Military Operations
Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning Gao ID: GAO-07-549 May 31, 2007Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has frequently been involved in stability and/or reconstruction operations that typically last 5 to 8 years and surpass combat operations in the cost of human lives and dollars. A 2005 presidential directive requires DOD and State to integrate stability activities with military contingency plans. GAO was asked to address (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability operations capabilities, and challenges that have emerged in implementing its approach; (2) DOD planning for stability operations and the extent of interagency involvement; and (3) the extent to which DOD is applying lessons learned in future plans. To address these issues, GAO assessed DOD policy and planning documents, reviewed planning efforts at three combatant commands, and evaluated DOD's use of lessons learned. GAO is also conducting a related study of the Department of State's efforts to lead and coordinate stability operations.
DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability operations, but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned into future plans. These challenges may hinder DOD's ability to develop sound plans. Since November 2005, the department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and defined a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for the next 15-20 years. These steps reflect a fundamental shift in DOD's policy because they elevate stability operations as a core mission comparable to combat operations and emphasize that military and civilian efforts must be integrated. However, DOD has yet to identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations because DOD has not provided clear guidance on how and when to accomplish this task. As a result, the services are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed by combatant commanders to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of weaknesses in DOD's guidance. DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning efforts. At the combatant commands, DOD has established working groups with representatives from several key organizations, but these groups and other outreach efforts by the commanders have had limited effect. Three factors cause this limited and inconsistent interagency participation in DOD's planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations lack a full understanding of each other's planning processes, and non-DOD organizations have had a limited capacity to participate in DOD's full range of planning activities. Although DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, planners are not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency plans. At all levels within the department, GAO found that information from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into various databases. However, planners are not consistently using this information because (1) DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons into its plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this step, (2) accessing lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-549, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning
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Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2007:
Military Operations:
Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and
Enhance Interagency Planning:
GAO-07-549:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-549, a report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has frequently been
involved in stability and/or reconstruction operations that typically
last 5 to 8 years and surpass combat operations in the cost of human
lives and dollars. A 2005 presidential directive requires DOD and State
to integrate stability activities with military contingency plans. GAO
was asked to address (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability operations
capabilities, and challenges that have emerged in implementing its
approach; (2) DOD planning for stability operations and the extent of
interagency involvement; and (3) the extent to which DOD is applying
lessons learned in future plans. To address these issues, GAO assessed
DOD policy and planning documents, reviewed planning efforts at three
combatant commands, and evaluated DOD‘s use of lessons learned. GAO is
also conducting a related study of the Department of State‘s efforts to
lead and coordinate stability operations.
What GAO Found:
DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability
operations, but faces challenges in developing capabilities and
measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD
agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons
learned into future plans. These challenges may hinder DOD‘s ability to
develop sound plans. Since November 2005, the department issued a new
policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and defined a joint
operating concept to help guide DOD planning for the next 15–20 years.
These steps reflect a fundamental shift in DOD‘s policy because they
elevate stability operations as a core mission comparable to combat
operations and emphasize that military and civilian efforts must be
integrated. However, DOD has yet to identify and prioritize the full
range of capabilities needed for stability operations because DOD has
not provided clear guidance on how and when to accomplish this task. As
a result, the services are pursuing initiatives to address capability
shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities
that will be needed by combatant commanders to effectively accomplish
stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD has made limited
progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of weaknesses
in DOD‘s guidance. DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive
military plans related to stability operations, but it has not
established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency
participation in its planning efforts. At the combatant commands, DOD
has established working groups with representatives from several key
organizations, but these groups and other outreach efforts by the
commanders have had limited effect. Three factors cause this limited
and inconsistent interagency participation in DOD‘s planning process:
(1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to
integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices
inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and non-DOD
organizations lack a full understanding of each other's planning
processes, and non-DOD organizations have had a limited capacity to
participate in DOD's full range of planning activities. Although DOD
collects lessons learned from past operations, planners are not
consistently using this information as they develop future contingency
plans. At all levels within the department, GAO found that information
from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated
into various databases. However, planners are not consistently using
this information because (1) DOD‘s guidance for incorporating lessons
into its plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners
to take this step, (2) accessing lessons-learned databases is
cumbersome, and (3) the review process does not evaluate the extent to
which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends DOD take several actions to improve its approach to
stability operations and interagency planning. DOD partially agreed
with GAO‘s recommendations, but did not specify actions it would take
to address them. Therefore, GAO recommends Congress require DOD to
develop an action plan and report annually on its efforts to address
GAO recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-549].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent, (202)
512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section].
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operations
Capabilities, but Faces Challenges in Identifying Capability Gaps and
Measures of Effectiveness:
DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency Planning for
Stability Operations:
Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes Contribute to
Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Stability Operations Planning:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Major Lessons-Learned Themes and Descriptions:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Reports:
Tables:
Table 1: Selected U.S. Government Responsibilities Related to Stability
Operations:
Table 2: JIACG Membership at the Central, European, and Pacific
Commands:
Figures:
Figure 1: Major Mission Elements of Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction Operations:
Figure 2: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility:
Figure 3: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations:
Figure 4: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of Military
Planning:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
JIACG: Joint Interagency Coordination Group:
NSPD: National Security Presidential Directive:
State: Department of State:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 31, 2007:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Shays:
In the ongoing war on terrorism, the United States government is
confronting a host of challenges requiring a capability to conduct what
has been termed stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction
operations in various countries around the world. The Department of
Defense (DOD) has defined "stability operations" as an overarching term
encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted
outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of
national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure
environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[Footnote 1]
Since the end of the Cold War, DOD's involvement in stability
operations activities has been significant, as evidenced by
reconstruction and transition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan, and security operations in
Bosnia and Kosovo. DOD's increased role in these types of activities
has also required it to employ an increasing number of personnel with
specific skills and capabilities, such as those in civil affairs and
psychological operations units. This shift in DOD's role was captured
in The Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and
from Hostilities, which highlighted that since the end of the Cold War,
the United States has been involved in either a stability or
reconstruction operation every 18 to 24 months, that these operations
typically last 5 to 8 years, and that these activities surpass combat
operations in the cost of human lives and dollars.
In December 2005, President George Bush issued National Security
Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) which directed U.S. government
agencies to increase efforts to better coordinate stability operations.
NSPD 44 also states that, when relevant and appropriate, reconstruction
and stabilization contingency plans and missions will be coordinated
with U.S. military contingency plans to ensure harmonization with any
planned or ongoing U.S. military operations. The Department of State
(State) and DoD have highlighted that success in stabilization and
reconstruction efforts will depend heavily upon the ability to develop
an integrated, interagency approach, and have initiated steps to
facilitate this shift in focus. But this shift will require cultural
changes throughout government that will take years or perhaps decades
to achieve, according to DOD and State officials.
In the near term, DOD's combatant commanders routinely develop a wide
range of military contingency plans, many of which involve
consideration of stability operations capabilities. As discussed in
this report, DOD's military planning efforts are being expanded to
include actions intended to stabilize regions before conflict develops,
deliver humanitarian assistance, or provide postconflict reconstruction
support. In many cases, these actions will require coordination with
non-DOD organizations, such as State, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the Department of Justice.
You asked us to examine DOD's capabilities related to stability
operations, and the extent to which DOD integrates its military
planning efforts with other government agencies. In response to your
request, this report addresses (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability
operations capabilities and challenges that have emerged in
implementing this approach, (2) DOD military planning for stability
operations and the extent to which the department's planning mechanisms
facilitate an interagency approach; and (3) the extent to which DOD is
applying stability operations-related lessons learned from past
operations as future plans are developed. As agreed with your office,
we have additional work underway to address your request to examine the
Department of State's efforts to lead and coordinate stabilization
operations in conjunction with DOD, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and other U.S. agencies, and plan to report on
those issues separately.
To evaluate DOD's approach to enhance stability operations
capabilities, and the challenges that have emerged in implementing this
approach, we obtained and analyzed relevant departmentwide polices and
implementing guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
services, and selected combatant commands, and we discussed with each
organization the challenges that exist in implementing DOD's approach.
