U.S. Public Diplomacy
Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges Gao ID: GAO-07-795T April 26, 2007Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, polling data have generally shown that anti-Americanism has spread and deepened around the world, and several groups have concluded that this trend may have harmed U.S. interests in significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities undertaken by the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which totaled almost $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2006, are designed to counter such sentiments. Based on our prior reports, this testimony addresses (1) the negative consequences various groups have associated with rising anti-American sentiments; (2) strategic planning, coordination, and performance measurement issues affecting U.S. public diplomacy efforts; and (3) key challenges that hamper agency activities.
Numerous experts, policymakers, and business leaders have identified various potential negative consequences of growing anti-Americanism. According to these sources, anti-Americanism may have a negative impact on American economic interests, the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy and military goals, and the security of Americans worldwide. Our reports and testimonies have highlighted the lack of a governmentwide communication strategy, as well as the need for an integrated State Department strategy, enhanced performance indicators for State and the BBG, and improvements in the BBG's audience research methodology. We also reported in March 2007 that U.S. foreign assistance activities were not being consistently publicized and branded, and we recommended that State help develop governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing these efforts. State has responded to our recommendations and has taken actions to develop a more strategic approach and measure the effectiveness of its programs. Likewise, the BBG has adapted its strategic plan to include additional performance indicators and is beginning to address our recommendations to adopt management improvements at its Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). Nevertheless, State and the BBG continue to face challenges in implementing public diplomacy and international broadcasting. State has shortages in staffing and language capabilities, and security issues continue to hamper overseas public diplomacy efforts. For example, in 2006 we reported that State continued to experience significant foreign language proficiency shortfalls, particularly at posts in the Muslim world. The BBG faces challenges in managing a disparate collection of broadcasters. Also, MBN faces several managerial challenges involving program review, internal control, and training.
GAO-07-795T, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights,
and Oversight, House Committee on Foreign Affairs:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 26, 2007:
U.S. Public Diplomacy:
Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant
Implementation Challenges:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-07-795T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-795T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, polling data have generally shown
that anti-Americanism has spread and deepened around the world, and
several groups have concluded that this trend may have harmed U.S.
interests in significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities
undertaken by the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG), which totaled almost $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2006,
are designed to counter such sentiments. Based on our prior reports,
this testimony addresses (1) the negative consequences various groups
have associated with rising anti-American sentiments; (2) strategic
planning, coordination, and performance measurement issues affecting
U.S. public diplomacy efforts; and (3) key challenges that hamper
agency activities.
What GAO Found:
Numerous experts, policymakers, and business leaders have identified
various potential negative consequences of growing anti-Americanism.
According to these sources, anti-Americanism may have a negative impact
on American economic interests, the ability of the United States to
pursue its foreign policy and military goals, and the security of
Americans worldwide.
Our reports and testimonies have highlighted the lack of a
governmentwide communication strategy, as well as the need for an
integrated State Department strategy, enhanced performance indicators
for State and the BBG, and improvements in the BBG‘s audience research
methodology. We also reported in March 2007 that U.S. foreign
assistance activities were not being consistently publicized and
branded, and we recommended that State help develop governmentwide
guidance for marking and publicizing these efforts. State has responded
to our recommendations and has taken actions to develop a more
strategic approach and measure the effectiveness of its programs.
Likewise, the BBG has adapted its strategic plan to include additional
performance indicators and is beginning to address our recommendations
to adopt management improvements at its Middle East Broadcasting
Networks (MBN).
Nevertheless, State and the BBG continue to face challenges in
implementing public diplomacy and international broadcasting. State has
shortages in staffing and language capabilities, and security issues
continue to hamper overseas public diplomacy efforts. For example, in
2006 we reported that State continued to experience significant foreign
language proficiency shortfalls, particularly at posts in the Muslim
world. The BBG faces challenges in managing a disparate collection of
broadcasters. Also, MBN faces several managerial challenges involving
program review, internal control, and training.
Figure: U.S. Public Diplomacy Resources for State Department and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2006:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: State Department and BBG.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
We have made a number of recommendations in the past 4 years to the
Secretary of State and the Chairman of the BBG to address strategic
planning issues and administrative and staffing concerns. Both agencies
agreed with our recommendations and have made some progress in
implementing them.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-795T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128, fordj@gao.gov.
