Stabilization and Reconstruction
Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps Gao ID: GAO-08-39 November 6, 2007In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination, planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. GAO was asked to report on State's efforts to improve (1) interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private research centers.
The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating the framework's use. However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies' roles and responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners. However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC) comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to international crises and has worked with several agencies to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to State's difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of training available to SRC volunteers, other agencies' inability to secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004, State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers, civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers' compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and management would require congressional action. Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-39, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2007:
Stabilization and Reconstruction:
Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and
Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps:
GAO-08-39:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-39, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and
implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In
December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential
Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination,
planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the
United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises.
GAO was asked to report on State‘s efforts to improve (1) interagency
planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction
operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To
address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and
reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private
research centers.
What GAO Found:
The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S.
reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security
Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the
framework”the Interagency Management System and procedures for
initiating the framework‘s use. However, the third element”a guide for
planning stabilization and reconstruction operations”is still in
progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be
because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and
reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies‘ roles and
responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-
upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses
an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency
partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for
the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning
process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as
cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced.
S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some
interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners.
However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of
civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective
coordination.
State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly
to international crises, but key details for establishing and
maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the
Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC)
comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to
international crises and has worked with several agencies to create
similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to State‘s
difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of
training available to SRC volunteers, other agencies‘ inability to
secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic
missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such
operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004,
State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be
comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for
stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers,
civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily
available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would
become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first
500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to
2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to
reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does
not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues
related to volunteers‘ compensation and benefits that could affect CRC
recruitment and management would require congressional action.
Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for
which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to
establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs
for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State clarify and communicate
roles and responsibilities within State for stabilization and
reconstruction operations and complete development and apply all
elements of the framework to an actual operation. GAO also recommends
that when considering authorizing the Civilian Reserve Corps, Congress
require State to report on its development, annual, and deployment
costs; types of missions; and obstacles that could affect its
operations. In comments on a draft of this report, State said it
partially concurs with the recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-39]. For more information, contact Joseph
A. Christoff at (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
State's Interagency Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clear
Guidance, and Interagency Support:
State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining
Rapid Deployment Corps:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Response to State's Comments:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: State's Estimated Startup Costs for CRC for Fiscal Years 2007
through 2009:
Table 2: Agencies and Research Centers Contacted for GAO Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and
Stabilization Operations:
Figure 2: Draft Planning Guide for Integrated U.S. Government
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:
Abbreviations:
ACT: Advance Civilian Team:
ARC: Active Response Corps:
CRC: Civilian Reserve Corps:
CRSG: Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group:
DFA: Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FACT: Field Advance Civilian Team:
IMS: Interagency Management System:
IPC: Integration Planning Cell:
NSC: National Security Council:
NSPD: National Security Presidential Directive:
S/CRS: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization:
SRC: Standby Response Corps:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 6, 2007:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Vic Snyder:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable W. Todd Akin:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The United States has determined that weak and failing states pose
significant threats to its national security and is committed to
helping countries prevent or emerge from conflict. According to the
Defense Science Board, since the end of the Cold War the United States
has begun stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24
months, with each operation typically lasting 5 to 8 years.[Footnote 1]
Following problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in 2003, an
internal Department of State (State) report noted that the U.S.
government had no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or
manage stabilization and reconstruction operations. Stabilization and
reconstruction operations include efforts to re-establish security,
strengthen governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve social and
economic well-being.
In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential
Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which recognized that the United States has a
significant stake in enhancing its capacity to stabilize and
reconstruct countries or regions. NSPD-44 directed the Secretary of
State to coordinate and lead U.S. government stabilization and
reconstruction operations. The Secretary of State delegated the
implementation of this directive to the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).[Footnote 2] In addition, the
directive established a National Security Council (NSC) committee to
lead interagency efforts to improve planning and coordination for
reconstruction and stabilization operations and to develop a strong
civilian response capability. The committee is co-chaired by the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and NSC.
In this report, we review S/CRS's efforts to improve (1) interagency
planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction
operations, and (2) the deployment of civilians to these
operations.[Footnote 3]
To complete our work, we reviewed the legislation that created S/CRS,
National Security Presidential Directives, the National Security
Strategy of the United States, the Foreign Affairs Manual, S/CRS
planning guidance, plans for several ongoing stabilization and
reconstruction operations, budget requests, and funding allocations. In
addition, we interviewed officials from eight executive agencies,
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense (DOD),
Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID); former senior S/CRS
officials; and experts from U.S. government and private research
centers. We asked agency officials about their agencies' roles and
responsibilities for planning and executing stabilization and
reconstruction operations, the development of a proposed framework for
planning and executing such operations, and the development of new
capabilities for deploying U.S. federal government personnel to
overseas crises. Finally, we reviewed related GAO reports.[Footnote 4]
We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
S/CRS is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning
and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations for
countries at risk of, in, or emerging from conflict. The framework
includes procedures and guidance to plan and coordinate reconstruction
and stabilization operations under NSPD-44. NSC has adopted two of
three elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System
(IMS), and procedures for initiating the framework's use.[Footnote 5]
However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and
reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine
how effective the framework will be since it has not been fully applied
to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition,
guidance on the roles and responsibilities of State's bureaus and
offices is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon
definition for what constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction
operation poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover,
some interagency partners said senior officials have shown limited
support for the framework and for S/CRS, and some described the
proposed interagency planning process, as outlined in early versions of
the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the
results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the
framework by addressing agencies' concerns and providing training to
interagency participants. However, differences between the planning
capacities and procedures of U.S. government civilian agencies and the
military pose obstacles to effective coordination.
State has begun developing three civilian corps--another element of the
framework--to deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details
for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First,
State created two units--the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the
Standby Response Corps (SRC)--comprised of U.S. government employees to
act as first responders to international crises. State also has
collaborated with other U.S. government agencies involved in such
operations to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited
due to (1) State's difficulties in achieving planned staffing levels
for ARC and providing training opportunities available to SRC
volunteers, (2) other agencies' inability to secure resources for
operations unrelated to their core missions, and (3) the possibility
that deploying agency staff and SRC volunteers would result in staff
shortages at their home units. Second, in 2004, State began developing
the initial concept for the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would
be made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for
stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers,
police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are not
readily available within the U.S. government. CRC personnel would
become full-time term federal employees once they are deployed. S/CRS
developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has
approved a plan to expand the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In
May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million
to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to
obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers'
compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and
management would require congressional actions. Furthermore, State has
not yet clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be
deployed. Finally, State has estimated costs for establishing CRC and
keeping it ready to deploy. However, these estimates do not include
costs for deploying CRC personnel to other countries or sustaining them
while there.
We recommend that the Secretary of State clarify and communicate roles
and responsibilities within the Department of State for stabilization
and reconstruction operations, and work with interagency partners to
complete and test the framework by applying all of its elements to an
actual operation. We also recommend that Congress, when considering
whether to authorize the establishment of CRC, should consider
requiring the Secretary to report on CRC's development, sustainment,
deployment, and the types of operations for which it would be used, and
potential obstacles that could affect recruitment, retention, and
deployment of volunteers, to better understand the long-term fiscal and
oversight commitments that would accompany its authorization.
The Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State provided written
comments on a draft of this report (see apps. II and III). State's
comments included a joint response from State, DOD, and USAID. Commerce
stated that the report provided a good overview of the new planning
process but did not comment on the report's recommendations. State
partially concurred with GAO's recommendations but noted that recent
progress S/CRS made developing the planning and coordination framework
and CRC was under reported. In the joint State, DOD, and USAID
response, the agencies stated they are committed to the new framework
and reiterated State's point that the draft report did not reflect the
achievements made over recent months. The agencies did not comment on
the report's recommendations or matter for congressional consideration.
The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and State
and USAID also provided technical comments, which were incorporated
into the report, as appropriate. The Departments of Homeland Security
and the Treasury were provided copies of the draft report but did not
comment. We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not
reflect changes that have occurred since the completion of our
fieldwork. We completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and
included in our draft report discussions and assessments on the
framework elements NSC approved in March 2007 and on civilian response
mechanisms. Our draft report did not include NSC-approved details for
ARC, SRC, and CRC because those details were not provided until October
2007. We incorporated this new information into our final report, as
well as other information from written and technical comments from six
agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the
status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007.
Background:
Following problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the fall of
2003, an internal State report concluded that the U.S. government had
no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or manage
stabilization and reconstruction operations; and the United States had
relied on ad hoc processes for planning and executing these efforts.
State recommended the establishment of a new office to provide a
centralized, permanent structure for planning and coordinating the
civilian response to stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Accordingly, in August 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced the
creation of S/CRS to coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and
resource responses to complex emergencies, failing and failed states,
and post-conflict environments. Such efforts could involve establishing
security, building basic public services, and supporting economic
development. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 granted
statutory authorization for S/CRS within the Office of the Secretary of
State.[Footnote 6]
In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to improve the
coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and
stabilization operations. NSPD-44 assigned the Secretary of State
responsibility for planning and coordinating U.S. government
stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries and regions at
risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The
Secretary, in turn, delegated implementation of the directive to the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD-44 identifies
the specific roles, responsibilities, and coordination requirements of
U.S. government agencies that would likely participate in stabilization
and reconstruction operations. It also requires State to lead the
development of a civilian response capability, including the capacity
to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to
overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44 established the NSC Policy
Coordination Committee[Footnote 7] for Reconstruction and Stabilization
Operations, which is co-chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization and NSC, and is comprised of representatives from
other executive agencies.
State's Interagency Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clear
Guidance, and Interagency Support:
S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning
and coordinating U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations. NSC
has adopted two of three elements of the framework--the Interagency
Management System and procedures for initiating its use. One element--
a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is
still in progress. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully
applied to any operation. In addition, guidance on roles and
responsibilities for State's bureaus and offices is unclear and
inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition of a
stabilization and reconstruction operation poses an obstacle to
interagency collaboration. In addition, some interagency partners have
shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners
described the proposed interagency planning process as cumbersome and
time consuming. S/CRS is taking steps to strengthen the framework's
effectiveness by addressing agencies' concerns and providing training
to interagency partners, but differences between the planning
capacities and procedures of U.S. government civilian agencies and the
military pose obstacles to effective coordination.
S/CRS Has Led the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning
and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:
S/CRS has led an NSC interagency group to create a framework for
developing specific reconstruction and stabilization plans under NSPD-
44. Sixteen U.S. agencies participated in NSC interagency working
groups tasked with developing the framework,[Footnote 8] including DOD.
