Disaster Assistance
Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters Gao ID: GAO-07-88 February 28, 2007In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed thousands of homes and displaced over 1 million people. In light of widespread Congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies' performance in assisting hurricane victims, GAO initiated work under the Comptroller General's authority to examine federal housing assistance. Specifically, this report examines (1) the extent to which the National Response Plan (NRP) clearly described the responsibilities and capabilities of federal agencies and the Red Cross; (2) the extent to which these organizations had plans for providing sheltering and housing assistance; and (3) the perceptions of victims and others regarding the assistance needed and provided. GAO reviewed the NRP and related documents, interviewed Red Cross and federal agency officials and a limited number of storm victims, and convened a group of experts to discuss these issues.
In general, the NRP, including its annex covering sheltering and temporary housing (emergency support function no. 6 or ESF-6) clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two primary agencies--the Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, the responsibilities described for the support agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA)--did not, and still do not, fully reflect their capabilities. For example, USDA provided temporary housing for victims, and Treasury acted to make available vacant rental units subsidized through a tax program, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect these capabilities. Further, the support agencies had not, and have not yet, developed fact sheets laying out their roles and responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency specific authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. FEMA's ability to effectively coordinate federal housing assistance was limited because the agency was not aware of the support agencies' full capabilities. The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked plans for providing shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but have since taken some steps to improve their response capabilities. Some ESF-6 support agencies had not developed operational plans for meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities, and while they were ultimately able to contribute much-needed assistance, it was not as timely as it might have been. For example, HUD and VA worked out agreements with FEMA after the storms to provide vacant properties, but it took several months before some were available to victims. HUD, USDA, and VA have formed an informal working group to work out procedural details for providing housing assistance, in order to avoid the need to do so after a disaster event. However, this group is not intended to address the full range of these agencies' responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not have a specific timetable for its activities. The specific needs of victims and their perceptions of the assistance that was provided varied, depending in part on circumstances such as where they were located after the disaster, whether they were homeowners or renters, and whether they had special needs. Most victims were eligible for some form of federal temporary housing assistance--such as rental assistance or a travel trailer--and those we contacted had mixed perceptions of the assistance they received. Our interviews with victims, as well as our expert group, indicate that temporary housing needs include not just shelter, but also access to medical facilities, public transportation, schools, employment opportunities, and other social services--and, particularly for those displaced to distant locations, information about all of these things. Legislation enacted in October 2006 requires a strategy that is to address a number of these ancillary needs for victims of future catastrophic disasters, and FEMA has initiated this effort.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-88, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters
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Report to Congressional Addressees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
February 2007:
Disaster Assistance:
Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters:
GAO-07-88:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-88, a report to congressional addressees
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed thousands of homes and
displaced over 1 million people. In light of widespread Congressional
and public interest in U.S. agencies‘ performance in assisting
hurricane victims, GAO initiated work under the Comptroller General‘s
authority to examine federal housing assistance. Specifically, this
report examines (1) the extent to which the National Response Plan
(NRP) clearly described the responsibilities and capabilities of
federal agencies and the Red Cross; (2) the extent to which these
organizations had plans for providing sheltering and housing
assistance; and (3) the perceptions of victims and others regarding the
assistance needed and provided. GAO reviewed the NRP and related
documents, interviewed Red Cross and federal agency officials and a
limited number of storm victims, and convened a group of experts to
discuss these issues.
What GAO Found:
In general, the NRP, including its annex covering sheltering and
temporary housing (emergency support function no. 6 or ESF-6) clearly
described the overall responsibilities of the two primary agencies”the
Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However,
the responsibilities described for the support agencies”the Departments
of Agriculture (USDA), Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA)”did not, and still do not, fully
reflect their capabilities. For example, USDA provided temporary
housing for victims, and Treasury acted to make available vacant rental
units subsidized through a tax program, but the ESF-6 annex did not
reflect these capabilities. Further, the support agencies had not, and
have not yet, developed fact sheets laying out their roles and
responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency
specific authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures.
FEMA‘s ability to effectively coordinate federal housing assistance was
limited because the agency was not aware of the support agencies‘ full
capabilities.
The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked plans for providing
shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic disasters
such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but have since taken some steps to
improve their response capabilities. Some ESF-6 support agencies had
not developed operational plans for meeting their ESF-6
responsibilities, and while they were ultimately able to contribute
much-needed assistance, it was not as timely as it might have been. For
example, HUD and VA worked out agreements with FEMA after the storms to
provide vacant properties, but it took several months before some were
available to victims. HUD, USDA, and VA have formed an informal working
group to work out procedural details for providing housing assistance,
in order to avoid the need to do so after a disaster event. However,
this group is not intended to address the full range of these agencies‘
responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not have a specific timetable
for its activities.
The specific needs of victims and their perceptions of the assistance
that was provided varied, depending in part on circumstances such as
where they were located after the disaster, whether they were
homeowners or renters, and whether they had special needs. Most victims
were eligible for some form of federal temporary housing
assistance”such as rental assistance or a travel trailer”and those we
contacted had mixed perceptions of the assistance they received. Our
interviews with victims, as well as our expert group, indicate that
temporary housing needs include not just shelter, but also access to
medical facilities, public transportation, schools, employment
opportunities, and other social services”and, particularly for those
displaced to distant locations, information about all of these things.
Legislation enacted in October 2006 requires a strategy that is to
address a number of these ancillary needs for victims of future
catastrophic disasters, and FEMA has initiated this effort.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA propose revisions to
ESF-6 that fully reflect their capabilities; that these agencies and
Defense develop fact sheets as required by standard operating
procedures; and that HUD, USDA, and VA develop operational plans for
their ESF-6 responsibilities. These agencies generally concurred with
our recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-88].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact David G. Wood at (202)
512-8678 or woodD@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
While ESF-6 Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, the
National Response Plan Did Not Fully Reflect Support Agencies'
Capabilities:
The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate Plans for
Providing Shelter and Temporary Housing to Victims of Catastrophic
Disasters:
Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Needs and the Assistance They Received:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Views of GAO's Expert Group on the Provision of Disaster
Housing Assistance by the Federal Government:
Members of GAO's Expert Group:
Views of the Group of Experts:
Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Appendix IV: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the American Red Cross:
Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Agriculture:
Appendix VI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Defense:
Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by HUD:
Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of the Treasury:
Appendix IX: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs:
Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by Freddie Mac:
Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by Fannie Mae:
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development:
Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Treasury:
Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs:
Appendix XVI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Number of Completed Interviews with Hurricane Katrina Victims:
Table 2: Self-Reported Demographic Data on Disaster Victims
Interviewed:
Figures:
Figure 1: Organizational Structure for Emergency Support Function-6:
Figure 2: Process for Activating ESF-6's Mass Care and Housing
Functions:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ESF: Emergency Support Function:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development:
IHP: Individuals and Households Program:
IRS: Internal Revenue Service:
NRP: National Response Plan:
USDA: Department of Agriculture:
VA: Department of Veterans Affairs:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 28, 2007:
Congressional Addressees:
In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, and
Hurricane Rita struck the same region less than 1 month later. These
two storms destroyed or damaged several hundred thousand homes and
displaced more than a million people from their residences. Federal
agencies, the American National Red Cross (Red Cross), and other
organizations provided emergency shelter and temporary housing for
victims of these storms. However, these storms illustrated the
limitations of the nation's readiness and ability to respond
effectively to a catastrophic disaster--that is, a disaster whose
effects almost immediately overwhelm the response capacities of
affected state and local first responders and require outside action
and support from the federal government and other entities.
Congressional and other reports on the federal response to Hurricane
Katrina have identified various failures, including those related to
the federal government's efforts to provide housing assistance to
victims of this storm.
The federal government provides support for emergency shelter and
temporary housing for victims of disasters under several legislative
and executive provisions. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily establishes the
programs and processes for the federal government to provide major
disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal
nations, individuals, and others. In addition, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 required that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
consolidate existing federal government response plans into a single,
coordinated national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the
National Response Plan (NRP) to establish a comprehensive approach to
domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The NRP "base plan"
describes the structure and processes for integrating the efforts and
resources of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and
nongovernmental organizations during incidents of national
significance.[Footnote 1] In addition, the NRP includes 15 Emergency
Support Function (ESF) "annexes" that describe responsibilities for
federal agencies and the Red Cross in specific functional areas. The
NRP also requires each ESF to develop standard operating procedures and
notification protocols and to maintain current rosters and contact
information for the function.[Footnote 2] Further, the NRP includes a
separate Catastrophic Incident Annex and a more detailed Catastrophic
Incident Supplement that describe additional responsibilities for
federal agencies in the event of a catastrophic incident.[Footnote 3]
ESF-6 addresses the nonmedical mass care, housing, and human services
needs of individuals impacted by incidents of national significance.
ESF-6 designates the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the
coordinator for this function. The ESF-6 annex also identifies the Red
Cross as the primary agency for coordinating federal assistance for
mass care (including emergency shelter) and FEMA as the primary agency
for coordinating federal assistance for housing and human services.
Further, ESF-6 identifies several support agencies, such as the
Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA), as having
responsibilities for providing sheltering or housing assistance. In
addition to its responsibilities as a primary agency under ESF-6, the
Red Cross is expected to provide relief services to the public in the
event of a disaster under the terms of a congressional
charter.[Footnote 4]
In light of widespread congressional and public interest in U.S.
agencies' performance in providing assistance to hurricane victims, we
prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative to review the events and
aftermath surrounding Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This report is part
of a continued effort to assist Congress in identifying lessons from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that can be used to improve federal
assistance for victims of future catastrophic disasters. Specifically,
this report examines: (1) the extent to which the NRP clearly described
the responsibilities and capabilities of the Red Cross and federal
agencies for providing shelter and temporary housing assistance, (2)
the extent to which federal agencies and the Red Cross had operational
plans for providing sheltering and housing assistance in response to
such catastrophic disasters, and (3) the perceptions of victims and
others of victims' sheltering and housing needs and the federal
assistance provided after Hurricane Katrina to address those needs.
We included the following federal agencies and other organizations in
our study: DOD, FEMA, HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA, as well as the Red
Cross, the Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac),
and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).[Footnote 5]
To examine the extent to which the NRP clearly described the
responsibilities of federal agencies and the Red Cross, we reviewed the
NRP and its ESF-6 annex along with relevant federal statutes and
regulations pertaining to emergency shelter and disaster housing
assistance. In addition, we obtained information from each organization
about the types of sheltering and temporary housing assistance they
provided following the two hurricanes and determined the extent to
which the assistance was provided under a responsibility described in
the NRP. To examine the extent to which federal agencies and the Red
Cross had operational plans for providing sheltering and housing
assistance in response to catastrophic disasters such as Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, we analyzed available agency and Red Cross documents,
including policies, plans, and procedures these organizations had for
providing assistance at the time of the disasters. In addition, we
interviewed federal agency and Red Cross officials in Washington, D.C.,
about the plans and procedures they used to provide assistance
following the hurricanes. While our focus was on the response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we have incorporated information on
relevant steps that the organizations within the scope of our study
have taken since those events. To obtain the perceptions of victims and
others of victims' shelter and housing needs and the federal assistance
provided to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina, we conducted
standardized telephone interviews with a purposeful stratified sample
of 38 victims of Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 6] While the results
cannot be statistically generalized to all victims of the storm, they
do provide useful insights into the experiences and needs of victims of
this disaster. We also convened a group of experts on the provision of
disaster housing assistance by the federal government.[Footnote 7]
Finally, to address all of our objectives, we reviewed relevant
literature on disaster housing and recent reports on the federal
response to Hurricane Katrina, including those issued by the Department
of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,[Footnote 8] the House
of Representatives,[Footnote 9] the Senate,[Footnote 10] and the White
House.[Footnote 11] While these reports addressed a broad range of
issues related to the preparedness for and response to Hurricane
Katrina, our report focuses exclusively on federal assistance for
sheltering and for providing temporary housing--the activities covered
by ESF-6.[Footnote 12] Accordingly, we included a comprehensive summary
of the various types of housing assistance provided by each of the ESF-
6 agencies to the victims of the two hurricanes. These summaries appear
in appendixes III through XI.
We conducted our work between November 2005 and February 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The overall responsibilities of the two ESF-6 primary agencies--the Red
Cross and FEMA--for coordinating federal sheltering and housing
assistance generally were clear under the NRP and related documents.
However, the responsibilities described in the ESF-6 annex for some
support agencies did not fully reflect their capabilities. The NRP
clearly described that the Red Cross is to coordinate federal mass care
assistance to support state and local sheltering efforts. For the most
part, the NRP clearly described FEMA's responsibilities, though neither
the ESF-6 annex nor the draft standard operating procedures fully
described the scope of FEMA's responsibility to work with appropriate
private-sector organizations to maximize use of all available
resources, and FEMA experienced challenges working with Fannie Mae to
house victims in over 1,500 properties that this organization made
available.[Footnote 13] As part of a housing task force, FEMA is
currently exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by
private-sector organizations. Finally, while the ESF-6 support
agencies' responsibilities were generally clearly described in the
NRP's ESF-6 annex, the document did not and currently does not fully
reflect the disaster housing capabilities of HUD, USDA, VA, and
Treasury. For example, USDA's Rural Development provided temporary
housing for victims of the disasters, and Treasury acted to make
available some vacant rental units subsidized through a tax program,
but the ESF-6 annex did not mention either of these capabilities.
According to FEMA officials, as the only multiagency all-hazards plan,
the NRP (including the annexes) should enable participating agencies to
clearly delineate what assistance other agencies are capable of
providing and to be aware of what might be expected of them as well, in
order to properly plan to provide that assistance if required.
Officials of the support agencies told us that the ESF-6 annex did not
fully reflect their agencies' capabilities in part because of the
limited time to provide input into its development. Also, Treasury
officials believed that the NRP did not need to reflect the Internal
Revenue Service's (IRS) capability to make tax program properties
available to house disaster victims because this measure is taken only
after extraordinary events. Relatedly, none of the support agencies had
developed fact sheets--required by the ESF-6 draft standard operating
procedures--that included their appropriate roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency- specific
authorities. Support agencies had not prepared the fact sheets because
they generally were not aware of this requirement. The lack of fully
reflected support agency capabilities within the NRP and the lack of
information required by the fact sheets hampered FEMA's ability to
provide leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal
efforts associated with housing assistance. For example, as noted in
the White House's February 2006 report on the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA employees' unfamiliarity with USDA's programs
made it difficult to take advantage of USDA's capabilities for
providing temporary housing.
The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked operational plans
for providing shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic
disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but have taken some
steps to improve their planning. Specifically:
* To provide disaster relief services to victims of the storms, the Red
Cross followed a specific response plan for tropical storms and
hurricanes that it updates annually. However, the Red Cross did not
anticipate the magnitude of an event like Hurricane Katrina. For
example, the Red Cross initially planned to open shelters in 5 states,
and had 306 shelters open or on standby when Hurricane Katrina struck,
but it ultimately opened more than 1,000 shelters in 27 states due to
the large number of displaced victims. The House Select Committee noted
that the Red Cross experienced many problems in obtaining enough food
to satisfy client needs. The Red Cross has taken a number of actions
intended to improve its planning and response for future hurricanes,
including expanding its warehouse capacity for disaster response
operations.
* FEMA had initiated various catastrophic planning efforts, but they
were incomplete at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These
efforts included preparing a draft Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan that outlined the response and recovery for a major
hurricane that would flood New Orleans and the surrounding parishes;
however, this and other planning efforts were incomplete when the
storms struck. FEMA was overwhelmed by the large number of people
displaced by the storms, and it experienced difficulties that not only
delayed providing housing assistance to some victims but also increased
the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. FEMA officials told us that
the agency has taken steps to better plan for providing housing
assistance. For example, in July 2006, FEMA issued a high-level
strategy for providing sheltering and housing assistance in support of
a presidentially declared emergency or major disaster involving a mass
evacuation. FEMA intends to develop more detailed policies to support
this strategy. However, these policies were not completed as of January
2007.
* The NRP requires support agencies named in ESF annexes to develop
supplemental plans and procedures for carrying out assigned
responsibilities. However, due to the lack of preexisting operational
plans detailing how the support agencies would provide disaster housing
assistance--including plans for meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities--
some agencies had to work out details or improvise in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and this affected the timeliness with
which some victims were provided with temporary housing. For example,
VA worked with FEMA for months after the storms in order to make vacant
properties from its programs available to disaster victims. In
contrast, Treasury's IRS and DOD's Army Corp of Engineers each had a
document that addressed meeting its responsibilities under ESF-6. HUD,
USDA, and VA officials told us that in an attempt to improve their
operational plans for providing housing assistance under ESF-6, the
agencies formed an informal working group since Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita to work out certain procedural details for providing housing
assistance, including developing better means of communicating and
sharing information, to avoid the need to do so after a disaster event.
However, the informal working group is not intended to address the full
range of each of these agencies' responsibilities under ESF-6, and does
not have a specific timetable for its activities.
According to victims, experts, and others we spoke with, the shelter
and housing needs of victims and the perceptions of the federal
assistance provided to meet these needs varied. For example, most
victims needed shelter, food, water, and other necessities in the
immediate aftermath of the hurricane, but many perceived that the
assistance provided fell short. In particular, many shelters were not
prepared to accommodate the large number of victims who were displaced
and were not prepared to provide assistance over an extended period of
time. In most cases, victims with a need for temporary housing in the
weeks and months that followed were eligible for some form of federal
disaster housing assistance, such as rental assistance or travel
trailers from FEMA or rental assistance from HUD. The specific needs of
victims, however, and their perceptions of the assistance that was
provided varied. Often those needs depended, at least in part, on
victims' own circumstances, such as where they were located after the
storm, whether they were homeowners or renters, and whether they had
special needs. Victims we contacted expressed both positive and
negative perceptions of the temporary housing assistance they received.
For example, victims perceived that rental assistance generally was
helpful in meeting their housing needs because it allowed them to find
a place to live and pay the rent while they "got back on their feet,"
but some noted that the process of having to recertify their
eligibility for FEMA's rental assistance every 3 months left them
uncertain about whether they would continue to receive aid. Similarly,
some victims who received a travel trailer that was located on their
property said that it enabled them to remain in close proximity to
their home during repairs. But other victims who had travel trailers
placed on their property indicated that the units were too small for
the number of family members needing housing. Further, our interviews
with victims, as well as our group of experts, indicated that temporary
housing needs include not just shelter, but also access to medical
facilities, public transportation, schools, employment opportunities,
and other social services--and, particularly for those displaced to
distant locations, information about all of these things. Many victims
needed but did not always get access to reliable and accurate
information about the assistance they were eligible to receive and help
locating temporary housing. FEMA has initiated development of the
national disaster housing strategy mandated by Public Law 109-295
(October 4, 2006), which is to address a number of these issues,
including housing populations with special needs, clustering temporary
housing near appropriate services, and providing information about
eligibility for assistance.
To help ensure that FEMA, as the designated primary agency for housing
and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, can effectively coordinate
federal assistance in providing temporary housing for victims of future
disasters, we are recommending that (1) HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA
propose revisions needed to ensure that the NRP fully reflects their
capabilities for providing temporary housing assistance under ESF-6 and
(2) Defense, HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA develop fact sheets as
required by the ESF-6 standard operating procedures. To help ensure
that ESF-6 support agencies are prepared to help expeditiously house
victims of future disasters, we are recommending that HUD, USDA, and VA
develop operational plans detailing how they will meet their housing
responsibilities under ESF-6.
We provided a draft of this report to the American Red Cross and the
Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, Housing and
Urban Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs. The Red Cross did
not provide comments. Defense, HUD, Treasury, and VA concurred with our
recommendations; these agencies' comments are discussed later in the
report and are reproduced in appendixes XII through XV. USDA responded
that it will continue to develop its capabilities, fact sheets, and
operational plans in order to meet ESF-6 responsibilities, as we
recommended. DHS, along with HUD, Treasury, and VA, provided technical
comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. In
addition, we provided relevant segments of this report to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac and incorporated technical comments from these
organizations where appropriate.
Background:
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast region in late August 2005,
causing approximately $81 billion in estimated property damage and over
1,500 deaths.[Footnote 14] Hurricane Katrina caused extensive damage
and significant loss of life in Louisiana and Mississippi, but damage
from this disaster also extended into Alabama, Florida, and Georgia,
ultimately covering approximately 90,000 square miles. Hurricane
Katrina was also the most expensive disaster in history, devastating
far more residential property and completely destroying or making
uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes. Hurricane Rita made landfall
near the Texas and Louisiana border in late September 2005, causing
approximately $10 billion in estimated property damage. Hurricane Rita
created a wide swath of damage from Alabama to eastern Texas and caused
flooding in some areas of Louisiana that had seen flooding from
Hurricane Katrina about a month earlier. Hurricane Rita severely
damaged or destroyed more than 23,600 housing units in Southwest
Louisiana and Southeast Texas. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displaced
more than 1 million people from their residences. According to the Red
Cross, 8 months following the disasters more than 750,000 persons
remained displaced across all 50 states.[Footnote 15]
The National Response Plan:
DHS issued the NRP in December 2004, intending for it to be an all-
discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive
framework for the management of domestic incidents where federal
involvement is necessary. Major federal government agencies and the Red
Cross are signatories to the plan. The NRP is designed on the premise
that local jurisdictions generally handle disaster response. In the
vast majority of disasters, local emergency personnel, such as police,
fire, public health, and emergency management personnel, act as first
responders and identify needed resources to aid the community. Local
jurisdictions can also call on state resources to provide additional
assistance. If an incident is of such severity that it is deemed an
incident of national significance, DHS and FEMA--an agency within DHS-
-coordinate with other federal agencies to provide the affected state
and local governments with additional resources and supplemental
assistance. In these instances, state and local governments can request
federal assistance for needed items. The Secretary of Homeland Security
declared Hurricane Katrina an incident of national significance on
August 30, 2005. This was the first time the federal government used
the NRP in response to an incident of national significance.
In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to respond
to disasters, the NRP includes (1) 15 Emergency Support Function
annexes that serve as the coordination mechanism to provide assistance
to state, local, and tribal governments or to federal departments and
agencies conducting missions of primary federal responsibility; (2) 9
Support Annexes that describe the framework through which federal
departments and agencies; state, local, and tribal entities; the
private sector; volunteer organizations; and nongovernmental
organizations such as the Red Cross will coordinate and execute common
functional processes and administrative requirements; and (3) 7
Incident Annexes that address contingency or hazard situations
requiring specialized application of the NRP. For example, the Private-
Sector Coordination Support Annex describes the policies,
responsibilities, and concept of operations for federal incident
management activities involving the private sector during actual or
potential incidents of national significance. In addition, the
Catastrophic Incident Annex establishes the context and overarching
strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive
national response to a catastrophic incident.
Emergency Support Function-6:
ESF-6, which is particularly relevant to sheltering victims and
providing temporary housing assistance, creates a working group of key
federal agencies and voluntary organizations to coordinate federal
assistance in support of state and local efforts. The efforts are aimed
at providing:
* mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid;
* housing, both short and long term; and:
* human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and
identifying support for persons with special needs.
ESF-6 designates a "primary" agency for each of these three areas. FEMA
has two roles under ESF-6: it serves as both the overall ESF-6
coordinator and the primary agency for both housing and for human
services (fig. 1). As ESF-6 coordinator, FEMA oversees the
implementation of ESF-6 and ensures overall coordination among mass
care, housing, and human services. As the primary agency for housing
and human services, FEMA coordinates federal efforts to provide these
services to the victims of disasters. The Red Cross is designated under
ESF-6 as the primary agency for mass care, which includes sheltering,
feeding, and the provision of emergency first aid. In this capacity,
the Red Cross coordinates federal mass care assistance in support of
state and local mass care efforts. Since 1905, the Red Cross also has
had a congressional charter, requiring the organization to provide
volunteer humanitarian assistance to the armed forces, serve as a
medium of communication between the people of the United States and the
armed forces, and provided disaster prevention and relief services.
Figure 1: Figure 1: Organizational Structure for Emergency Support
Function-6:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of the National Response Plan.
[End of figure]
Figure 2 illustrates the process for activating ESF-6's mass care and
housing areas in response to an incident of national significance. The
FEMA Operations Center activates ESF-6 and notifies the primary
agencies. The primary agencies--Red Cross and FEMA--then deploy staff
to the designated ESF-6 location. The primary agencies also notify and
request assistance from support agencies. ESF-6 support agencies are
expected to conduct operations, when requested by DHS or the designated
ESF primary agency, using their own authorities, subject-matter
experts, capabilities, or resources.
Figure 2: Process for Activating ESF-6's Mass Care and Housing
Functions:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO analysis; Art Explosion (clip art).
[End of figure]
While ESF-6 Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, the
National Response Plan Did Not Fully Reflect Support Agencies'
Capabilities:
The responsibilities of the two ESF-6 primary agencies for mass care
and housing--the Red Cross and FEMA--generally were clearly described
in the NRP. However, under its role as the primary agency for housing,
FEMA's responsibility for working with private-sector organizations was
less clearly described in the NRP, and FEMA experienced challenges
working with a private-sector organization to make housing units
available to victims of the disasters. In general, the NRP clearly
described the responsibilities for ESF-6 support agencies, but the plan
did not fully reflect all of these agencies' capabilities for providing
housing assistance in part because of the limited time agencies had to
provide input into its development. As a result, FEMA's ability to
provide leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal
efforts associated with housing assistance was limited.
The Red Cross's and FEMA's Responsibilities Under ESF-6 Were Generally
Clear:
The Red Cross's responsibilities as the primary agency for mass care
(which includes sheltering) under ESF-6 were clearly described in the
NRP. For example, the ESF-6 annex to the NRP clearly states that the
Red Cross is to coordinate federal mass care assistance in support of
state and local mass care efforts. In addition, the more detailed ESF-
6 standard operating procedures in effect at the time of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita clearly described additional Red Cross primary agency
responsibilities, such as assisting with the identification and
coordination of (1) nonmedical mass care services for sheltering and
feeding operations, (2) emergency first aid at designated sites, and
(3) bulk distribution of emergency relief items during incidents of
national significance. To fulfill its responsibilities, the Red Cross-
-after receiving requests from state or local governments for federal
resources to help meet sheltering or other mass care needs--identifies
resources to meet the needs or calls FEMA to meet the needs. The Red
Cross's responsibilities as the primary agency for mass care under ESF-
6 also included mass care reporting--that is, providing to FEMA
sheltering, feeding, and other mass care information.
FEMA's responsibilities as the primary agency for housing under ESF-6
were also generally clear. For example, the ESF-6 annex notes that FEMA
is to provide leadership in coordinating and integrating overall
federal efforts associated with housing services. In addition, the more
detailed draft ESF-6 standard operating procedures state that FEMA is
to (1) assist with the data collection of housing resources potentially
available within proximity of the impacted area, (2) coordinate
temporary housing resources needed to support sheltering shortfall, and
(3) address the short-term and long-term disaster related housing needs
of victims during incidents of national significance. Further, the
introduction to the NRP's emergency support function annexes states
that any primary agency named in the plan is to notify and request
assistance from designated support agencies, manage mission
assignments,[Footnote 16] coordinate with appropriate state agencies,
and work with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize the
use of all available resources.
While their responsibilities under the NRP were generally clear, the
Red Cross and FEMA disagreed about the operational role of the ESF-6
coordinator--a FEMA official with overall responsibility for leading
efforts to coordinate federal mass care, housing, and human services
assistance--as we reported in June 2006.[Footnote 17] The Red Cross
maintained that the ESF-6 standard operating procedures in effect at
the time permitted it to take requests for FEMA assistance directly to
the Operations Section Chief--a FEMA official responsible for
coordinating operational support to incident management efforts.
Specifically, the procedures stated that the Red Cross would "not be
precluded" from taking priorities directly to the Operations Section
Chief. However, following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA instructed the Red
Cross to direct these requests through the ESF-6 coordinator, who would
pass the requests to the Operations Section Chief. Red Cross officials
told us that it complied with this procedure, but that this added time
to the process. In our June 2006 report, we recommended that the
Secretary of DHS direct FEMA to work with the Interim President and
Chief Executive Officer of the Red Cross as soon as possible on the
operating procedures they would both use in an incident of national
significance. FEMA and the Red Cross have worked to clarify their
understanding of the role of the ESF-6 coordinator. For example, FEMA
issued revised ESF-6 operating procedures in September 2006. The
revised procedures state that it is not envisioned that the ESF-6
coordinator will have a direct operational role during response
activities. During our work for this current review, FEMA and Red Cross
officials told us that both organizations now agree that the Red Cross
can take requests for FEMA assistance to the Human Services Branch
Chief for referral directly to the Operations Section Chief. As a
result, this should clarify both organizations' understanding regarding
the role of the ESF-6 coordinator and the process for requesting FEMA
assistance under ESF-6.
The DHS Inspector General's March 2006 report on the response to
Hurricane Katrina also suggested that the scope of the Red Cross's mass
care reporting activities might not have been mutually clear to both
the Red Cross and FEMA.[Footnote 18] According to the report, a senior
Red Cross official said that it was responsible for coordinating and
reporting only on the Red Cross' own mass care operations, while FEMA
was relying on the Red Cross to coordinate and report on non-Red Cross
mass care operations as well. The Inspector General recommended that
FEMA establish an ESF-6 working group to define the explicit roles and
responsibilities for each agency, develop standard operating
procedures, and implement a concept-of-operations plan for response
activities that address all levels of disasters. Red Cross officials
told us that, notwithstanding the official's statement in the Inspector
General's report, the Red Cross was clearly responsible under ESF-6 for
reporting to FEMA on both Red Cross and non-Red Cross sheltering
operations, and that the organization relies on state and local
officials to supply some of this information. However, Red Cross
officials also told us that, following Hurricane Katrina, it was unable
to obtain complete information from some state and local officials.
FEMA officials told us that it had to gather information on its own
regarding some non-Red Cross shelter locations in response to the
storm.
Further, the NRP did not clearly describe the scope of FEMA's
responsibility to, or delineate how the agency would, work with
appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize the use of all
available housing resources for incidents of national significance.
During our review, we found that Fannie Mae approached FEMA in
September 2005 with an offer to make some 1,500 of its properties
available for temporarily housing victims of the disasters. Because
FEMA and Fannie Mae had no prior working relationship, the
organizations initially experienced operational challenges regarding
the leasing of these units. For example, FEMA officials told us that
Fannie Mae did not have a mechanism in place for accepting calls from
disaster victims that FEMA referred to the organization. Also,
according to Fannie Mae officials, it expected that FEMA would be
responsible for managing its offered housing units. However, because
FEMA did not have this capability, Fannie Mae had to develop a
mechanism for managing the units through its network of brokers.
According to Fannie Mae officials, structuring a brand new process for
these operational issues created some delays in providing benefits to
disaster victims. FEMA and Fannie Mae eventually did reach an agreement
for placing disaster victims in Fannie Mae-owned housing units, and
disaster victims began occupying these properties in October 2005.
Freddie Mac also offered assistance to victims of the disasters,
placing more than 1,000 families in temporary housing, including
properties from its own inventory. However, Freddie Mac provided this
assistance through nonprofit organizations rather than coordinating
through FEMA. Freddie Mac officials noted that it would have been
difficult for FEMA to have been involved in this effort in the absence
of a previous relationship or specific plans for coordination.
According to FEMA officials, the agency is assessing whether to develop
agreements with private-sector organizations as part of the agency's
housing task force. The agreements would outline processes for
utilizing housing resources offered by these organizations during
catastrophic disasters.
ESF-6 Support Agencies' Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, but
Their Capabilities Were Not Fully Reflected in the NRP:
The ESF-6 annex clearly described responsibilities for support
agencies, but the annex did not fully reflect the housing-related
capabilities of these agencies. According to a FEMA official, the NRP
(including the annexes) should enable participating agencies to clearly
delineate what assistance other agencies are capable of providing and
to be aware of what might be expected of them as well, in order to
properly plan to provide that assistance if required. Further, as we
have previously testified, in the event of a catastrophic disaster,
leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for the
response at all levels must be clearly defined and effectively
communicated in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision
making.[Footnote 19]
With the exception of DOD, each of the support agencies in our study
described to us assistance that they provided to victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita that was not reflected in the NRP. Specifically:
* Department of Agriculture--The ESF-6 annex clearly described that
USDA's Forest Service is to provide available departmental resources
(e.g., cots, blankets, sleeping bags, personnel) for shelters. However,
USDA's Rural Development also provided temporary housing for victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in multifamily units financed by the
department and in its inventory of single-family properties, but the
ESF-6 annex did not reflect these capabilities.[Footnote 20] In
addition, USDA provided other forms of housing assistance that the ESF-
6 annex did not reflect, including (1) rental assistance to low-income
disaster victims, in the form of a subsidy to help cover their rent and
(2) requests to holders of program mortgages to provide temporary
moratoriums on payments and to exercise forbearance (i.e., refrain from
foreclosures) for program borrowers in the affected areas. While
temporary suspensions of mortgage payments and foreclosures are not, in
themselves, forms of temporary housing, they can help make it
financially possible for homeowners to rent alternative housing until
their homes can be reoccupied.
* Department of Housing and Urban Development--The ESF-6 annex clearly
described that HUD is to provide information on available housing units
owned or in HUD possession for use as emergency shelters and temporary
housing and utilize available HUD staff when needed to assist with mass
care and housing operations. However, HUD provided other forms of
housing-related assistance in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
that the ESF-6 annex did not reflect. For example, HUD waived certain
requirements in its existing grant programs to assist disaster victims
with rehabilitating or purchasing a residence. Also, similar to USDA,
HUD asked lenders to adopt temporary payment moratoriums and to
exercise forbearance for victims with HUD-insured mortgages. In
addition, FEMA tasked HUD through a mission assignment to create a
housing voucher program for disaster victims who, prior to the
disaster, were served by HUD's rental assistance programs or were
homeless.[Footnote 21]
* Department of Treasury--The ESF-6 annex clearly described that IRS is
to distribute disaster kits containing tax forms and publications to
help victims determine the amount of a casualty loss deduction for
destroyed property. However, in response to Hurricane Katrina, IRS also
provided housing-related assistance that the ESF-6 annex did not
reflect. For example, IRS, at the request of governors of the affected
states, temporarily suspended the income limits that normally restrict
eligibility for certain low-income housing tax credit projects in order
to allow displaced individuals to occupy vacant low-income
units.[Footnote 22] IRS also offered tax relief under the Katrina
Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005. For example, IRS permitted taxpayers
who provided housing in their main homes to individuals displaced by
Hurricane Katrina to claim additional exemptions of $500 per displaced
person (up to $2,000) in 2005 or 2006.
* Department of Veterans Affairs--The ESF-6 annex clearly described
that VA is to provide available facilities suitable for mass shelter
and develop and maintain plans to make VA-owned housing assets
available for use by disaster victims. However, VA--like USDA and HUD-
-also provided mortgage assistance by asking the holders of program
mortgages to offer temporary moratoriums on payments and to exercise
forbearance for borrowers in the affected areas, but the ESF-6 annex
did not reflect this capability.
Appendixes III through XI contain a more detailed listing of the
shelter, temporary housing, and other types of housing assistance that
the Red Cross, FEMA, ESF-6 support agencies, and other organizations
provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
The introduction to the NRP states that the purpose of the plan, among
other things, is to describe the capabilities and resources and
establish responsibilities to help protect the nation from natural and
other hazards. If such capabilities change over time, any department or
agency with assigned responsibilities may propose a change to the plan.
In addition, the NRP states that DHS and FEMA are responsible for the
ongoing management and maintenance of the plan, including coordinating
all proposed modifications with primary and support agencies and other
stakeholders and issuing an official notice of change for all approved
modifications.[Footnote 23]
The ESF-6 annex did not fully reflect support agency capabilities for
several reasons. For example, during the period in which DHS was
developing the NRP--essentially, between February 2003 and December
2004--some ESF-6 support agency officials told us that there was a
limited amount of time to provide input into the development of the
annex. In addition, a FEMA official told us that many of the support
agency responsibilities under the ESF-6 annex were simply carried over
from the Federal Response Plan, a previous plan for disaster
management, with very few revisions, even though the scope of ESF-6
expanded under the NRP to include housing and human services (in
contrast, under the Federal Response Plan, ESF-6 covered mass care
activities only). Further, a Treasury official told us that DHS
described ESF-6 to them as being more related to first responders and
caring for basic human needs, so Treasury decided that it would have
very little to offer. However, Treasury officials stated that they did
not believe it was necessary to include certain agency capabilities
under ESF-6. For example, these officials indicated that it was not
appropriate for ESF-6 to reflect the IRS's capability to temporarily
waive income limitations for subsidized rental units because this
action was not required for every presidential disaster declaration.
Finally, a USDA official told us that the agency provided housing-
related responsibilities to a centralized office within USDA for
inclusion in ESF-6, but these responsibilities were not incorporated
into the final document.
While the NRP calls for fully reflecting support agencies'
capabilities, the ESF-6 draft standard operating procedures in effect
at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita also required each support
agency to develop a fact sheet with appropriate roles and
responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency-
specific authorities; and to review the fact sheet annually in order to
keep it up to date. However, none of the ESF-6 support agencies had
developed the fact sheets, and most support agency officials we spoke
with were not aware of this requirement.
The lack of fully reflected support agency capabilities within the NRP
and the lack of information required by the fact sheets hampered the
ability of FEMA to provide leadership in coordinating and integrating
overall federal efforts associated with this assistance. For example,
FEMA was not aware in many cases of housing assistance that ESF-6
support agencies could provide that was not reflected in the NRP. As
noted in the White House's report on the federal response to Hurricane
Katrina, USDA had capabilities for providing temporary housing but had
difficulty getting FEMA to take advantage of those capabilities because
some FEMA employees were unfamiliar with USDA programs. Having USDA's
full capabilities reflected in the ESF-6 annex or having access to a
fact sheet about the agency's capabilities and programs might have
helped to avoid this problem.
Recent legislation (Public Law 109-295, October 4, 2006) requires FEMA,
in consultation with other federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the Red Cross, to develop and provide a national
disaster housing strategy within 270 days. The legislation requires
that the strategy, among other things, (1) identify the most efficient
and cost-effective federal programs for meeting the short-term and long-
term housing needs of individuals affected by a major disaster, and (2)
clearly define the role, programs, authorities, and responsibilities of
each entity involved in providing that assistance, including FEMA, HUD,
USDA, VA, and any other relevant federal agency. However, the
legislation does not specify the relationship of the strategy to the
existing NRP and its ESF-6 annex. According to FEMA, a stakeholders
group planned to begin work on the strategy in mid- February 2007, and
the initial report from the group was due to Congress on July 4, 2007.
According to FEMA officials responsible for coordinating housing
assistance under ESF-6, notwithstanding the strategy required by the
legislation, the NRP should fully reflect the capabilities of the ESF-
6 support agencies with disaster housing responsibilities. The ESF-6
unit leader also confirmed that the fact sheets required by the ESF-6
standard operating procedures are important because support agencies
must clearly define for the primary agencies what types of housing
assistance they can provide in response to a disaster. In commenting on
a draft of this report, FEMA stated that the agency is working with ESF-
6 partner agencies to rewrite the ESF-6 annex as part of full revision
of the NRP. FEMA also stated that the ESF-6 standard operating
procedures are being revised in partnership with the support agencies
and that the revised procedures would include fact sheets developed to
describe support agency disaster programs.
The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate Plans for
Providing Shelter and Temporary Housing to Victims of Catastrophic
Disasters:
The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked adequate plans for
providing shelter and temporary housing to victims of catastrophic
disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, the Red
Cross followed its existing planning documents but had difficulty
providing relief services because of the magnitude of destruction and
the significant number of displaced residents. FEMA's catastrophic
planning efforts were incomplete at the time of the disasters, and as a
result the agency was overwhelmed by the large number of people
displaced by the disaster. In addition, some of the steps that FEMA
took in response to the storms increased the potential for fraud,
waste, and abuse. Both the Red Cross and FEMA have taken steps since
the storms to better plan for their response to future catastrophic
disasters. Finally, ESF-6 support agencies generally had not developed
specific operational plans for meeting their housing-related
responsibilities at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Agency
officials whom we spoke with said that they relied on existing
statutory authorities and other agreements to provide assistance to
victims of the disasters. However, the lack of preexisting operational
plans detailing how the support agencies would provide disaster housing
assistance meant that the agencies had to work out details or improvise
in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and this affected the
timeliness with which some victims were provided with temporary
housing.
Red Cross Had Plans for Sheltering Hurricane Victims Under Its
Congressional Charter, but Has Taken Steps to Expand Capacity for
Large, Catastrophic Events:
In addition to its responsibilities as the primary agency for mass care
under ESF-6, the Red Cross is expected to provide disaster relief
services under its congressional charter.[Footnote 24] According to the
Red Cross, it has frequently executed a specific response plan for
tropical storms and hurricanes because these events pose a recurring
threat to a substantial number of individuals in the United States.
This plan, which is updated annually, outlines the systematic approach
that the Red Cross will take to prepare for and respond to hurricanes,
including pre-and postlandfall activities. Further, the plan calls for
the Red Cross to initiate an anticipated service delivery plan before a
hurricane makes landfall, including recommended resource allocations,
locations for service centers, aid stations, and long-term shelters.
For Hurricane Katrina, Red Cross officials told us that it initially
planned to open shelters in five states and had 306 shelters open or on
standby when the storm made landfall.
However, Red Cross officials told us that the organization did not
anticipate the magnitude of the destruction of Hurricane Katrina or the
number of residents who would be displaced. As the extent of the damage
became clear, the Red Cross faced several challenges providing relief
services to victims impacted by the storm. These included:
* The need for long-term shelter--Many individuals displaced by the
storms--particularly those in New Orleans--faced not being able to
return to their residence for weeks or months. Red Cross officials
noted that during most disasters, victims were generally able to return
to their residences within 48 hours following the event. After
Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross had to develop a national strategy to
provide assistance to the large number of individuals who required
longer-term shelter, and it ultimately opened more than 1,000 shelters
in 27 states. Complicating matters was a shortage of trained managers
to operate such a large number of shelters for extended time periods.
* Supply shortages--The May 2006 Senate Report on Hurricane Katrina
noted that many shelter residents found conditions quite difficult
because of shortages of food and water and sanitation problems. The
report concluded that the Red Cross's planning needed to be more
detailed for such a catastrophic disaster, during which residents
typically need longer-term shelter.[Footnote 25] Similarly, the House
Select Committee in its report on Hurricane Katrina noted that the Red
Cross did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to deal
with a catastrophic disaster the size of Katrina, especially with
regard to food service, as the organization had many problems simply
getting enough food to satisfy victims' needs.[Footnote 26] Officials
at one local Red Cross chapter told us that they had prepositioned
supplies to support Red Cross shelters for 3 days but that the supplies
were stretched for 7 days to support both Red Cross and non-Red Cross
shelters. These officials also told us that they experienced challenges
transporting supplies to shelters because of damage to the roadways.
According to Red Cross officials, on August 28, 2005--the day before
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans--FEMA, anticipating the
activation of ESF-6, contacted the Red Cross and asked for its
estimates of the sheltering needs expected from the storm. The
officials said that early on the morning of August 29, 2005, they
provided estimates of resources that would be needed, including kitchen
supplies, meals, and personnel. The officials noted that they based
these estimates on assumptions contained in the Catastrophic Incident
Annex--that is, up to 300,000 victims needing sheltering assistance for
an extended period of time. However, Red Cross officials told us that
later that day, at FEMA's request, they reduced the estimates but still
did not ultimately receive all of the items requested.
* The need for stronger relationships with partners--The Red Cross
reported that their experiences in responding to Hurricane Katrina
highlighted the fact that the organization had not developed strong and
enduring local partner relationships in certain sections of hurricane-
prone states. As a result, the Red Cross did not react consistently
when opportunities to cooperate with new partners surfaced. For
example, a Red Cross headquarters official told us that the
organization did not clearly communicate what community-based
sheltering partners could expect of the Red Cross. Although the Red
Cross provided substantial resources to community-based shelters, this
official acknowledged that coordination with and support of Red Cross
sheltering partners could be improved.
Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross has taken a number of
actions intended to improve its planning and response during future
hurricane seasons. The June 2006 report that outlined these actions
focused primarily on the disaster relief services that the Red Cross
provides, but it also identified actions that the organization planned
to take regarding its role at the federal level.[Footnote 27] These
actions included (1) hiring Red Cross employees in key risk states to
work with state emergency management to better prepare at-risk
communities for disasters; (2) working with appropriate federal
agencies to clarify roles and expectations, in particular the Red
Cross's role under the NRP as primary agency for coordinating federal
mass care resources to support state and local governments; and (3)
creating a nationwide shelter database with FEMA.
The Red Cross also has acted to enhance its ability to respond to large-
scale events. For example, the organization:
* launched a national pilot program to proactively recruit and train
corporate employees as local disaster response volunteers and partnered
with a nonprofit service that matches potential volunteers with
community service organizations via the Internet;
* increased its prepositioned supply inventory to support shelters for
up to 500,000 people and 1 million meals per day;
* expanded its warehouse capacity for disaster response operations to
more than 1.3 million square feet in over 30 locations in 24 states and
territories; and:
* developed basic written agreements that will establish roles,
responsibilities, and the general parameters for service delivery for
local entities that wish to be service providers during major
disasters.
FEMA Had Not Completed Catastrophic Planning Efforts Prior to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Faced Challenges in Providing Temporary
Housing:
Although FEMA had initiated various catastrophic planning efforts prior
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, those efforts were incomplete at the
time of the disasters. For example, in 2004 FEMA sponsored a disaster
exercise called "Hurricane Pam." The purpose of this exercise was to
develop a response and recovery plan specifically for a major hurricane
that would flood New Orleans and the surrounding parishes and identify
any deficiencies in current capabilities. In addition to widespread
flooding, the exercise included extensive evacuations and the resulting
need to shelter thousands of individuals left homeless after the storm.
From the Hurricane Pam exercise, FEMA produced a draft Southeast
Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan and also made efforts to finalize
agreements with hospital and university officials to create temporary
medical operation staging areas around the state. However, by the time
of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA had not yet finalized plans for evacuating
those with special needs or for providing postlandfall care. Also, in
early 2005 FEMA issued a draft strategy for catastrophic incident
planning that was intended to establish a comprehensive set of goals
and objectives for fiscal years 2005 to 2009 and to prioritize
capability-building initiatives to meet the challenges posed by an
incident of catastrophic magnitude. However, this strategy was not
finalized or distributed.
In the absence of completed plans for catastrophic events, FEMA's
efforts to provide temporary housing to victims of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita were overwhelmed, and it faced several challenges in providing
temporary housing to victims of the storms. Red Cross officials told us
that the organization kept some shelters open for up to 4 months after
Hurricane Katrina because FEMA was not able to transition victims to
temporary housing assistance more quickly. For example, FEMA
experienced difficulties in making available travel trailers to
disaster victims.[Footnote 28] According to the House report on the
response to Hurricane Katrina, the nation's manufacturing capacity was
about 6,000 trailers per month at the time of the storm, limiting how
quickly FEMA could obtain travel trailers and make them available to
disaster victims. Further, DHS's Inspector General reported in March
2006 that FEMA had difficulty identifying acceptable sites for the
travel trailers and manufactured homes and was slow in identifying
applicants to occupy these units.
FEMA also experienced difficulties utilizing the program housing units
made available by three support agencies--HUD, USDA, and VA. In
addition to its inventory of single-family properties, USDA identified
vacant units in multifamily properties that it financed. These agencies
made properties available to FEMA for victims of the storms, but FEMA
had difficulty utilizing them for several reasons:
* FEMA officials told us that many of the housing units offered to
disaster victims needed repairs, and it did not have a means of
assuring that the repairs were made. As discussed later in this report,
VA--in response to Hurricane Katrina--sought to enter into an
interagency agreement with FEMA under which VA's Veterans Benefits
Housing Fund would be reimbursed for repairs needed to make its
available housing units habitable for disaster victims. According to VA
officials, the two organizations could not come to an agreement because
of FEMA's budgetary constraints.
* FEMA officials also told us that some of the offered properties were
located in rural areas that were not central to public transportation
or medical services desired by disaster victims.
* FEMA also encountered difficulties verifying that housing units
offered by the support agencies were indeed available. According to
FEMA officials, such verification was very important when placing
victims in temporary housing, as it did not want to refer victims to
housing units that were no longer available. FEMA officials told us
that the support agency housing databases it relied on to determine the
availability of housing units were not always kept up to date.
* FEMA officials told us that because each of these entities had its
own rules, regulations, and authorities that affected the conditions
under which the properties could be made available, it was difficult to
coordinate and match disaster victims with properties. According to the
officials, during the aftermath of the disasters FEMA worked on
developing a document to facilitate its understanding of each
organization's authorities related to leasing housing units to disaster
victims, but the agency never finalized the document.
In part because plans for catastrophic events had not been completed,
some of the steps FEMA took in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
increased the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. For example:
* DHS's Inspector General testified in February 2006 that FEMA might
have purchased more manufactured homes and modular homes than it
needed. According to the Inspector General, FEMA purchased 24,967
manufactured homes at a cost of $857.8 million and 1,295 modular homes
at a cost of $40 million. However, because FEMA regulations prohibited
using mobile homes in flood plains, some of these homes and the
manufactured homes and modular homes could not be used where they were
most needed (i.e., in parts of Louisiana and Mississippi). FEMA also
paid to store and maintain the unoccupied units, and the Inspector
General testified that more than 10,000 manufactured homes at one site
were improperly stored without adequate support, causing the units to
sink in the mud and their frames to bend.
* As we testified in February 2006, the need to provide assistance
quickly led FEMA to implement expedited assistance with limited
controls to verify eligibility for the initial expedited assistance
payments.[Footnote 29] We also reported in September 2006 that the
unprecedented challenges posed by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exposed
FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) to fraud and
abuse.[Footnote 30] We estimated that, as of February 2006, 16 percent,
or approximately $1 billion, in FEMA IHP payments were improper and
potentially fraudulent because of invalid application data such as
Social Security Numbers and addresses.[Footnote 31] Further, we
testified in December 2006 that FEMA continued to lose tens of millions
of dollars through potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments from
both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.[Footnote 32]
* Because FEMA was unable to immediately implement IHP assistance
(under section 408 of the Stafford Act) that would provide funds to
move victims from short-term lodging--including shelters, hotels and
motels--to longer-term housing alternatives such as mobile homes and
apartments, the agency used public assistance funds. Normally, FEMA
uses public assistance funds (authorized under section 403 of the
Stafford Act) only for immediate emergency sheltering efforts. FEMA
officials said if the agency had followed its normal practice of using
IHP assistance, the program's rules would have left many applicants
waiting months for assistance. Under the IHP program, each applicant's
damaged dwelling must be inspected before FEMA provides any assistance.
However, the DHS Inspector General reported in March 2006 that the use
of public assistance funds was problematic for two reasons. First, FEMA
did not know whether those it housed were actually eligible for
assistance as a direct result of the disaster, and second, using this
type of assistance increased the potential for duplication with other
assistance programs.[Footnote 33]
To address the difficulties FEMA encountered in providing temporary
housing to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the agency formed a
joint housing solutions group to identify manufactured housing options
for disaster operations. The group's goal is to help identify situation-
appropriate manufactured or other housing options for disasters. FEMA
also convened a housing task force, which began meeting in summer 2006.
The task force had two goals: to resolve procedural problems
encountered in response to the hurricanes, and to establish better
working relationships with other housing providers. As of January 2007,
the housing task force had not released any findings or taken any
actions.
FEMA has taken other steps to improve its plans for providing temporary
housing assistance for large-scale disasters. For example:
* In July 2006, FEMA issued a high-level strategy for providing
sheltering and housing assistance in support of a presidentially
declared emergency or major disaster involving a mass evacuation. FEMA
intends to develop more detailed policies to support this strategy.
However, these policies were not completed as of January 2007.
As previously noted, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect the capabilities
of USDA's Rural Housing Service to provide temporary housing to victims
of disasters.
* In December 2006, FEMA awarded grants totaling up to $388 million to
states in the Gulf region to develop alternatives to FEMA travel
trailers and mobile homes under its Alternative Housing Pilot Program.
Support Agencies Generally Lacked Plans for Providing Assistance in
Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
The NRP requires federal agencies to develop supplemental plans and
procedures for carrying out the responsibilities assigned in the ESF
annexes. As we have previously testified, the NRP base plan and its
supporting catastrophic incident annex need to be supported and
supplemented by more detailed and robust operational implementation
plans that further define any capabilities that might be needed in a
catastrophic disaster.[Footnote 34] More detailed planning would
provide greater visibility and understanding of the types of support
that support agencies could be expected to provide following a
catastrophic event, including the types of assistance and capabilities
that might be provided and what might be done proactively and in
response to specific requests.
The ESF-6 support agencies generally had not developed specific
operational plans for the housing assistance they provided in response
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, whether or not the agencies'
capabilities for providing the assistance were specifically reflected
in the NRP. Rather, officials from the ESF-6 support agencies told us
that they generally worked out the procedures for providing the
assistance after the hurricanes struck, relying on preexisting
statutory authorities or interagency agreements or, in some cases,
acting in response to FEMA mission assignments or legislation enacted
after the storms. For example:
* HUD officials noted that the department relied primarily on existing
statutory authorities to expedite the delivery of assistance in
disaster situations. However, it was not until after Hurricane Katrina
struck that HUD and FEMA entered into an interagency agreement--on
September 12, 2005--that defined how HUD would make its properties
available to victims. As noted above, in response to a FEMA mission
assignment after Hurricane Katrina, HUD also created a housing voucher
program to house disaster victims who were previously assisted by HUD
or were homeless.
* USDA officials told us that the department relied on existing
statutory authorities to provide housing-related assistance in disaster
situations. As previously noted, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect the
capabilities of USDA's Rural Development to provide temporary housing
to victims of disasters. However, the department had a preexisting 1982
memorandum of understanding that outlined the terms under which FEMA
might utilize housing units owned by USDA to provide temporary housing
to victims of disasters. USDA officials told us that the department
followed this memorandum in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but
did not locate any single-family properties that qualified under the
terms of the memorandum.
* VA officials said that, while they had a memorandum of understanding
with FEMA--outlining the working relationship with respect to disaster
preparedness and relief activities after a major disaster or emergency-
-dating back to 1982, after Hurricane Katrina they attempted a new
interagency agreement similar to the one between FEMA and HUD. However,
according to the officials, FEMA and VA could not reach an agreement,
primarily because of differences over the reimbursement of property
expenses to VA's Veterans Benefits Housing Fund. FEMA and VA ultimately
revised the 1982 memorandum in December 2005.
In contrast, Treasury's IRS, while also relying on existing statutory
authorities, had a preexisting reference tool that identified specific
actions that IRS will take to provide tax relief in response to
disasters or other significant emergencies, and the officials and
functional organizations responsible for carrying out these actions. As
noted previously, one of IRS's responsibilities specifically described
in ESF-6 is to help victims determine the amount of a casualty loss
deduction for destroyed property. While encompassing a wider range of
activities, IRS's reference tool does address the responsibilities
described in ESF-6 annex. Similarly, DOD's Army Corp of Engineers had
procedures in place detailing how the agency would provide temporary
roofing for minimally damaged homes.
Due to the lack of preexisting operational plans detailing how the
support agencies would provide disaster housing assistance--including
plans for meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities--the agencies had to
work out details or improvise in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, and this affected the timeliness with which some victims were
provided with temporary housing. For example, VA's attempt to develop a
new interagency agreement--before ultimately revising an existing
memorandum of understanding with FEMA--delayed the availability of VA
properties for disaster victims until several months after the storms.
VA made 600 properties available for rent in 11 states in January 2006.
HUD, USDA, and VA officials told us that, in an attempt to improve
their operational plans for providing housing assistance under ESF-6,
they formed an informal working group since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
to work out certain procedural details, including developing better
means of communicating and sharing information. The USDA official
involved in this effort noted the practical importance of working out
such operational details before a disaster strikes in order to avoid
the need to do so following the event. However, the informal working
group is not intended to address the full range of each of these
agencies' responsibilities under ESF-6, and as of January 2007 does not
have a specific timetable for its activities.
Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Temporary Housing
Needs and the Assistance They Received:
According to victims, experts, and others we spoke with, the sheltering
and housing needs of victims and the perceptions of the federal
assistance provided to meet these needs varied. For example, most
victims needed shelter, food, water, and other necessities in the
immediate aftermath of the hurricane, but many perceived that the
assistance provided fell short of meeting these needs. Over the weeks
and months following the hurricane, many victims developed a need for
temporary housing while they made arrangements to have their homes
repaired or other plans to recover from the disaster. In most cases,
victims with a need for temporary housing were eligible for some form
of federal disaster housing assistance, such as from FEMA or HUD.
However, victims expressed both positive and negative perceptions of
the temporary housing assistance they received. Furthermore, many
victims needed, but did not always receive, access to reliable and
accurate information about the assistance they were eligible to receive
and help locating temporary housing. More than a year after the
hurricane, some people continue to have temporary housing needs,
including some of the most vulnerable individuals--the elderly, persons
with disabilities, and those from the most devastated areas. The recent
amendments to the Stafford Act call for provisions in the mandated
disaster housing strategy that appear to address a number of the issues
that victims and others raised regarding the assistance provided after
Hurricane Katrina.
Most Victims Had Similar Immediate Sheltering and Related Needs, but
Some Victims' Needs Were Not Met:
According to current and former Gulf Coast residents affected by
Hurricane Katrina, experts, and others we spoke with, immediately
before and after the hurricane made landfall many victims needed
shelter, food, water, and clothing. Some victims, such as those who
voluntarily evacuated before the storm made landfall, sought shelter in
a variety of locations, including the homes of family and friends,
hotels, and shelters operated by the Red Cross and others. Many other
victims, including those without transportation, those with special
needs such as the disabled and the elderly, and those who would not
abandon their homes or pets, ended up in shelters of last resort such
as the Louisiana Superdome.[Footnote 35] Regardless of where victims
took shelter, however, those providing it generally were unprepared for
the number of people needing help or the length of time they would have
to remain and did not have adequate resources to help all of them.
Many victims we spoke with did not feel that their immediate sheltering
and related needs were met for a number of reasons. According to
victims and others we spoke with, regardless of the type or provider of
shelter--family, Red Cross or church shelters, or a hotel--conditions
were generally overcrowded and uncomfortable, and supplies were
lacking. For example, many victims we spoke with evacuated from their
homes with limited supplies of food and water and just the clothes on
their back. One victim we spoke with said that she evacuated from
Mississippi and went to stay with family, taking with her just a
suitcase with some clothing and some canned food. Another victim told
us that when she and her family evacuated, they only brought enough
clothing for 3 days. While some shelters had supplies on hand to assist
evacuees, resources were strained because they generally did not
anticipate the number of victims who were seeking shelter or the length
of time people would need shelter. For example, Red Cross officials
told us that they only planned to operate shelters for 7-10 days in 5
states following Hurricane Katrina, but as noted previously, some
shelters were open for up to 4 months, and the organization's
operations covered 27 states. As noted previously, Red Cross officials
told us that they kept shelters open for this long because FEMA was not
able to transition victims to temporary housing assistance more
quickly.
Victims whose circumstances made it impossible for them to evacuate
prior to the storm or who chose not to evacuate were probably even less
likely to feel their immediate sheltering needs were met than those who
evacuated prior to the storm. Many of these victims ended up at
shelters of last resort such as the Louisiana Superdome. These shelters
were overcrowded and lacked an adequate amount of supplies. One victim
we spoke with who was evacuated to the New Orleans Convention Center
after the storm said that she needed food, water, and clothing and that
the Convention Center had none of these items. Further, some victims
avoided centralized shelter due to concerns about safety. For example,
one victim we spoke with said that her family chose to crowd 15 people
into a small house rather than go to a shelter because they had heard
that the shelters were unsafe.
Although members of our group of experts suggested that victims should
be presented with a range of choices about where to relocate, some of
the victims were evacuated without knowing where they would end up--for
example buses and flights were diverted en route to new destinations.
One victim with whom we spoke said that the Navy evacuated him from an
apartment building in New Orleans a week after the storm and put him on
a plane to Washington, D.C., but that he was not told where he was
headed until the plane had taken off. Another victim we spoke with who
was evacuated from the New Orleans Convention Center said the U.S. Army
flew her from the Convention Center to Austin, Texas even though she
had not asked to go there. She was in Austin at a shelter for 5 more
days before being flown to Georgia, where she had family. Other victims
said they were given a choice about where to go. For example, one
victim said when the Army Corps of Engineers came to evacuate her from
Xavier University where she had taken shelter, she was able request
that she be sent to Fort Worth, Texas, because she had family there.
Some of those who could not evacuate ahead of time were special needs
populations, especially the elderly and persons with disabilities. As
we previously reported, state and local governments have primary
responsibility for evacuating these populations, but state and local
governments in the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina likely faced
challenges in transporting many special needs residents out of the
disaster area due to legal and social barriers and other
factors.[Footnote 36] Further, many shelters were not prepared to
accept special needs persons, such as those with physical or mental
disabilities, in part because the Red Cross typically leaves sheltering
of those with special needs to the state and local government. As a
result, at the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall, some special needs
individuals ended up in shelters that were not prepared to meet their
needs. For instance, one elderly victim we spoke with said that she was
at the New Orleans Convention Center in poor conditions for more than 5
days before being evacuated out of the city, and added that she did not
feel safe or secure while she was there. Eventually, many of those in
the mass shelters in New Orleans were evacuated to cities such as
Houston and Atlanta where they were provided shelter while awaiting
temporary housing.
Victims' Temporary Housing Needs and Their Views of Federal Assistance
Varied with Circumstances:
In the weeks and months following the hurricane, the housing needs of
many Gulf Coast residents evolved as they assessed storm damage, and
many realized that they would not be able to return home immediately.
In general, most victims were eligible for at least some form of
temporary federal disaster housing assistance, such as rental
assistance or travel trailers from FEMA or--if prior to the disaster
they were among those in HUD's rental assistance programs or were
homeless--housing vouchers from HUD. The specific needs of victims,
however, and their perceptions of the assistance that was provided
varied and depended, at least in part, on victims' own circumstances
such as their postdisaster location relative to their predisaster home,
whether they were homeowners or renters, and if they had special needs.
More specifically:
* Postdisaster location--We found that victims' temporary housing needs
were often closely related to their postdisaster location. In
particular, many victims we spoke with either evacuated to or were
transported to other cities to find shelter from the devastation.
Because in many cases the extent of damage made immediately returning
to their predisaster homes uncertain or unlikely, these victims needed
access to some form of temporary rental housing while they assessed
their options and made plans for returning home and repairing their
residence or living somewhere else. However, victims and experts that
we spoke with emphasized that temporary housing needs included not only
shelter, but also proximity to schools, grocery stores, jobs, and other
necessities. As discussed below, for those who found themselves in new
locations away from their predisaster homes, this meant a need for
information about both available housing and services.
In contrast, for a variety of reasons, some victims we spoke with
preferred and were able to remain in or near their predisaster
communities after the hurricanes and needed temporary housing that
could accommodate their circumstances, particularly if they could not
quickly reoccupy their predisaster home. In light of the shortage of
available rental housing in the Gulf Coast area after the hurricanes,
travel trailers were one of the few options available for victims who
wanted to remain near their predisaster residences or communities.
* Homeownership status--In some cases, homeowners and renters had
different needs for temporary housing. For example, some homeowners who
could not reoccupy their predisaster homes expressed a need for
temporary housing that allowed them to be in close proximity, so that
they could monitor repair or reconstruction and interact with insurance
companies and contractors. In some of these cases, FEMA was able to
place travel trailers directly on victims' property to address this
need. Because renters had little influence over the repair or
reconstruction of the apartment units they resided in prior to the
hurricanes, they generally needed temporary housing assistance until
they could make decisions about whether to remain in, or return to,
their predisaster locations or to reestablish themselves in another
area altogether. This generally came in the form of rental assistance-
-either cash from FEMA or vouchers from HUD. In cases where renters
desired to remain in the disaster area, some were able to obtain FEMA
travel trailers, which were generally placed on either FEMA-operated or
privately operated group sites.
* Special needs populations--The elderly and those with disabilities
that we spoke with expressed a need for temporary housing that could
accommodate their special needs. For example, those who were mobility
impaired needed housing that was wheelchair accessible, while those who
were elderly expressed a need to be close to family and medical
providers. Access to transportation was another need mentioned to us by
elderly and disabled victims; those with specials needs said without
access to transportation, they had difficulty finding temporary
housing. One disabled victim we spoke with said that it would have been
helpful to her to have received transportation assistance to look for
housing since she uses a wheelchair, while another disabled victim said
that she received help from the Red Cross which transported her around
to find housing.
Members of our group of experts noted that special needs populations
are often overlooked in planning for disaster housing assistance. These
experts and others said that disaster assistance often does not
accommodate the needs of special populations such as the elderly,
homeless, those with mental and physical disabilities, and residents of
domestic violence shelters. For instance, the elderly or disabled may
need to be placed in ground floor units to facilitate wheelchair
access. Additionally, these populations may face related needs that
cannot be addressed by temporary housing alone.
Victims expressed both positive and negative perceptions of the
temporary housing assistance they received, whether in the form or
rental assistance or a travel trailer. In general, victims who received
rental assistance perceived that it was helpful in meeting their
housing needs because it allowed them to find a place to live and pay
the rent while they "got back on their feet." One victim said having
rental assistance allowed her to keep her sanity because she knew she
had a place to live and her kids were in a good school. However, some
recipients, such as those who received FEMA rental assistance, said
that the process of having to recertify their eligibility for the
program every 3 months left them uncertain about whether they would
continue to receive the assistance. The uncertainty made it difficult
for victims to know what their long-term housing plans would be, as
they did not know when their rental assistance would be cut off or what
they would do about their housing after that. For example, one victim
said that her plans for the future were uncertain because she did not
know when the rental assistance would expire. One elderly victim we
spoke with said that she does not think that, once the assistance ends,
she will be able to afford her new apartment, even though she would
like to stay there.
Victims we spoke with who received temporary housing assistance through
HUD said that the disaster voucher program (DVP) generally met their
housing needs. For example, some of these individuals said that the
local housing authority in their new cities assisted them in finding
housing, making things easier for them. Others said that not having to
pay rent allowed them to use their earnings for other necessities such
as car payments or furniture and also allowed them to look for work
without having to worry about how the rent would be paid.[Footnote 37]
HUD officials we spoke with in the field also said that in their
opinion, the disaster voucher meets the needs of the people it was
intended to serve; however, they noted that it depended on the needs of
the individual and the willingness of the displaced family to move
elsewhere to find housing.
As with rental assistance, perceptions of those who received travel
trailers were also mixed. Some of the victims we spoke with who were in
trailers on their property said that the trailers were helpful. For
example, one victim from Mississippi whom we spoke with said the
trailer was wonderful because it provided her with privacy, and another
said that her trailer met her needs because it provided shelter.
Another victim from Alabama said that her family received a FEMA
trailer and that they were able to live in it until they could repair
and move back into their home. Although some of these victims said that
they had difficulty finding contractors and that as a result, the
rebuilding process was slow, they also said that they had made progress
and that the trailer had met their temporary housing needs. Other
homeowners did not perceive the trailers as meeting their temporary
housing needs. Some victims we spoke with waited months to receive
trailers, only to find that the trailers were too small for their
families. One victim we spoke with needed a trailer for his family of
five but received a trailer that could house only two people. This
victim said that he ended up not using the trailer because it was too
small, the hot water never worked, and it had a bad odor that made his
eyes burn. Other victims we spoke with who received trailers from FEMA
also felt the trailers were uninhabitable. One victim who was in the
military said that she and her family spent only a few days in the
trailer they received because it leaked badly and had mildew. She said
that someone from FEMA had checked on these problems but that they were
never fixed. Ultimately she chose to live on the Air National Guard
base where her unit was headquartered.
Perceptions of travel trailers located on group sites were generally
less positive than those of trailers placed on private property.
Experts noted that trailer sites may not provide ready access to
facilities like grocery stores, laundry facilities, or playgrounds that
are necessary for daily living. We found that victims sometimes did not
like group sites for these reasons. One victim we spoke with said that
he did not like living in the group site, as it was too far from the
doctors that he needed to see. He was eventually able to get another
trailer in another group site that better met his needs. Another victim
we spoke with said that FEMA wanted to locate her to a group site but
she refused and insisted that the trailer be put on her property so
that her children could remain in their school and not have to relocate
to another community.
Some Victims Lacked Access to Information on Federal Assistance and
Help Finding Temporary Housing:
Many victims we spoke with were grateful for the temporary housing
assistance they received after the disaster some, however, regardless
of where they lived or their other circumstances, said that they needed
better access to accurate and reliable information about the housing
assistance available. Because of sustained disruption to normal modes
of communication (such as newspapers, television, telephone, and radio)
following the hurricane, many victims found it difficult to register
for assistance. In some cases, this may have hindered victims' efforts
to receive temporary housing assistance. However, while many victims we
spoke with said that once they got through on the phone registering
with FEMA was relatively easy, some said that the information they
received after they registered was confusing and sometimes conflicting.
These victims told us that when they followed up with FEMA to find out
about the assistance they qualified for, their questions were not
answered or they received inconsistent answers from different
employees. For example, one victim we spoke with received two letters
from FEMA on the same day--one stating that she was eligible for rental
assistance and one stating that she was ineligible for assistance. This
person did not want to use the rental assistance because she feared
that FEMA would eventually ask that it be returned.
Some victims we spoke with also said that they could have used
assistance in finding temporary housing. When asked what the government
or others could have done to make finding housing easier for them, many
victims we spoke with said that they needed assistance with finding a
new place to live and help becoming familiar with new surroundings.
Some of those we interviewed said they did not receive this assistance.
Some of those we spoke with were able to rely on family and friends to
get help in finding housing in a new city and others just navigated
through the process themselves. One former resident of New Orleans that
we spoke with said that her home was destroyed after Hurricane Katrina
and she needed help find housing in Texas, where she had been moved.
This victim used apartment-finding guides to help her locate available
housing. Another victim we spoke with who ended up in Texas also said
that she needed help getting oriented to her new surroundings, such as
finding housing that was in close proximity to good schools for her
children, stores, and the post office. This victim said that since she
wasn't familiar with the area, she eventually relied on a realtor to
help her find housing that met her needs.
In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA noted that it had
initiated a contract to evaluate applicant communications in order to
develop a strategic communications plan. FEMA said that the first phase
of the study--target audience interviews--had been completed and that
the second phase of the contract would provide strategies for improving
and enhancing applicant communications, with an emphasis on reaching
diverse audiences, including those with limited English speaking
ability.
Some Victims Continue to Experience Temporary Housing and Related Needs
More than a Year after the Hurricanes:
More than a year after Hurricane Katrina, some victims--including those
from the hardest hit areas, the elderly, and the disabled--still have
temporary housing and related needs. However, the circumstances of
those who continue to receive temporary housing assistance vary. For
example:
* Some of those receiving this assistance are homeowners who are still
waiting for settlements from their insurance company. One homeowner
from New Orleans told us that she had great difficulty getting in touch
with her insurance company and was still waiting for a settlement as of
July 2006. In the meantime, she is relying on rental assistance from
FEMA but worries her lease will expire before her house is repaired.
* Many renters from the hardest-hit areas also face uncertainty because
much of the rental housing stock was destroyed and may not be replaced.
One renter from New Orleans said her landlord is repairing the home she
was renting, but she does not know if it will be done before her FEMA
rental assistance runs out.
* Some victims we spoke with expressed concern over their ability to
become self-sufficient once their federal housing assistance expires.
Some want to work but are having difficulty finding employment. One
victim said that if the federal assistance was going to run out after
18 months, she thought it would be helpful if the government could help
people find jobs so they could become self-sufficient.
* Some elderly and disabled who were displaced also continue to face
difficulty meeting their housing and related needs. Although some of
these populations had special needs before the hurricanes, in some
cases the stress of the disasters exacerbated their situations. For
example, one disabled victim we spoke with said her health has worsened
since the storm, and she does not have medical benefits. She wants to
work but needs to find something she can do from home due to her
disability. Another disabled victim told us that her health made it
difficult for her to climb stairs but that she was living in a second-
floor apartment because that was all she could find. FEMA officials
told us that after Hurricane Katrina they tried to work closely with
other agencies that offered social services to ensure that these
special needs populations were receiving the services they needed, but
acknowledged that some needs had gone unmet.
Victims who receive temporary housing assistance from FEMA are eligible
to receive this assistance generally for up to 18 months after the date
of the disaster declaration (i.e., until the end of February 2007 for
victims of Hurricane Katrina). FEMA may extend the assistance beyond
the 18-month period if it determines that due to extraordinary
circumstances an extension would be in the public interest. According
to some experts and housing advocates, 18 months of housing assistance
is not long enough to help some of the victims of the disaster, and
that ending federal assistance could lead to a larger number of
homeless families. Experts also agreed that some victims have needs
that extend beyond housing assistance and that addressing such needs
requires a case management approach such as linking housing assistance
with jobs, child care, and education. Recently, FEMA announced that it
extended temporary housing assistance for some victims of Hurricane
Katrina for an additional 6 months--until August 31, 2007. It is
uncertain what will happen to those who continue to need housing
assistance beyond this date.
According to HUD, as of November 2006, approximately 23,800 families
were still receiving temporary housing assistance under DVP. By
definition, those continuing to receive DVP are primarily those who,
prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, resided in HUD-assisted units or
public housing that was damaged or destroyed, or were homeless. It is
uncertain when or whether many of these units will be repaired or
replaced. In the meantime, DVP is set to expire in September 2007. HUD
recently issued proposed guidance explaining options available to those
who will still be receiving DVP assistance when the program expires.
For example, HUD proposed that a family that was living in public
housing prior to the hurricanes may choose to return to their
predisaster unit if it is available. If the family chooses not to
return, it may live in the DVP unit until the DVP assistance ends; if
the pre-disaster unit is unavailable for reoccupancy, the family may
receive another project-based unit or a special public housing voucher
may be made available.[Footnote 38] HUD proposed that families who were
receiving tenant-based vouchers prior to the disaster may find new
units in the predisaster location, or, if choosing not to return to the
predisaster location, may receive DVP assistance until it ends, at
which time they will receive a regular voucher under HUD's nondisaster
voucher program.
Strategy Required by Recent Legislation May Address Some Issues
Identified by Victims:
In requiring FEMA, working with other agencies, to prepare a national
disaster housing strategy, Public Law 109-295 in October 2006 addressed
several issues raised during our interviews with victims and experts.
For example:
* Need for temporary housing that enables access to services--The
legislation directs FEMA, in developing the national disaster housing
strategy, to include plans for the operation of "clusters" of housing
provided to individuals and households, including access to public
services, site management, and security. As previously discussed, this
strategy was under development at the time of this review.
* Need for assistance in finding housing as well as social services--
The legislation authorizes the President to provide case management
services, when needed, to state or local government agencies or
qualified private organizations to provide such services to victims.
According to FEMA, this new authority does not apply to victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, FEMA told us that victims of the
hurricanes who needed case management were able to receive assistance
from Katrina Aid Today--a consortium of social service and voluntary
organizations.[Footnote 39]
* Need for those with disabilities or other special populations--The
legislation provides that the national disaster housing strategy
describe programs directed to meet the needs of special needs and low-
income populations, and to ensure that a sufficient number of housing
units are provided for individuals with disabilities.
* Need for accurate and timely information for victims about what they
are eligible for and how to obtain it--The legislation requires FEMA to
develop guidance to be issued to the public following a disaster on the
types of housing assistance available, eligibility for such assistance,
and the application procedures.
Conclusions:
While the sheltering and temporary housing responsibilities of the Red
Cross and FEMA generally were clearly defined under the National
Response Plan, the lack of fully reflected capabilities for ESF-6
support agencies, excepting DOD, hampered FEMA's ability to effectively
fulfill its primary agency role of coordinating sheltering and
temporary housing assistance to victims of catastrophic disasters. For
example, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect USDA's capability to provide
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita with temporary housing in
multifamily units that it subsidizes. Similarly, the ESF-6 annex did
not reflect Treasury's ability to help make available vacant units in
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit properties. Although these agencies
provided needed housing assistance in response to the disaster, by
fully reflecting their capabilities under ESF-6 and by updating them as
needed, FEMA, as the designated primary agency for housing and as the
overall coordinator for ESF-6, would be better able to effectively
coordinate federal resources to provide temporary housing in support of
state and local efforts for victims of future disasters. In this
regard, FEMA would also have benefited if the ESF-6 support agencies
had developed--as required by the draft standard operating procedures
in effect at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita--the fact sheets
outlining appropriate roles and responsibilities, notification and
activation procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining to
their disaster housing responsibilities. Similarly, more specifically
defining FEMA's primary agency role to work with private-sector
organizations would help ensure the agency's ability to make effective
and expeditious use of housing resources offered by organizations such
as Fannie Mae. FEMA is currently exploring ways of working with private
sector organizations as part of its ongoing disaster housing task
force.
The extent of operational planning for providing sheltering and
temporary housing varied among the Red Cross, FEMA, and the ESF-6
support agencies, but generally their plans were not adequate to deal
with the needs created by catastrophic disasters on the scale of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Red Cross had to significantly exceed
the parameters of its hurricane and tropical storm plan--which it was
able to do, despite experiencing operational challenges--and as a
result it has taken a number of steps designed to enhance its capacity
to respond to large, catastrophic events. FEMA had initiated
catastrophic event planning, but its efforts were not complete at the
time Hurricane Katrina struck. In August 2006, DHS finalized the
National Response Plan's Catastrophic Incident Supplement, which
describes additional responsibilities for federal agencies in the event
of a catastrophic incident. The ESF-6 support agencies covered by our
review provided a variety of assistance, but all excepting Treasury and
DOD lacked specific operational plans, which inhibited the timeliness
of placing some victims in temporary housing. For example, both HUD and
VA entered into agreements with FEMA detailing conditions for use of
their properties--but not until after the hurricanes struck. Just as it
is important for the support agencies' capabilities to be reflected in
the NRP, so that each agency and FEMA can be aware of options for
housing disaster victims, the support agencies need operational plans
for effecting those capabilities. Although HUD, USDA, and VA are
working to develop an agreement to improve the coordination among the
three agencies, developing operational plans for carrying out their ESF-
6 responsibilities would help ensure that the support agencies are
better prepared to help expeditiously house victims of future disasters
and help avoid the need to improvise after disasters occur. The working
group is not intended to produce operational details for all of these
agencies responsibilities under ESF-6.
Our interviews with victims of Hurricanes Katrina, experts, and with
officials involved in assisting them, as well as our review of reports
by others on the federal response to these disasters, suggest that the
federal government could improve the temporary housing assistance it
provides in response to disasters by recognizing the broader needs of
victims. These include the need for access to medical facilities,
public transportation, schools, employment opportunities, and other
social services--and, particularly for those displaced to distant
locations--information about all of these things. The national disaster
housing strategy called for by recent legislation provides an
opportunity to more comprehensively plan for temporary housing
assistance, with specific provisions related to special-needs
populations, access to a range of services, and meeting victims' need
for accurate information. The legislation also authorized the provision
of additional case management services to victims of disasters.
Although FEMA recently extended temporary assistance for some victims
until August 2007, some of these victims may continue to need temporary
housing assistance beyond this period.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that FEMA, as the designated primary agency for housing
and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, can effectively coordinate
federal assistance in providing temporary housing for victims of future
disasters, we recommend that:
* The Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development,
Treasury, and Veterans Affairs propose revisions as needed to ensure
that the NRP fully reflects their respective agencies' capabilities for
providing temporary housing assistance under ESF-6; and:
* The Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban
Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs develop fact sheets
outlining appropriate roles and responsibilities, notification and
activation procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining to
their disaster housing capabilities, as required by the ESF-6 standard
operating procedures.
To help ensure that ESF-6 support agencies are prepared to help
expeditiously house victims of future disasters, we recommend that the
Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, and Veterans
Affairs develop operational plans that provide details on how their
respective agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities
under ESF-6.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the American Red Cross and the Departments of Agriculture,
Defense, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Treasury,
and Veterans Affairs with a draft of this report for their review and
comment. We received written comments from Defense, HUD, Treasury, and
VA, each of which concurred with our recommendations. These comments
are summarized below and reprinted in appendixes XII through XV. The
Red Cross did not provide comments on the draft report. USDA responded
that it will continue to develop its capabilities, fact sheets, and
operational plans in order to meet ESF-6 responsibilities, as we
recommended. DHS, HUD, Treasury, and VA also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. We also
provided relevant segments of this report to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
and incorporated technical comments from these organizations where
appropriate.
In its comments, Defense said that it concurred with the recommendation
to develop fact sheets outlining the appropriate roles and
responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency
specific authorities pertaining to its disaster housing capabilities.
While HUD concurred with our recommendations, it commented that it
provided fact sheets to FEMA and non-profit organizations. However, our
review of these fact sheets indicated that they did not reference ESF-
6 or include the information required by the draft ESF-6 standard
operating procedures, such as appropriate roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific
authorities. HUD also said that our draft report should be expanded to
more fully reflect the activities that the department performed in
response to Hurricane Katrina, which included establishing Katrina
Disaster Assistance Program Centers, assisting public housing residents
in relocating to other housing units, and finding permanent units for
disaster victims. Our report, including appendix VII, discusses these
and other types of housing assistance provided by HUD at a level of
detail that we believe is consistent with our objectives.
Treasury noted that its role in providing disaster relief was generally
limited to relief provided under the Internal Revenue Code, although
the department also has a broader role in facilitating federal
payments. With regard to our recommendations, Treasury said that it
would work with DHS to ensure that the NRP fully reflects the
capabilities of the department to provide temporary housing assistance.
Treasury added that any amendment to the department's section of the
NRP that reflects the availability of administrative relief relating to
the low-income housing tax credit should note that such relief is
appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances and take into
consideration the impact it might have on low-income taxpayers who are
the intended beneficiaries of the low-income housing tax credit.
Treasury also said that it would collaborate with DHS to ensure that it
develops the appropriate fact sheets under ESF-6.
VA noted that it is working with ESF-6 partner agencies to propose NRP
revisions that will detail each agency's full capabilities. VA also
noted that it would continue to work with ESF-6 partner agencies and
FEMA to formulate the fact sheets as required by the ESF-6 standard
operating procedures.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security,
Housing and Urban Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs, the Red
Cross, and other interested parties and will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8678 or woodd@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix XVI.
Signed by:
David G. Wood:
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affair:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Larry E. Craig:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Veterans' Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Barney Frank:
Chairman:
Committee on Financial Service:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Steve Buyer:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Veterans' Affairs:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In this report, we examine: (1) the extent to which the
responsibilities for the Red Cross and federal agencies were clearly
described in the National Response Plan (NRP), (2) the extent to which
federal agencies and the Red Cross had operational plans for providing
sheltering and housing assistance in response to catastrophic
disasters, and (3) the perceptions victims and others had of evacuees'
sheltering and housing needs and the assistance provided by the federal
government to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina. We included
the following federal agencies and other organizations in this study:
* American Red Cross:
* Department of Agriculture:
* Department of Defense:
* Department of Housing and Urban Development:
* Department of Treasury:
* Department of Veterans Affairs:
* Federal Emergency Management Agency:
* Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac):
* Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae):
To address all of the objectives, we sponsored a group consisting of
seven experts on disaster response and housing. We contracted with the
National Academy of Sciences to convene a balanced, diverse group of
experts to discuss the federal role in providing housing assistance
after a presidentially declared disaster. The individuals represented
state and local agencies in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas and
academicians whose work focuses on disaster response. (The names and
organizational affiliations of the group members are listed in app.
II.) In keeping with National Academies policy, members of the group
were invited to provide their individual views, and the group was not
designed to reach a consensus on any of the issues that we asked them
to discuss. The group of seven experts convened at the National
Academies in Washington, D.C., on August 17, 2006 (we had invited nine,
but two invitees were unable to attend). The meeting was recorded and
transcribed to ensure that we had accurately captured the group's
statements.
We also reviewed relevant literature on disaster housing and recent
reports on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina to address all of
our objectives, including those issued by the House of
Representatives,[Footnote 40] the Senate,[Footnote 41] and the White
House.[Footnote 42] While these reports addressed a broad range of
issues related to the preparedness for, and response to Hurricanes
Katrina, our report focuses exclusively on federal assistance for
sheltering and for providing temporary housing--the activities covered
by Emergency Support Function (ESF) Number 6 (ESF-6).
To examine the extent to which the responsibilities for the Red Cross
and federal agencies were clearly described in the NRP, we reviewed the
ESF-6 annex and relevant federal statutes and regulations that federal
agencies and the Red Cross followed in providing sheltering and housing-
related assistance in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In
addition, we obtained information from each organization about the
types of sheltering and temporary housing assistance they provided
following the two hurricanes, and determined the extent to which the
assistance was provided under a responsibility described in the NRP. We
also discussed with various federal, state, and local officials--in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas--how federal agencies and the Red
Cross carried out their responsibilities for providing sheltering and
housing-related assistance in response to the disasters. Further, we
reviewed recommendations made in prior GAO and Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Inspector General reports related to ESF-6 and
determined what progress had been made to address the recommendations.
To examine the extent to which federal agencies and the Red Cross had
operational plans for providing sheltering and housing assistance in
response to catastrophic disasters, we obtained and analyzed available
plans, policies, and procedures that these organizations followed in
providing assistance under the ESF-6 annex. In addition, we discussed
these documents with federal agency and Red Cross officials in
Washington, D.C., and federal, state, and local officials in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas. We also reviewed the NRP and ESF-6 standard
operating procedures to identify planning requirements and obtained
information on the characteristics of effective disaster response plans
put forth by disaster experts. Further, we reviewed prior GAO and DHS
Inspector General reports that addressed federal agency planning for
catastrophic disasters. While our focus was on the response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we have incorporated information on
relevant steps that the organizations within the scope of our study
have taken since those events.
Disaster Victim Interviews:
To examine the perceptions victims and others had of evacuees'
sheltering and housing needs and the assistance provided by the federal
government to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina, we conducted
standardized telephone interviews with victims of the disaster. Due to
the sensitivity of the topic to the interview participant, and because
there was no efficient way to attempt to create a universe of all
Hurricane Katrina disaster victims, we used a qualitative data
collection approach. We developed an interview guide based on disaster
housing literature and government reports, interviews with government
officials, a preliminary discussion with a group of victims evacuated
to the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area, and unstructured interviews
with two victims from the metropolitan New Orleans area. We pretested
the interview guide with two disaster victims also from the
metropolitan New Orleans area. The interview questions covered victims'
housing and related needs since the disasters, the locations of shelter
and housing, sources of assistance in securing housing, challenges in
finding housing, the FEMA registration process, types of assistance for
which they were eligible and received, current status of their
neighborhood and former homes, and their concerns and future housing
plans.
We used a purposeful stratified sampling procedure where we
intentionally chose to interview people with particular characteristics
to capture both common core experiences, as well as important
variations among those with differing characteristics. We identified
the state in which the victim resided before the disaster (Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) and whether the victim received HUD
housing assistance prior to the storm as two characteristics that would
influence victims' needs and their experience finding housing after the
hurricanes. When using a nonprobability sample, like a purposeful
stratified sample, it is important to be resource efficient in data
collection, but also to simultaneously collect enough data to ensure
saturation, or repetition, in the information obtained.[Footnote 43]
Therefore, we sought to collect data from a total of 48 victims; 24 who
had received public housing assistance prior the storm and 24 who had
not, and within both groups of 24, an equal number of participants from
the four affected states (see table 1).
Table 1: Number of Completed Interviews with Hurricane Katrina Victims:
State: Alabama;
Individuals who received HUD housing assistance prior to disaster: 2;
Individuals who did not receive HUD housing assistance prior to
disaster: 6.
State: Louisiana;
Individuals who received HUD housing assistance prior to disaster: 8;
Individuals who did not receive HUD housing assistance prior to
disaster: 6.
State: Mississippi;
Individuals who received HUD housing assistance prior to disaster: 8;
Individuals who did not receive HUD housing assistance prior to
disaster: 7.
State: Texas;
Individuals who received HUD housing assistance prior to disaster: 0;
Individuals who did not receive HUD housing assistance prior to
disaster: 1.
Source: GAO.
Note: We attempted to complete six interviews per table cell.
[End of table]
We identified victims either through word of mouth or through HUD or
FEMA disaster assistance lists. Names and contact information for
victims identified through word of mouth were provided to us by
organizations working directly with victims, such as churches,
nonprofit organizations, or other victims. We also asked HUD and FEMA
to provide us with the lists of victims who received assistance through
their agencies. HUD provided us a list as of July 14, 2006, which was
our primary means of identifying victims who received HUD housing
assistance prior to the hurricanes. FEMA provided us a list as of July
20, 2006. After eliminating cases that had no telephone numbers, victim
names were systematically selected from the agencies' lists.
We contacted victims and asked them to participate in our telephone
interview that lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes. If the victim was
unable to be reached, declined, or was again not available at the
scheduled interview time, we eliminated the name from our contact list.
We completed 38 interviews with disaster victims. We contacted
approximately 319 victims to request their participation.
Demographic information on the victims whom we interviewed appears in
table 2. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample, some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample. Although the findings
we collected do not generalize to all victims of Hurricanes Katrina,
when coupled with results of our group of experts, interviews with
agency officials, and housing advocates, they do provide useful insight
into the experiences and needs of victims of this disaster.
Table 2: Self-Reported Demographic Data on Disaster Victims
Interviewed:
Age (in years):
Average; 49.
Range; 22-72.
Refused; 1.
Ethnicity;
American Indian or Alaska Native; 2.
Asian; 0.
Black or African American; 26.
Hispanic or Latino; 1.
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; 0.
White; 9.
Homeownership status;
Owner; 13.
Renter; 25.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We performed our work in Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana;
Biloxi, Gulfport, and Jackson, Mississippi; Austin, Fort Worth,
Houston, and Temple, Texas; and Washington, D.C. We conducted our work
between November 2005 and February 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Views of GAO's Expert Group on the Provision of Disaster
Housing Assistance by the Federal Government:
This appendix provides the views of the group of experts that GAO
convened on the provision of disaster housing assistance by the federal
government. The group consisted of seven experts who, during a daylong
meeting convened by the National Academies, discussed issues related to
the federal government's provision of disaster housing assistance in
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. All the ideas presented in
this appendix may not represent the view of every member of the group
of experts. Moreover, these ideas should not be considered to be the
views of GAO.
Members of GAO's Expert Group:
The following individuals were members of GAO's group of experts on the
provision of disaster housing assistance by the federal government:
* Pamela Dashiell, President, Holy Cross Neighborhood Association:
* Buddy Grantham, Operations Officer, Joint Hurricane Housing Task
Force:
* Robert Olshansky, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign:
* Jae Park, Chief Policy Analyst, Mississippi Governor's Office of
Recovery and Renewal:
* Walter Peacock, Professor, Texas A&M University:
* Lori Peek, Assistant Professor, Colorado State University:
* Brenda Phillips, Professor, Oklahoma State University:
Views of the Group of Experts:
The group of experts addressed a number of issues related to the
federal government's provision of housing assistance in response to
disasters. Specifically, the group of experts' discussion focused on
the following: (1) the federal government's role in providing housing
assistance in response to disasters, (2) plans federal agencies and the
Red Cross follow in providing sheltering and housing assistance in
response to a disaster, and (3) opinions regarding the sheltering and
housing needs victims face following a disaster and the extent to which
these needs were met following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Federal Roles and Responsibilities:
In general, the group of experts commented that the federal government
needed to take a more active leadership role in providing or
facilitating the provision of sheltering and temporary housing in
response to catastrophic disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
In particular, the group of experts commented on the federal
government's role in disseminating information to victims and public
officials, tracking victims, and providing case management assistance
to victims with multiple needs. Specifically, group members discussed
the following:
* The federal government should have played a greater role in
disseminating information on the roles and responsibilities of those
who provide sheltering and temporary housing assistance. For example,
one member of the group of experts said this should be one of the
federal government's primary responsibilities in responding to
disasters.
* The federal government should have done more to disseminate
information to individuals and public officials on how federal
assistance programs work. One member of the group of experts said it
was very confusing for both victims and public officials to try to
understand how the multiple federal programs and policies work. Another
group member who made a similar comment stated that certain groups,
such as the elderly, have a particularly difficult time understanding
how to access federal disaster assistance programs.
* The federal government should have played a more active role in
tracking victims. For example, one member of the group of experts said
that there was no processing of victims into and out of the shelters.
Another member of the group said that out-processing of disaster
victims is common in other countries as a way to keep families
together. One member of the group of experts also stated that during
Hurricane Katrina, there was no system for tracking victims across the
multiple federal programs that provided housing assistance.
* There is a role for the federal government to play in providing case
management for victims of Hurricane Katrina, many of whom have multiple
needs in addition to housing, including the need for job training,
education, and healthcare. For example, according to one member of the
group of experts, case management is the kind of assistance that is
needed in a disaster of this magnitude.
Federal Agency Planning for Providing Disaster Housing Assistance:
Members of our group of experts said that a federal disaster housing
plan should define how agencies will coordinate with each other in
response to a disaster. The members of our group of experts also said
that a federal disaster housing plan should include certain elements.
More specifically, the group members discussed the following:
* The members of our group of experts said that a federal disaster
housing plan must not just sit on the shelf; the federal government
must ensure that the plan is disseminated to the appropriate
individuals who will be involved in the response so these individuals
have an understanding of what is expected.
* The federal government must engage in disaster exercises and
simulations to ensure that a federal disaster housing plan is properly
rehearsed. The group members noted that the Hurricane Pam exercise
conducted in 2004 was an example of how the federal, state, and local
governments and nonprofit organizations came together to plan for
responding to a hurricane striking New Orleans.
* A federal disaster housing plan should promote housing solutions that
enable individuals to maintain their community and social networks to
the extent possible, as research has shown that individuals have a more
difficult time recovering after a disaster when their communities and
social networks are destroyed. In addition, the plan should promote a
variety of housing solutions, as our nation is made up of a diverse
population and one approach does not necessarily work for everyone. The
plan also should promote housing solutions that are sustainable over
the long term.
Immediate Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their Housing Needs:
Group members stated that there are a number of immediate challenges
disaster victims face in meeting their housing needs. These challenges
encompass things such as access to information about housing
assistance, timeliness of assistance provided, the different types of
housing assistance to best meet individual needs, returning to normalcy
or a routine after a disaster, and addressing needs beyond housing.
More specifically, group members discussed the following:
* Victims face challenges in getting access to information about the
federal disaster housing assistance that is available, the eligibility
requirements for assistance, and information on how long assistance
will last. Experts also said those providing assistance need to be
consistent in what they tell victims about the assistance as victims
heard conflicting information following Hurricane Katrina.
* Disaster housing assistance needs to be provided in a timely manner.
For example, one expert noted that trailers were not received by
households in a timely manner, while two others had observed trailers
sitting unused. Experts noted that the necessary infrastructure, such
as land, water, sewer, and electricity, was not consistently available
to support trailer use.
* There are different types of housing assistance available and victims
need to receive the assistance that will best meet their needs. Some of
the experts commented that trailers may work better for homeowners
while for others, apartments may better meet their needs.
* It is important following a disaster that those affected return to a
state of normalcy as soon as possible. The disaster housing assistance
provided should strive to ensure that victims are able to reestablish a
routine. Experts said temporary housing should provide access to
facilities like grocery stores, laundry facilities, and playgrounds
that are necessary for daily living. Additionally, temporary housing
should be located close to one's community so victims can stay
connected their community and jobs.
* Some victims have needs that extend beyond housing. Experts said
victims may need child care, access to jobs or job training, and
assistance integrating into a new community. Experts suggested
providing housing assistance as part of a case management approach so
victims' other needs could be simultaneously addressed.
Longer-Term Challenges Victims Face in Meeting Their Housing Needs:
Members of our expert group identified some longer-term challenges
disaster victims may face in meeting their housing needs. They said
challenges include housing affordability issues and meeting victims'
needs after federal assistance expires. Some issues discussed by the
group of experts included the following:
* Displaced victims may have ended up in temporary housing that they
are unable to afford once federal assistance runs out.
* Experts said many victims will face challenges and uncertainty if
they continue to need housing assistance after 18 months when federal
assistance is set to expire. Some experts thought that there could be a
larger homeless population if assistance is not extended while others
thought states and localities would have to step in and assume some of
the responsibility for providing housing assistance.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency:
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of Homeland
Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided disaster
housing assistance by administering its traditional programs for
presidentially declared disasters: the Public Assistance (PA) program
and the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), authorized under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act), Sections 403 and 408, respectively. The following
information presents details on the disaster housing assistance
provided by FEMA in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Sheltering.
Cruise ships;
To provide transitional shelter for the large number of displaced
Hurricane victims, FEMA, for the first time, contracted with four
cruise ships for 6 months using its authority under Section 403 of the
Stafford Act.[A] The cruise ships docked in Louisiana and Alabama. In
Alabama, FEMA's use of cruise ships was primarily for evacuees from
Mississippi who were 65 years and older and in good health, single
parents with children, and homeless individuals living in adverse
conditions, according to DHS. In Louisiana, FEMA used cruise ships to
house disaster victims, with a primary focus on first responders or
personnel essential to recovery efforts. FEMA's cruise ship contracts
expired on March 1, 2006. According to FEMA, cruise ships provided
emergency shelter for over 7,000 households affected by Hurricane
Katrina.
Reimbursements for shelters;
Under the Public Assistance program, state and local governments are
eligible for grants for reimbursement for costs of emergency protective
measures, which includes emergency sheltering. State and local
governments can apply to FEMA for reimbursements for eligible costs,
which include costs for transportation, labor, and sheltering
operations. By statute, the federal share may not be less than 75
percent of the eligible costs. The federal government reimbursed state
and local applicants 100 percent of the eligible costs for Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita for specified time periods. As of August 2006, FEMA
reimbursed, through PA grants, more than $663 million to 45 states and
the District of Columbia for sheltering and emergency protective
measures taken during the evacuation of the Gulf Coast and for ongoing
shelter initiatives directly following Hurricane Katrina. These funds
were provided in addition to nearly $1.75 billion obligated to
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama for emergency sheltering
operations.
Reimbursements for hotel rooms;
FEMA has the authority to provide short-term assistance in the form of
lodging expense reimbursement, such as hotel rooms, to victims whose
homes have been made uninhabitable by disasters. Traditionally, FEMA
provides reimbursements to individuals and households for hotel stays
through the IHP. However, in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
FEMA used its authority under Section 403 of the Stafford Act to
reimburse the Red Cross and hotel owners for providing interim
sheltering in hotels to displaced victims. On behalf of FEMA and on a
reimbursable basis, the Red Cross administered FEMA's Special Transient
Housing Accommodations Program until October 25, 2005, when FEMA took
over administration of the program. FEMA then provided reimbursements
to hotel owners through a private contractor. To receive lodging
assistance, victims only needed proof of residence in disaster-affected
zip codes. FEMA required all victims staying in hotels obtain a FEMA
authorization code by January 30, 2006, to continue receiving
assistance. The authorization code allowed FEMA to ensure displaced
hurricane victims were registered with FEMA for assistance and to
ensure they were fully processed for rental assistance eligibility
before transitioning to longer-term housing. For most victims, hotel
room reimbursements ended in February or March 2006. According to FEMA,
during its administration of the program, from October 25, 2005, until
March 2006, FEMA provided 4,270,350 cumulative hotel nights to
hurricane victims.
Temporary Housing.
Direct housing - travel trailers and mobile homes;
Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to
provide direct temporary housing assistance under IHP. FEMA may provide
temporary housing units (e.g., mobile homes and travel trailers),
acquired by purchase or lease, directly to disaster victims, who,
because of a lack of available housing resources, would be unable to
make use of financial assistance to rent alternate housing
accommodations (i.e., rental accommodations are not available). By
statute, direct assistance is limited to an 18-month period from the
date of the presidential disaster declaration, after which FEMA may
charge fair market rent for the housing unless the President extends
the 18-month period due to extraordinary circumstances. For renters,
FEMA placed travel trailers or mobile homes at emergency group sites
developed by FEMA or commercial sites. For homeowners, FEMA either
placed travel trailers or mobile homes on their properties or on group
sites. As of August 2006, FEMA provided 123,957 travel trailers and
mobile homes in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas.
Financial assistance for temporary rental housing;
Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to
provide financial assistance for temporary rental housing to disaster
victims through IHP. FEMA may provide financial assistance to
individuals or households to rent alternative housing accommodations,
existing rental units, manufactured housing, recreational vehicles, or
other readily fabricated dwellings. The maximum amount of financial
assistance that an individual or household may receive is capped at
$25,000, adjusted annually to reflect changes in the Consumer Price
Index (CPI). In 2005, the maximum was $26,200. For 2006, the maximum
was $27,200, and the maximum in 2007 is $28,200. Disaster victims must
register with FEMA to determine IHP eligibility. In response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of Homeland Security,
through FEMA's IHP program, provided transitional housing assistance
for qualified homeowners and renters. Eligible victims received an
initial payment of $2,358 for 3 months of rental assistance. This
payment was calculated based on the average fair market rent for a two-
bedroom unit nationwide. Victims could use this payment for
transitional housing costs for any location; To receive extended
assistance, victims must be periodically recertified, and FEMA may
adjust the relevant fair market rate according to location and family
size. Rental assistance may then be provided in 3-month increments
depending on the victim's temporary housing needs. For qualified
victims, assistance can be provided for up to 18 months from the date
of the presidential disaster declaration or up to the IHP financial
assistance cap, whichever occurs first. FEMA, in extraordinary
circumstances, may extend this assistance beyond 18 months. However,
FEMA cannot exceed the financial assistance cap. If a victim reaches
the financial assistance maximum, FEMA may provide direct housing
assistance by directly paying rent to the landlord. As of May 31, 2006,
FEMA provided rental assistance to 717,262 distinct households
displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Reimbursements for rental assistance;
Under Section 403 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to
reimburse state and local governments for emergency sheltering through
the PA grant program. According to FEMA officials, to house the large
number of displaced residents quickly, FEMA used this authority to
reimburse states for rental assistance provided to evacuees of
Hurricane Katrina. All contiguous states were eligible for
reimbursements for housing assistance under the emergency declaration
issued by the President. According to FEMA, approximately 60,000
households received rental assistance under this authority. In early
2006, FEMA began determining the eligibility of those it was assisting
under Section 403 to transition to IHP under Section 408.[B] In March
2006, FEMA announced that it would no longer provide interim shelter
under Section 403 as of May 31, 2006.c.
Assistance to Homeowners/ Homebuyers.
Home repair/ replacement grants and loans;
Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA may provide financial
assistance for the repair of owner-occupied private residences,
utilities, and residential infrastructure damaged by a major disaster
not covered by insurance through IHP.[D] The maximum amount of repair
assistance provided to a household is limited to $5,000, adjusted
annually to reflect changes in the CPI. In 2005, the maximum was
$5,200. For 2006, the maximum was $5,400. FEMA may also provide
assistance to replace owner-occupied private residences under Section
408. The amount of replacement assistance FEMA may provide to a
household is limited to $10,000, adjusted annually to reflect changes
in the CPI. In 2005, the maximum was $10,500. For 2006, the maximum was
$10,900. For a victim to receive this assistance there must have been
at least $10,000 of damage to the dwelling. In response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, FEMA provided home repair assistance to 183,446
households and home replacement assistance to 31,250 households.e.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA data.
[A] Because FEMA was unable to immediately implement IHP assistance
(under section 408 of the Stafford Act) to provide funds to transition
victims from short-term lodging to longer-term housing, the agency used
public assistance funds (authorized under section 403 of the Stafford
Act). Normally, FEMA uses public assistance funds only for immediate
emergency sheltering efforts.
[B] The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled
in November 2006 that FEMA must immediately restore Section 403
benefits to victims of Hurricanes and Katrina and Rita for whom FEMA
declared ineligible for IHP assistance. FEMA had informed the victims
of their ineligibility in connection with its efforts to transition
eligible individuals from Section 403 to IHP. According to the court,
FEMA violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution when it
terminated Section 403 benefits and provided only vague, confusing
explanations to the victims as to why they were being denied. On
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
suspended the District Court's ruling that FEMA immediately restore
Section 403 benefits. The suspension will last at least until the
appeals court hears arguments in the case. The appeals court did not
suspend the part of the district court's ruling that ordered FEMA to
provide victims clearer explanations of the reasons they were not
eligible for IHP benefits.
[C] FEMA announced certain exceptions to the May 31, 2006, deadline. In
particular, FEMA stated that it planned to make every effort to notify
states of the IHP eligibility status of evacuees before April 15, 2006.
If this notification occurred after April 15, states could request
additional time to provide eligible and ineligible evacuees with a 30-
day lease termination notice. Specifically, states could receive up to
15 additional days for eligible evacuees, and up to 30 additional days
for ineligible evacuees. Also, for ineligible evacuees, the state would
be reimbursed for contractual lease termination costs associated with
leases that require greater than 30 days notice. FEMA subsequently
extended the May 31, 2006, deadline to June 30, 2006, for 11
jurisdictions. FEMA further extended the deadline for one of these
jurisdictions--Houston, Texas--until September 30, 2006.
[D] IHP repair assistance is designed to make the victim's owner-
occupied home habitable and functional, not to restore the home to its
predisaster condition. When disaster victims register for FEMA
assistance, they are asked to provide their approximate household
income. If the applicant's income exceeds certain thresholds, FEMA
automatically refers them to the Small Business Administration's
Disaster Loan Program. Applicants whose income falls below the
thresholds or who are denied SBA assistance are referred back to FEMA
for possible grant assistance under IHP.
[E] The 2007 DHS Appropriations Act repealed the $5,000 and $10,000
limits for repair and replacement assistance.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the American Red Cross:
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the American Red Cross (Red
Cross) provided disaster housing assistance according to its
congressionally mandated role to respond to disasters and mitigate
suffering. The Red Cross, working with governmental and nongovernmental
organizations, provided sheltering and other mass care services to
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through its nationwide network
of local chapters and its Disaster Services Program. In addition, the
Red Cross administered the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
hotel/motel program on a reimbursable basis. The following provides
further details on sheltering and temporary housing assistance provided
by the Red Cross.
Sheltering.
Emergency shelters;
To provide assistance to hurricane victims, the Red Cross executes its
plan for responding to tropical storms and hurricanes in accordance
with its Disaster Services Program, according to Red Cross officials.
The Red Cross, with local governments, opens and operates shelters
before a disaster, during disaster evacuations, and after a disaster
occurs. According to Red Cross officials, shelters are typically open
for 7 to 10 days, and most disaster victims are able to return to their
homes within 48 to 72 hours of the event. In response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross opened over 1,000 shelters and provided
over 3.7 million overnight shelter stays for evacuees in 27 states and
the District of Columbia, according to the Red Cross. Some Red Cross
shelters for Hurricane Katrina evacuees remained open for up to 4
months. The Red Cross also provided support to shelters operated by
state and local governments and other nonprofit organizations.
Reimbursements for hotel rooms;
The Red Cross may operate a small-scale hotel program in areas where it
is not feasible to open shelters or to provide better shelter
conditions for large families, elderly victims, or persons with certain
medical conditions. Due to the large number of Hurricane Katrina
victims and the need for longer-term sheltering, the Red Cross
administered a large-scale hotel program, the Special Transient Hotel
Accommodations Program, on behalf of FEMA on a reimbursable basis.
Through an existing relationship with a private contractor, the Red
Cross reimbursed hotel owners for hurricane victims' hotel stays.
Hurricane victims only needed proof of residence in the disaster-
affected areas to receive assistance. The Red Cross administered this
program from August 28, 2005, until October 25, 2005, when FEMA assumed
administration of the program. Through this effort, the Red Cross
provided hotel rooms to over 650,000 Hurricane Katrina and Rita victims
at more than 11,000 hotels in all 50 states.
Source: GAO analysis of Red Cross data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Agriculture:
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) provided housing assistance using disaster
provisions under its traditional multifamily and single-family rural
housing programs.[Footnote 44] USDA also established new initiatives
specifically to provide disaster housing assistance to the large number
of evacuees displaced as a result of the disasters. USDA assisted
victims of Katrina and Rita by providing temporary housing assistance,
including making multifamily units and single-family homes available
for lease nationwide, offering rental assistance, and issuing program
waivers. Also, USDA provided assistance to homeowners and homebuyers by
providing grants and loans for home repair and replacement, and by
providing mortgage assistance. The following information provides
further details on the disaster housing assistance USDA provided in
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Temporary Housing.
USDA multifamily units for lease;
Homeowners of USDA-financed single- family properties and tenants of
USDA multifamily properties made uninhabitable by a presidentially
declared disaster are eligible for occupancy nationwide as "displaced
tenants" at any USDA Rural Development financed multi-family housing
property. As a new initiative, USDA also extended the lease of its
multifamily units to all hurricane evacuees regardless of whether they
were living in USDA- financed single-family or multifamily properties
prior to the disasters. According to USDA officials, hurricane victims
could lease these units as long as they paid rent. USDA leased 3,848
units to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as of May 31, 2006.
USDA real estate-owned homes for lease;
USDA typically offers for sale to the general public its foreclosed
homes. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA established a
new initiative by halting the sale of homes that it owned, and making
them available for lease to displaced residents of the disaster areas.
According to USDA, the department offered 153 homes for lease under
this initiative, of which 25 were eventually leased. Victims with no
income were eligible to receive up to 3 months of free rent. Otherwise,
they were required to pay 30 percent of their adjusted income. Disaster
victims who rented USDA homes were given the first option to purchase
the homes at any time during the lease period.
Rental assistance;
Under USDA's rental assistance program, the department permits the
transfer of rental assistance for units made uninhabitable by a
presidentially declared disaster to another eligible multifamily
property. As a new initiative, USDA also provided rental assistance to
displaced victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita who were not
previously assisted by USDA. These victims were provided USDA rental
assistance for up to 6 months, and some were permitted 2-month
extensions for hardships. Both previously assisted and nonpreviously
assisted tenants were required to pay rent according to USDA's standard
rental assistance program, in which renters pay 30 percent of their
income in rent and USDA provides the difference between the tenant's
contribution and the rent. As of May 31, 2006, USDA provided rental
assistance to 3,124 displaced disaster victims.
Waivers for placement of hurricane victims in USDA-financed properties;
USDA is permitted to waive some program requirements to respond to
disasters. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, UDSA implemented
several program waivers, which were in effect for 90 days, to allow
USDA-financed property owners to accept displaced tenants and expedite
placing victims in available units. For example, USDA issued Letters of
Priority Entitlement (LOPE) by which victims are moved to the top of
waiting lists for vacancies for 120 days. Victims could provide
documentation of FEMA registration in lieu of a LOPE. USDA also waived
requirements such as 1-year lease terms, security deposits, and age
restrictions at designated elderly properties to expedite placing
disaster victims in available housing.
Rural area population requirements;
Subsequent to a natural disaster, USDA Rural Development has the
authority to waive, for 3 years from the date of a presidential
disaster declaration, population limits for its single-family and
multifamily housing programs. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, USDA immediately increased the population limitation in rural
areas to 50,000 for any county or parish declared for individual
assistance as a result the disasters. This waiver enabled USDA to
provide housing assistance in rural areas that absorbed large numbers
of evacuees. Conversely, USDA considered some cities, which lost a
significant population due to the disasters, as rural areas to enable
the department to provide assistance in these areas as well. USDA also
implemented waiver authority under the 2006 Department of Defense
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. This act provided the
Secretary of USDA the authority to waive rural area population
limitations for all Rural Development programs for a period of 6
months.
Assistance to Homeowners/ Homebuyers.
Home repair/ replacement grants and loans;
To assist low-and moderate- income households to purchase, repair, or
construct homes, USDA has the authority to finance the purchase or
repair of single family housing in rural areas through USDA grants,
direct loans, or loans from private lenders guaranteed by USDA. USDA
borrowers who are affected by presidentially declared disasters may be
eligible for this assistance to repair or replace property damaged as a
direct result of a natural disaster. Applicants of this assistance must
meet certain income requirements. The 2006 Department of Defense
Emergency Supplemental Act appropriated funds to provide home repair
and replacement loans, grants, and loan guarantees. The repair grants
are generally provided only to persons 62 and older who cannot afford a
loan; however, these grants were appropriated without age restrictions.
According to USDA, in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the
department has obligated (1) $86.2 million in direct loans for home
purchase or repair, (2) $143.6 million in guaranteed loans for home
purchase or repair, (3) $2.6 million in direct loans for home repair,
and (4) $14.8 million in grants for home repair as of September 30,
2006.
Foreclosure moratorium;
In response to Hurricane Katrina, a 90-day hold was placed on all
direct home ownership loans that were in foreclosure and located in the
presidentially declared disaster areas.
Mortgage payment forbearance;
After a presidential disaster declaration, USDA-financed homeowners
living in designated disaster areas are eligible for a 6-month
moratorium on mortgage payments for direct USDA loans. The moratorium
may be extended but may not exceed 2 years. For USDA-guaranteed loans,
USDA asks lenders to offer mortgage payment forbearance as well. In
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA provided a 6-month
suspension of mortgage payments and extended this payment suspension
for 2 years for accounts that had not been returned to normal
servicing. According to USDA, 25,727 accounts were originally placed on
mortgage payment moratorium.
Source: GAO analysis of USDA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Defense:
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of Defense
(DOD) provided temporary housing assistance to victims on Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Specifically, DOD provided temporary housing
assistance by installing temporary roofs. In addition, in accordance
with traditional evacuation assistance, DOD offered safe haven benefits
to its military and civilian personnel who evacuated hurricane-damaged
areas. The following information provides further details on the
disaster housing assistance DOD provided in response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
Temporary Housing.
Temporary roof repair;
Under a mission assignment from FEMA, the Army Corp of Engineers
provided free temporary roofs for residential structures, daycare
facilities, schools, and all publicly owned facilities under Operation
Blue Roof. These roofs (plastic sheeting) allowed occupants to return
to their homes and facilities, providing temporary relief until the
owner made permanent repairs. To qualify for blue roofs, damage to the
roof must have been less than 50 percent and the area to be covered
must have been structurally sound. Property owners were required to
complete a right-of-entry form to allow government and contract
employees on their property.
Relocation assistance;
In accordance with Joint Federal Travel Regulations, military
dependents, civilian employees, and families ordered to evacuate
military installations in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas
due to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were authorized to select an
alternate safe haven within the continental U.S. and receive safe haven
benefits. Safe haven benefits include travel costs, actual costs of
lodging, and allowances for meals and incidentals. This authority
applied to individuals whose housing was made uninhabitable by the
hurricanes. According to DOD officials, approximately 10,000 military
and DOD civilian personnel were displaced by Hurricane Katrina. Safe
haven benefits are usually allowed for up to 180 days from the arrival
at the alternate safe haven location. Normally, full safe haven per
diem rates are offered for the first 30 days after relocation, and
reduced per diem rates are offered thereafter. In response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, unreduced per diem rates were extended
five times to cover the maximum 180 days of safe haven benefits. In
addition, DOD authorized a continuation of evacuation allowances beyond
180 days for hurricane evacuees until August 1, 2006, at the full per
diem rate.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by HUD:
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided disaster housing
assistance using flexibilities allowed under its existing multifamily
and single-family housing programs and through its disaster housing
programs. HUD facilitated sheltering by issuing waivers of certain
program requirements. In addition, HUD provided or facilitated the
provision of temporary housing assistance, such as by making homes that
it owned exclusively available for lease to victims of Katrina and
Rita, and by issuing rental assistance vouchers to previously HUD-
assisted tenants and victims who were homeless prior to the hurricanes.
HUD also provided assistance to homeowners, including providing
mortgage relief to those with FHA-insured loans. The following
information presents further details on the sheltering and housing
assistance HUD provided to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Sheltering.
Emergency shelter grant waivers;
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD waived certain requirements
for its Emergency Shelter Grant program for presidentially declared
disaster areas. HUD waived requirements related to citizen
participation for plan amendments, the definition of emergency shelter
facilities, and deadlines for using grant funds.
Temporary Housing.
HUD real estate-owned homes for lease;
HUD typically offers for sale to the general public homes that it
acquires due to foreclosure on HUD- insured mortgages. In response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD and FEMA entered into an Interagency
Agreement on September 12, 2005, to make available these properties--
referred to as Real Estate Owned (REO) properties--to families
displaced by the hurricanes. HUD took its REO properties off the market
and made them available to FEMA for this purpose. According to HUD, as
of August 2006, the department had leased over 2,000 of its homes.
Victims who leased these properties had the option to purchase them at
a discounted price and qualify for financing though HUD's Mortgage
Insurance for Disaster Victims Program. In addition, all evacuees had
the opportunity to purchase a HUD home, before it was offered to the
public, at a discounted price.
Rental assistance vouchers;
In response to a mission assignment from FEMA, HUD administered the
Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP), funded by FEMA, to
assist victims of Hurricane Katrina who resided in HUD-assisted
properties prior to the disaster. To receive KDHAP funding, families
must have been (1) either assisted by HUD prior to Hurricane Katrina
through certain housing programs or qualified as predisaster homeless,
(2) displaced by Hurricane Katrina, and (3) registered with FEMA no
later than December 31, 2005. Under KDHAP, households received a
voucher which covered 100 percent of the rent (capped at the local fair
market rent) for up to 18 months anywhere in the United States. In
December 2005, Congress appropriated $390 million for temporary rental
voucher assistance for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through
the 2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations. The act authorized HUD
to establish and administer a new program--the Disaster Voucher Program
(DVP). DVP replaced KDHAP and expanded assistance to victims of
Hurricane Rita. In February 2006, HUD began transitioning those from
KDHAP to DVP. Households eligible for DVP must have been displaced by
Hurricane Katrina or Rita and must have been either previously assisted
under certain HUD-assisted housing programs or qualified as a
predisaster special needs/homeless family. Under DVP, households
received a housing voucher which covers 100 percent of the rent (capped
at the Public Housing Authority payment standard) anywhere in the
United States for the first 18 months the household receives DVP
assistance. DVP assistance is expected to expire in September 2007. As
of November 15, 2006, HUD had registered 29,470 households for DVP, and
23,832 DVP vouchers had been used to lease a house or apartment.
Waivers for public housing authorities;
Using flexibilities allowed under its existing authorities, HUD
provided waivers to facilitate the provision of temporary housing
assistance to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, HUD
allowed Public Housing Authorities additional time to submit tenant
verification and allowed assessment and cost-limitation flexibilities.
Waivers for HUD's grant programs;
HUD testified that its Office of Community Planning and Development
issued waivers of more than 40 requirements in an effort to increase
the flexibility of existing grant programs to be used within their
current resources for disaster relief. These included waivers for the
HOME Investment Partnerships program and American Dream Down Payment
Initiative to help low-income Louisianans receive tenant-based rental
assistance, and rehabilitate and buy homes.
Assistance to Homeowners/ Homebuyers.
Home repair/replacement grants;
Congress approved emergency supplemental appropriations providing $11.5
billion and $5.2 billion for HUD's Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program to assist with long-term housing and infrastructure
restoration in Gulf Coast states affected by the hurricanes. HUD
allocated funds based on approved state plans. Some plans included
grants for homeowners whose homes were destroyed or severely damaged
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As of August 2006, HUD has
approved plans and awarded CDBG funds to Mississippi, Alabama,
Louisiana, Texas, and Florida. Mississippi and Louisiana have expended
funds from their allocation, as of September 2006.
Foreclosure moratorium;
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD issued mortgage letters
instructing servicers advising them not to foreclose on homes with FHA-
insured mortgages for 90 days from the date of the presidential
disaster declaration. This moratorium was extended in November 2005 and
in February 2006. On June 30, 2006, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) provided a limited extension of the foreclosure moratorium
through August 31, 2006.
Other mortgage relief and assistance;
In October 2005, HUD issued a mortgagee letter to supplement its
existing procedures for the servicing of loans in states and
communities designated by FEMA as disaster areas as a result of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In particular, the letter asked lenders to
(1) not charge late fees for unsuccessful electronic or debit
transactions, (2) not charge fees for late payments, and (3) not report
to credit agencies until a property goes into foreclosure. The
mortgagee letter also addressed delinquency, servicing, and loss-
mitigation matters, including requiring lenders to explore all
available loss-mitigation options and special forbearance for hurricane
affected mortgages. It further reminded lenders of the 90-day
moratorium on foreclosures and offered guidance on property inspections
in affected areas. The letter emphasized the importance of preservation
and protection of properties, particularly where owners have not
returned. The letter also encouraged mortgagees to make exceptional
efforts to assist borrowers in gaining access to insurance funds as
soon as possible by providing copies of policies and other insurance
information, promptly releasing insurance proceeds, and assuring that
hazard insurance claims are filed and settled expeditiously. Finally,
the letter provided guidance on how to convey properties already in
foreclosure prior to the hurricanes and disaster declarations. In
addition, in December 2005, the department announced an additional
homeownership retention initiative to help homeowners with FHA-insured
mortgages who are unable to maintain their payment obligations due to
hurricane-related property damage, curtailment of income, or increased
living expenses. Under the initiative, FHA will advance mortgage
payments for up to 12 months for eligible borrowers who are committed
to continued occupancy of their homes as a principal residence and are
expected to have the financial capacity to repair storm damage and
resume making full mortgage payments within a 12-month period.
According to HUD, this mortgage relief is expected to help several
thousand families to remain homeowners.
Mortgage insurance;
HUD allowed disaster victims to obtain 100 percent financing on a
replacement home anywhere in the United States under its special
mortgage insurance program for disaster victims. The benefit is for
individuals or families whose residences were destroyed or damaged to
such an extent that reconstruction or replacement is necessary. In
addition, the department allows homeowners and homebuyers who have lost
their homes to finance both the purchase price and/or refinancing cost
of a house and the cost of its rehabilitation through a single
mortgage. HUD augmented this mortgage insurance program to facilitate
the purchase of properties needing minor rehabilitation.
Source: GAO analysis of HUD data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of the Treasury:
The Department of the Treasury's Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
provided assistance to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for
sheltering for temporary housing by offering relief under the Katrina
Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) and the Gulf Opportunity Act
of 2005, which included tax exemptions, repayment of qualified
distributions, and recapturing of federal mortgage subsidies. In
addition, the IRS provided regulatory relief regarding tenant rules for
low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) projects. The following
information provides further details.
Sheltering.
Additional tax exemptions;
For homeowners or renters who provided housing in their main homes to
qualifying individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina, the IRS
permitted the claim of additional exemptions for a specific displaced
individual in 2005 or 2006.[A] For each displaced individual housed, a
person could claim an exemption of $500. For all tax years, the maximum
additional exemption amount that could be claimed was $2,000 ($1,000 if
married filing separately). Taxpayers in the same home could not claim
additional exemptions for the same displaced individuals. Exemptions
could not be claimed if the taxpayer received any amount of rent from
any source for providing the housing or reimbursements for the extra
costs of heat, electricity, or water used by the displaced individual.
However, taxpayers could receive payments or reimbursements that did
not relate to normal housing costs, such as food and clothing.
Temporary Housing.
Temporary suspension of tenant income rules for low-income housing tax
credit projects;
Administered by IRS and state tax credit allocation agencies, the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC) provides developers and
investors with eligible affordable housing developments, a dollar-for-
dollar reduction in their federal taxes.[B] In response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita and at the request of state housing credit agencies,
the IRS temporarily suspended income limitation requirements for
certain low-income projects in which there were vacant low-income units
to allow states to temporarily house displaced individuals. The state
housing credit agencies determined the appropriate period of temporary
housing for each project, not to extend beyond September 30, 2006.
Assistance to Homeowners/ Homebuyers.
New rules for repayment of qualified distributions;
The IRS implemented new rules to provide tax-favored withdrawals,
repayments, and loans from certain retirement plans for taxpayers who
suffered economic losses as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Qualified distributions were permitted without regard to need or actual
amount of economic loss.[C] The total of qualified hurricane
distributions was limited to $100,000 and was not subject to the
additional taxes usually assessed on early distributions from
retirement plans. Qualified taxpayers have 3 years from the date of the
distribution to make a repayment. Amounts that are repaid are not
counted as income.
Increased loan amount for recapture of federal mortgage subsidy;
Generally, persons who finance homes under a federally subsidized
program (i.e., loans from tax-exempt qualified mortgage bonds or loans
with mortgage credit certificates) have to recapture all or part of the
benefit received from the program when the home is sold or otherwise
disposed of. However, borrowers do not have to recapture any benefit if
the mortgage loan was a qualified home improvement loan of no more than
$15,000. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the IRS increased
this loan amount to $150,000 if the loan is provided before 2011 and
used to (1) repair damage caused by Hurricane Katrina to a residence in
the disaster area, or (2) alter, repair, or improve an existing owner-
occupied residence in the Katrina or Rita Gulf Opportunity (GO) Zones
(core disaster area).
Source: GAO analysis of Treasury data.
[A] Qualifying displaced individuals must have had their main home in
the Hurricane Katrina core disaster area on August 28, 2005, and been
displaced from that home, or for homes inside the disaster area but
outside of the core disaster areas; the home must have been damaged by
Hurricane Katrina or the individual must have been evacuated from that
home because of Hurricane Katrina. To qualify, the individual also must
have been provided housing in the taxpayer's home for at least 60
consecutive days ending in the tax year for which the exemption is
claimed. Finally, the individual can not be the spouse or dependent of
the taxpayer.
[B] LIHTCs are available for projects with (1) at least 20 percent of
its units are both rent restricted and rented to households with
incomes of 50 percent or less than the area median income; or (2) at
least 40 percent of its units are both rent restricted and rented to
households with incomes of 60 percent or less than the area median
income.
[C] For victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, distributions
(withdrawals) qualified if (1) the distribution was made after August
24, 2005, and before January 1, 2007, for Hurricane Katrina or after
September 22, 2005, and before January 1, 2007, for Hurricane Rita; (2)
the victim's main home was in the disaster areas on August 28, 2005 or
September 23, 2005, for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, respectively; and
(3) the victim sustained as economic loss because of Hurricane Katrina
or Rita, including damage or destruction of real property or losses
related to displacement.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs:
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) provided temporary housing assistance and
assistance to homeowners and homebuyers affected by the hurricanes. For
example, the VA directly provided temporary housing by making available
units from its inventory of real estate-owned (REO) properties. In
addition, the VA provided mortgage relief and assistance to homeowners
and worked with loan holders to establish mortgage payment forbearance,
credit protections, and a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures. The
following information provides additional details on the disaster-
related housing assistance the VA offered in response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
Temporary Housing.
VA real estate-owned homes for lease;
Following Hurricane Katrina, the VA and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) amended an existing memorandum of
understanding for the lease of VA's REO homes to victims certified for
FEMA rental assistance. Although VA had made its REO homes available in
response to previous disasters, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were the
first disasters for which the homes were leased to disaster victims,
according to VA officials. Victims could occupy VA homes for up to the
term of FEMA temporary housing assistance under a month-to-month lease
for $350 per month. As of May 2006, 312 VA homes had been leased to
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Assistance to Homeowners/ Homebuyers.
Foreclosure moratorium;
The VA requested that loan holders establish a 90-day moratorium from
the date of the declared disaster on initiating new foreclosures in the
disaster area. The VA requested a 90-day extension of this moratorium.
In disaster areas declared eligible for individual assistance by FEMA,
the VA requested an extension through February 28, 2006. In addition,
subject to certain restrictions, the VA extended the moratorium for an
additional 120 days.
Mortgage payment forbearance, late payment waivers, and credit
protections;
The VA encouraged holders of guaranteed loans to extend every possible
forbearance to borrowers as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and
encouraged servicers to extend special forbearance to members of the
National Guard called to active duty to assist in disaster recovery. VA
encouraged lenders to extend mortgage payment forbearance until
February 28, 2006, and requested another extension for an additional
120 days subject to certain restrictions. VA also encouraged all
servicers to waive late charges on loans in disaster areas. In
addition, the VA encouraged servicers to consider suspension of credit
bureau reporting on borrowers nationwide who have been affected by the
hurricanes.
Underwriting flexibilities;
VA issued guidance on eligibility and underwriting issues regarding
veterans who have been impacted by Hurricane Katrina or Rita. According
to VA, veterans who had derogatory credit related to the effects of the
hurricanes but who had satisfactory credit prior to the disasters
should be determined as a satisfactory credit risk. In addition, VA
allowed flexibilities regarding restoration of VA loan entitlement and
documentation requirements. VA guidance also stated that lenders should
not consider the outstanding mortgage obligation on damaged or
destroyed properties when determining a veteran's ability to make
payments on a new loan. Further, the Defense Appropriations Act (Public
Law 109-148, December 30, 2005) gave the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
the authority to make a supplemental grant to a veteran whose home was
previously adapted and substantially damaged or destroyed as a result
of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in calendar year 2005.
Source: GAO analysis of VA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by Freddie Mac:
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) provided temporary housing and
mortgage relief for victims of the disasters. Temporary housing
assistance Freddie Mac provided included direct housing assistance,
such making some of its real estate-owned (REO) units available for
lease, and providing grants to non-profits and other housing
organizations. In addition, Freddie Mac took steps to provide mortgage
relief and assistance to borrowers, including issuing a temporary
moratorium on foreclosures, extending mortgage relief to members of the
National Guard who were on state duty involved in Hurricane Katrina
operations, providing mortgage payment forbearance, and by taking other
measures. The following provides further details on disaster-related
housing assistance provided by Freddie Mac in response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
Temporary Housing.
Lease of REO homes and multifamily units;
Freddie Mac created a program in late 2005 to lease some of its REO
homes to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Hurricane victims
could lease units free of charge for 6 months; however, tenants were
required to pay monthly utilities. At the end of the lease term,
tenants had the option to purchase the home. If the tenant had an
interest in purchasing the home or other temporary qualifying issues
which support the need for an extension, the tenant had the option to
request an extension of up to 6 additional months. As of September 30,
2006, Freddie Mac had leased 65 REO homes in Texas and Georgia. In
addition, Freddie Mac also provided temporary housing in one of its
multifamily REO properties to 31 Hurricane Katrina victims rent free
for 3 months.
Grants to non-profits and other housing organizations;
Freddie Mac donated over $9 million to nonprofits and other housing
organizations for rental assistance and for the purchase, donation, and
lease of single-family homes, multifamily units, and manufactured
homes. For example, Freddie Mac provided $900,000 to the Mississippi
Home Corporation, a quasigovernmental agency that administers tax
credits and housing bonds, for the acquisition and positioning of 36
manufactured homes to provide temporary hosing to hurricane victims in
Mississippi. Overall, Freddie Mac assistance provided homes for 118
displaced families, temporary homes for 483 displaced families, and
rental assistance to 1,548 families.
Assistance to Homeowners/ Homebuyers.
Foreclosure moratorium;
Freddie Mac instructed servicers to suspend foreclosure activities in
the storm-affected areas. Freddie Mac extended this moratorium for
mortgages on homes in the hurricane disaster areas through February 28,
2006. For counties in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas that
suffered the most severe damage, Freddie Mac extended it moratorium
until May 31, 2006, and again until August 31, 2006, for counties in
Louisiana and Mississippi, after which Freddie Mac has required
servicers to obtain approval before initiating any foreclosures.
Mortgage relief extended to national guard;
Freddie Mac instructed its servicers to extend mortgage relief
available to members of the armed forces under the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act (SCRA) to National Guard members on state duty involved in
Hurricane Katrina operations. SCRA protects active duty personnel from
foreclosure and interest rates in excess of 6 percent. National Guard
members are covered when called to state duty in response to a national
emergency declared by the President.
Mortgage payment forbearance, loan modification, and credit
protections;
As a new policy, Freddie Mac instructed its servicers to suspend
mortgage payment collection for September, October, and November 2005
in disaster areas designated as eligible for individual assistance by
FEMA. This 3-month suspension of mortgage payments applied to every
borrower with a Freddie Mac single-family mortgage in the areas
designated for FEMA's individual assistance program, regardless of the
condition of the home. After the 3-month mortgage payment suspension,
Freddie Mac advised servicers to offer additional assistance on a case-
by-case basis. Servicers could continue the mortgage payment suspension
or reduce mortgage payments for a total of 12 months. Freddie Mac
extended its policy to allow servicers the discretion to extend
mortgage payment forbearance through March 31, 2007. As of August 31,
2006, Freddie Mac had extended forbearance to over 33,500 homeowners
and approved more than 3,000 loan modifications. In addition, Freddie
Mac instructed its servicers not to report to credit bureaus any
reversed or suspended payments on Freddie Mac-owned loans as a result
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and to suspend late fees during the 3-
month mortgage payment suspension. Unique credit- reporting
requirements were extended and will expire March 31, 2007. Servicers
also had the option not to advance interest on any Freddie Mac mortgage
granted forbearance under its special hurricane policies.
Mortgage payment return;
For the first time, Freddie Mac allowed its servicers discretion to
return mortgage payments for September 2005 to Hurricane Katrina-
affected borrowers and October 2005 to Hurricane Rita-affected
borrowers for payments made that had not yet been reported to Freddie
Mac. Borrowers could also request a return of their mortgage payments.
Underwriting flexibilities;
Freddie Mac temporarily eased some underwriting requirements to allow
hurricane victims to qualify for mortgages that Freddie Mac would
purchase. The special underwriting requirements applied to mortgages
closed on or after August 30 for Hurricane Katrina victims and on or
after September 25 for victims of Hurricane Rita, and expired on
October 3, 2006. The underwriting flexibility applied to borrowers who
were victims of either storm and lived in, had employers in, or
relocated from FEMA-designated major disaster areas. Specifically, the
underwriting flexibilities allowed lenders to accommodate hurricane
victims who had to rely on temporary income, alternative third-party
documentation in place of lost or destroyed records, or storm-damaged
credit reputations.
Tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds;
Freddie Mac committed to purchasing up to $1 billion in tax-exempt
mortgage revenue bonds to allow housing finance agencies in the Gulf
Coast to provide below-market-rate mortgaged and home loans to as many
as 10,000 families displace by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Freddie Mac
made this commitment after Congress passed the Katrina Emergency Tax
Relief Act of 2005 which waived homebuyer requirements on mortgage
revenue bond loans and raised the cap on home repair loans from $15,000
to $150,000.
Purchase of mortgages secured by properties affected by Hurricane
Katrina;
Freddie Mac eased some of its policies in order to purchase an
estimated $300 million in single-family mortgages, which were closed
between June 1 and August 29, 2005, and secured by properties in areas
heavily impacted by Hurricane Katrina, to assist lenders with loans
funded and closed in anticipation of sale to Freddie Mac. Normally,
these loans may have no longer been eligible for sale because of
potential property damage or income loss caused by Hurricane Katrina.
In response to Hurricane Katrina, Freddie Mac offered to purchase these
loans through October 31, 2005.
Source: GAO analysis of Freddie Mac data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing Assistance
Provided by Fannie Mae:
In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) offered direct housing assistance and
mortgage relief to the storms' victims. Fannie Mae offered single
family homes and multifamily units for lease from its inventory of real
estate-owned (REO) properties. Also, Fannie Mae offered mortgage relief
and assistance that included a temporary moratorium on foreclosures,
mortgage payment forbearance, loan modifications, and credit
protections. The following information provides further details on
disaster-related housing assistance offered by Fannie Mae.
Temporary Housing.
Lease of REO homes and multifamily units;
Fannie Mae provided temporary housing assistance utilizing its
inventory of REO homes and multifamily units. Fannie Mae made 1,500 of
its REO homes available for lease to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. Fannie Mae REO homes were available for lease for up to 18 months
rent free. To lease a Fannie Mae REO home, persons must have been
victims of Hurricane Katrina or Rita and have had no prior felony
convictions. As of October 2006, Fannie Mae provided over 1,000
families rent free housing in its REO homes. Evacuee tenants were also
given the opportunity to purchase these homes and Fannie Mae provided
purchase assistance. In addition, Fannie Mae housed 308 hurricane
victims in 148 of its REO multifamily units in Dallas and Houston,
Texas. Victims who occupied REO multifamily units were given free rent
while they applied for FEMA rental assistance. Tenants who received
rental assistance from FEMA then paid rent for Fannie Mae's REO
multifamily units. According to Fannie Mae officials, most victims
occupying its multifamily units began receiving FEMA rental assistance
by January 2006.
Waiver of minimum lease term;
Fannie Mae agreed to waive the minimum 6- month lease restriction on
its multifamily units to allow multifamily property owners to permit
shorter-term leases for households displaced by Hurricane Katrina.
Assistance to Homeowners/ Homebuyers.
Foreclosure moratorium;
Fannie Mae established a moratorium on foreclosures on single family
properties in the most devastated hurricane areas, lasting until August
31, 2006. Afterwards, through March 31, 2007, servicers were required
to obtain written approval from Fannie Mae before initiating or
continuing a foreclosure in the six most damaged counties/parishes.
Mortgage payment forbearance, loan modification, and credit
protections;
Fannie Mae reminded its servicers that its existing policy for natural
disasters allows servicers to offer forbearance as they deem
appropriate, on a case-by-case basis, for up to 18 months on single-
family properties. For multifamily properties, Fannie Mae agreed to
provide an initial 1-month forbearance from exercising default
remedies, and thereafter authorized the servicers the ability to grant,
on a month-to-month basis, additional forbearance to multifamily
borrowers. In addition, lenders could offer disaster victims a
reduction in mortgage payments for up to 18 months or create longer
payback plans on a case-by-case basis for single-family properties.
Fannie Mae also waived income/asset verifications for repayment plans
and loan modifications and encouraged its servicers to waive late
payment charges when likely due to a natural disaster for single-family
homes. In addition, Fannie Mae instructed its servicers to suspend
credit bureau reporting for delinquencies caused by the hurricanes and
advised its servicers and lenders not to report a delinquency to the
credit repositories in cases of missed payments that were likely caused
by hardships from the hurricanes.
Underwriting flexibilities;
Fannie Mae implemented new single-family underwriting flexibilities for
hurricane-affected borrowers to acquire new homes or loans to renovate
damaged homes. These flexibilities allowed lenders to disregard
obligations on previously owner-occupied homes when calculating a
hurricane-impacted borrower's debt-to-income ratio and permitted
lenders to base loan decisions on a borrower's credit prior to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Source: GAO analysis of Fannie Mae data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Feb 16 2007:
Mr. David G. Wood:
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Wood:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-07-88, `Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for
Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters,' dated January 23, 2007 (GAO
Code 250270).
The Department concurs with the recommendation, and our comment is
attached.
Signed by:
Joseph K. Sikes:
Director, Housing and Competitive Sourcing:
Attachment:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated January 23, 2007 GAO-07-88 (GAO Codes 250270):
"Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed For Housing Victims Of
Catastrophic Disasters"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop fact sheets outlining appropriate roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency specific authorities
pertaining to its disaster housing capabilities, as required by the
emergency support function no. 6 (ESF-6) standard operating procedures.
(p. 49/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur.
[End of section]
Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development:
U.S. Department Of Housing And Urban Development:
The Deputy Secretary:
Washington, DC 20410-0050:
February 20, 2007:
Mr. David G. Wood:
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment Team:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Wood:
Thank you for providing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development with an opportunity to comment on the draft Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled Disaster Assistance: Better
Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters (GAO-07-
88). The following comments are submitted for your consideration:
* HUD provided fact sheets to the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), American National Red Cross, Catholic Charities USA, U.S.
Department of Agriculture Rural Development, the United Methodist
Committee on Relief, the Jackson (Mississippi) United Methodist Church,
and to all of the Disaster Relocation Centers (DRCs) that were open for
4 months after Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, HUD provided vacancy
lists of public housing units to FEMA.
* HUD created the Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP)
and worked with FEMA and local volunteers to locate and support
formerly HUD-assisted clients that had been displaced by Hurricane
Katrina. HUD staff, in conjunction with FEMA, reached out to DRCs and
hotels, and established KDHAP centers in the Mississippi cities of
Hattiesburg and Gulfport. On top of that, the local HUD office in
Mississippi mailed 2,000 KDHAP flyers to local hotels and 3,000 KDHAP
flyers to local organizations throughout the state.
* HUD also supported Louisiana and Alabama residents by collaborating
with local housing providers to identify transitional housing, by
conducting on-site damage reviews, and by providing the listing of
damaged units to FEMA. HUD facilitated frequent communication between
local public housing agencies (PHAs) and DRCs by disseminating new
information as it became available. In addition, HUD personnel
conducted intake interviews at evacuee shelters to determine the
evacuees' eligibility for HUD programs and provided them with essential
information.
* HUD also established a national hotline to assist clients with
understanding KDHAP and locating available housing. The national
hotline number was provided to the Emergency Support Function-6 (ESF-6)
organizations for their use. Additionally, HUD offices nationwide
worked with 3,100 PHAs to identify local housing vacancies and provide
assistance to local disaster victims.
* Due to the success of HUD's KDHAP program, in 2006, Congress
appropriated funds to a more comprehensive Disaster Voucher Program
(DVP). DVP is the successor to KDHAP.
* In addition to the HUD-published fact sheets on temporary housing
availability, there was a Department of Homeland Security Mass Care
publication entitled, "National Voluntary Organizations Active in
Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and Rita Relief and Recovery Assistance
Guide, Version 6." The publication, dated November 21, 2005, contained
the Office of Public and Indian Housing resource and information toll-
free number, the KDHAP telephone number, and several housing websites
and other telephone numbers.
* HUD recommends that the section on page 19 under "Department of
Housing and Urban Development" be expanded to more fully reflect the
activities that HUD performed, including:
- establishment of KDHAP centers;
- performance of on-site damage review of assisted housing units;
- training of FEMA and partner organizations;
- obtaining and providing of lists of housing vacancies to public
housing residents;
- design, development, and support of KDHAP call centers and HUD's
KDHAP website;
- outreach and housing advice to clients at hotels;
- assistance to public housing residents in relocating to other housing
units; o arranging of bus transportation;
- assistance to residents in obtaining their FEMA number;
- assistance to residents in obtaining clothing, health care, and
shelter; and:
- finding permanent units for disaster victims.
* HUD recommends that Section 901 of the supplemental appropriation on
DVP be included on page 84. The section allowed the PHAs to pool their
resources between programs to rebuild, repair, and rehabilitate public
housing units.
* HUD recommends that the third sentence regarding KDHAP on page 85 be
revised to reflect that households received a housing voucher that
covered 100 percent of the rent (capped at the local Fair Market Rent)
for up to 18 months anywhere in the United States.
* HUD recommends that the first full sentence on page 86 be revised to
reflect that households participating in the DVP received a housing
voucher that covered 100 percent of the rent (capped at the PHA payment
standard) anywhere in the country for the first 18 months.
HUD concurs with the first recommendation to propose revisions as
needed to ensure that the National Response Plan fully reflects HUD's
capabilities for providing temporary housing assistance under ESF-6.
HUD concurs with the second recommendation to develop the following, as
required by the ESF-6 standard operating procedures: (1) fact sheets
outlining appropriate roles and responsibilities, (2) notification and
activation procedures, and (3) agency-specific authorities. HUD has
implemented this recommendation and provided a fact sheet to GAO on
February 15, 2007.
HUD concurs with the third recommendation to develop operational plans
that provide details on how HUD will meet temporary housing
responsibilities under ESF-6.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to provide clarifying
comments. If you have any questions, please contact James M. Martin,
Deputy Chief Financial Officer, at (202) 708-1946.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Roy A. Bernardi:
[End of section]
Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Treasury:
Office of Tax Policy:
U.S. Department of Treasury:
February 15, 2007:
Treasury Department/IRS Response to GAO Draft Report: "Disaster
Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims in Catastrophic
Disasters" (GAO-07-88):
* The Treasury Department's role in providing disaster relief is
generally limited to relief under the Internal Revenue Code, although
the Department also has a broader role in facilitating Federal
payments. Unlike the other agencies that were included in the report,
the Treasury Department does not provide any form of direct housing
assistance. Rather, the Department helps to develop the
Administration's position on Federal tax policies and programs and the
IRS implements and administers the Internal Revenue Code.
* Current law provides a tax credit to owners of qualified low-income
rental units through the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC). The IRS
administers this law by ensuring that the owners of LIHTC properties
qualify to claim the credit. The Treasury Department does not own LIHTC
properties and cannot make vacant LIHTC units available for disaster
victims. The Treasury Department and the IRS have, however, provided
temporary tax relief to owners of LIHTC properties in limited
circumstances. For example, in response to Hurricane Katrina, the
Treasury Department and the IRS provided in Notice 2005-69, 2005-40
I.R.B. 622 limited administrative relief to the owners of qualified
LIHTC properties. This relief administratively suspended, on a
nationwide basis, the income limits that otherwise apply to residents
of LIHTC properties. Administrative relief from the income limits under
section 42 should be unique to disasters that, like Hurricane Katrina,
involve the displacement of tens of thousands of residents. Moreover,
providing this relief in the context of Hurricane Katrina raised
concerns among some low-income housing advocates, suggesting that the
Treasury Department and IRS proceed carefully in considering whether
similar relief should be provided for future disasters.
* The draft report recommends that the National Response Plan (NRP) be
revised to reflect the Treasury Department's ability to provide
temporary housing assistance through administrative relief relating to
the LIHTC. This relief is unique to disasters like Hurricane Katrina,
however, and should only be extended, if at all, in the case of similar
disasters involving the displacement of tens of thousands of
individuals. Any amendment to the Treasury Department's section of the
NRP to reflect the availability of administrative relief relating to
the LIHTC should therefore qualify that such relief is appropriate only
in extraordinary circumstances and should take into consideration the
impact it might have on low-income taxpayers who are the intended
beneficiaries of the LIHTC.
* The draft report refers to the IRS offering tax relief under the
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) and the Gulf
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO Zone Act). (See for example, page 20
and page 91). The report should clarify that this relief was provided
by Congress when it enacted KETRA and the GO Zone Act. The Treasury
Department and the IRS merely administered the tax relief enacted by
Congress.
* Current law provides the Treasury Department and IRS authority to
grant certain types of tax relief to victims of a Presidentially
declared disaster. Through the IRS Disaster Assistance and Emergency
Relief Program, the IRS can grant relief to taxpayers who are victims
of a Presidentially-declared disaster, including:
- Postponing tax deadlines to provide extra time to file returns and
make payments without being penalized:
- Abating interest for specific tax periods when additional time is
granted for filing tax returns and paying taxes:
* The IRS issues a news release or notice that describes the relief
available for each disaster. In addition to relief provided by the IRS,
certain tax laws apply directly to victims of a Presidentially-declared
disaster. For example, an unreimbursed loss from a casualty may be
deductible on the tax return for the year the casualty occurred. If the
loss happened in an area the President designated as a disaster area,
the loss may be reported on an amended tax return for the immediate
preceding tax year, and may result in a refund of taxes already paid.
Also, taxpayers may use an appraisal that was used to get a federal
loan (or federal loan guarantee) to establish the amount of losses that
occurred in a Presidentially-declared disaster area.
*There were several audits conducted by the Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration (TIGTA) on the IRS' response to Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita and Wilma. These reports acknowledged IRS' actions to
provide immediate relief to taxpayers impacted by these devastating
disasters.
Enclosure: Specific Response to Draft Report Recommendations:
Enclosure:
Recommendation:
The Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, Treasury
and Veterans Affairs propose revisions as needed to ensure that the NRP
fully reflects their respective agencies' capabilities for providing
temporary housing assistance under ESF-6.
Response:
The Department of the Treasury will work with the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure that the NRP fully reflects the
capabilities of the Department of the Treasury to provide temporary
housing assistance.
Recommendation:
The Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development,
Treasury and Veterans Affairs develop fact sheets outlining appropriate
roles and responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and
agency specific authorities pertaining to their disaster housing
capabilities, as required by the ESF-6 standard operating procedures.
Response:
The Department of the Treasury will collaborate with the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure that the appropriate facts sheets under ESF-
6 fully reflect the capabilities of the Department of the Treasury to
provide temporary housing assistance.
[End of section]
Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs:
The Deputy Secretary Of Veterans Affairs:
Washington:
February 13, 2007:
Mr. David G. Wood:
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Wood:
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has reviewed your draft report,
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters (GAO-07-88) and agrees with your findings and
concurs with your recommendations. VA actively supports its role in the
National Response Plan and appreciates GAO's recommendations to
strengthen the plan.
The enclosure specifically addresses your recommendations and provides
needed technical corrections.
VA appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft report.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gordon H. Mansfield:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix XVI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David G. Wood, (202) 512-8678, woodD@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Charles Wilson, Jr.,
Assistant Director; Johnnie Barnes; Emily Chalmers; Marshall Hamlett;
Charlene Johnson; Alison Martin; Michael Maslowski; Marc Molino; John
McGrail; David Pittman; and Rachel Siegel made key contributions to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The NRP defines an incident of national significance as an actual
or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and
effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, state,
local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private sector entities in order to
save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term
community recovery and mitigation activities.
[2] Throughout this report, unless otherwise noted, our reference to
the NRP includes the base plan, supporting annexes, and standard
operating procedures. The standard operating procedures for ESF-6 were
in draft form at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
[3] The more detailed Catastrophic Incident Supplement was in draft
form at the time when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck. DHS issued
the final supplement in August 2006.
[4] The Red Cross generally does not provide shelter to people with
medical and/or special needs such as those with physical or mental
disabilities. States and localities generally have responsibility for
providing shelter for these populations.
[5] ESF-6 also mentions the Small Business Administration (SBA) as
having responsibilities for providing housing assistance. We excluded
SBA from this report because GAO is reporting separately on SBA. See
GAO, Small Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More
Timely Disaster Assistance, GAO-06-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2006) and Small Business Administration: A Additional Steps Needed to
Enhance Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters, GAO-07-114
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007).
[6] A purposeful stratified sample is used in qualitative data
collection to gather data from individuals who can provide detailed
information about the issues of central importance to the purpose of
the study, but which also uses characteristics to divide the sample
into smaller groups with the purpose of attempting to capture major
variations in the issues across the groups.
[7] Appendix II identifies and contains a summary of the views
expressed by the group of experts.
[8] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).
[9] United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A
Failure of Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
[10] United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
(Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
[11] The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006).
[12] Although this report focuses on sheltering and housing activities
covered by ESF-6, the federal agencies included in this study also have
responsibilities under other ESF annexes as well. For example, in
addition to having responsibilities under ESF-6, USDA's Forest Service
also has responsibilities under other ESF annexes, such as ESF-1
(Transportation) and ESF-2 (Communications).
[13] Congress established and chartered Fannie Mae, as well as Freddie
Mac (discussed later in the report), as government-sponsored
enterprises that are privately owned and operated. Their mission is to
enhance the availability of mortgage credit by purchasing mortgages
from lenders (banks, thrifts, and mortgage bankers) that use the
proceeds to make additional mortgage loans to home buyers.
[14] Preliminary estimate as reported by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration in August 2006.
[15] The number of displaced persons includes those impacted by
Hurricane Wilma, which struck the United States in October 2005.
[16] A mission assignment is a FEMA request to another federal agency
to provide a specific service. FEMA uses mission assignments to support
federal operations in a major disaster or emergency declaration under
the Stafford Act. It orders immediate, short-term emergency response
assistance when an applicable State or local government is overwhelmed
by the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the
necessary work.
[17] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and
the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, GAO-06-
712 (Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006).
[18] Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, A Performance
Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to
Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[19] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2006).
[20] Like HUD and VA, USDA may at any given time have an inventory of
vacant homes, commonly referred to as "real estate-owned" or REO
properties. This inventory results from defaults in the agencies'
mortgage loan and loan guarantee programs.
[21] HUD administers a variety of rental assistance programs, including
public housing; project-based Section 8 rental assistance; programs for
the elderly and persons with disabilities; and housing choice vouchers,
which are used by recipients to rent privately owned units.
[22] Administered by IRS and state agencies, the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit Program provides developers of and investors in eligible
affordable housing developments a dollar-for-dollar reduction in their
federal taxes. These tax credits are available for projects in which
(1) at least 20 percent of units are both rent restricted and rented to
households with incomes of 50 percent or less than the area median
income, or (2) at least 40 percent of units are both rent restricted
and rented to households with incomes of 60 percent or less than the
area median income.
[23] DHS is also responsible for coordinating full reviews and updates
of the NRP every 4 years, or more frequently if the Secretary of DHS
deems necessary. The review and update will consider lessons learned
and best practices identified during exercises and responses to actual
events.
[24] The detailed supplement to the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex
notes that the responsibilities assigned to the Red Cross as a primary
agency under ESF-6 do not supersede the organization's responsibilities
under its congressional charter.
[25] United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared,
(Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
[26] United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
[27] American Red Cross, From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross
Actions to Improve and Enhance Its Disaster Response and Related
Capabilities for the 2006 Hurricane Season and Beyond (June 2006).
[28] Mobile homes and travel trailers (also referred to as "direct"
temporary housing assistance) are one of five types of financial
assistance that FEMA may provide under the Individuals and Households
Program. The other four include financial assistance to rent
alternative housing accommodations, existing rental units, manufactured
housing, recreational vehicles, or other readily fabricated dwellings;
repair owner-occupied private residences, utilities, and residential
infrastructure; replace owner-occupied private residences; and
construct permanent housing in insular and other remote areas where no
alternative housing resources are available and other forms of
authorized temporary housing assistance are unavailable, infeasible, or
not cost effective.
[29] GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita: FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant
Fraud and Abuse, GAO-06-403T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2006).
[30] IHP provides temporary housing or financial assistance to eligible
victims. See GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges
Exposed the Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse;
Actions Needed to Reduce Such Problems in the Future, GAO-06-1013
(Washington, D.C.: Sep. 27, 2006).
[31] The 95 percent confidence interval associated with our estimate of
improper and potentially fraudulent registrations ranges from a low of
$600 million to a high of $1.4 billion in improper and potentially
fraudulent payments.
[32] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued
Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, GAO-07-252T (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 6, 2006).
[33] OIG-06-32.
[34] GAO-06-442T.
[35] The Louisiana State Emergency Operation Plan identifies a shelter
of last resort as a place for persons to be protected from the high
winds and heavy rains of the storm. Unlike other shelters, there may be
little or no water or food and possibly no utilities.
[36] See GAO, Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed
to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations,
GAO-07-44 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2006).
[37] Under DVP, voucher recipients were not required to make any
contribution toward their rental units' costs for the first 18 months
that the recipients received assistance, after which they were expected
to contribute 30 percent of their adjusted incomes.
[38] Under the Disaster Voucher Program, funding must be obligated by
September 30, 2007, unless expressly renewed or extended by law.
[39] Katrina Aid Today is sponsored by FEMA using donations from the
international community, and is administered by the humanitarian
development agency of the United Methodist Church. According to FEMA,
Katrina Aid Today assists victims in identifying sources of support,
developing personal recovery plans, and acquiring access to services
needed to rebuild their lives.
[40] United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, A Failure of Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
[41] United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
(Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
[42] The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006).
[43] Janice M. Morse, Designing Funded Qualitative Research (chapter
13, pp. 220-235) in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds),
Handbook of Qualitative Research, (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks,
Calif, 1994). Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation
Methods, 3rd edition, (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, Calif., 2002).
[44] USDA's traditional multifamily housing programs provide affordable
multifamily rental housing in rural areas for very low-, low-, and
moderate-income families, the elderly, and persons with disabilities
primarily through direct mortgages to finance multifamily housing and
rental subsides. USDA's single-family programs generally provide home
ownership opportunities to low-and moderate-income rural Americans
largely through loans, grants, and loan guarantees.
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