Stabilization and Reconstruction
Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations Gao ID: GAO-08-228T October 30, 2007The United States has become increasingly involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations as evidenced in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44, establishing governmentwide policy for coordinating, planning, and implementing U.S. stabilization and reconstruction assistance to affected foreign entities. This testimony addresses stabilization and reconstruction issues related to (1) State Department (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to enhance its capabilities and planning, and (3) State efforts to develop civilian capabilities. GAO's statement is based on its May 2007 report on DOD stability operations and preliminary observations related to State's interagency planning framework and civilian response capabilities.
State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework has yet to be fully applied to any operation. The National Security Council has not approved the entire framework, guidance related to the framework is unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted it. For example, some interagency partners stated that the framework's planning process is cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it produces. While steps have been taken to address concerns and strengthen the framework's effectiveness, differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies may pose obstacles to effective coordination. DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder DOD's ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. Among its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy, planning construct and joint operating concept with a greater focus on stability operations, and each service is pursuing efforts to improve capabilities. However, inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of these improvement efforts. Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises, but significant challenges must be addressed before they will be fully capable. State and other agencies face challenges in establishing two of these units--the Active Response Corps and Standby Response Corps--because of staffing and resource constraints and concerns that stabilization and reconstruction operations are not core missions for each parent organization. Congress has not yet enacted legislation necessary for State to obligate funds for the third unit, the Civilian Reserve Corps, staffed solely with non-federal volunteers. Further, State has not fully defined the types of missions these personnel would be deployed to support.
GAO-08-228T, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-228T
entitled 'Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve
Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations' which
was released on October 30, 2007.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, October 30, 2007:
Stabilization and Reconstruction:
Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for
Future Operations:
Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director International Affairs and
Trade, and:
Janet A. St. Laurent, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-08-228T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-228T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The United States has become increasingly involved in stabilization and
reconstruction operations as evidenced in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia,
Iraq, and Afghanistan. In December 2005, the President issued National
Security Presidential Directive 44, establishing governmentwide policy
for coordinating, planning, and implementing U.S. stabilization and
reconstruction assistance to affected foreign entities. This testimony
addresses stabilization and reconstruction issues related to (1) State
Department (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and
coordination, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to enhance its
capabilities and planning, and (3) State efforts to develop civilian
capabilities. GAO‘s statement is based on its May 2007 report on DOD
stability operations and preliminary observations related to State‘s
interagency planning framework and civilian response capabilities
What GAO Found:
State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate
stabilization and reconstruction activities, but several significant
challenges may hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential
operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct
them. State‘s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when
planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework
has yet to be fully applied to any operation. The National Security
Council has not approved the entire framework, guidance related to the
framework is unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted
it. For example, some interagency partners stated that the framework‘s
planning process is cumbersome and too time consuming for the results
it produces. While steps have been taken to address concerns and
strengthen the framework‘s effectiveness, differences in planning
capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies may pose
obstacles to effective coordination.
DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct
stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities
and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD
agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons
learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if
not addressed, may hinder DOD‘s ability to fully coordinate and
integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other
agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations
may require. Among its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy,
planning construct and joint operating concept with a greater focus on
stability operations, and each service is pursuing efforts to improve
capabilities. However, inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit
sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and
differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-
DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of these improvement
efforts.
Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy
rapidly to international crises, but significant challenges must be
addressed before they will be fully capable. State and other agencies
face challenges in establishing two of these units”the Active Response
Corps and Standby Response Corps”because of staffing and resource
constraints and concerns that stabilization and reconstruction
operations are not core missions for each parent organization. Congress
has not yet enacted legislation necessary for State to obligate funds
for the third unit, the Civilian Reserve Corps, staffed solely with non-
federal volunteers. Further, State has not fully defined the types of
missions these personnel would be deployed to support.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommended that DOD take several actions to improve its
capabilities and interagency planning. DOD partially agreed but did not
specify actions it would take to address them. Therefore GAO suggests
Congress require DOD to do so. GAO has prepared a draft report with
recommendations to State to address the issues cited in this testimony
and is reviewing State‘s comments on the draft.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-228T]. For more information, contact
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov, and Joseph
Christoff, (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the goals, opportunities,
and challenges to improving an integrated government approach to
stability and reconstruction operations, which is becoming an
increasingly important aspect of our national security. Stabilization
and reconstruction operations may include efforts to reestablish
security, strengthen governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve
social and economic well-being in foreign states and regions at risk
of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. These
operations have increasingly become a central operational mission for
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State),
highlighted by experiences in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. The Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study on
Transition to and from Hostilities noted that since the end of the Cold
War, the United States has been involved in either a stability or
reconstruction operation every 18 to 24 months, these operations
typically last 5 to 8 years, and they are costly in terms of human
lives and dollars.
