Combating Terrorism
Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations Gao ID: GAO-08-144T October 4, 2007Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. This testimony addresses (1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism or how they should do so. In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with developing a plan to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June of 2006. According to NCTC, Department of State, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, implementing guidance for the plan is under development, and they would not discuss the contents of the plan or the guidance. LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports, and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance program. However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally lacked guidance on using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing terrorist vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring systems and formal structures for sharing information and collaborating. We also found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs may not be tailoring their full range of training and assistance to address key terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries.
GAO-08-144T, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Statement for the Record Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives:
To accompany the Committee hearing record of Thursday, October 4, 2007.
Combating Terrorism:
Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations:
Statement for the Record by Jess T. Ford:
Director International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-08-144T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-144T, a statement for the record to the
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Terrorism, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the wake of the 9/11
attacks, directed U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEA) to focus on the
prevention of terrorist attacks. The strategies called for LEAs to
intensify their efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. This testimony addresses (1) the guidance for
LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this
guidance.
What GAO Found:
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies
that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to
assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should
implement the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations
combat terrorism or how they should do so. In December 2004, Congress
passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
which charged the NCTC with developing a plan to use all elements of
national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials
told us they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the
President in June of 2006. According to NCTC, State, Justice, and DHS
officials, implementing guidance for the plan is under development, and
they would not discuss the contents of the plan or the guidance.
LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its
Container Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign
ports, and State has expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance program.
However, we found that because most LEAs, with the exception of the
FBI, have not been given clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined
roles and responsibilities on helping foreign nations identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the lack
of clear roles and responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have
compromised several joint operations intended to identify and disrupt
potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and foreign
nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally lacked guidance on
using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing terrorist
vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring systems and
formal structures for sharing information and collaborating. We also
found that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not conducted,
LEAs may not be tailoring their full range of training and assistance
to address key terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries.
Photograph: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism
Exercises.
What GAO Recommends:
In our recent report on this issue, we recommended that the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), ensure that the implementing guidance
for its plan for combating terrorism articulates a clear strategy for
using LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism. We also
recommended that State, Justice, and DHS explore enhancements to
overseas coordination mechanisms and develop clear guidance and
performance monitoring to enhance efforts to help foreign nations
combat terrorism.
NCTC stated it had already begun to implement our recommendations. DHS
generally agreed with our recommendations. State and Justice stated
they would consider ways to improve overseas coordination, but did not
indicate whether they concurred with our other recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-144T]. For more information, contact Jess
Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to submit this statement for the record on U.S. law
enforcement efforts to help foreign nations to combat terrorism abroad
[Footnote 1]. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, combating
terrorism has become the nation‘s top national security goal and the
highest strategic objective of U.S. embassies worldwide. Law
enforcement agencies (LEA) from the departments of State (State),
Justice (Justice), and Homeland Security (DHS)”including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and State‘s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)”operate from U.S.
embassies overseas and assist foreign nation governments on a broad
array of law enforcement issues, such as investigating crime, reducing
illegal drug activity, controlling borders and immigration, and
protecting U.S. embassies and diplomats from attack.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of national
strategies that have called for using all elements of national power to
combat terrorism, including changing the role of LEAs. In particular,
these strategies have directed that law enforcement activities be
increasingly focused on the prevention of further terrorist attacks,
including helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. This includes technical assistance, such as antiterrorism
training and the provision of technologies used to identify terrorist
threats, and operational assistance, such as joint U.S.-foreign nation
investigations and operations against terrorists.
This statement discusses the findings from our recent report regarding
(1) the guidance for LEAs to help foreign nations combat terrorism, and
(2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented this guidance. I should
point out that our review was limited to U.S. law enforcement efforts
overseas. It did not focus on U.S. domestic law enforcement efforts or
other instruments of national power”including military, intelligence,
diplomatic, and financial”currently being used to combat terrorism.
During the course of our review, we analyzed the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, the National Strategy for
Homeland Security, and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. We
discussed this and other guidance with representatives from State,
Justice, and DHS, along with embassy and LEA officials involved with
working with foreign nation counterparts. We also reviewed State,
Justice, and DHS strategic plans and annual performance reports and
conducted detailed work in four countries with key roles in combating
terrorism where we met with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials.
