Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq
GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues Gao ID: GAO-08-231T October 30, 2007Since 2003, the Congress has obligated nearly $400 billion for U.S. efforts in Iraq, of which about $40 billion has supported reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Congressional oversight of this substantial investment is crucial as the Administration requests additional military and economic funds for Iraq. This testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and proposes three areas for which continued oversight is needed: (1) progress in improving security and national reconciliation, (2) efforts to develop clear U.S. strategies, and (3) Iraqi and international contributions to economic development. We reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed agency officials, including the departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; and the U.S. Agency for International Development; the UN; and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq as part of this work.
Since GAO last reported in September 2007, on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial elections. In addition, sectarian influences within Iraqi ministries continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and performance measures. The U.S. strategy for victory in Iraq partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy and does not fully address how the United States would integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministry capability lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqi government's lack of integrated strategic planning in its critical energy sector. The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqis and international community would help finance Iraq's reconstruction. However, the Iraqi government has limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds. For example, Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for capital projects and reconstruction in 2007. However, a large portion of this amount is unlikely to be spent, as ministries had spent only 24 percent of their capital budgets through mid-July 2007. Iraq has proposed spending only $4 billion for capital projects in 2008, a significant reduction from 2007. The international community has pledged $15.6 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but about $11 billion of this is in the form of loans.
GAO-08-231T, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, October 30, 2007:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq:
GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues:
Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and
Trade:
GAO-08-231T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-231T, testimony before the Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2003, the Congress has obligated nearly $400 billion for U.S.
efforts in Iraq, of which about $40 billion has supported
reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Congressional oversight of
this substantial investment is crucial as the Administration requests
additional military and economic funds for Iraq.
This testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and
proposes three areas for which continued oversight is needed: (1)
progress in improving security and national reconciliation, (2) efforts
to develop clear U.S. strategies, and (3) Iraqi and international
contributions to economic development.
We reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed agency officials,
including the departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; and the U.S.
Agency for International Development; the UN; and the Iraqi government.
We also made multiple trips to Iraq as part of this work.
What GAO Found:
Since GAO last reported in September 2007, on the status of the 18
Iraqi benchmarks, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined.
While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet
advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding
provincial elections. In addition, sectarian influences within Iraqi
ministries continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of
Iraqi security forces.
U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and
performance measures. The U.S. strategy for victory in Iraq partially
identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the
strategy and does not fully address how the United States would
integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international
community. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministry capability lack an
overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S.
priorities have been subject to numerous changes. The weaknesses in
U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqi government‘s lack
of integrated strategic planning in its critical energy sector.
The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqis and international community
would help finance Iraq‘s reconstruction. However, the Iraqi government
has limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds. For example, Iraq
allocated $10 billion of its revenues for capital projects and
reconstruction in 2007. However, a large portion of this amount is
unlikely to be spent, as ministries had spent only 24 percent of their
capital budgets through mid-July 2007. Iraq has proposed spending only
$4 billion for capital projects in 2008, a significant reduction from
2007. The international community has pledged $15.6 billion for
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but about $11 billion of this is in the
form of loans.
Figure: Energy-Initiated Attacks May 2003 through September 2007:
This figure is a bar chart showing energy initiated attacks between May
2003 and September 2007. The bars show total monthly attack(s) on Iraqi
security forces, total monthly attack(s) on civilians, and total
monthly attack(s) on coalition. The X axis of the chart is the number
of attacks, and the Y axis is the month and year of the incident.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
September 2007.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO reports have recommended that the Administration, in conjunction
with the Iraqi government, develop clear and complete strategic plans
for overall and sector specific efforts in Iraq. The agencies generally
agreed on the importance of having clear strategies but provided
various comments on how best to implement these strategies.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://GAO-08-231T]. For more information, contact Joseph
A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairwoman Lowey, Ranking Member Wolf, and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's recent work on U.S.
efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq.
