordination
provides opportunity to enhance border security efforts on the
southwest and northern borders, including those to deter alien
smuggling.
CBP‘s Border Patrol component is moving ahead with a new technology
deployment plan to secure the border, but cost and operational
effectiveness and suitability are not yet clear. In January 2011, the
Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new direction to deploying
technology to assist in securing the border. The decision ended the
Secure Border Initiative Network technology program”one part of a
multiyear, multibillion dollar effort aimed at securing the border
through technology such as radar, sensors, and cameras and
infrastructure such as fencing. Under a new plan, called Alternative
(Southwest) Border Technology, Border Patrol is to develop terrain-
and population-based solutions using existing proven technology, such
as camera-based surveillance systems. However, the analysis DHS
performed to arrive at an appropriate mix of technology in its new
plan raises questions. For example, the analysis cited a range of
uncertainties in costs and effectiveness, with no clear-cut cost
effective technology alternative among those considered, as GAO
reported in preliminary observations in March 2011. GAO will continue
to assess this issue and report its results later this year.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. However,
GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to strengthen border
security, including enhancing measures to protect against the entry of
terrorists, inadmissible aliens, and contraband; improving interagency
coordination; and strengthening technology acquisition and deployment
plans. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has
actions underway or planned in response.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/AO-11-508T] or key
components. For more information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202)
512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov.
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the
Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to address the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) efforts to secure U.S. land borders with Mexico and
Canada against threats of terrorism; the smuggling of drugs, humans,
and other contraband; and illegal migration since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). At the end of fiscal year 2004,
the first full year DHS existed as an agency, it had about 10,500
agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and about 17,600
officers inspecting travelers at air, land, and sea ports of entry
(POE),[Footnote 1] amounting to a total of about $5.9 billion (for
personnel, infrastructure, and technology) that had been appropriated
to secure the entire U.S. border.[Footnote 2] At the end of fiscal
year 2010, both the number of personnel and amount of resources
dedicated to border security had significantly increased, with almost
20,000 agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and 20,600
officers assigned to air, land, and sea ports of entry, amounting to
about $11.9 billion appropriated to secure the entire U.S. border (for
personnel, infrastructure, and technology).[Footnote 3] DHS has also
reported that about $4.4 billion has been invested since fiscal year
2006 in border technology and infrastructure under the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI) program--a multiyear, multibillion dollar effort to
help secure U.S. borders using a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras
(called SBI Network, or SBInet) along with border fencing, roads, and
lighting.
DHS reported that the increased resources have resulted in fewer
numbers of apprehensions, and that this stronger enforcement presence
was one of several reasons fewer people were attempting to illegally
cross the border. However, challenges remain at and between the POEs
as DHS data show that several hundred thousand violators enter the
country illegally and undetected through the nation's POEs and several
hundred thousand persons illegally cross the border between the POEs.
DHS also remains challenged to stem the increasing threat from
smuggling of drugs, firearms, and currency which Mexican drug-
trafficking organizations, terrorist organizations, and other groups
use with malevolent intent. Overall, DHS reported achieving an
acceptable level of border control across less than half of the
southwest border and less than 2 percent of the northern border during
fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 4] DHS is in the process of developing a
new methodology and performance measures for assessing border security
and it expects to complete this effort by fiscal year 2012.
DHS's efforts to secure the border at and between the POEs are the
primary responsibility of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
(CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) and Office of Border Patrol
(Border Patrol) components, respectively. OFO is responsible for
processing the flow of people and goods that enter the country through
air, land, and sea POEs where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods
to determine whether they may be legally admitted into the country.
Border Patrol works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and
contraband into the United States between the ports of entry using a
"defense-in-depth" approach to border security operations that
provides for layers of agents who operate not only at the border, but
also in key enforcement zones, such as at traffic checkpoints located
25 miles or more from the border on U.S. roads. Other DHS components
also play a role. DHS' U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
is responsible for investigating cross-border illegal activity and
criminal organizations that transport persons and goods across the
border. On the northern border, DHS' U.S. Coast Guard executes its
maritime security mission on and over major waterways, including the
Great Lakes, using marine and air assets. For all borders, CBP's
Office of Air and Marine operates a fleet of air and marine assets in
support of federal border security efforts. Other federal, state,
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies also expend resources for
border security. DHS has established various memoranda of
understanding and agreement across these multiple levels of government
to enhance information sharing and achieve an integrated response
among law enforcement agencies operating in common geographic areas.
Over the years, we have reviewed a variety of DHS border security
programs and operations and issued a number of reports. Today I will
discuss some of the key issues from these reports as well as
recommendations we have made in the following areas:
(1) DHS capabilities to enforce border security at or near the border,
(2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security
information-sharing and enforcement efforts, and:
(3) DHS management of technology programs.