We also discussed DOD's approach with Department of State and USAID
officials to obtain their perspectives on these issues. Within DOD, we
analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, the services,
three combatant commands (Central Command, European Command, and
Pacific Command) and fourteen of their related component commands. To
evaluate DOD's stability operations planning and the extent to which
the department's planning mechanisms encourage and facilitate an
interagency approach, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and portions of
selected planning documents that pertain to interagency coordination.
Our review did not include the planning for ongoing operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. We also discussed the planning process and impediments
to interagency coordination with representatives from non-DOD agencies
assigned to the combatant commands to gain their perspectives,
understand the extent to which these agencies are represented, identify
their roles and responsibilities, and determine the extent to which
they participate in the DOD planning process. We did not, however,
assess the extent to which these roles and responsibilities, including
those of DOD, are appropriate. To determine the extent to which DOD
planners are applying lessons learned from past operations and
exercises in planning, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance, discussed
with DOD officials the consideration of lessons during planning, and
analyzed information in lessons-learned databases maintained by each
service and Joint Forces Command, and two non-DOD organizations. With
the information from both DOD and non-DOD sources, we developed a
database with over 3,500 individual lessons and observations from 38
reports or studies, identified strategic-level lessons learned related
to stability operations using a process of independent coding and
review, and then grouped the selected lessons into 14 major themes.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Additional information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix
I.
Results in Brief:
DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its
stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in
identifying and addressing capability gaps and developing measures of
effectiveness, which are critical to successfully executing this
approach. Among the many improvement efforts underway, the department
has taken three key steps that frame this new approach. Specifically,
the department (1) formalized a new stability operations policy, DOD
Directive 3000.05, that elevated stability operations to a core mission
on par with combat operations, (2) expanded DOD's planning construct to
more fully address pre-and postconflict operations, and (3) defined a
new joint operating concept that will serve as a basis for how the
military will support stabilization, security, transition, and
reconstruction operations in the next 15 to 20 years. Notwithstanding
these positive and important steps, however, DOD has encountered
challenges in identifying stability operations capabilities and
developing measures of effectiveness--both of which are key tasks
required by DOD Directive 3000.05 and important steps in performance-
based management. Specifically, the services are each pursuing efforts
to improve current capabilities, such as those associated with civil
affairs and language skills. However, DOD has yet to systematically
identify and prioritize the full range of needed capabilities because
DOD has not provided clear guidance, including timeframes for
completion, on how and when to accomplish these tasks. As a result, the
services are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that
may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be
needed to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future.
Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of
effectiveness required by DOD Directive 3000.05 because the current
guidance does not clearly articulate a systematic approach for
developing measures of effectiveness. Without agreed-upon measures of
effectiveness, DOD will not be able to assess the extent to which its
efforts are enhancing stability operations capabilities. We are
recommending DOD provide more comprehensive guidance, including a clear
methodology and time frames for completion, to combatant commanders and
the services on how to identify and prioritize needed capabilities and
develop measures of effectiveness.
DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans to
address stability operations, but it has not established adequate
mechanisms to obtain input from other federal agencies to incorporate
into its planning efforts. Recent changes in national security strategy
and policies and DOD guidance require State and DOD to integrate
stabilization and reconstruction plans with military contingency plans
where relevant and appropriate, and to coordinate those plans with
relevant government and nongovernment organizations.[Footnote 2] DOD
has begun taking steps to better coordinate with other U.S. government
agencies by establishing working groups with representatives from
several key organizations, such as the Department of State and USAID,
but these working groups are comprised of liaison officers with limited
planning experience and training, the representatives are few in
number, and the representatives do not consistently participate in
DOD's planning process. In addition, some DOD organizations are
reaching out to country teams in embassies within their areas of
responsibility on an ad hoc basis, but this approach can be cumbersome
because of the large number of countries that may be affected by a
regional plan. Combatant Commanders have achieved limited interagency
participation in the development of military plans because: (1) DOD has
not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate
planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the
appropriate sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations,
and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations lack an understanding of each
other's planning processes and capabilities, and have different
planning cultures and capacities. As a result, the overall foundation
for unity of effort--common understanding of the purpose and concept of
the operations, coordinated policies and plans, and trust and
confidence in key participants--in military operations that involve
stabilization and reconstruction activities is not being established.
To increase unity of effort in these operations, we are recommending
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
provide implementation guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate
and encourage interagency participation in the development of military
plans, develop a process to share planning information with non-DOD
agencies early in the planning process as appropriate, and orient DOD
and non-DOD personnel in each agency's planning processes and
capabilities.
Although DOD has spent considerable time and resources to collect
lessons learned from past and ongoing operations, DOD planners are not
consistently using these lessons learned as they develop future
contingency plans. Department policies and guidance encourage the
consideration of lessons learned during the planning process, and
information from current and past operations is being incorporated into
various databases.[Footnote 3] For example, our analysis of DOD's
databases identified lessons learned related to the need for (1) the
military to work more closely with other agencies during stability
operations, (2) DOD to develop knowledge of other agencies and the
capabilities they can contribute, and (3) commanders to ensure that
military sectors during operations correspond with civil geopolitical
boundaries. However, we found that DOD planners are not using lessons-
learned information on a consistent basis as plans are developed or
revised because (1) Joint Staff guidance for incorporating lessons into
its plans is outdated and does not specifically state that planners are
required to include lessons learned in the planning process, (2)
accessing and searching lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and
(3) the planning review process does not evaluate the extent to which
lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans. DOD has recently
initiated an effort to develop an information system to improve access
to lessons learned within the department and between non-DOD agencies,
and although this is a positive step, this effort is in its early
stages. Moreover, it is not clear how the system will accommodate
interagency needs, and when it will be fully operational. In addition,
without a comprehensive and timely approach to improve guidance,
information systems, and the planning review process, DOD's efforts to
improve information systems alone may not enable the department to
fully leverage lessons learned from past operations into its future
plans, and past mistakes could be repeated. We are recommending that
DOD update its planning guidance to: (1) direct planners to include
lessons learned as plans are developed, and (2) require that the plan
review process include a step to verify lessons learned have been
considered and adopted as appropriate. We are also recommending that
DOD include the interagency stakeholders in the development of its new
lessons-learned information system earlier than currently planned.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed
with our eight recommendations but did not discuss what specific steps,
if any, it plans to take to implement our recommendations. (DOD's
comments appear in their entirety in app. III.) State was also afforded
an opportunity to comment on this report, but declined to do so. In its
written comments, DOD highlighted traditional DOD methodologies and
approaches to developing capabilities, measures of effectiveness,
coordinating with other agencies, and incorporating lessons learned
that it believes are adequate to address our recommendations. Although
DOD is making progress in achieving a greater focus on stability
operations through its new directive, our report notes it has made
limited progress in certain areas, such as establishing measures of
effectiveness, due to the limited guidance provided to DOD components.
As a result, we continue to believe our recommendations are warranted
and that DOD should take specific steps to address them. Because it is
unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD plans to take to implement our
recommendations we have added a matter for congressional consideration
suggesting that the Congress require the Secretary of Defense to
develop an action plan and report annually on the specific steps being
taken to address our recommendations and the current status of its
efforts. The report should also identify challenges to achieving an
integrated interagency approach to stability operations, and potential
solutions for mitigating those challenges.
Background:
According to DOD's guidance, the immediate goal of stability operations
often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential
services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help
develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable
market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust
civil society.[Footnote 4] Stability operations include a continuum of
activities that can occur throughout the spectrum of conflict ranging
from preconflict stabilization to postconflict reconstruction and
transition to effective governance. DOD has identified six major
activities, or major mission elements, that U.S. military forces,
civilian government agencies, and in many cases multinational partners
may need to engage in to stabilize an environment and build sustainable
host-nation capabilities. Figure 1 depicts these major mission elements.
Figure 1: Major Mission Elements of Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction Operations:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO presentation of DOD information.
[End of figure]
As Figure 1 illustrates, the mission elements, or dimensions, of
stability operations range from establishing and maintaining a secure
environment to delivering humanitarian assistance, economic support,
and establishing effective forms of governance. As shown in the figure,
DOD envisions one key element--strategic communications--as
encompassing all of the other five mission elements. DOD guidance
recognizes that many stability operations are best performed by
indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals and that DOD's
participation may be in a supporting role. However, this guidance also
states U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks
necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.
