HUD Purchase Cards
Poor Internal Controls Resulted in Improper and Questionable Purchases
Gao ID: GAO-03-489 April 11, 2003
Due to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) increasing use of purchase cards and the inherent risk associated with their use, Congress asked GAO to audit the purchase card program concentrating on assessing internal controls and determining whether purchases being made are a valid use of government funds.
Significant internal control weaknesses in HUD's approximately $10.6 million purchase card program resulted in improper, potentially improper, and questionable purchases in fiscal year 2001. Because of these internal control weaknesses, there was often inadequate documentation supporting many purchases GAO reviewed, and as a result, GAO was unable to determine whether these purchases were a valid use of government funds. GAO also found that HUD's remedial action plan for its purchase card program does not adequately address all the control weaknesses we identified. These weaknesses created an environment in which improper purchases could be made with little risk of detection and likely contributed to the $2.3 million in improper, potentially improper, and questionable purchases GAO identified. GAO found improper and potentially improper purchases totaling about $1 million where HUD employees either split or appeared to have split purchases into multiple transactions to circumvent cardholder limits. GAO also found that HUD employees lacked adequate supporting documentation for about $1.3 million in questionable purchases including those from vendors not expected to engage in commerce with HUD, purchases made on holidays and weekends, and $74,500 in portable assets such as computer equipment and digital cameras. In these instances, it was not possible to determine what was purchased, for whom, and why. The problems GAO identified with HUD's purchase card program leave the agency vulnerable to wasteful, fraudulent, or otherwise improper purchases. Unless HUD makes specific improvements to its review and approval process, requirements for documentation and record retention, monitoring process, and remedial action plan, the department remains susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-03-489, HUD Purchase Cards: Poor Internal Controls Resulted in Improper and Questionable Purchases
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Report to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development:
April 2003:
HUD Purchase Cards:
Poor Internal Controls Resulted in Improper and Questionable Purchases:
GAO-03-489:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-489, a report to the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development
Why GAO Did This Study:
Due to HUD‘s increasing use of purchase cards and the inherent risk
associated with their use, Congress asked GAO to audit the purchase
card program concentrating on assessing internal controls and
determining whether purchases being made are a valid use of government
funds.
What GAO Found:
Significant internal control weaknesses in HUD‘s approximately
$10.6 million purchase card program resulted in improper, potentially
improper, and questionable purchases in fiscal year 2001. Because of
these internal control weaknesses, there was often inadequate
documentation supporting many purchases GAO reviewed, and as a result,
GAO was unable to determine whether these purchases were a valid use of
government funds. GAO also found that HUD‘s remedial action plan for
its purchase card program does not adequately address all the control
weaknesses we identified.
These weaknesses created an environment in which improper purchases
could be made with little risk of detection and likely contributed to
the $2.3 million in improper, potentially improper, and questionable
purchases GAO identified. GAO found improper and potentially improper
purchases totaling about $1 million where HUD employees either split or
appeared to have split purchases into multiple transactions to
circumvent cardholder limits. GAO also found that HUD employees lacked
adequate supporting documentation for about $1.3 million in
questionable purchases including those from vendors not expected to
engage in commerce with HUD, purchases made on holidays and weekends,
and $74,500 in portable assets such as computer equipment and digital
cameras. In these instances, it was not possible to determine what was
purchased, for whom, and why. Some examples of these inadequately
supported purchases are shown in the table below.
The problems GAO identified with HUD‘s purchase card program leave the
agency vulnerable to wasteful, fraudulent, or otherwise improper
purchases. Unless HUD makes specific improvements to its review and
approval process, requirements for documentation and record retention,
monitoring process, and remedial action plan, the department remains
susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making several recommendations to strengthen internal controls
including:
* developing and implementing a robust review and approval function to
include requiring and performing a detailed review of relevant
supporting documentation for each purchase,
* establishing specific requirements for documentation and records to
support each purchase, and
* developing and implementing a formal monitoring process to assess the
effectiveness of the enhanced review and approval process.
HUD said that while it had made some improvements, it agreed that it
still needed to strengthen its purchase card controls. HUD‘s response
listed actions to address five of the seven recommendations. GAO
believes that HUD needs to address the remaining two recommendations as
well.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-489.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Linda Calbom at
202-512-8341 or by E-mail at calboml@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Scope and Methodology:
HUD‘s Internal Controls over Purchase Cards Did Not Provide Assurance
That Improper Purchases Would Be Prevented or Detected:
Control Weaknesses Contributed to Improper, Potentially Improper, and
Questionable Purchase Card Transactions:
HUD‘s Remedial Action Plan to Correct Purchase Card Program
Deficiencies Lacked Specificity:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development:
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
:
Letter April 11, 2003:
The Honorable Mel Martinez
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The use of purchase cards at the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has been steadily increasing over the last several
years. During fiscal year 2001, purchase cards were used to make over
24,000 purchases totaling more than $10 million compared to over 14,000
transactions totaling more than $7.6 million in fiscal year 1997.
