Employment Verification
Agencies Have Improved E-Verify, but Significant Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-11-522T April 14, 2011This testimony discusses the E-Verify program, which provides employers a tool for verifying an employee's authorization to work in the United States. The opportunity for employment is one of the most powerful magnets attracting immigrants to the United States. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, as of March 2010, approximately 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the country, and an estimated 8 million of them, or about 70 percent, were in the labor force. Congress, the administration, and some states have taken various actions to better ensure that those who work here have appropriate work authorization and to safeguard jobs for authorized employees. Nonetheless, opportunities remain for unauthorized workers to fraudulently obtain employment by using borrowed or stolen documents and for unscrupulous employers to hire unauthorized workers. Immigration experts have noted that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other things, a more reliable employment eligibility verification process and a more robust worksite enforcement capacity. E-Verify is a free, largely voluntary, Internet-based system operated by the Verification Division of the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA). The goals of E-Verify are to (1) reduce the employment of individuals unauthorized to work, (2) reduce discrimination, (3) protect employee civil liberties and privacy, and (4) prevent undue burden on employers. Pursuant to a 2007 Office of Management Budget directive, all federal agencies are required to use E-Verify on their new hires and, as of September 2009, certain federal contractors and subcontractors are required to use E-Verify for newly hired employees working in the United States as well as existing employees working directly under the contract. A number of states have also mandated that some or all employers within the state use E-Verify on new hires. From October 1, 2010, through April 5, 2011, E-Verify processed approximately 7.8 million queries from nearly 258,000 employers. In an August 2005 report and June 2008 testimony on E-Verify, we noted that USCIS faced challenges in detecting identity fraud and ensuring employer compliance with the program's rules. We highlighted some of the challenges USCIS and SSA faced in reducing instances of erroneous tentative nonconfirmations (TNC), or situations in which work-authorized employees are not automatically confirmed by E-Verify. We also noted that mandatory implementation of E-Verify would place increased demands on USCIS's and SSA's resources. This testimony is based primarily on a report we issued in December 2010 and provide updates to the challenges we noted in our 2005 report and 2008 testimony. The statement, as requested, highlights findings from that report and discusses the extent to which (1) USCIS has reduced the incidence of TNCs and E-Verify's vulnerability to fraud, (2) USCIS has provided safeguards for employees' personal information, and (3) USCIS and SSA have taken steps to prepare for mandatory E-Verify implementation. Our December 2010 report also includes a discussion of the extent to which USCIS has improved its ability to monitor and ensure employer compliance with E-Verify program policies and procedures.
USCIS has reduced TNCs from about 8 percent for the period June 2004 through March 2007 to about 2.6 percent in fiscal year 2009. In fiscal year 2009, about 2.6 percent or over 211,000 of newly hired employees received either a SSA or USCIS TNC, including about 0.3 percent who were determined to be work eligible after they contested a TNC and resolved errors or inaccuracies in their records, and about 2.3 percent, or about 189,000, who received a final nonconfirmation because their employment eligibility status remained unresolved. For the approximately 2.3 percent who received a final nonconfirmation, USCIS was unable to determine how many of these employees (1) were authorized employees who did not take action to resolve a TNC because they were not informed by their employers of their right to contest the TNC, (2) independently decided not to contest the TNC, or (3) were not eligible to work. USCIS has taken actions to institute safeguards for the privacy of personal information for employees who are processed through E-Verify, but has not established mechanisms for employees to identify and access personal information maintained by DHS that may lead to an erroneous TNC, or for E-Verify staff to correct such information. To safeguard the privacy of personal information for employees who are processed through E-Verify, USCIS has addressed the Fair Information Practice Principles, which are the basis for DHS's privacy policy. For example, USCIS published privacy notices in 2009 and 2010 that defined parameters, including setting limits on DHS's collection and use of personal information for the E-Verify program. USCIS and SSA have taken actions to prepare for possible mandatory implementation of E-Verify for all employers nationwide by addressing key practices for effectively managing E-Verify system capacity and availability and coordinating with each other in operating E-Verify. However, USCIS and SSA face challenges in accurately estimating E-Verify costs. Our analysis showed that USCIS's E-Verify estimates partially met three of four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate and minimally met one characteristic. As a result, we found that USCIS is at increased risk of not making informed investment decisions, understanding system affordability, and developing justifiable budget requests for future E-Verify use and potential mandatory implementation of it. To ensure that USCIS has a sound basis for making decisions about resource investments for E-Verify and securing sufficient resources, in our December 2010 report, we recommended that the Director of USCIS ensure that a life-cycle cost estimate for E-Verify is developed in a manner that reflects the four characteristics of a reliable estimate consistent with best practices. USCIS concurred and senior program officials told us that USCIS, among other things, has contracted with a federally funded research and development center to develop an independent cost estimate of the life-cycle costs of E-Verify to better comply with our cost-estimating guidance.