NSPD-44 outlines the major roles and responsibilities throughout the
government for stability operations, including the responsibilities of
the National Security Council, State, non-DOD agencies, and DOD. In
November 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 3000.05, which established the
department's overall policy and assigned responsibilities within DOD
for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability
operations.[Footnote 5] Table 1 highlights several key responsibilities
established by NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05.
Table 1: Selected U.S. Government Responsibilities Related to Stability
Operations:
Organization: National Security Council[A]; Key Responsibilities: * Co-
Chair to Policy Coordination Committee established for Reconstruction
and Stabilization[B]; * Designate lead and supporting responsibilities
as outlined in National Security Presidential Directive-1[C] for
stability operations.
Organization: Department of State; Key Responsibilities: * Coordinate
and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts, involving all U.S.
departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan
for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities; * Develop
and approve strategies, with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and
economic cooperation, for reconstruction and stabilization activities
directed toward foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in
transition from conflict or civil strife; * Coordinate interagency
process to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency
planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed
contingency plans for integrated U.S. government reconstruction and
stabilization efforts for those states and regions and for widely
applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency
plans, where appropriate; * Provide U.S. government decision makers
with detailed options for an integrated response in connection with
specific reconstruction and stabilization operations;
* Coordinate U.S. government responses for reconstruction and
stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization
with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including
peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases;
develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for
reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be
integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine; * Lead U.S.
government development of a strong civilian response capability
including necessary surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and
recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to
ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response
capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities
to respond quickly and effectively; * Resolve relevant policy, program,
and funding disputes among U.S. government departments and agencies
with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic
cooperation related to reconstruction and stabilization, consistent
with Office of Management and Budget's budget and policy coordinating
functions.
Organization: Other Executive Departments and Agencies; Key
Responsibilities: * Support stability operations activities and
requirements with agency resources; * Coordinate with the Department of
State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization during budget
formulation for relevant reconstruction and stabilization activities
prior to submission to the Office of Management and Budget and
Congress, or as required to coordinate reconstruction and stabilization
activities; * Identify, develop, and provide Department of State's
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization with relevant
information on capabilities and assets; * Identify and develop internal
capabilities for planning and for resource and program management that
can be mobilized in response to crises; * Identify within each agency
current and former agency personnel skilled in crisis response,
including contract employees, and establish under each agency's
authorities mechanisms to reassign or reemploy these personnel and
mobilize associated resources rapidly in response to crises; * Assist
in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency
plans, responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and
undertaking other efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S.
response and effective international reconstruction and stabilization
efforts.
Organization: Department of Defense; Key Responsibilities: *
Institutionalize stability operations within DOD and prioritize them
comparable with combat operations; * Integrate stability operations
across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training,
education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and
planning; * With the Secretary of State, integrate stabilization and
reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when
relevant and appropriate; * Develop general framework with the
Secretary of State to fully coordinate stabilization and reconstruction
activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate; *
Provide and seek assistance and advice from the Department of State and
other U.S. departments and agencies, as appropriate, for developing
stability operations capabilities; * Develop greater means to help
build other countries' security capacity quickly to ensure security in
their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations
elsewhere; * Be prepared to perform all necessary tasks to establish or
maintain order when civilians or other agencies cannot do so; * Lead
and support the development of military civilian teams to support
stability operations activities; * Share information with U.S.
departments and agencies, foreign governments and forces, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and members of the
private sector supporting stability operations, consistent with legal
requirements.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and non-DOD data.
Note: Data are from NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05.
[A] In those instances when we refer to the National Security Council
as it relates to NSPD-44, the directive generally refers to the
National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), Organization of
the National Security Council System (Washington, D.C., Feb. 13, 2001).
[B] National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committees manage the
development and implementation of national security policies and serve
as the mechanism for interagency coordination of national security
policy. They provide policy analysis and ensure timely responses to
decisions made by the President.
[C] National Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the
National Security Council System (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2001).
This directive is issued by the President and establishes policy for
the organization and membership in the National Security Council to
advise and assist the President in integrating all aspects of national
security policy as it affects the United States--domestic, foreign,
military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National
Economic Council [NEC]). The National Security Council system is a
process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the
effective development and implementation of those national security
policies.
[End of table]
Within DOD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is
responsible for developing stability operations policy options for the
Secretary of Defense and, according to DOD officials, provides
oversight for the implementation of DOD's stability operations policy.
Under DOD Directive 3000.05, the Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, in
coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall each develop stability
operations capabilities. Commanders of the geographic combatant
commands through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall identify
stability operations requirements within their areas of responsibility,
shown in figure 2. Combatant commands are also directed to engage other
organizations in stability operations planning, training, and
exercises, in coordination with the Joint Staff and the Office of
Policy.
Figure 2: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.
Note: As of October 1, 2006.
[A] The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command's Area
of Responsibility. Forces based in Alaska, however, may be assigned to
multiple commands.
[End of figure]
The department has recently announced that it plans to realign these
areas of responsibility to establish a new geographic combatant command
for the continent of Africa. As of February 2007, the details of this
realignment had not been finalized.
DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operations
Capabilities, but Faces Challenges in Identifying Capability Gaps and
Measures of Effectiveness:
DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its
stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in
identifying capability gaps and developing measures of effectiveness,
which are critical to successfully executing this approach. Among the
many improvement efforts underway, the department has taken three key
steps that frame this new approach. Specifically, the department has:
(1) formalized a new stability operations policy that elevated
stability operations to a core mission and gave them priority
comparable to combat operations, and assigned numerous responsibilities
to DOD organizations, (2) expanded DOD's planning construct to more
fully address stability operations, and (3) defined a new joint
operating concept that will serve as a basis for how the military will
support stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction
operations in the next 15 to 20 years. However, DOD has made limited
progress in identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities, and in
developing measures of effectiveness, which are critical steps required
by DOD's new directive and important tenets of performance-based
management. Capability gaps are not being assessed because the
department has yet to issue adequate guidance on how to conduct these
assessments or set specific time frames to complete them. Similarly,
the department has made limited progress in developing measures of
effectiveness because current guidance does not clearly articulate a
systematic approach on how to develop measures of effectiveness.
Without a comprehensive assessment of stability operations capability
gaps and clear measures of effectiveness, the department may not be
appropriately prioritizing and developing the needed capabilities, or
measuring its progress toward achieving these goals.
DOD's Approach to Stability Operations Includes a New Policy, Planning
Guidance, and a Joint Operating Concept:
In the past 18 months, DOD has taken positive steps to improve
stability operations capabilities by establishing a new and
comprehensive policy, planning guidance, and joint operating concept.
First, in November 2005, DOD published DOD Directive 3000.05, which
established DOD's stability operations policy and assigned
responsibilities within the department for planning, training, and
preparing to conduct and support stability operations. This directive
reflects a fundamental shift in DOD's policy because it designates
stability operations as a core mission that shall be given priority
comparable to combat operations and emphasizes that integrated military
and civilian efforts are key to successful stability operations
efforts. According to DOD officials, this publication is intended to
serve as a catalyst, pushing DOD to develop methods to enhance its own
capabilities and integrate the capabilities and capacities of the
defense, diplomatic, and development communities for achieving unity of
effort in stability operations. The policy emphasizes that integrating
civilian and military efforts is key to successful stability operations
and recognizes that stability operations will not always be led by the
military, and that DOD needs to be prepared to provide support to both
government and nongovernment organizations when necessary.
The directive assigns responsibility for approximately 115 tasks to 18
organizations in the department, such as the Under Secretaries for
Policy and Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Combatant Commanders, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
The directive states that stability operations skills, such as language
capabilities and regional area expertise, be developed and incorporated
into professional military education at all levels, and that
information shall be shared with U.S. departments and agencies, foreign
governments and forces, international organizations, Nongovernmental
Organizations, and the members of the private sector supporting
stability operations, consistent with legal requirements. The policy
also states that military plans shall address stability operations
throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate, and that
stability operations dimensions of military plans be exercised and
tested, when appropriate, with other U.S. departments and agencies. In
addition, the directive states that the Under Secretary for Policy
shall submit a semiannual report developed in coordination with
responsible DOD components to the Secretary of Defense evaluating the
department's progress in implementing the directive.
