Homeland Security
DHS and TSA Acquisition and Development of New Technologies Gao ID: GAO-11-957T September 22, 2011Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for developing and acquiring new technologies to address homeland security needs. TSA's acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security missions and investments including technologies used to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo, among others. GAO's testimony addresses three key challenges identified in past work: (1) developing technology program requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new technologies, and (3) incorporating information on costs and benefits in making technology acquisition decisions. This statement also addresses recent DHS efforts to strengthen its investment and acquisition processes. This statement is based on reports and testimonies GAO issued from October 2009 through September 2011 related to TSA's efforts to manage, test, and deploy various technology programs.
GAO's past work has found that TSA has faced challenges in developing technology program requirements on a systemic and individual basis. Program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start. In June 2010, GAO reported that over half of the 15 DHS programs (including 3 TSA programs) GAO reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines. At the program level, in July 2011, GAO reported that in 2010 TSA revised its explosive detection systems (EDS) requirements to better address current threats and plans to implement these requirements in a phased approach. However, GAO reported that some number of the EDSs in TSA's fleet are configured to detect explosives at the levels established in the 2005 requirements and TSA did not have a plan with time frames needed to deploy EDSs to meet the current requirements. GAO has also reported DHS and TSA challenges in overseeing and testing new technologies. For example, in July 2011, GAO reported that TSA experienced challenges in collecting data on the physical and chemical properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software and needed by TSA before procuring and deploying EDSs to airports. TSA and DHS Science and Technology Directorate have experienced these challenges because of problems associated with safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives. The challenges related to data collection for certain explosives have resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned. In addition, in October 2009, GAO reported that TSA deployed explosives trace portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers at airport checkpoints, in January 2006 even though TSA officials were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier models of the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment. In June 2006, TSA halted deployment of the explosives trace portals because of performance problems and high installation costs. GAO's prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help congressional and agency decision makers assess and prioritize resource investments and consider potentially more cost-effective alternatives, and that without this ability, agencies are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. GAO has reported that TSA has not consistently included these analyses in its acquisition decision making. In June 2011, DHS reported that it is taking steps to strengthen its investment and acquisition management processes by implementing a decision-making process at critical phases throughout the investment life cycle. The actions DHS reports taking to address the management of its acquisitions and the development of new technologies are positive steps and, if implemented effectively, could help the department address many of these challenges. GAO is not making any new recommendations. In prior work, GAO made recommendations to address challenges related to deploying EDS to meet requirements, overseeing and conducting testing of new technologies, and incorporating information on costs and benefits in making technology acquisition decisions. DHS and TSA concurred and described actions underway to address the recommendations.
GAO-11-957T, Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Acquisition and Development of New Technologies
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, September 22, 2011:
Homeland Security:
DHS and TSA Acquisition and Development of New Technologies:
Statement of Steve Lord, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-11-957T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-957T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for developing and
acquiring new technologies to address homeland security needs. TSA‘s
acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life-cycle costs
and support a wide range of aviation security missions and investments
including technologies used to screen passengers, checked baggage, and
air cargo, among others. GAO‘s testimony addresses three key
challenges identified in past work: (1) developing technology program
requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new
technologies, and (3) incorporating information on costs and benefits
in making technology acquisition decisions. This statement also
addresses recent DHS efforts to strengthen its investment and
acquisition processes. This statement is based on reports and
testimonies GAO issued from October 2009 through September 2011
related to TSA‘s efforts to manage, test, and deploy various
technology programs.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s past work has found that TSA has faced challenges in developing
technology program requirements on a systemic and individual basis.
Program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid
baseline requirements established at the program start. In June 2010,
GAO reported that over half of the 15 DHS programs (including 3 TSA
programs) GAO reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition
activities without component or department approval of documents
essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements,
or establishing acquisition program baselines. At the program level,
in July 2011, GAO reported that in 2010 TSA revised its explosive
detection systems (EDS) requirements to better address current threats
and plans to implement these requirements in a phased approach.