Over the last 4 years, the United States has provided thousands of
troops and obligated nearly $400 billion to help achieve the strategic
goal of creating a democratic Iraq that can defend itself and be an
ally in the war on terror. Of this amount, about $40 billion has been
used for reconstruction and stabilization purposes. Congressional
oversight of these substantial investments is crucial particularly
since the Administration is requesting additional military and economic
funds for U.S. efforts in Iraq.
This testimony summarizes the results of recent GAO audit work and
proposes three areas in which continued oversight is needed: (1)
progress in improving security and enacting Iraqi legislation that
promotes national reconciliation, (2) efforts to develop clear
strategies for programs to rebuild and stabilize Iraq, and (3) Iraqi
and international contributions to economic development in Iraq.
As part of this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed
officials with the departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and the
Treasury (Treasury); the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID); the Multinational Force-Iraq and its subordinate commands; the
Embassy Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO); the United Nations;
the World Bank; and the Iraqi government. As part of this work, we made
multiple visits to Iraq in 2006 and 2007, most recently in August 2007.
Because of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed our
work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United
States to conduct reviews on his own initiative. We conducted our
review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Summary:
In summary, we found that:
* Since GAO last reported on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks in
September 2007, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While
political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key
legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial
elections. In addition, sectarian influences within the Iraqi ministries
continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi
security forces.
* Key U.S. efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq lack strategies with
clear purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, and performance
measures. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by
the Iraqi government's lack of integrated strategic planning in its
critical energy sector.
* The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqi government and international
community funds would help finance Iraq's development needs. However,
the Iraqi government has limited capacity to spend reconstruction
funds. In addition, the international community has provided funds for
Iraq's reconstruction, but most of the funding offered has been in the
form of loans that the Iraqis have not accessed.
Background:
Iraq's national government was established after a constitutional
referendum in October 2005, followed by election of the first Council
of Representatives (Parliament) in December 2005, and the selection of
the first Prime Minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, in May 2006. By mid-
2006, the cabinet was approved; the government now has 34 ministries
responsible for providing security and essential services--including
electricity, water, and education--for the Iraqi people. The Ministry
of Finance is responsible for tracking and reporting government
expenditures. The Iraqi government uses single-year budgeting, which
generally requires that funds be used by December 31, the end of Iraq's
fiscal year.
In March 2003, the United States--along with the United Kingdom,
Australia, and other members of the coalition--began combat operations
in Iraq. The original "coalition of the willing" consisted of 49
countries (including the United States) that publicly committed to the
war effort and also provided a variety of support, such as direct
military participation, logistical and intelligence support, over-
flight rights, or humanitarian and reconstruction aid. Many nations and
various international organizations are supporting the efforts to
rebuild Iraq through multilateral or bilateral assistance. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1511 of October 16, 2003, urged member
states and international and regional organizations to support the Iraq
reconstruction effort. On October 23-24, 2003, an international donors
conference was held in Madrid, with 76 countries, 20 international
organizations, and 13 nongovernmental organizations participating.
Limited Progress Has Been Made in National Reconciliation:
Since GAO last reported on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks in
September 2007, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While
political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key
legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial
elections. In addition, sectarian influences within the Iraqi
ministries continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of
Iraqi security forces.
The January 2007 U.S. strategy, New Way Forward in Iraq, is designed to
support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and foster conditions
for national reconciliation by providing the Iraqi government with the
time and space needed to help address differences among the various
segments of Iraqi society. The number of enemy-initiated attacks on
civilians, Iraqi Security Forces, and coalition forces increased
dramatically after the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in
Samarra. The increase in the number of monthly attacks generally
continued through June 2007. To help quell the violence, the United
States deployed about 30,000 additional troops to Iraq during the
spring of 2007, bringing the total number of U.S. military personnel to
about 164,700 as of September 2007.
As depicted in figure 1, enemy-initiated attacks declined from a total
of about 5,300 in June 2007 to about 3,000 in September 2007. However,
the recent decrease in monthly attacks was primarily due to a decrease
in the number of attacks against coalition forces. Attacks against
Iraqi Security Forces and civilians have declined less than attacks
against coalition forces.