GAO-11-522T, Employment Verification: Agencies Have Improved E-Verify, but Significant Challenges Remain
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and
Means, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 14, 2011:
Employment Verification:
Agencies Have Improved E-Verify, but Significant Challenges Remain:
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
GAO-11-522T:
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Becerra, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss the E-Verify program, which
provides employers a tool for verifying an employee's authorization to
work in the United States. The opportunity for employment is one of
the most powerful magnets attracting immigrants to the United States.
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, as of March 2010, approximately
11.2 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the country, and
an estimated 8 million of them, or about 70 percent, were in the labor
force. Congress, the administration, and some states have taken
various actions to better ensure that those who work here have
appropriate work authorization and to safeguard jobs for authorized
employees. Nonetheless, opportunities remain for unauthorized workers
to fraudulently obtain employment by using borrowed or stolen
documents and for unscrupulous employers to hire unauthorized workers.
Immigration experts have noted that deterring illegal immigration
requires, among other things, a more reliable employment eligibility
verification process and a more robust worksite enforcement capacity.
E-Verify is a free, largely voluntary, Internet-based system operated
by the Verification Division of the Department of Homeland Security's
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Social
Security Administration (SSA). The goals of E-Verify are to (1) reduce
the employment of individuals unauthorized to work, (2) reduce
discrimination, (3) protect employee civil liberties and privacy, and
(4) prevent undue burden on employers. Pursuant to a 2007 Office of
Management Budget directive, all federal agencies are required to use
E-Verify on their new hires and, as of September 2009, certain federal
contractors and subcontractors are required to use E-Verify for newly
hired employees working in the United States as well as existing
employees working directly under the contract. A number of states have
also mandated that some or all employers within the state use E-Verify
on new hires. From October 1, 2010, through April 5, 2011, E-Verify
processed approximately 7.8 million queries from nearly 258,000
employers.
In an August 2005 report and June 2008 testimony on E-Verify, we noted
that USCIS faced challenges in detecting identity fraud and ensuring
employer compliance with the program's rules.[Footnote 1] We
highlighted some of the challenges USCIS and SSA faced in reducing
instances of erroneous tentative nonconfirmations (TNC), or situations
in which work-authorized employees are not automatically confirmed by
E-Verify.[Footnote 2] We also noted that mandatory implementation of E-
Verify would place increased demands on USCIS's and SSA's resources.
My comments today are based primarily on a report we issued in
December 2010 and provide updates to the challenges we noted in our
2005 report and 2008 testimony.[Footnote 3] My statement, as
requested, highlights findings from that report and discusses the
extent to which (1) USCIS has reduced the incidence of TNCs and E-
Verify's vulnerability to fraud, (2) USCIS has provided safeguards for
employees' personal information, and (3) USCIS and SSA have taken
steps to prepare for mandatory E-Verify implementation. Our December
2010 report also includes a discussion of the extent to which USCIS
has improved its ability to monitor and ensure employer compliance
with E-Verify program policies and procedures.
For our report, we analyzed data on the results of E-Verify cases for
fiscal year 2009 and interviewed senior E-Verify program officials
about their procedures for ensuring quality in the E-Verify
transaction database. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of our report. We reviewed documentation
explaining how to resolve TNCs and assist employees with name and
citizenship changes. We reviewed USCIS's privacy policy for E-Verify
and conducted interviews with privacy officials at USCIS to determine
what, if any, challenges exist in resolving TNCs. We assessed USCIS's
and SSA's life-cycle cost estimates and SSA's workload estimates, and
compared them to characteristics of a reliable cost estimate as
defined in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.[Footnote 4] We
selected three states for site visits--Colorado, North Carolina, and
Arizona--based on, among other reasons, the length of time each
state's E-Verify law had been in effect. While the views provided are
not generalizable, they provided us with additional perspectives on
the benefits and challenges associated with the E-Verify program. More
detailed information on our scope and methodology is contained in our
December 2010 report. We conducted this work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
USCIS and SSA Have Reduced TNCs, but the Accuracy of E-Verify
Continues to Be Limited by Both Inconsistent Recording of Employees'
Names and Fraud:
USCIS has reduced TNCs from about 8 percent for the period June 2004
through March 2007 to about 2.6 percent in fiscal year 2009.[Footnote
5] As shown in figure 1, in fiscal year 2009, about 2.6 percent or
over 211,000 of newly hired employees received either a SSA or USCIS
TNC, including about 0.3 percent who were determined to be work
eligible after they contested a TNC and resolved errors or
inaccuracies in their records, and about 2.3 percent, or about
189,000, who received a final nonconfirmation because their employment
eligibility status remained unresolved. For the approximately 2.3
percent who received a final nonconfirmation, USCIS was unable to
determine how many of these employees (1) were authorized employees
who did not take action to resolve a TNC because they were not
informed by their employers of their right to contest the TNC, (2)
independently decided not to contest the TNC, or (3) were not eligible
to work.