However, GAO reported that some number of the EDSs in TSA‘s fleet are
configured to detect explosives at the levels established in the 2005
requirements and TSA did not have a plan with time frames needed to
deploy EDSs to meet the current requirements.
GAO has also reported DHS and TSA challenges in overseeing and testing
new technologies. For example, in July 2011, GAO reported that TSA
experienced challenges in collecting data on the physical and chemical
properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS
detection software and needed by TSA before procuring and deploying
EDSs to airports. TSA and DHS Science and Technology Directorate have
experienced these challenges because of problems associated with
safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives. The
challenges related to data collection for certain explosives have
resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned. In
addition, in October 2009, GAO reported that TSA deployed explosives
trace portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on
passengers at airport checkpoints, in January 2006 even though TSA
officials were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on
earlier models of the portals suggested the portals did not
demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment. In June
2006, TSA halted deployment of the explosives trace portals because of
performance problems and high installation costs.
GAO‘s prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help
congressional and agency decision makers assess and prioritize
resource investments and consider potentially more cost-effective
alternatives, and that without this ability, agencies are at risk of
experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance
shortfalls. GAO has reported that TSA has not consistently included
these analyses in its acquisition decision making.
In June 2011, DHS reported that it is taking steps to strengthen its
investment and acquisition management processes by implementing a
decision-making process at critical phases throughout the investment
life cycle. The actions DHS reports taking to address the management
of its acquisitions and the development of new technologies are
positive steps and, if implemented effectively, could help the
department address many of these challenges.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making any new recommendations. In prior work, GAO made
recommendations to address challenges related to deploying EDS to meet
requirements, overseeing and conducting testing of new technologies,
and incorporating information on costs and benefits in making
technology acquisition decisions. DHS and TSA concurred and described
actions underway to address the recommendations.
[End of section]
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) progress and challenges
in developing and acquiring new technologies to address homeland
security needs. TSA acquisition programs represent billions of dollars
in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security
missions and investments including technologies used to screen
passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo, among others. Within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) has responsibility for coordinating and conducting
basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and
evaluation activities relevant to DHS components, which also have
responsibilities for developing, testing, acquiring, and deploying
such technologies. For example, TSA is responsible for securing the
nation's transportation systems and, with S&T, researching,
developing, and deploying technologies to, for example, screen airline
passengers and their property.
In recent years, we have reported that DHS has experienced challenges
in managing its multibillion-dollar acquisition efforts, including
implementing technologies that did not meet intended requirements and
were not appropriately tested and evaluated, and has not consistently
included completed analyses of costs and benefits before technologies
were implemented.
My testimony today focuses on the key findings of our prior work
related to TSA's efforts to acquire and deploy new technologies to
address homeland security needs. Our past work has identified three
key challenges: (1) developing technology program requirements, (2)
overseeing and conducting testing of new technologies, and (3)
incorporating information on costs and benefits in making technology
acquisition decisions. This statement will also discuss recent DHS and
TSA efforts to strengthen its investment and acquisition processes.
This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from
October 2009 through September 2011 related to TSA's efforts to
manage, test, and deploy various technology programs.[Footnote 1] For
our past work, we reviewed program schedules, planning documents,
testing reports, and other acquisition documentation. For some of the
programs we discuss in this testimony, we conducted site visits to a
range of facilities, such as national laboratories, airports, and
other locations to observe research, development, and testing efforts.
We also conducted interviews with DHS component program managers and
S&T officials to discuss issues related to individual programs. We
conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. More detailed information on the scope and
methodology from our previous work can be found within each specific
report.