In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential
Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which established the overall governmentwide
policy related to interagency efforts for stabilization and
reconstruction efforts. The purpose of NSPD-44 is to promote the
security of the United States through improved coordination, planning,
and implementation for stabilization and reconstruction assistance to
foreign states and regions. NSPD-44 assigned the responsibility for
coordinating and leading integrated federal efforts to plan for and
conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities to the Secretary of
State. It further stated that the Secretary of State shall coordinate
such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmony with any
planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of
conflict. State and DOD have emphasized that success in stabilization
and reconstruction efforts will depend heavily upon the ability to
develop an integrated, interagency approach, and they have initiated
steps to facilitate this shift in focus.
Our testimony today will address (1) Department of State efforts to
improve interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and
reconstruction operations, (2) Department of Defense efforts to enhance
stability operations capabilities and plans, and (3) State efforts to
develop a civilian response capability.
Our testimony is based on recently completed or ongoing work that
addresses DOD and State efforts to enhance and better integrate
stability and reconstruction capabilities. In May 2007, we issued a
report to Representative Christopher Shays, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, on the DOD's approach to stability
operations and interagency planning and made several recommendations
for executive action.[Footnote 1] We are also completing work for
Representative Shays and this subcommittee on State's interagency
planning framework and civilian response capacities, and we have
prepared a draft report summarizing our results. We are reviewing
State's comments on our draft report and are developing recommendations
to address the problems cited in this statement. For both our prior
report and ongoing work, we obtained and analyzed National Security
Presidential Directives; DOD, State, and other relevant agencies'
internal policies; planning guidance; operational plans; budget
requests and funding allocations for stability and reconstruction
efforts. We met with cognizant officials from the Departments of
Defense, State, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice and
the Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID);
and private research centers. We also met with various officials and
military planners from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command,
and U.S. Pacific Command and, collectively, 14 component commands.
While NSPD-44 also charges State with coordinating U.S. stabilization
and reconstruction efforts with foreign governments, multilateral
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, these areas lie
outside the scope of our review. Our work was conducted from October
2005 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Summary:
State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS) is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when
planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations
for countries at risk of, in, or emerging from conflict. The National
Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three elements of the
framework--an Interagency Management System and procedures for
initiating the framework's use.[Footnote 2] However, the third element-
-a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--has
not been approved or completed. While S/CRS has tested parts of the
framework, it has not fully applied it to any stabilization and
reconstruction operation. In completing the framework, State must
address three unresolved issues. First, NSPD-44, the Foreign Affairs
Manual, and the framework provide unclear and inconsistent guidance on
the roles and responsibilities of S/CRS and State's other bureaus and
offices. Second, the lack of a common definition for stability and
reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency
collaboration. Third, some interagency partners expressed concerns over
the importance and utility of the framework, stating that the framework
is cumbersome and time-consuming for the results it has produced.
DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct
stability operations but faces challenges in identifying needed
capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the
contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and
incorporating lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may
hinder DOD's ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization
and reconstruction activities with other elements of national power, or
to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require.
Since November 2005, the department issued a new directive focused on
stability operations, expanded its military planning guidance, and
developed a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for
stability operations. Notwithstanding these positive and important
steps, however, DOD has encountered challenges in identifying stability
operations capabilities and developing measures of effectiveness--both
of which are key tasks required by DOD's recent directive and important
steps in performance-based management. In addition, DOD is taking steps
to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability
operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms at the
combatant commands to facilitate and encourage interagency
participation in its planning efforts. This shortcoming has occurred
due to inadequate guidance, DOD practices that limit the sharing of
planning information without the specific consent of the Secretary of
Defense, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of
all organizations involved. Also, although DOD collects lessons learned
from past and ongoing operations, DOD planners are not consistently
using these lessons learned as they develop future contingency plans.
We have recommended that DOD take several actions, such as providing
more comprehensive guidance to combatant commanders and the services on
how to identify and prioritize stability operations capabilities and
the mechanisms needed to facilitate and encourage interagency
participation in the development of military plans. We have also
suggested that Congress require DOD to develop an action plan and
report annually on its efforts to address our recommendations.
Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy
rapidly to international crises but has not addressed key details for
establishing and maintaining these units. State created two units
within the department--an Active Response Corps (ARC) and Standby
Response Corps (SRC) to serve as early responders to an international
crisis. State also has collaborated with other U.S. government agencies
to create similar units. In May 2007, State received funding, subject
to further congressional authorization, to establish a third corps--the
Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC)--which would deploy a cadre of civilian
volunteers such as police officers, judges, public administrators, and
civil engineers. However, State and other agencies face challenges in
establishing their response corps, including difficulties in (1)
achieving planned staffing levels and required training, (2) securing
resources for international operations that some agencies do not view
as part of their domestic missions, and (3) ensuring that home units
are not understaffed as a result of overseas deployments. State faces
additional challenges in creating the Civilian Reserve Corps. State
does not yet have congressional authority to establish the corps and
offer personnel an attractive benefits package. Further, State is
moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a common
interagency definition of what constitutes a stabilization and
reconstruction operation. We are reviewing State Department's comments
on our draft report and developing recommendations to address the
problems cited in this statement.