Figure 1: Energy-Initiated Attacks May 2003 through September 2007:
This figure is a bar chart showing energy initiated attacks between May
2003 and September 2007. The bars show total monthly attack(s) on Iraqi
security forces, total monthly attack(s) on civilians, and total
monthly attack(s) on coalition. The X axis of the chart is the number
of attacks, and the Y axis is the month and year of the incident.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
September 2007.
[End of figure]
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the incidents
captured in military reporting do not account for all violence
throughout Iraq. For example, they may underreport incidents of Shi'a
militias fighting each other and attacks against Iraqi security forces
in southern Iraq and other areas with few or no coalition forces.
In addition, according to a UN report released October 15, 2007, the
Iraqi people and government continue to confront major challenges
resulting from the devastating effects of violence. The UN reported
that widespread insecurity continues to make national dialogue
challenging, and increasing levels of displacement are adding to an
alarming humanitarian crisis.
The Iraqi government continues to make limited progress in meeting
eight legislative benchmarks intended to promote national
reconciliation.[Footnote 1] As of October 25, 2007, the Iraqi
government had met one legislative benchmark and partially met another.
Specifically, the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi
legislature were protected through existing provisions in the Iraqi
Constitution and Council of Representatives' by-laws. In addition, the
Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to enact and implement
legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in
October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008.
The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not yet
been met. Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the
constitutional review process, such as expanded powers for the
presidency, the resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and
power sharing between federal and regional governments over issues such
as the distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legislative
benchmarks requiring parliamentary action have not yet been met. Figure
2 highlights the status of the benchmarks requiring legislative
enactment and implementation.
Figure 2: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks, as of October 25, 2007:
This figure is a chart showing enactment and implementation status of
six legislative benchmarks, as of October 25, 2007.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, UN
and Iraqi government data.
[A] The Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts.
[B] According to State, the Iraqi legislature has received competing
drafts from the Council of Ministers and is awaiting clarification from
the Council.
[C] The Iraqi constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from
following the Presidency Council's ratification process, which is set
out in Article 138 of the Constitution.
[D] According to State, it is unclear if the Iraqi government needs
legislation to set an election date.
[End of figure]
Although State and Multinational Force-Iraq report progress in
promoting reconciliation at local levels such as Anbar province, at the
national level, sectarian factions within the Iraqi government
ministries continue to undermine reconciliation efforts. For example,
ministries within the Iraqi government continued to be controlled by
sectarian factions and are used to maintain power and provide patronage
to individuals and groups. According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency
report, the withdrawal of members of the Iraqi cabinet ended the Shi'a-
dominated coalition's claim to be a government of national unity and
further undermined Iraq's already faltering program of national
reconciliation. In late August 2007, Iraq's senior Shi'a and Sunni Arab
and Kurdish political leaders signed a unity accord signaling efforts
to foster greater national reconciliation. The accord covered draft
legislation on de-Ba'athification reform and provincial powers laws,
and established a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held
without charges. However, these laws have not been passed as of October
25, 2007.
The Iraqi government has made limited progress in developing effective
and non-sectarian forces. Since 2003, the United States has provided
about $19.2 billion to train and equip about 360,000 Iraqi soldiers and
police officers, in an effort to develop Iraqi security forces,
transfer security responsibilities to them and to the Iraqi government,
and ultimately withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. Iraqi security forces
have grown in size and are increasingly leading counterinsurgency
operations. However, only about 10 of 140 Iraqi army, national police,
and special operations forces are operating independently as of
September 2007.
Several factors have complicated the development of effective and loyal
Iraqi security forces. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a
single unified force with a primary mission of countering the
insurgency in Iraq. Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry
reporting result in an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security
forces present for duty. Third, sectarian and militia influences have
divided the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. According to the
Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, the Iraqi
National Police is not viable and should be disbanded. Fourth, Iraqi
units remain dependent upon the coalition for their logistical, command
and control, and intelligence capabilities.[Footnote 2]
United States and Iraq Lack Clear Strategies for Key Efforts:
Three GAO reports illustrate a recurring problem with U.S. efforts in
Iraq--the lack of strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles and
responsibilities, and performance measures. Our reports assessing (1)
the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI), (2) U.S. efforts to
develop planning and budget capacity in Iraq's ministries, and (3) U.S.
and Iraqi efforts to rebuild Iraq's energy sector show that clear
strategies are needed to guide U.S. efforts, manage risk, and identify
needed resources.
Developing a National Strategy for Iraq:
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq was intended to clarify the
President's strategy for achieving overall U.S. political, security,
and economic goals in Iraq. In our 2006 report, we found that the
strategy was incomplete. [Footnote 3] First, it only partially
identified the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the
strategy. Second, it did not fully address how the United States would
integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international
community, and it did not detail Iraq's anticipated contribution to its
future needs. Third, it only partially identified the current and
future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S.
military operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding
critical infrastructure. Without a complete strategy, U.S. efforts are
less likely to be effective. We recommended that the National Security
Council (NSC), along with DOD and State, complete the strategy by
addressing all six characteristics of an effective national strategy,
including detailed information on costs and roles and responsibilities.
NSC, State, and DOD did not comment on GAO's recommendations. In
commenting on the report, State asserted that GAO misrepresented the
NSVI's purpose--to provide the public a broad overview of the U.S.
strategy in Iraq, not to set forth details readily available elsewhere.
However, without detailed information on costs and roles and
responsibilities, the strategy does not provide Congress with a clear
road map for achieving victory in Iraq.
In addition, we have provided the Congress classified reports and
briefings on the Joint U.S. Embassy - Multinational Force-Iraq's
classified campaign plan for Iraq.
Building Capacity in Iraq's Ministries:
The development of competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to
stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq.[Footnote 4] To help Iraq develop the
capability of its ministries, the United States has provided about $300
million between fiscal years 2005 to 2007. The Administration has
requested an additional $255 million for fiscal year 2008 to continue
these efforts. However, U.S. efforts lack an overall strategy, no lead
agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been
subject to numerous changes. U.S. efforts also face four challenges
that pose risks to their success and long-term sustainability. First,
Iraqi government institutions have significant shortages of personnel
with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to provide
security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. Second,
Iraq's government confronts significant challenges in staffing a
nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia infiltration of key
ministries. Third, widespread corruption undermines efforts to develop
the government's capacity by robbing it of needed resources. Fourth,
violence in Iraq hinders U.S. advisors' access to Iraqi ministries,
increases absenteeism among ministry employees, and contributes to the
growing number of professional Iraqis leaving the country.
Without a unified U.S. strategy that clearly articulates agency roles
and responsibilities and addresses the risks cited above, U.S. efforts
are less likely to succeed. We recommended that the State Department
complete an overall integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development
efforts. Congress should also consider conditioning future
appropriations on the completion of the strategy. State recognized the
value of such a strategy but expressed concern about conditioning
further capacity development investment on completion of such a
strategy.
Reconstructing Iraq's Energy Sectors:
The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqis'
lack of strategic planning in its critical energy sector. As we
reported in May 2007, it is difficult to identify the most pressing
future funding needs, key rebuilding priorities, and existing
vulnerabilities and risks given the absence of an overarching strategic
plan that comprehensively assesses the requirements of the energy
sector as a whole.[Footnote 5] While the Iraqi government has crafted a
multiyear strategic plan for Iraq's electricity sector, no such plan
exists for the oil sector. Given the highly interdependent nature of
the oil and electricity sectors, such a plan would help identify the
most pressing needs for the entire energy sector and help overcome the
daunting challenges affecting future development prospects. For fiscal
years 2003 to 2006, the United States made available about $7.4 billion
and spent about $5.1 billion to rebuild Iraq's oil and electricity
sectors. However, production in both sectors has consistently fallen
below U.S. program goals of 3 million barrels per day and 6,000
megawatts of electrical peak generation capacity.
Billions of dollars are still needed to rebuild, maintain, and secure
Iraq's oil and electricity infrastructure, underscoring the need for
sound strategic planning. The Ministry of Electricity's 2006-2015
Electricity Master Plan estimates that $27 billion will be needed to
reach its goal of providing reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015.
According to DOD, investment in Iraq's oil sector is "woefully short"
of the absolute minimum required to sustain current production, and
additional foreign and private investment is needed. Moreover, U.S.
officials and industry experts estimate that Iraq would need $20
billion to $30 billion over the next several years to reach and sustain
a crude oil production capacity of 5 million barrels per day. We
recommended that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with relevant
U.S. agencies and international donors, work with Iraqi ministries to
develop an integrated energy strategy. State commented that the Iraqi
government, not the U.S. government, is responsible for taking action
on GAO's recommendations. We believe that the recommendations are still
valid given the billions made available for Iraq's energy sector and
the U.S. government's influence in overseeing Iraq's rebuilding
efforts.
Iraqi and International Contributions Have Played a Limited Role in
Rebuilding Iraq:
From the onset of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the U.S.
strategy assumed that the Iraqis and the international community would
help finance Iraq's development needs. However, the Iraqi government
has a limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds, which hinders its
ability to assume a more prominent role in rebuilding Iraq's crumbling
infrastructure. The international community has provided funds for
Iraq's reconstruction, but most of the funding offered has been in the
form of loans that the Iraqis have not accessed.
Iraqi Government Has Spent a Small Portion of Its Funds on
Reconstruction:
The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its 2007 revenues for
capital projects and reconstruction, including capital funds for the
provinces based on their populations. However, available data from the
government of Iraq and analysis from U.S. and coalition officials show
that, while 2007 spending has increased compared with 2006, a large
portion of Iraq's $10 billion in capital projects and reconstruction
budget will likely go unspent through the end of this year.[Footnote 6]
Iraq's ministries, for example, spent only 24 percent of their 2007
capital budgets through mid-July 2007.
U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified
a number of factors that affect the Iraqi government's ability to spend
capital budgets. In addition to the poor security environment and
"brain drain" issues, U.S. and foreign officials also noted that
weaknesses in Iraqi procurement and budgeting procedures impede
completion of capital projects. For example, according to the State
Department, Iraq's Contracting Committee requires about a dozen
signatures to approve projects exceeding $10 million, which slows the
process.
As a possible reflection of Iraq's difficulty in spending its capital
budgets, Iraq's proposed 2008 capital budget declines substantially (57
percent) from 2007 (see table 1).
Table 1: Government of Iraq 2007 Budget and Proposed 2008 Budget:
Dollars in millions.
Operating expenditures;
2007 Budget: $31,002;
Proposed 2008 Budget: $31,040;
Percentage change: 0.1.
Capital projects expenditures;
2007 Budget: 10,052;
Proposed 2008 Budget: 4,286;
Percentage change: -57.
Total;
2007 Budget: $41,054;
Proposed 2008 Budget: $35,326;
Percentage change: -14.
Source: GAO analysis of Iraqi government data provided by U.S.
Treasury.
Note: Budget figures in Iraq dinars are converted to dollars using a
constant exchange rate of ID 1260 per dollar. This preserves the growth
rates in Iraq dinars. For budget purposes, U.S. Treasury assumes that
the dinar will appreciate by 5 percent and uses an exchange rate of ID
1200 per dollar for the 2008 budget. This will add between 2 to 5
percentage points to the growth rates.
[End of table]
As a percentage of its overall budget, Iraq's capital expenditures will
decline from 24 percent in 2007 to 12 percent in 2008. We are
conducting a review of U.S. efforts to help Iraq spend its budget and
will issue a separate report at a later date.
International Donor Contributions:
As of April 2007, international donors have pledged about $14.9 billion
in support of Iraq reconstruction.[Footnote 7] In addition, some
countries exceeded their pledges by providing an additional $744
million for a total of about $15.6 billion, according to the State
Department. Of this amount, about $11 billion is in the form of loans.