Background:
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) established TSA as
the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the
nation's civil aviation system, which includes the screening of all
passenger and property transported from and within the United States
by commercial passenger aircraft.[Footnote 2] In accordance with ATSA,
all passengers, their accessible property, and their checked baggage
are screened pursuant to TSA-established procedures at the 463
airports presently regulated for security by TSA. These procedures
generally provide, among other things, that passengers pass through
security checkpoints where they and their identification documents,
and accessible property, are checked by transportation security
officers (TSO), other TSA employees, or by private-sector screeners
under TSA's Screening Partnership Program.[Footnote 3] Airport
operators, however, also have direct responsibility for implementing
TSA security requirements such as those relating to perimeter security
and access controls, in accordance with their approved security
programs and other TSA direction.
TSA relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and
disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. These
layers include behavior detection officers (BDOs), who examine
passenger behaviors and appearances to identify passengers who might
pose a potential security risk at TSA-regulated airports;[Footnote 4]
travel document checkers, who examine tickets, passports, and other
forms of identification; TSOs responsible for screening passengers and
their carry-on baggage at passenger checkpoints, using x-ray
equipment, magnetometers, Advanced Imaging Technology, and other
devices; random employee screening; and checked-baggage screening
systems.[Footnote 5]
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA have taken
actions to coordinate and collaborate in their efforts to develop and
deploy technologies for aviation security. For example, they entered
into a 2006 memorandum of understanding for using S&T's Transportation
Security Laboratory, and they established the Capstone Integrated
Product Team for Explosives Prevention in 2006 to help DHS, TSA, and
the U.S. Secret Service to, among other things, identify priorities
for explosives prevention.
DHS and TSA Have Experienced Challenges in Developing and Meeting Key
Performance Requirements for Various Technologies:
Our past work has found that technology program performance cannot be
accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at
the program start. Without the development, review, and approval of
key acquisition documents, such as the mission need statement,
agencies are at risk of having poorly defined requirements that can
negatively affect program performance and contribute to increased
costs.[Footnote 6] For example, in June 2010, we reported that over
half of the 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate
acquisition activities without component or department approval of
documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational
requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines.[Footnote
7] For example, TSA's Electronic Baggage Screening Program did not
have a department-approved program baseline or program requirements,
but TSA is acquiring and deploying next-generation explosive detection
technology to replace legacy systems. We made a number of
recommendations to help address issues related to these procurements
as discussed below. DHS has generally agreed with these
recommendations and, to varying degrees, has taken actions to address
them.
In addition, our past work has found that TSA faces challenges in
identifying and meeting program requirements in a number of its
programs. For example:
* In July 2011, we reported that TSA revised its explosive detection
system (EDS) requirements to better address current threats and plans
to implement these requirements in a phased approach.[Footnote 8]
However, we reported that some number of the EDSs in TSA's fleet are
configured to detect explosives at the levels established in the 2005
requirements. The remaining EDSs are configured to detect explosives
at 1998 levels. When TSA established the 2005 requirements, it did not
have a plan with the appropriate time frames needed to deploy EDSs to
meet the requirements. To help ensure that EDSs are operating most
effectively, we recommended that TSA develop a plan to deploy and
operate EDSs to meet the most recent requirements to ensure new and
currently deployed EDSs are operated at the levels in established
requirements.[Footnote 9] DHS concurred with our recommendation and
has begun taking action to address them; for example, DHS reported
that TSA has developed a plan to evaluate its current fleet of EDSs to
determine the extent to which they comply with these requirements.
However, our recommendation is intended to ensure that TSA operate all
EDSs at airports at the most recent requirements. Until TSA develops a
plan identifying how it will approach the upgrades for currently
deployed EDSs--and the plan includes such items as estimated costs and
the number of machines that can be upgraded--it will be difficult for
TSA to provide reasonable assurance that its upgrade approach is
feasible or cost-effective. Further, while TSA's efforts are positive
steps, it is too early to assess their effect or whether they address
our recommendation.