A second step taken by DOD to improve stability operations was to
broaden its military planning guidance for joint operations to include
noncombat activities to stabilize countries or regions and prevent
hostilities; and postcombat activities that emphasize stabilization,
reconstruction, and transition governance to civil authorities. Figure
3 illustrates the change in DOD planning guidance.
Figure 3: Prior and Current Phases of Military Operations:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of figure]
As shown in Figure 3, previous Joint Staff planning guidance considered
four operational phases, including deter and engage the enemy, seize
the initiative, conduct decisive operations, and transition to peaceful
activities. The revised planning guidance now directs consideration of
six phases of an operation, which include shaping efforts to stabilize
regions so that conflicts do not develop, and expanding the dimensions
of stability operations that are needed in more hostile environments
after conflicts occur.[Footnote 6] This new planning guidance requires
planners to consider the types of activities that can be conducted to
help a nation establish a safe and secure environment, eliminating the
need for armed conflict, and activities to assist a nation in
establishing security forces and governing mechanisms to transition to
self-rule. These are also the phases of an operation that will require
significant unity of effort and close coordination between DOD and
other federal agencies.
In December 2006, DOD took a third step in outlining its approach to
stability operations when the Joint Forces Command published the
Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept[Footnote 7]. This
operating concept describes how the future Joint Force Commander will
provide military support to stabilization, security, transition, and
reconstruction operations within a military campaign in pursuit of
national strategic objectives in the 2014-2026 time frame. The
operating concept focuses on the full range of military support that
the future Joint Force might provide in foreign countries across the
continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order to assist a state
or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due to either a
natural or man-made disaster. This publication provides a conceptual
framework for how future commanders can provide military support in
foreign countries to a full range of stabilization, security,
transition, and reconstruction operations, such as:
* assist an existing or new host nation government in providing
security, essential public services, economic development, and
governance following the significant degradation or collapse of the
government's capabilities due to internal failure or as a consequence
of the destruction and dislocation of a war;
* provide support to stabilize and administer occupied territory and
care for refugees in major combat operations fought for limited
objectives that fall short of forcibly changing the adversary regime;
* support a fragile national government that is faltering due to
serious internal challenges, which include civil unrest, insurgency,
terrorism and factional conflict;
* assist a stable government that has been struck by a devastating
natural disaster;
* provide limited security cooperation assistance to a state that is
facing modest internal challenges; and:
* provide military assistance and training to partner nations that
increase their capability and capacity to conduct stabilization,
security, transition, and reconstruction operations at home or abroad.
This publication is intended to complement both policy and planning
guidance by expanding the understanding of stability operations and by
providing leaders with a conceptual explanation of the strategic
considerations, solutions, risks and mitigations, and implications to
consider when planning a stability operation.
In addition to establishing a new policy, revising planning guidance,
and developing a new joint operating concept, DOD has taken other
complementary actions to address stability operations capabilities
within the department. For example, in order to follow up on
initiatives identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the
department has published a series of roadmaps on specific topics such
as Building Partnership Capacity. The Building Partnership Capacity
Roadmap provides an action plan to meet objectives focused on
strengthening interagency planning and enhancing both DOD and non-DOD
capabilities in this area. Another step taken by DOD was to work with
the Department of State to develop a draft planning guide for other
federal agencies that is intended to assist these organizations in the
planning for reconstruction and stabilization operations.[Footnote 8]
DOD Has Encountered Challenges in Identifying and Prioritizing
Stability Operations Capabilities:
DOD Directive 3000.05 tasked several organizations within the
department to take specific actions to identify and prioritize
stability operations capabilities, but the department has made limited
progress in meeting this goal. Specifically, the directive states that
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall identify DOD-wide
stability operations capabilities and recommend priorities to the
Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
tasked to identify stability operations capabilities and assess their
development. The Geographic Combatant Commanders, responsible for
contingency planning and commanding U.S. forces in their regions, shall
identify stability operations requirements. Finally, the Secretaries of
the Military Departments and Commander of U.S. Special Operations
Command are required to develop the required stability operations
capabilities and capacity in coordination with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Officials from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's office
stated they intended to meet the requirement to identify capabilities
and recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense through an
iterative process known as capability gap assessments. Policy officials
envisioned that the geographic combatant commands would conduct theater-
specific, scenario-driven assessments of forces and capabilities
required for contingencies through DOD's planning process. They also
expected that the geographic commands would compare the planned
requirements for stability operations with the current available forces
and military capabilities, and propose remedies for eliminating the
gaps. DOD officials described the Joint Staff's role as to review each
of the combatant command assessments and provide guidance, including
common standards and criteria, to the combatant commands to assist them
in identifying their requirements. The combatant command requirements
were then expected to drive each service's development of stability
operations capabilities and capacity.
As discussed below, as of March 2007, DOD has made limited progress in
identifying and prioritizing needed capabilities following this
iterative capability gap assessment process. At the three combatant
commands that we visited, we found that the identification of stability
operations requirements was occurring in a fragmented manner. At
Central Command, officials from the command's assessment branch
explained that there has been increased emphasis on stability
operations across the command, especially for nonlethal activities,
such as civil military operations. Officials explained that
organizations at the command level routinely conduct capability
assessments and turn in a list of shortfalls for incorporation into the
command's consolidated integrated priority list that the Combatant
Command Commander submits annually to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.[Footnote 9] They envision that in the future these lists will
include stability operations requirement shortfalls. Similarly, in the
European Command, various organizations are independently conducting
assessments within their respective areas. For example, within the
combatant command headquarters, training officials explained that they
were working on a consolidated and prioritized list of stability
operations training requirements, while at the Naval component command
they are evaluating each country within its region to identify the
specific stability operations requirements for that country. At the
Pacific Command, officials stated that they had not tasked any of their
component commands to identify stability operations requirements.
However, component command officials indicated that capability
requirements would be identified through routine processes, such as
DOD's required Joint Quarterly Readiness Review.[Footnote 10]
Notwithstanding the lack of identification of specific requirements
from combatant commanders, each service is taking some steps to improve
stability operations capabilities, but each service is using a
different approach. For example, Marine Corps officials highlighted the
establishment of a program to improve cultural awareness training,
increased civil affairs planning in its operational headquarters, and
the establishment of a Security Cooperation Training Center as key
efforts to improve stability operations capabilities.[Footnote 11] Navy
officials highlighted the service efforts to align its strategic plan
and operations concept to support stability operations, the
establishment of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and the
dedication of Foreign Area Officers to specific countries as their key
efforts.[Footnote 12] Army officials highlighted the establishment of
an office dedicated to stability operations policy and strategy, the
development of Army doctrine related to stability operations, and an
ongoing process to address gaps in Army stability operations
capabilities and capacities. Army officials expect to approve an action
plan by the end of fiscal year 2007 that is intended to provide
solutions for improving its capabilities to conduct stability
operations. Air Force officials emphasized the service's use of an
analytical capabilities-based planning model that has identified and
begun to address specific shortfalls related to stability operations.
Because of the fragmented efforts being taken by combatant commands to
identify requirements, and the different approaches taken by the
services to develop capabilities, the potential exists that the
department may not be identifying and prioritizing the most critical
capabilities needed by the combatant commanders, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy has not been able to recommend
capability priorities to the Secretary of Defense. The department
recognizes the importance of successfully completing these capability
assessments, and in the first semiannual report on stability operations
to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary stated that the
department has not yet defined the magnitude of DOD's stability
operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the scope of
these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the
department.[Footnote 13]
We identified two factors that are limiting DOD's ability to carry out
the capability gap assessment process envisioned by the Office of
Policy. First, at the time of our review, DOD had not issued guidance
or set specific timeframes for the combatant commands to identify
stability operations capability requirements. Joint Staff officials
explained that the combatant commanders were expected to identify
capability requirements based on operational plans, and DOD has not
issued its 2007 planning guidance to the combatant commanders that
reflect the new six-phase approach to planning previously discussed in
this report.[Footnote 14] Joint Staff officials expressed concerns that
if the combatant commands based their requirements on existing plans
that have not been updated to reflect new planning guidance, the
requirements would not reflect the more comprehensive stability
operations capabilities needed.