[end of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work on U.S. public
diplomacy efforts. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
polling data have generally shown that anti-Americanism has spread and
intensified around the world and many groups have concluded that this
trend may have harmed U.S. national security and business interests in
significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities designed to counter
such negative sentiments are largely divided between the State
Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).[Footnote 1]
In the past 4 years, we have issued a series of reports on these
agencies' public diplomacy efforts (see enclosure). At the request of
the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, we are currently reviewing how research is used to inform
and direct U.S. government efforts to communicate with foreign
audiences. We plan to issue a final report this summer.
The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and
influence overseas audiences. State's Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs oversees an annual budget of nearly $800
million, which funds the activities of program bureaus in Washington
and the activities of nearly 700 public diplomacy officers located at
more than 260 posts around the world and domestically. Program efforts
include academic and professional exchanges, English language teaching,
information programs, and news management activities. The BBG, as the
overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, aims to support
U.S. public diplomacy objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate
information, while maintaining its journalistic independence as a news
organization. The BBG manages a budget of nearly $650 million that
funds multiple discrete broadcast entities that broadcast in 57 foreign
languages to 125 media markets around the world.
Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss key findings from the reports we
have issued over the past several years, particularly regarding our
government's public diplomacy strategy and the challenges faced in
implementing these activities in the field. Today, I will talk about
(1) the negative consequences various groups have associated with
rising anti-American sentiments; (2) strategic planning, coordination,
and performance measurement issues affecting U.S. public diplomacy
efforts; and (3) the key challenges that hamper agency efforts.
As part of our reviews of public diplomacy, we have met with officials
from the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Broadcasting
Board of Governors. We have also observed U.S. public diplomacy efforts
in a range of countries including Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and
Pakistan; conducted a worldwide poll of public diplomacy officials in
2003 and more limited surveys of field activity in recent reviews; and
have met with public diplomacy counterparts in the United Kingdom and
Germany. Finally, we convened roundtables of key agency staff and
experts on public relations and the Muslim world to obtain their key
insights and recommendations for improvement. The work used to support
this testimony was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Summary:
Public opinion polls of foreign audiences have generally shown that
negative attitudes toward the United States continue to rise. For
example, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has found increasing anti-
American sentiment throughout the world. Numerous experts,
policymakers, and business leaders have identified a variety of
potential negative consequences of this growing anti-Americanism.
According to these sources, anti-Americanism may have a negative impact
on American economic interests around the world, the ability of the
United States to pursue its foreign policy goals and succeed in foreign
military operations, and the security of Americans at home and abroad.
Although we cannot draw a direct causal link between negative foreign
public opinion toward our country and specific outcomes in these areas,
it is clear that growing anti-Americanism does not help the United
States achieve its economic, foreign policy, and security goals.
Therefore, U.S. public diplomacy efforts, which seek to counter
negative foreign public opinion, have a critical role to play in
supporting U.S. interests.
Key problems identified in our prior reports include a general lack of
strategic planning, inadequate coordination among agency efforts, and
problems with measuring performance and results. Beginning in 2003, we
reported that the government lacked an interagency communications
strategy. Four years later, a strategy still has not been released,
although State officials told us that this will happen soon. Last
month, we also reported on challenges in marking and publicizing U.S.
foreign assistance that may result in missed opportunities to increase
public awareness of U.S. foreign aid activities. Accordingly, we
recommended that State develop strategies and establish interagency
agreements to better coordinate and assess the impact of U.S. marking
and publicity programs. We also reported that State did not have a
strategy to integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities. State
began to address this shortcoming in 2005 when the current Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs developed a strategic
framework to focus State's efforts on three priority goals: offer
foreign publics a vision of hope and opportunity rooted in basic U.S.