* In October 2009, we reported that TSA passenger screening checkpoint
technologies were delayed because TSA had not consistently
communicated clear requirements for testing the technologies.[Footnote
10] We recommended that TSA evaluate whether current passenger
screening procedures should be revised to require the use of
appropriate screening procedures until TSA determined that existing
emerging technologies meet their functional requirements in an
operational environment. TSA agreed with this recommendation. However,
communications issues with the business community persist. In July
2011, we reported that vendors for checked-baggage screening
technology expressed concerns about the extent to which TSA
communicated with the business community about the current EDS
procurement.[Footnote 11] TSA agreed with our July 2011 recommendation
to establish a process to communicate information regarding TSA's EDS
acquisition to EDS vendors in a timely manner and reported taking
actions to address it such as soliciting more feedback from vendors
through kickoff meetings, industry days, and classified discussions of
program requirements.
DHS and TSA Have Encountered Challenges in Overseeing and Testing New
Technologies:
Our prior work has also shown that not resolving problems discovered
during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and rework at a
later date. Addressing such problems before moving to the acquisition
phase can help agencies better manage costs. Specifically:
* In June 2011 we reported that S&T's Test & Evaluation and Standards
Office, responsible for overseeing test and evaluation of DHS's major
acquisition programs, reviewed or approved test and evaluation
documents and plans for programs undergoing testing, and conducted
independent assessments for the programs that completed operational
testing.[Footnote 12] DHS senior-level officials considered the
office's assessments and input in deciding whether programs were ready
to proceed to the next acquisition phase. However, the office did not
consistently document its review and approval of components' test
agents--a government entity or independent contractor carrying out
independent operational testing for a major acquisition. In addition,
the office did not document its review of other component acquisition
documents, such as those establishing programs' operational
requirements. We recommended, among other things, that S&T develop
mechanisms to document its review of component acquisition
documentation. DHS concurred and reported actions underway to address
them.
* In July 2011, we reported that TSA experienced challenges in
collecting explosives data on the physical and chemical properties of
certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection
software.[Footnote 13] These data are also needed by TSA for testing
the machines to determine whether they meet established requirements
prior to their procurement and deployment to airports. TSA and S&T
have experienced these challenges because of problems associated with
safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives. The
challenges related to data collection for certain explosives have
resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned.
Specifically, attempting to collect data for certain explosives while
simultaneously pursuing the EDS procurement delayed the EDS
acquisition schedule. We recommended that TSA develop a plan to ensure
that TSA has the explosives data needed for each of the planned phases
of the 2010 EDS requirements before starting the procurement process
for new EDSs or upgrades included in each applicable phase. DHS stated
that TSA modified its strategy for the EDS's competitive procurement
in July 2010 in response to the challenges in working with the
explosives for data collection by removing the data collection from
the procurement process. While TSA's plan to separate the data
collection from the procurement process is a positive step, we feel,
to fully address our recommendation, a plan is needed to establish a
process for ensuring that data are available before starting the
procurement process for new EDSs or upgrades for each applicable phase.
* In July 2011, we also reported that TSA revised EDS explosives
detection requirements in January 2010 to better address current
threats and plans to implement these requirements in a phased
approach. TSA had previously revised the EDS requirements in 2005
though it did not begin operating EDS to meet the 2005 requirements
until 2009. Further, TSA deployed a number of EDSs that had the
software necessary to meet the 2005 requirements, but because the
software was not activated, these EDSs were still detecting explosives
at levels established before TSA revised the requirements in 2005. TSA
officials stated that prior to activating the software in these EDSs,
they must conduct testing to compare the false-alarm rates for
machines operating at one level of requirements to those operating at
another level of requirements. According to TSA officials, the results
of this testing would allow them to determine if additional staff are
needed at airports to help resolve false alarms once the EDSs are
configured to operate at a certain level of requirements. TSA
officials told us that they plan to perform this testing as a part of
the current EDS acquisition.