The framework is intended to guide the development of U.S. planning for
reconstruction and stabilization operations by facilitating
coordination across federal agencies and aligning interagency efforts
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Key elements of the
framework include:
* the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority
and highly complex crises and operations;
* a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization
operations, and;
* procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS
and the planning guide.[Footnote 9]
IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high-
priority and highly complex crises and operations. IMS is a system for
guiding communication and coordination between Washington policymakers
and Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and military planners. In March
2007, NSC approved IMS and, with the Cabinet Secretaries and Deputy
Secretaries, would determine whether IMS is required for a specific
operation. If IMS is used, it would consist of three interagency
groups: a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), an
Integration Planning Cell (IPC), and an Advance Civilian Team (ACT)
(see fig. 1).
CRSG would be responsible for developing and integrating U.S.
government policies, integrating civilian and military plans, and
mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction
operations. It would be comprised of the NSC policy coordination
committee responsible for the country or region and would be supported
by a secretariat comprised of staff from multiple agencies that develop
the plans in conjunction with Chiefs of Mission and the U.S. military.
CRSG also would mobilize resources, monitor and evaluate
implementation, and coordinate with international partners.
IPC would be responsible for integrating U.S. civilian agencies' plans
with military operations. IPC members would include civilian agency
staff with country-specific, functional, or planning expertise. IPC
would be located at the headquarters of the military combatant command
responsible for planning military operations but would report to the
CRSG rather than the combatant commander. IPC would not be formed when
planning and implementing operations that do not require military
actions.
ACT would be deployed to the U.S. embassy, if one exists, to set up,
coordinate, and conduct field operations and provide implementation
planning and civilian-operations expertise to the Chief of Mission and
military field commanders. ACT could be supported by Field Advance
Civilian Teams (FACT) to help implement reconstruction and
stabilization programs at the provincial or local levels.
Figure 1: Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and
Stabilization Operations:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the Interagency Management System for
Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The following
relationships are depicted:
Headquarters, Civilian:
* National Security Council;
- Principals Committee;
- Deputies Committee;
* Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group [A] (Policy
Coordination Committee and Staff).
Headquarters, Military:
* Combatant Command.
The Integration Planning Cell [A] overlaps both Civilian and Military,
with a direct relationship between the National Security Council and
the Combatant Command.
Field: Civilian;
Embassy or Ambassador (or existing U.S. government presence):
* Advance Civilian Team [A];
- Field Advance Civilian Team (3 depicted).
Field, Military:
* Joint Task Force or Theater Commander;
- Field Commander.
The illustration also depicts the following direct relationships:
Embassy or Ambassador (or existing U.S. government presence) with Joint
Task Force or Theater Commander;
Field Advance Civilian Team with Field Commander.
Sources: GAO analysis of Interagency Management System for
Reconstruction and Stabilization and S/CRS documents.
[A] Bodies developed under NSPD-44.
Note: The U.S. military may or may not be involved in specific
operations. The figure shows operations that include U.S. military
efforts. NSPD-44 also charges State with coordinating U.S.
reconstruction and stabilization efforts with foreign governments,
multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Although
important, these areas lie outside the scope of our review and are not
included in the figure.
[End of figure]
The second element of the framework, the planning guide, has not been
approved by NSC because State is rewriting the guide to address
interagency concerns. Although NSC is not required to approve the
planning guide, S/CRS officials stated that NSC approval would
strengthen the framework's overall standing among interagency partners.
Without NSC approval, the framework lacks the authority needed for
interagency use. The planning guide divides planning for stabilization
and reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation,
strategy development, and implementation planning (see fig. 2). As
currently envisioned, the guide states that goals and objectives at
each level should be achievable; have well-defined measures for
determining progress; and have goals, objectives, and planned
activities that are clearly linked. At the first level of planning,
policy formulation, Washington-based policymakers would articulate the
overall goal or desired outcome the United States plans to
achieve.[Footnote 10] At the second level, strategy development, the
same Washington policymakers, in conjunction with the relevant Chiefs
of Mission, would define the major objectives and essential tasks
necessary to achieve the overarching policy goal, the resources
necessary for completing each objective, and the implementing agency or
bureau. At the third level, implementation planning, the agencies,
bureaus, and overseas posts responsible for implementing the programs
and tasks for achieving the objectives would develop work plans,
resource requirements, and metrics for monitoring progress.
Figure 2: Draft Planning Guide for Integrated U.S. Government
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:
[See PDF for image]
The figure is an illustration of the Draft Planning Guide for
Integrated U.S. Government Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.
The following data is depicted:
Planning level: Policy Formulation;
* Assesses conflict;
* Develops goals;
Plan elements: Overarching policy or goal.
Planning level: Strategy Development;
* Develops strategies, including identification of metrics and
resources;
* Identifies essential tasks;
* Determines lead agency or bureau for each task;
* Tracks other donor contributions;
Plan elements: Major mission objectives.
Planning level: Implementation planning;
* Develops and monitors task metrics;
* Provides budget information;
* Tracks program management;
Plan elements: Tasks for each mission objective.
Sources: GAO analysis of draft planning guide for reconstruction and
stabilization and S/CRS documents.
[End of figure]
The third element, which the NSC approved in March 2007, establishes
procedures for using the framework when agencies are responding to an
actual or imminent crisis or engaging in long-term scenario-based
planning. Factors that may trigger a U.S. response to a crisis include
the potential for significant military action in the near-term; actual
or imminent state failure; events with significant potential to
undermine regional stability and development progress, such as coups,
economic collapse, or severe environmental damage; large-scale
displacement of people; and impending or actual genocide, ethnic
cleansing, or massive and grave human-rights violations. Planning for
crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC (including the Cabinet
Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, or Policy Coordination Committees) or
by a direct request from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
Defense. Long-term scenario planning may be conducted for crises that
may emerge within 2 to 3 years. NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional
Assistant Secretaries of State may request the initiation of long-term
scenario-based planning based on five criteria: (1) the potential
impact on U.S. national security and foreign-policy objectives; (2) the
regional impact or scale of humanitarian needs; (3) the potential for
significant U.S. military involvement; (4) the probability of a crisis
occurring, as indicated by U.S. government agencies, the United
Nations, or other international organizations; and (5) the ability of
the affected country or neighboring countries to respond to a crisis.
As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any
stabilization and reconstruction operation. S/CRS and interagency
partners have used draft versions of the planning guide to plan
operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo, but implementation of the
resulting plans has been limited. Only the plan for Haiti was
implemented. The plan for Sudan was not implemented because it was
completed just as the government of Sudan and opposition groups signed
a peace accord. Interagency planning for potential operations in Kosovo
is ongoing.
According to State officials, the administration is using interagency
processes created in NSPD-1 National Security Council System for
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. NSPD-1 established the process for
coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and
implementation of national security policies, which includes the
interagency Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and policy
coordination committees.[Footnote 11] In May 2004, the President issued
NSPD-36 to direct U.S. operations in Iraq following the transfer of
sovereignty to the Iraqi government. This directive made State
responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all
U.S. government employees, policies, and activities in Iraq, except
those under the command of an area military commander or seconded to an
international organization. According to the directive, the Commander
of the U.S. Central Command--under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense--continues to be responsible for
U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq,
including U.S. efforts in support of training and equipping Iraqi
security forces. In April 2006, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and the
U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq developed their first joint campaign
plan for Iraq and issued a revision to their joint plan in July 2007.
Guidance Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities and a Common
Definition for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations:
We found that NSPD-44, related State and administration guidance, and
the planning framework collectively do not provide clear direction in
three key areas. First, S/CRS's roles and responsibilities conflict
with those assigned to State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission
in the Foreign Affairs Manual. Second, guidance is inconsistent
regarding S/CRS's responsibilities for conflict prevention efforts,
which could compromise the office's ability to fulfill its mandate.
Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and
stabilization operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration.
First, S/CRS's roles and responsibilities conflict with those of
State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. In October 2005, we
reported that collaborating agencies must agree on how to lead
collaborative efforts.[Footnote 12] According to the Foreign Affairs
Manual, each regional bureau is responsible for U.S. foreign relations
with countries within a given region, including providing overall
direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. activities in the
region.[Footnote 13] In addition, Chiefs of Mission have authority over
all U.S. government staff and activities in their countries.[Footnote
14] As S/CRS initially interpreted NSPD-44, S/CRS's roles and
responsibilities included leading, planning, and coordinating
stabilization and reconstruction operations; these responsibilities
conflict with those of the regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. S/
CRS officials stated that they expected the next version of the Foreign
Affairs Manual to include a clearly defined and substantive description
of the office's roles.
Second, guidance varies regarding S/CRS's responsibility for preventing
conflicts. NSPD-44 and the memo announcing S/CRS's creation include
conflict prevention as one of the office's responsibilities. However,
S/CRS's authorizing legislation and the State memo aligning S/CRS with
the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) do not explicitly include
conflict prevention as a responsibility. Ambiguity about S/CRS's
prevention role could result in inadequate prevention efforts. A DOD
official in the Global Strategic Partnerships office stated that
responsibility for prevention is not currently assigned to anyone, and
the work might not be done without such an assignment.
Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and
stabilization operations poses an obstacle to effective collaboration
under the framework. In our October 2005 report, we found that
collaborative efforts require agency staff to define and articulate a
common outcome or purpose.[Footnote 15] While the framework includes
definitions for reconstruction and stabilization, it does not define
what constitutes stabilization or reconstruction operations or explain
how these operations differ from other types of military and civilian
foreign assistance operations, such as counterinsurgency operations,
counterterrorism operations, and standard development assistance. In
addition, while S/CRS has developed a list of basic terms related to
reconstruction and stabilization, staff from other bureaus and agencies
had different definitions of these terms. As a result, it is not clear
when agencies and bureaus are expected to apply the framework. S/CRS
staff said that it is difficult to clearly define reconstruction and
stabilization and difficult to determine when a response to a crisis
constitutes a reconstruction or stabilization operation. Prior GAO work
shows that the lack of a clear definition can pose an obstacle to
improved planning and coordination of reconstruction and stabilization
operations. In our previous report on DOD's stability operations
approach, GAO found that the lack of a clear and consistent definition
of stability operations caused confusion among military planners and
limited progress in strengthening stability-operations
capability.[Footnote 16]
Civilian Interagency Partners Have Concerns about S/CRS and the
Planning Framework:
State and other U.S. civilian agencies have concerns about the planning
framework for three key reasons. First, some civilian interagency
partners are concerned that S/CRS is assuming their traditional roles
and responsibilities. Staff from one of State's regional bureaus
believed that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with
the Regional Assistant Secretary's responsibility for leading an
operation and coordinating with interagency partners. USAID staff noted
how their agency had planned and coordinated reconstruction operations
in the past and questioned why S/CRS now had these roles. Although most
agency staff and outside experts we interviewed agreed that interagency
coordination should improve, some USAID and State employees questioned
why NSC was not given the primary role for planning and coordinating
stabilization and reconstruction operations or for implementing NSPD-
44.