Background:
Both State and DOD recognize the need to improve stability and
reconstruction capabilities of the United States, and the importance of
coordinating military activities with those of other U.S. government
agencies and international partners. Following the problems with
reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the Fall of 2003, State noted that
the U.S. government had no standing civilian capacity to plan,
implement, or manage stabilization and reconstruction operations and
had relied on ad hoc processes for planning and executing these
efforts. State recommended that a new office be established to provide
a centralized and permanent structure for planning and coordinating the
civilian response to stabilization and reconstruction operations.
In August 2004, the Secretary of State announced the creation of the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
to coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and resource responses to
complex emergencies, failing and failed states, and post conflict
environments. Such efforts could involve establishing security,
building basic public services, and economic development. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 granted statutory authorization
for S/CRS within the Office of the Secretary of State.[Footnote 3]
In November 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations, which established the Department's policy for stability
operations. In its directive, DOD recognizes that stability operations
is a core U.S. military mission, but that many stability operations are
best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals
and that DOD's participation may be in a supporting role. However, it
also states that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all
tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do
so.
In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to promote the security
of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and
implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance. NSPD-44
assigned the Secretary of State the responsibility to coordinate and
lead U.S. government efforts to plan for, prepare and conduct
stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries and regions at
risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The
Secretary, in turn, delegated implementation of the directive to S/CRS.
NSPD-44 identifies roles, responsibilities, and coordination
requirements of U.S. government agencies that would likely participate
in stabilization and reconstruction operations. It also requires that
State lead the development of civilian response capability, including
the capacity to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and
effectively to overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44 established the NSC
Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization
Operations to manage the development, implementation, and coordination
of stabilization and reconstruction national security policies.
State's Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clearly Defined
Roles and Responsibilities, and Interagency Support:
S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning
and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. The NSC
has adopted two of three elements of the framework--the Interagency
Management System (IMS) and procedures for initiating the framework's
use. One element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction
operations--has not been completed. As of October 2007, the framework
has not been fully applied to any operation. In addition, NSPD-44, the
Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and
inconsistent guidance on roles and responsibilities for S/CRS and other
State bureaus and offices; the lack of a common definition for
stability and reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to
interagency collaboration; and some partners have shown limited support
for the framework and S/CRS.
S/CRS Is Leading the Development of an Interagency Framework for
Planning and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction
Operations:
S/CRS is leading an NSC interagency group of 16 agencies to create a
framework for developing specific stabilization and reconstruction
plans under NSPD-44. The framework is intended to guide the development
of U.S. planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations by
facilitating coordination across federal agencies and aligning
interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Key elements of the framework include an IMS, a guide for planning
specific stabilization and reconstruction operations, and procedures
for initiating governmentwide planning.
The IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high-
priority and highly complex crises and operations. In March 2007, the
NSC approved the IMS, which would guide coordination between
Washington, D.C. policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and
military planners. If used, IMS would include three new interagency
groups for responding to specific crises: a Country Reconstruction and
Stabilization Group, an Integration Planning Cell, and an Advance
Civilian Team. The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group would
be responsible for developing U.S. government policies that integrate
civilian and military plans and for mobilizing civilian responses to
stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Integration Planning
Cell would integrate U.S. civilian agencies' plans with military
operations. The Advance Civilian Team would be deployed to U.S.
embassies to set up, coordinate, and conduct field operations and
provide expertise on implementing civilian operations to the Chief of
Mission and military field commanders. These teams would be supported
by Field Advance Civilian Teams to assist reconstruction efforts at the
local level.
The second element of the framework, which the NSC approved in March
2007, establishes procedures for initiating the use of the framework
for planning a U.S. response to an actual crisis or in longer-term
scenario-based planning. Factors that may trigger the use of the
framework include the potential for military action, actual or imminent
state failure, the potential for regional instability, displacement of
large numbers of people, and grave human rights violations. The use of
the framework for planning crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC
or by a direct request from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
Defense. The NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional Assistant Secretaries
of State may request the framework's initiation for longer-term
scenario planning for crises that may occur within 2 to 3 years.
The third element, the planning guide, has not been approved by the NSC
because State is rewriting the draft planning guide to address
interagency concerns.[Footnote 4] Although NSC approval of the draft
planning guide is not required, S/CRS officials stated that NSC
approval would lend authority to the framework and strengthen its
standing among interagency partners. The draft planning guide divides
planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations into three
levels: policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation
planning. The guide states that the goals and objectives at each level
should be achievable, be linked to planned activities, and include well-
defined measures for determining progress.
As of October 2007, the administration had not fully applied the
framework to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. While IMS
was approved by the NSC, the administration has not yet applied it to a
current or potential crisis. The administration also applied earlier
versions of one component of the framework--the planning guide--for
efforts in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo. According to State officials, the
administration has been using NSPD-1 processes to manage and plan U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the absence of an approved
framework.[Footnote 5]
Framework Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities, Common
Definitions, and Interagency Support:
In completing the framework, State must resolve three key problems.
First, NSPD-44, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide
unclear and inconsistent guidance on the roles and responsibilities of
S/CRS and State's bureaus and offices, resulting in confusion and
disputes about who should lead policy development and control resources
for stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Foreign Affairs
Manual does not define S/CRS's roles and responsibilities, but it does
define responsibilities for State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of
Mission. Each regional bureau is responsible for providing direction,
coordination, and supervision of U.S. activities in countries within
the region,[Footnote 6] while each Chief of Mission has authority over
all U.S. government staff and activities in the country.[Footnote 7]
However, according to S/CRS's initial interpretation of NSPD-44, it was
responsible for leading, planning, and coordinating stabilization and
reconstruction operations. Staff from one of State's regional bureaus
said that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with the
Regional Assistant Secretary's responsibility for leading an operation
and coordinating with interagency partners. More recently, according to
S/CRS officials, S/CRS has taken a more facilitative role in
implementing NSPD-44.
Second, the lack of a common definition for stability and
reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to effective interagency
collaboration under the framework. The framework does not define what
constitutes stabilization or reconstruction operations, including what
specific missions and activities would be involved. In addition, the
framework does not explain how these operations differ from other types
of military and civilian operations, such as counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, and development assistance. As a result, it is not
clear when, where, or how the administration would apply the framework.
In our October 2005 report, we found that collaborative efforts require
agency staff to define and articulate a common outcome or
purpose.[Footnote 8] Prior GAO work shows that the lack of a clear
definition can pose an obstacle to improved planning and coordination
of stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Third, some interagency partners and State staff expressed concern over
the framework's importance and utility. For example, some interagency
partners and staffs from various State offices said that senior
officials did not communicate strong support for S/CRS or the
expectation that State and interagency partners should use the
framework. S/CRS has not been given key roles for operations that
emerged after its creation, such as the ongoing efforts in Lebanon and
Somalia, which several officials and experts stated are the types of
operations S/CRS was created to address. In addition, USAID staff noted
that some aspects of the planning framework were unrealistic,
ineffective, and redundant because interagency teams had already
devised planning processes for ongoing operations in accordance with
NSPD-1. Further, some interagency partners believe the planning
process, as outlined in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and
time consuming for the results it produces. Although officials who
participated in planning for Haiti stated that the process provided
more systematic planning, some involved in the operations for Haiti and
Sudan said that the framework was too focused on process. Staff also
said that in some cases, the planning process did not improve outcomes
or increase resources, particularly since S/CRS has few resources to
offer. As a result, officials from some offices and agencies have
expressed reluctance to work with S/CRS on future stabilization and
reconstruction plans.
DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations, But Faces
Significant Challenges to Improve Capabilities and Planning:
DOD has taken several positive steps toward developing a new approach
to stability operations but has encountered challenges in several
areas. As discussed in our May 2007 report, since November 2005, the
department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning
guidance, and developed a joint operating concept to help guide DOD
planning for stability operations.[Footnote 9] However, because DOD has
not yet fully identified and prioritized stability operations
capabilities as required by DOD's new policy, the services are pursuing
initiatives that may not provide the comprehensive set of capabilities
that combatant commanders need to accomplish stability operations in
the future. Also, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures
of effectiveness as required by DOD Directive 3000.05, which may hinder
the department's ability to determine if its efforts to improve
stability operations capabilities are achieving the desired results.
Similarly, the combatant commanders are establishing working groups and
other outreach efforts to include non-DOD organizations in the
development of a wide range of military plans that combatant commanders
routinely develop, but these efforts have had a limited effect because
of inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning
information, and differences in the planning capabilities and
capacities of all organizations involved. Finally, although DOD
collects lessons learned from past operations, DOD does not have a
process to ensure that lessons learned are considered when plans are
reviewed. As a result, DOD heightens its risk of either repeating past
mistakes or being unable to build on its experiences from past
operations as it plans for future operations.
DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations:
Among the many improvement efforts under way, DOD has taken three key
steps that frame its approach to stability operations. First, in
November 2005, DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which formalized a
stability operations policy that elevated stability operations to a
core mission, gave such operations priority comparable to combat
operations, and stated that stability operations will be explicitly
addressed and integrated across all DOD activities, including doctrine,
training, education, exercises, and planning. The directive also states
that many stability operations are best performed by indigenous,
foreign, or U.S. civilian personnel, but that U.S. military forces
shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to maintain order when
civilians cannot do so. The directive assigned approximately 115
specific responsibilities to 18 DOD organizations. For example, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for, among other
things, identifying DOD-wide stability operations capabilities, and
recommending priorities to the Secretary of Defense, and submitting a
semiannual stability operations report to the Secretary of Defense.
A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to
broaden its military planning guidance beyond DOD's traditional
emphasis on combat operations for joint operations to include noncombat
activities to stabilize countries or regions and prevent hostilities
and postcombat activities that emphasize stabilization, reconstruction,
and transition governance to civil authorities.[Footnote 10] Figure 1
illustrates the change in DOD planning guidance.
Figure 1: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations:
This figure is a chart showing the flow of prior and current phases of
military operations.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 1, military planners in DOD's combatant commands
will now be required to plan for six phases of an operation, which
include new phases focused on (1) shaping efforts to stabilize regions
so that conflicts do not develop and (2) enabling civil authorities.
These are also the phases of an operation that will require significant
unity of effort and close coordination between DOD and other federal
agencies.
A third step taken by DOD that frames the approach to stability
operations was the publication, by Joint Forces Command, of the
Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept. This publication
will serve as a basis for how the military will support stabilization,
security, transition, and reconstruction operations in foreign
countries in the next 15 to 20 years.
The military services also have taken complementary actions to improve
stability operations capabilities. For example, the Marine Corps has
established a program to improve cultural awareness training, increased
civil affairs planning in its operational headquarters, and established
a Security Cooperation Training Center. Navy officials highlighted
service efforts to (1) align its strategic plan and operations concept
to support stability operations, (2) establish the Navy Expeditionary
Combat Command, and (3) dedicate Foreign Area Officers to specific
countries as their key efforts to improve stability operations
capabilities.
Specific Challenges Hinder DOD's Ability to Develop Capabilities and
Encourage Interagency Participation in Combatant Command Planning
Efforts:
We have identified four specific challenges that if not addressed, may
hinder DOD's ability to develop the full range of capabilities needed
for stability operations, or to facilitate interagency participation in
the routine planning activities at the combatant commands.
* DOD has not identified and prioritized the full range of capabilities
needed for stability operations. At the time of our review, DOD had
made limited progress in fully identifying and prioritizing
capabilities needed for stability operations, which was required by DOD
Directive 3000.05. In the absence of DOD-wide guidance, a variety of
approaches were being used by the combatant commands to identify
stability operations capabilities and requirements.
We identified two factors that limited DOD's progress in carrying out
the capability gap assessment process.[Footnote 11] First, at the time
of our review, DOD had not issued its 2007 planning guidance to the
combatant commanders that reflect the new 6-phase approach to planning
previously discussed in this testimony. This planning guidance forms
the basis on which combatant commanders develop operational plans and
identify needed capabilities. Second, there was significant confusion
over how to define stability operations. For example, Air Force
officials stated in their May 22, 2006, Stability Operations Self-
Assessment that the absence of a common lexicon for stability
operations functions, tasks, and actions results in unnecessary
confusion and uncertainty when addressing stability operations. This
lack of a clear and consistent definition of stability operations has
caused confusion across DOD about how to identify stability operations
activities and the end state for which commanders need to plan.
Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant commands to
identify requirements, and the different approaches taken by the
services to develop capabilities, the potential exists that the
department may not be identifying and prioritizing the most critical
capabilities needed by the combatant commanders, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy has not been able to recommend
capability priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The department
recognizes the importance of successfully completing these capability
assessments, and in the August 2006 report on stability operations to
the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary stated that the
department has not yet defined the magnitude of DOD's stability
operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the scope of
these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the department.
* DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of
effectiveness. DOD Directive 3000.05 required numerous organizations
within DOD to develop measures of effectiveness that could be used to
evaluate progress in meeting their respective goals outlined in the
directive. Our past work on DOD transformation reported the advantages
of using management tools, such as performance measures, to gauge
performance in helping organizations successfully manage major
transformation efforts.[Footnote 12] Performance measures are an
important results-oriented management tool that can enable managers to
determine the extent to which desired outcomes are being achieved.
Performance measures should include a baseline and target; be
objective, measurable, and quantifiable; and include specific time
frames. Results-oriented measures further ensure that it is not the
task itself being evaluated, but progress in achieving the intended
outcome.
Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however, as
of March 2007, we found that DOD achieved limited progress in
developing measures of effectiveness because of significant confusion
over how this task should be accomplished and minimal guidance provided
by the Office of Policy. For example, each of the services described to
us alternative approaches it was taking to develop measures of
effectiveness, and three services initially placed this task on hold
pending guidance from DOD. Officials in the combatant commands we
visited were either waiting for additional guidance or stated that that
there were no actions taken to develop measures of effectiveness.
Without clear departmentwide guidance on how to develop measures of
effectiveness and milestones for completing them, confusion may
continue to exist within the department, and progress on this important
management tool may be significantly hindered.
* DOD has not fully established mechanisms that would help it achieve
consistent interagency participation in the military planning process.
The combatant commanders routinely develop a wide range of military
plans for potential contingencies for which DOD may need to seek input
from other agencies or organizations. Within the combatant commands
where contingency plans are developed, the department is either
beginning to establish working groups or is reaching out to U.S.
embassies on an ad hoc basis to obtain interagency perspectives. But
this approach to coordinate with embassies on an ad-hoc basis can be
cumbersome, does not facilitate interagency participation in the actual
planning process, and does not include all organizations that may be
able to contribute to the operation being planned.
Three factors hinder interagency participation in DOD's routine
planning activities at the combatant commands. First, DOD has not
provided specific guidance to the commands on how to integrate planning
with non-DOD organizations. Second, DOD does not have a process in
place to facilitate the sharing of planning information with non-DOD
agencies because department policy is to not share DOD contingency
plans with agencies or offices outside of DOD unless directed by the
Secretary of Defense. Third, DOD and non-DOD organizations, such as
State and USAID, lack an understanding of each other's planning
processes and capabilities and have different planning cultures and
capacities.
* DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, but planners are
not consistently using this information as they develop future
contingency plans. Lessons learned from current and past operations are
being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our
analysis shows that DOD planners are not using this information on a
consistent basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors
contribute to this inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning: (1)
DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons learned into plans is outdated
and does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned
in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned
databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not
evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into
specific plans. As a result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of
the lessons-learned systems and may repeat past mistakes.
In our May 2007 report,[Footnote 13] we recommended that DOD provide
comprehensive guidance to enhance their efforts to (1) identify and
address capability gaps, (2) develop measures of effectiveness, and (3)
facilitate interagency participation in the development of military
plans. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense in
coordination with the Secretary of State develop a process to share
planning information with interagency representatives early in the
development of military contingency plans, and more fully incorporate
stability operations-related lessons learned into the planning process.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendations but did not state what
specific steps, if any, it plans to take to implement them. Therefore,
we included a matter for congressional consideration suggesting that
Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop an
action plan and report annually on the specific steps being taken to
address our recommendations and the current status of its efforts.
State Is Establishing Three Civilian Corps but Must Address Staffing
Issues and Seek Additional Congressional Approvals:
Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy
rapidly to international crises. State has established two internal
units made up of State employees--the Active Response Corps (ARC) and
the Standby Response Corps (SRC). In May 2007, State began an effort to
establish the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would be made up of
nonfederal civilians who would become full-time term federal employees.
State and other agencies face difficulties in establishing positions
and recruiting personnel for the ARC and training SRC volunteers;
securing resources for international operations not viewed as part of
the agencies' domestic missions; and addressing the possibility that
deployed volunteers could result in staff shortages for the home unit.
For the CRC, State needs further congressional authorization to
establish the Corps and provide compensation packages. Further, State
is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a common
interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Agencies Have Partially Staffed Active and Standby Response Corps;
Civilian Reserve Corps Still a Concept:
To meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian
response capability, State and other U.S. agencies are developing three
corps of civilians to support stabilization and reconstruction
operations. Table 1 summarizes the three civilian corps.
Table 1: Three Civilian Corps under Development:
Unit: Active Response Corps (ARC);
Composition of volunteers: Current State employees serving 1-year
rotations as first responders;
Deployment: Within 24-48 hours for 3-6 months;
Responsibilities: Deploy to unstable environments to support a U.S.
mission, engage with a host country government, and conduct assessments
in the field;
Personnel, as of 2007:
* 11 filled positions;
* 15 approved temporary positions;
Government-wide personnel goal, for FY 2009: 265.
Unit: Standby Response Corps (SRC);
Composition of volunteers: Current and retired State employees
available as second responders;
Deployment: Within 30-60 days for up to 6 months;
Responsibilities: Deploy to unstable environments to assist ARC when
additional or specialized personnel are needed;
Personnel, as of 2007:
* 91 current State employees ready to deploy;
* 209 retirees on roster;
Government-wide personnel goal, for FY 2009: 2,000.