A second factor contributing to the limited progress in completing
capability gap assessments is confusion over how to define stability
operations. For example, Air Force officials stated in their May 22,
2006, Stability Operations Self Assessment that the absence of a common
lexicon for stability operations functions, tasks, and actions results
in unnecessary confusion and uncertainty when addressing stability
operations. In March 2007 they reiterated that they still consider this
lack of a common lexicon an issue in identifying stability operations
capabilities. Central Command and Pacific Command officials equated
stability operations with activities conducted under the auspices of
Theater Security Cooperation, while European Command officials stated
that stability operations are what they do in every country they have a
presence. This lack of a clear and consistent definition of stability
operations has caused confusion across the department about how to
identify activities that are considered stability operations, and
commanders have difficulty identifying what the end state is for which
they need to plan. Officials with DOD's Office of Policy have
recognized that confusion exists surrounding the definition of
stability operations, and stated they are taking actions to clarify it.
For example, Office of Policy officials cited a revised definition of
stability operations that has been incorporated into DOD's September
2006 planning guidance discussed previously in this report, and the
office is considering a more aggressive outreach program that will help
DOD officials at all levels better understand the definition and
application of stability operations concepts in identifying and
addressing capability gaps.[Footnote 15] However, without clear
guidance on how and when combatant commanders are to develop stability
operations capability requirements, the combatant commanders and the
military services may not be able to effectively identify and
prioritize needed capabilities.
DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Developing Measures of Effectiveness:
Past GAO work on DOD transformation reported the advantages of using
management tools, such as performance measures, to gauge performance in
helping organizations successfully manage major transformation
efforts.[Footnote 16] Good performance measures are an important
results-oriented management tool that allows DOD to determine the
extent to which individual goals contribute to progress in achieving
the overall goal of increasing stability operations capability. GAO's
previous work highlighted that the elements of a performance measure
should include a baseline and target; be objective, measurable,
quantifiable; and include a time frame. Clear, well-developed and
coordinated performance measures help ensure that stakeholders are held
responsible and accountable for completing their tasks in a timely
manner and to an agreed-upon standard. Results-oriented measures
further ensure that it is not the task itself being evaluated, but
progress in achieving the intended outcome.
DOD has recognized the need for performance measures to evaluate its
progress in enhancing stability operations goals and objectives.
Specifically, DOD Directive 3000.05 requires each organization tasked
under the directive to develop measures of effectiveness to evaluate
progress in meeting its goals. According to Office of Policy officials
the intent for developing measures of effectiveness was to let
stakeholders take ownership in identifying the metrics and procedures
for evaluating their assigned tasks. These officials also explained
that as each organization develops a measure of effectiveness, the
Office of Policy will review the proposed measure, provide feedback,
and assist the stakeholders in refining the metrics to ensure that the
measure is adequate. Policy officials expect that some measures will be
quantitative, while others will be qualitative. This approach is based
on the premise that the directive did not intend to place a fixed
methodology on the stakeholders, would allow development of a process
that was flexible enough to evolve with future stability operations
activities and requirements, and would motivate change at the lowest
level.
Despite this emphasis on developing performance measures, however, as
of March 2007 we found that limited progress has been made in
developing measures of effectiveness because of significant confusion
over how this task should be accomplished, and because of minimal
guidance provided by the Office of Policy. Specifically, in initial
discussions with us, the Army had indicated that it was working on an
Action Plan for Stability Operations, but had placed the process on
hold pending guidance from DOD. More recently, despite the lack of
guidance, the Director of the Army's Stability Operations Division told
us that it is taking steps to finalize the Action Plan for Stability
Operations and once it is approved will track all of the
responsibilities outlined in DOD 3000.05 through its Strategic
Management System. Army officials have also established May 2007 as an
objective for developing and refining its performance-based metrics.
Air Force officials explained that they already conduct a biennial
review of Air Force Concepts of Operations that produces a stability
operations assessment and that the results of its 2005 review were
summarized and provided to DOD. Air Force officials indicated that in
their opinion, this satisfied the requirement to develop performance
measures for stability operations. As of March 2007, officials from the
Navy's Office of Strategy and Concepts explained that the Navy has
begun efforts to implement a stability operations action plan that
includes developing metrics and measures of effectiveness, but have put
the process on hold pending metrics guidance from DOD. Similarly, the
Marine Corps's Action Plan for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction dated February 2007 shows that the Marine Corps is also
still waiting for additional guidance from DOD on developing measures
of effectiveness. Within the combatant commands, Pacific Command
officials explained that they were still waiting for guidance on
implementing the directive from the Office of Policy and had not tasked
the component commands with any implementing tasks, including
developing metrics. At Central Command a policy official told us that
there had been no development of measures of effectiveness relative to
the directive. In DOD headquarters, officials in the Office of
Personnel and Readiness stated that they expected the development of
measures of effectiveness to be problematic, for both themselves and
the Office of Policy, and that they were unsure how the measures would
be developed for their office.
Officials from DOD's office for stability operations stated they are
aware of the confusion surrounding the development of measures of
effectiveness and that in the next few months they plan to sponsor a
workshop to help train individuals on developing measures of
effectiveness. While these workshops can be a positive step, they will
only benefit those who participate. Without clear departmentwide
guidance on how to develop measures of effectiveness and milestones for
completing them, confusion may continue to exist within the department
and progress on this important management tool may be significantly
hindered. Moreover, without central oversight of the process to develop
measures of effectiveness, including those that address identifying and
developing stability operations capabilities, the department will be
limited on its overall ability to gauge progress in achieving stability
operations goals and objectives.
DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency Planning for
Stability Operations:
DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive plans related to
stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to
facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development
of military plans developed by the combatant commanders. Recent
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the overall war
on terrorism, have led to changes in national security and defense
strategies and an increased governmentwide emphasis on stability
operations. NSPD-44 states that lead and supporting responsibilities
for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism
outlined in NSPD-1. In some cases, per NSPD-44, the National Security
Council may direct the Department of State to lead the development of
stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction plans for
specific countries.[Footnote 17] However, the combatant commanders also
routinely develop a wide range of military plans for potential
contingencies for which DOD may need to seek input from other agencies
or organizations. Within the combatant commands where contingency plans
are developed, the department is either beginning to establish working
groups or is reaching out to U.S. embassies on an ad hoc basis to
obtain interagency perspectives. But this approach can be cumbersome,
does not facilitate interagency participation in the actual planning
process, and does not include all organizations that may be able to
contribute to the operation being planned for. Combatant Commanders
have achieved limited interagency participation in the development of
military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to
commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2)
DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of planning information
with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations lack
an understanding of each other's planning processes and capabilities,
and have different planning cultures and capacities. As a result, the
overall foundation for unity of effort in stability operations--common
understanding of the purpose and concept of the operation, coordinated
policies and plans, and trust and confidence between key participants-
-is not being achieved.
Interagency Coordination is Necessary at Strategic, Operational and
Tactical Levels of Planning:
As previously discussed, NSPD-44 states that the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of State will integrate stabilization and
reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when
relevant and appropriate and will develop a general framework for fully
coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military
operations at all levels where appropriate. DOD Directive 3000.05 has
placed significant emphasis on the interagency nature of stability
operations and the need for a coordinated approach to integrate the
efforts of government and nongovernment organizations. Specifically,
the Directive requires the geographic combatant commanders to engage
relevant U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and
security forces, international organizations, nongovernment
organizations, and members of the private sector in stability
operations planning, training, and exercising, as appropriate, in
coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.[Footnote 18] Beyond this
directive, combatant commanders also have the overall responsibility to
plan for a wide range of military operations, such as potential
military conflicts, other operations to stabilize fragile governments
or regions, or to respond to unexpected events such as the Tsunami
relief effort in 2005. As a result, combatant commanders now have an
expanding responsibility to coordinate these planning efforts with
representatives from various U.S. agencies, organizations, other
governments, and the private sector.
Combatant commanders develop military plans focused at three distinct,
yet overlapping, levels that help commanders at each level visualize a
logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign
tasks. Figure 4 illustrates these levels, and the type of planning that
occurs in each.