As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about $436 million in loans from
the International Monetary Fund. The remaining $4.6 billion is in the
form of grants, to be provided multilaterally or bilaterally; $3
billion of that amount has been disbursed to Iraq. See appendix I for
pledges made at Madrid and thereafter for Iraq reconstruction. In
addition, 16 of the 41 countries that pledged funding for Iraq
reconstruction also provided troops to the multinational force in Iraq.
In addition to funds, some countries also contribute troops to the U.S.-
led coalition. As of September 2007, 26 countries were contributing
12,300 troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with the
164,700 forces from the United States, other coalition countries
represent about 7 percent of Multinational Forces in Iraq. From
December 2003 through September 2007, the number of non-U.S. coalition
troops decreased from 24,000 to 12,300 and the number of coalition
nations contributing troops to military operations decreased from 33 to
26.[Footnote 8] See appendix II for a comparison of U.S and coalition
troops from December 2003 through September 2007.
Conclusion:
As this committee is called upon to provide more resources to help
stabilize and rebuild Iraq, continued oversight is needed of the key
issues highlighted in today's testimony. While U.S. troops have
performed courageously under difficult and dangerous circumstances, the
continued violence and polarization of Iraqi society as well as the
Iraqi government's continued difficulties in funding its reconstruction
needs diminishes the prospects for achieving current U.S. security,
political, and economic goals in Iraq.
Of particular concern is the lack of strategic plans to guide U.S. and
Iraqi efforts to rebuild and stabilize the country. Our assessment of
the U.S. strategy for Iraq and recent efforts to build central ministry
capacity show that U.S. planning efforts have been plagued by unclear
goals and objectives, changing priorities, inadequate risk assessments,
and uncertain costs. Weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are
compounded by the lack of strategic planning in Iraq's energy sector,
the sector that provides the most government revenues.
Madam Chair this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other Members may have.
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact me on (202) 512-
8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this statement
were Stephen Lord, David Bruno, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Mattias
Fenton, Muriel Forster, Lisa Helmer, Dorian Herring, Patrick Hickey,
Bruce Kutnicky, Tetsuo Miyabara, Judith McCloskey, and Mary Moutsos.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Donor Pledges for Iraq Reconstruction (in thousands):
Table 2:
Donor: Australia;
Madrid Pledges: 45,590;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 28,680;
Total: 74,270.
Donor: Austria;
Madrid Pledges: 5,480;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 5,480.
Donor: Belgium;
Madrid Pledges: 5,890;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 5,890.
Donor: Bulgaria;
Madrid Pledges: 640;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 640.
Donor: Canada;
Madrid Pledges: 187,470;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 187,470.
Donor: China;
Madrid Pledges: 25,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 6,500;
Total: 31,500.
Donor: Croatia;
Madrid Pledges: 0;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 333;
Total: 333.
Donor: Cyprus;
Madrid Pledges: 120;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 120.
Donor: Czech Republic;
Madrid Pledges: 14,660;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 14,660.
Donor: Denmark;
Madrid Pledges: 26,950;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 35,000;
Total: 61,950.
Donor: European Commission;
Madrid Pledges: 235,620;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 685,685;
Total: 921,305.
Donor: Estonia;
Madrid Pledges: 80;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 80.
Donor: Finland;
Madrid Pledges: 5,890;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 2,944;
Total: 8,834.
Donor: Germany;
Madrid Pledges: 0;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 4,150;
Total: 4,150.
Donor: Greece;
Madrid Pledges: 3,530;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 3,618;
Total: 7,148.
Donor: Hungary;
Madrid Pledges: 1,240;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 430;
Total: 1,670.
Donor: Iceland;
Madrid Pledges: 2,500;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 500;
Total: 3,000.
Donor: India;
Madrid Pledges: 10,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 10,000.
Donor: Iran;
Madrid Pledges: 5,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges:
1,000,000;
Total: 1,005,000.