We also met with officials from the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC)[Footnote 2] to brief them on our observations and to determine
the status of ongoing efforts to develop a plan to use all elements of
national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials
would not discuss the plan, its contents, or any issues raised in our
report. During the course of our work we experienced considerable
delays obtaining information from Justice and State, which resulted in
our report being issued several months later than initially planned. We
were eventually able to obtain information sufficient for answering our
objectives. The work used to support this statement was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
The national strategies issued after the 9/11 attacks collectively
called for reorienting U.S. LEAs to proactively work to prevent
terrorist attacks at home and abroad. However, they lacked key
components, such as clearly defined objectives, roles, and
responsibilities necessary for a strategic plan and for facilitating
interagency collaboration. Further, they did not articulate which LEAs
should implement the general guidance provided in the strategies or how
they should do so. For example, of the seven LEAs in our review, only
the FBI received and has issued some implementing guidance”for example,
stating that it planned to increase its presence abroad and increase
joint operations with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. In December 2004, Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (the 2004 Intelligence
Reform Act)[Footnote 3], which charged the NCTC with developing a plan
to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat
terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan,
which was approved by the President in June 2006. According to NCTC
officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was still under
development as of May 2007, and they would not discuss the plan, its
contents, or the implementing guidance.
Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help foreign
nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, the
FBI has increased its overseas activities and DHS has worked with
foreign nations to implement the Container Security Initiative to
screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports. However, almost 6 years after
the 9/11 attacks, the United States lacks clear implementing guidance
for integrating the variety of overseas LEA activities to help foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We found that,
because most LEAs have not been provided clear directives, they
generally lacked (1) clearly articulated roles and responsibilities to
assist foreign nations; (2) guidance on setting funding priorities and
providing resources; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess LEA
progress; (4) formal structures to coordinate LEA operational and
technical assistance to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive
country needs assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational
assistance to specific foreign nation needs.
Looking forward, the United States needs to develop clear implementing
guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA activities
assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. In our recent report, we
recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the
National Security Council (NSC), ensure that the implementing guidance
for the NCTC‘s plan for combating terrorism clearly articulates the
specific objectives for each LEA, clarifies their roles and
responsibilities, and proposes actions linked to available resources
and directed at the most pressing needs for assisting foreign nations
to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In addition, since
these activities are central to the overall U.S. effort to combat
terrorism, DHS, Justice, and State need to ensure that their component
agencies have clear guidance to implement the national security
strategies‘ goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs to assist
foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and
also need to assess progress toward objectives and provide regular
reporting to Congress on the results, impediments, and planned
improvements. NCTC stated it had already begun to implement our
recommendations. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations. State
and Justice stated they would consider ways to improve overseas
coordination.
Background:
State, Justice, and DHS each include LEAs that operate from U.S.
embassies. LEAs abroad work on a wide array of law enforcement issues,
including those that cover criminal enterprises, drug cartels, visa and
immigration fraud, financial crimes, criminal and terrorist threats
against U.S. embassies and personnel, and fugitive capture and
extraditions. In this statement, we are focused primarily on ICE, FBI,
and DS operations abroad, although in our report we also reviewed the
overseas counter-terrorism activities of the Drug Enforcement
Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; Customs and Border Protection;
and the U.S. Secret Service.
ICE investigates threats to U.S. border security and works to eliminate
the potential threat of terrorist acts against the United States. The
FBI is charged with protecting the United States from terrorist
attacks; preventing, disrupting, and defeating terrorist operations;
and expanding operational partnerships with foreign nation law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt and prevent terrorism.
DS is State‘s law enforcement arm and is responsible for protecting
U.S. embassies, diplomats, and their families from criminal and
terrorist attacks.
The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act created the NCTC and charged it with
integrating all instruments of national power”including diplomatic,
financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law
enforcement activities”within and among agencies, with the ultimate
goal of preventing future attacks against America and its interests
worldwide. The NCTC is a part of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and reports to the Director on matters of intelligence
collection and analysis; however, on matters of strategic operational
planning for counterterrorism, the Director of the NCTC reports
directly to the President. As a result, the NCTC works under the policy
direction of the NSC on matters of counterterrorism planning.
National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance, but Lack Key Elements for a
Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration:
A series of national strategies have provided broad guidance for U.S.
LEAs to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. However, the strategies lack essential elements of a
strategic plan and for facilitating interagency collaboration, and they
do not clearly delineate what role, if any, the various LEAs should
play in assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. The 2004
Intelligence Reform Act requires the NCTC to develop U.S.
governmentwide strategic operational plans to combat terrorism, which
should include the mission, objectives, tasks to be performed,
interagency coordination of operational activities, and assignment of
roles and responsibilities among participating agencies. NCTC officials
told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a general plan,
which was approved by the President in June 2006, but the implementing
guidance for the plan was still under development.
National Strategies Provide Broad Guidance for LEAs to Assist Foreign
Nations to Combat Terrorism:
A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level
guidance for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. For example, the National Security Strategy,
issued in 2002 and updated in March 2006, states that the United States
will continue to encourage regional partners to take up a coordinated
effort that isolates the terrorists, and help ensure that foreign
nations have the law enforcement, military, political, and financial
tools necessary to disrupt and destroy terrorist operations before they
reach American borders.
Additionally, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
primarily focuses on domestic efforts to secure America from further
terrorist attacks. It clarifies the role of LEAs in the post 9/11
world, stating that, ’Our Nation‘s highest law enforcement objective
must be the prevention of terrorist acts”a significant shift from pre-
9/11 objectives.“ The strategy also notes that, in a world where the
terrorist threat pays no respect to traditional boundaries, the
American strategy for homeland security cannot stop at the country‘s
borders.
It also calls for a sustained and systematic international agenda to
counter the global terrorist threat and improve homeland security, and
identifies a number of initiatives in this area, including (1)
intensifying international law enforcement cooperation and helping
foreign nations fight terrorism and (2) augmenting the FBI‘s overseas
presence by increasing the number of LEGATs around the world. It states
that Justice, in cooperation with State, is to work with foreign nation
counterparts on these law enforcement issues.
Also, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in 2003 and
updated in 2006, focuses on the United States‘ efforts to combat
terrorism abroad. It also provides greater detail on the objectives and
strategies for U.S. LEAs in working with their foreign nation
counterparts. According to the strategy, the United States is to:
* Expand, where appropriate, the U.S. law enforcement presence abroad
to further the investigative and operational assistance related to the
interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist suspects;
* Increase technical and operational assistance efforts to help foreign
nation LEAs acquire the necessary capabilities to fight terrorism
through a variety of means, including (1) improved legislation, (2)
technical assistance, (3) new investigative techniques, (4)
intelligence sharing, and (5) law enforcement training;
* Enhance operational assistance to expand international cooperation to
combat terrorism through expanded sharing of law enforcement
information.
In 2006, the White House released updates of the National Security
Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Both updated
strategies reinforce the basic concepts of using U.S. LEAs to assist
foreign nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists
abroad. For example, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism supports
intensifying training and other types of assistance to improve foreign
nation LEA capacities to identify and disrupt terrorists threats, as
well as implementing legal reforms aimed at ensuring that foreign
nations have the necessary laws to carry out this effort, and that
investigators, prosecutors, and judges have the capacity to effectively
prosecute terrorists using these new laws. The strategies state that
this approach has succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting
terrorists since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The National Strategies Lack Key Elements for a Strategic Plan and
Interagency Collaboration:
Our past work has stressed the importance of developing a strategy to
combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives, priorities,
outcomes, milestones, and performance measures.[Footnote 4] In March
2003, we reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives
to be accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting
each objective, ensure that funding necessary to achieve the objectives
is available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress
and identify needed improvements. For example, our past work has found
that identifying clear roles and responsibilities for each federal
agency combating terrorism is a major challenge in implementing
national strategies related to terrorism.
In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires
each federal agency to develop strategic plans that cover a period of
at least 5 years and include the agency‘s mission statement; identify
the agency‘s general goals and objectives; and describe how the agency
intends to achieve those goals through its activities and human,
capital, information, and other resources. Under GPRA, strategic plans
are the starting point for agencies to set annual performance plans for
programs and to measure the performance of the programs in achieving
those goals. Our past work has found that GPRA has the potential for
greatly enhancing agency performance. For example, managers can use
performance information to identify problems in existing programs, to
try to identify the causes of problems, and to develop corrective
actions. [Footnote 5]
Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency
collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1)
define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually
reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding needs
by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5)
establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate
across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate,
and report on results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for
collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8)
reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through
performance management systems. [Footnote 6] We have specifically noted
that, given the number of agencies involved in U.S. government efforts
to combat terrorism, it is particularly important that there be
mechanisms to coordinate across agencies. [Footnote 7]
We found that while the national strategies, as well as their updates
in 2006, provided broad guidance, they lacked key strategic elements,
including those to promote LEA collaboration in assisting foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example,
none of the three national strategies established joint agency
strategies that would capitalize on the unique capacity of each LEA to
combat terrorism. Further, none of them identified funding needs or
leveraged resources; reached agreement on roles and responsibilities;
or established procedures to operate across agency boundaries.
Moreover, none of the strategies included mechanisms to monitor,
evaluate, and report on their overall results, nor did they reinforce
agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans
and reports.
NCTC Has Drafted Plan for Combating Terrorism, but Implementing
Guidance Is Still under Development:
In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act,
creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic operational
plans to combat terrorism using every element of national power,
including those of U.S. LEAs. Under the act, the NCTC is expected to
(1) conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism
activities; (2) integrate all instruments of national power in such
planning, including law enforcement, diplomatic, military,
intelligence, and financial activities; (3) assign roles and
responsibilities to lead departments and agencies; (4) ensure that
agencies have access to intelligence and intelligence support needed to
execute their counterterrorism plans and accomplish their assigned
activities; and (5) monitor implementation of these operational plans.
In June 2006, the NCTC Director testified before Congress that the lack
of a detailed plan to ensure full implementation of the national
security strategy had been a void that stretched back for decades.
[Footnote 8] According to the director, what has long been missing is a
plan to ensure that national strategies are implemented at the
operational level in a coordinated, integrated fashion, and that there
has been no formal process to translate the national strategies into
strategic and tangible objectives, assigned to lead agencies, with
roles and responsibilities clearly defined. In addition, there has been
no plan to ensure the coordination, integration, and synchronization of
joint departmental operations, or any effort to monitor the combined
impact of the multiple agencies engaged in implementing the national
security strategy.
NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a
general plan, which was approved by the President in June of 2006.
According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance for the plan was
still under development as of May 2007, and they would not discuss the
plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance.
Several Factors Limit LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists:
Although some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help
foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, most LEAs
have not been given clear guidance for helping foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We found that LEA efforts
to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists
have been hindered because the LEAs generally lacked (1) clearly
articulated roles and responsibilities from NCTC to assist foreign
nations; (2) guidance on setting funding priorities and providing
resources; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess LEA progress;
(4) formal structures to coordinate LEA operational and technical
assistance to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive country needs
assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to
specific foreign nation needs.
Some LEAs Have Taken Steps to Assist Foreign Nations to Combat
Terrorism:
Some LEAs have increased their efforts to help foreign nations combat
terrorism. For example, the FBI is attempting to operationally assist
foreign nations to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks before they
occur, and it has responded to specific terrorist attacks by assisting
foreign nations to identify and prosecute the suspected terrorists. In
addition, new programs have been specifically designed to assist
foreign nations to identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats,
such as the DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, some
existing technical assistance programs, like State‘s Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) program, have been expanded in an effort to improve
foreign nation capabilities. While this list is not all inclusive,
these represent some significant U.S. efforts to use U.S. LEAs to
assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We found that these three
efforts were limited by a variety of factors.
We found that the FBI has both responded to specific terrorist attacks
by operationally assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify and
prosecute terrorists involved in those attacks, as well as tried to
proactively assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists. In one country we visited, the FBI provided limited but
vital operational assistance to locate terrorist suspects and provided
key evidence for their successful prosecution. In another country we
visited, the FBI was working proactively with ICE and with foreign
nation counterparts to track suspicious migrants and identify and
disrupt potential terrorists before they entered the United States.
However, as we will discuss below, we found that the impact of the
FBI‘s efforts to combat terrorism has been limited in some posts
overseas.
DHS‘s CSI effort targets for inspection at foreign seaports high-risk
cargo shipments before they leave for the United States. It was created
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and requires U.S. law enforcement
personnel to be physically colocated with foreign nation LEAs to
identify and disrupt terrorist threats to America. In 2005, we reported
that CSI had led to improved information sharing between U.S. and
foreign customs staff and a heightened level of bilateral cooperation
and international awareness of the need to identify and disrupt
terrorist threats. [Footnote 9] However, we also found that several
issues limited its effectiveness, such as the inability to fully staff
some ports because of diplomatic constraints.
LEAs Lack Clear Roles and Responsibilities:
Despite such actions, we found that most LEAs have not been given clear
guidance for helping foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. We found that neither NCTC nor the executive
departments have clearly translated the national strategies‘ broad
strategic objectives to agency-specific roles and responsibilities. In
addition, we found that, with one exception, neither Justice, DHS, nor
State had issued guidance to their component LEAs to implement this new
national security goal of assisting foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. Only Justice had issued some guidance
to the FBI. As a result, most U.S. LEAs lacked clearly defined roles
and responsibilities for implementing their efforts to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.
We found problems because of this lack of guidance on roles and
responsibilities. For example:
* Although Justice told us in February 2007 that the FBI was designated
the lead federal LEA on investigating terrorism-related crimes abroad,
this view was not shared by the other LEAs or even the FBI itself.
LEAs, including DHS‘s ICE, Justice‘s FBI, and State‘s DS all told us
there was no lead LEA charged with using the combined capabilities of
federal LEAs to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.
* In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and
responsibilities between two U.S. LEAs may have compromised several
joint operations intended to identify and disrupt potential terrorist
activities, according to the U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. ICE was
responsible for tracking special interest aliens, while the FBI was
responsible for identifying terrorists trying to enter the United
States. Because it was unclear whether some of these special interest
aliens were migrants or potential terrorists”and ICE and FBI were not
given clear guidance to determine which LEA had the lead role”foreign
nation and agency officials noted instances where joint U.S.-foreign
nation investigations or operations were poorly coordinated. As a
result, ICE and FBI, unknowingly working with different foreign nation
LEAs, moved in on the same subject. According to the foreign nation law
enforcement and FBI officials, such actions may have compromised
several of their investigations.
* DS‘s Regional Security Officers (RSO) have been given no post 9/11
guidance from State on how to assist foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and RSOs voiced confusion about this
role. In three of the four countries we visited, RSOs told us that they
were not working with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists, while in another country, the RSO played a
critical role in embassy efforts to help the foreign nation capture and
prosecute terrorists responsible for attacks against Americans and
others.
* At the four embassies we visited, we found State had not provided
guidance on how to use LEA assets to assist foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Ambassadors or deputy
chiefs of mission at each embassy we visited voiced their concern that,
despite combating terrorism being the embassy‘s highest priority, they
received little to no guidance on how to design a coordinated
assistance program using the full capacities of U.S. technical and
operational assistance from LEAs, and ensure that LEAs had the
necessary goals, skills, capabilities, and time to work closely with
foreign nation officials to stop terrorists attacks.
In commenting on our findings in February 2007, officials from DHS,
Justice, and State agreed that there had been a lack of clear guidance
instructing LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists. Officials noted that the NSC and now the NCTC
have the authority to compel U.S. LEAs to work together in a
coordinated, systematic fashion to help stop terrorist attacks.
Officials said that no executive department has the authority to direct
the LEAs from other departments to focus on this goal, and they noted
that recommendations to individual agencies would not result in a
unified multidepartmental effort to help foreign nations combat
terrorism.
LEAs Lack Guidance on Prioritizing Funds:
Officials from DHS, Justice, and State told us that they are attempting
to fund a broad array of LEA activities abroad with limited staffing
and funds, and without guidance from the NSC on reprioritizing funds
from other activities. As a result, their efforts to assist foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists have been
hindered. For example:
* DHS officials from ICE and Customs and Border Protection said they
were limited in their ability to undertake new overseas
counterterrorism initiatives or to fully staff existing positions
already approved by embassies;
* Although FBI‘s Strategic Plan states that it will expand the role of
its LEGAT offices to undertake joint investigative and operational
partnerships with foreign nation LEAs to identify and stop terrorist
attacks against U.S. interests, we found several problems that reduced
their ability to meet this goal. For example, the LEGATs in three of
the four countries we visited said they generally lacked the resources,
time, and staff to develop the close, collaborative relationships
necessary to conduct joint investigations or operations;
* A 2006 report from State‘s Office of Inspector General found that
State lacked adequate resources to meet its mandate to coordinate all
U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad, and was too under-funded to
provide advice, coordination, and action on counterterrorism issues to
its embassies;
* In all four countries we visited, terrorist transit and border
vulnerabilities were identified as primary terrorist threats; yet, in
three of these countries, funding had not been realigned to support
this effort, so the respective embassies could not provide specific
assistance to address these needs;
* In all four countries we visited, there was more funding to assist
foreign nations combat illegal drugs and crime than to combat
terrorism, despite the fact that efforts to combat terrorism were the
highest priority of each embassy. For example, in one country with an
extremely high terrorist threat to American interests globally, State
provided more than six times the amount of funding to stop illicit
drugs and crime ($220.2 million) than it did for antiterrorism
assistance ($34.5 million) from fiscal years 2002 to 2006.
LEAs Lack Performance Monitoring Systems:
DHS, Justice, and State officials said that they lacked systems to
assess their performance and progress in assisting foreign nations to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result, none of the
LEAs had in place a method for determining progress or documenting
their accomplishments in assisting foreign nations to identify,
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, either for technical or operational
assistance.
Because the LEAs lack such a monitoring system, they could not provide
a comprehensive list of key accomplishments in assisting foreign
nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists from 2001 to
2005. As a result, we could not conduct a full assessment of the LEAs‘
progress in these efforts.
LEAs Lack Mechanisms to Foster Joint Collaboration:
We found that neither NCTC, State, Justice, nor DHS had developed
policies to facilitate joint LEA investigations and operations abroad.
As a result:
* LEAs told us that the embassies had not been reoriented to harness
the combined capabilities of all LEAs in a collective effort to prevent
another terrorist attack on the United States or its interests;
* In three of the four embassies we visited, we found that the
embassies generally retained pre-9/11 structures for information
sharing among LEAs. Although embassies generally use law enforcement
working groups to share information, we found they were not focused on
joint investigative or operational efforts to identify and disrupt
terrorist acts. For example, in one country we visited with an
extremely high terrorist threat, an FBI official told us that the law
enforcement working group had never been asked to try to identify or
disrupt any of the terrorists on the most wanted lists of the
departments of State or Defense, or of the foreign nation itself.
LEAs Lack Comprehensive Country Needs Assessments:
In each country we visited, we found that there were no comprehensive
needs assessments being conducted that consider all U.S. assistance
available for addressing the country‘s needs in combating terrorism. As
a result, we found that State, Justice, DHS, and their LEAs may not be
targeting their full range of training and assistance to help foreign
countries to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example:
* According to embassy officials in three of the four countries we
visited, terrorist transit across their borders was a key
vulnerability. However, there was no comprehensive effort by State,
Justice, DHS, or their LEAs to provide training to the foreign nation
border patrols, immigration officers, and customs agents to identify
and disrupt terrorists transiting their borders.
Conclusion:
In closing, the enhanced missions of LEAs to work with foreign nations
to combat terrorism and the creation of the NCTC are potentially
significant steps to resolving some of the serious national security
problems identified by the 9/11 Commission. However, in our recent
report, we found important gaps between the broad goals of the national
strategies and what was actually being implemented in the field. While
the national strategies articulated changes in the direction and
emphasis of overseas LEA activities, they have not provided specific
roles, objectives, or mechanisms for determining success. As a result
of these and other weaknesses, LEAs, a key element of national power,
are not being fully utilized abroad to help protect U.S. citizens and
interests from future terrorist attacks. Looking forward, the United
States needs to develop clear implementing guidance for integrating the
variety of overseas LEA activities assisting foreign nations to combat
terrorism. As such, it is imperative that the NCTC plan for combating
terrorism be clear in assigning roles and responsibilities and ensuring
that each LEA has the means, the incentives, and the procedures to work
with other agencies to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and
prosecute terrorists.
Recommendations to Improve U.S. LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations
to Combat Terrorism:
In our report, we recommended that the NCTC ensure that the
implementing guidance for the NCTC‘s plan for combating terrorism
articulates a clear strategy for using LEAs to help foreign nations
combat terrorism. We also recommended that State, Justice, and DHS
explore enhancements to overseas coordination mechanisms and develop
clear guidance and performance monitoring to enhance efforts to help
foreign nations combat terrorism. NCTC stated it had already begun to
implement our recommendations. DHS generally agreed with our
recommendations.
State and Justice stated they would consider ways to improve overseas
coordination, but did not indicate whether they concurred with our
other recommendations.
I would be pleased to meet with you or your staff to answer any
questions you may have or to discuss this statement.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions
to this statement include: Dave Maurer, Assistant Director; Edward J.
George; J. Addison Ricks; and Joe Carney.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives
to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
Terrorists, GAO-07-697 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007).
[2] The NCTC was created by Congress as part of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). NCTC‘s mission
includes developing plans that coordinate the use of all elements of
national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism and prevent
terrorist attacks. As detailed in the background section of this
report, the NCTC reports directly to the President on matters of
strategic operational planning for counterterrorism and works under the
policy direction of the NSC.
[3] P.L. 108-458, section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 404o).
[4] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies
Related to Terrorism, GAO 03 519T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003).
[5] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, GAO 05 927 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005).
[6] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
[7] GAO-03-519T.
[8] Admiral John Scott Redd, in testimony before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006.
[9] GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum
Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection
Efforts, GAO 05 557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).
[End of section]
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