values, isolate and marginalize violent extremists, and nurture common
interests and values. However, State has not issued guidance on how its
assorted public diplomacy activities will be coordinated to achieve
these goals. In addition, posts' public diplomacy efforts generally
lack important strategic communication elements found in the private
sector, which GAO recommended that State adopt as a means to better
communicate with target audiences. Key steps in this approach include
defining core messages, identifying target audiences, developing
detailed communication strategies and tactics, and using research and
evaluation to inform and re-direct efforts as needed. Finally, we and
others have recommended that State develop more rigorous measures of
effectiveness to better document the impact of its public diplomacy
efforts. State has taken several steps towards this goal, including
establishing a centralized office to better coordinate and direct the
collection of performance data. Regarding the BBG, we have noted that
the Board launched a new strategic approach in 2001 that included a
focus on supporting the U.S. war on terror. The BBG made this support
tangible through several key initiatives, including the creation of
Radio Sawa in 2002 and the Alhurra TV network in 2004, which are run by
the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). While these are noteworthy
attempts to help turn the tide of negative opinion in the Muslim world
toward the United States, our August 2006 report on MBN recommended
that several steps be taken to correct methodological concerns which
could impact the accuracy of its audience research data. MBN continues
to evaluate possible solutions to these concerns.
We also have reported that State and the BBG face multiple challenges
in managing and implementing their public diplomacy programs. Several
embassy officials indicated that insufficient numbers of staff and the
lack of staff time for public diplomacy activities hinder outreach
efforts. To help address these concerns, the Secretary of State has
repositioned some staff to posts with the greatest perceived shortages;
however, significant shortfalls remain. In May 2006, we reported that
approximately 15 percent of State's worldwide public diplomacy
positions were vacant. Updated information provided by State shows that
this problem has worsened and approximately 22 percent of such
positions are now vacant. We reported that the State Department
continues to experience significant shortfalls in foreign language
proficiency in countries around the world. In our May 2006 report, we
noted that this problem is particularly acute in the Muslim world,
where 30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions are
filled by officers without the level of language proficiency required
for their positions, thus hampering their ability to engage with
foreign publics. State has taken steps to address language deficiencies
by bolstering its language training activities. In addition, security
concerns have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities
and curtail certain public outreach efforts, sending the unintended
message that the United States is unapproachable. The department has
attempted to compensate for the lack of public presence in high threat
posts through a variety of means, including the use of small-scale
external facilities. The BBG faces the primary challenge of managing a
disparate collection of multiple discrete broadcast entities. In
addition, MBN faces several managerial challenges involving program
review and evaluation, editorial oversight, internal control issues,
and staff training.
Background:
The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and
influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a
wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print,
broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, the
State Department's efforts have focused on foreign elites--current and
future overseas opinion leaders, agenda setters, and decision makers.
However, the dramatic growth in global mass communications and other
trends have forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun
to consider techniques for communicating with broader foreign
audiences. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has
expanded its public diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly
on countries in the Muslim world considered to be of strategic
importance in the war on terror. In May 2006, we reported that this
trend continued with funding increases of 25 percent for the Near East
and 39 percent for South Asia from 2004 to 2006.
The BBG supports U.S. public diplomacy's key objectives by broadcasting
news and information about the United States and world affairs and
serving as a model of how a free press should operate. The BBG manages
and oversees the Voice of America (VOA), Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Farda, Radio Sawa, and the
Alhurra TV Network.
As shown in figure 1, State and the BBG spent close to $1.5 billion on
public diplomacy programs in fiscal year 2006.
Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State
Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department and BBG.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
[End of figure]
Widespread Concern Exists about the Impact of Anti-American Sentiment:
As others have previously reported, in recent years anti-American
sentiment has spread and intensified around the world. For example, the
Pew Global Attitudes Project has found that the decline in favorable
opinion of the United States is a worldwide trend. For instance,
favorable attitudes toward the United States in Indonesia declined from
75 percent in 2000 to 30 percent in 2006 and from 52 percent to 12
percent over the same time period in Turkey. While individual opinion
polls may reflect a snapshot in time, consistently negative polls may
reflect the development of more deeply seated sentiments about the
United States.
Numerous experts, expert groups, policymakers, and business leaders
have expressed concerns that anti-Americanism may harm U.S. interests
in various ways. In its 2004 report on strategic communication, the
Defense Science Board states that "damaging consequences for other
elements of U.S. soft power are tactical manifestations of a pervasive
atmosphere of hostility." Similarly, the Council on Foreign Relations
has claimed that the loss of goodwill and trust from publics around the
world has had a negative impact on U.S. security and foreign policy.
Anti-American sentiments may negatively affect American economic
interests, U.S. foreign policy and military operations, and the
security of Americans.