Donor: Ireland;
Madrid Pledges: 3,530;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 3,530.
Donor: Italy;
Madrid Pledges: 235,620;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 235,620.
Donor: Japan;
Madrid Pledges: 4,914,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 4,914,000.
Donor: Republic of Korea;
Madrid Pledges: 200,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 200,000.
Donor: Kuwait;
Madrid Pledges: 500,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 500,000.
Donor: Lithuania;
Madrid Pledges: 0;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 30;
Total: 30.
Donor: Luxembourg;
Madrid Pledges: 2,360;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 199;
Total: 2,559.
Donor: Malta;
Madrid Pledges: 27;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 27.
Donor: Netherlands;
Madrid Pledges: 9,420;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 3,465;
Total: 12,885.
Donor: New Zealand;
Madrid Pledges: 3,350;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 2,760;
Total: 6,110.
Donor: Norway;
Madrid Pledges: 12,870;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 10,840;
Total: 23,710.
Donor: Oman;
Madrid Pledges: 3,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 3,000.
Donor: Pakistan;
Madrid Pledges: 2,500;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 2,500.
Donor: Portugal;
Madrid Pledges: 0;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 600;
Total: 600.
Donor: Qatar;
Madrid Pledges: 100,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 100,000.
Donor: Saudi Arabia;
Madrid Pledges: 500,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 500,000.
Donor: Slovenia;
Madrid Pledges: 420;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 420.
Donor: Spain;
Madrid Pledges: 220,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 28,000;
Total: 248,000.
Donor: Sweden;
Madrid Pledges: 33,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 33,000.
Donor: Turkey;
Madrid Pledges: 50,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 50,000.
Donor: United Arab Emirates;
Madrid Pledges: 215,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 215,000.
Donor: United Kingdom;
Madrid Pledges: 452,330;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 198,000;
Total: 650,330.
Donor: Vietnam;
Madrid Pledges: 0;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 700;
Total: 700.
Donor: Lower end of planned World Bank lending;
Madrid Pledges: 3,000,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 3,000,000.
Donor: Lower end of planned IMF lending;
Madrid Pledges: 2,550,000;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges: 0;
Total: 2,550,000.
Donor: Total non-US pledges and donations;
Madrid Pledges: 13,583,087;
Post-Madrid Pledges and Donations in Excess of Madrid Pledges:
2,012,434;
Total: 15,595,521.
Source: Not available.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: U.S. and Coalition Troops in Iraq (in thousands):
Figure: U.S. and Coalition Troops in Iraq (in thousands):
This figure is a bar chart showing the number of troops, in thousands,
in Iraq. In December, 2003, there were 126.9 U.S. troops, and 24.0
Coalition troops. In July 2004, there were 126.8 U.S. troops, and 22.0
Coalition troops. In December 2004, there were 152.3 U.S. troops, and
25.0 Coalition troops. In July 2005, there were 139.2 U.S. troops, and
23.0 Coalition troops. In December 2005, there were 155.1 U.S. troops,
and 23.0 Coalition troops. In July 2006, there were 133.5 U.S. troops,
and 19.0 Coalition troops. In December 2006, there were 131.5 U.S.
troops, and 15.2 Coalition troops. In July 2007, there were 161.4 U.S.
troops, and 11.5 Coalition troops. In September 2007, there were 164.7
U.S. troops, and 12.3 Coalition troops.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
[End of figure]
Footnotes:
[1] Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has
Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO-07-
1195 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007).
[2] For more information, see Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the
Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces, GAO-07-612T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 13, 2007).
[3] Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to
Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).
[4] Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development
Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage
Risk, GAO-08-117 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007).
[5] Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore
Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors, GAO-07-677 (Washington, D.C.: May
15, 2007).
[6] Iraq's fiscal year is January 1 to December 31.
[7] Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and
International Donor Commitments, GAO-07-827T (Washington, D.C.: May 9,
2007).
[8] In addition to multinational force contributions, six countries
contribute troops to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, which supports
training of Iraqi security forces. As of September 2007, these
countries were Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and
Turkey.
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