Purchase cards are available to federal agencies under a General
Services Administration (GSA) SmartPay Master Contract and may be used
to make purchases with minimal paperwork. GSA administers the master
contract and also provides purchase card program guidance for
government agencies on its GSA Web site. Individual agencies are
required to administer their own purchase card programs and set the
parameters for use by authorizing employees, establishing dollar
limits, and monitoring usage. The benefits of using purchase cards
versus traditional contracting and payment processes are lower
transaction processing costs and less ’red tape“ for both the
government and the vendor community. While we support the use of a
well-controlled purchase card program to streamline the government‘s
acquisition processes, it is important that agencies have adequate
internal controls in place to protect the government from fraud, waste,
and abuse.
Given HUD‘s increasing use of purchase cards and the inherent risk in
their use, we were asked to assess HUD‘s purchase card
activities.[Footnote 1] Specifically, we were asked to determine if (1)
HUD‘s existing controls over the purchase card program provide
reasonable assurance that improper payments will not occur or will be
detected in the normal course of business and (2) payments for purchase
card transactions are properly supported as a valid use of government
funds. During the course of our work, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) issued a memorandum requiring all agencies to develop a
remedial action plan to manage the risk associated with purchase card
usage. Because of this memorandum‘s relevance, we expanded our work to
include determining whether HUD‘s remedial action plan effectively
addressed its internal control weaknesses.
Results in Brief:
Significant internal control weaknesses in HUD‘s purchase card program
made the agency vulnerable to and in some cases resulted in improper,
potentially improper, and questionable purchases. During our review,
which covered fiscal year 2001, we found that a preapproval process,
required by HUD to help ensure the appropriateness of each purchase,
was virtually nonexistent. Of the total $1.8 million purchase card
transactions selected in the statistical sample,[Footnote 2] $1.4
million lacked adequate supporting documentation for the approving
official to determine the validity of the purchase. Nevertheless, these
purchases were approved for payment. Based on the results of the
sample, we estimate that $4.8 million[Footnote 3] of the total sampled
population of purchases ($10.6 million) lacked adequate supporting
documentation. Additionally, HUD was not performing the required
periodic reviews of purchase card transactions to assess compliance
with its policies and procedures, thus preventing adequate monitoring
of the purchase card program. These weaknesses, combined with the
inherent risk of fraud and abuse associated with purchase cards,
created an environment in which improper purchases could be made with
little risk of detection.
These control weaknesses likely contributed to the approximately
$2.3 million in improper, potentially improper, and questionable
purchases we identified during our review. For example, we identified
improper split purchases and potential split purchases totaling over $1
million. Split purchases occur when multiple charges are made to the
same vendor for one purchase in order to circumvent single purchase
limits. We also identified questionable purchases, such as those made
on holidays or weekends, and purchases made with vendors not routinely
expected to engage in commerce with HUD. To determine whether these
purchases were a valid use of government funds, we requested supporting
documentation. HUD was unable to provide adequate supporting
documentation for 1,478 transactions totaling about $1.3 million or 43
percent of the transactions we requested and 72 percent of the total
dollars requested. These unsupported transactions included $27,000 to
various department stores, $8,900 to music and audio stores, and $9,700
to restaurants. Because HUD was unable to provide adequate
documentation for these purchases, we consider them to be a
questionable use of government funds and therefore potentially
improper.
HUD‘s remedial action plan for its purchase card program does not
effectively address its internal control weaknesses. Although HUD
recognizes the need to improve its internal controls, its plan lacks
specific commitment of time and resources to implement the proposed
actions. Management‘s commitment to improving internal control is
necessary to reduce HUD‘s vulnerability to future improper payments.
Unless HUD‘s management makes specific improvements to its review and
approval process, requirements for documentation and record retention,
monitoring process, and remedial action plan, HUD will continue to be
susceptible to misuse of government funds. We are making
recommendations in each of these areas.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HUD agreed that further
improvements are needed to strengthen the department‘s purchase card
controls and cited actions it is taking or plans to take to address
five of our seven recommendations. Regarding the remaining two
recommendations, we continue to believe that HUD needs to revise its
remedial action plan to include the steps necessary to fully implement
the proposed changes to strengthen internal controls. Also, HUD needs
to follow up on the inadequately supported purchases identified during
our audit.