Figure 1: E-Verify Results for Fiscal Year 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Percentage of employees who receive TNCs later confirmed as work
authorized: 0.3%;
Percentage of employees receiving final nonconfirmations: 2.3%;
Percentage of employees automatically confirmed as work authorized:
97.4%.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of figure]
USCIS has reduced TNCs and increased E-Verify accuracy by, among other
things, expanding the number of databases that E-Verify can query and
instituting quality control procedures to screen for data entry
errors. However, erroneous TNCs continue to occur, in part, because of
inaccuracies and inconsistencies in how personal information is
recorded on employee documents, in government databases, or both. Some
actions have been taken to address name-related TNCs, but more could
be done. Specifically, USCIS could better position employees to avoid
an erroneous TNC by disseminating information to employees on the
importance of providing consistent name information and how to record
their names consistently. In our December 2010 report, we recommended
that USCIS disseminate information to employees on the potential for
name mismatches to result in erroneous TNCs and how to record their
names consistently. USCIS concurred with our recommendation and
outlined actions to address it. For example, USCIS commented that in
November 2010 it began to distribute the U.S. Citizenship Welcome
Packet at all naturalization ceremonies to advise new citizens to
update their records with SSA. USCIS also commented that it has
commissioned a study, to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal
year 2011, to determine how to enhance its name-matching algorithms.
USCIS's actions for reducing the likelihood of name-related erroneous
TNCs are useful steps, but they do not fully address the intent of the
recommendation because they do not provide specific information to
employees on how to prevent a name-related TNC. See our December 2010
report for more details.
In addition, identity fraud remains a challenge because employers may
not be able to determine if employees are presenting genuine identity
and employment eligibility documents that are borrowed or stolen.
[Footnote 6] E-Verify also cannot detect cases in which an
unscrupulous employer assists unauthorized employees. USCIS has taken
actions to address fraud, most notably with the fiscal year 2007
implementation of the photo matching tool for permanent residency
cards and employment authorization documents and the September 2010
addition to the matching tool of passport photographs. Although the
photo tool has some limitations, it can help reduce some fraud
associated with the use of genuine documents in which the original
photograph is substituted for another.[Footnote 7] To help combat
identity fraud, USCIS is also seeking to obtain driver's license data
from states and planning to develop a program that would allow victims
of identity theft to "lock" their Social Security numbers within E-
Verify until they need them to obtain employment authorization.
[Footnote 8] Combating identity fraud through the use of biometrics,
such as through fingerprint or facial recognition, has been included
in proposed legislation before Congress as an element of comprehensive
immigration reform, but implementing a biometric system has its own
set of challenges, including those associated with cost and civil
liberties. Resolving these issues will be important if this technology
is to be effectively implemented in combating identity fraud in the
employment verification process.
An effective employment authorization system requires a credible
worksite enforcement program to ensure employer compliance with
applicable immigration laws; however, USCIS is challenged in ensuring
employer compliance with E-Verify requirements for several reasons.
For example, USCIS cannot monitor the extent to which employers follow
program rules because USCIS does not have a presence in employers'
workplaces.[Footnote 9] USCIS is further limited by its existing
technology infrastructure, which provides limited ability to analyze
patterns and trends in the data that could be indicative of employer
misuse of E-Verify. USCIS has minimal avenue for recourse if employers
do not respond or remedy noncompliant behavior after a contact from
USCIS compliance staff because it has limited authority to investigate
employer misuse and no authority to impose penalties against such
employers, other than terminating those who knowingly use the
voluntary system for an unauthorized purpose. For enforcement action
for violations of immigration laws, USCIS relies on U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to investigate, sanction, and prosecute
employers. However, ICE has reported that it has limited resources to
investigate and sanction employers that knowingly hire unauthorized
workers or those that knowingly violate E-Verify program rules.
[Footnote 10] Instead, according to senior ICE officials, ICE agents
seek to maximize limited resources by applying risk assessment
principles to worksite enforcement cases and focusing on detecting and
removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites.