My statement today is based on our body of work from 2007 to the
present that examined DHS efforts to secure the U.S. border (see
Related GAO Products at the end of this statement), with selected
updates in February and March 2011. Our reports and testimonies
incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from officials from
various components of DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Department of Interior (DOI), the Department of Agriculture (USDA),
state and local law enforcement agencies, and Canadian law enforcement
agencies responsible for border security at and between the ports of
entry along the southwest and northern borders. For the updates, we
obtained information on CBP's performance measures for POEs and
interviewed CBP officials regarding changes in performance goals for
detecting illegal entries at land border POEs. More detailed
information about our scope and methodology, including data
reliability, can be found in our reports and testimonies. Our work was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
CBP Reported Some Success in Stemming Illegal Activity, but
Improvements to Operations and Infrastructure Could Help Enforce
Security Closer to the U.S. Border:
CBP has increased personnel--by 17 percent over its 2004 levels--and
resources for border security at the POEs and reported some success in
interdicting illegal cross-border activity. At the POEs, for example,
CBP reported that deployment of imaging technology had increased
seizures of drugs and other contraband. Between the POEs, Border
Patrol reported that increased staffing and resources have resulted in
some success in reducing the volume of illegal migration and
increasing drug seizures. However, weaknesses in POE traveler
inspection procedures and infrastructure increased the potential that
dangerous people and illegal goods could enter the country, and that
currency and firearms could leave the country. Border Patrol continues
to face challenges in efforts to address the increasing threat from
cross-border drug smuggling activity, with many drug seizures and
apprehensions occurring some distance from the border. CBP does not
have externally reported performance measures that reflect the results
of its overall enforcement efforts at the border. In fiscal year 2010,
before it discontinued the public reporting of performance measures
showing border security progress, Border Patrol reported few border
miles where it had the capability to deter or apprehend illegal
activity at the immediate border. DHS is developing a new methodology
and performance measures for border security and plans to implement
them in fiscal year 2012.
Improvements in POE Inspection Programs, Staffing, and Facilities
Provide Opportunity to Reduce Risk That Terrorists and Inadmissible
Aliens Could Enter the Country but Challenges Remain:
CBP reported that $2.7 billion was appropriated in fiscal year 2010
for border security at POEs, with a workforce of 20,600 CBP officers
and 2,300 agriculture specialists. These CBP officers inspected 352
million travelers and nearly 106 million cars, trucks, buses, trains,
vessels, and aircraft at over 330 air, sea, and land POEs. To
facilitate inspections, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
(WHTI) generally requires all citizens of the United States and
citizens of Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda traveling to the United States
as nonimmigrant visitors to have a passport or other accepted document
that establishes the bearer's identity and nationality to enter the
country from within the Western Hemisphere. CBP also deployed
technology to assist officers in detecting illegal activity, providing
1,428 radiation portal monitors to screen for radiological or nuclear
materials and mobile surveillance units, thermal imaging systems, and
large-and small-scale Non-intrusive Inspection technology imaging
systems to detect stowaways and materials such as explosives,
narcotics, and currency in passenger vehicles and cargo. CBP reported
that these resources have resulted in greater enforcement at the
border. For example, CBP reported that deployment of imaging
technology at POEs to detect stowaways or materials in vehicles and
cargo had resulted in over 1,300 seizures, which included 288,000
pounds of narcotics. In fiscal year 2010, CBP reported turning away
over 227,000 aliens[Footnote 5] who attempted to enter the country
illegally; apprehending more than 8,400 people wanted for a variety of
charges, to include serious crimes such as murder, rape, and child
molestation; and seizing over 870,000 pounds of illegal drugs, $147
million in currency (inbound and outbound), more than 29,000
fraudulent documents, and more than 1.7 million prohibited plant
materials, meat, and animal byproducts.
Despite technology and other improvements in the traveler inspection
program, our work has shown that vulnerabilities still exist. We
reported in January 2008 that weaknesses remained in CBP's inbound
traveler inspection program and related infrastructure which increased
the potential that dangerous people and illegal goods could enter the
country.[Footnote 6] For example, CBP analyses indicate that several
thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the United
States in fiscal year 2006. The weaknesses included challenges in
attaining budgeted staffing levels because of attrition and lack of
officer compliance with screening procedures, such as those used to
determine citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering the
country as required by law and CBP policy.[Footnote 7] Contributing
factors included lack of focus and complacency, lack of supervisory
presence, and lack of training. In this regard, the extent of
continued noncompliance is unknown, and CBP management faces
challenges in ensuring its directives are carried out. Another
challenge was that CBP headquarters did not require field managers to
share the results of their periodic audits and assessments to ensure
compliance with the inspection procedures, hindering the ability of
CBP management to efficiently use the information to overcome
weaknesses in traveler inspections. To mitigate infrastructure
weaknesses, such as the lack of vehicle barriers, CBP estimated in
2007 that it would need about $4 billion to make capital improvements
at all 163 of the nation's land crossings. CBP was also challenged by
the fact that some POEs are owned by other governmental or private
entities, adding to the time and complexity in addressing
infrastructure problems. DHS concurred with our recommendations that
CBP enhance internal controls in the inspection process, establish
measures for training provided to CBP officers and new officer
proficiency, and implement performance measures for apprehending
inadmissible aliens and other violators; and indicated that CBP was
taking steps to address the recommendations.