Anti-Americanism May Have Negative Effects on U.S. Economic Interests
Around the World:
According to Business for Diplomatic Action,[Footnote 2] anti-
Americanism can hurt U.S. businesses by causing boycotts of American
products, a backlash against American brands, increased security costs
for U.S. companies, higher foreign opposition to U.S. trade policies,
and a decrease in the U.S.'s ability to attract the world's best talent
to join the American workforce. Additionally, a report from the
Princeton-based Working Group on Anti-Americanism[Footnote 3] generally
echoes the possibility that anti-Americanism may harm U.S. business
interests in these same areas.
Further, as reported by the Travel Business Roundtable during previous
hearings before this subcommittee, the U.S. travel industry has
reported significant declines in the U.S. market share of the worldwide
travel market and a decline in overseas visitors to the United States
since 9/11. Further, the State Department's 2003 report on Patterns of
Global Terrorism recorded 67 attacks on American business facilities
and 7 business casualties. In 2006, the Overseas Security Advisory
Council noted that more threats against the private sector occurred in
2006 than in 2004 or 2005 in most of the industries it reports on.
Finally, the Working Group on Anti-Americanism also indicated that
threats to American private property and personnel working overseas
have become constant in some regions, especially the Middle East, and
have resulted in significantly increased security costs.
Anti-Americanism May Limit Ability to Pursue U.S. Foreign Policy:
According to the Defense Science Board, the Brookings Institution, and
others, anti-Americanism around the world may reduce the U.S.'s ability
to pursue its foreign policy goals, including efforts to foster
diplomatic relationships with other foreign leaders and to garner
support for the global war on terror. For instance, in October 2003,
the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World
reported that "hostility toward the U.S. makes achieving our policy
goals far more difficult." Specifically, according to a paper from the
Working Group on Anti-Americanism, foreign leaders may seek to leverage
anti-American sentiment in pursuit of their own political goals, which
may then limit their future support for U.S. foreign policy. As these
leaders achieve personal political successes based on their opposition
to the United States, they may then be less likely to support U.S.
foreign policy going forward.
Further, the 9/11 Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and
others have reported on the possibility that anti-Americanism may also
serve as a barrier to success in the global war on terror and related
U.S. military operations. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission report of
July 2004 stated that perceptions of the United States' foreign
policies as anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, and pro-Israel have contributed to
the rise in extremist rhetoric against the United States. Further, the
Council on Foreign Relations has argued that increasing hostility
toward America in Muslim countries facilitates recruitment and support
for extremism and terror.
Anti-Americanism May Be Linked to Decreased Security of Americans
Around the World:
The Council on Foreign Relations also has identified potential
consequences of anti-Americanism on the security of individual
Americans, noting that Americans now face an increased risk of direct
attack from individuals and small groups that wield increasingly more
destructive power. According to State's Country Reports on Terrorism
for 2005,[Footnote 4] 56 private U.S. citizens were killed as a result
of terrorism incidents in 2005. The Working Group on Anti-Americanism
suggests that there is some correlation between anti-Americanism and
violence against Americans in the greater Middle East but notes that
the relationship is complex. For example, they note that while
increased anti-Americanism in Europe or Jordan has not led to violence
against Americans or U.S. interests in those areas, it does seem to
play a role in fueling such violence in Iraq. Other factors, such as
the visibility of Americans overseas, particularly in Iraq; the role of
the media in supporting anti-Americanism; and the absence of economic
security may also contribute to this violence.
While all of the topics discussed here represent areas in which anti-
Americanism may have negative consequences, the empirical evidence to
support direct relationships is limited. As such, we cannot confirm any
causal relationships between negative foreign public opinion and
specific negative outcomes regarding U.S. interests. Despite the fact
that we cannot draw a direct causal link between anti-Americanism and
specific outcomes in these areas, it is clear that growing negative
foreign public opinion does not help the United States achieve its
economic, foreign policy, and security goals, and therefore U.S. public
diplomacy efforts, which seek to counter anti-Americanism sentiment,
have a critical role to play in supporting U.S. interests throughout
the world.