USAID and regional bureau staffs also said some aspects of the planning
framework were unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant since
interagency teams had already devised planning processes for ongoing
operations in accordance with NSPD-1. For example, planning for U.S.
assistance to Sudan and Darfur before 2005 was led by State's Bureau of
African Affairs. In 2005, S/CRS applied an early version of the
planning guide to ongoing efforts in Sudan. USAID staff involved in
both the regional bureau-led planning and S/CRS-led planning stated
they were frustrated that S/CRS staff were not well-versed in Sudan
policy and had to be educated before planning could occur. Other staff
said S/CRS should focus more on filling the gaps in planning and
operational mechanisms and focus less on policy development.
Concerns about roles and responsibilities have led to confusion and
disputes about who should lead policy development and control resource
allocation. As a result, some of State's regional bureaus have resisted
applying the new interagency planning process to particular
reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS staff said one
regional bureau discouraged the office's involvement in a country that
S/CRS identified as appropriate for the framework; another bureau is
generally reluctant to allow S/CRS to participate in its efforts in the
region. In addition, State and other agency staff said S/CRS had
conflicts with DFA over which office controlled resource allocation for
these operations. These disputes made it difficult for S/CRS to
coordinate and plan reconstruction and stabilization operations using
the framework.
Second, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have
provided limited support for S/CRS and its planning framework. In our
October 2005 report, we stated that committed leadership from all
levels of an organization is needed to overcome the barriers that exist
when working across agency boundaries.[Footnote 17] Staffs from various
State offices said senior officials did not communicate strong support
for S/CRS or the expectation that State and interagency partners should
follow its framework for planning and coordinating reconstruction and
stabilization operations. In addition, S/CRS was not selected to lead
planning for recent high-priority operations. When the office was
created in 2004, S/CRS and other State officials agreed that it would
not focus efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq because these operations had
existing processes, and policymakers feared that the scope of those
operations would overwhelm S/CRS. However, S/CRS has not been given key
roles for operations that emerged after its creation, such as the
ongoing efforts in Lebanon and Somalia, which several officials and
experts stated are the types of operations S/CRS was created to
address. These officials and experts stated that S/CRS has a large
responsibility but little authority and no resources to achieve it.
Third, interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined
in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for
the results it produces. Officials who participated in the planning for
Haiti stated that the process provided more systematic planning, better
identification of interagency goals and responsibilities, and better
identification of sequencing and resource requirements. However, some
officials involved in planning operations for Haiti and Sudan stated
that using the framework was time consuming, involved long meetings and
extra work hours for staff, and was cumbersome to use because it was
overly focused on process details. Staff also said that, in some cases,
the planning process did not improve outcomes or increase resources,
particularly since S/CRS has few resources to offer. Other officials
were frustrated when S/CRS processes were applied to interagency
planning efforts that they believed were already functioning. As a
result of these concerns, officials from some offices and agencies
expressed reluctance to work with S/CRS on future reconstruction and
stabilization plans.
State Is Taking Steps to Revise and Strengthen the Framework:
State is taking steps to strengthen the framework by revising and
updating its draft planning guide based on feedback from other agencies
and participants. S/CRS said it would commit to ensuring that the S/
CRS-facilitated planning process is not duplicative or overly
burdensome relative to its results and intends to provide assistance to
State regional bureaus.[Footnote 18] S/CRS also said the revisions
would provide more details about the framework's implementation at the
field level and metrics to assess progress.
State officials also said S/CRS's realignment under DFA would
strengthen S/CRS's control over reconstruction and stabilization
resources. On March 12, 2007, the Secretary of State aligned S/CRS with
DFA, while still maintaining a direct reporting relationship between S/
CRS and the Office of the Secretary. DFA is charged with reorganizing
U.S. foreign assistance and has authority over all State and USAID
foreign-assistance funding and programs. However, it is not clear how
the change will affect S/CRS's role and the use of the framework. DFA
has procedures and tools to guide the development of operational plans
for foreign assistance, and its staff said some of those processes
would likely be applied to S/CRS planning.
According to S/CRS officials, S/CRS and DFA have recently developed a
more productive working relationship than they had in the past. For
example, the two organizations recently settled a dispute over funds
State could receive from DOD under section 1207 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. This act authorized the
Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million per year in fiscal
years 2006 and 2007 to State to be applied to stabilization and
reconstruction operations.[Footnote 19] According to State and DOD
staff, in 2006 only $10 million was transferred to State due to a
dispute between S/CRS and DFA over which office controlled the money.
However, according to the March 2007 memo aligning S/CRS with DFA, S/
CRS would be responsible for overseeing the transfer and use of these
funds. S/CRS provided documents that indicated that State had obligated
approximately $99.7 million of the $100 million available under section
1207 for fiscal year 2007. This funding was applied to ongoing
stabilization and reconstruction operations in Haiti, Nepal, Columbia,
Yemen, and Somalia; to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership;
and to infrastructure, economic development, rule of law programs, and
counterterrorism activities in the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. In addition, S/CRS participated in DFA's review of U.S.
assistance to some countries for fiscal year 2008 and, as S/CRS
acquires new staff, it plans to assume responsibility for the budget
process of countries in DFA's "rebuilding" category.[Footnote 20]
Although S/CRS has not finished updating the framework guide or
determined its role under DFA, it has taken other steps to strengthen
the use of the framework and prepare interagency partners to coordinate
effectively. For example, S/CRS offers Foreign Service Institute
courses to train interagency participants in planning stabilization and
reconstruction operations, leading and managing interagency
coordination for such operations, and applying tools for early warning
and conflict assessment. S/CRS reported that 352 federal employees
participated in its training courses in 2006 and 452 employees
participated in 2007.[Footnote 21] The majority of participants were
from State, DOD, and USAID, although S/CRS reported that staff from
seven other agencies also attended classes. Course instructors said it
was difficult to attract participants from other agencies and described
advertising to those agencies as ad hoc, in part because the Foreign
Service Institute does not have an up-to-date list of contacts. S/CRS
staff said they were exploring other strategies for recruiting course
participants, such as identifying key agency leaders who agree that
their staffs should attend.[Footnote 22] S/CRS also has developed tools
and information to strengthen reconstruction and stabilization
operations, such as information on guiding concepts and terms and tools
for early warning and prevention, assessing best practices, and
applying lessons learned.
Differences between Military and Civilian Planning Pose Obstacles to
Coordination:
Although S/CRS made efforts to strengthen both coordination and the
commitment of key DOD officials to the goals of S/CRS, several
differences in military and civilian planning capacities and procedures
pose obstacles to effective coordination.[Footnote 23] First,
differences in planning capacities and resources make coordination
difficult. In our report on DOD's stability operations
approach,[Footnote 24] we found that DOD and non-DOD organizations do
not fully understand each other's planning processes, and non-DOD
organizations have limited capacity to participate in DOD's full range
of planning activities. State officials noted its planning differs from
DOD's; State is more focused on current operations and less focused on
the wide range of potential contingency operations for which DOD must
plan. State does not have a large pool of planners who can deploy to
DOD's combatant commands. DOD officials noted that their efforts to
include non-DOD organizations in planning and exercise efforts were
stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies can offer.
State officials indicated it does not have DOD's capacity to staff
operations and planning; both DOD and State staff doubted that civilian
capacity and resources would ever match the levels desired.
Second, State generally does not receive DOD military plans as they are
being developed, which restricts its ability to harmonize
reconstruction and stabilization efforts with military plans and
operations as required by NSPD-44. DOD does not have a process in place
to share, when appropriate, information with non-DOD agencies early in
plan development without specific approval from the Secretary of
Defense.[Footnote 25] DOD's hierarchical approach limits interagency
participation while plans are being developed by the combatant commands
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. NSPD-44 working
groups are developing a process for reviewing military plans, when
appropriate, but are not yet ready to use it.
Third, agency staff and outside experts have found that differences in
organizational structure, terminology, and information systems pose
obstacles to effective coordination between military and civilian
agencies. For example, S/CRS found that differences between civilian
agencies' headquarters and field organization and the strategic,
operational, and tactical organization of the military can make
coordination more difficult.[Footnote 26] The Administration's July
2007 report to Congress stated it was developing common standards and
systems, including blogs and other technologies, to address
inconsistencies in U.S. information management systems and to support
interagency collaboration and communication.[Footnote 27]
In our stability operations report,[Footnote 28] we recommended that
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
provide implementation guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate
and encourage interagency participation in the development of military
plans; develop a process to share planning information with non-DOD
agencies early in the planning process, as appropriate; and orient DOD
and non-DOD personnel in each agency's planning processes and
capabilities. In commenting on the report, DOD said it partially agreed
with our recommendations but did not indicate the steps it would take
to implement them.
State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining
Rapid Deployment Corps:
State has begun developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to
international crises but has not addressed key details for establishing
and maintaining these units. First, State created two units within the
department--the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response
Corps (SRC)--and has collaborated with several other U.S. government
agencies to create similar units. State and other agencies, however,
face challenges in establishing these units, including (1) difficulties
in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training
opportunities for State's SRC volunteers, (2) agencies' inabilities to
secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core
missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying volunteers could
result in their home units having insufficient staff. Second, in May
2007, State began an effort to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps
(CRC), which would be made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and
experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations,
such as civil engineers, police officers, judges, and public
administrators, that are not readily available within the U.S.
government. If deployed, reservists would become federal employees.
State, however, does not yet have congressional authority to establish
the CRC or to provide the planned benefits package for CRC personnel.
In addition, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for
which CRC would be deployed. Further, State has estimated the costs for
establishing and keeping CRC ready to deploy, including costs for
recruiting, training, equipping CRC personnel, but these estimates do
not include the costs of deploying CRC personnel to other countries or
sustaining them once deployed.
State, USAID, and the Department of the Treasury Have Developed Some
Internal Capacity to Deploy Staff Rapidly in Support of Stabilization
and Reconstruction Operations:
To meet NSPD-44 requirements for developing a strong civilian response
capability, State and other U.S. agencies developed internal mechanisms
to reassign personnel in support of stabilization and reconstruction
operations. S/CRS has taken the lead in expanding State's internal
capacity to respond to conflict by creating ARC and SRC.[Footnote 29]
S/CRS also collaborated with several other U.S. government agencies to
initiate the development of ARC and SRC units within those agencies.
In 2006, State developed ARC within S/CRS to deploy during the initial
stage of stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS has 15
temporary staff positions for ARC; ARC staff serve 1-year rotations. In
October 2007, 10 of the 15 authorized positions were staffed. ARC staff
deploy to unstable environments to assess countries' or regions' needs
and help plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response.