Background:
HUD‘s purchase card program is part of the governmentwide commercial
credit card program established to simplify federal agency acquisition
processes by providing a low-cost, efficient vehicle for obtaining
goods and services from vendors. According to Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) Part 13.201(b), government purchase cards should be
used for micropurchases, which are purchases up to $2,500.[Footnote 4]
The Department of the Treasury also requires agencies to establish
approved uses and limitations on the types of purchases and spending
limits. GSA administers the master contract and HUD‘s purchase card
policy was derived from the GSA governmentwide credit card program and
tailored by HUD to meet its specific needs. During the period of our
review--October 2000 through September 2001--HUD was operating under a
policy dated October 1995. HUD is currently updating its purchase card
policy.
HUD‘s purchase card policy states that purchase cards are intended to
procure general-purpose office supplies and other support needs. The
policy requires each approving official to develop a preapproval
process to ensure that all purchase card transactions are authorized
and in accordance with departmental and other federal regulations. The
approving official signifies that a cardholder‘s purchases are
appropriate by reviewing and signing monthly statements.
As required by the Department of the Treasury, HUD‘s purchase card
policy established approved uses and limitations on the types of
purchases and dollar amounts in its purchase card policy. This policy
also includes a detailed list of items that cardholders are prohibited
from buying with their government purchase cards. For example, purchase
or rental of nonexpendable property (generally defined as property of a
durable nature with a life expectancy of at least 1 year), meals,
drinks, entertainment or lodging, and construction costs exceeding
$2,000 are generally prohibited.[Footnote 5] Fiscal year 2001 single
purchase limits for individual cardholders, which are required to be
established by the approving officials and approved by the departmental
directors, ranged from $100 to $80,000, and their monthly limits ranged
from $100 to $300,000. HUD was in the process of reevaluating and where
applicable, lowering these limits. Bank One currently services the
purchase card program at HUD.
Internal control is a major part of managing an organization and is key
to ensuring proper use of government resources. As mandated by 31
U.S.C. 3512, commonly known as the Federal Managers‘ Financial
Integrity Act of 1982, the Comptroller General issues standards for
internal control in the federal government.[Footnote 6] These standards
provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining internal
control and for identifying and addressing major performance and
management challenges and areas at greatest risk of fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement. According to these standards, internal
control comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet
missions, goals, and objectives.
Control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques, and
mechanisms that enforce management‘s directives and help ensure that
actions are taken to address risks. Control activities are an integral
part of an entity‘s planning, implementation, review, and
accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving
effective results. They include a wide range of diverse activities.
Some examples of control activities include controls over information
processing, physical control over vulnerable assets, segregation of
duties, proper execution of transactions and events, and access
restrictions to and accountability for resources and records.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether HUD‘s existing controls over the purchase card
program provided assurance that improper purchases would be detected or
prevented in the normal course of business, we interviewed HUD staff
and performed walk-throughs of the process. We reviewed HUD‘s policies
and procedures and prior GAO reports as well as reports by HUD‘s Office
of Inspector General (OIG) and independent auditors on this topic. To
test the effectiveness of internal controls, we selected a stratified
random sample of 222 purchase card transactions made during fiscal year
2001 totaling over $1.8 million from a population of purchase card
transactions totaling $10.6 million. To identify potential improper
purchases we requested and obtained fiscal year 2001 transaction data
from Bank One and used data mining techniques[Footnote 7] and other
computer analyses to identify unusual transactions and payment patterns
in HUD‘s fiscal year 2001 purchase card transaction data that may be
indicative of improper purchases.
In order to determine if fiscal year 2001 purchases were adequately
supported and for a valid government use, we requested and analyzed
supporting documentation for those transactions that we identified as
potentially improper and questionable. While we identified some
improper, potentially improper, and questionable purchases, our work
was not designed to determine the full extent of improper purchases.
We requested comments from the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development. We conducted our work from November 2001 through November
2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards, and we performed our investigative work in accordance with
standards prescribed by the President‘s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency.
HUD‘s Internal Controls over Purchase Cards Did Not Provide Assurance
That Improper Purchases Would Be Prevented or Detected:
HUD staff did not comply with key elements of its purchase card
policies that would have helped minimize the risk of improper
purchases, including (1) obtaining preapproval for purchases, (2)
retaining adequate supporting documentation, (3) conducting
supervisory review of all purchases, and
(4) periodically reviewing purchase card transactions to ensure
compliance with key aspects of the department‘s policy. This created an
environment where improper purchases could be made with little risk of
detection and likely contributed to the $2.3 million in improper,
potentially improper, and questionable purchases we identified through
our data mining efforts.
GAO‘s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government[Footnote
8] states that transactions and other significant events should be
authorized and executed only by persons acting within the scope of
their authority. This is the principal means of assuring that only
valid transactions to exchange, transfer, use, or commit resources and
other events are initiated or entered into. To address these internal
control standards, HUD‘s purchase card policy contains fundamental
controls designed to minimize the agency‘s exposure to improper
purchases. HUD‘s policy requires each approving official to establish a
preapproval process for each cardholder to ensure that all purchases
are appropriate and for official government use. Further, HUD‘s policy
states that the approving official is required to review, certify, and
monitor all cardholder purchases to ensure that they have the necessary
approvals before purchases are made. Additionally, HUD‘s purchase card
policy requires that approving officials review each purchase along
with the applicable supporting documentation in order to certify that
the purchases were appropriate and a valid use of government funds.