Strategic Planning, Coordination, and Performance Measurement Remain
Areas of Concern:
Over the past 4 years, we have identified and made recommendations to
State and the BBG on a number of issues related to a general lack of
strategic planning, inadequate coordination of agency efforts, and
problems with measuring performance and results. Among other things, we
have recommended that (1) communication strategies be developed to
coordinate and focus the efforts of key government agencies and the
private sector, (2) the State Department develop a strategic plan to
integrate its diverse efforts, (3) posts adopt strategic communication
best practices, and (4) meaningful performance goals and indicators be
established by both State and the BBG. Currently, the U.S. government
lacks an interagency public diplomacy strategy; however, such a plan
has been drafted and will be released shortly. While the department has
articulated a strategic framework to direct its efforts, comprehensive
guidance on how to implement this strategic framework has not yet been
developed. In addition, posts generally do not pursue a campaign-style
approach to communications that incorporates best practices endorsed by
GAO and others. State has begun to take credible steps towards
instituting more systematic performance measurement practices,
consistent with recommendations GAO and others have made. Finally,
although the BBG has added audience size as a key performance measure
within its strategic plan, our latest review of MBN's operations call
into question the potential value of this measure due to various
methodological concerns.
Government Lacks an Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy:
In 2003, we reported that the United States lacked a governmentwide,
interagency public diplomacy strategy, defining the messages and means
for communication efforts abroad. We reported since then that the
administration has made a number of unsuccessful attempts to develop
such a strategy. The lack of such a strategy complicates the task of
conveying consistent messages and therefore increases the risk of
making damaging communication mistakes. State officials have said that
it also diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide
public diplomacy efforts, while several reports have concluded that a
strategy is needed to synchronize agencies' target audience
assessments, messages, and capabilities.
On April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordination
Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. This
committee, led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs, intends to better coordinate interagency activities, including
the development of an interagency public diplomacy strategy. We have
been told this strategy is still under development and will be issued
soon.
The U.S. government also lacks a governmentwide strategy and meaningful
methods to ensure that recipients of U.S. foreign assistance are
consistently aware that the aid comes from the United States. In March
2007, we reported that most agencies involved in foreign assistance
activities had established some marking and publicity requirements in
their policies, regulations, and guidelines, and used various methods
to mark and publicize their activities. However, we identified some
challenges to marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance,
including the lack of a strategy for assessing the impact of marking
and publicity efforts on public awareness and the lack of
governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing U.S. foreign aid.
To better ensure that recipients of U.S. foreign assistance are aware
that the aid is provided by the United States and its taxpayers, we
recommended that State, in consultation with other U.S. government
agencies, (1) develop a strategy to better assess the impact of marking
and publicity programs on public awareness and (2) establish
interagency agreements for marking and publicizing all U.S. foreign
assistance. State indicated that the interagency public diplomacy
strategy will address assessment of marking and publicity programs and
will include governmentwide marking and publicity guidance.
Private Sector Engagement Strategy Not Yet Developed:
In 2005, we noted that State's efforts to engage the private sector in
pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives had met with mixed
success and recommended that the Secretary develop a strategy to guide
these efforts. Since then, State has established an Office of Private
Sector Outreach, is partnering with individuals and the private sector
on various projects, and hosted a Private Sector Summit on Public
Diplomacy in January 2007. However, State has not yet developed a
comprehensive strategy to guide the Department's efforts to engage the
private sector.
State Has Established a Public Diplomacy Strategic Framework but Lacks
Implementing Guidance:
In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S.
public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1)
offer foreign publics a vision of hope and opportunity rooted in the
U.S.'s most basic values; (2) isolate and marginalize extremists; and
(3) promote understanding regarding shared values and common interests
between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures, and
faiths. The Under Secretary noted that she intends to achieve these
goals using five tactics--engagement, exchanges, education,
empowerment, and evaluation--and by using various public diplomacy
programs and other means, including coordinating outreach efforts with
the private sector. This framework partially responds to our 2003
recommendation that State should develop and disseminate a strategy to
integrate its public diplomacy efforts and direct them toward achieving
common objectives. State has not yet developed written guidance that
provides details on how these five tactics will be used to implement
the Under Secretary's priority goals. However, it should be noted that
the Under Secretary has issued limited guidance regarding the goal of
countering extremism to 18 posts selected to participate in a pilot
initiative focusing on this objective.
