Combating Nuclear Smuggling
DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain
Gao ID: GAO-11-869T July 26, 2011
This testimony discusses our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a "dirty bomb"). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings. However, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways and has identified several gaps in the GNDA, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States; (2) international general aviation; and (3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. Developing strategies, technologies, and resources to address these gaps remains one of the key challenges in deploying the GNDA. Some progress has been made, but DHS and other federal agencies have yet to fully address gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, this testimony discusses DHS's efforts to (1) address our prior recommendations to develop a strategic plan for the GNDA, including developing strategies to prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, (2) complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, and (3) develop new technologies to detect nuclear or radioactive materials. This testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials issued from October 2002 through September 2010. We updated this information in July 2011 to reflect DHS's efforts to address our prior recommendations by meeting with DNDO officials and reviewing recent DNDO documents, such as the 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan and the 2011 GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review.
In summary, since December 2010, DNDO has issued both a strategic plan to guide the development of the GNDA and an annual report on the current status of the GNDA. The new strategic plan addressed some key components of what we previously recommended be included in a strategic plan, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities for meeting strategic objectives. However, neither the plan nor the annual report identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's objectives or employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. DHS officials informed us that they will address these missing elements in an implementation plan, which they plan to issue before the end of this year. As we reported in September 2010, DHS has made progress in deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo entering the United States through land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials. For example, according to DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports. However, as we reported in July 2011, DHS has experienced challenges in developing new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials, such as developing and meeting key performance requirements. DHS has plans to enhance its development and acquisition of new technologies, although it is still too early to assess their impact on addressing the challenges we identified in our past work.
GAO-11-869T, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-869T
entitled 'Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic
Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain'
which was released on July 26, 2011.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House
of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, July 26, 2011:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture, but Gaps Remain:
Statement of David C. Maurer, Director: Homeland Security and Justice:
and:
Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-11-869T:
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in
planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection
architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an
integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction
activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the
U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling
nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use
these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological
dispersal device (also called a "dirty bomb"). The detonation of a
nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands
of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for
miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could
nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic
costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and
possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological
decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains
our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the
consequences of nuclear terrorism.
The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).[Footnote 1] DNDO is also responsible
for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment
to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on
established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border
crossings. However, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection
strategies along other potential pathways and has identified several
gaps in the GNDA, including (1) land border areas between ports of
entry into the United States; (2) international general aviation; and
(3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial
fishing vessels. Developing strategies, technologies, and resources to
address these gaps remains one of the key challenges in deploying the
GNDA.
Even before DNDO's inception in 2005,[Footnote 2] we were highlighting
the need for a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In
2002, we reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing
radiation detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at
all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry.[Footnote 3] We reported
that this plan should (1) address vulnerabilities and risks; (2)
identify the complement of radiation detection equipment that should
be used at each type of border entry point--air, rail, land, and sea--
and whether equipment could be immediately deployed; (3) identify
longer-term radiation detection needs; and (4) develop measures to
ensure that the equipment is adequately maintained. More recently, in
July 2008, we testified that DNDO had not developed an overarching
strategic plan and recommended that DHS coordinate with the
Departments of Defense, Energy, and State to develop one.[Footnote 4]
In January 2009, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global
nuclear detection strategy to help ensure the success of initiatives
aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities in the United States.
[Footnote 5] We stated that this plan should focus on, among other
things, establishing time frames and costs for the three gaps DNDO had
identified--land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and
small maritime vessels. DHS agreed with the recommendation that we
made in our 2008 testimony on the need for an overarching strategic
plan to guide future efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and move
toward a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. DHS did
not comment on our 2009 recommendation to develop a plan for the
domestic portion of the GNDA but noted that it aligned with DNDO's
past, present, and future actions.
As we will discuss today, some progress has been made, but DHS and
other federal agencies have yet to fully address gaps in the global
nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, this testimony discusses
DHS's efforts to (1) address our prior recommendations to develop a
strategic plan for the GNDA, including developing strategies to
prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the
critical gaps DNDO identified, (2) complete the deployment of
radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances
entering the United States at ports of entry, and (3) develop new
technologies to detect nuclear or radioactive materials.
This testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts
to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological
materials issued from October 2002 through September 2010. We updated
this information in July 2011 to reflect DHS's efforts to address our
prior recommendations by meeting with DNDO officials and reviewing
recent DNDO documents, such as the 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan and the
2011 GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review.[Footnote 6] Our comments on
DNDO's efforts to develop new technologies to detect nuclear material
are based on our prior work on DHS's progress and challenges
developing and acquiring new technologies issued from May 2009 through
July 2011. Details on the scope and methodology for those reviews are
available in our published reports.[Footnote 7] We conducted this work
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary, since December 2010, DNDO has issued both a strategic plan
to guide the development of the GNDA and an annual report on the
current status of the GNDA. The new strategic plan addressed some key
components of what we previously recommended be included in a
strategic plan, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities for
meeting strategic objectives. However, neither the plan nor the annual
report identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's
objectives or employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic
progress and identify needed improvements. DHS officials informed us
that they will address these missing elements in an implementation
plan, which they plan to issue before the end of this year.
As we reported in September 2010, DHS has made progress in deploying
both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan
cargo entering the United States through land and sea ports of entry
for nuclear and radiological materials.[Footnote 8] For example,
according to DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of
the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land
borders and major seaports. However, as we reported in July 2011, DHS
has experienced challenges in developing new technologies to detect
nuclear and radiological materials, such as developing and meeting key
performance requirements.[Footnote 9] DHS has plans to enhance its
development and acquisition of new technologies, although it is still
too early to assess their impact on addressing the challenges we
identified in our past work.
DHS Has Developed a Strategic Plan for GNDA, but It Does Not Yet
Discuss Key Elements for Addressing Gaps:
In our past work on GNDA, we made recommendations about the need for a
strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among other
things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an overall
strategic plan for the GNDA that (1) clearly defines the objectives to
be accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities for
meeting each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to
achieve those objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to
determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements.
[Footnote 10] In January 2009, we also recommended that DHS develop
strategies to guide the domestic aspects of the GNDA including
establishing time frames and costs for addressing previously
identified gaps in the GNDA--land border areas between ports of entry,
international general aviation, and small maritime vessels.[Footnote
11] DHS concurred with our 2008 recommendation to develop an overall
strategic plan and did not comment on our 2009 recommendation to
develop a plan for the domestic portion of the GNDA, but noted that it
aligned with DNDO's past, present, and future actions.
In December 2010, DNDO issued a strategic plan for the GNDA. The
strategic plan establishes a broad vision for the GNDA, identifies
cross-cutting issues, defines several objectives, and assigns mission
roles and responsibilities to the various federal entities that
contribute to the GNDA. For example, the Department of Energy has the
lead for several aspects of enhancing international capabilities for
detecting nuclear materials abroad, DHS has the lead for detecting
nuclear materials as they cross the border into the United States, and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the lead on reporting and
sharing information on lost or stolen domestic radiological material.
In addition, earlier this year, DNDO released the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture Joint Annual Interagency Review 2011. This
review describes the current status of GNDA and includes information
about the multiple federal programs that collectively seek to prevent
nuclear terrorism in the United States.
However, neither the strategic plan nor the 2011 interagency review
identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's objectives
nor establishes monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic
progress and identify needed improvements--key elements of a strategic
plan that we previously identified in our recommendations.
Furthermore, while the plan and the 2011 interagency review discuss
previously identified gaps in the domestic portion of the
architecture, neither discusses strategies, priorities, timeframes, or
costs for addressing these gaps.
In our view, one of the key benefits of a strategic plan is that it is
a comprehensive means of establishing priorities, and using these
priorities to allocate resources so that the greatest needs are being
addressed. In times of tight budgets, allocating resources to address
the highest priorities becomes even more important. Accordingly, while
DNDO's new strategic plan represents an important step forward in
guiding the development of the GNDA, DNDO could do more to articulate
strategies, priorities, timeframes and costs in addressing gaps and
further deploying the GNDA in order to protect the homeland from the
consequences of nuclear terrorism. In discussing these issues with DHS
officials, they indicated that they will be producing a GNDA
implementation plan later this year that will address several of these
issues.