Based on our review of HUD‘s purchase card process, we found that most
approving officials had not established a preapproval process to ensure
the appropriateness of purchases before they are made. Only the
Information Technology Office routinely obtained authorization prior to
purchasing items with the purchase card. The approving official‘s
review of each purchase card transaction is one of the most important
controls to ensure that all purchases are a valid use of government
funds. We found that this critical control was seriously compromised
because of inadequate supervisory review of supporting documentation by
approving officials. To test the effectiveness of this key internal
control, we selected and tested a stratified random sample of 222
purchase card transactions made during fiscal year 2001. Of the total
$1.8 million purchase card transactions selected in the statistical
sample,[Footnote 9] $1.4 million lacked adequate supporting
documentation for the approving official to determine the validity of
the purchase. Based on the results of this sample, we estimate that
$4,753,253[Footnote 10] of the total sampled population of purchases
($10,590,461) made during fiscal year 2001 lacked adequate supporting
documentation.
Our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states
that internal control activities help ensure that management‘s
directives are carried out. One such activity is the appropriate
documentation of transactions. Internal control and all transactions
and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the
documentation should be readily available for examination. All
documentation should be properly managed and maintained.
We determined that some of HUD‘s records supporting the purchase card
program were not properly managed or maintained. For instance, HUD
could not provide a complete and accurate list of all approving
officials. When we attempted to contact cardholders and their
respective approving officials to request supporting documentation
using the list the agency provided, at least 28 approving officials
provided written notification that cardholders assigned to them
according to HUD records were not their responsibility. According to
HUD officials, the purchase card program administrator is not routinely
informed of changes in approving officials and often does not have the
time to update the list regularly. Because HUD does not know who should
be approving purchases, there is an increased risk of collusion as well
as a general lack of accountability for ensuring the proper use of
government funds.
Another control activity that was available but not being used by HUD
is blocking Merchant Category Codes (MCC). Blocking categories of
merchants allows agencies to prohibit certain types of transactions
that are clearly not business related, such as purchases from jewelry
stores or entertainment establishments. During our review, we found
that HUD was not blocking any MCCs. These blocks are available as part
of HUD‘s purchase card task order, under the GSA SmartPay Master
Contract with Bank One. Because HUD did not take advantage of this
control, there were no restrictions on the types of purchases employees
could make during fiscal year 2001--the period of our audit. As a
result of our audit work, on March 6, 2002, HUD began using selected
MCC blocks.
Our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states
that internal control should generally be designed to assure that
ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations. Internal
control monitoring should assess the quality of performance over time
and ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are promptly
resolved. Program and operational managers should monitor the
effectiveness of control activities as part of their regular duties.
HUD‘s purchase card policy requires the department to perform annual
program reviews and report the results, including findings and
recommendations, to the purchase card program administrator. However,
HUD officials could locate only one such report. This November 2001
report, prepared by a consultant, identified problems that were similar
to the findings previously reported by the OIG in February
1999.[Footnote 11] Both reports documented problems with weak internal
controls and insufficient supporting documentation. The consultant‘s
report also noted that HUD was not performing the periodic program
reviews required by its policies and that employees were making
improper split purchases. HUD management agreed with the findings in
the OIG report and developed and implemented an action plan to address
the identified weaknesses. According to HUD OIG staff, its
recommendations were implemented and have been closed since September
30, 2000. However, based on our findings, corrective actions taken at
that time were not effective. The results of our control testing
indicate that HUD‘s lack of internal control over the purchase card
process allows continued vulnerability to wasteful, fraudulent, or
otherwise improper purchases by employees using government purchase
cards.
Control Weaknesses Contributed to Improper, Potentially Improper, and
Questionable Purchase Card Transactions:
Poor internal controls created an environment where improper purchases
could be made with little risk of detection. We define improper
purchases as those purchases that include errors, such as duplicate
charges and miscalculations; charges for services not rendered;
multiple charges to the same vendor for a single purchase to circumvent
existing single purchase limits--known as split purchases; and
purchases resulting from fraud and abuse. We define questionable
purchases as those that, while authorized, were for items purchased for
a questionable government need as well as transactions for which HUD
could not provide adequate supporting documentation to enable us to
determine whether the purchases were valid.
