Drug Control

Hampered by declining U.S. funding, staff cutbacks, and corruption among key Mexican institutions, drug interdiction efforts in Mexico have failed to stem the flow of illegal drugs reaching the United States. Mexico remains the primary transit route for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine smuggled into this country. U.S. narcotics activities in Mexico and the transit zone have declined since 1992. U.S. funding for counternarcotics efforts in the transit zone and Mexico fell from $1 billion in fiscal year 1992 to $570 million in fiscal year 1995. Moreover, since 1992, direct U.S. assistance to Mexico has been negligible because of Mexico's 1993 policy of refusing most U.S. counternarcotics assistance. Staffing reductions in the State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City have limited monitoring of earlier U.S. assistance, mainly helicopters and spare parts. Since GAO's June 1995 testimony before Congress (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182), the U.S. embassy has elevated drug control issues in importance and has developed a drug control operating plan with measurable goals; the Mexican government has indicated a willingness to develop a mutual counternarcotics assistance program and has taken action on important law enforcement and money laundering legislation; and the United States and Mexico have created a framework for greater cooperation and are expected to develop a joint counternarcotics strategy by the end of the year. Following through on these efforts is critical to combatting drug trafficking in Mexico. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico, by Benjamin F. Nelson, Director of International Relations and Trade Issues, before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Relations and Criminal Justice, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-182, June 12 (10 pages).

GAO found that: (1) Mexico continues to be a major transit point for cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the United States; (2) drug traffickers have changed their preferred mode of transportation for moving cocaine into Mexico, decreasing the use of aircraft and increasing the use of maritime vessels, which are currently used to move an estimated two-thirds of the cocaine entering Mexico; (3) Mexico eradicated substantial amounts of marijuana and opium poppy crops in 1995; (4) however, U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts have had little, if any, impact on the overall flow of drugs through Mexico to the United States; (5) the current Mexican government appears committed to fighting drug trafficking, but, according to U.S. officials, is hampered by pervasive corruption of key institutions, economic and political problems, and limited counternarcotics and law enforcement capabilities; (6) the current U.S. strategy in Mexico focuses on strengthening the Mexican government's political commitment and institutional capability, targeting major drug-trafficking organizations, and developing operational initiatives; (7) in late 1993, the United States revised its international cocaine strategy from focusing on intercepting drugs as they move through the transit region of Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean to stopping cocaine at its production source in South America; (8) U.S. counternarcotics activities in Mexico and the transit zone have declined since 1992; (9) multiple-agency drug interdiction funding for the transit zone, including Mexico, declined from about $1 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1992 to about $570 million in FY 1995; (10) the U.S. assistance program in Mexico has been negligible since Mexico initiated its policy of refusing nearly all U.S. counternarcotics assistance in early 1993; (11) staffing cutbacks have limited U.S. capabilities to monitor previously funded U.S. assistance; and (12) since GAO's June 1995 testimony, several events have occurred that could greatly affect future drug control efforts by the United States and Mexico: (a) drug control issues have been elevated in importance at the U.S. embassy and a drug control operating plan with measurable goals has been developed for U.S. agencies in Mexico; (b) the Mexican government has recently signaled a willingness to develop a mutual counternarcotics assistance program; (c) the Mexican government has taken some action on important law enforcement and money laundering legislation; and (d) the United States and Mexico have created a framework for increased cooperation and are currently developing a new binational strategy.