DHS Continues to Make Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection
Equipment:
As we reported in June 2010, DHS has made significant progress in
deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures
to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed
land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials,
deploying nearly two-thirds of the radiation portal monitors
identified in its deployment plan. According to DHS officials, the
department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances
entering the United States through land borders and major seaports.
However, as we reported, DHS has made less progress scanning for
radiation in (1) railcars entering the United States from Canada and
Mexico; (2) international air cargo; and (3) international commercial
aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage.
Fixed Land and Sea Ports of Entry:
According to DHS officials, since November 2009, almost all non-rail
land ports of entry have been equipped with one or more radiation
detection portal monitors and 100 percent of all cargo, conveyances,
drivers, and passengers driving into the United States through
commercial lanes at land borders are scanned for radiation, as are
more than 99 percent of all personally operated vehicles (non
commercial passenger cars and light trucks), drivers, and passengers.
Similarly, at major seaports, according to DHS officials, the
department scans nearly all containerized cargo entering U.S. seaports
for nuclear and radiological materials. DHS has deployed radiation
portal monitors to major American seaports that account for the
majority of cargo entering the United States. However, some smaller
seaports that receive cargo may not be equipped with these portal
monitors. DHS officials stated that current deployment plans have been
in place to address all the remaining gaps in the deployment of portal
monitors to seaports but that current and future budget realities
require a re-planning of the deployment schedule.
International Rail:
DHS has made much less progress scanning international rail. As we
reported in June 2010, there is limited systematic radiation scanning
of the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars entering the United States each
day from Canada and Mexico. Much of the scanning for radioactive
materials that takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with
portable, hand-held radioactive isotope identification devices.
According to DHS officials, international rail traffic represents one
of the most difficult challenges for radiation detection systems due
to the nature of trains and the need to develop close cooperation with
officials in Mexico and Canada. In addition, DHS officials told us
that rail companies resist doing things that might slow down rail
traffic and typically own the land where DHS would need to establish
stations for primary and secondary screening. DHS is in the early
stages of developing procedures and technology to feasibly scan
international rail traffic.
International Air Cargo and Commercial Aviation:
As we reported in 2010, DHS is in the early stages of addressing the
challenges of scanning for radioactive materials presented by air
cargo and commercial aviation. DHS officials are also developing plans
to increase their capacity to scan for radioactive materials in
international air cargo conveyed on commercial airlines. DHS officials
stated that their experience in scanning air cargo at a few major
international airports in the United States has helped them develop
scanning procedures and inform current and future deployment
strategies for both fixed and mobile radiation detection equipment.
These officials said that they believe that further operational
experience and research is necessary before they can develop practical
mobile scanning strategies and procedures. DHS is also developing
plans to effectively scan commercial aviation aircraft, passengers,
and baggage for radioactive materials.
DHS Has Had Difficulty in Developing New Technologies to Detect
Nuclear Materials:
Since 2006, we have reported that DHS faces difficulties in developing
new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials.
Specifically, we have reported on longstanding problems with DNDO's
efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation
detection monitors. The ASP is a more advanced and significantly more
expensive type of radiation detection portal monitor to replace the
polyvinyl toluene (PVT) portal monitors in many locations that the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency within DHS, currently
uses to screen cargo at ports of entry. We have issued numerous
reports regarding problems with the cost and performance of the ASPs
and the lack of rigor in testing this equipment. For example, we found
that tests DNDO conducted in early 2007 used biased test methods that
enhanced the apparent performance of ASPs and did not use critical CBP
operating procedures that are fundamental to the performance of
current radiation detectors.[Footnote 12] In addition, in 2008 we
estimated the lifecycle cost of each standard cargo version of the ASP
(including deployment costs) to be about $822,000, compared with about
$308,000 for the PVT portal monitor, and the total program cost for
DNDO's latest plan for deploying radiation portal monitors to be about
$2 billion.[Footnote 13] Based in part on our work, DHS informed this
Committee in February 2010, after spending over $280 million, that the
department had scaled back its plans for the development and use of
ASP technology.