DHS Has Instituted Employee Privacy Protections for E-Verify, but
Resolving Erroneous TNCs Can Be Challenging:
USCIS has taken actions to institute safeguards for the privacy of
personal information for employees who are processed through E-Verify,
but has not established mechanisms for employees to identify and
access personal information maintained by DHS that may lead to an
erroneous TNC, or for E-Verify staff to correct such information. To
safeguard the privacy of personal information for employees who are
processed through E-Verify, USCIS has addressed the Fair Information
Practice Principles, which are the basis for DHS's privacy policy.
[Footnote 11] For example, USCIS published privacy notices in 2009 and
2010 that defined parameters, including setting limits on DHS's
collection and use of personal information for the E-Verify program.
Notwithstanding the efforts made by USCIS to address privacy concerns,
employees are limited in their ability to identify and access personal
information maintained by DHS that may lead to an erroneous TNC.
[Footnote 12] In our December 2010 report, we recommended that USCIS
develop procedures to enable employees to access personal information
and correct inaccuracies or inconsistencies in such information within
DHS databases. USCIS concurred and identified steps that it is taking
to address this issue, such as developing a pilot program to assist
employees receiving TNCs to request a records update and referring
individuals who receive a TNC to local USCIS or U.S. Customs and
Border Protection offices and ports of entry to correct records when
inconsistent or inaccurate information is identified. In part to
address this recommendation, in March 2011, USCIS began implementing a
Self-Check program to allow individuals to check their own work
authorization status against SSA and DHS databases prior to applying
for a job.[Footnote 13] We recognize that these efforts may be a step
in the right direction, but they do not fully respond to our
recommendation. This is because, among other things, USCIS does not
have operating procedures in place for USCIS staff to explain to
employees what personal information produced the TNC or what specific
steps they should take to correct the information. We encourage USCIS
to continue its efforts to develop procedures enabling employees to
access and correct inaccurate and inconsistent personal information in
DHS databases.
USCIS and SSA Have Taken Actions to Prepare for Mandatory
Implementation of E-Verify, but Face Challenges in Estimating Costs:
USCIS and SSA have taken actions to prepare for possible mandatory
implementation of E-Verify for all employers nationwide by addressing
key practices for effectively managing E-Verify system capacity and
availability and coordinating with each other in operating E-Verify.
However, USCIS and SSA face challenges in accurately estimating E-
Verify costs. Our analysis showed that USCIS's E-Verify estimates
partially met three of four characteristics of a reliable cost
estimate and minimally met one characteristic.[Footnote 14] As a
result, we found that USCIS is at increased risk of not making
informed investment decisions, understanding system affordability, and
developing justifiable budget requests for future E-Verify use and
potential mandatory implementation of it. To ensure that USCIS has a
sound basis for making decisions about resource investments for E-
Verify and securing sufficient resources, in our December 2010 report,
we recommended that the Director of USCIS ensure that a life-cycle
cost estimate for E-Verify is developed in a manner that reflects the
four characteristics of a reliable estimate consistent with best
practices. USCIS concurred and senior program officials told us that
USCIS, among other things, has contracted with a federally funded
research and development center to develop an independent cost
estimate of the life-cycle costs of E-Verify to better comply with our
cost-estimating guidance.
Our analysis showed that SSA's E-Verify estimates substantially met
three of four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. However, we
found that SSA's cost estimates are partially credible because SSA may
not be able to provide assurance to USCIS that it can provide the
required level of support for E-Verify operations if it experiences
cost overruns within any one fiscal year.[Footnote 15] In our December
2010 report, we recommended that the Commissioner of SSA assess the
risk around SSA's E-Verify workload estimate, in accordance with best
practices, to ensure that SSA can accurately project costs associated
with its E-Verify workload and provide the required level of support
to USCIS and E-Verify operations. SSA did not concur, and stated that
it assesses the risk around its workload cost estimates and, if E-
Verify were to become mandatory, SSA would adapt its budget models and
recalculate estimated costs based on the new projected E-Verify
workload volume. As discussed in our December 2010 report, however,
SSA does not conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis that uses
statistical models to quantitatively determine the extent of
variability around its cost estimate or identify the limitations
associated with the assumptions used to create the estimate. Thus, we
continue to believe that SSA should adopt this best practice for
estimating risks to help it reduce the potential for experiencing cost
overruns for E-Verify.
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Becerra, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased
to respond to any questions you may have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact
Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. In addition,
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals
who made key contributions to this testimony are Evi Rezmovic,
Assistant Director; Sara Margraf; and Michelle Woods. Additionally,
key contributors to our December 2010 report include Blake Ainsworth,
David Alexander, Tonia Brown, Frances Cook, Marisol Cruz, John de
Ferrari, Julian King, Danielle Pakdaman, David Plocher, Karen Richey,
Robert Robinson, Douglas Sloane, Stacey Steele, Desiree Cunningham,
Vanessa Taylor, Teresa Tucker, and Ashley Vaughan.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment
Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-813] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31,
2005) and GAO, Employment Verification: Challenges Exist in
Implementing a Mandatory Electronic Employment Verification System,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-895T] (Washington,
D.C.: June 10, 2008).
[2] We collectively refer to these situations--as well as those in
which (1) employers inadvertently make errors in data entry when
making E-Verify queries, (2) employees provide inconsistent personal
information to government agencies, and (3) government databases
contain errors unrelated to an employer's or employee's action--as
erroneous TNCs.
[3] GAO, Employment Verification: Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to
Improve E-Verify, but Significant Challenges Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-146] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17,
2010).
[4] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March
2009), 8-13.
[5] Since our December 2010 report, USCIS reported that it has further
reduced the TNC rate from about 2.6 percent in fiscal year 2009 to
about 1.7 percent in fiscal year 2010.
[6] GAO has previously reported on the risks associated with the use
of fraudulent documents and agencies' actions to address them. See
GAO, Border Security: Better Usage of Electronic Passport Security
Features Could Improve Fraud Detection, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-96] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22,
2010), and State Department: Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance
Process Remains Vulnerable to Fraud, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-922T] (Washington, D.C.: July 29,
2010).
[7] According to USCIS, from October 2009 to August 2010, there were
393,574 cases that initiated E-Verify's photo matching tool. Of these
cases, employers indicated that 1,569 employees' photos did not match,
with one case resulting in a contested TNC. USCIS told us that it is
unable to determine what percentage of the remaining 1,568 cases
involved identity fraud because they do not have additional
information on those cases.
[8] According to USCIS, a locked Social Security number would halt any
attempt by participating E-Verify employers to verify an employee's
Social Security number through E-Verify if the employee notifies USCIS
that his or her identity has been stolen and can provide supporting
documentation to USCIS.
[9] Senior E-Verify program officials said they expect improved
technology enabling automated analysis of E-Verify data to be
implemented by fiscal year 2012.
[10] In fiscal year, 2010 ICE spent about 600,000 agent-reported
workload hours on worksite enforcement, issued 237 fines as the result
of worksite audits, and made 196 criminal and 1,224 administrative
worksite enforcement arrests. For the first two quarters of fiscal
year 2011, ICE reported that the agency spent about 333,000 agent-
reported workload hours on worksite enforcement, issued 171 fines as
the result of worksite audits, and made 105 criminal and 745
administrative worksite enforcement arrests.
[11] The Fair Information Practice Principles adopted by DHS are a
revision of principles, called the Fair Information Practices, first
proposed by a U.S. government advisory committee. See Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights of
Citizens: Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems (July 1973). These principles include
Transparency, Individual Participation, Purpose Specification, Data
Minimization, Use Limitation, Data Quality and Integrity, Security,
and Accountability and Auditing.
[12] If an employee chooses to contest a TNC, the employer is required
to provide the employee a referral letter that identifies which agency
an employee needs to visit or call to resolve the TNC and close the
case.
[13] The Self-Check program allows users to check their work
authorization status by entering information into an online portal.
The Self-Check program checks users' information against relevant SSA
and DHS databases and returns information on users' employment
eligibility status. USCIS is releasing the E-Verify Self-Check service
in phases, and plans to expand Self-Check's availability nationwide
within 12 months. Self-Check service is currently offered to users
that maintain an address in Arizona, Colorado, the District of
Columbia, Idaho, Mississippi, or Virginia. We have not assessed the
privacy implications associated with the Self-Check program.
[14] Our research has determined that a reliable cost estimate should
include four characteristics. Specifically, the estimate should be
comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. GAO, GAO Cost
Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and
Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March
2009), 8-13.
[15] Pursuant to a reimbursable agreement, at the beginning of each
fiscal year, USCIS pays SSA the costs for maintaining its system
operations, as well as the projected costs for assisting employees
with resolving TNCs. At the end of each fiscal year, SSA and USCIS
reconcile any differences between actual costs and estimates, and SSA
is to return any unspent funds to USCIS. USCIS provides SSA estimates
of anticipated transaction volumes to help SSA estimate its future
costs for operating E-Verify. In fiscal year 2010, USCIS reimbursed
SSA approximately $7.8 million for operating E-Verify.
[End of section]
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