We identified 88 transactions totaling about $112,000 that were
improper split purchases. For example, one cardholder purchased nine
personal digital assistants and the related accessories from a single
vendor on the same day in two separate transactions just 5 minutes
apart. Because the total purchase price of $3,788 exceeded the
cardholder‘s single purchase limit of $2,500, the purchase was split
into two transactions of $2,388 and $1,400, respectively. These
improper split purchases violate provisions of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation and HUD‘s own purchase card policy, which prohibits
splitting purchases into more than one transaction to circumvent single
purchase limits. We received documentation from some cardholders
confirming that they split their purchases because they exceeded their
single purchase limits, while one cardholder claimed the vendor
independently split the purchases.
We identified an additional 465 purchases totaling over $913,000 where
HUD employees made multiple purchases from a vendor on the same day.
Specifically, cardholders made multiple purchases totaling over $2,500
on the same day from the same vendor. Although we were unable to
determine definitively whether these purchases were improper, based on
the available supporting documentation, these transactions share
similar characteristics with the 88 split purchases, and therefore we
consider these transactions to be potentially improper.
We also found 2,507 transactions, totaling about $1.3 million, with
vendors that would not routinely be expected to engage in commerce with
HUD. In order to determine whether these questionable purchases were a
valid use of government funds, we requested supporting documentation
for each purchase. HUD was able to provide us with adequate supporting
documentation for 1,324 transactions totaling about $412,000. The
department was unable, however, to provide adequate support for the
remaining 1,183 transactions (47 percent of total transactions
requested) totaling about $869,000 (67 percent of total dollars
requested). Additionally, we found 940 transactions, totaling about
$554,000, where the purchases were made either on a weekend or holiday.
We requested supporting documentation for each of these transactions.
HUD was able to provide us with adequate support for 645 transactions
totaling about $189,000. HUD was unable to provide adequate support for
the remaining 295 transactions (31 percent of total transactions
requested) totaling over $364,000 (66 percent of total dollars
requested). In these instances, we were unable to determine what was
purchased, for whom, and why.
Some examples of the questionable vendor transactions for which we did
not receive adequate support included over $27,000 to various
department stores such as Best Buy, Circuit City, Dillard‘s, JCPenney,
Lord & Taylor, Macy‘s, and Sears; over $8,900 to several music and
audio stores including Sound Craft Systems, J&R‘s Music Store, Guitar
Source, and Clean Cuts Music; and over $9,700 to various restaurants
such as Legal Sea Food, Levis Restaurant, The Cheesecake Factory, and
TGI Fridays. Additional examples of questionable or potentially
improper purchases we found include $25,400 of ’no show“ hotel charges
for HUD employees who did not attend scheduled training and $21,400 of
purchases from vendors who appear to have been out of business prior to
the purchase. Because HUD was unable to provide adequate documentation
for these purchases, we consider them to be a questionable use of
government funds and therefore potentially improper purchases.
We also have concerns about HUD‘s accountability for computer and
related computer equipment bought with purchase cards because of the
large volume of transactions for which it did not have appropriate
documentation. For example, our testing revealed that HUD employees
used their purchase cards to buy portable assets, such as computer
equipment and digital cameras, totaling over $74,500 for which they
have provided either no support or inadequate support. In HUD‘s August
28, 2002, purchase card remedial action plan, discussed in more detail
in the next section, HUD acknowledged that items bought with purchase
cards were not being consistently entered in the department‘s asset
management system. As a result, portable assets became vulnerable to
loss or theft. In our follow-up work, we plan to determine whether
these items are included in HUD‘s asset management system and are being
appropriately safeguarded.
HUD‘s Remedial Action Plan to Correct Purchase Card Program
Deficiencies Lacked Specificity:
OMB‘s April 18, 2002 memorandum, M-02-05, requires all agencies to
develop remedial action plans to manage the risk associated with
purchase card usage. Agencies were required to submit their plans to
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy no later than June 1, 2002.
HUD‘s remedial action plan was submitted to OMB on May 31, 2002. Our
review of HUD‘s remedial purchase card action plan found that it did
not address all the weaknesses we identified. Although HUD‘s plan
includes steps for resolving and preventing a number of potential
problem areas, including the need for (1) adequate monitoring, (2) more
frequent internal audits,
(3) accountability and penalties for misuse of cards, (4) updating the
agency handbook, (5) spending limits in line with purchasing
requirements, (6) adequate program records, including proper approving
officials, and
(7) entering property purchased with purchase cards in the inventory
system, the plan falls short in other key areas.
For example, the plan did not include requirements for (1) a robust
review and approval function for purchase card transactions, focusing
on identifying split purchases and other inappropriate transactions,
(2) a process to periodically assess the effectiveness of the review
and approval process, and (3) specific documentation and records to
support the purchase card transactions. In addition, the remedial plan
lacked specifics as to how and when HUD would implement it. On August
16, 2002, OMB returned HUD‘s remedial action plan and asked that a
timeline be incorporated.