Unit: Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC);
Composition of volunteers: Non-U.S. government employees with expertise
in critical areas serving 4-year terms;
Deployment: Within 30-60 days for up to 1 year;
Responsibilities: Rapidly deploy to a country in crisis to conduct
assessments; design, implement and evaluate programs; manage
contractors, etc.;
Personnel, as of 2007: None;
Government-wide personnel goal, for FY 2009: 2,000.
Source: GAO analysis of State Department information.
[End of table]
In 2006, State established the ARC within S/CRS, whose members would
deploy during the initial stage of a U.S. stabilization and
reconstruction operation. These first responders would deploy to
unstable environments to assess countries' or regions' needs and help
plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response. Since 2006,
S/CRS has deployed ARC staff to Sudan, Eastern Chad, Lebanon, Kosovo,
Liberia, Iraq, and Haiti. When not deployed, ARC members engage in
training and other planning exercises and work with other S/CRS offices
and State bureaus on related issues to gain relevant expertise.
Members of the SRC would deploy during the second stage of a
stabilization and reconstruction operation and would supplement ARC
staff or provide specialized skills needed for the stabilization and
reconstruction operation. When not deployed, SRC employees serve in
other capacities throughout State. Through October 2007, S/CRS has
deployed SRC members to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement
and to Chad to support Darfur refugees who had migrated into the
country.
S/CRS has worked to establish Active and Standby Response Corps in
other U.S. agencies that could be drawn upon during the initial stage
of a stabilization and reconstruction operation. Currently, only USAID
and the Department of the Treasury have established units to respond
rapidly to stability and reconstruction missions and have identified
staff available for immediate deployment to a crisis. In July 2007, the
NSC approved S/CRS plans to establish a governmentwide SRC with 500
volunteers by fiscal year 2008 and 2,000 volunteers by fiscal year
2009.
In 2007, State received authority to make available funds to establish
a CRC. This corps' staff would be deployed to support stabilization and
reconstruction operations for periods of time longer than the Active
and Standby Response Corps. The CRC would be comprised of U.S.
civilians from the private sector, state and local governments, and
nongovernmental organizations who have skills not readily available
within the U.S. government. These reservists would remain in their
nonfederal jobs until called upon for service and, when deployed, would
be classified as full-time term federal employees. They would have the
authority to speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government
contracts and employees. These personnel would receive training upon
joining CRC and would be required to complete annual training. In
addition, they would receive training specific and relevant to an
operation immediately before deployment.
The Administration Faces Several Challenges in Establishing the Three
Civilian Corps:
Based on our work to date, State and other agencies face the following
challenges in establishing and expanding their Active and Standby
Response Corps.
* S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting
personnel for ARC and training SRC volunteers. S/CRS plans to increase
the number of authorized staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary
positions to 33 permanent positions, which State included in its 2008
budget request. However, according to S/CRS staff, it is unlikely that
State will receive authority to establish all 33 positions. Further, S/
CRS has had trouble recruiting ARC personnel, and as shown in Table 1,
S/CRS has only been able to recruit 11 of the 15 approved ARC
positions. State also does not presently have the capacity to train the
1,500 new SRC volunteers that S/CRS plans to recruit in 2009. S/CRS is
studying ways to correct the situation.
* Many agencies that operate overseas have limited numbers of staff
available for rapid responses to overseas crises because their missions
are domestic in nature. Officials from the Departments of Commerce,
Homeland Security, and Justice said that their agencies or their
appropriators do not view international programs as central to their
missions. As a result, it is difficult for these agencies to secure
funding for deployments to active stabilization and reconstruction
operations, whether as part of a cadre of on-call first and second
responders or for longer-term assistance programs.
* State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can result in
staff shortages in their home units; thus, they must weigh the value of
deploying volunteers against the needs of these units. For example,
according to State's Office of the Inspector General, S/CRS has had
difficulty getting State's other units to release the SRC volunteers it
wants to deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction
operations.[Footnote 14] Other agencies also reported a reluctance to
deploy staff overseas or to establish on-call units because doing so
would leave fewer workers available to complete the offices' work
requirements.[Footnote 15]
State also faces several challenges in establishing the CRC. In 2007,
Congress granted State the authority to make available up to $50
million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds in the fiscal year
2007 supplemental to support and maintain the CRC.[Footnote 16]
However, the legislation specified that no money may be obligated
without specific authorization for the CRC's establishment in a
subsequent act of Congress. Legislation that would authorize the CRC is
pending in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, but as of
October 2007, neither chamber had taken action on the bills.[Footnote
17]
In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key
elements of a planned compensation package for CRC personnel.[Footnote
18] Proposed legislation would allow State to provide the same
compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to
members of the Foreign Service, including health, life, and death
benefits; mission-specific awards and incentive pay; and overtime pay
and compensatory time. However, the proposed legislation does not
address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive hiring
status for other positions within State or whether the time deployed
would count toward government retirement benefits. In addition,
deployed CRC personnel would not have reemployment rights similar to
those for military reservists. Currently, military reservists who are
voluntarily or involuntarily called into service have the right to
return to their previous places of employment upon completion of their
military service requirements.[Footnote 19]
Further, S/CRS is moving the CRC concept forward without a common
interagency definition of stabilization and reconstruction operations.