CBP's public outreach campaign has led to a high rate of compliance
with WHTI's document requirements, averaging more than 95 percent
nationally throughout fiscal year 2010. CBP conducts queries against
law enforcement databases for more than 95 percent of the traveling
public, up from 5 percent in 2005. We reported in June 2010, however,
that CBP officers at POEs are unable to take full advantage of the
security features in WHTI documents because of time constraints,
limited use of technology in primary inspection, and the lack of
sample documents for training.[Footnote 8] For example, while CBP had
deployed technology tools for primary inspectors to use when
inspecting documents, it could make better usage of fingerprint data
to mitigate the risk of imposter fraud with border crossing cards, the
most common type of fraud. We are currently reviewing the training of
CBP officers at POEs for the House Homeland Security Committee and the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and plan
to report the results of this work later this year.
In June 2009 and March 2011, we reported results of our review of
CBP's Outbound Enforcement Program intended to stem illegal cross-
border smuggling of firearms and large volumes of cash used by Mexican
drug-trafficking organizations, terrorist organizations, and other
groups with malevolent intent.[Footnote 9] Under the program, CBP
inspects travelers leaving the country at all 25 land ports of entry
along the southwest border. On the northern border, inspections are
conducted at the discretion of the Port Director. Available evidence
indicated that many of the firearms fueling Mexican drug violence
originated in the United States, including a number of increasingly
lethal weapons, and the U.S. government faced several challenges in
combating illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stemming
their flow to Mexico. DOJ's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives and DHS's ICE are the primary agencies implementing efforts
to address this issue. However, we reported in June 2009 that these
agencies did not effectively coordinate their efforts, in part because
the agencies lack clear roles and responsibilities and had been
operating under an outdated interagency agreement.[Footnote 10]
Additionally, these agencies generally had not systematically
gathered, analyzed, and reported data that could be useful to help
plan and assess results of their efforts to address arms trafficking
to Mexico. Further, until June 2009, when the administration included
a chapter on combating illicit arms trafficking to Mexico in its
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, various efforts
undertaken by individual U.S. agencies were not part of a
comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing the problem.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that DHS and DOJ, among other
agencies, improve interagency coordination, data gathering and
analysis, and strategic planning and described steps it was
undertaking to implement them. DOJ did not comment on the report.
We previously reported that stemming the flow of bulk cash has been a
difficult and challenging task.[Footnote 11] From March 2009 through
February 22, 2011, as part of the Outbound Enforcement Program, CBP
officers seized about $67 million in illicit bulk cash leaving the
country at land POEs, almost all of which was seized along the
southwest border. However, the National Drug Intelligence Center
estimates that criminals smuggle $18 billion to $39 billion a year
across the southwest border, and that the flow of cash across the
northern border with Canada is also significant. CBP challenges we
reported included limited hours of operation, technology,
infrastructure, and procedures to support outbound inspection
operations. For example, as of March 2011, license plate readers were
available at 48 of 118 outbound lanes on the southwest border but none
of the 179 outbound lanes on the northern border. CBP is in the early
phases of this program and has not yet taken some actions to gain a
better understanding of how well the program is working, such as
gathering data for measuring program costs and benefits.
Our March 2011 testimony also included information about regulatory
gaps related to the stored value industry, including exemptions from
anti-money laundering requirements for certain types of financial
institutions and the lack of cross-border reporting requirements with
regard to the use of stored value, such as prepaid cards.[Footnote 12]
For example, individuals must report transporting more than $10,000 in
currency or monetary instruments when crossing the U.S. border, but
the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCen) does not have a similar requirement in place for individuals
transporting stored value across U.S. borders. The Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD
Act) required the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, to issue regulations in final form
implementing the Bank Secrecy Act, regarding the sale, issuance,
redemption, or international transport of stored value, including
stored value cards. In doing so, the Credit CARD Act stated that
Treasury may issue regulations regarding the international transport
of stored value to include reporting requirements pursuant to the
statute applicable to the transport of currency or monetary
instruments. CBP and FinCEN concurred with our recommendations that
they gather cost-benefit data and develop a plan to better manage
rulemaking, respectively, and described actions they were taking to
implement them.
Border Patrol Reported Some Success in Reducing Illegal Migration, but
Challenges Remained in Stemming Cross-Border Smuggling of Illegal
Drugs between the POEs:
CBP reported that $3.6 billion was appropriated in fiscal year 2010
for border security efforts between the POEs, and that the Border
Patrol is better staffed now than at any time in its 86-year history,
having doubled the number of agents from 10,000 in fiscal year 2004 to
more than 20,500 in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 13] CBP also
constructed 649 miles of pedestrian and vehicle fencing on the
southwest border covering 33 percent of the border,[Footnote 14] and
increased its investment in traffic checkpoints, the last layer of
defense in Border Patrol's effort to apprehend illegal activity that
has crossed the border undetected. Border Patrol reported that
apprehensions had decreased nationwide by 36 percent from fiscal year
2008 (nearly 724,000) to fiscal year 2010 (approximately 463,000),
[Footnote 15] indicating in its view that fewer people were attempting
to illegally cross the border. However, during the same time that
apprehensions decreased, marijuana drug seizures increased almost 50
percent from over 1.6 million pounds in fiscal year 2008 to about 2.4
million pounds in fiscal year 2010, and CBP has been challenged to
link its investments to changes in border control.[Footnote 16]
We reported in May 2010 that CBP had not accounted for the impact of
its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border
security.[Footnote 17] Border fencing was designed to prevent people
on foot and vehicles from crossing the border and to enhance Border
Patrol agents' ability to respond to areas of illegal entry. CBP
estimated that the border fencing had a life cycle of 20 years and
over these years, a total estimated cost of about $6.5 billion to
deploy, operate, and maintain the fencing and other infrastructure.
According to CBP, during fiscal year 2010, there were 4,037 documented
and repaired breaches of the fencing and CBP spent at least $7.2
million to repair the breaches, or an average of about $1,800 per
breach. CBP reported an increase in control of southwest border miles,
but could not account separately for the impact of the border fencing
and other infrastructure. In our May 4, 2010, testimony, we concluded
that until CBP determines the contribution of border fencing and other
infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to address the
impact of its investment; and reported that in response to a prior
recommendation, CBP was in the process of conducting an analysis of
the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security.[Footnote 18]
Traffic checkpoints contributed to furthering the Border Patrol
mission to protect the border. In 2008, they accounted for about 35
percent of Border Patrol drug seizures along the southwest border and
17,000 apprehensions of illegal aliens, including 3 individuals
identified as persons linked to terrorism. However, we reported in
August 2009 that Border Patrol did not have measures to determine if
these checkpoints were operating effectively and efficiently,[Footnote
19] and weaknesses in checkpoint design and operation increased the
risk that illegal activity may travel to the U.S. interior undetected.
Border Patrol officials said that several factors impeded higher
levels of performance, including insufficient staff, canine teams, and
inspection technology. Other challenges included insufficient guidance
to ensure that new checkpoints were appropriately sized, lack of
management oversight and guidance to ensure consistent data collection
practices, and a lack of performance measures to determine if
checkpoints were operating efficiently and effectively with minimal
adverse impact on local communities. CBP agreed with our
recommendations to take several actions to strengthen checkpoint
design and staffing, and improve the measurement and reporting of
checkpoint effectiveness, including community impact and identified
actions planned or underway to implement the recommendations.
DHS Performance Measures Show Response to Illegal Border Activity Most
Often Occurs after Entry into the United States:
As of fiscal year 2011, CBP no longer has externally reported
performance goals or measures that reflect its overall success in
detecting illegal entries and contraband at and between the POEs, but
the measures for fiscal year 2010 showed few land border miles are at
a level of control where deterrence or apprehensions of illegal
entries occurs at the immediate border. Border Patrol is in the
process of developing a new methodology and performance measures,
however, for assessing border security between the POEs. Further, OFO
has multiple performance measures in place, but it does not have an
external measure that captures the results of its overall enforcement
efforts at POEs. In fiscal year 2009, however, OFO used a statistical
model to report that over 99 percent of travelers in passenger
vehicles passing through the southwest and northern land border POEs
were compliant with U.S. laws, rules, and regulations. For the less
than 1 percent of travelers who comprised the noncompliant population,
OFO officials reported in the CBP Fiscal Year 2009 Performance and
Accountability Report a goal to apprehend at least 28 percent of
serious criminal activities--such as transporting illegal drugs, guns,
or other banned substances in fiscal year 2009, the last year this
information was publicly available. OFO officials said that they
considered this an effective performance measure and that at the end
of fiscal year 2009, the land border POEs had achieved that goal.
[Footnote 20]
As we reported in December 2010 and February 2011, and through
selected updates, the Border Patrol is in the process of developing
new performance measures for assessing border security between the
POEs.[Footnote 21] However, up until fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol
used a security performance measure of border miles under control to
assess security between the POEs, which reflected its ability to deter
or detect and apprehend illegal entries at the border or after they
occur. As we testified in February 2011 about our preliminary
observations on this measure, Border Patrol indicated that in fiscal
year 2010, 873 of the nearly 2,000 southwest border miles and 69 of
the nearly 4,000 northern border miles between Washington and Maine
were at an acceptable level of control. Within this border security
classification, Border Patrol further distinguished between the
ability to deter or detect and apprehend illegal entries at the
immediate border versus after entry--at distances of up to 100 miles
or more away from the immediate border--into the United States.
[Footnote 22] Our preliminary analysis of these Border Patrol data
showed that the agency reported a capability to deter or detect and
apprehend illegal entries at the immediate border across 129 of the
873 southwest border miles and 2 of the 69 northern border miles. Our
preliminary analysis also showed that Border Patrol reported the
ability to deter or detect and apprehend illegal entries after they
crossed the border for an additional 744 southwest border miles and 67
northern border miles.
As we previously observed in December 2010 and February 2011, and
through selected updates, Border Patrol determined in fiscal year 2010
that border security was not at an acceptable level of control for
1,120 southwest border miles and 3,918 northern border miles, and that
on the northern border there was a significant or high degree of
reliance on enforcement support from outside the border zones for
detection and apprehension of cross-border illegal activity.[Footnote
23] For two-thirds of these southwest miles, Border Patrol reported
that the probability of detecting illegal activity was high; however,
the ability to respond was defined by accessibility to the area or
availability of resources. One-fourth of these northern border miles
were also reported at this level. The remaining southwest and northern
border miles were reported at levels where lack of resources or
infrastructure inhibited detection or interdiction of cross-border
illegal activity.
In our February 2011 testimony regarding our observations on Border
Patrol security measures, and through selected updates, we noted that
in fiscal year 2011 DHS discontinued the public reporting of
performance measures showing border security progress, while it
develops and implements a new methodology and measures for border
security.[Footnote 24] In the meantime Border Patrol is reporting on
the number of agents and joint operations on the southwest border and
the number of apprehensions. CBP does not have an estimate of the time
and effort needed to secure the southwest border; however, the agency
expects new border security measures to be in place by fiscal year
2012 which will enable it to make such an estimate. DHS, CBP, and
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the new approach to
border security between the POEs is expected to be more flexible and
cost-effective, and that Border Patrol officials expect that they will
be requesting fewer resources to secure the border.
DHS Law Enforcement Partners Reported Improved Results for Interagency
Coordination and Oversight of Border Security Intelligence and
Enforcement Operations but Gaps Remained:
Federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement partners
reported improved DHS coordination to secure the border. For example,
interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a common
understanding of border security threats, while joint operations
helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement
response. However, critical gaps remained in sharing information and
resources useful for operations, such as daily patrols in vulnerable
areas, including National Parks and Forests. Our past work has shown
that additional actions to improve coordination could enhance border
security efforts on the southwest and northern borders, including
those to deter alien smuggling.
DOI and USDA Reported Improved DHS Coordination to Secure Federal
Borderlands, but Critical Gaps Remained in Sharing Intelligence and
Communications for Daily Operations:
Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal
lands protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the
southwest and northern borders and can cause damage to natural,
historic, and cultural resources, and put agency personnel and the
visiting public at risk. We reported in November 2010 that information
sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement
officials had increased in recent years.[Footnote 25] Interagency
forums were used to exchange information about border issues and
interagency liaisons facilitated exchange of operational statistics.
However, critical gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements
to ensure law enforcement officials had access to daily threat
information and compatible secure radio communications needed to
better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response
to illegal activity. This was important in Border Patrol's Tucson
sector on the southwest border, where apprehensions on federal lands
had not kept pace with the estimated number of illegal entries,
indicating that threats caused by drug smugglers and illegal migration
may be increasing.
Federal land managers in the Tucson sector said they would like
additional guidance to determine when illegal cross-border activity
poses a sufficient public safety risk to restrict or close access to
federal lands. In Border Patrol's Spokane sector on the northern
border, coordination of intelligence information was particularly
important due to sparse law enforcement presence and technical
challenges that precluded Border Patrol's ability to fully assess
cross-border threats, such as air smuggling of high-potency marijuana.
The agencies agreed with our recommendations that DOI and USDA
determine if more guidance is needed for federal land closures and
that DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and accountability as needed
to further implement interagency agreements for coordinating
information and integrating operations. In January 2011, CBP issued a
memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol
agents emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to
address border security threats on federal lands. This action is a
positive step toward implementing our recommendations and we encourage
DHS, DOI, and USDA to take the additional steps necessary to monitor
and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements in
order to enhance border security on federal lands.
Northern Border Partners Reported Interagency Forums Improved
Coordination, but DHS Oversight Was Needed to Resolve Interagency
Conflict in Roles and Responsibilities:
DHS has stated that partnerships with other federal, state, local,
tribal, and Canadian law enforcement agencies are critical to the
success of northern border security efforts. We reported in December
2010 that DHS efforts to coordinate with these partners through
interagency forums and joint operations were considered successful,
according to a majority of these partners we interviewed.[Footnote 26]
In addition, DHS component officials reported that federal agency
coordination to secure the northern border was improved. However, DHS
did not provide oversight for the number and location of forums
established by its components and numerous federal, state, local, and
Canadian partners cited challenges related to the inability to
resource the increasing number of forums, raising concerns that some
efforts may be overlapping. In addition, federal law enforcement
partners in all four locations we visited as part of our work cited
ongoing challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, Border Patrol and
Forest Service, and ICE and DOJ's Drug Enforcement Administration in
sharing information and resources that compromised daily border
security related to operations and investigations. DHS had established
and updated interagency agreements to address ongoing coordination
challenges; however, oversight by management at the component and
local level has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of
these agreements.
We also reported that while Border Patrol's border security measures
reflect that there is a high reliance on law enforcement support from
outside the border zones, the extent of partner law enforcement
resources that could be leveraged to fill Border Patrol resource gaps,
target coordination efforts, and make more efficient resource
decisions are not reflected in Border Patrol's processes for assessing
border security and resource requirements. We previously reported in
November 2008 that DHS was not fully responsive to a legislative
reporting requirement to identify resources needed to secure the
northern border.[Footnote 27] Specifically, the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required the
Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress that
addresses the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provides
recommendations and required resources to address them.[Footnote 28]
DHS agreed with our recommendations to provide guidance and oversight
for interagency forums and for component compliance with interagency
agreements, and develop policy and guidance necessary to integrate
partner resources in border security assessments and resource planning
documents. DHS also reported that it was taking action to address
these recommendations.
Selected Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies Reported Federal
Information Sharing Occurred, but Consistent Coordination Could Help
Identify Terrorist Threats and Other Criminal Activity at the Border:
Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation's borders against
crimes and potential terrorist threats. In many border communities,
the individuals who are best positioned to observe and report
suspicious activities that may be related to these threats are local
and tribal law enforcement officers. We reported in December 2009 that
15 of 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies in southwest or
northern communities we contacted during our work said they received
information directly from Border Patrol, ICE, or from DOJ's Federal
Bureau of Investigation that was useful for enhancing their
situational awareness of crimes along the border and potential
terrorist threats.[Footnote 29] However, 5 of the 20 agencies reported
that they did not receive information from the federal agencies, in
part, because information-sharing partnerships and related mechanisms
to share information did not exist. In addition, officials from 13 of
the 20 agencies in border communities said that they did not clearly
know what suspicious activities federal agencies wanted them to
report, how to report them, or to whom because federal agencies had
not provided necessary guidance. We recommended that DHS and DOJ more
fully identify the information needs of and establish partnerships
with local and tribal officials along the borders, identify promising
practices in developing border intelligence products, and define the
suspicious activities that local land tribal officials in border
communities are to report and how to report them. DHS agreed with the
recommendations and indicated that it was taking action to implement
them. DOJ did not comment.
Leveraging a State Justice Agency's Investigative Strategy Could
Provide DHS with Additional Opportunity to Deter Alien Smuggling:
Alien smuggling along the southwest border is a growing threat to the
security of the United States and Mexico due, in part, to the
expanding involvement of Mexican drug trafficking organizations and
aliens who illegally enter the region from countries of special
interest to the United States such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and
Pakistan. Violence associated with alien smuggling has also increased
in recent years, particularly in Arizona. In October 2007, the
National Drug Intelligence Center reported that the success of
expanding border security initiatives and additional Border Patrol
resources are likely obstructing regularly used smuggling routes and
fueling an increase in violence, particularly against law enforcement
officers in Arizona.[Footnote 30]
We reported in May 2010 and testified in July 2010, that ICE may be
missing an opportunity to leverage techniques used by the Arizona
Attorney General to disrupt alien smuggling operations.[Footnote 31]
Specifically, an Arizona Attorney General task force seized millions
of dollars and disrupted alien smuggling operations by following cash
transactions flowing through money transmitters that serve as the
primary method of payment to those individuals responsible for
smuggling aliens. By analyzing money transmitter transaction data,
task force investigators identified suspected alien smugglers and
those money transmitter businesses that were complicit in laundering
alien smuggling proceeds. An overall assessment of whether and how
these techniques may be applied by ICE in the context of disrupting
alien smuggling could help ensure that it is not missing opportunities
to take additional actions and leverage resources to support the
common goal of countering alien smuggling. We recommended that ICE
assess the Arizona Attorney General's financial investigations
strategy to identify any promising investigative techniques for
federal use. ICE concurred with our recommendation and outlined
specific steps it was taking to implement it.
Border Patrol Moving Ahead with New Technology Deployment Plan to
Secure the Border, but Cost and Operational Effectiveness and
Suitability Are Not Yet Clear:
In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new
direction in deploying technology to assist in securing the border,
ending the SBInet program as originally conceived because it did not
meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards. Since fiscal year
2006, DHS had allocated about $1.5 billion for SBInet that would
provide a mix of sensors, radars, and cameras on fixed towers that
could gather information along the border and transmit this
information to terminals in command centers to provide agents with
border situational awareness. Our previous reports on CBP's SBI
program have outlined program challenges and delays.[Footnote 32]
Specifically, the initial segment of SBInet technology, Project 28,
encountered performance shortfalls and delays, including the
following: users were not involved in developing the requirements,
contractor oversight was limited, and project scope and complexity
were underestimated. Program uncertainties, such as a lack of fully
defined program expectations, continued to delay planned SBInet
deployments following Project 28. In addition, the deployment of
related infrastructure, such as towers and roads, experienced
challenges, such as increased costs, unknown life-cycle costs, and
land acquisition issues.
As part of her decision to end SBInet, the Secretary of Homeland
Security directed CBP to proceed with a new plan to deploy a mix of
technology to protect the border called Alternative (Southwest) Border
Technology. Under this plan, CBP is to focus on developing terrain-and
population-based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such
as camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region.
Accordingly, the plan is to incorporate a mix of technology, including
an Integrated Fixed Tower surveillance system similar to that used in
the current SBInet system (i.e., a tower with cameras and radar that
transmit images to a central location), beginning with high-risk areas
in Arizona.
According to this new plan, DHS is to deploy other technologies,
including Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile
Surveillance Systems (MSS), and hand-held equipment for use by Border
Patrol agents. For fiscal year 2011, DHS plans to use about $159
million to begin buying RVSSs, MSSs, unattended ground sensors, and
hand-held devices for Arizona. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget
request calls for $242 million to fund three of five planned
deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower systems in Arizona although,
depending on funding, the earliest DHS expects the deployments to
begin is March 2013 with completion anticipated by 2015 or later. The
estimated cost for the overall plan's Arizona component, called the
Arizona Technology Plan, is about $734 million, of which $575 million
is for the Integrated Fixed Tower component.
To arrive at an appropriate mix of technology in its plan, DHS
performed an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA).[Footnote 33] In March
2011, we provided preliminary observations regarding this analysis.
[Footnote 34] Specifically, we noted that on the basis of our ongoing
review of available information to date, there were several areas that
raise questions about how the AOA results were used to inform Border
Patrol judgments about moving forward with technology deployments,
including the Integrated Fixed Tower system. For example, the AOA
cited a range of uncertainties in costs related to the operational
effectiveness of the four technology alternatives considered (mobile,
fixed tower, agent equipment, and aerial alternatives) in each of the
four geographic analysis areas, meaning there was no clear-cut cost-
effective technology alternative for any of the analysis areas. Yet,
the AOA observed that a fixed tower alternative may represent the most
effective choice only in certain circumstances. Further, we have
questions about how the AOA analyses were factored into planning and
budget decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology deployments
in Arizona. Specifically, we have not yet examined the Border Patrol's
operational assessment to determine how the results of the AOA were
considered in developing technology deployment planning in Arizona
and, in turn, the fiscal year 2012 budget request. The cost and
effectiveness uncertainties noted above raise questions about the
decisions that informed the budget formulation process. We are
continuing to assess this issue for the House Homeland Security
Committee and will report the final results later this year.
Deployment of DHS U.S.-VISIT Program Technology Provides Opportunity
to Identify Illegal Migration Through Visa Overstays:
DHS took action to better monitor and control the entry and exit of
foreign visitors to the United States by establishing the U.S. Visitor
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, that
tracks foreign visitors using biometric information (such as
fingerprints) and biographic information. DHS has incrementally
delivered US-VISIT capabilities to track foreign entries, and a
biometrically enabled entry capability has been fully operational at
about 300 air, sea, and land POEs since December 2006. In November
2009, we reported that, according to DHS, US-VISIT entry operations
have produced results. For example, as of June 2009, the program
reported that it had more than 150,000 biometric hits in entry
resulting in more than 8,000 people having adverse actions, such as
denial of entry, taken against them.[Footnote 35]
Since 2004, however, we have identified a range of DHS management
challenges to fully deploy a biometric exit capability intended, in
part, to track foreigners who had overstayed their visas and remained
illegally in the United States. For example, in November 2009 we
reported that DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to
scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be
accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution.[Footnote 36]
Most recently, in August 2010 we reported that the DHS pilot programs
to track the exit of foreign visitors at air POEs had limitations
curtailing the ability to inform a decision for a long-term exit
solution at these POEs.[Footnote 37] We made recommendations to ensure
that US-VISIT exit was planned, designed, developed, and implemented
in an effective and efficient manner. DHS generally agreed with our
recommendations and outlined actions designed to implement them.
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and members of the
committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact
Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. In addition,
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals
who made key contributions to this testimony are Cindy Ayers, Seto
Bagdoyan, and Mike Dino, Assistant Directors; as well as Joel Aldape,
Frances Cook, Kevin Copping, Katherine Davis, Justin Dunleavy, Rick
Eiserman, Michele Fejfar, Barbara Guffy, Nancy Kawahara, Brian Lipman,
Dawn Locke, and Taylor Matheson.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key
Southwest Border Technology Programs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2011.
Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for Strengthening the
Federal Government's Efforts to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T]. Washington,
D.C.: March 9, 2011.
Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures
for the Southwest Border. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T]. Washington, D.C.: February
15, 2011.
Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency
Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97]. Washington, D.C.: December 17,
2010.
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a
Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177]. Washington, D.C.:
November 18, 2010.
Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government's
Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73]. Washington, D.C.: October 25,
2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and
Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-6]. Washington, D.C.: October 18,
2010.
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited
Understanding of Air Exit Options. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860]. Washington, D.C.: August 10,
2010.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Border Security Fencing,
Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2010 Expenditure Plan.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-877R]. Washington,
D.C.: July 30, 2010.
Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien Smuggling along the
Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative Resources and Measuring
Program Performance. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-919T]. Washington, D.C.: July 22,
2010.
Border Security: Improvements in the Department of State's Development
Process Could Increase the Security of Passport Cards and Border
Crossing Cards. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-589].
Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2010.
Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative Resources
and Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-328] (Washington, D.C.:
May 24, 2010):
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed
Investment in Key Technology Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-340]. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T]. Washington, D.C.: May 4,
2010.
Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism
Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement, but Additional
Efforts are Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-41]. Washington, D.C.: December 18,
2009.
Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of
Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13]. Washington, D.C.: November 19,
2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896]. Washington, D.C.: September
9, 2009.
Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but
More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could
Improve Effectiveness. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-824]. Washington, D.C.: August 2009.
Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to
Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-709]. Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2009.
Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by
Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address
Vulnerabilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-93].
Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in
Delivering Key Technology Investments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]. Washington, D.C.: September
22, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T]. Washington,
D.C.: September 10, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying
Lessons Learned to Future Projects. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T]. Washington, D.C.: February
27, 2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation's Port of Entry. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-329T]. Washington, D.C.: January 3,
2008.
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections
Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-219]. Washington: D.C.: November 5,
2007.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet
Program Implementation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T]. Washington, D.C.: October
24, 2007.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] POEs are the facilities that provide for the controlled entry into
or departure from the United States for persons and materials.
Specifically, a POE is any officially designated location (seaport,
airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are
assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and
enforce customs laws.
[2] The number of border agents includes only those assigned to
northern and southwest border sectors. The number of officers assigned
to POEs does not include those performing trade or agricultural
inspections. The $5.9 billion includes all funds appropriated to DHS
for border security in fiscal year 2004.
[3] The $11.9 billion is the amount of funds DHS reported as
appropriated for border security for fiscal year 2010.
[4] According to Border Patrol, an acceptable level of border control
is established when it has the capability (i.e., resources) to deter
or detect and apprehend incursions at the immediate border or after
entry.
[5] OFO reported that of the total inadmissible aliens, 78,936 were at
the southwest land border and 36,710 were at the northern border. The
remaining inadmissible aliens were at sea ports (68,112) and air ports
(43,891).
[6] GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-329T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3,
2008).
[7] The Immigration and Nationality Act, implementing regulations, and
CBP policies and procedures for traveler inspection at all POEs
require officers to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of
individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country. See 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a); 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a), (b), (f)(1).
[8] GAO, Border Security: Improvements in the Department of State's
Development Process Could Increase the Security of Passport Cards and
Border Crossing Cards, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-589] (Washington, D.C.: June 1,
2010).
[9] GAO, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking
to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-709] (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2009), and Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for
Strengthening the Federal Government's Efforts to Stem Cross-Border
Currency Smuggling, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T], (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9,
2011).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-709] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T].
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T] and GAO,
Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government's
Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-73] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25,
2010).
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-407T].
[13] Of the 20,558 agents in place in fiscal year 2010, 17,535 agents
were dedicated to the southwest border, 2,263 were dedicated to the
northern border, 246 agents were dedicated to the southeast coastal
border, and 514 agents were dedicated to other locations.
[14] The length of the border with Mexico is defined by the U.S.
International Boundary and Water Commission at 1,954 miles. The length
of the land border is 675 miles, while the length of the border along
the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers is 1,279 miles.
[15] Apprehensions decreased on the southwest border from 705,005 to
447,731; on the northern border from 7,925 to 7,431; and on the
southeast coastal border from 10,895 to 8,220.
[16] Marijuana drug seizures on the southwest border increased from
over 1.6 million pounds to over 2.4 million pounds, on the northern
border from over 9,500 pounds to over 12,700 pounds, and on the
southeast coastal border from over 730 pounds to nearly 1,300 pounds.
[17] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T] (Washington, D.C.: May 4,
2010).
[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-651T].
[19] GAO, Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's
Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance
Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-824] (Washington, D.C.: August
2009).
[20] OFO's Executive Director of Planning, Program Analysis, and
Evaluation said that the results of this performance measure for
fiscal year 2009 were designated for official use only, so we could
not publicly report the proportion of illegal activity that is
apprehended at the border.
[21] GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control
Measures for the Southwest Border, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2011), and Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of
Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 17, 2010).
[22] These differences stem from Border Patrol's "defense in depth"
approach to border security operations that provides for layers of
agents who operate not only at the border but also in other areas of a
Border Patrol sector.
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-307T].
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T].
[25] GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure
a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 18, 2010).
[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97].
[27] GAO, Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform
Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to
Address Vulnerabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-93] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25,
2008).
[28] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 731(a)-(b), 121 Stat. 266, 351.
[29] GAO, Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and
Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies,
but Additional Efforts are Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-41] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2009).
[30] U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2008 (Johnstown, Pa.: October 2007).
[31] GAO, Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative
Resources and Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-328] (Washington, D.C.:
May 24, 2010) and Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien
Smuggling along the Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative
Resources and Measuring Program Performance, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-919T] (Washington, D.C.: July 22,
2010).
[32] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2009); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected
Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24,
2007); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of
Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27,
2008); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008); and Secure Border Initiative: DHS
Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology
Investment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008).
[33] Performing an AOA is a key first step in the acquisition process
intended to assess the operational effectiveness, costs, and risks of
alternative system solutions for addressing a validated mission need.
[34] GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of
Key Southwest Border Technology Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-448T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15,
2011).
[35] GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages
of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 19, 2009).
[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13].
[37] GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited
Understanding of Air Exit Options, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10,
2010).
[End of section]
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