In September 2010, we also reported that DNDO was simultaneously
engaged in the research and development phase while planning for the
acquisition phase of its cargo advanced automated radiography system
(CAARS) to detect certain nuclear materials in vehicles and containers
at CBP ports of entry.[Footnote 14] DNDO pursued the deployment of
CAARS without fully understanding that it would not fit within
existing inspection lanes at ports of entry and would slow down the
flow of commerce through these lanes, causing significant delays. DHS
spent $113 million on the program since 2005 and canceled the
acquisition phase of the program in 2007. As we reported in September
2010, no CAARS machines had been deployed, and CAARS machines from
various vendors were either disassembled or sitting idle without being
tested in a port environment.
DNDO's problems developing the ASP and CAARS technologies are examples
of broader challenges DHS faces in developing and acquiring new
technologies to meet homeland security needs. Earlier this month, we
testified that DHS has experienced challenges managing its
multibillion-dollar acquisition efforts, including implementing
technologies that did not meet intended requirements and were not
appropriately tested and evaluated, and has not consistently completed
analysis of costs and benefits before technologies were implemented.
[Footnote 15] In June 2011, DHS reported to us that it is taking steps
to strengthen its investment and acquisition management processes
across the department. For example, DHS plans to establish a new model
for managing departmentwide investments, establish new councils and
boards to help ensure that test and evaluation methods are
appropriately considered, and is working to improve the quality and
accuracy of program cost estimates. As we testified, we believe these
are positive steps and, if implemented effectively, could help the
department address many of its acquisition challenges. However, it is
still too early to assess the impact of DHS's efforts to address these
challenges. Going forward, we believe DHS will need to demonstrate
measurable, sustained progress in effectively implementing these
actions.
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact David C. Maurer at
(202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov or Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement
include Ned Woodward and Kevin Tarmann.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development
of New Technologies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-829T] (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2011).
DHS Science and Technology: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Test and
Evaluation Requirements Are Met, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-596 (Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2011).
Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container Security
Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational Scenarios To
Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-887] (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29,
2010).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and Oversight
Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography System to
Detect Nuclear Materials, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1041T] (Washington D.C.: Sept. 15,
2010).
Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex
Acquisitions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-588SP]
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-804T] (Washington, D.C.: June 25,
2009).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show
Limits of the New Technology. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-655] (Washington, D.C.: May 21,
2009).
Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve
Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257] (Washington D.C.: Jan. 29,
2009).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and Deploy
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the
Department's Previous Cost Estimates, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1108R] (Washington DC: Sept. 22,
2008).
Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T](Washington, D.C.: July 16,
2008).
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure
Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007).
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-235T]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2002).
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Other departments and agencies contributing to the GNDA include
the Departments of Energy, State, Defense, and Justice; the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence; and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
[2] National Security Presidential Directive 43/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 14, Domestic Nuclear Detection, April 15, 2005.
DNDO was established in statute by the Security and Accountability for
Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 501
(codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 591-596a).
[3] GAO, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation
Detection Equipment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-235T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17,
2002).
[4] GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T] (Washington, D.C.: July 16,
2008).
[5] GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should
Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257] (Washington D.C.:
Jan. 29, 2009).
[6] The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Joint Annual Interagency
Review 2011 was produced by DNDO in response to Section 1103 of the
"Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007"
(Pub.L. No. 110-53), which mandates a Joint Annual Interagency Review
of the GNDA and the joint submission of a report on that review to the
President and specified Congressional Committees by the Secretaries of
Homeland Security, State, Defense, Energy; the Attorney General; and
the Director of National Intelligence.
[7] See a list of related GAO products at the end of this statement.
[8] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and
Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography
System to Detect Nuclear Materials, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1041T] (Washington D.C.: Sept. 15,
2010).
[9] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and
Development of New Technologies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-829T] (Washington D.C.: July 15,
2011).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T].
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257].
[12] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to
Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection
Equipment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007).
[13] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and
Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to
Exceed the Department's Previous Cost Estimates, GAO-08-1108R
(Washington DC: Sept 22, 2008).
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1041T].
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-829T].
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: