Disaster Assistance
Greater Coordination and an Evaluation of Programs' Outcomes Could Improve Disaster Case Management Gao ID: GAO-09-561 July 8, 2009As a result of the unprecedented damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the federal government, for the first time, funded several disaster case management programs. These programs help victims access services for disaster-related needs. GAO was asked to review (1) steps the federal government took to support disaster case management programs after the hurricanes, (2) the extent to which federal agencies oversaw the implementation of these programs, (3) challenges case management agencies experienced in delivering disaster case management services, and (4) how these programs will inform the development of a federal case management program for future disasters. GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, obtained data from two programs, conducted site visits to Louisiana and Mississippi, and interviewed case management providers and officials from federal and state agencies involved in disaster case management.
Federal agencies provided more than$209 million for disaster case management services to help thousands of households cope with the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but breaks in federal funding adversely affected services to some hurricane victims. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) awarded a grant of $66 million for initial case management services provided by Katrina Aid Today (KAT) shortly after the hurricanes made landfall. When this program ended in March 2008, FEMA provided funds for additional programs to continue services. As a result of ongoing budget negotiations between FEMA and Mississippi, the state-managed Disaster Case Management Pilot (DCM-P) program in Mississippi did not begin until August 2008, approximately 2 months after it was scheduled to, and FEMA's DCM-P program in Louisiana was never implemented. Consequently, some victims most in need may not have received case management services. FEMA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided some oversight of disaster case management programs, but monitoring of KAT was limited and coordination challenges may provide lessons for future disasters. As recovery continued, FEMA and HUD provided additional monitoring of subsequent programs. Coordination challenges contributed to implementation difficulties, such as a lack of timely information sharing. For example, client information provided by FEMA to the Mississippi state agency implementing the DCM-P program was invalid or out-of-date for nearly 20 percent of eligible clients. As a result of incompatible databases and inconsistent outreach efforts, some victims may have received services from multiple agencies while others may not have been reached. Case management agencies experienced challenges in delivering federally-funded disaster case management services due to large caseloads, limited community resources, and federal funding rules. Some case management agencies experienced high turnover, and some case managers had caseloads of more than 100 clients, making it difficult to meet client needs. KAT and HUD data indicated that the most frequently occurring needs among clients included housing and employment, but these resources were limited following the hurricanes. Further, case management agencies saw the ability to provide direct financial assistance for items such as home repair, clothing, or furniture as key to helping victims, yet only one federally funded program allowed case management agencies to use federal funds for direct assistance. FEMA and other agencies are evaluating disaster case management pilot programs to inform the development of a federal disaster case management program for future disasters, but some of the evaluations have limitations. For example, some evaluations will not assess program outcomes, such as whether clients' needs were met. In addition, FEMA did not include stakeholder input in designing its evaluation of multiple pilot programs. According to FEMA officials, the agency does not have a time line for developing the federal disaster case management program.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-561, Disaster Assistance: Greater Coordination and an Evaluation of Programs' Outcomes Could Improve Disaster Case Management
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2009:
Disaster Assistance:
Greater Coordination and an Evaluation of Programs' Outcomes Could
Improve Disaster Case Management:
GAO-09-561:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-561, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
As a result of the unprecedented damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita in 2005, the federal government, for the first time, funded
several disaster case management programs. These programs help victims
access services for disaster-related needs. GAO was asked to review (1)
steps the federal government took to support disaster case management
programs after the hurricanes, (2) the extent to which federal agencies
oversaw the implementation of these programs, (3) challenges case
management agencies experienced in delivering disaster case management
services, and (4) how these programs will inform the development of a
federal case management program for future disasters. GAO reviewed
relevant laws and guidance, obtained data from two programs, conducted
site visits to Louisiana and Mississippi, and interviewed case
management providers and officials from federal and state agencies
involved in disaster case management.
What GAO Found:
Federal agencies provided more than $209 million for disaster case
management services to help thousands of households cope with the
devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but breaks in
federal funding adversely affected services to some hurricane victims.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) awarded a grant of $66
million for initial case management services provided by Katrina Aid
Today (KAT) shortly after the hurricanes made landfall. When this
program ended in March 2008, FEMA provided funds for additional
programs to continue services. As a result of ongoing budget
negotiations between FEMA and Mississippi, the state-managed Disaster
Case Management Pilot (DCM-P) program in Mississippi did not begin
until August 2008, approximately 2 months after it was scheduled to,
and FEMA‘s DCM-P program in Louisiana was never implemented.
Consequently, some victims most in need may not have received case
management services.
FEMA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided
some oversight of disaster case management programs, but monitoring of
KAT was limited and coordination challenges may provide lessons for
future disasters. As recovery continued, FEMA and HUD provided
additional monitoring of subsequent programs. Coordination challenges
contributed to implementation difficulties, such as a lack of timely
information sharing. For example, client information provided by FEMA
to the Mississippi state agency implementing the DCM-P program was
invalid or out-of-date for nearly 20 percent of eligible clients. As a
result of incompatible databases and inconsistent outreach efforts,
some victims may have received services from multiple agencies while
others may not have been reached.
Case management agencies experienced challenges in delivering
federally-funded disaster case management services due to large
caseloads, limited community resources, and federal funding rules. Some
case management agencies experienced high turnover, and some case
managers had caseloads of more than 100 clients, making it difficult to
meet client needs. KAT and HUD data indicated that the most frequently
occurring needs among clients included housing and employment, but
these resources were limited following the hurricanes. Further, case
management agencies saw the ability to provide direct financial
assistance for items such as home repair, clothing, or furniture as key
to helping victims, yet only one federally funded program allowed case
management agencies to use federal funds for direct assistance.
FEMA and other agencies are evaluating disaster case management pilot
programs to inform the development of a federal disaster case
management program for future disasters, but some of the evaluations
have limitations. For example, some evaluations will not assess program
outcomes, such as whether clients‘ needs were met. In addition, FEMA
did not include stakeholder input in designing its evaluation of
multiple pilot programs. According to FEMA officials, the agency does
not have a time line for developing the federal disaster case
management program.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that FEMA (1) establish a time line for developing a
disaster case management program, (2) include practices to enhance
coordination among stakeholders involved in this program and (3)
evaluate outcomes of disaster case management pilot programs to inform
the development of this program. FEMA agreed with our recommendations
and is taking steps to address them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-561] or key
components. For more information, contact Kay Brown at (202)512-7215 or
brownke@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Federal Government Supported Disaster Case Management Programs for
the First Time after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but Breaks in Federal
Funding May Have Hindered Assistance to Victims:
FEMA and HUD Provided Some Oversight of Disaster Case Management
Programs, but Monitoring of KAT Was Limited and Coordination Challenges
May Provide Lessons for Future Disasters:
Case Management Agencies Experienced a Range of Service-Delivery
Challenges, and As A Result, Those Most in Need of Services May Not
Have Been Helped:
FEMA Plans to Use Evaluations of Pilot Programs to Inform the
Development of a Federal Disaster Case Management Program for Future
Disasters; However, Some Evaluations Have Limitations:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: List of Organizations Interviewed:
Figures:
Figure 1: Time Line of Federally Funded Disaster Case Management
Programs for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
Figure 2: Most to Least Frequently Occurring Client Need by Disaster
Case Management Program:
Figure 3: Evaluations of Federally Funded Disaster Case Management
Pilot Programs:
Abbreviations:
DCM-P: Disaster Case Management Pilot:
DHAP: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development:
KAT: Katrina Aid Today:
LFRC: Louisiana Family Recovery Corps:
Post-Katrina Act: Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006:
SSBG: Social Services Block Grant:
Stafford Act: Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act:
TANF: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families:
UMCOR: United Methodist Committee on Relief:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
July 8, 2009:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States
Senate:
The Honorable Mary Landrieu:
Chairman:
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery:
Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast in late August 2005
and caused more than $80 billion in estimated property damage, making
the storm the most expensive natural disaster in the history of the
United States. Approximately 300,000 homes were destroyed or rendered
uninhabitable. Less than one month later, Hurricane Rita struck the
same region, severely damaging or destroying more than 23,600 homes in
southwest Louisiana and southeast Texas and causing $10 billion in
estimated property damage. Together, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
displaced more than 1 million people from some of the poorest
communities in the country. To help hurricane victims recover from the
unprecedented damage and displacement caused by the storms, the federal
government provided more than $209 million to states and nonprofit
organizations to support several disaster case management programs.
Disaster case management involves helping victims access services for a
range of needs, including employment, housing, and health care.
In August 2009, nearly four years after the storms, the last federally
funded disaster case management program for victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita is scheduled to end despite the thousands who still
require assistance. Given the unprecedented damage and displacement
caused by the hurricanes and the continuing recovery needs of victims,
GAO was asked to review the federal government's efforts to leverage
governmental and nongovernmental resources to help victims with their
recovery. GAO has issued reports on housing, health care, the role of
voluntary organizations, and services for victims residing in Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailer group sites, among others.
[Footnote 1] This report focuses on federally funded disaster case
management programs and addresses the following key questions:
1. What steps did the federal government take to support disaster case
management programs after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?
2. How did federal agencies oversee the implementation of these
disaster case management programs?
3. What challenges did case management agencies experience in
delivering disaster case management services under federally funded
programs?
4. How will previous or existing federally funded disaster case
management programs be used to inform the development of a federal case
management program for future disasters?
To address these questions, we reviewed the roles and responsibilities
of the federal government for disaster recovery services, as well as
federal laws, regulations, and guidance related to the federally funded
case management programs established to assist victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, including the federal government's authority to
establish or fund post-disaster case management programs. We also
reviewed prior GAO work on best practices for coordination among
federal agencies and between federal and nonfederal stakeholders. We
interviewed federal officials from FEMA, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). We focused our review on Louisiana and Mississippi, as
those were the states most directly affected by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, and conducted site visits to Baton Rouge and New Orleans,
Louisiana; and Biloxi, Gulfport, Moss Point, Jackson, and Pascagoula,
Mississippi. We conducted, either in person or by phone, interviews
with organizations involved in disaster case management in these states
(see table 1 in appendix I for a comprehensive list of the
organizations interviewed). During these interviews, we obtained
information on, among other topics, coordination between government
agencies and case management agencies and challenges to helping clients
meet their recovery needs. We selected interviewees to ensure that we
spoke to representatives from a range of appropriate organizations
serving Hurricane Katrina and Rita victims. In both states we spoke to
the majority of disaster case management providers for the Katrina Aid
Today (KAT) program and selected providers for the Disaster Housing
Assistance Program (DHAP). We also spoke with selected providers for
the state-managed Disaster Case Management Pilot (DCM-P) program in
Mississippi. We did not interview disaster case management providers
who served victims that relocated to other states. The views of the
disaster case management providers we spoke with cannot be generalized
to all organizations that provided disaster case management services to
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition to the interviews,
we obtained summary data on KAT clients from the Coordinated Assistance
Network database maintained by the American Red Cross and received
record-level data from the Tracking-at-a-Glance database used for DHAP.
These data included, among other variables, information on the needs of
case management clients. We assessed the reliability of these data
sources and used only those elements we found to be sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. For more information on our
scope and methodology, see appendix I. We conducted this performance
audit from May 2008 to July 2009, in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Disaster Case Management:
Case management is a process that assists people in identifying their
service needs, locating and arranging services, and coordinating the
services of multiple providers.[Footnote 2] Disaster case management
uses the same process to help people recover from a disaster. The
Council on Accreditation[Footnote 3] says disaster recovery case
management services "plan, secure, coordinate, monitor, and advocate
for unified goals and services with organizations and personnel in
partnership with individuals and families. —[They] include practices
that are unique to delivery of services in the aftermath of emergencies
and major incidents." The Council on Accreditation adds that while
disaster case management services may include emergency relief
services, they extend beyond the immediate to address long-term
recovery needs,[Footnote 4] such as health care, employment, housing,
and other social services. In line with the Council on Accreditation
standards, disaster case management programs may directly provide
assistance, make referrals to organizations that have agreed to meet
specific client needs, contract with other organizations, or otherwise
arrange for individuals and families to receive needed services and
resources.[Footnote 5] In addition, according to the Council on
Accreditation, the process of disaster case management generally
includes assessment, recovery planning, service delivery, monitoring,
and advocacy.
Disaster case management agencies may also work in conjunction with
long-term recovery committees to serve their clients. These committees
are typically community-based organizations that bring together a
variety of local leaders--such as members of voluntary organizations,
civic organizations, social service agencies, local churches, and case
management agencies. Long-term recovery committees coordinate recovery
efforts and provide resources to address the unmet needs of disaster
victims when all other resources have been exhausted or when current
resources are inadequate based on the victim's recovery plan. These
committees often include unmet needs committees, or roundtables, at
which case managers from member organizations present cases in order to
obtain resources for clients in need.
Federal Role for Funding and Coordinating Disaster Case Management
Services:
The federal role for funding and coordinating disaster case management
was not explicitly defined until the passage of the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act).[Footnote 6]
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act)[Footnote 7], as amended, is the primary authority under
which the federal government provides major disaster and emergency
assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals,
and qualified private, nonprofit organizations. FEMA is responsible for
administering the provisions of the Stafford Act. At the time of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Stafford Act contained no explicit
authority to fund disaster case management services. The Post-Katrina
Act amended the Stafford Act and, among other things, granted the
President the authority to provide financial assistance for case
management services to victims of major disasters.
In addition to its responsibilities under the Stafford Act, FEMA has
responsibility for administering and ensuring implementation of the
National Response Framework, which replaced the former National
Response Plan--a framework for managing the federal response to
disasters.[Footnote 8] Under the National Response Plan, in effect at
the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA was responsible for
coordinating the delivery of human services to support state, regional,
local, tribal government, and nongovernmental organization efforts.
This included coordinating victim-related human services for recovery
efforts such as counseling, support for persons with special needs, and
expediting the processing of new federal benefits claims, among others.
While the National Response Plan did not explicitly include or exclude
disaster case management services, the Plan did state that close
coordination is required among those federal agencies responsible for
response operations and recovery activities, and other nongovernmental
organizations providing assistance.
In January 2008, the National Response Plan was revised and replaced
with the National Response Framework, which became effective in March
2008. The Framework maintains FEMA's responsibility for coordinating
human services, and specifically includes disaster case management as
one of several categories of human services. The National Response
Framework recognizes the need for collaboration among the myriad of
entities and personnel involved in response efforts at all levels of
government and the nonprofit and private sectors and places increased
responsibility on FEMA for coordinating with voluntary organizations.
Moreover, the Framework requires federal agencies involved in mass
care, housing, and human services to coordinate federal response
efforts with the efforts of state, local, private, nongovernmental, and
faith-based organizations. In previous work, GAO has stated that these
updated requirements for coordination with voluntary organizations are
more extensive and specific than in the National Response Plan, and
FEMA officials have told GAO that voluntary agency liaisons, who are
FEMA employees, will fill this role.[Footnote 9]
The Federal Government Supported Disaster Case Management Programs for
the First Time after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but Breaks in Federal
Funding May Have Hindered Assistance to Victims:
Through Varied Funding Mechanisms, FEMA, HUD, and HHS Supported a
Variety of Disaster Case Management Programs for Victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita:
Since the hurricanes nearly 4 years ago, more than $209 million of FEMA
and HHS funds have been used to support disaster case management
programs to assist victims of Hurricanes of Katrina and Rita, one of
which was administered by HUD. These programs overlapped and began at
different times, as federal agencies identified ongoing need for
services (see figure 1). We estimate that, at most, nearly 116,000
families affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita relied on federally
funded disaster case management services supported by FEMA, HUD, and
HHS to obtain assistance in rebuilding their lives.[Footnote 10]
Figure 1: Time Line of Federally Funded Disaster Case Management
Programs for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Administering
agency):
[Refer to PDF for image: time line illustration]
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the Gulf Coast, August 29, 2005;
Hurricane Rita made landfall in the Gulf Coast, September 24, 2005;
Katrina Aid Today (FEMA): December 2005 – March 2008;
Louisiana Family Recovery Corps (HHS): January 2006 – June 2007;
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act enacted: October 4, 2006;
Disaster Housing Assistance Program (HUD): September 2007 – February
2009;
Phase 1: Cora Brown Bridge Program (FEMA): April 2008 – May 2008;
Phase 2: Mississippi Disaster Case Management Pilot Program (FEMA):
August 2008 – May 2009.
Source: GAO.
Notes: The program dates above represent when case management services
began. Grant agreements may have been in place prior to these dates.
Louisiana received emergency block grant funding from HHS. State
officials in Louisiana designated a portion of these funds for disaster
case management.
[End of figure]
FEMA:
In October 2005, during the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
the Department of State transferred $66 million of international
donations to FEMA to finance disaster case management services for
households affected by Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 11] Although FEMA
had not previously funded disaster case management, FEMA had proposed
that international donations be used for this purpose due to the
unprecedented magnitude of the damage and displacement caused by
Hurricane Katrina. FEMA awarded a $66 million, 2-year case management
services grant to the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR).
[Footnote 12] UMCOR used the grant to establish KAT, a national
consortium consisting of nine social service and voluntary
organizations, to provide case management services to victims of
Hurricane Katrina. As part of its case management system, the grant
specified that UMCOR would initiate or support long-term recovery
committees in all disaster affected states and KAT consortium members
were to participate in these organizations. Furthermore, KAT consortium
members were required to use the Coordinated Assistance Network
database to track client information and case management activities.
Although case management services provided by KAT were scheduled to end
in October 2007, FEMA used interest accrued on the $66 million in
charitable international donations--about $2 million--to allow KAT
consortium members to continue providing disaster case management
services through March 2008. KAT ended its activities on March 31,
2008, and according to program data, served more than 69,000
households.
To assist the thousands of victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that
were still without permanent housing and continued to need case
management services as KAT ended, FEMA collaborated with the states of
Louisiana and Mississippi on a two-phase disaster case management
program that would continue until March 1, 2009. The first phase used
Cora Brown funds,[Footnote 13] given directly to Louisiana and
Mississippi state governments--$524,000 and $502,000, respectively--to
continue providing case management services to individuals and families
affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This assistance--referred to
as the Cora Brown Bridge Program or Phase 1--lasted from April 1, 2008
to May 31, 2008, and, according to FEMA officials, served 1,747 clients
in Louisiana and 1,314 in Mississippi who still had open KAT cases.
Rather than giving the funds to the KAT organization, the states
distributed the funds directly to the case management agencies that
provided services under KAT, since the KAT program had officially
ended. The intent of the program was to provide "bridge" case
management services for clients while FEMA developed the second phase.
For the second phase of the program, FEMA used funds from its Disaster
Relief Fund[Footnote 14] for a state-managed DCM-P program. Through
this pilot, case management services were intended for households in
Louisiana and Mississippi affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita with
the primary goal of helping them achieve sustainable permanent housing.
Eligible families included those living in FEMA temporary housing,
those with health-related concerns living in FEMA-funded hotels or
motels, and those whose case management services were not fully
completed in the Cora Brown case management program. FEMA awarded a
conditional grant of $25.4 million to Mississippi in July 2008 and the
program became operational in August 2008.[Footnote 15] The Mississippi
Commission for Volunteer Services administered the program in
Mississippi and created the Mississippi Case Management Consortium of
13 member organizations. The program was scheduled to end March 1,
2009, however FEMA extended the program until June 1, 2009. As of March
2009, the Mississippi Commission for Volunteer Services reported that
the consortium had served more than 3,000 families throughout
Mississippi. According to FEMA officials, in October 2008, FEMA awarded
an initial grant of $32.5 million to Louisiana to implement the DCM-P
program, but the state was unable to implement the program due to the
withdrawal of a lead agency. According to the lead agency officials,
the agency withdrew due to the short time frame in which services were
to be provided and the lack of direct assistance funds. In February
2009, FEMA provided an adjusted grant award of $8.4 million, but
Louisiana was unable to secure a contract with a different lead agency,
the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps (LFRC), according to FEMA
officials. According to LFRC officials, they declined to implement the
program because there was not sufficient time in which to provide
services, among other reasons. Because LFRC declined, the state of
Louisiana proposed using funds allocated for the DCM-P program for
construction instead. However, FEMA officials said this proposal was
declined because it does not fall within the case management services
for which the funds were originally intended. In addition, FEMA
officials said it is unlikely that the DCM-P program will be
implemented in Louisiana.
HHS:
Following the hurricanes, Congress appropriated emergency funding to
states to help affected individuals and families through two programs
administered by HHS, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
and Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) programs.[Footnote 16] These
programs, through federal grants made to states, assist needy families
with children and provide social services to individuals. HHS
distributed $32.7 million in emergency TANF funds to Louisiana, which
entered into a memorandum of understanding with LFRC to provide human
services, including case management, to victims of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita residing in Louisiana. In October 2006, LFRC received
approximately $18.5 million in emergency SSBG funds from the state. The
contract between the state of Louisiana and LFRC required that 70
percent of the TANF and SSBG funds be used for direct assistance and 30
percent of the funds for case management assistance. LFRC awarded
grants to nonprofit agencies to provide case management services across
the state of Louisiana from January 2006 through June 2007.
Due to federal eligibility criteria for these programs, LFRC could only
use TANF funds to support needy households with minor children and SSBG
funds could be used to support low-income households with or without
minors. In addition, program rules limited TANF-funded emergency
assistance to 4 months. According to an evaluation of LFRC, the program
provided case management services to more than 9,500 families in
Louisiana.
HUD:
When it became clear that existing housing efforts to assist victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita would be insufficient, FEMA and HUD signed
an inter-agency agreement in July 2007 for HUD to design and implement
a pilot grant program known as the Disaster Housing Assistance Program
(DHAP).[Footnote 17] The main purpose of DHAP was for HUD to provide
rental assistance to eligible victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
from September 1, 2007 to March 1, 2009.[Footnote 18] Eligibility for
DHAP was determined by FEMA and included anyone who was displaced from
their homes as a result of Hurricanes Katrina or Rita and consequently
was either receiving or was eligible to receive rental assistance
administered by FEMA. To participate, clients also had to receive case
management services.[Footnote 19]
DHAP was funded by FEMA, using up to $585 million from its Disaster
Relief Fund. According to HUD officials, $63.8 million of these funds
supported the case management portion of the program. While HUD worked
through its existing network of local public housing authorities in
several states across the U.S. to implement DHAP, 59 percent of cases
were in Louisiana, and only 1 percent of cases were in Mississippi. In
turn, many public housing authorities contracted with other agencies to
provide the case management services required by the program. On August
5, 2008, the Mississippi Case Management Consortium--the organization
created to implement FEMA's state-managed DCM-P program--took over the
case management portion of DHAP for most new DHAP clients in
Mississippi, according to HUD officials.[Footnote 20] HUD data
indicated that over 30,000 clients received case management. Some DHAP
clients will continue to receive housing assistance through a DHAP
transitional closeout program until August 31, 2009.[Footnote 21]
States may request to provide case management services during the
transitional closeout period. For clients in Louisiana, HUD officials
said they signed an agreement on March 20, 2009 with the Louisiana
Recovery Authority to provide case management to 16,000 clients in the
DHAP transitional closeout program. According to HUD officials, no
other states have made similar requests to continue case management
services.
Breaks in Federal Funding Adversely Affected Disaster Case Management
Services to Some Hurricane Victims:
The discontinuous nature of the federally funded disaster case
management programs initiated after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita led to
breaks in funding that adversely affected case management agencies and
may have left victims most in need of assistance without access to case
management services. For example, as the first federally funded case
management program--KAT--drew to a close in March 2008, some case
management providers began to shut down their operations and case
managers were laid off. Officials from two KAT agencies noted that some
cases were closed not because clients' needs were met, but because the
program was ending. It was not until 3 days before the official end of
the KAT program that FEMA announced the continuation of services
through FEMA's Cora Brown Bridge Program. Because eligibility was
limited to those with open KAT cases, and since FEMA did not require
case management agencies to track clients who continued to have
disaster-related needs, but whose cases were closed only because the
KAT program ended, it is unknown whether some clients still in need of
case management obtained assistance elsewhere or whether their cases
were eventually reopened when the case management agencies received the
Cora Brown Bridge program funding.
The break in federal funding after the Cora Brown Bridge program ended
also forced some case management agencies to shut down their programs
as they waited for the new federal program to start. Clients with open
cases under the Cora Brown Bridge program were supposed to transition
from the bridge program, which ended on May 31, 2008, to FEMA's state-
managed DCM-P program, which was supposed to begin in June 1, 2008. As
a result of ongoing budget negotiations between FEMA and Mississippi,
the state-managed DCM-P program in Mississippi did not begin until
August 2008, approximately 2 months after it was scheduled to,
according to officials from the Mississippi Commission for Volunteer
Services.[Footnote 22] In addition, while Louisiana received an award
letter from FEMA for the program in February 2009--8 months after the
program was intended to begin--the program never became operational in
the state due to time constraints. An official at one case management
agency in Louisiana said the organization used at least $225,000 of its
own resources to keep clients' cases active while waiting for a
decision on whether Louisiana would receive funds for a state-managed
DCM-P program. However, not all case management agencies had the
resources to continue to provide services. According to the Mississippi
Case Management Consortium, many of the smaller case management
organizations were unable to find alternative resources to pay the case
managers hired in June for FEMA's state-managed DCM-P program and had
to lay off case managers with the hope of hiring them back once they
received federal funding.
The breaks in service after the bridge program concluded left
additional hurricane victims in need of services without access to case
management. Although FEMA guidance estimated that it would refer 8,378
people to the state-managed DCM-P program in Mississippi, FEMA referred
only 5,456 people to the Mississippi state agency administering the
pilot program. Of those, 3,432 had been served as of March 2009.
[Footnote 23] According to FEMA, the difference between the target
estimate and actual number of clients assigned to the Mississippi
state-managed DCM-P program is accounted for by the number victims in
FEMA temporary housing that moved into more suitable housing before the
pilot program became operational. A FEMA official also told us that the
primary method for relocating applicants to more suitable housing was
DHAP, which required clients to participate in case management
services. However, data do not exist to determine if victims who found
more suitable forms of housing outside of DHAP received disaster case
management services. In addition, FEMA guidance estimated that 18,820
clients were to be referred to the Louisiana DCM-P program. However,
because the program was never implemented in Louisiana, it is likely
that many of these clients did not receive services since nonprofits
throughout the state would not have been able to absorb these clients,
according to LFRC officials.
FEMA and HUD Provided Some Oversight of Disaster Case Management
Programs, but Monitoring of KAT Was Limited and Coordination Challenges
May Provide Lessons for Future Disasters:
Although Initial Oversight of KAT Was Limited, FEMA and HUD Used a
Variety of Methods to Monitor Subsequent Disaster Case Management
Programs:
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in the absence of explicit
authority to fund disaster case management, FEMA believed it had
limited responsibility for overseeing international donations allocated
to UMCOR and limited authority to ensure all aspects of the grant
proposal for KAT were carried out. When Hurricane Katrina made
landfall, specific policies and procedures for handling international
cash donations to the federal government had not yet been developed.
[Footnote 24] According to a FEMA official, FEMA acted as a pass-
through for the international funds. FEMA approved the grant proposal
submitted by UMCOR and relied on reports of the program objectives in
the proposal to monitor the implementation of KAT. As stipulated in the
grant proposal, UMCOR submitted quarterly financial and performance
reports to FEMA that contained information on program objectives, the
number of referrals provided and utilized, and other indicators.
According to a FEMA official who had a key role in overseeing the UMCOR
grant, FEMA reviewed the reports, frequently participated in
discussions with KAT representatives, attended regular quarterly
management meetings with KAT members, and provided technical guidance
to KAT personnel. FEMA discussed challenges to implementing KAT with
UMCOR, but believed it was beyond the scope of its authority to ensure
that all aspects of the grant proposal were carried out. For example,
the grant proposal stated that UMCOR would initiate or support the
formation of long-term recovery committees, and representatives from
KAT agencies would participate. According to case management agencies,
these committees did not always operate effectively. While FEMA
officials were aware of this challenge, the agency did not believe it
had authority to take action.
Similarly, FEMA relied on the procedures specified in the approved
grant proposal for obtaining information on clients. The grant proposal
stipulated that KAT case management agencies would utilize the
Coordinated Assistance Network database to input case management data
and to provide for easy transfer of information between agencies. The
Coordinated Assistance Network[Footnote 25]--initiated and developed by
charitable disaster response organizations--is the national database
used to coordinate and manage service delivery for disaster relief
organizations, including KAT partners. According to KAT guidance, it is
a tool for sharing referral information and services, storing client
information, and transferring clients between partners without
interruption to service. This database is also used to extract client
information, case management services provided, needs, recovery plan
outcomes, information on case closings, and demographic information for
reports and evaluation purposes. KAT selected the Coordinated
Assistance Network as the database for coordinating case management
services and reporting on outcomes and indicators.
Data from the Coordinated Assistance Network database provided limited
information on overall program outcomes for KAT clients, in part
because the extent to which data were consistently entered into the
system varied, but recent changes will help case management agencies
use the database more consistently in the future. UMCOR provided FEMA
with quarterly reports from KAT that contained data generated from the
Coordinated Assistance Network, but FEMA did not assess the
completeness or reliability of the data because government agencies are
not permitted to access the database.[Footnote 26] In addition, because
the Coordinated Assistance Network does not receive federal funds, FEMA
had no authority to audit the system, according to a FEMA official.
According to a third party evaluation of KAT, many KAT staff and
external stakeholders stated the Coordinated Assistance Network
database was successful in helping agencies communicate with one
another, track resources, and generate progress reports. However, data
on certain variables were missing for a large number of clients because
users of the system did not consistently enter complete information. As
a result, the database is of limited use in understanding outcomes of
the program as a whole such as the frequency of certain client needs
and the extent to which those needs were met. Representatives of the
Coordinated Assistance Network told us that changes have since been
made to the database to help case management agencies enter data more
consistently, which may help track outcomes in the future.[Footnote 27]
For example, according to the representatives, the database now has the
capability to require entry in certain data fields.
As recovery continued and FEMA's role in funding disaster case
management became explicit, FEMA and HUD used various methods--such as
reviewing disaster case management data, conducting site visits, and
providing technical support--to oversee later disaster case management
programs. FEMA reviewed reports from the Mississippi state agency that
administered the state-managed DCM-P program. The Mississippi state
agency was required to report to FEMA on a quarterly basis on all
state- managed DCM-P program activities and costs, and include a
narrative summary of the program's status, accomplishments, and
challenges. In addition, FEMA assigned a DCM-P coordinator to
Mississippi to provide coordination and technical assistance. FEMA
reviewed the quarterly reports and conducted site visits. FEMA's DCM-P
program also provided funding for monitoring staff, which were
responsible for testing data reliability, according to a FEMA official.
To monitor the implementation of DHAP, HUD produced weekly reports from
its case management database and hired a contractor to monitor and
provide technical assistance to DHAP grantees, according to HUD
officials. The contractor also reviewed data quality and followed up
with DHAP grantees on the case management program, irregularities in
DHAP reports, and any implementation challenges. HUD also established
monitoring tasks for DHAP grantees based on caseloads, as well as
scores on various key processes and output and outcome metrics.
Challenges to Coordination Among Federal Agencies and Case Management
Agencies Contributed to Implementation Difficulties:
Federal agencies and case management agencies faced challenges in
following key practices for coordination in delivering disaster case
management services. In previous work, GAO has identified key practices
to enhance and sustain coordination among federal agencies,[Footnote
28] and has since recommended these same key practices to strengthen
partnerships between government and nonprofit organizations.[Footnote
29] Key practices for coordination include establishing mutually
reinforcing or joint strategies and compatible policies, procedures,
and other means of operating across agency boundaries. While FEMA had a
lead role in coordinating other types of disaster assistance after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, their role for coordinating disaster case
management was not explicit. Initial coordination activities among
federal agencies and case management providers were minimal following
the hurricanes. As a result, some victims may not have received case
management services while others may have received services from
multiple providers. Challenges faced by federal agencies and case
management providers in following key practices for coordination may
provide lessons for disaster case management services in future
disasters.
Lack of Accurate and Timely Information Sharing:
Difficulties in coordinating disaster case management services resulted
in a lack of accurate and timely information sharing between federal
agencies and case management providers. State and local agencies
providing federally funded disaster case management services faced
challenges in obtaining timely and accurate information from the
federal agencies overseeing the programs. For example, the Mississippi
state agency administering the FEMA state-managed DCM-P program faced
challenges receiving complete and accurate information from FEMA.
According to officials in Mississippi who managed the program, FEMA
provided clients' names with addresses or phone numbers, but these were
often invalid or out-of-date. According to a FEMA official, FEMA has no
method for tracking clients, and clients voluntarily contact FEMA to
provide updated information. Program managers reported that case
management providers in Mississippi were unable to contact more than
1,000 clients, out of a total of more than 5,000 clients, due to
disconnected phone numbers or incorrect addresses. According to the
FEMA official, FEMA's information sharing policies under the Privacy
Act precluded the agency from providing registration numbers that would
have allowed the agency to match cases with clients served through
previous programs and more easily identify and contact eligible
individuals.[Footnote 30] While FEMA attempted to update information on
these clients, a FEMA official told us the work was time consuming
because client contact information could be stored in various FEMA
databases. In addition, officials from a public housing authority in
Mississippi told us they were notified by HUD that they would receive
DHAP clients only 5 days prior to the deadline for processing housing
assistance payments for the clients, which was a difficult timeframe to
meet.[Footnote 31]
In addition, some case management providers faced difficulties in
obtaining information from FEMA that may have facilitated the
coordination of service delivery. To protect the privacy of disaster
victims, FEMA shared limited client information, potentially resulting
in some eligible hurricane victims not receiving services. For example,
according to an official of a case management agency operating in
Louisiana and an HHS official, FEMA approached HHS about serving some
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita under its pilot disaster case
management program for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. The potential clients
were residing in FEMA-provided travel trailers and mobile homes but may
not have been receiving case management services because the state-
managed pilot program never became operational in Louisiana. However,
when the case management agency implementing the HHS pilot requested
client information from FEMA to determine whether it was already
serving any of these disaster victims and to assess its capacity to
serve additional clients, FEMA only provided aggregate data on the
number of mobile homes and travel trailers in each parish. The case
management agency found this information unusable.[Footnote 32]
According to FEMA officials, its routine use policy specifies that for
an organization to obtain client-level information, it must indicate a
specific service it intends to provide to the disaster victims for
which information is requested. As FEMA officials explained to us, such
a request for client-level information from the case management agency
implementing the HHS pilot would have been denied based on this policy.
Incompatible Databases:
Many of the databases used by case management agencies--including those
used by KAT, LFRC, and agencies that provided case management services
under DHAP--were not compatible, leading to confusion regarding the
services clients may have received. As GAO has reported, to facilitate
coordination, agencies need to address the compatibility of data
systems to operate across agency boundaries.[Footnote 33] The
incompatibility of the databases made it difficult to track clients
across agencies, and some hurricane victims who applied to more than
one program may have received duplicate services. For example, clients
who received case management services through KAT may have also
received services through LFRC, but because the KAT and LFRC
databases--the Coordinated Assistance Network database and
ServicePoint, respectively--are not compatible, some case management
agencies for these two programs may not have be able to screen for
duplication of services.[Footnote 34]
While case management agencies that operated under KAT and FEMA's
state-managed DCM-P program used the Coordinated Assistance Network
database in an effort to facilitate consistent data collection across
case management agencies and to report information on their programs,
government agencies could not access the system, creating
inefficiencies. The database, which offers tools for case management,
allows disaster relief organizations to communicate about clients'
needs and services offered. However, because government agencies
administering case management programs are not given access to the
system, officials from Mississippi who administer FEMA's state-managed
DCM-P program told us they had to incorporate a nonprofit agency as an
intermediary in its management structure to access and collect data for
the state to report to FEMA. The Mississippi DCM-P program officials
considered this process inefficient.
Inconsistent Outreach:
Many case management agencies conducted little coordinated outreach, if
any, and as a result, those most in need of case management--such as
those residing in FEMA group trailer sites--may not have received
services. GAO has reported that to achieve a common outcome, partner
agencies need to establish strategies that work in concert or are joint
in nature to help align their activities and resources.[Footnote 35]
Case management agencies we spoke to acknowledged that victims residing
in FEMA group sites needed a range of services and may have been those
most in need. In addition, we previously reported that FEMA officials
said that those who remained in group sites were the hardest to serve
people including the elderly, persons with disabilities, and unemployed
people.[Footnote 36] According to LFRC officials, there was no
coordinated approach for providing case management services among
federally funded programs, and without a coordinated approach to case
management, residents in these group sites may not have received needed
case management. According to a KAT official, KAT case management
agencies were not required to conduct outreach to residents in FEMA
group sites. In addition, we have previously reported that federal
efforts to assist victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita with
employment, services for families with children, and transportation
generally did not target group site residents.[Footnote 37] FEMA's
state-managed DCM-P program specifically targeted those in FEMA-funded
temporary housing, including group sites. However, in Mississippi, for
example, FEMA's housing advisors[Footnote 38] were not always aware of
FEMA's DCM-P program, and this lack of coordination led to confusion
and frustration among FEMA housing advisors, case managers, and
clients, according to Mississippi officials.
Case Management Agencies Experienced a Range of Service-Delivery
Challenges, and As A Result, Those Most in Need of Services May Not
Have Been Helped:
Staff Turnover and Large Caseloads Were Barriers to Meeting Clients'
Needs:
According to various sources, some case management agencies experienced
high turnover in case managers, which made it difficult to meet
clients' needs. For example, one case management agency reported 100
percent turnover in its case managers during the KAT program. An
official at this agency said turnover was high because case managers
expected a short-term assignment or found the work too emotionally
draining. While KAT partners tried to reduce staff turnover through
incentive systems such as flex time and bonuses and through staff
meetings to determine how best to share resources to support case
managers, according to a KAT summary of its quarterly reports, the
retention of case managers was an ongoing challenge for maintaining the
capacity to serve clients. Similarly, an evaluation of LFRC showed
that, in one focus group, six out of nine participants did not know who
their current case manager was because of staff changes; others
described their replacement case managers as lacking knowledge about
available resources.[Footnote 39]
Caseloads were generally significantly higher than suggested by program
guidance for earlier programs, which adversely affected the assistance
provided to clients. KAT guidance suggested that one case manager could
handle an average of 20 to 30 cases, and LFRC caseloads were to be
limited to 25 clients; however, several case management agencies we
spoke with that operated under these programs reporter much higher
caseloads. For example, some KAT case managers said they had 40 open
cases at a time, while other KAT case managers said caseloads were as
high as 300 clients per case manager. KAT's summary of its quarterly
reports also states that senior management became concerned that new
cases were not being opened fast enough and agreed that the pace needed
to be accelerated despite case managers' already high caseloads. In
addition to KAT, LFRC case management agencies also reported having
heavy caseloads; for example, case managers at one LFRC partner agency
reported caseloads ranging from 60 to 100 clients. Several factors may
have contributed to high caseloads including the magnitude of the
disaster and a shortage of case managers. Multiple case management
agencies said the number of hurricane victims outnumbered case manager
capacity, and some case management agencies had to turn clients away or
had waiting lists as a result. For victims who did receive services,
case managers may not have been able to build more personal
relationships to fully understand clients' recovery needs in order to
provide assistance. Case management agencies operating under later
programs such as DHAP and the Mississippi DCM-P program have not
exceeded required caseload sizes of 50 and 25 cases, respectively.
According to a Mississippi DCM-P official, this is because staffing for
the program was based on a fixed number of clients.
Clients Had Multiple Needs Including Housing, Employment, and
Transportation; However, These Community Resources Were Limited:
Case managers said one of the main needs of clients was and continues
to be housing; however, housing resources have been limited following
the hurricanes. According to program data, approximately 67 percent of
KAT clients were displaced from their primary residence as a result of
Hurricane Katrina. As GAO previously reported, Hurricane Katrina
destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes,[Footnote
40] and more than 82,000 rental housing units in Louisiana and more
than 20,000 rental housing units in Mississippi had major or severe
damage following the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, according to statewide
HUD data.[Footnote 41] We previously reported that under HUD's
Community Development Block Grant program--a key program providing
federal funds to rebuild housing in Louisiana and Mississippi--the
states have used the majority of funding to assist homeowners rather
than renters. For example, while Louisiana allocated $8 billion of
$10.4 billion in Community Development Block Grant funding to establish
the Road Home program to help homeowners rebuild, $1.7 of the $10.4
billion went to rental, low-income housing, and other related housing
projects. Further, for the Road Home program, Louisiana estimated a
$2.9 to $5 billion shortfall in funding to help homeowners.[Footnote
42] In addition, we reported that through the Gulf Opportunity Zone
Act, which provided low-income housing tax credits to help finance the
development of rental housing, only 17 percent of the rental housing
units with major or severe damage in the state of Louisiana, and 45
percent of the similarly damaged units in the state of Mississippi,
would be addressed.[Footnote 43] The limited availability of housing
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has made it difficult to help
some clients with their recovery needs. For example, HUD officials
estimate that approximately 12,000 former DHAP clients may need and be
eligible for long-term housing assistance through the Housing Choice
Voucher program.[Footnote 44] HUD is in the process of transitioning
families to this program.
Case managers said that client needs also included employment and
transportation, but these community resources were limited. According
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, between August 2005 and August 2006,
almost 128,000 jobs were lost in eight areas of Louisiana and
Mississippi that were heavily affected by Hurricane Katrina. In
addition, an Urban Institute report stated that several hundred
thousand former residents of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast lost their
jobs as a result of Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 45] Despite some job
recovery since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, some DHAP case managers
recently stated that employment was still a common need among their
clients. We previously reported that transportation services can
provide a vital link to other services and employment for displaced
persons;[Footnote 46] yet multiple sources stated that clients,
particularly those living in FEMA group sites, needed transportation
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, case management
officials said lack of access to transportation made it difficult to
connect clients living in remote group sites to services such as
employment, education, and child care.[Footnote 47] Federal agencies
developed the LA Moves program to provide free, statewide transit
service for residents in Louisiana group sites; however, LA Moves
service was limited to FEMA defined "essential services," specifically,
banks, grocery stores, and pharmacies and did not include
transportation to welfare-to-work sites, employment, and human and
medical services.[Footnote 48] Data from KAT and DHAP indicated the
types of resources clients needed to aid in their recovery (see figure
2).
Figure 2: Most to Least Frequently Occurring Client Need by Disaster
Case Management Program:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The following lists are prioritized by level of need from most frequent
to least frequent.
KAT:
Housing;
Furniture and appliances;
Health and well being;
Utilities and services;
Food and nutrition;
Employment and job training;
Clothing;
Transportation;
Financial assistance;
Application assistance;
Children and youth services;
Aged and disability services;
Benefits restoration;
Legal assistance;
Language assistance.
DHAP:
Employment and job training;
Health and well being;
Housing;
Financial assistance;
Transportation;
Application assistance and benefits restoration; Household items
(including clothing and furniture); Food and nutrition;
Aged and disability services;
Utilities and services;
Children and youth services;
Legal assistance;
Language assistance.
Source: GAO analysis of program data.
Note: KAT program data included predefined categories of need. For the
DHAP program, we analyzed needs assessment data for those clients with
a completed needs assessment and combined variables to create
categories comparable to KAT. The DHAP needs assessment did not include
individual questions for application assistance, benefits restoration,
furniture and appliances, or clothing; as a result, the KAT and DHAP
categories are not a one-to-one match.
[End of figure]
Case Managers Faced Challenges in Meeting Client Needs Due to Federal
Funding Rules on Direct Assistance and Difficulties in Accessing Needed
Resources Through the Long-Term Recovery Committee Process:
Case management agencies saw the ability to provide direct financial
assistance for items such as home repairs, clothing, or furniture as
key to helping clients with their basic needs; yet such assistance was
not always available. An official from a case management umbrella
organization said without direct service funds, short-term needs
ultimately can become long-term issues because individuals have to rely
on the social service system to fulfill their needs and may become
dependent on government assistance rather than becoming self
sufficient. For example, a family might come into a case management
program with a need for money to fix their roof, but they may not
qualify for government assistance outside of disaster case management
to repair their home. Direct assistance funds to repair their roof
might help them stay on track, but if these funds are unavailable, the
family could require long-term housing assistance at a much greater
cost. In addition, case management officials said that referrals to
other resources were not always available or had waiting lists. For
example, an official administering the FEMA state-managed DCM-P program
in Mississippi said there were minimal resources available for clients
to obtain assistance for needs such as rental and utility deposits. In
addition, according to an Urban Institute report, many nonprofit social
service organizations that existed before the storms were no longer
operating while others may not have been able to operate at their
previous capacity due to sustained damage.[Footnote 49]
Depending on the funding source, some case management agencies could
provide direct assistance to clients while others could not. Using
emergency TANF and SSBG funds provided by HHS through the state of
Louisiana, LFRC case management agencies were allowed to give up to
$3500 in financial assistance to a client. LFRC stipulated in contracts
with its case management agencies the types of goods and services
allowed as direct assistance, such as living accommodations and
transportation. However, according to an evaluation of LFRC, the case
management agencies did not have a shared understanding about how funds
could be used, which affected a client's ability to access needed
items. For example, some LFRC case management agencies allowed case
managers to provide funds for medical costs or labor and material costs
to rebuild homes, whereas other LFRC case management agencies did not.
[Footnote 50] Case management agencies that were part of KAT were not
allowed to use dollars from international donations distributed by FEMA
on direct assistance to clients. However, KAT case management agencies
could refer clients to other organizations or use private funds to
provide direct assistance to clients. Case management agencies
providing services under FEMA-funded programs, including the state-
managed DCM-P program in Mississippi and the DHAP program, could not
provide direct assistance. According to a FEMA official, direct
assistance was not part of these programs because FEMA already provided
direct service funding through the Individual and Households Program.
The maximum amount that an individual or household may receive through
the Housing Assistance and Other Needs Assistance programs within the
Individual and Households Program is statutorily capped at $25,000,
[Footnote 51] adjusted annually to reflect changes in the Consumer
Price Index.[Footnote 52] In addition, there are caps on the amount
of assistance that can be provided to individuals and households for
some items within these programs. For example, FEMA can provide up to
$5,000, also adjusted annually, for home repair assistance. According
to case management officials, not all clients qualify for the maximum
amount of assistance available through the Individual and Households
Program, and a FEMA official noted that the maximum amount may not be
enough to meet all disaster-related needs.
According to case managers, the different funding rules on direct
assistance resulted in clients "shopping around" for services. Case
managers we spoke with stated that some clients went to more than one
agency for services to find one that could provide direct assistance,
particularly in Louisiana where multiple agencies were providing
disaster case management at the same time in the same communities.
Since disaster case management programs used different and incompatible
databases to record client information, some clients likely received
duplicate services since case managers could not track clients across
programs. As a result, some hurricane victims may have gone through the
intake process more than once with different case managers affiliated
with different case management programs, creating additional work for
case managers with already high caseloads and preventing them from
helping other victims who had not yet received assistance.
While long-term recovery committees were a resource for case managers
to obtain direct assistance to address clients' unmet needs, in some
cases, utilizing these committees was unsuccessful. Some committees
were unable to help clients since the member agencies were depleted of
goods or donations to pass on to clients. In addition, case managers
also cited challenges in the process of working with these committees.
For example, a third-party evaluation of the KAT program[Footnote 53]
and officials at one case management agency we interviewed stated that
cases received intense scrutiny from committee members, which left case
managers intimidated and humiliated. Further, the evaluation of the KAT
program indicated there was confusion associated with the long-term
recovery committee process because there may have been multiple
committees operating in the same area. For example, according to a case
management official, if there were several committees in the same
county, case managers did not know whether they had to present their
cases to each committee individually.[Footnote 54] Case management
officials we interviewed also said long-term recovery committees were
organized differently. For example, one case management official said
some committees combined money from all organizations and used the
pooled money to assist clients while other committees did not combine
funds; without one common funding source, clients could receive
assistance from multiple organizations in the same committee, but they
did not always receive money in a timely matter since they had to wait
on checks from multiple sources.
Case Managers Said that Program Eligibility Requirements Were a Barrier
to Providing Disaster Case Management Services:
Eligibility requirements to receive disaster case management services
also varied depending on the funding source. Federal funds provided by
FEMA for KAT could only be used for victims of Hurricane Katrina, even
though a portion of the disaster affected area included victims of
Hurricane Rita as well.[Footnote 55] LFRC officials said they could not
help other hurricane victims such as the elderly residents in FEMA
trailer sites because the emergency TANF funds they used restricted
their agencies to serving families with children. LFRC eventually
received SSBG funds that were not restricted to families with children,
which widened eligibility for disaster case management assistance.
However, according to an evaluation of the LFRC case management
program, expansion of client eligibility was not clearly communicated
outside of LFRC, and key stakeholders were not aware that services were
available to a wider population; these stakeholders identified this as
a shortcoming of the program.[Footnote 56]
Eligibility guidelines that restricted disaster case management
programs to serving those residing in FEMA temporary housing or
receiving FEMA housing assistance may have prevented some programs from
assisting other individuals or families in need of case management
services. Case managers at an agency in Mississippi said they were
aware of at least 200 households who needed assistance but were not
eligible for services through the FEMA state-managed DCM-P program
because they were not in FEMA housing. In addition, officials at a case
management provider in Louisiana said there were thousands of families
deemed ineligible for FEMA's Louisiana DCM-P program that would have
benefited from disaster case management. Data are not available to
determine whether ineligible individuals ultimately received services.
FEMA Plans to Use Evaluations of Pilot Programs to Inform the
Development of a Federal Disaster Case Management Program for Future
Disasters; However, Some Evaluations Have Limitations:
FEMA and other agencies are conducting evaluations of disaster case
management pilot programs. FEMA hired a contractor to evaluate the
implementation of two FEMA-funded programs--the state-managed DCM-P
program in Mississippi and Louisiana and the HHS disaster case
management pilot program for victims of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. The
contractor will submit its evaluation to FEMA by June 30, 2009. In
addition, a FEMA official said the contractor will likely evaluate, at
a later date, the disaster case management portion of the DHAP programs
for victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav and Ike and a DCM-P
program in Texas. In addition to FEMA's evaluation of their programs,
HHS provided FEMA with an evaluation of the disaster case management
pilot program it administered. HUD and the agency managing the DCM-P
program in Mississippi will also provide FEMA with evaluations of the
disaster case management pilot programs they administered (see figure
3). These evaluations vary in scope. For example, the Mississippi Case
Management Consortium, the agency managing the Mississippi DCM-P
program, is conducting an evaluation that will adhere to program
guidance and examine whether the targets and objectives of the state-
specific strategies were met. The Consortium will also evaluate
financial and programmatic performance to ensure that appropriate
disaster case management outcomes were provided for clients of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The HUD evaluation of DHAP case management
for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will include, among other
areas, an assessment of implementation challenges and successful case
management activities.[Footnote 57]
Figure 3: Evaluations of Federally Funded Disaster Case Management
Pilot Programs:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Programs evaluated:
Agency conducting evaluation: Federal Emergency Management Agency;
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Mississippi Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: Evaluation planned or in progress;
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Louisiana Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: Evaluation planned or in progress;
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
Evaluation may occur at a later date;
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: HHS Disaster Case Management Pilot Program:
Evaluation planned or in progress;
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: Texas Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: Evaluation may occur at a later date;
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
Evaluation may occur at a later date.
Agency conducting evaluation: Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS);
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Mississippi Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: [Empty];
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Louisiana Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: [Empty];
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
[Empty];
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: HHS Disaster Case Management Pilot Program:
Evaluation complete;
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: Texas Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: [Empty];
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
[Empty].
Agency conducting evaluation: Department of Housing and Urban
Development;
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Mississippi Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: [Empty];
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Louisiana Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: [Empty];
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
Evaluation may occur at a later date;
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: HHS Disaster Case Management Pilot Program:
[Empty];
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: Texas Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: [Empty];
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
Evaluation planned or in progress.
Agency conducting evaluation: Mississippi Case Management Consortium;
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Mississippi Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: Evaluation planned or in progress;
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Louisiana Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: [Empty];
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
[Empty];
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: HHS Disaster Case Management Pilot Program:
[Empty];
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: Texas Disaster Case Management Pilot
Program: [Empty];
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
[Empty].
Source: GAO.
Notes: The agencies listed hired contractors to conduct all, or part,
of the evaluations on their behalf.
The evaluations of the Disaster Housing Assistance Program examine the
case management portion only.
[End of figure]
Neither FEMA's evaluation nor the HHS or HUD evaluations will provide
information on the outcomes of case management services. Unlike an
outcome evaluation, which assesses the extent to which a program
achieved its outcome-oriented objectives, the FEMA and HHS evaluations
are process or implementation evaluations.[Footnote 58] According to
the statement of work for the FEMA evaluation, the contractor will
assess program implementation from the time FEMA funded the programs to
the time case management services began. For example, the contractor
will evaluate whether funds granted were administered within guidelines
and compare the planned costs versus actual costs of the programs.
However, the contractor will not examine program results, such as
whether clients' needs were met and what factors contributed to client
outcomes. A FEMA official said the evaluation only focuses on overall
implementation rather than the provision of services because they
believe the case management process is very similar for all programs.
HHS' evaluation examined the early implementation of the disaster case
management pilot during the first 2 weeks of the program and developed
recommendations regarding this period. According to a HUD official, the
data analysis completed by the contractor conducting the evaluation,
which was intended to provide information on client outcomes, did not
allow HUD to derive substantial conclusions.[Footnote 59] Based on its
evaluation and those already provided by HHS and HUD, FEMA will not
have information on program outcomes for its DCM-P program, the HHS
pilot, or DHAP case management services, which could provide
information on the results of the various programs such as the extent
to which clients' disaster-related needs were met. However, FEMA said
that the agency expects to receive other evaluations of the Mississippi
DCM-P program and HHS pilot that may provide information on individual
program outcomes. Further, these evaluations will provide limited
information to assess the causes and results of challenges we have
identified, including barriers to coordination and information sharing.
In addition, FEMA's evaluation of all of the disaster case management
pilot programs is limited in that stakeholders were not asked to
provide input regarding the evaluation design. According to the
American Evaluation Association's Guiding Principles for Evaluators,
evaluations should include relevant perspectives and interests of the
full range of stakeholders. The statement of work for FEMA's evaluation
required that the contractor consult FEMA and other stakeholders in
identifying performance measures, setting performance standards, and
designing the evaluation. FEMA officials said they contacted HHS
officials early on in the development of the evaluation; however,
officials at HHS and at the case management provider implementing the
HHS pilot said they had no involvement in designing FEMA's evaluation
and had not been contacted to provide input. FEMA officials also stated
that they did not ask other organizations for input on their evaluation
design. As a result, stakeholders that likely had more intimate
knowledge about the programs evaluated by FEMA's contractor were not
able to provide input that may have strengthened the evaluation.
Using information from its evaluation and those from other agencies,
FEMA will develop a model for a federal disaster case management
program for future disasters. However, a FEMA official said FEMA does
not have a time line or goal for developing this program. Establishing
a time line that includes major activities that need to take place and
completion dates for all activities leading up to them can help to
identify potential problems that could arise during program development
and determine whether the time line is realistic and achievable. Until
FEMA develops its disaster case management program, providing federal
funds for disaster case management services will be done on a case-by-
case basis, depending on the magnitude of the disaster. In addition,
while stakeholders were not involved in designing FEMA's program
evaluation, FEMA officials told us they will have stakeholder meetings
when they develop the future federal disaster case management program.
Conclusions:
Federally funded disaster case management programs following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita faced unprecedented challenges, in part because of the
sheer size of the disaster, yet they played a key role in assisting
individuals and families in their recovery and will remain a component
of future disaster recovery efforts. The scarcity of significant
community resources has continued to limit the ability of case
management agencies to make referrals and connect clients to needed
resources. More than 3 years after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita made
landfall on the Gulf Coast, many individuals and families remain in
temporary housing, have yet to regain employment, and continue to need
other services to rebuild their lives.
As the federal government seeks to improve its overall disaster
response, a critical component in doing so is FEMA's development of a
single, federal disaster case management program. However, the time
line for creating this program has not yet been established. Providing
disaster case management services on a case-by-case basis will likely
result in many of the same problems we identified for Hurricane Katrina
and Hurricane Rita programs; however, establishing a single program may
address some of these challenges--such as those related to gaps in
funding and insufficient coordination--and also help ensure that scarce
resources are used effectively. Developing a time line for this program
is critical to help FEMA and other organizations better plan given the
uncertainty of when and how large the next major disaster will be.
Given the magnitude of devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, we recognize the efforts made by multiple federal agencies to
meet the overwhelming need for disaster case management services. But
difficulties in coordinating various stakeholders, both federal and
nonfederal, may provide lessons learned for providing services
following future disasters. FEMA's role for coordinating disaster case
management was not explicit at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
and initial coordination activities among federal agencies and case
management providers were minimal following the hurricanes. This lack
of coordination contributed to a lack of timely information sharing and
uncoordinated outreach, which was exacerbated by incompatible
databases. In addition, absent sufficient coordination, case management
agencies experienced challenges in delivering services. Improving
coordination among federal and nonfederal stakeholders that provide
disaster response and recovery services, such as state governments,
voluntary agencies, and community-based recovery organizations, could
help overcome these challenges and help ensure that those most in need
of services are reached, that federal and state entities and case
management agencies have accurate client information to provide timely
service delivery and avoid duplication of services, and that victims
receive the specific services and assistance required for recovery.
Although significant federal resources were expended to provide
disaster case management services to victims after Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, there remain important gaps in our understanding of how well
these programs worked and what could be done to improve future case
management programs. While existing evaluations will address some of
these gaps, a better understanding of program results--including
whether those most in need received services, client outcomes, factors
that contribute to those outcomes, and the role of specific services
such as direct assistance and long-term recovery committees--may
require further study. It is only by conducting additional evaluations
that not only cover these issues, but also involve all stakeholders and
address limitations of existing data sources, that policymakers will
have the information they need to identify and quantify needs and
develop more effective case management programs for future disasters.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
direct the Administrator of FEMA to take the following three actions:
1. Establish a realistic and achievable time line for designing and
implementing a single, federal disaster case management program for
future disasters.
2. Ensure that the federal disaster case management program FEMA
develops includes practices to enhance and sustain coordination among
federal and nonfederal stakeholders.
3. Conduct an outcome evaluation to determine the results of disaster
case management pilot programs that have assisted victims of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, as well as pilot programs for victims of subsequent
disasters. Such an evaluation will further inform the development of
the federal disaster case management program for future disasters.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to HHS, the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) FEMA, and HUD for review and comments. HHS'
Administration for Children and Families reviewed the report on behalf
of the department and provided a technical comment, which we
incorporated into the report. FEMA provided comments that are
reproduced in appendix II. HUD's Office of Public and Indian Housing
provided comments on behalf of the department that are reproduced in
appendix III.
FEMA agreed with our recommendations and is taking steps to address
them. FEMA said the agency is actively pursuing all program development
requirements for the single, federal disaster case management program,
and once those requirements are identified, will create a work plan to
assist in addressing the challenges GAO identified and to establish a
time line for developing the program. FEMA also stated that it will
coordinate with stakeholders to ensure that the future program includes
practices to enhance or sustain coordination by establishing a disaster
case management program team with HHS that will develop plans for the
future program. In addition, FEMA said it will host stakeholder
meetings to discuss the results of the evaluations of disaster case
management pilot programs and long-range program planning. Further,
FEMA said it is modifying its existing evaluation of disaster case
management pilot programs to include a detailed review of the results
of the independent evaluations of the pilot programs and to also
evaluate the Texas DCM-P program and the case management portion of
DHAP. However, we continue to believe FEMA should conduct an outcome
evaluation to determine the results of disaster case management pilot
programs; such an evaluation would assess whether those most in need
received services, client outcomes, factors that contribute to those
outcomes, and the role of specific services such as direct assistance
and long-term recovery committees. FEMA also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
HUD generally agreed with our recommendations but requested that our
recommendation to include practices to enhance and sustain coordination
in the new federal disaster case management program include additional
detail about the role of HUD. However, we did not revise our
recommendation as HUD's role in disaster case management remains
unknown pending FEMA's development of this program. Regarding our
report findings, HUD disagreed with our characterization of the
department's monitoring of disaster case management services after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We revised the report to better reflect
HUD's efforts in this area. Further, HUD provided additional
information on its efforts to evaluate the case management portion of
DHAP for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and for victims of
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, as well as its efforts to collect
qualitative information during its evaluation process. We also
incorporated this information in the report. HUD provided additional
comments to enhance or clarify information in the report, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate
congressional committees, HHS, the Department of Homeland Security,
HUD, and other interested parties. The report will also be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownke@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Kay Brown:
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) what steps the
federal government took to support disaster case management programs
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, (2) how federal agencies oversaw the
implementation of these disaster case management programs, (3) the
challenges case management agencies experienced in delivering disaster
case management services under federally funded programs, and (4) how
previous or existing federally funded disaster case management programs
will be used to inform the development of a federal case management
program for future disasters.
For our study, we limited our review of federally funded disaster case
management programs to Louisiana and Mississippi as these were the
states most directly affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and we
conducted site visits to Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana; and
Biloxi, Gulfport, Moss Point, Jackson, and Pascagoula, Mississippi. To
inform our findings, we interviewed federal agencies and state
government agencies involved in disaster case management, case
management providers, and academic organizations. See table 1 for a
comprehensive list of the organizations we interviewed. We conducted
these interviews in person or by phone. We focused our interviews on
disaster case management providers who served clients in Louisiana and
Mississippi and selected interviewees to ensure that we spoke to
representatives from a range of appropriate organizations serving
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We spoke to the majority of
disaster case management providers in both states for the Katrina Aid
Today (KAT) program, selected providers in both states for the Disaster
Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), and selected providers for the
state- managed Disaster Case Management pilot program in Mississippi.
We did not interview disaster case management providers who served
victims that relocated to other states. The views of the disaster case
management providers we spoke with cannot be generalized to all
disaster case management organizations that served victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Table 1: List of Organizations Interviewed:
Federal agencies:
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD); Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA); Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding.
State agencies: Louisiana;
Department of Social Services;
Louisiana Recovery Authority.
State agencies: Mississippi;
Department of Human Services;
Governor's Office of Recovery and Renewal;
Mississippi Commission on Volunteer Services.
Case management providers: National level;
Catholic Charities USA;
Katrina Aid Today;
United Methodist Committee on Relief.
Case management providers: By state; Louisiana;
Advocacy Center Louisiana;
Catholic Charities, Baton Rouge;
Catholic Charities, New Orleans;
DHAP Greater New Orleans;
Greater New Orleans Disaster Recovery Partnership;
Jefferson Parish Housing Authority;
Louisiana Family Recovery Corps;
Salvation Army, New Orleans;
St. Vincent de Paul, Baton Rouge;
Volunteers of America, New Orleans.
Case management providers: By state; Mississippi;
Biloxi Housing Authority;
Boat People SOS;
Catholic Charities, Biloxi;
International Relief and Development;
Jackson County Civic Action Committee;
Lutheran Episcopal Services Ministry;
Mississippi Case Management Consortium;
Mississippi Protection and Advocacy Agency;
Mississippi Regional Housing Authority VI; Pilgrim Rest;
Recover, Rebuild, Restore Southeast Mississippi;
Salvation Army, Jackson.
Academic organizations:
Louisiana State University;
The Urban Institute.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To determine what steps the federal government took to support disaster
case management programs after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we reviewed
the roles and responsibilities of the federal government for disaster
recovery services. We also reviewed federal laws, regulations, and
guidance related to the federally funded disaster case management
programs established to assist victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
including the federal government's authority to establish or fund post-
disaster case management programs. We interviewed officials from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), as FEMA and HHS funds were used for disaster case
management programs to assist victims of Hurricanes of Katrina and
Rita, and HUD administered one of these programs. We also interviewed
disaster case management providers to determine what impact breaks in
federal funding had on their agencies and on the disaster victims.
To determine how federal agencies oversaw the implementation of
federally funded disaster case management programs, we reviewed program
guidance for federally funded disaster case management programs for
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and interviewed officials from
FEMA and HUD regarding their oversight responsibilities, including
their review of disaster case management data. We also analyzed the
reliability and completeness of data on KAT clients from the
Coordinated Assistance Network database, and we spoke to officials who
were knowledgeable about the database. We reviewed FEMA's National
Response Plan and National Response Framework to determine what role
the federal government had in coordinating the delivery of human
services following a disaster. We also reviewed previous GAO work to
identify best practices for coordination among federal agencies,
practices to sustain coordination, and the importance of information
sharing. We interviewed officials from federal agencies and case
management providers to determine whether they adhered to best
practices and what challenges they faced in coordinating and sharing
information.
To determine what challenges case management agencies experienced in
delivering federally funded disaster case management services, we
conducted a content analysis of interviews with federal agencies, case
management providers, and academic organizations regarding disaster
case management services for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Some interviews were conducted by other GAO teams doing work related to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Through an iterative process we developed
a general list of challenges, grouped them, and assigned them a
specific category of challenge such as agency resource constraint or
community resource constraint. We reported on commonly identified
challenges and provided relevant examples of each. We also reviewed
evaluations of the federally funded disaster case management programs,
relevant federal laws, and previous GAO work to support our findings.
In addition, to obtain information on the needs of disaster case
management clients, we obtained summary level data on KAT clients from
the Coordinated Assistance Network database maintained by the American
Red Cross, and we received record-level data on DHAP case management
clients from HUD's Tracking-at-a-Glance database. To assess the
reliability of the data needed to address this objective, we checked
the data for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, reviewed
existing information about these data, and interviewed officials
knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data we used for
this objective were sufficiently reliable.
To determine how previous or existing federally funded case management
programs will be used to inform the development of a federal case
management program for future disasters, we interviewed officials from
FEMA, HUD, HHS, and case management providers regarding the evaluations
of disaster case management programs. We also spoke with officials from
the contractor hired by FEMA for its evaluation of disaster case
management pilot programs. We reviewed documentation, such as program
guidance and statements of work on agencies' evaluations of disaster
case management programs.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 to July 2009, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
June 22, 2009:
Kay E. Brown, Director:
Education, Workforce,and Income Security Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548
Dear Ms. Brown:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report GAO-09-561
"Disaster Assistance: Greater Coordination and an Evaluation of
Programs' Outcomes Could Improve Disaster Case Management." The
Department of Homeland Security appreciates the work in planning and
conducting and issuing this report.
The following is our response to the recommendations.
Recommendation: Create a timeline for the establishment of the Disaster
Case Management (DCM) Program.
Response: Concur. The report states that FEMA should create a timeline
for the establishment of the DCM Program. Even prior to the GAO's draft
report, FEMA's program office has been working closely with the FEMA
Grant Programs Directorate and Office of Chief Counsel to actively
pursue all program development requirements. Once those requirements
are identified, FEMA will create a program development work plan to
assist in addressing the challenges identified in the draft report and
identify a timeline for the establishment of the DCM Program.
Recommendation: Ensure that the program includes practices to enhance
and sustain coordination among federal and nonfederal stakeholders.
Response: Concur. In regards to ensuring that the DCM Program includes
practices to enhance and sustain coordination among federal and non-
federal stakeholders, FEMA is working closely with the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services' Administration for Children and Families
(ACF) to establish a DCM Program management team. The team intends to
meet bi-weekly to further develop plans for a proposed DCM Program
model that is a hybrid between the FEMA State-managed DCMP and the
pilot implemented by ACF. Additionally, once evaluation results from
each pilot are completed, FEMA intends to host DCM stakeholder
meetings, with both federal and non-federal partners, to discuss the
pilot evaluation results and long range program planning.
Recommendation: Conduct an outcome evaluation to determine the results
of the DCM-P Programs that have assisted victims of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita as well as pilot programs for victims of subsequent disasters.
Response: Concur. FEMA is working to complete all appropriate
documentation to modify the existing DCM-P evaluation project. The
modification includes a detailed review of the evaluation results
collected by each DCM-P. In addition, the modification will expand to
include an evaluation of the Texas DCM-P and the U.S. Housing and Urban
Development's Disaster Housing Assistance Program's case management
component. It is also FEMA's intent that the pilot evaluation project
will establish common data collection points for future reporting and
provide FEMA with evaluation tools that will become the standard data
collection information for the DCM Program.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments to the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development:
U.S. Department Of Housing And Urban Development: Office Of Public And
Indian Housing:
Washington, DC 20410-5000:
[hyperlink, http://www.hud.gov]
[hyperlink, http://www.espanol.hud.gov]
June 2, 2009:
Ms. Kay E. Brown:
Director:
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Brown:
The Office of Public and Indian Housing has reviewed the draft report
on Disaster Assistance: Greater Coordination and an Evaluation of
Programs' Outcomes Could Improve Disaster Case Management (GAO-09-561).
Enclosed are my written comments concerning your report.
Please contact Tony Hebert at (202) 402-7387, if you have any
questions.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Deborah Hernand, for:
Paula O. Blunt:
General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing:
Enclosure:
[End of letter]
Office of Public Housing and Voucher Programs: Disaster Housing
Programs:
Comments on GAO 09-561:
1. Highlights Page: The second paragraph states that HUD's initial
monitoring of case management services was limited. The Department
disagrees with this characterization. HUD closely monitored grantees
throughout the duration of case management services under the Disaster
Housing Assistance Program - Katrina/Gustav (DHAP-Katrina). Programs
were monitored through a case management tracking system, program
assessments, on-site monitoring visits and on-site training visits.
Monitoring was done by HUD headquarters staff, HUD field staff, and
HUD's case management contractor. The case management contractor
provided technical assistance staff for both on-site and remote
monitoring of grantees across the entire DHAP-Katrina portfolio. In
addition, contract staff based in Gulf Coast states conducted regular
on-site monitoring across large and low performing grantees,
particularly at the front end of the program to ensure that grantees
were effectively implementing case management programs. GAO indicates
that HUD and FEMA both provided only minimal initial monitoring, yet in
subsequent sentences GAO states that HUD provided additional
monitoring. The statements in this section regarding HUD's monitoring
efforts are inconsistent with other information provided by GAO within
the report and HUD's standard operating procedures under DHAP-Katrina.
2. Highlights Page Recommendation: GAO recommends that FEMA "evaluate
outcomes of disaster case management pilot programs to inform the
development of this program." The U.S. Department of the Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) agrees in part with this recommendation and
will investigate the effectiveness of its case management to date as
part of a study of DHAP. HUD's Office of Policy Development and
Research (PD&R) is conducting a Disaster Housing Assistance Program
(DHAP) Incremental Rent Transition Study. This study will compare
families transitioning from stepped-up rents (i.e., Phase I families)
and $0 rent (i.e., Phase II/Phase III families) to market rate or
assisted housing and measure their outcomes over time. This Information
Collection would enable the Department to answer the question of how do
you transition people most effectively from rental assistance to market
rate housing after a disaster. Additionally, since DHAP differs from
the regular Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, this study will
enable HUD to see if DHAP vouchers and their differential rents are
having a different effect on housing, employment, education, health,
and other outcomes after DHAP ends February 28, 2009. See Notice of
Submission of Proposed Information Collection to OMB, FR-5187-N-69.
Further, the report provides recommendations for FEMA, but doesn't
provide adequate details on the recommendation for coordination of
other stakeholders such as HUD and HHS with FEMA. It would be
informative for HUD if the report were revised to provide specific
desired outcomes for HUD in disaster planning as it relates to the
challenges described in the report.
3. Page 9, Paragraph 3: The Mississippi Case Management Consortium
(MCMC) under FEMA's DCM-P only provided case management services to
DHAP-Katrina families newly referred after August 5, 2008 in the state
of Mississippi. The total number of DHAP-Katrina families served by the
MCMC through the DCM-P in Mississippi was 459 families. This paragraph
overstates the role MCMC played in providing case management services
to DHAP-Katrina families.
4. Page 9, Paragraph 3: GAO states that most DHAP-Katrina clients will
receive rental assistance under the DHAP-Katrina Transitional Closeout
Plan through August 31, 2009. While rental assistance will be provided
until August 2009, not all families will receive this assistance
through the end of the closeout program. Many families will convert to
the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program through HUD's DHAP to HCV
conversion process. Others will transition off of the program through
HUD's Incremental Rent Transition (IRT). Under this process, the amount
of housing assistance provided to each family is reduced by $100 each
month. If at any point the housing assistance payment is zero, the
family transitions off of the program. Since the start of the DHAP-
Katrina Transitional Closeout Plan, thousands of families have either
converted to the HCV program or transitioned off of DHAP assistance
through the IRT process.
5. Page 11 (sub-title) and Page 13, Paragraph 2: HUD's approach to
monitoring DHAP-Katrina sites focused on intensive initial monitoring
of all sites to ensure proper implementation and follow-up monitoring
with large and low performing sites over the life of the program. The
data reported by DHAP-Katrina grantees through the case management
tracking software (Tracking-at-a-Glance) allowed HUD to develop program
assessments which enabled the Department to target both technical
assistance and monitoring to low performing sites. HUD's monitoring of
case management programs under DHAP-Katrina was both strategic and
sustained. In addition, the Department organized roundtable discussions
and regional training sessions in Louisiana and Texas to provide
program updates, policy reviews, and additional technical assistance.
Ongoing training was also provided for case managers through a variety
of methods: on-site, telephone, webinars, and via email until the end
of the program.
6. Page 14, Paragraph 2 and Page 15, Paragraph 1: GAO states that a
Mississippi housing agency received short notice to process housing
payments for DHAP-Katrina clients. Under the standard DHAP-Katrina
protocols for Phase I and Phase 11 families, DHAP-Katrina grantees had
ample time to process a family and make housing assistance payments by
the lease effective date of the Disaster Rent Subsidy Contract (DRSC).
For Phase III families, housing agencies were provided completed DHAP
participant packets, and the agency merely had to process the housing
payment. If the housing authority received the packet at a time that
made it difficult to make a rental payment based on the agency schedule
or lease effective date, the landlord was made well aware and fully
understood that the rental payment could be late due to the nature of
the process.
7. Page 18, paragraph 1: HUD's initial estimate was that approximately
12,000 DHAP-Katrina families may ultimately need and be eligible for
HCVs provided under a special $85 million appropriation of HCVs
targeting DHAP-Katrina families. The conversion of these families from
the DHAP-Katrina Transitional Closeout Program to the HCV program is
currently in process.
8. Page 23, Chart: HUD plans to conduct two evaluations of the DHAP-Ike
case management program. One will focus on process and lessons learned.
The second will analyze program data and family outcomes. HUD's Office
of Policy Development and Research (PD&R) is working with program staff
on these efforts to ensure that both evaluations provide comprehensive
assessments of the DHAP-Ike case management program.
9. Page 24, Paragraph 1: GAO notes that HUD was unable to derive
substantial conclusions from its initial evaluation of the DHAP-Katrina
case management data. Presently, the Department is utilizing additional
approaches to reach conclusions about client outcomes and the
effectiveness of the DHAP-Katrina case management program. GAO states
that current evaluations provide limited information on outcomes and
program elements that need improvement. However, the Department
conducted structured interviews with housing agencies and case
management providers to determine their perspectives on DHAP-Katrina
case management and service provision to persons with disabilities.
This qualitative data provided useful information regarding challenges
associated with DHAP-Katrina case management. Data from these process
interviews is being used to develop lessons learned and case management
best practices.
10. Page 26: GAO recommends that federal agencies conduct outcome based
evaluations on future disaster case management programs. The Department
agrees with this recommendation, and has already engaged evaluation
partners to evaluate DHAP-Ike family outcomes and implementation
processes.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Kay E. Brown, (202) 512-7215 or brownke@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Kathryn A. Larin, Assistant Director; Melinda Bowman; Nisha R. Hazra;
and Charlene M. Johnson made significant contributions to this report.
Molly Traci also made key contributions. In addition, Doreen Feldman
and Sheila McCoy provided legal assistance; Cynthia L. Grant and Walter
K. Vance analyzed and assessed the reliability of data; Susan Aschoff
assisted in report development; Mimi Nguyen developed the report's
graphics; and Carolyn Blocker, Beth Faraguna, Lise Levie, Suneeti Shah,
Barbara Steel-Lowney, and Nyree Ryder Tee verified our findings.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Gulf Coast Disaster Recovery: Community Development Block Grant Program
Guidance to States Needs to Be Improved. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-541]. Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2009.
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike Disaster Assistance: FEMA Strengthened Its
Fraud Prevention Controls, but Customer Service Needs Improvement.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-671]. Washington, D.C.:
June 19, 2009.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete
and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369]. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2009.
Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding:
Perspectives and Observations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-411R]. Washington, D.C.: April 10,
2009.
Emergency Management: Actions to Implement Select Provisions of the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-433T]. Washington, D.C.: March 17,
2009.
Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences Offer Recovery Lessons for
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Future Disasters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-437T]. Washington, D.C.: March 3,
2009.
Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program Experienced
Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-129]. Washington, D.C.: December 18,
2008.
Disaster Assistance: Federal Efforts to Assist Group Site Residents
with Employment, Services for Families with Children, and
Transportation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81].
Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2008.
Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-59R].
Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2008.
Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences Offer Insights for Recovering from
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other Recent Natural Disasters.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]. Washington, D.C.:
September 26, 2008.
Mass Care in Disasters: FEMA Should Update the Red Cross Role in
Catastrophic Events and More Fully Assess Voluntary Organizations' Mass
Care Capabilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1175T]. Washington, D.C.: September
23, 2008.
Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organization's
Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in Catastrophic
Events. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-823].
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2008.