Posts Lack a Campaign-Style Approach to Communications:
We have recommended that State, where appropriate, adopt strategic
communication best practices (which we refer to as the "campaign-style
approach")[Footnote 5] and develop country-specific communication
plans[Footnote 6] that incorporate the key steps embodied in this
approach. As shown in figure 2, these steps include defining the core
message, identifying and segmenting target audiences, developing
detailed communication strategies and tactics, and using research and
evaluation to inform and re-direct efforts as needed. As noted in our
May 2006 report, our review of public diplomacy operations in Nigeria,
Pakistan, and Egypt in 2006 found that this approach and corresponding
communication plans were absent. Rather, post public diplomacy efforts
constituted an ad hoc collection of activities designed to support such
broad goals as promoting mutual understanding.
Figure 2: Key Elements of Campaign-style Communication Efforts:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In a recent development, 18 posts participating in the department's
pilot countries initiative have developed country-level plans focusing
on the countering extremism goal.[Footnote 7] These plans were
developed on the basis of a template issued by the Under Secretary that
requires each post to provide a list of supporting objectives, a
description of the media environment, identification of key target
audiences, and a list of supporting programs and activities. We
reviewed most of the plans submitted in response to this guidance.
Although useful as a high-level planning exercise, these plans do not
adhere to the campaign-style approach, which requires a level of rigor
and detail that normally exceeds the three-to four-page plans produced
by posts in pilot countries. The plans omit basic elements, such as
specific core messages and themes or any substantive evidence that
proposed communication programs were driven by detailed audience
research--one of the key principles embodied in the campaign-style
approach. In the absence of such research, programs may lack important
information about appropriate target audiences and credible messages
and messengers.
State Is Making a Concerted Effort to Better Measure Program
Performance and Impact:
Based on prior reports by GAO and others, the department has begun to
institute a more concerted effort to measure the impact of its programs
and activities. The department created (1) the Office of Policy,
Planning, and Resources within the office of the Under Secretary; (2)
the Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council to share best practices; and
(3) a unified Public Diplomacy Evaluation Office. The Department
established an expanded evaluation schedule that is designed to cover
all major public diplomacy programs. The department also has called on
program managers to analyze and define their key inputs, activities,
outputs, outcomes, and impact to help identify meaningful performance
goals and indicators. Finally, the department recently launched a pilot
public diplomacy performance measurement data collection project that
is designed to collect, document, and quantify reliable annual and long-
term outcome performance measures to support government reporting
requirements.
BBG Has Strategy for International Broadcasting, but Audience Data May
be Misleading:
In 2001, the BBG introduced a market-based approach to international
broadcasting that sought to "marry the mission to the market." This
approach was designed to generate large listening audiences in priority
markets that the BBG believes it must reach to effectively meet its
mission. Implementing this strategy has focused on markets relevant to
the war on terrorism, in particular in the Middle East through such key
initiatives as Radio Sawa and the Alhurra TV network. The Board's
vision is to create a flexible, multimedia, research-driven U.S.
international broadcasting system.
We found that the BBG's strategic plan to implement its new approach
did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to
gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its
strategy focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority
markets. The BBG subsequently created a single strategic goal to focus
on the key objective of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest
to the United States and made audience size a key performance measure.
However, in our August 2006 review of the Middle East Broadcasting
Networks, we found that methodological concerns call into question the
potential accuracy of this key performance measure with regard to Radio
Sawa's listening rates and Alhurra's viewing rates. Specifically, we
found that weaknesses in the BBG's audience surveys create uncertainty
over whether some of Radio Sawa's or Alhurra's performance targets for
audience size have been met. We recommended that the BBG improve its
audience research methods, including identifying significant
methodological limitations. The BBG accepted our recommendation and has
informed us that it is currently considering how it will do so.
A Number of Internal and External Challenges Hamper U.S. Public
Diplomacy Activities:
Public diplomacy efforts in the field face several other challenges.
Beginning with our September 2003 report on State's public diplomacy
efforts, post officials have consistently cited several key challenges,
including a general lack of staff, insufficient administrative support,
and inadequate language training. Furthermore, public diplomacy
officers struggle to balance security with public access and outreach
to local populations. Finally, the BBG's disparate organizational
structure has been viewed as a key management challenge that
significantly complicates its efforts to focus and direct U.S.
international broadcasting efforts.