According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation that would authorize
CRC, reservists would deploy to nonhumanitarian stabilization and
reconstruction missions. However, S/CRS has not defined what these
missions would be and how they would differ from other foreign
assistance operations. A common interagency definition of what
constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction operation is needed to
determine the corps' structure, the missions it would support, and the
skills and training its volunteers would need.
Conclusions:
State and DOD have begun to take steps to enhance and better coordinate
stability and reconstruction activities, but several significant
challenges may hinder their ability to successfully integrate planning
for potential future operations and strengthen military and civilian
capabilities to conduct them. Specifically, without an interagency
planning framework and clearly defined roles and responsibilities,
achieving unity of effort in stabilization and reconstruction
operations, as envisioned by NSPD-44, may continue to be difficult to
achieve. Also, unless DOD develops a better approach for including
other agencies in the development of combatant commander military
contingency plans, DOD's plans may continue to reflect a DOD-centric
view of how potential conflicts may unfold. Moreover, better guidance
on how DOD should identify and prioritize capability gaps, measure
progress, and incorporate lessons learned into future planning is
needed to ensure that DOD is using its available resources to address
the highest priority gaps in its stability operations capabilities.
Finally, unless State develops and implements a sound plan to bolster
civilian capabilities to support stability and reconstruction
operations and establish a capable civilian reserve corps, DOD may
continue to be heavily relied upon to provide needed stability and
reconstruction capabilities, rather than leveraging expertise that
resides more appropriately in civilian agencies.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our
prepared remarks. We would be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Janet A. St.
Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov or Joseph A. Christoff
at (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Other key contributors to this statement were
Robert L. Repasky, Assistant Director; Judith McCloskey, Assistant
Director; Sam Bernet; Tim Burke; Leigh Caraher; Grace Coleman; Lynn
Cothern; Marissa Jones; Sona Kalapura; Kate Lenane; and Amber Simco.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Stability
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, GAO-07-549
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007).
[2] In this testimony, we use the term "framework" to refer to the key
elements developed to plan and coordinate stabilization and
reconstruction operations under NSPD-44. The first section of our
testimony discusses three elements for planning these operations, while
civilian response mechanisms, which S/CRS considers a fourth element,
are discussed later in this testimony.
[3] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 408
(2004).
[4] United States Joint Forces Command J7 and Department of State,
Pamphlet Version 1.0, U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (December
2005) and State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, Update to Draft USG Planning Framework for
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Washington,
D.C.: August 2006). When S/CRS and U.S. Joint Forces Command issued the
first draft in December 2005, they distributed it to stakeholder
agencies and requested their feedback.
[5] NSPD-1 organized the NSC and its committees for the current
administration.
[6] Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 112 (a).
[7] 22 U.S.C. 3927.
[8] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
an Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies GAO-06-15, (Washington,
D.C.: October 21, 2005)
[9] Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2005); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: September 2006); and Department of
Defense, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept (Washington, D.C.,
December 2006).
[10] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0.
[11] Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials stated they
intended to identify capabilities through an iterative process known as
capability gap assessments. They envisioned that geographic combatant
commands would conduct theater-specific, scenario-driven assessments of
forces and capabilities required for contingencies through routine DOD
planning processes, compare planned requirements for stability
operations with current available forces and military capabilities, and
propose remedies for eliminating any gaps in capability that they
identify.
[12] GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability,
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).
[13] GAO-07-549.
[14] Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office
of Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization, ISP-l-07-26 (Washington, D.C.,
May 2007).
[15] Some civilian agencies recently agreed to identify, train, and
deploy employees to stabilization and reconstruction operations if
State funds the efforts. According to S/CRS staff, however, the
training and deployment of non-State ARC and SRC would not begin until
at least fiscal year 2009.
[16] See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and
Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, §
3810 (2006).
[17] See 110th Congress, S. 613 and H.R. 1084.
[18] These benefits would include, among other things, salary
commensurate with experience; danger, hardship, and other mission-
specific pays, benefits, and allowances; recruitment bonuses for hard-
to-fill positions; overtime pay and compensatory time; competitive
hiring status; federal health, life, and death benefits, and medical
treatment while deployed; and dual compensation for retired federal
workers.
[19] See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C
§§ 4301-4333.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, DC 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, DC 20548:
Public Affairs:
Susan Becker, Acting Manager, BeckerS@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, DC 20548:
