Nuclear Nonproliferation

After the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, there was concern that weapons-grade material from retired Russian nuclear weapons, such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium, could be stolen or reused in nuclear weapons if not disposed of or properly protected. In 1993, the United States agreed to buy 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium that had been extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons during the last 20 years. From 1995 through 1998, 1,487 metric tons of low enriched uranium was delivered to the United States. The United States and Russia negotiated a series of access and monitoring measures, known as transparency measures, at several nuclear materials processing facilities that are located in closed Russian nuclear cities. GAO concludes that although most of the transparency measures have gradually been implemented at four Russian processing facilities, several key measures have not yet been put into place. In addition, the U.S. officials do not have access to Russian nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities and to the weapons dismantlement process. In a July 1999 classified report, GAO included information on whether the transparency measures ensure that the arms control objectives of the agreement are being met.

GAO noted that: (1) while most of the transparency measures have gradually been implemented at four Russian nuclear material processing facilities, several key measures have not yet been put into place; (2) under the agreement, U.S. officials lack access to Russian nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities and to the weapons dismantlement process; (3) some of the low enriched uranium (LEU) delivered to the United States--about one-third--was shipped before the transparency measures had been implemented at each of the Russian facilities; (4) according to the Departments of State and Energy, there was a deliberate decision by the U.S. government that U.S. interests would be served by allowing a portion of the HEU to be blended into LEU and to be rapidly removed from Russia while the details of the transparency measures were being worked out; (5) U.S. officials first visited a Russia facility in February 1996 to implement the initial set of transparency measures; (6) in October 1996, Russian officials agreed to strengthen the measures in return for a $100 million advance payment to be credited against their deliveries of LEU; (7) transparency measures provide U.S. officials with confidence that weapons-grade HEU is being blended into LEU at the three Russian blending facilities; (8) U.S. officials will not be highly confident that all of the LEU purchased under the agreement is coming from weapons-grade HEU until continuous-monitoring equipment is operating at the Russian blending facilities; (9) according to the Energy, U.S. officials rejected one cylinder of LEU that was shipped to the United States in 1997 for purchase under the agreement because it did not meet the agreement's requirement; (10) the Secretary of Energy proposed to the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy a number of additional transparency measures that included providing U.S. officials with greater access to the Russian nuclear-weapons-dismantlement process; and (11) there has been no progress in reaching an agreement with Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy on adopting these additional measures.