Figure 4: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of Military
Planning:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
As illustrated in figure 4, at the strategic level, planners prepare
what is known as the supported plan, which describes how a combatant
commander intends to meet the national or high-level goals for his
geographical area of responsibility. These plans assign
responsibilities for specific strategic goals to other organizations
and subordinate commands, but do not provide the details for how these
goals will be accomplished. Generally, component commands (Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force forces assigned to the combatant commander)
prepare operational and tactical level plans, which are intended to
provide an increasing level of detail and fidelity to the plans and are
referred to as supporting plans. It is at this level of planning that
planners develop specific details about actions that will be taken and
how resources will be applied to achieve the objectives outlined in the
strategic level plan. At the operational and tactical levels, military
planners need knowledge of the resources they can rely on from other
agencies for conducting operations and who will be on the ground that
they can coordinate with for information and integration of activities.
To achieve a fully integrated strategic, operational, or tactical plan,
DOD planners require increased knowledge of the roles,
responsibilities, and capabilities that all agencies and organizations
can contribute to stabilization efforts. DOD policy officials
responsible for developing planning guidance have stated that
interagency planning in military operations can no longer be an
afterthought, but is critical to realizing U.S. interests in future
conflicts. We found almost universal agreement between all
organizations included in our review that there needs to be more
interagency coordination in planning, and that these coordination
requirements differ at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
of planning. For example, officials agreed that at the strategic level,
the many organizations that can play a key role in stability operations
should be present to represent their respective organizations, and that
those representatives can help facilitate a mutual understanding of the
overall contributions, capabilities, and capacity of each organization.
These representatives can also develop a better understanding of DOD
and the process used to develop military plans. At the operational and
tactical level, DOD officials agreed that, ideally, they need
consistent access to interagency personnel from other government
agencies that have been authorized by their organizations to establish
coordinating relationships with the military. Specifically, European
Command officials commented that they would benefit from subject matter
experts from non-DOD organizations at the operational level who can (1)
participate in the planning process and (2) increase the probability
that planned contributions from non-DOD organizations in stability
operations can actually be provided. Similarly, Pacific Command
officials stated that to facilitate interagency coordination at the
operational and tactical levels, several issues such as liaison
authority, willingness on the part of other agencies to work with DOD,
and coordinating mechanisms must be addressed. The department has also
recognized that nongovernmental organizations should participate in
DOD's planning process, where appropriate.[Footnote 19]
DOD Has Not Achieved Consistent Interagency Participation in the
Military Planning Process:
DOD has taken steps to establish interagency coordination mechanisms
and to improve interagency participation in its planning efforts, but
it has not achieved consistent interagency representation or
participation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
planning. At the strategic level, DOD's primary mechanism for
interagency coordination within each combatant command is the Joint
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). As shown in Table 2, the size
and composition of these groups varied within each combatant command we
visited, but in general, they have been comprised of a limited number
of representatives from State, USAID, the Department of Treasury, the
Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Table 2: JIACG Membership at the Central, European, and Pacific
Commands:
U.S. Central Command; JIACG membership (proposed staffing): Department
of Defense (DOD): Military: 41; JIACG membership (proposed staffing):
Department of Defense (DOD): Civilian: 8; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Department of State: 1; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Federal Bureau of Investigations: 2; JIACG membership
(proposed staffing): Drug Enforcement Agency: 1; JIACG membership
(proposed staffing): Department of Homeland Security: 1; JIACG
membership (proposed staffing): Department of the Treasury: 1; JIACG
membership (proposed staffing): USAID: 1; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Department of Transportation: 0.
U.S. European Command; JIACG membership (proposed staffing): Department
of Defense (DOD): Military: 13; JIACG membership (proposed staffing):
Department of Defense (DOD): Civilian: 2; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Department of State: 1; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Federal Bureau of Investigations: 2; JIACG membership
(proposed staffing): Drug Enforcement Agency: 0; JIACG membership
(proposed staffing): Department of Homeland Security: 0; JIACG
membership (proposed staffing): Department of the Treasury: 1; JIACG
membership (proposed staffing): USAID: 1; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Department of Transportation: 0.
U.S. Pacific Command; JIACG membership (proposed staffing): Department
of Defense (DOD): Military: 8; JIACG membership (proposed staffing):
Department of Defense (DOD): Civilian: 1; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Department of State: 2; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Federal Bureau of Investigations: 1; JIACG membership
(proposed staffing): Drug Enforcement Agency: 0; JIACG membership
(proposed staffing): Department of Homeland Security: 0; JIACG
membership (proposed staffing): Department of the Treasury: 0; JIACG
membership (proposed staffing): USAID: 1; JIACG membership (proposed
staffing): Department of Transportation: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of table]
The organization and functions of the JIACGs are evolving. At the time
of our review, each JIACG we examined had an overall function to
improve general coordination between DOD and the agencies represented
in the group and were not intended to be actively involved in DOD's
planning efforts. At each command we visited, we found JIACG
participants served primarily as advisors and liaisons between DOD and
their parent organizations, had limited planning experience and
training, and were not consistently engaged in DOD's planning process.
However, officials commented that the role of the JIACG was changing.
Specifically, Central Command officials expected that the JIACG within
their command would begin to assume a more active role in the planning
process, but they did not have specific details on how or when this
would occur. At the Pacific Command, the JIACG was being refocused by
the commander from coordinating counterterrorism activities to more of
a "full spectrum" approach that would include stability operations
activities. At the European Command, officials also expected the focus
of the JIACG would expand from a counterterrorism focus to a fuller
spectrum of operations, which, in their opinion, could include
participating in the planning process.
Below the strategic level, at the operational and tactical levels, some
service component commands are reaching out to country teams in
embassies within their areas of responsibility on an ad hoc basis to
obtain interagency perspectives during their planning efforts. But this
approach can be cumbersome because of the large number of countries
that may be affected by a regional plan. Generally, component command
officials we contacted agreed that the primary mechanism available to
them for interagency coordination was establishing personal
relationships and direct dealings with country teams and other embassy
personnel. For example, according to Naval Forces Europe, it is
developing new contingency plans, and one of its first steps in this
effort is to identify the key participants and resources available
within its area of operations and to develop individual relationships
that will help it accomplish more. In Central Command, both the Army
and Navy component commands commented that they work directly with the
embassies in the area of operations in order to interface with other
agencies.
Limited Guidance, Information Sharing and Training Hinder Interagency
Participation in the Development of Military Plans:
Combatant Commanders have achieved limited interagency participation in
the development of military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided
specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-
DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of
planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and non-
DOD organizations lack an understanding of each other's planning
processes and capabilities, and non-DOD organizations have limited
capacity to fully engage in DOD's planning efforts. At each combatant
command we visited, planners acknowledged the requirement to include
interagency considerations in planning, as required by recent DOD
policy. But command officials stated they did not have any guidance on
how to meet the requirement, or on the specific mechanisms that would
facilitate interagency planning at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. For example, numerous DOD publications and documents
discuss the JIACG organizations at each combatant command, but there is
no published DOD guidance that establishes policy governing the JIACGs
or that outlines the responsibilities for establishing and managing
them. Officials from the DOD and State also commented that the JIACG
organizations were not intended to be a coordinating body for military
planning, and questioned if this was an appropriate mechanism for
integrating the planning efforts between DOD and other agencies.
The second factor inhibiting interagency participation is that DOD does
not have a process in place to facilitate the sharing of planning
information with non-DOD agencies, when appropriate, early in the
planning process without specific approval from the Secretary of
Defense. Specifically, DOD policy officials, including the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that it
is the department's policy not to share DOD contingency plans with
agencies or offices outside of DOD unless directed to do so by the
Secretary of Defense, who determines if they have a need to know. In
addition, DOD's planning policies and procedures state that a combatant
commander, with Secretary of Defense approval, may present interagency
aspects of his plan to the Joint Staff during the plan approval process
for transmittal to the National Security Council for interagency
staffing and plan development. This hierarchical approach limits
interagency participation as plans are developed by the combatant
commands at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. State
officials also told us that DOD's current process for sharing planning
information limits non-DOD participation in the development of military
plans, and inviting interagency participation only after the plans have
been formulated is a significant obstacle to achieving a unified
government approach in those plans. In their opinion, it is critical to
include interagency participation in the early stages of plan
development at the combatant commands.
Additionally, according to combatant command officials, non-DOD
personnel do not always have the necessary security clearances required
by DOD for access to the department's planning documents or
participation in planning sessions. In its recent interim report to the
Secretary of Defense on DOD Directive 3000.05, DOD acknowledged the
current challenges in information sharing and predicts that DOD will
continue to face serious problems concerning the release and sharing of
information among DOD, other U.S. government agencies, international
partners, and other nongovernmental organizations. In the report DOD
attributed information-sharing issues to restrictions based on current
information-sharing policies and emphasized that to improve information-
sharing capabilities senior leadership direction is required.
The third factor limiting the effectiveness of interagency coordination
efforts is that DOD and non-DOD organizations lack an understanding of
each other's planning processes and capabilities, and have different
planning cultures and capacities. DOD and non-DOD officials repeatedly
emphasized in their discussions with us the cultural and capacity
challenges that the two communities face. Within DOD, officials
discussed a lack of formally trained DOD planners within the combatant
commands. For example, only two of the six planners at U.S. Army Europe
were formally trained, and another official noted that it takes a
planner about a year on the job to become proficient in what is
generally a 2-year assignment. Even if combatant command planners are
experienced, they may lack knowledge of interagency processes and
capabilities. For example, a Pacific Command planner stated that they
had to guess about interagency capabilities during planning. Senior
Pacific Command officials cited a need to educate DOD planners on U.S.
government agencies strengths and weaknesses and where expectations may
exceed an agency's capabilities. Similarly, European command JIACG
officials commented that DOD needs to institutionalize the interagency
education piece at its schools for professional planners, and a
European Command planner stated that it is essential to understand what
the various non-DOD agencies do and what they need to know about DOD
capabilities.
Our analysis of DOD's lessons-learned databases from current and past
military operations provided details that specifically addressed the
training differences between DOD and non-DOD agencies and the limited
knowledge of each other's capabilities. For example, the databases can
contain lessons learned such as: (1) DOD needs to develop knowledge of
other agencies and the capabilities they bring to operations, (2)
significant improvements could be made in military education by the
development of interagency programs of instruction, and (3) DOD should
work to aggressively include State in the process of project
development.[Footnote 20] Furthermore, DOD officials described what
they believe is a significant difference in the planning cultures of
DOD and non-DOD organizations. They stated that DOD has a robust
planning culture that includes extensive training programs, significant
resources, dedicated personnel, and career positions. Conversely,
officials from the Joint Staff, the Office of Policy, Joint Forces
Command, and the combatant commands explained that many agencies
outside of DOD do not appear to have a similar planning culture and do
not appear to embrace the detailed planning approach taken by DOD. In
addition, these officials repeatedly stated that their efforts to
include non-DOD organizations in planning and exercise efforts has been
stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies have
available to participate. DOD has attempted to mitigate some of these
challenges by sharing its planning resources to projects such as the
development of a draft joint planning concept with State, offering DOD
personnel to provide training to non-DOD organizations, and encouraging
non-DOD agencies to participate in exercise planning. We did not
examine the planning capability and capacity of non-DOD organizations
in this review, but we do have ongoing work that is examining this
issue in more detail.
The difference in planning between DOD and other U.S. departments and
agencies was also highlighted in the first semiannual report to the
Secretary of Defense on stability operations. In that report, the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy states, "The difference between
DOD and other U.S. Departments and Agencies is that DOD plans and
prepares for current and future operations and other U.S. Departments
and Agencies plan and prepare for current operations. This is reflected
in the different planning processes across the U.S. Government and the
relative spending on training, education, and exercises."[Footnote 21]
Officials from State offered similar perspectives on the planning
capabilities and capacities of non-DOD organizations. They stated that
State planning is different from military planning, with State more
focused on current operations, and less focused on the wide range of
potential contingency operations that DOD is required to plan for. As a
result, State does not allocate planning resources in the same way as
DOD, and therefore does not have a large pool of planners that can be
deployed to the combatant commands to engage in DOD's planning process.
These officials agreed, however, that participating in DOD's planning
efforts as plans are being formulated is necessary to achieve a unified
government approach in the military plans, and suggested alternative
methods to accomplish this goal. For example, State officials discussed
a current initiative to test methods to "virtually" include State
planners in a DOD contingency planning effort in the European Command
using electronic communication tools, and stated that State personnel
could potentially participate in a large number of planning efforts if
this approach were expanded. State officials also suggested that DOD
policies may need to be revised to authorize combatant commanders to
reach back directly to State and other government agencies as plans are
being developed, instead of through the hierarchical approach through
the Joint Staff and the National Security Council as previously
discussed.
Without clear guidance to the combatant commanders on how to establish
adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency
participation in planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of planning, a process to share planning information as plans
are being developed, and methods to orient and include professional
planners from key organizations in DOD's planning process, the
contributions and capabilities of these organizations may not be fully
integrated into DOD's plans, and a unified government approach may not
be achieved.
Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes Contribute to
Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Stability Operations Planning:
DOD planners are not consistently using lessons learned from past
operations as they develop future contingency plans. NSPD-44 and DOD
policies highlight the importance of incorporating lessons learned into
operational planning. Lessons learned from current and past operations
are being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our
analysis indicates that DOD planners are not using this information on
a consistent basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors
contribute to this inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning: (1)
DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons learned into plans is outdated
and does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned
in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons-learned
databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process does not
evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into
specific plans. As a result, DOD is not fully utilizing the results of
the lessons-learned systems and may repeat past mistakes.
NSPD-44 and DOD guidance stress the importance of incorporating lessons
learned into operations and planning. Furthermore, the recently
released Joint Operating Concept for stability operations envisions
that the Joint Force will implement a continuous learning process that
incorporates lessons learned into ongoing and future operations through
constant observation, assessment, application, and adaptation of
tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System manual, which provides planners with the step by step
process for planning joint operations, states that a regular review of
lessons information can alert planners to known pitfalls and successful
and innovative ideas. Prior GAO work on DOD's lessons learned noted
that effective guidance and sharing of lessons-learned are key tools to
institutionalize and facilitate efficient operations, and failure to
utilize lessons heightens the risk of repeating past mistakes and being
unable to build on the efficiencies others have developed during past
operations.[Footnote 22]
Lessons Learned are Being Captured but Not Incorporated into Plans:
DOD has established comprehensive joint lessons learned programs at all
levels within the department, and lessons learned from exercises and
operations are being captured. The department's Joint Lessons Learned
Program is a federation of separate lessons-learned organizations
embedded within the Joint Staff, combatant commands, the Services and
Combat Support Agencies that focus upon capturing information, data,
and lessons based upon each command's priorities. Each lessons-learned
organization within this program has developed its own processes,
systems, and information products for capturing, storing, and
retrieving lessons and observations based upon each organization's
requirements and resources.
The various organizations in the Joint Lessons Learned Program focus on
capturing lessons learned at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. These lessons tend to be oriented toward a specific customer
and are disseminated through a variety of different products. For
example, the services tend to collect tactical-and operational-level
lessons that they use to address command and service-specific issues
for resolution. Similarly, the combatant commands have each developed
their own theater-specific command-level lessons programs related to
joint, interagency, and multinational matters and other matters
involving interoperability. In addition, each organization tailors its
lessons-learned programs to meet the individual command's requirements
and available resources. For example, the U.S. Pacific Command's
program is: managed by one civilian contractor; focuses it efforts on
issues at the senior command leadership level; and hosts a web-based
repository that contains approximately 145 lessons documents. In
contrast, the Center for Army Lessons Learned has 179 people on staff;
focuses on all levels within the Army from the individual soldier to
the most senior leaders; uses a combination of active collection
techniques, such as sending out teams to interview soldiers and observe
operations; and has an electronic repository consisting of
approximately 157,000 documents.
Our lessons-learned analysis provides insights into the types of
lessons available to DOD planners and the volume of information that
could be useful to improve future stability operations planning. We
grouped 1,074 lessons into 14 themes that reflect the full spectrum of
strategic-level issues surrounding stability operations, such as
cultural sensitivity, language skills, intelligence, communications
systems, and reconstruction activities. For example, the information in
one theme we developed related to DOD coordination and planning with
other U.S. agencies and non-U.S. government organizations highlights
issues such as the need for (1) the military to work more closely with
other agencies during stability operations, (2) DOD to develop
knowledge of other agencies and the capabilities they can contribute,
and (3) commanders to ensure that military sectors during operations
correspond with civil geopolitical boundaries. The information in
another of our themes discussing civil military operations highlights
issues such as steps needed to improve information operations, and how
to address cultural differences during information operations to reach
specific audiences. A comprehensive listing of our themes and an
explanation for each can be found in appendix II.