Since 2006, ARC staff have deployed to seven locations: (1) Sudan, to
help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement; (2) Eastern Chad, to monitor
the displacement of civilians resulting from the conflict in Darfur;
(3) Lebanon, to assist with the evacuation of American citizens and to
coordinate assistance immediately following the Israeli-Hezbollah
conflict; (4) Kosovo, to help plan for a follow-on to the United
Nations Mission to Kosovo; (5) Liberia, to coordinate reforms of the
security sector; (6) Iraq, to assist with integrating new Provincial
Reconstruction Team members; and (7) Haiti, to plan the implementation
and oversight of programs to improve security, local government
capacity, and economic opportunity in Cité Soleil. According to S/CRS,
regional bureau staff, and State's Office of the Inspector General, ARC
involvement and performance in these operations has been positive. When
not deployed, ARC members engage in training and other planning
exercises and work with other S/CRS offices and State bureaus on
related issues to gain relevant expertise.
SRC would deploy during the second stage of a surge to stabilization
and reconstruction operations. SRC works to support activities of ARC
when additional staff or specialized skills are required. Unlike ARC,
SRC does not have not dedicated staff positions. Rather, when not
deployed, current employees on the SRC roster serve in other capacities
throughout State. Currently, SRC is composed of about 90 State
employees and 210 State retirees. In July 2007, NSC approved S/CRS
plans to increase SRC to a roster of 500 volunteers government-wide by
fiscal year 2008, and to a roster of 2,000 volunteers government-wide
by fiscal year 2009. If called upon, SRC members would be available for
deployment within 60 days and could be deployed for up to 6 months.
According to S/CRS staff, the office aims to have up to one-quarter of
this standby corps ready for deployment at any one time. However, to
date, S/CRS has deployed SRC members to only two ongoing operations:
one to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement and one to Chad
to support refugees from Eastern Darfur.
Although S/CRS has started working with other U.S. agencies to
establish units similar to ARC and SRC, these efforts are in very early
stages. Currently, only USAID and the Department of the Treasury have
established mechanisms for responding rapidly to stability and
reconstruction missions. USAID uses the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives to respond to
conflict situations.[Footnote 30] In addition, USAID has started
developing its own internal surge capacity and has identified 15 staff
available for immediate deployment to crises. USAID's Bureau of
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance developed a proposal
to create a civilian reserve office to respond to stabilization and
reconstruction operations and requested funds to hire, train, equip,
and deploy more than 50 staff specifically for this purpose. The
Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance has ongoing
programs around the world and intends to build the capacity to lead
long-term stability operations.[Footnote 31] In addition, the Office of
Technical Assistance developed the First Responder Initiative in 2004,
which includes approximately 30 staff who are willing to deploy rapidly
to conflict areas in support of stabilization and reconstruction
operations.
State and Other Agencies Face Challenges That Limit Their Efforts to
Establish and Deploy Rapid Response Units:
State and other agencies face challenges in establishing their rapid
response capabilities. These challenges include (1) difficulties in
achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training
opportunities for State's SRC volunteers, (2) agencies' inability to
secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core
missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying agency staff and SRC
volunteers would result in staff shortages in their home units.
S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting for ARC
and training SRC members. S/CRS plans to increase the number of
authorized staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary positions to 33
permanent positions, which State included in its 2008 budget request.
However, according to S/CRS staff, it is unlikely that State will
receive authority to establish all 33 positions. Although S/CRS has not
had difficulty recruiting SRC volunteers, it does not presently have
the capacity to ensure they are properly trained for participating in
stabilization and reconstruction operations. ARC staff and SRC
volunteers would be required to complete five courses offered jointly
by S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute. According to S/CRS staff,
the Foreign Service Institute does not currently have the capacity to
train the 1,500 new volunteers S/CRS plans to recruit in 2009. S/CRS is
studying ways to correct the situation.
Although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and
reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff
available for rapid responses to overseas crises. Most agencies'
missions are domestic in nature. Nonetheless, domestic policy agencies,
including the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, operate
overseas programs. However, officials from these agencies said
international programs are viewed as extensions of their domestic
missions.[Footnote 32] As a result, it is difficult for these agencies
to secure funding for cadres of on-call first and second responders.
Finally, State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can
leave home units without sufficient staff and, as a result, they must
weigh the value of deploying volunteers against the needs of their
units. For example, when not deployed to stabilization and
reconstruction operations, current State SRC volunteers serve normal
duty rotations at overseas posts or within State's various bureaus and
offices within the United States. According to State's Office of the
Inspector General, S/CRS has had difficulty getting State's other units
to release the SRC volunteers it wants to deploy in support of
stabilization and reconstruction operations.[Footnote 33] The home
units of the volunteers do not want to become short of staff or lose
high-performing staff to other operations. Other agencies reported a
reluctance to deploy staff overseas or establish on-call units because
doing so would leave fewer workers available to complete the offices'
work requirements. Some civilian agencies recently agreed to identify,
train, and deploy employees to stabilization and reconstruction
operations provided that State fund the efforts. According to S/CRS
staff, however, the training and deployment of non-State ARC and SRC
would not begin until fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 34]
S/CRS Has Made Efforts to Establish CRC:
In 2004, S/CRS developed an initial concept for CRC, which would be
deployed in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. CRC
would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences
useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil
engineers, police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are
not readily available within the U.S. government. Reservists would
serve 4-year terms of voluntary service and, if called upon, would
deploy for rotations of up to 1 year. Reservists would remain in their
daily jobs until called upon for service and would be ready for
deployment within 30 to 60 days. Deployed CRC personnel would be
classified as full-time term federal employees, with the authority to
speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government contracts and
employees. Volunteers would receive training upon joining CRC and would
be required to complete annual training. In addition, they would
receive training specific and relevant to an operation immediately
before deployment.
According to S/CRS staff, NSC has approved plans to develop a roster of
2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 2009; however, a BearingPoint study
commissioned by S/CRS found that CRC would require at least 3,550
volunteers to respond to CRC goals.[Footnote 35] The BearingPoint study
also noted that decisions about CRC's roster size would likely evolve
over time.[Footnote 36] In addition, a panel of experts convened by the
Congressional Research Service concluded that the proposed roster may
represent only a portion of what is likely required.[Footnote 37] The
panel noted that simultaneously deploying CRC to two large and one
small operation, as defined by BearingPoint, could require deploying
the entire CRC roster.[Footnote 38] S/CRS staff said the office would
assess whether to expand the roster in subsequent years.
CRC Lacks Congressional Authority in Key Areas and a Clearly Defined
Mission:
State cannot spend any funds for the CRC until Congress has authorized
the CRC's establishment. In 2007, Congress granted State the authority
to reallocate up to $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to
support and maintain CRC.[Footnote 39] However, the legislation
specified that no money may be obligated without a subsequent act of
Congress. Legislation that would authorize CRC is pending in both the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but as of October 2007,
neither chamber had taken action on the bills.[Footnote 40]
In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key
elements of the planned compensation package for deployed volunteers.
Under current plans, deployed volunteers would become full-time term
federal employees and would receive compensation and benefits similar
to those received by Foreign Service employees. Such compensation and
benefits would include:
* salary commensurate with experience;
* danger, hardship, and other mission-specific pays, benefits, and
allowances;
* recruitment bonuses for hard-to-fill positions;
* overtime pay and compensatory time;
* leave accrual and payment for unused leave upon service completion;
* competitive hiring status;
* federal health, life, and death benefits, and medical treatment while
deployed;
* dual compensation for retired federal workers; and;
* the ability to count deployed time toward retirement benefits.
The pending legislation would address some of the compensation
authorities needed by State to offer the full proposed benefits package
to CRC personnel. Specifically, it would authorize State to provide the
same compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to
members of the Foreign Service. However, the proposed legislation does
not address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive
hiring status for other positions within State or whether the time
deployed would count toward government retirement benefits. In
addition, deployed personnel would not have re-employment rights
similar to those for military reservists. Currently, military
reservists who are voluntarily or involuntarily called into service
have the right to return to their previous place of employment upon
completion of their military service requirements.[Footnote 41]
However, the pending legislation to authorize CRC does not include
similar rights for deployed CRC personnel. S/CRS staff said that the
Civilian Reserve Task Force would assess whether re-employment rights
are necessary based on the experience of recruiting the first 500
personnel.
Further, S/CRS is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a
defined set of potential missions in which CRC would participate.
According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation in the House and
Senate that would authorize CRC, reservists would deploy to specific
nonhumanitarian stabilization and reconstruction missions when called
upon by the President. However, as with the planning guide and IMS,
there is no agreed-upon definition for what constitutes a stabilization
and reconstruction mission. S/CRS staff said they are still working
through the conceptual differences between these and other types of
operations, such as for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, but
that under its current approach, CRC could be deployed to almost any
operation in a conflict zone.
State Has Estimated Some Costs for CRC:
Although State has estimated some costs for establishing and sustaining
CRC at home, the estimates do not include the costs of deploying CRC
personnel to other countries or sustaining them once deployed.
As shown in table 1, State has identified about $135 million in
estimated costs for establishing and sustaining CRC at home during
fiscal years 2008 and 2009.[Footnote 42] In comparison, Bearing Point's
study estimated that a 3-year startup period would cost approximately
$341 million. Under current State plans, these funds would come from
the fiscal year 2007 reallocation authority and from State's fiscal
year 2009 budget. The administration did not request any funds for CRC
in fiscal year 2008.
Table 1: State's Estimated Startup Costs for CRC for Fiscal Years 2007
through 2009, Dollars in millions:
Funding Purpose:
Marketing, recruiting, screening, and enrolling;
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: $7.7;
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: $17.2;
Total: $24.9.
Funding Purpose: Training;
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 5.1;
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 13.1;
Total: 18.2.
Funding Purpose: Equipment Purchases;
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 2.3;
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 45.4;
Total: 47.7.
Funding Purpose: Administration;
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 6.4;
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 12.6;
Total: 19.0.
Funding Purpose: Compensation;
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 4.2;
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 20.7;
Total: 24.9.
Funding Purpose: Total;
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: $25.7;
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: $109.0;
Total: $134.7.
Source: Department of State documents and staff.
[End of table]
If Congress authorizes the CRC, State plans to obligate approximately
$26 million of the $50 million authority in fiscal year 2007
supplemental funds to market the program and recruit, screen, and
enroll the first 500 CRC personnel, including 350 with expertise in
rule of law issues ($7.7 million); train the first 500 personnel ($5.1
million); purchase equipment such as armored vehicles, police weapons,
electronics, cots, tents, and body armor ($2.3 million); administer
CRC, such as establishing a home office and a U.S. Deployment Center,
and hiring 37 new government staff and contractor positions to manage
CRC's day-to-day administrative functions ($6.4 million); and
compensate CRC personnel when they are being trained ($4.2 million).
State currently estimates that it will cost about $109 million to
expand the CRC to 2,000 personnel in fiscal year 2009 (see table 1). In
this phase, State would hire up to 26 additional administrative staff
and provide training for the new CRC volunteers.[Footnote 43] As of
October 2007, the Office of Management and Budget had not yet approved
State's request for $109 million. The actual funding request for 2009
may differ from these estimates.
S/CRS estimates that the annual costs for sustaining at home a 2,000-
volunteer CRC would be up to $47 million. According to S/CRS staff,
these annual costs include the activities needed to ensure that CRC
personnel are ready to deploy. However, they do not include costs for
deploying CRC personnel outside the United States or sustaining them
once overseas. Deployment and overseas sustainment costs could include
security costs, which may be high in a conflict zone; salaries and
allowances; operation and infrastructure costs, including for
facilities; and life support, such as food, lodging, and medical
support.
Conclusions:
Government personnel and outside experts in national security issues
agree that the U.S. government must improve its capacity to plan for
and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. To address
these issues, S/CRS and its interagency partners have worked to develop
a new interagency planning and coordination framework and rapid
response corps of civilian government and nongovernment personnel.
Since the framework has never been fully applied, an understanding of
its benefits and drawbacks remains unknown. However, concerns about
roles and responsibilities and the value of the framework have slowed
its acceptance by interagency partners. Although there is no
requirement that NSC approve all elements of the framework, without
such approval it will be difficult to ensure that U.S. government
agencies collaborate and contribute to interagency planning efforts to
the fullest extent possible.
S/CRS has not completed developing plans to fully establish and
maintain CRC, but is seeking authorization to begin recruitment of CRC
volunteers. Although State received authority to reallocate up to $50
million for CRC, a separate act of Congress is required to authorize
CRC before State may obligate that or future funding. S/CRS has
developed a plan for using this funding to train, equip, and keep ready
to deploy up to 2,000 CRC personnel by fiscal year 2009. However, costs
of deploying CRC personnel to operations outside of the United States
or of sustaining them at their new posts are not included. In addition,
S/CRS has not yet specified types of missions for which the CRC would
be used. Moreover, failure to provide full benefits and re-employment
rights could affect State's ability to recruit and retain personnel for
CRC. These are critical elements for Congress to consider when debating
the long-term commitment associated with authorizing CRC and the future
oversight of CRC operations and effectiveness.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen interagency planning and coordination of stabilization
and reconstruction operations, we recommend that the Secretary of State
clarify and communicate specific roles and responsibilities within
State for S/CRS and the regional bureaus, including updating the
Foreign Affairs Manual.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary, with the assistance of
interagency partners, finish developing the framework and test its
usefulness by fully applying it to a stabilization and reconstruction
operation.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
To better understand the long-term fiscal and oversight commitments
that would accompany authorizing CRC, when considering whether to grant
such authority, the Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of
State, in consultation with other relevant agencies, to report on the
activities and costs required for its development; the administrative
requirements and annual operating costs once it is established,
including for sustainment at home, deployment, and sustainment once
deployed; the types of operations for which it would be used; and
potential obstacles that could affect recruitment, retention, and
deployment of personnel.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State (see appendixes II and
III). In addition, State, DOD, and USAID submitted a joint statement to
the draft report, which is included as part of State's comments. The
Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Defense, Justice, and
State and USAID also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated into the report, as appropriate. The Departments of
Homeland Security and the Treasury were provided copies of the draft
report but did not comment.
Commerce stated the report was a good overview of the new process for
planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations,
but did not comment on the report's recommendations and matter for
Congressional consideration.
State said it partially concurred with our recommendations. It said
that while it had no objections to the recommendations, it believes the
progress made toward developing a civilian R&S capability was
underreported. State said that the data GAO presented preceded a
tremendous period of growth and change for the interagency process. In
a joint statement, State, DOD, and USAID reiterated the draft report
did not reflect the achievements made over recent months, including the
IMS, ARC, SRC, and CRC. The joint statement did not comment on the
report's recommendations or matter for Congressional consideration.
When providing technical comments, USDA, Justice, USAID each stated
strong support for the new planning and coordination framework, and
that they would continue to work with S/CRS to improve civilian
deployment capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction
operations. USAID further stated that more work is needed to clarify
roles and responsibilities, particularly in the relationships between
S/CRS and DFA, and between S/CRS and USAID.
We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect
changes that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We
completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our
draft report discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC
approved in March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft
report did not include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC
because those details were not provided until October 2007. We
incorporated this new information into our final report, as well as
other information from written and technical comments from six
agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the
status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, State, and the Treasury and to the Administrator for USAID. We
will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4128 or at christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To address both of the objectives of our review, we examined U.S.
government documents and research and conducted more than 50 interviews
with staff from 31 offices and bureaus at eight U.S. agencies with
roles in reconstruction and stabilization operations (see table 2). We
also interviewed staff members and reviewed reports and documents from
eight U.S. government and independent research organizations.
Table 2: Agencies and Research Centers Contacted for GAO Review:
Agency: Department of State;
Bureau or office contacted:
* Bureau of African Affairs;
* Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs;
* Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs;
* Bureau of International Organization Affairs;
* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement;
* Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs;
* Bureau of Political Affairs;
* Bureau of Political-Military Affairs;
* Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs;
* Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs;
* Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance;
* Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization;
* Office of the Inspector General.
Agency: Department of Agriculture;
Bureau or office contacted:
* Foreign Agricultural Service.
Agency: Department of Commerce;
Bureau or office contacted:
* International Trade Administration.
Agency: Department of Defense;
Bureau or office contacted:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense;
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy;
* Joint Staff, J5.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security;
Bureau or office contacted:
* Office of International Affairs.
Agency: Department of Justice;
Bureau or office contacted:
* National Security Division.
Agency: Department of the Treasury;
Bureau or office contacted:
* Office of Technical Assistance.
Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development;
Bureau or office contacted:
* Africa Bureau;
* Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance;
* Food for Peace;
* Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance;
* Office of Military Affairs;
* Office of Transition Initiatives.
Agency: U.S. Government Research Centers;
Bureau or office contacted:
* Institute for Defense Analyses;
* National Defense University;
* U.S. Institute for Peace.
Agency: Independent Research Centers;
Bureau or office contacted:
* Brookings Institution;
* Center for Global Development;
* Center for Strategic and International Studies;
* Project on National Security Reform;
* RAND Corporation.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To determine the Department of State's (State) efforts to improve
interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and
reconstruction operations, we interviewed current and former staff from
the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/
CRS) and reviewed documentation on its development, roles, and
responsibilities. Documents reviewed include Presidential Decision
Directive 56, National Security Presidential Directives 1 and 44,
Section 408 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005,[Footnote
44] the Foreign Affairs Manual, and internal State reports and memos.
We also reviewed documentation from and held discussions with S/CRS,
State's regional and program bureaus, other agencies, and public and
private research institutions on the development of the new planning
framework for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Topics
reviewed and discussed included mechanisms for triggering the process,
roles and responsibilities of various actors, the Interagency
Management System, the new planning template, and monitoring and
evaluation requirements. We also discussed planning efforts and, where
possible, reviewed resultant plans for stabilization and reconstruction
operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo with S/CRS, staff from State's
relevant regional bureaus, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development. Finally, we participated in five training courses on
stabilization and reconstruction planning developed and taught by S/CRS
staff in conjunction with the Foreign Service Institute.
To determine State's efforts to improve the deployment of civilians to
these operations, we reviewed documents and interviewed State and other
agencies' staffs about the existing internal capacity each has for
supporting stabilization and reconstruction operations and the actions
they are taking to develop rapid deployment units and capabilities. We
reviewed the development of the Active Response Corps, Standby Response
Corps, and Civilian Reserve Corps by interviewing State staff from S/
CRS, regional bureaus, select program bureaus, and the Office of the
Inspector General. We reviewed BearingPoint's study for creating and
maintaining the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) and S/CRS plans for
implementing the study's recommendations, we examined proposals and
assessments prepared by the U.S. Institute for Peace, the Institute for
Defense Analyses, and the Congressional Research Service, and we
reviewed pending legislation in the Senate and House of Representatives
that would authorize CRC. Finally, we discussed S/CRS's civilian
reserve concept with staffs from other agencies including the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and the
Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as
with private research institutions, including the Brookings
Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and
the RAND Corporation.
We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
United States Department Of Commerce:
The Under Secretary for International Trade:
Washington, D.C. 20230:
October 23, 2007:
David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Walker:
Thank you for sharing with us the draft United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled, "Stabilization and
Reconstruction: Actions are Needed to Develop a Planning and
Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps," and
for the opportunity to comment on the report. The report provides a
good overview of the complexities associated with the development and
implementation of a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning
and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations for
countries threatened by conflict.
Technical comments and corrections have been attached in a separate
document for your consideration.
Thank you for your work in producing this report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher A. Padilla, Acting:
[End of letter]
Department Of Commerce Comments:
Government Accountability Office Report GAO-08-39:
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions are Needed to Develop a
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
Corps:
Department of Commerce Contact:
Merriam Mashatt, International Trade Administration:
(202) 482-3499, MerrianaMashatt@mail.doc.gov:
1. Page 25: Delete the reference to "Commerce" in the third sentence of
the first paragraph (below). This sentence does not reflect the
official position of the Department of Commerce and is factually
incorrect. International programs are a central part of the
Department's core mission and the Department's appropriations reflect
this fact. Already, the Department plays a significant role in
stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition, insert the language as the last 2 sentences of the first
paragraph. Commerce comments in bold text below:
"Although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and
reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff
available to respond rapidly to overseas crises. Most agencies have
primary missions that are domestic in nature although many agencies,
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security
and Justice operate overseas programs. However, according to (at this
point the word "Commerce" has been struck through with a line) Homeland
Security, and Justice officials, international programs are not viewed
as central to their core missions, either by the agency or their
appropriators. As a result, it is difficult for these agencies to
secure funding to deploy to active stabilization and reconstruction
operations, whether as part of a cadre of on-call first and second
responders or for longer-term assistance programs. Start Insert - The
Department of Commerce is taking steps to develop a capability that
could be deployed for reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Over
the next year, the International Trade Administration intends to
conduct analysis and execute a series of tabletop exercises to develop
a reconstruction and stabilization response mechanism for relevant
Department of Commerce agencies and bureaus. - End Insert."
2. Page 14 through 16 and in Summary Sections:
In the section entitled "Civilian Interagency Partners Have Not
Accepted the Framework Due to Concerns about Roles and
Responsibilities, Limited Support for the S/CRS, and a Cumbersome
Planning Process," the current use of the term "interagency" is
misleading. The Department of Commerce does not claim to have these
objections to the framework and it is inaccurate to include implicit or
explicit references to the Department of Commerce in this section.
Please redraft this section and any other summary sections referring to
this section to make it clear that the Department of Commerce, as a
civilian interagency partner, does not hold the assertions made in it.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
October 24, 2007:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
Corps," GAO Job Code 320438.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Sheila Gwaltney, Senior Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization at (202) 663-0842.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO ” Sam Bernet:
S/CRS ” John Herbst:
State/OIG ” Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department of State, Defense, and USAID Joint Response:
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
Corps (GAO-08-39, GAO Code 320438):
On behalf of the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development, the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) thanks the Government
Accountability Office for the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft
report.
We welcome the GAO's review of the U.S. Government's efforts to develop
the systems and procedures for whole-of-government planning and
management of reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) policy and
operations. Our nation's security will be strengthened by improving the
capacity of civilian agencies to prevent or mitigate conflicts that may
threaten us, and stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from
conflict by fostering stability, democracy, and economic development.
Our agencies share the view that the GAO report, which was over a year
in preparation, does not reflect the achievements made over recent
months in developing interagency mechanisms for effective management of
R&S situations. Chief among those achievements was the formal approval
by all agencies of the Interagency Management System (IMS), which
provides the framework for comprehensive policy and program management
for R&S operations, integrated within Washington agencies, as well as
our embassies and regional combatant commands. We also have made
significant strides in the planning for a Civilian Reserve Corps,
which, if Congress funds it, will create a critically important
capability benefiting the nation. We have determined the interagency
composition of the Active Response Corps and the Standby Response
Corps, and created additional interagency tools for R&S management. The
results of these advances also can be seen in recent engagements in
Afghanistan, Haiti and Liberia, to name just three specific examples.
Our agencies have each commented separately on the GAO report, but we
also wanted to take this opportunity to provide a joint response in
recognition of the unprecedented degree of interagency cooperation and
collaboration on these issues of national importance.
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
Corps (GAO-08-39, GAO Code 320438):
Introduction:
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and
comment on the GAO Draft Report, "Stabilization and Reconstruction:
Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and
Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps. " The Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established formally
in August 2004, and received its mandate, as delegated by the Secretary
of State, from National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) of
December 2005. Its core mission is to enhance our nation's capacity to
lead, coordinate, and institutionalize civilian capability to prevent
or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and
reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so
they can reach a more sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a
market economy. Over the three years since it was established, S/CRS
has led the interagency effort in Washington to implement the
President's vision to develop the systems and procedures to provide
comprehensive, whole-of-government planning for and management of
reconstruction and stabilization operations.
In her February 8, 2007 remarks on transformational diplomacy,
Secretary Rice stated:
"When it comes to working comprehensively to help societies rebuild
after conflict, one group of diplomats is truly at the forefront of our
efforts; that is, our Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization. These individuals are not just helping our Department to
plan for the next Bosnia or Liberia or Haiti. Some of them are actually
deployed right now in the hottest spots overseas.... These men and
women are part of our effort to create an expeditionary arm of the
Department of State. It is a way of thinking and training and operating
that is mostly new for us, but one that we must adopt."
Over the last year, S/CRS has worked with fifteen agencies associated
with reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) to develop integrated
planning, operations, and civilian response systems. Based on S/CRS'
demonstrated capacity for developing reconstruction and stabilization
plans and operations, this office is prepared to take on the role for
which it was created: to coordinate the interagency in managing the
U.S. Government response to the next crisis with reconstruction and
stabilization implications.
S/CRS and its interagency partners have made great progress over the
last several months in creating the procedures and tools for managing
R&S operations. These are ready for use. The Interagency Management
System (IMS) and its components can be activated to plan for, manage,
and staff a whole-of-government R&S response to a foreign crisis. The
Washington-based, interagency component of the IMS, the Country
Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), can provide policy
options and overall management of the R&S response. The CRSG's
secretariat, an interagency, working level team, can immediately begin
planning with the relevant regional bureau and embassy involved. If
significant U.S. military involvement is anticipated, S/CRS can
assemble an interagency team of planners and experts to send to the
relevant Combatant Command as an Integration Planning Cell (IPC). If
requested by the Chief of Mission, members of the Active Response Corp
(ARC) can deploy immediately to assist the Embassy as the core element
of an Advance Civilian Team (ACT).
The S/CRS Interagency Process Has Just Begun:
As noted above, S/CRS is a relatively new organization and is creating
a fundamentally new approach to enable more timely, integrated, and
effective management of U.S. Government efforts in reconstruction and
stabilization. This new approach requires modification of long-standing
bureaucratic practices and creation of new habitual relationships,
lines of communication, and forms of cooperation. In the year since
work on the GAO report was begun – which represents a third of the
lifespan thus far for S/CRS – the office's engagement with interagency
partners has expanded, deepened and been strengthened. [See comment 1]
For example, a series of working groups and other formal structures
regularly bring together representatives of the Departments of State,
Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Homeland Security,
Health and Human Services, Transportation, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the intelligence community, and the
National Security Council (NSC) to prepare for effective whole-of-
government planning for and management of reconstruction and
stabilization efforts. Within the Department of State, regional bureaus
and S/CRS have collaborated to develop and implement programs in Haiti,
Nepal, Sudan, Chad, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Colombia, Liberia, Yemen, the
trans-Sahara region, the tri-border region in Asia (Philippines,
Indonesia and Malaysia) and in Somalia. The data presented in this GAO
study, while perhaps accurate at the time of collection several months
ago, preceded a period of tremendous growth and change for the
interagency process and do not adequately reflect the current
situation. [See comment 1]
Areas of Significant Progress Not Adequately Recognized in the Report:
The critical areas of progress listed below were not captured in the
GAO report and are important developments that round out the report's
findings.
Implementation of NSPD-44: The GAO report states that two of three
elements of an interagency framework for planning and coordinating R&S
operations have been approved. In fact, since January 2007, the NSC has
approved three of four major components of the interagency management
effort for R&S engagements. The three approved components are the
Interagency Management System (IMS); procedures for initiating the IMS;
and the civilian surge mechanism, a critical component of which is the
Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). Work on the fourth element, the planning
framework, is in progress. [See comment 2]
The GAO report at one point incorrectly stated that NSPD-44 delegates
authority to S/CRS for leading U.S. Government R&S efforts, while in
other sections correctly notes that the Presidential directive tasks
the Secretary of State with this responsibility. Specifically, NSPD-44
delegates to the Secretary responsibility for "integrated U.S.
Government efforts involving U.S. Departments and Agencies with
relevant capabilities" to prepare for, plan, and conduct stabilization
and reconstruction operations in the range of failing and post-conflict
states (Emphasis added). The Secretary of State in turn can delegate to
S/CRS responsibility for leading these efforts. S/CRS has worked with
its partners from a variety of relevant agencies to establish the tasks
and systems needed for R&S mobilization, management and field
operations as well as the exercises and experimentation necessary to
test and refine these systems. The interagency agreed on an
implementation work plan and timeline that will produce the interagency
tools and procedures to enable whole-of-government engagement in R&S
situations. Greater detail on these tools and procedures is provided
below. [See comment 3]
Interagency Management System (IMS): Early in 2007, the NSC approved
the IMS and the procedures for initiating its use. The IMS provides the
framework to enable Washington policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and
military commanders to manage complex R&S engagements jointly. It
ensures coordination among all U.S. Government stakeholders, elaborates
the roles and responsibilities for interagency teams, and facilitates
and supports integrated strategic and implementation planning. [See
comment 4]
The GAO report states that there is lack of clarity on roles and
responsibilities among regional bureaus and S/CRS and among agencies of
the U.S. Government. The Department notes that continuing work on the
IMS by S/CRS, the Department's regional bureaus, and our interagency
partners will refine and test the IMS through a number of events,
experiments, and exercises with the goal of further identifying gaps
and clarifying roles and responsibilities both within the Department of
State and among executive branch agencies.
Over ten U.S. Government departments participated in a recent
demonstration of the IMS and in the after-action review that provided
very useful input to help the interagency fine tune IMS procedures and
mechanisms. The Department also notes that S/CRS works to complement
the existing roles of regional and functional bureaus at State, USAID,
and other agencies working in R&S. S/CRS may, depending on the
circumstance, assist with conflict assessment and planning processes
for reconstruction and stabilization in conjunction with its
interagency partners; in the field – if asked by the Chief of Mission –
elements of the interagency Advance Civilian Team may function as an
executive office or clearinghouse for information and action, or
provide critical liaison among various field elements that are
executing the tasks routinely associated with their agency's mandate.
Procedures for Initiation of Whole-of-Government Planning: Early in
2007, the NSC also approved interagency-agreed criteria and processes
for initiating or "triggering" whole-of-government planning for
specific R&S engagements, including immediate crisis response as well
as long-term scenario-based (or contingency) planning. Senior policy-
level bodies, Chiefs of Mission and State Department Regional Assistant
Secretaries may request that the Reconstruction and Stabilization
Policy Coordinating Committee consider initiating whole-of-government
planning for long-term scenarios, while senior officials (such as the
Secretary of State or Defense) can authorize planning for imminent
crises. The criteria for triggering whole-of-government R&S planning
and response include significant actual or potential U.S. military
involvement; significant threats to regional security; and actual or
imminent state failure, particularly where the host government is
unwilling or unable to respond; excessive mortality rates; or large-
scale displacement of people. [See comment 5]
Draft Planning Framework: Once planning is triggered by the above
process, the interagency planning framework will be used to guide
department and agency involvement in a whole-of-government planning
effort at the levels of both strategy and implementation. The goal of
the planning process is to translate a whole-of-government approach to
policy and strategy development into operational effectiveness. The
development of concepts and plans must ensure integration across major
mission programs, as prioritized activities frequently have multiple
effects, and when implemented and coordinated correctly can be
synergistic and achieve multiple objectives. As a principle, the
planning process should reflect the greatest amount of consultation in
the field with local stakeholders that the environment allows. [See
comment 6]
Civilian Surge Capability: In the State of the Union address in January
2007, President Bush called for the creation of an expeditionary or
civilian reserve corps, noting that "such a corps would function much
like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces
by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on
missions abroad when America needs them. And it would give people
across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the
defining struggle of our time." [See comment 7]
In testimony on February 7, 2007, to the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, the Secretary also underscored the importance of
establishing the Civilian Response Corps that the President proposed in
the State of the Union. She noted: "... we don't have a counterpart to
the military, national guard, or reserve corps of civilians who can be
ready and trained to go out and perform these functions: engineers,
lawyers, agricultural specialists. And so we are charged with
developing the concept for a Civilian Response Corps. We will be coming
to the Congress for support for that concept and for funding for that
concept so that we can have a ready reserve of civilians to take
exactly this kind of task."
Following the State of the Union address, and the inclusion of up to
$50 million in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-
28), S/CRS formed an interagency Civilian Reserve Task Force, made up
of representatives from the State Department, USAID, the Departments of
Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland
Security, and Treasury and with the Department of Defense (DOD). The
Task Force has worked for the last eight months to develop the
policies, procedures and infrastructure necessary to stand-up the U.S.
Civilian Reserve Corps.
The critical step remaining to create the CRC is securing the
authorizing legislation necessary to access the supplemental funding.
The key legislation, "The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian
Management Act of 2006," passed by unanimous consent in the Senate
during the 109th Congress. That important legislation, with minor
changes, has been reintroduced as S. 613, with a similar bill being
introduced on the House side in the form of H.R. 1084. While there is
bipartisan support for the legislation, the bills nonetheless are still
pending. If this authorizing legislation is enacted, up to $50 million
in the P.L. 110-28 would become available to support and maintain the
CRC.
The GAO report does not fully convey the progress that has been
achieved in preparing to stand up the CRC, pending authorization by
Congress. These achievements include: [See comment 7]
* An NSC-approved CRC Mission Statement;
* Determination of the skills sets that will be required by the CRC to
respond to critical stabilization and reconstruction missions. A total
of 121 separate positions have been identified for which fully
developed position descriptions have been completed;
* Development of the necessary interagency human resources policies,
mechanisms, and procedures for recruiting, hiring and compensating CRC
members;
* Development of a detailed training plan for the CRC members that will
leverage existing training capacity and also create new courses
tailored to the needs of the CRC;
* Candidate search culminating in a short-list for the Chief Operating
Officer of the CRC. The position will be filled once funding becomes
available upon enactment of the CRC authorizing legislation;
* Development of a draft memorandum of understanding between State and
other U.S. Government civilian agencies regarding the roles and
responsibilities for recruiting, selecting, training, and managing the
CRC when deployed;
* Secured space and staffing plan for the CRC Administrative Office
(Home Office);
* Concept development of the CRC deployment center, to be established
and operated by USAID; and;
* Draft CRC Agreement outlining the terms and conditions of CRC
service.
The GAO report contains a number of technical errors related to the
CRC. First, the GAO states that CRC members will be temporary U.S.
Government employees. It is important to clarify that all CRC members
will be full-time, term federal employees if and when they begin their
pre-deployment training. As envisioned by S. 613, CRC members will
enjoy important benefits and employment rights. Following the
recruitment of the first five hundred members of the CRC, the
Department will evaluate whether other employment terms need to be
considered, including the question of reemployment rights. [See comment
7]
Second, the GAO report raises the issue of whether and what punitive
actions could be taken for CRC members who refuse to deploy. The
Department notes that all Civilian Reservists will be required to sign
a Service Agreement that will outline acceptable reasons for service
deferments and actions that will be taken if the Reservist refuses to
deploy. S/CRS is in the process of preparing this agreement. [See
comment 7]
Third, the GAO report states that S/CRS is moving the CRC's development
forward without a set of potential missions for which it could be
deployed. This point is somewhat puzzling to the Department. Similar
entities, such as the military reserves, do not maintain lists of
possible deployments and are not limited to certain missions specified
in advance. The CRC is intended to provide the civilian surge and
backup capability for R&S crises. Reservists will train for deployment
under a variety of circumstances and must have the flexibility to
respond to different situations. [See comment 8]
Finally, the GAO report states that the plan for expanding the CRC from
500 to 2000 members has not been made public. The Department notes that
the expansion plan has been drafted and is still undergoing internal
review and will be shared with the Congress when the review is
completed.
Development of Surge Capability in the ARC: The GAO report states that
the Department of State has been unable to achieve planned staffing
levels for the one of the other components of civilian surge, the
Active Response Corps (ARC). The Department notes that the ARC
currently has ten officers. These ARC members represent a mix of
Foreign Service and Civil Service employees assigned to the ARC, plus
detailee employees from other offices within State. All have training
necessary to deploy; most also have experience from previous
deployments and exercising with the military. In late Fiscal Year 2007,
S/CRS added three new Civil Service positions to regularize the
positions filled by detailees. S/CRS also began to recruit additional
detailees from other agencies, effectively making the ARC interagency,
and is actively recruiting Foreign Service Officers in the current
assignment cycle. We are awaiting the outcome of the Fiscal Year 2008
Department budget request to determine future ARC personnel levels.
[See comment 9]
The Standby Response Corps (SRC) currently has in excess of 90 vetted
members, from all areas of the State Department. A small but growing
number of those members have received at least the minimum necessary
training. Efforts are currently underway to increase the current roster
of 90 and add USAID employees to it, and to get written commitments
from the State Department and other agency personnel systems to allow
SRC members to train and deploy as needed while still filling their
"day" jobs. [See comment 9]
Elements of the ARC and the SRC have deployed to Sudan, Chad, Lebanon,
Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Two SRC and
approximately one dozen ARC members have deployed for periods of
between one and five months.
S/CRS has a full-time development officer devoted to building up the
SRC. Both that position and the positions of the Director of the Office
of Civilian Readiness and Response, the ARC Director and her deputy
have as their number one goal the expansion of the ARC and the SRC.
That is also the primary goal of a two-person training unit that is
developing and maintaining the necessary training regime for a fully
capable ARC and SRC.
Training: The GAO report states that there is a lack of training
opportunities for one of the three civilian surge capabilities, the
Standby Response Corps (SRC). The Department notes that R&S training
opportunities are available and are increasing at a rapid pace among
the interagency as training, education, exercises, and experiments are
being designed and delivered to meet the needs of current and future
engagements. SRC volunteers have the opportunity to access training
provided by multiple agencies and the Department is working to ensure
that SRC members are able to take time from their current assignments
to pursue professional development. ARC members, on the other hand, are
able to complete an extensive training regimen and engage in exercises
due to the nature of their jobs. [See comment 9]
Based on the interagency R&S training strategy of 2005, S/CRS is
currently involved in the design and delivery of courses at the Foreign
Service Institute (FSI) and National Defense University, as well as
helping design distance learning courses at Joint Forces Command, the
DOD, and the Department of Commerce.
S/CRS courses with FSI are increasing from five in 2006 to ten in 2008.
All courses focus on integrated and interagency R&S topics. The R&S
courses reserve informally 80% of the tuition-free slots for agencies
and offices that do or will contribute SRC members. Outreach to the
interagency community to increase enrollment in S/CRS's FSI courses has
been successful. The number trained increased from 352 to 432 in the
past year with basic courses having reached capacity. A majority of the
participants are from State, USAID, and DOD as these are the leading
agencies in overseas operations; however, nine other agencies are
consistently involved as their leadership recognizes the new
requirements outline. [See comment 9]
Of equal significance, S/CRS convened an interagency body to develop a
training program tailored to meet current and future needs. This group
established an interagency training implementation strategy and is
systematically addressing each component necessary to prepare to train
future personnel.
Expansion of 1207-funded activities and coordination with the Office of
the Director for Foreign Assistance: The Department appreciates GAO's
recognition of the expansion of R&S activities funded under Section
1207. The GAO report states that the Department obtained only $10
million of the $100 million of funds authorized in Fiscal Year 2006
under Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
R&S projects, and that confusion between S/CRS and the Office of the
Director for Foreign Assistance (F, which had just been created)
complicated transfer of additional funding that year. Building on the
FY06 experience, and in complete coordination with F, S/CRS worked
closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense during Fiscal Year
2007 to identify and obtain approval for seven interagency projects,
totaling $99.745 million of the $100 million Congress authorized DOD to
transfer. [See comment 10]
Conflict Prevention: The GAO asserts that S/CRS 's authorizing
legislation does not include conflict prevention. While "conflict
prevention" is not explicitly mentioned in Public Law 108-447 that
created S/CRS, the law does call upon the office to "address crises in
countries and regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict
or civil strife." (Emphasis added) Conflict prevention is an important
mechanism to support societies in this transitional phase to ensure
that conflict does not re-emerge during the stabilization and
reconstruction periods through support for stabilizing influences and
deterrence of the destabilizing influences. Conflict prevention is thus
inherent in the basic work of S/CRS. [See comment 11]
Other Comments:
Inclusion of personal observations by U.S. Government officials: The
GAO report contains personal comments voiced by U.S. Government
employees that are in direct contradiction to the official positions of
these individuals' agencies. In some cases, these personal views are
taken out of context; in others, it is not clear when the statements
were made or if the individuals' views have changed due to intervening
developments. While the Department fully respects the rights of
individuals to express their personal opinions, the GAO report would be
more balanced and would benefit if these personal observations were
identified as such. [See comment 12]
The Department's Response to the Recommendations:
Partially concur. While the Department poses no objections to GAO's
recommendations, we believe the progress made toward achieving the
goals articulated in the recommendations, as well as the overall
progress achieved toward developing a civilian R&S capability, is under-
reported. [See comment 13]
The Department stands ready to assist the GAO in the future to update
this report's evaluation of the U.S. government's civilian interagency
surge capabilities. The Department is confident that S/CRS will
continue to develop this capability, fully implement a planning and
coordination framework, and establish a Civilian Reserve Corps.
[End of Department of State, Defense, and USAID Joint Response]
GAO Response to State's Comments:
We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect
changes that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We
completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our
draft report discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC
approved in March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft
report did not include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC
because those details were not provided until October 2007. We
incorporated this new information into our final report, as well as
other information from written and technical comments from six
agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the
status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007. We also
have specific comments to points raised by State (see below).
1. While we are aware of the efforts S/CRS and regional bureaus have
made in the countries cited, we note that S/CRS involvement in most of
them includes the deployment of a small number of staff or the
allocation of section 1207 funds, which we recognized in the report. We
also note in the report that S/CRS applied its draft planning guide to
operations in Haiti and Sudan, and we note the outcomes of those plans.
We also report that interagency staff involved in those efforts had
different points of view on the merits of the planning process, that
the planning guide is still in development, and that S/CRS is revising
the planning guide based on partners' concerns.
2. We chose to discuss CRC separately because of the potential costs
associated with its development and sustainment. However, we
acknowledge within the report that State views civilian response
mechanisms--ARC, CRC, and SRC--as the fourth major element of the
framework.
3. We have changed the text in our report to reflect State's comment.
4. We reported on the basic structures of the IMS. We note that it is
designed to ensure coordination between Washington and the field, and
between the civilian and military sectors of government. However, since
IMS has never been used, it is premature to state whether it is an
effective tool. We found, however, that different documents outline
different roles and responsibilities for S/CRS. While State and S/CRS
have taken some steps to clarify S/CRS' role, some interagency partners
stated more must be done. For example, when providing comments on a
draft of our report, USAID stated it would like more definition on the
relationships between S/CRS and DFA, and S/CRS and USAID. State would
seem to agree with this assessment since it plans to use exercises to
identify gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities. Although we are
encouraged that State plans to take these actions, we believe the true
test of IMS's effectiveness will come when it is applied to an actual
operation.
5. We reported on the procedures for triggering the use of IMS and,
once finalized, the planning guide. As with IMS, the true test of the
effectiveness of these procedures will come when it is used for an
actual operation.
6. We reported on the ongoing development of the draft planning guide,
including its features; its use for planning operations in Haiti, Sudan
and Kosovo; and revisions S/CRS is making based on partners' concerns.
We also note that although NSC need not approve this element, such
approval would add credibility to the guide and the framework, as a
whole.
7. Based on these comments and technical comments from State, we
updated information on State's plans for establishing CRC, including
startup costs, annual costs, and authorizing legislation. We
acknowledge that NSC approved a plan to establish by 2009 a roster of
2,000 CRC reservists who would deploy to stabilization and
reconstruction operations. Although we constrain our discussion to
higher-level considerations, we are encouraged by the list of
achievements State says it recently made; however, we note that a
number them are still in the draft or conceptual stage of development.
In addition, we removed from the final report discussion on the
punitive actions State could take against volunteers who refused to
deploy.
8. We did not state that lists of possible locations for deployment of
CRC volunteers should be maintained. Our finding and conclusion pertain
to the lack of clarity for the type of operations for which CRC would
be used. As stated in the report, State has not clarified how
stabilization and reconstruction operations differ from other
operations, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, or
traditional development assistance programs. Having a clear definition
of the types of operations CRC volunteers could deploy to would enable
State to better define the skill mix it needs for the CRC roster. It
would also provide a basis for Congressional oversight and a valuable
check against potential misuse.
9. We updated our discussions or ARC and SRC based on information
provided in these and other technical comments. We are encouraged that
S/CRS has developed these courses--five of which GAO staff attended.
However, based on our findings, we are concerned that S/CRS and the
Foreign Service Institute may not have the capacity to provide full
training to 3,000 SRC and CRC volunteers in fiscal year 2009.
10. We adjusted the report to reflect this new information. We note
that approximately $80 million of the $99.75 million was obligated in
the final month of the fiscal year.
11. We do not challenge States interpretation that the legislation
implicitly authorizes S/CRS to engage in conflict prevention
activities. Our point was to show that ambiguities between the sources
of S/CRS authorities can lead to confusion among partners over S/CRS's
true roles and responsibilities.
12. Although agencies may have official positions that they support S/
CRS and the new framework, our fieldwork revealed that many individuals
within State's regional and program bureaus and other agencies have not
yet accepted it.
13. We disagree with the assertion that our report does not reflect
changes that occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We
completed our initial audit work in August 2007, and in October 2007 we
obtained and incorporated additional information from agencies written
and technical comments on a draft of our report. Our report reflects
the status of the framework and development of civilian response
capabilities as of October 2007.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual contact named above, Judith McCloskey,
Assistant Director; Sam Bernet; Lynn Cothern; Marissa Jones; and Sona
Kalapura made key contributions to this report. Technical assistance
was provided by Joseph Brown, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Mark
Dowling, Holly Dye, Francisco Enriquez, Timothy Fairbanks, Etana
Finkler, Bradley Hunt, Marisela Perez, Nina Pfeiffer, and Jeremy Sebest.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Defense Science Board defines stabilization and reconstruction
as the period following the cessation of high-intensity conflict. See
DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from
Hostilities (Washington, D.C.: December 2004).
[2] In August 2004, State created S/CRS under the Secretary of State's
authority. Congress subsequently authorized the office in section 408
of the Fiscal Year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 108-
447, Div. B, Title IV, sec. 408).
[3] We provided preliminary observations on our findings in testimony
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed
Services Committee. See GAO, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions
Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future
Operations, GAO-08-228T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007).
[4] In May 2007, we reported on DOD's efforts to elevate stability,
security, transition, and reconstruction operations to the same level
as combat operations. GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to
Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency
Planning, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007). See also GAO,
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 21, 2006).
[5] In this report, we use the term "framework" to refer to the key
elements developed to plan and coordinate reconstruction and
stabilization operations under NSPD-44. The first section of our report
discusses three elements for planning these operations, while civilian
response mechanisms, which S/CRS considers a fourth element, are
discussed in the second section of this report.
[6] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (Pub. L. 108-447, sec. 408).
[7] NSC policy coordination committees manage the development and
implementation of national security policies and serve as the main day-
to-day mechanism for interagency coordination of national security
policies.
[8] The Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and
Stabilization Operations created interagency working groups to develop
plans and processes for implementing NSPD-44 that focus on sectors of
reconstruction and stabilization, such as transitional security and
rule of law, humanitarian response and social well-being, and conflict
prevention and mitigation. Among other responsibilities, each working
group was tasked with identifying current reconstruction and
stabilization capabilities and gaps in those capabilities; lessons
learned; and issues for diplomatic outreach.
[9] United States Joint Forces Command J7 and Department of State,
Pamphlet Version 1.0, U.S., Government Draft Planning Framework for
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (December
2005).
[10] Washington policymakers would include NSC, Assistant Secretaries
for State's regional bureaus and their counterparts at other civilian
agencies, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and DOD.
[11] NSPD-1 organized NSC and its committees for the current
administration. NSPD-1 placed oversight of stabilization and
reconstruction operations under the six regional Policy Coordination
Committees, which are chaired by officials of Under Secretary or
Assistant Secretary rank, designated by the Secretary of State.
[12] GAO-06-15.
[13] Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 112 (a).
[14] 22 U.S.C. 3927.
[15] GAO-06-15.
[16] GAO-07-549.
[17] GAO-06-15.
[18] State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, Update to Draft USG Planning Framework for
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Washington,
D.C.: August 2006). When S/CRS and U.S. Joint Forces Command issued the
first draft in December 2005, they distributed it to stakeholder
agencies and requested their feedback. S/CRS is currently developing a
revised framework based on stakeholders' comments.
[19] Pub. L. 109-163, sec. 1207.
[20] DFA developed the Foreign Assistance Framework to guide the budget
process for foreign-assistance programs. The framework identifies five
categories of countries receiving foreign assistance including
rebuilding, developing, transforming, sustaining partnership, and
restricting. The rebuilding category includes countries "in or emerging
from and rebuilding after internal or external strife."
[21] This figure includes S/CRS staff who received the training. In
addition, several GAO staff participated in courses in fiscal year 2007
to obtain information about the S/CRS framework and the office's
efforts to train interagency staff.
[22] State currently pays tuition for non-State participants, and staff
said other agencies do not have funds available for this purpose.
[23] S/CRS has emphasized the importance of close coordination between
military and civilian government, while acknowledging that not all
reconstruction and stabilization operations require military
participation. S/CRS has been involved in more than a dozen joint
exercises to practice civilian and military coordination and strengthen
interagency operations. For example, S/CRS partnered with the U.S.
Joint Forces Command to support Multinational Experiment 4 in February
and March 2006 to test crisis coordination among eight countries and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. S/CRS also is coordinating
interagency input into the U.S. Joint Forces Command-led Multinational
Experiment 5 series.
[24] GAO-07-549.
[25] Specifically, DOD officials stated that DOD's policy is not to
share DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside DOD unless
directed to do so by the Secretary of Defense, who determines their
need to know. However, these officials also noted DOD's planning
policies and procedures state that a Combatant Commander, with
Secretary of Defense's approval, may work in coordination with the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff
to seek input on plan development from other U.S. government agencies.
[26] State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, Update to Draft USG Planning Framework for
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Washington,
D.C.: August 2006).
[27] DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Improving
Interagency Support for United States 21st Century National Security
Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, D.C., July 19,
2007). Congress mandated this report in the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Pub. L. 109-364, sec.
1035).
[28] GAO-07-549.
[29] Before the creation of ARC and SRC, State had a program to provide
operational capacity for stability operations through the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. However, according to the
U.S. Institute for Peace, this capacity was limited to providing police
for international police missions through a private contractor. U.S.
Institute for Peace, Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability
Operations (Washington, D.C.:, April 2004).
[30] The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance uses Disaster Area
Response Teams and Response Alternatives for Technical Services, among
other mechanisms, in support of humanitarian assistance in
stabilization and reconstruction missions. The office also has standing
agreements with disaster assistance teams around the world that are
trained and equipped to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world. The
Office of Transition Initiatives has 16 staff available for deployment,
but the staff take assignments by mutual consent. The staff also said
that, depending on availability and needed skill sets, other employees
may deploy to humanitarian missions.
[31] These programs focus on economic governance for developing
countries so that their governments can become legitimate sources of
power. The Office of Technical Assistance focuses on countries in
failed-state environments and has deployed staff to assist operations
in such places as Iraq and Haiti.
[32] Officials from the Department of Justice said the agency is not a
foreign affairs agency and its base appropriations provide for its
defined missions. Funding for Justice Department stabilization and
reconstruction activities is achieved through interagency agreements,
generally through agreements with State and USAID pursuant to section
632 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2392).
[33] State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector
General, Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, ISP-l-07-26 (Washington, D.C., May
2007).
[34] State plans to request funds to deploy interagency response teams
in the fiscal year 2009 budget. Training would occur only if this
request was approved.
[35] BearingPoint, Management Study for Establishing and Managing a
Civilian Reserve (McLean, Virginia, 2006).
[36] BearingPoint, pp. 11, 69, and 71.
[37] Congressional Research Service, A Civilian Reserve for
Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S.
Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress
(Washington, D.C., 2007).
[38] BearingPoint's study said the reserve should be capable of
deploying simultaneously to one large, one medium, and one small
operation. BearingPoint defines these sizes in terms of deployment
years. A large deployment year would see 900 to 1,200 volunteers
deployed, a medium deployment year would see 600 to 900 volunteers
deployed, and a small deployment year would see up to 600 volunteers
deployed.
[39] This authority was granted in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental
appropriation to fund operations in Iraq and elsewhere. See U.S. Troop
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. 110-28, sec. 3810).
[40] See 110th Congress, S. 613 and H.R. 1084.
[41] See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C.
Secs. 4301-4333.
[42] This plan was developed by the Civilian Reserve Task Force, which
is led by S/CRS, and approved by NSC in July 2007.
[43] S/CRS stated that it would establish up to 63 total permanent and
contract administrative positions depending on the actual size of CRC.
These staff would be responsible for such functions as recruiting,
training, logistics and supply management, payroll, and benefits
management, among other duties.
[44] Pub. L. 108-447.
[End of section]
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