HUD submitted a new plan to OMB on August 28, 2002. While the revised
remedial action plan includes a broad timeline for completion of each
objective, we found that it still does not adequately address key
control weaknesses we identified, in part because it lacks specific
steps necessary to fully address identified problem areas. In addition,
the revised remedial action plan does not require the program
administration staff to begin designing a monitoring plan to assess
HUD‘s compliance with key aspects of its purchase card policy until the
second quarter of fiscal year 2003 and does not give an estimated date
for when this key internal control will be implemented. Additionally,
the revised plan does not specifically identify who is responsible for
developing or implementing any of the proposed improvements.
Conclusions:
The problems we identified with HUD‘s purchase card program leave the
agency vulnerable to wasteful, fraudulent, or otherwise improper
purchases. The remedial action plan prepared by HUD is an important
first step toward addressing the control weaknesses we identified. At
the same time, much still remains to be done to effectively control the
inherent risk in HUD‘s purchase card program. HUD management will have
to effectively follow through on its implementation plan and expand the
plan to improve its review and approval process, requirements for
documentation and record retention, monitoring process, and remedial
action plan or HUD will continue to be susceptible to misuse of
government funds.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen its internal control over the purchase card program and
reduce HUD‘s vulnerability to improper purchases, we recommend that the
Secretary direct the Assistant Secretary for the Office of
Administration to take the following actions:
* implement the preapproval requirement in the existing purchase card
policy;
* develop and implement a robust review and approval function for
purchase card transactions, focusing on identifying split purchases and
other inappropriate transactions, and on performing a detailed review
of relevant supporting documentation for each purchase;
* update the list of approving officials and their designated
cardholders quarterly to ensure accuracy and completeness;
* establish specific requirements for documentation and records to
support all purchase card purchases;
* develop and implement a formal monitoring process to periodically
assess the effectiveness of the enhanced review and approval process;
* revise the remedial action plan for purchase cards to include the
specific steps necessary to fully implement the above five
recommendations; and:
* follow up on the purchases we identified for which cardholders did
not provide adequate supporting documentation to determine the validity
and the propriety of the purchases.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in
appendix I, HUD agreed that further improvements are needed to
strengthen the department‘s purchase card controls. Although HUD did
not specifically agree or disagree with our individual recommendations,
the actions being taken or planned by the agency address five of our
seven recommendations.
For example, in response to our recommendation to implement the
preapproval requirement in the existing purchase card program, HUD
stated that it has always had an effective preapproval process in its
field offices through the Automated Client Response System (ACRS).
While we agree that this system is available for use, during our review
of supporting documentation, we found no evidence that cardholders were
utilizing this system. To improve its preapproval process at its
headquarters, HUD stated that it has implemented the mandatory use of
HUD Form 10.4, Requisition for Supplies, Equipment, Forms,
Publications, and Procurement Services.
In addition, to enhance its review and approval function, HUD said it
had provided mandatory training in January 2003 to approving officials
on the procedures for reviewing and approving cardholder statements.
HUD also said that it was working with Bank One to provide training to
cardholders and approving officials on the use of the automated
purchase card system and the monitoring tools available through Bank
One. HUD also stated that as of January 2003, a review of the approving
officials will be performed and the Agency Program Coordinator will
make the necessary changes quarterly to ensure the list is accurate and
complete.
To ensure proper supporting documentation is maintained for all
purchases, HUD also noted that it provided training to cardholders and
approving officials starting in January 2003. Additionally, HUD stated
that in October 2002, a staff person was assigned to begin performing
planned internal reviews and random spot reviews of purchase card
transactions with reports to be issued on an interim basis as the
reviews are completed to ensure that proper management and internal
controls are maintained over the authorization of purchases and use of
the purchase card. These actions will be helpful in strengthening the
purchase card controls at HUD.
HUD did not state what, if any, action it planned to take regarding the
two remaining recommendations. Regarding our recommendation to revise
its remedial action plan, HUD stated that the plan adequately met the
requirements set forth by OMB. While the plan may address the elements
required by OMB, we do not believe it lays out an adequate approach for
resolving identified control weaknesses. As discussed in the report,
the plan lacks the specific steps necessary to fully implement the
proposed changes to strengthen internal controls.
Concerning follow-up on inadequately supported purchases we identified,
HUD stated that it had provided documentation when asked and would
provide more if necessary. On July 8, 2002, we provided HUD with a
compact disk containing all transactions for which we received either
no support or inadequate support during our fieldwork and allowed an
additional 3 weeks for the agency to provide the supporting
documentation. We have not received any additional supporting
documentation since then. It is our view that HUD has a fiduciary duty
to follow up on the inadequately supported purchases, which total about
$2.1 million and represent 57 percent of the total purchase
transactions we tested, to ensure their propriety. HUD offered several
additional technical comments, which have been incorporated into this
report as appropriate.
This report contains recommendations to you. The head of a federal
agency is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to submit a written statement on
actions taken on these recommendations to the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight within 60 days of the date of this report. You must also send
a written statement to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations with the agency‘s first request for appropriations more
than 60 days after the date of this report.
:
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and
the House Committee on Government Reform, the Director of Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We also will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8341 or by E-mail at
calboml@gao.gov.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Linda Calbom
Director, Financial Management and Assurance:
[End of section]
Appendixes :
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development:
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Washington, D.C.
20410-3000:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION:
MAR 28 2003:
Ms. Linda Calbom:
Director, Financial Management and Assurance U.S. General Accounting
Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Calbom:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on the draft report
entitled ’Department of Housing and Urban Development: Poor Internal
Controls Over Purchase Card Program Resulted in Improper and
Questionable Purchases“ (GAO-03-489). We reviewed the report and agree
that, while the Department made some program improvements, there is
still a need to strengthen our purchase card controls. This response
lists the actions that have been taken and are planned to improve HUD‘s
Purchase Card Program. Additional comments on several statements in the
report are also included.
Recommendation: Implement the pre-approval requirement in the existing
purchase card policy.
Response: HUD has always had an effective pre-approval process in our
field offices. The Automated Client Response System (ACRS) is used by
field staff for purchase card transactions. Receipt of the ACRS request
by the approving official officially initiates a purchase transaction.
The request must contain an adequate description of the item or service
requested including the quantity needed, the prices, and proper funds
reservation. Additionally, the (ACRS) requisition must be properly
approved by the appropriate officials prior to any purchase.
To improve the pre-approval process in Headquarters, the Department
implemented the mandatory use of HUD Form 10.4, Requisition for
Supplies, Equipment, Forms, Publications and Procurement Services. This
form documents the item or service requested for purchase, the
quantity, and total cost. In January 2003, during our annual mandatory
purchase card training, all cardholders were instructed to complete HUD
Form 10.4 and obtain proper approval from their budget office and the
approving official prior to any purchase card transaction. Failure to
follow these procedures would result in adverse actions.
Recommendation: Develop and implement a robust review and approval
function for purchase card transactions, focusing on identifying split
purchases and other inappropriate transactions, as well as performing a
detailed review of relevant supporting documentation for each purchase.
Response: In January 2003, during our annual mandatory purchase card
training, approving officials were instructed again on the procedures
for reviewing each cardholder‘s statement. Approving officials were
directed to verify: (1) the appropriateness of each item purchased; (2)
that HUD received the purchased items; and (3) that the transactions
were supported by the appropriate documentation. They were also
instructed to review the purchase logs maintained by cardholders on a
daily basis.
Our review and approval function will also be enhanced by the
Department‘s increasing use of automated monitoring tools. Use of the
servicing bank‘s automated system will greatly enhance the monitoring
effort. For example, cardholders will be able to review and run reports
on their transactions enabling them to quickly detect errors and
initiate the dispute process. Approving officials will be able to
manage and monitor more efficiently because they will have the ability
to review the cardholders‘ statement in real time versus 30 days after
the purchase. This will enable them to check for split purchases and
any other prohibited or questionable transactions. Further, using the
automated purchase card system provides for daily monitoring of
purchase transactions by Program Administration Staff, which can ensure
that infrequent instances of long-term cardholder abuse do not occur.
This is a coordinated effort with the servicing bank to provide
training to cardholders and approving officials on the use of the
automated purchase card system. Implementation of this process is being
phased in over a period of two years. It began in November 2002 with
the training of the Field Program Coordinators. Training is scheduled
throughout Fiscal Years (FYs) 2003 and 2004 with completion in FY 2004.
In October 2002, HUD assigned a staff person to perform planned
internal reviews as well as conduct random spot reviews. Use of the
automated monitoring allows for weekly, sometimes daily, checks for
split purchases, adequate rotation of vendors, prohibited purchases,
and any other questionable purchases.
Recommendation: Update the list of approving officials and their
designated cardholders quarterly to ensure accuracy and completeness.
Response: In January 2003, a list of our current approving officials,
cardholders, and respective spending limits was distributed to each
Assistant Secretary within the Department. Each was asked to review the
list for accuracy and submit corrections back to the Agency Program
Coordinator. This task will be performed quarterly.
Recommendation: Establish specific requirements for documentation and
records to support all purchase card purchases.
Response: As of January 2003, all Headquarters cardholders were
required to complete HUD Form 10.4, which documents the items or
services requested for purchase, the quantity and estimated cost. Each
cardholder is required to get approval from their Budget Office for the
availability of funds and the approving official prior to any purchase
card transaction.
As previously stated, approving officials are required to review the
purchase logs maintained by cardholders. In order to ensure consistency
throughout the Department, we provided both approving officials and
cardholders with an example of a standardized purchase log. We also
gave very detailed instructions on the fields of information for the
purchase logs and the types of supporting documentation, in addition to
invoices and receipts, which should be kept on file for
each transaction. Failure to comply with this process would result in
adverse actions.
Recommendation: Develop and implement a formal monitoring process to
periodically assess the effectiveness of the enhanced review and
approval process.
Response: As previously stated, in October 2002 the Department assigned
a staff person to perform planned internal reviews as well as random
spot reviews. This function will ensure that proper management and
internal controls are maintained over the authorization and use of the
purchase card transactions. Reports will be issued on an interim basis
as reviews are completed.
Recommendation: Revise the remedial action plan for purchase cards to
include the specific steps necessary to fully implement the above five
recommendations.
Response: Our remedial plan has been revised to meet the guidelines set
forth by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The plan was
resubmitted to and approved by OMB.
Recommendation: Follow up on the purchases we identified for which
cardholders did not provide adequate supporting documentation to
determine the validity and propriety of the purchases.
Response: During the audit, cardholders provided documentation to
support purchase card transactions when requested. If any additional
information is needed, we will ensure it is provided.
Listed below are additional actions that have been taken or are planned
to further enhance and strengthen controls over the purchase card
program.
* Validation of Need for Purchase Card. The Department is performing
periodic reviews to verify that the need for the card is still valid,
the spending limits are appropriate for the purchasing need and the
delegations of authority for single purchase limits above $2,500 are
current. The Department performed the first review in November 2002.
These reviews are scheduled to occur annually.
* Improve Program Guidance and Communication. The Department plans to
create a handbook supplement that will summarize the cardholder and
approving official duties and responsibilities and clearly define each
level of accountability. The supplement will contain a comprehensive
list of the penalties for various types of misuse, abuse, and fraud
associated with the purchase card. It will also contain the do‘s and
don‘ts of the purchase and approval process. The supplement will have
to be certified that it has been read and understood by the cardholder
and approving official. This task is scheduled to begin in the third
quarter FY 2003.
* Travel and Purchase Charge Card Awareness Day. On March 26, 2003, the
Office of Administration partnered with the Office of the Chief
Financial Officer to host a Travel and Purchase Charge Card Awareness
Day. HUD officials who participated in the event included our
Secretary, Chief Financial Officer, and myself. The purpose of this
event
was to remind and educate HUD employees on the dos‘ and don‘ts of using
purchase and travel cards. During this event, cardholders were provided
with: (1) purchase card procedures; (2) purchase card do‘s and don‘ts;
and, (3) the purchase card dispute process. Representatives were also
present from HUD‘s Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, the Office
of Budget and Administrative Support, and the servicing bank to answer
questions and to provide information to cardholders. This event shows
the level of commitment that the Department has undertaken in making
the Purchase Charge Card Program a top priority in our daily work. The
Awareness Day agenda along with the packets that were passed out to
cardholders are provided as attachments.
Although the Department still faces some challenges in this area, the
work described above demonstrates that we are in the process of taking
specific actions designed to enhance and improve our purchase card
program.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. If you have any questions concerning this response, please
contact Glennel M. Cooper, Director, Office of Budget and
Administrative Support, at (202) 708-1583.
Sincerely,
Vickers B. Meadows:
Assistant Secretary for Administration:
Signed by Vickers B. Meadows:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Dan Blair, (202) 512-9401:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Sharon Byrd, Lisa Crye, Sharon
Loftin, and Julie Matta made key contributions to this report.
(190083):
FOOTNOTES
[1] This work was done as part of a broader body of work on which we
testified last fall. [U.S. General Accounting Office, Strategies to
Address Improper Payments at HUD, Education, and Other Federal
Agencies, GAO-03-167T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 3, 2002.)] We are
currently assessing the effectiveness of internal controls over other
disbursement processes at HUD and will report on the results of that
work at a later date.
[2] We randomly sampled 222 transactions from a total of 23,688
transactions.
[3] We are 95 percent confident that the estimate is between $4,074,446
and $5,432,059. This estimate exceeds the tolerable amount in error of
$1,059,046 (10 percent of the population total of $10,590,461).
[4] Certain construction purchases are limited to $2,000.
[5] Under certain circumstances, some offices within HUD are permitted
to purchase some of the prohibited items in the policy.
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control: Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[7] Data mining for improper payments involves using computer aided
auditing techniques to highlight hidden patterns and relationships in
data that help identify unusual transactions, which may be improper
payments.
[8] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
[9] We randomly sampled 222 transactions from a total of 23,688
transactions.
[10] We are 95 percent confident that the estimate is between
$4,074,446 and $5,432,059. This estimate exceeds the tolerable amount
in error of $1,059,046 (10 percent of the population total of
$10,590,461).
[11] Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Inspector
General, Commercial Credit Card Program, 99-DP-166-0001 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 1, 1999).
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