Insufficient Staff and Lack of Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy
Activities:
Although several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an
increase in U.S. public diplomacy program spending, several embassy
officials stated that, with current staffing levels, they do not have
the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to
State, the Department had 887 established public diplomacy positions
(overseas and domestic) as of March 31, 2007, but 199, or roughly 22
percent, were vacant. Compounding this challenge is the loss of public
diplomacy officers to temporary duty in Iraq, which, according to one
State official, has drawn down field officers even further. Staffing
shortages may also limit the amount of training public diplomacy
officers receive. State is repositioning several public diplomacy
officers as part of its transformational diplomacy initiative. However,
this effort represents shifting existing public diplomacy officers and
does not increase the overall number of officers, which we have noted
were generally the same in fiscal years 2004 and 2006.
In addition, public diplomacy officers at posts are burdened with
administrative tasks, and thus have less time to conduct public
diplomacy outreach activities than they did previously. One senior
State official said that administrative duties, such as budget,
personnel, and internal reporting, compete with officers' public
diplomacy responsibilities. Another official in Egypt stated that she
rarely had enough time to strategize, plan, or evaluate her programs.
These statements echo comments we heard during overseas fieldwork and
in a survey for our 2003 report. In that survey, officers stated that,
although they manage to attend public outreach and other functions
within their host country capitals, it was particularly difficult to
find time to travel outside the capitals to interact with other
communities. This challenge is compounded at posts with short tours of
duty, including many tours in the Muslim world, as officials stated
that it is difficult to establish the type of close working
relationships essential to effective public diplomacy work when they
are in country for only a short time. In our May 2006 report, we
reported that the average length of tour at posts in the Muslim world
is about 22 percent shorter than tour lengths elsewhere. Noting the
prevalence of 1-year tours in the Muslim world, a senior official at
State said that public affairs officers who have shorter tours tend to
produce less effective work than officers with longer tours.
To address these challenges, we recommended in 2003 that the Secretary
of State designate more administrative positions to overseas public
affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden. Officials at
State said that the Management bureau is currently considering options
for reducing the administrative burden on posts, including the
development of centralized administrative capabilities offshore.
Language Deficiencies Continue, Especially in the Muslim World:
In August 2006, GAO reported that the State Department continued to
experience significant foreign language proficiency shortfalls in
countries around the world.[Footnote 8] Our May 2006 report noted this
problem was particularly acute at posts in the Muslim world where
Arabic--classified as a "superhard" language by State--predominates. In
countries with significant Muslim populations, we reported that 30
percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions were filled
by officers without the requisite proficiency in those languages,
compared with 24 percent elsewhere. In Arabic language posts, about 36
percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions were filled
by staff unable to speak Arabic at the designated level. In addition,
State officials said that there are even fewer officers who are willing
or able to speak on television or engage in public debate in Arabic.
The information officer in Cairo stated that his office does not have
enough Arabic speakers to engage the Egyptian media effectively. Figure
3 shows the percentage of public diplomacy positions in the Muslim
world staffed by officers meeting language requirements.
Figure 3: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy
Positions in the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language
Requirements (as of August 2005):
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
State has begun to address these language deficiencies by increasing
its overall amount of language training and providing supplemental
training for more difficult languages at overseas locations. State has
also made efforts to ensure that its public diplomacy staff receive
appropriate language training. For example, State's Foreign Service
Institute recently offered a week of intensive media training for
language-qualified officers that provided guidance on how to
communicate with Arabic-speaking audiences.
Embassies Must Balance Security and Public Outreach:
Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public
access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between
safety and mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "Safety is one
of our top priorities—but it can't be at the expense of the mission."
In our May 2006 reported we noted that security concerns are
particularly elevated in countries with significant Muslim populations,
where the threat level for terrorism is rated as "critical" or "high"
in 80 percent of posts.
Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly
accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and
Libraries. In Pakistan, for example, all American Centers have closed
for security reasons; the last facility, in Islamabad, closed in
February 2005. These same concerns have prevented establishing a U.S.
presence elsewhere. As a result, embassies have had to find other
venues for public diplomacy programs, and some activities have been
moved onto embassy compounds, where precautions designed to improve
security have had the ancillary effect of sending the message that the
United States is unapproachable and distrustful, according to State
officials. Concrete barriers and armed escorts contribute to this
perception, as do requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones
and pagers within the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan,
visitors to the embassy's reference library have declined to as few as
one per day because many visitors feel humiliated by the embassy's
rigorous security procedures.
Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to
reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report
concluded that "security concerns often require a 'low profile'
approach during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier
times, would have been able to generate considerable good will for the
United States." This constraint is particularly acute in Pakistan,
where the embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and exchange
programs.
State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly
accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including
American Corners, which are centers that provide information about the
United States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local
employees. According to State data, there are currently 365 American
Corners throughout the world, including more than 200 in the Muslim
world, with another 31 planned (more than 20 of which will be in the
Muslim world). However, two of the posts we visited in October 2005
were having difficulty finding hosts for American Corners, as local
institutions fear becoming terrorist targets.
Disparate Structure and Management Concerns Challenge the Broadcasting
Board of Governors:
The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy
challenges, including trying to gain large audiences in priority
markets while dealing with a disparate organizational structure that
contains multiple discrete broadcasters (see fig. 4). As noted in the
BBG's strategic plan, "the diversity of the BBG--diverse organizations
with different missions, different frameworks, and different
constituencies--makes it a challenge to bring all the separate parts
together in a more effective whole." As we reported in July 2003, the
Board hoped to address this key challenge through two primary means.
First, it planned to treat the component parts of U.S. international
broadcasting as a single system with the Board in the position of
actively managing resources across broadcast entities to achieve common
broadcast goals. Second, it intended to realign the BBG's
organizational structure to reinforce the Board's role as CEO with a
host of responsibilities, including taking the lead role in shaping the
BBG's overall strategic direction, setting expectations and standards,
and creating the context for innovation and change.
Figure 4: Organization of the BBG:
[See PDF for image]
Source: BBG.
Note: RFE/RL and VOA jointly produce Radio Farda, a Persian language
service broadcast to Iran.
[End of figure]
In addition, in 2006, we found that MBN, which received $79 million in
funding in fiscal year 2006, faces several managerial and editorial
challenges that may hinder the organization's efforts to expand in
their highly competitive market. While MBN has taken steps to improve
its process of program review and evaluation, it has not yet
implemented our recommendations to improve its system of internal
control or develop a comprehensive staff training plan.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions
to this statement include Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Michael ten
Kate; Eve Weisberg; Kate France Smiles; and Joe Carney.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Better Assess the Impact of
Agencies' Marking and Publicizing Efforts. GAO-07-277. Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 12, 2007.
U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East Broadcasting
Services Could Be Improved. GAO-06-762. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006.
Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist
Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. GAO-06-894. Washington, D.C.: Aug.
4, 2006.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant
Challenges. GAO-06-535. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain
Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges. GAO-06-707T.
Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006.
International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address
Islamic Extremism. GAO-05-852. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2005.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the
Lack of a National Communication Strategy. GAO-05-323. Washington,
D.C.: April 4, 2005.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of
Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain. GAO-04-1061T.
Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2004.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant
Challenges. GAO-04-435T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2004.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces
Significant Challenges. GAO-03-951. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2003.
U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on
Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives. GAO-
03-772. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The U.S. Agency for International Development participates in U.S.
public diplomacy efforts by seeking to tell America's assistance story
to the world. The Department of Defense has established an office to
provide military support for public diplomacy to better coordinate its
communication activities with those of the State Department.
[2] Incorporated in January 2004 by interested private sector leaders,
Business for Diplomatic Action seeks to counter anti-American
sentiments that can harm U.S. business interests by helping to
coordinate the outreach efforts of U.S. multinational companies.
[3] This working group is part of a larger effort called "The Princeton
Project on National Security," which was established by the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University in 2004. Members of the project come from the government,
academia, business, and the non-profit sector.
[4] Beginning in 2004, the State Department replaced its Patterns of
Global Terrorism reports with annual publications titled Country
Reports on Terrorism.
[5] In contrast to State, we believe that these key elements have been
largely adopted by both the Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency
for International Development to help guide their thematic
communication efforts directed at foreign audiences.
[6] Prior to 1999, when public diplomacy efforts were managed by the
former U.S. Information Agency, detailed communication plans were
developed on a country-by-country basis. These plans included details
on core messages and themes, target audiences, and research on key
opinion leaders, audience attitudes, and the local media environment.
[7] This exercise has now been broadened, and posts around the world
are developing similar country-level plans targeting their key public
diplomacy objectives.
[8] GAO, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls
Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps, GAO-06-894 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006).
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