Gulf Opportunity Zone: States Are Allocating Federal Tax Incentives to
Finance Low-Income Housing and a Wide Range of Private Facilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-913]. Washington, D.C.:
July 16, 2008.
National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to
Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-768]. Washington, D.C.:
June 11, 2008.
Catastrophic Disasters: Federal Efforts Help States Prepare for and
Respond to Psychological Consequences, but FEMA's Crisis Counseling
Program Needs Improvements. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
08-22]. Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2008.
National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity
and Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-369]. Washington, D.C.: February 27,
2008.
Emergency Transit Assistance: Federal Funding for Recent Disasters, and
Options for the Future. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-243]. Washington, D.C.: February 15,
2008.
Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Observations on Federal Financial Implications.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1079T]. Washington,
D.C.: August 2, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1142T]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2007.
For more GAO products related to disaster preparedness, response, and
reconstruction visit the Topic Collections page on GAO's Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For a listing of reports, please see the related GAO products at
the end of this report.
[2] GAO, Long-Term Care Reform: States' Views on Key Elements of Well-
Designed Programs for the Elderly, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HEHS-94-227] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
6, 1994).
[3] The Council on Accreditation is an international, independent, not-
for-profit, child-and family-service and behavioral healthcare
accrediting organization. It was founded in 1977 by the Child Welfare
League of America and Family Service America (now the Alliance for
Children and Families). Originally known as an accrediting body for
family and children's agencies, the Council on Accreditation currently
accredits 45 different service areas. Among its service areas are
substance abuse treatment, adult day care, services for the homeless,
foster care, and inter-country adoption.
[4] Council on Accreditation. Council on Accreditation Standards: 8th
Edition /Private (August 2008). [hyperlink,
http://www.coastandards.org] (accessed Oct. 17, 2008).
[5] ibid.
[6] Pub. L. No. 109-295, title VI, §689f, codified at 42 U.S.C. §5189d.
The Post-Katrina Act was passed in October 2006.
[7] Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974).
[8] The National Response Plan was an all-discipline, all-hazards plan
establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the management of
domestic incidents where federal involvement is necessary.
[9] GAO, National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve
Capacity and Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-369] (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 27, 2008).
[10] This estimate is based on information obtained from each of the
agencies that provided federally funded disaster case management
services. However, it is possible that clients may have received
services from more than one case management program.
[11] UMCOR, formed in 1940, is the humanitarian relief agency of the
United Methodist Church. UMCOR provides immediate and long-term relief
to people around the world, and uses case management as a vehicle to
provide long-term recovery.
[12] For more information on the use and management of the
international donations see GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive
Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and
Accountability for International Assistance, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-460] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6,
2006). Because these international donations were distributed through
federal agencies, we refer to them as federal funds for the purposes of
this report.
[13] The Cora Brown fund was established in 1977 when Cora C. Brown of
Kansas City, Mo., left a portion of her estate to the United States to
be used as a special fund solely for the relief of human suffering
caused by natural disasters. It is a fund of last resort that is used
to help victims of presidentially-declared disasters who have disaster-
related needs that cannot be met by any other means.
[14] FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund is the major source of federal
disaster recovery assistance for state and local governments when a
disaster occurs.
[15] According to guidance for the DCM-P program, the funding period
for the program began on June 1, 2008, and tentative awards were to be
made to states on June 16, 2008.
[16] Emergency TANF funds were authorized under the TANF Emergency
Response and Recovery Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-68. Emergency SSBG
funds were authorized under the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico
and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148.
[17] HUD had responsibility for supporting FEMA in providing shelter
and housing assistance to victims of disasters under Emergency Support
Function 6 of the National Response Plan in place at the time of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and maintained that responsibility under
the subsequent National Response Framework.
[18] HUD has also administered a DHAP program for victims of subsequent
disasters. In this report, DHAP refers to programs for victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
[19] After the FEMA state-managed DCM-P program in Mississippi became
operational in August 2008, it assumed case management responsibilities
for new DHAP clients. Clients that received DHAP assistance before the
DCM-P program became operational continued to receive case management
from DHAP case management providers.
[20] The Mississippi Case Management Consortium did not provide case
management services for clients who moved to Mississippi from out of
state. According to HUD officials, the Mississippi DCM-P program
provided disaster case management services to 459 families
participating in DHAP.
[21] According to HUD officials, not all DHAP clients will receive
housing assistance through the end of the transitional program. Some
may convert to HUD's Housing Choice Voucher Program and others may
leave the program when they are no longer eligible to receive
assistance.
[22] As stated previously, FEMA awarded a conditional grant for the
Mississippi DCM-P program in July 2008.
[23] Some of the 5,456 clients that were referred by FEMA did not
receive services through the Mississippi DCM-P program for a variety of
reasons. For example, in March 2009, Mississippi reported that 1,078
clients had incorrect or no contact information and 949 clients refused
services.
[24] Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. government had neither asked
for nor accepted disaster assistance directly from foreign countries.
See GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are
Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for
International Assistance, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
06-460] (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006). The Department of Homeland
Security and Department of State have since developed policies,
procedures, and plans to help ensure international cash donations for
disaster relief and assistance are accepted and used appropriately as
needed.
[25] Coordinated Assistance Network is a partnership among several
national disaster relief nonprofit organizations. After September 11,
GAO recommended that FEMA convene a working group to encourage
voluntary organizations involved in disaster response to integrate
several lessons learned from the attacks, including easing access to
aid for those eligible and enhancing coordination among charities and
with FEMA. See GAO, September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could
Enhance Charitable Organizations' Contributions in Disasters,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-259] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 19, 2002). Following our report, seven of the largest disaster
response organizations--including the Red Cross, The Salvation Army,
and the United Way--in partnership with FEMA, formed the Coordinated
Assistance Network to ease collaboration and facilitate data sharing.
[26] At the Coordinated Assistance Network's inception, the founding
agencies recognized that pursuant to various privacy laws, there was no
mechanism that allowed government agencies to partition relief
information from law enforcement particularly in cases of undocumented
persons. Thus, government agencies are not allowed access to the
database because there would be no way to ensure that government
agencies would limit their use of the database to service delivery.
[27] According to a FEMA official, the Coordinated Assistance Network
Steering Committee--which includes two FEMA representatives--oversees
changes or enhancements to the database.
[28] For the purposes of this report we defined "coordination" broadly
to include interagency activities that others have previously defined
as cooperation, collaboration, integration, or networking. Here, we use
this definition to describe coordination among federal agencies as well
as between federal agencies and nonfederal stakeholders. See GAO,
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[29] See GAO, Nonprofit Sector: Increasing Numbers and Key Role in
Delivering Federal Services, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1084T] (Washington, D.C.: July 24,
2007).
[30] Under the Privacy Act, an agency may disclose information without
the permission of the individual to whom the information relates for a
number of statutorily permitted purposes, including if it is determined
to be a "routine use"--a use compatible with the purpose for which it
was collected. FEMA has published a routine use notice outlining the
instances where it may share data from its Disaster Recovery Assistance
Files. According to its routine use policy, FEMA can disclose
application information as necessary, to prevent duplication of efforts
or benefits in determining eligibility for disaster assistance. This
could include releasing information to federal, state, and voluntary
organizations. This policy does not allow FEMA to provide FEMA
registration numbers to organizations that request information. FEMA
registration numbers are assigned to victims that apply for FEMA
assistance and are used to track claims. FEMA will, however, provide
contact information once an appropriate request in writing has been
approved. FEMA requires that the organization obtain the FEMA
identification number directly from the client before any specific
information about FEMA assistance to an individual can be released.
[31] According to HUD officials, the standard DHAP protocols for Phase
I and Phase II families would have provided ample time to process a
family and make housing assistance payments. For Phase III families, if
the housing authority did not receive client information with enough
time to make a rental payment by the required date, the landlord was
made aware that the payment could be late.
[32] It was ultimately determined that victims of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita would not be served under the HHS pilot.
[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[34] According to FEMA, the agency hopes to obtain information
concerning the use of compatible tracking systems from their evaluation
of pilot programs, which we discuss later in this report. In addition,
FEMA officials said that efforts are underway to develop methods for
two-way information sharing among various database systems, including
those used by FEMA and HUD.
[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[36] Disaster Assistance: Federal Efforts to Assist Group Site
Residents with Employment, Services for Families with Children, and
Transportation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2008).
[37] Group site residents may have received these services, but data
generally do not distinguish group site residents from other
recipients. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81].
[38] FEMA employs housing advisors who recertify disaster victims for
continued housing assistance from FEMA. Housing advisors are not case
managers. However, they provide housing resource information to
disaster victims to assist them in securing permanent housing.
[39] Jacqueline Berman and Yasuyo Abe, They are Thinking of Today, Not
Tomorrow: Evaluation of the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps' Case
Management Program and Human Recovery Coordination: Final Report
(Berkeley Policy Associates, Oakland, CA: August 2007).
[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81].
[41] GAO, Gulf Opportunity Zone: States are Allocating Federal Tax
Incentives to Finance Low-Income Housing and a Wide Range of Private
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-913]
(Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2008).
[42] GAO, Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Observations on Federal Financial
Implications, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1079T]
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2007).
[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-913].
[44] While there were more than 30,000 DHAP clients receiving housing
assistance as of January 2009, HUD officials said some clients may not
be eligible for long-term housing assistance due to program rules based
on income or criminal background, among other factors.
[45] Harry Holzer and Robert Lerman, Employment Issues and Challenges
in Post-Katrina New Orleans, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute,
February 2006).
[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81].
[47] As we previously reported, FEMA officials stated that given the
level of destruction and, in some cases, opposition from communities,
FEMA was not always able to locate temporary housing in places with
easy access to existing infrastructure. See GAO-09-81.
[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81].
[49] Jennifer Claire Auer and Linda M. Lampkin, After Katrina: Open and
Operating? An Assessment of Louisiana Nonprofit Health and Human
Services after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, (Washington, D.C.: The
Urban Institute, February 2006).
[50] Berman, 2007.
[51] See 42 U.S.C. §5174 and 44 C.F.R. §206.110.
[52] The Housing Assistance program provides assistance for such things
as rental housing, home repair, and home replacement. The Other Needs
Assistance program includes financial assistance for medical, dental,
funeral, personal property, transportation, and other disaster-related
expenses not compensated by other means. In 2005, the maximum amount an
individual or household could receive through these programs was
$26,200.
[53] Eric Jenner, Lynne W. Jenner, Eva Silvestre, and Maya Matthews-
Sterling, Final Evaluation of the United Methodist Committee of Relief
Katrina Aid Today National Case Management Consortium (New Orleans, LA:
The Policy and Research Group, March 2008).
[54] Ibid.
[55] The money used to fund KAT came from international donations for
Hurricane Katrina victims.
[56] Berman, 2007.
[57] According to agency officials, HUD is also conducting a study
related to the housing assistance provided under the DHAP program. The
goal of this study is to determine how to transition people most
effectively from rental assistance to market rate housing following a
disaster.
[58] GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and
Relationships, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-739SP]
(Washington, D.C.: May 2005).
[59] According to agency officials, HUD is currently utilizing
additional approaches to reach conclusions about client outcomes and
the effectiveness of the DHAP case management program for victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, HUD said the department
collected qualitative information regarding challenges associated with
DHAP-Katrina case management, which is being used to develop lessons
learned and case management best practices.
[End of section]
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