* In October 2009, we reported that TSA deployed explosives trace
portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on passengers
at airport checkpoints, in January 2006 even though TSA officials were
aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier models of
the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable
performance in an airport environment.[Footnote 14] TSA also lacked
assurance that the portals would meet functional requirements in
airports within estimated costs and the machines were more expensive
to install and maintain than expected. In June 2006, TSA halted
deployment of the explosives trace portals because of performance
problems and high installation costs. We recommended that to the
extent feasible, TSA ensure that tests are completed before deploying
checkpoint screening technologies to airports. DHS concurred with the
recommendation and has taken action to address it, such as requiring
more-recent technologies to complete both laboratory and operational
tests prior to deployment. For example, TSA officials stated that,
unlike the explosive trace portal, operational testing for the
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) was successfully completed late in
2009 before its deployment was fully initiated. We are currently
evaluating the testing conducted on AIT as part of an ongoing review.
TSA Has Not Consistently Incorporated Information on Costs and
Benefits in Making Acquisition Decisions:
According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, security
strategies should be informed by, among other things, a risk
assessment that includes threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments, information such as cost-benefit analyses to prioritize
investments, and performance measures to assess the extent to which a
strategy reduces or mitigates the risk of terrorist attacks.[Footnote
15] Our prior work has shown that cost-benefit analyses help
congressional and agency decision makers assess and prioritize
resource investments and consider potentially more cost-effective
alternatives, and that without this ability, agencies are at risk of
experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance
shortfalls. For example, we have reported that TSA has not
consistently included these analyses in its acquisition decision
making. Specifically:
* In October 2009, we reported that TSA had not yet completed a cost-
benefit analysis to prioritize and fund its technology investments for
screening passengers at airport checkpoints.[Footnote 16] One reason
that TSA had difficulty developing a cost-benefit analysis was that it
had not yet developed life-cycle cost estimates for its various
screening technologies. We reported that this information was
important because it would help decision makers determine, given the
cost of various technologies, which technology provided the greatest
mitigation of risk for the resources that were available. We
recommended that TSA develop a cost-benefit analysis. TSA agreed with
this recommendation and has completed a life-cycle cost estimate, but
has not yet completed a cost-benefit analysis.
* In March 2010, we reported that TSA had not conducted a cost-benefit
analysis to guide the initial AIT deployment strategy.[Footnote 17]
Such an analysis would help inform TSA's judgment about the optimal
deployment strategy for the AITs, as well as provide information to
inform the best path forward, considering all elements of the
screening system, for addressing the vulnerability identified by the
attempted December 25, 2009, terrorist attack. We recommended that TSA
conduct a cost-benefit analysis. TSA completed a cost-effectiveness
analysis in June 2011 and provided it to us in August 2011. We are
currently evaluating this analysis as part of our ongoing AIT review.
DHS Has Efforts Underway to Strengthen Acquisition and Technology
Development:
Since DHS's inception in 2003, we have designated implementing and
transforming DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22
agencies--several with major management challenges--into one
department. This high-risk area includes challenges in strengthening
DHS's management functions, including acquisitions; the effect of
those challenges on DHS's mission implementation; and challenges in
integrating management functions within and across the department and
its components. Failure to effectively address DHS's management and
mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and
economic security.[Footnote 18]
In part because of the problems we have highlighted in DHS's
acquisition process, implementing and transforming DHS has remained on
our high-risk list. DHS currently has several plans and efforts
underway to address the high-risk designation as well as the more
specific challenges related to acquisition, technology development,
and program implementation that we have previously identified.
In June 2011, DHS reported to us that it is taking steps to strengthen
its investment and acquisition management processes across the
department by implementing a decision-making process at critical
phases throughout the investment life cycle.[Footnote 19] For example,
DHS reported that it plans to establish a new model for managing
departmentwide investments across their life cycles. Under this plan,
S&T would be involved in each phase of the investment life cycle and
participate in new councils and boards DHS is planning to create to
help ensure that test and evaluation methods are appropriately
considered as part of DHS's overall research and development
investment strategies. According to DHS, S&T will help ensure that new
technologies are properly scoped, developed, and tested before being
implemented. DHS also reports that it is working with components to
improve the quality and accuracy of cost estimates and has increased
its staff during fiscal year 2011 to develop independent cost
estimates, a GAO best practice, to ensure the accuracy and credibility
of program costs.[Footnote 20] DHS reports that four cost estimates
for level 1 programs have been validated to date, but did not
explicitly identify whether any of the Life Cycle Cost Estimates were
for TSA programs.[Footnote 21]
The actions DHS reports taking or has underway to address the
management of its acquisitions and the development of new technologies
are positive steps and, if implemented effectively, could help the
department address many of these challenges. However, showing
demonstrable progress in executing these plans is key. In the past,
DHS has not effectively implemented its acquisition policies, in part
because it lacked the oversight capacity necessary to manage its
growing portfolio of major acquisition programs. Since DHS has only
recently initiated these actions, it is too early to fully assess
their effect on the challenges that we have identified in our past
work. Going forward, we believe DHS will need to demonstrate
measurable, sustainable progress in effectively implementing these
actions.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
subcommittee may have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Steve Lord at (202)
512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony are David M. Bruno, Assistant Director; Robert Lowthian;
Scott Behen; Ryan Consaul; Tom Lombardi; Bill Russell; Nate
Tranquilli; and Julie Silvers.
Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on
are listed within each individual product.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are
Needed to Improve Security. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-938T]. Washington, D.C.: September
16, 2011.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in
Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-881]. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 2011.
Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development
of New Technologies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-829T]. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2011.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Improve Security, but
Additional Efforts Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-807T]. Washington, D.C.: July 13,
2011.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection
Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740].
Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011.
Homeland Security: Improvements in Managing Research and Development
Could Help Reduce Inefficiencies and Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-464T]. Washington D.C.: March 15,
2011.
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278]. Washington D.C.: February 16,
2011.
Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex
Acquisitions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-588SP].
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Aviation Security: Progress Made but Actions Needed to Address
Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-880T]. Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2010.
Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of
Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other
Areas of Aviation Security Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-484T]. Washington, D.C.: March 17,
2010.
Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun
Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to
Face Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128].
Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2009.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See the related products list at the end of this statement.
[2] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). For purposes of this
testimony, "commercial passenger aircraft" refers to a U.S. or foreign-
based air carrier operating under TSA-approved security programs with
regularly scheduled passenger operations to or from a U.S. airport.
[3] Private-sector screeners under contract to and overseen by TSA,
and not TSOs, perform screening activities at the 16 airports
participating in TSA's Screening Partnership Program as of July 2011.
See 49 U.S.C. § 44920.
[4] TSA designed the Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques
program to provide BDOs with a means of identifying persons who may
pose a potential security risk at TSA-regulated airports by focusing
on behaviors and appearances that deviate from an established baseline
and that may be indicative of stress, fear, or deception.
[5] Advanced Imaging Technology screens passengers for metallic and
nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other objects
concealed under layers of clothing.
[6] The mission need statement outlines the specific functional
capabilities required to accomplish DHS's mission and objectives,
along with deficiencies and gaps in these capabilities.
[7] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected
Complex Acquisitions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-588SP] (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2010). Three of 15 were TSA programs.
[8] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection
Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740]
(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011).
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740]. An EDS
machine uses computed tomography technology to automatically measure
the physical characteristics of objects in baggage. The system
automatically triggers an alarm when objects that exhibit the physical
characteristics of explosives are detected.
[10] GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed,
and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but
Continue to Face Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7,
2009).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740].
[12] GAO, DHS Science and Technology: Additional Steps Needed to
Ensure Test and Evaluation Requirements Are Met. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-596]. (Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2011)
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740].
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128].
[15] DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, D.C.:
June 2006). In 2009, DHS issued an updated plan that replaced the one
issued in 2006.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128].
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-484T].
[18] GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: February
2011).
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-588SP].
[20] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2,
2009).
[21] Level 1 programs are those that have estimated life-cycle costs
in excess of $1 billion and are reviewed at the department level.
[End of section]
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