Despite the robust lessons-learned gathering process in place, we found
that DOD planners at the combatant and component commands in our review
did not consistently incorporate lessons as plans were developed or
revised. For example, two of the combatant commands that we visited
stated that they did not routinely use lessons as plans were developed.
Similarly, we found a range of how lessons learned were used in the
planning process at the component commands we visited. For example, one
Central Command component stated that lessons learned were part of the
component command's planning process, but a Pacific Command component
commented that it generally did not utilize lessons learned as it
developed plans.
When we discussed the limited use of lessons learned with officials
from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, they
stated that planners are generally aware of the need to check lessons
learned as they develop plans. However, the officials acknowledged that
there are barriers to the use of lessons learned, that the existing
lessons learned systems need updating, and questions do exist on
whether the information provided by the current systems is adequate.
One official noted that Office of Policy is developing a new Center for
Complex Operations, which is envisioned to facilitate the use of
lessons by acting as a clearinghouse for stability operations
information. The Center is still in the planning phase, and we were
told that funding has been requested in the fiscal year 2007
supplemental budget request and in the fiscal year 2008 budget to
implement the plan.
Three Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in
Planning:
We identified three factors that contribute to this inconsistent use of
lessons learned in the planning process. First, the guidance regarding
lessons learned in the Joint Staff's manual for planning is outdated-
the relevant section of the manual has not been updated since July 2000
and does not specifically require planners to include lessons learned
in the planning process. Specifically, this guidance states that the
Joint Universal Lessons Learned System should be contacted early in the
planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific
practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution based on
actual operation and exercise occurrences.[Footnote 23] However, this
system does not exist and has not been supported since 1997, nor does
the update reference an existing system that planners can access for
joint lessons learned.
The second factor contributing to limited use of lessons learned in the
planning process is that accessing and searching lessons-learned
databases is cumbersome. For example, to conduct our analysis of DOD
lessons learned, we used five databases--four managed by each of the
services, and one managed by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis.
To obtain lessons-learned information from these sources, we had to:
separately access each database, become familiar with each system's
functionality and search engines; repeat the same searches in each site
for stability operations-related terms; and review the results to find
relevant lessons. However, knowing how to navigate and search each of
the lessons-learned systems is not enough. We also had to familiarize
ourselves with and sort through the multitude of products generated to
find lessons that were applicable to our analysis. Planners we
contacted also told us they considered the databases difficult and time-
consuming to use. One combatant command official described the
magnitude of the challenge by noting that there is so much information
within the program that the biggest difficulty is turning the
information into usable knowledge. Additionally, the Joint Staff has
acknowledged that the current system is inefficient and of limited
effectiveness in sharing lessons-learned data.
In an effort to address these issues, DOD has recently initiated an
effort to develop a Joint Lessons Learned Information System, which is
intended to standardize the collection, management, dissemination and
tracking of observations and lessons. The department is in the early
stages of developing this system, and plans that the system will
establish interoperable lessons databases that can be searched with an
easy-to-use search engine. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System
development strategy includes non-DOD agencies, and eventually non-U.S.
partners. However, while Joint Staff officials recognize the need for
stakeholder input to avoid continued inefficiency and limited
effectiveness in sharing lessons learned, they do not plan to include
non-DOD organizations until the later stages of the program's
development.
The third factor affecting the use of lessons learned is that the
planning review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons
learned are incorporated into specific plans. During discussions with
planners at the various commands, we found no evidence of a formal
mechanism to verify that lessons were considered in plan development.
Furthermore we found conflicting views as to the need for a formal
requirement. For example, one combatant command planner believed that,
despite the lack of a formal mechanism, the command's vetting process
for plans ensured that lessons would be incorporated, while at another
combatant command a planner stated that mechanisms for ensuring that
lessons are used in planning is broken because there is no formal
requirement to utilize lessons in plan development.
DOD has invested substantial resources to develop systems that capture
lessons from exercises, experiments, and operations, with the intent of
using these lessons to improve efficiency. However, in the case of
planning, the department has not developed mechanisms to ensure that
they are taking advantage of this resource. As a result, DOD heightens
its risk of either repeating past mistakes or being unable to build on
the efficiencies developed during past operations as it plans for
future operations.
Conclusions:
The DOD has a critical role in supporting a new national policy to
improve stability operations capabilities and to achieve a more unified
governmentwide approach to this demanding and important mission. Recent
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, along with current operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq provide daily reminders of how complex and
difficult these missions are. The department has developed an approach
to improve its ability to execute stability operations, but it has
achieved limited progress in two key areas--identifying needed
capabilities, and developing measures of effectiveness--that are
critical to successfully executing this approach. Without clear
guidance on how and when combatant commanders are to develop stability
operations capability requirements, the capabilities needed to conduct
stability operations may not be fully developed or current service
efforts to enhance capabilities may not be addressing the most critical
needs of the commanders. Similarly, without clear departmentwide
guidance on how to develop measures of effectiveness and milestones for
completing them, confusion may continue to exist within the department,
and progress on this important management tool may be significantly
hindered.
DOD has recognized the need to achieve greater interagency
participation in the development of military plans, but it has not
established an effective mechanism to accomplish this goal. A
governmentwide approach to stability operations is dependent upon an
integrated planning effort of all organizations involved in them.
Integrated planning can help fully leverage the capabilities,
contributions, and capacity of each organization, and increase the
potential for successful operations. The challenge now facing the
department is how to modify its planning approach to better integrate
non-DOD organizations into all levels--strategic, operational, and
tactical--of planning and to support State as the lead agency in
stability operations planning. Without improved guidance to military
commanders on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate interagency
planning, an approach to appropriately share planning information with
non-DOD organizations as plans are developed, and steps for overcoming
differences in planning culture and training and capacities among the
affected agencies, integrated interagency planning for stability
operations may continue to be stymied.
The consideration of lessons learned from past operations as new plans
are developed is not only a requirement stipulated by new stability
operations guidance, it is a requisite step to reducing the potential
that past mistakes will be repeated in future operations. Without clear
and complete guidance for planners, steps to increase the potential
that information system improvements will facilitate sharing of lessons
learned both within DOD and between all organizations that will
participate in planning for stability operations, and a focus on
lessons learned as plans are reviewed, the potential gains that can be
achieved through systematic consideration of lessons learned as future
plans are developed may not be realized.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To meet the goals of identifying and developing stability operations
capabilities and for developing tools to evaluate progress in achieving
these goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to take the following two actions:
* Provide comprehensive guidance, including a clear methodology and
time frames for completion, to the combatant commanders and the
services on how to identify and address stability operations capability
gaps.
* Provide comprehensive guidance to DOD organizations on how to develop
measures of effectiveness as directed by DOD Directive 3000.05,
including those measures related to identifying and developing
stability operations capabilities.
To achieve greater interagency participation in the development of
military plans that include stability operations, and increase the
potential for unity of effort as those operations are executed, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the
Secretary of State take the following three actions:
* Provide specific implementation guidance to combatant and component
commanders on the mechanisms that are needed to facilitate and
encourage interagency participation in the development of military
plans that include stability operations-related activities.
* Develop a process to share planning information with the interagency
representatives early in the planning process.
* Develop an approach to overcome differences in planning culture,
training, and capacities among the affected agencies.
To more fully incorporate lessons learned in the planning process, we
recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint
Chief's of Staff working with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to
take the following actions:
* Update the current planning guidance to:
* direct military planners to include lessons learned as they develop
plans, and:
* require that the plan review process include a step to verify that
lessons learned have been considered and adopted as appropriate.
* Include non-DOD stakeholders in the development of the Joint Lessons
Learned Information System at an earlier point than currently planned.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Because it is unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD plans to take to
implement our recommendations, the Congress should consider requiring
the Secretary of Defense to develop an action plan and report annually
to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on
Armed Services on the specific steps being taken and current status of
its efforts to (1) identify and prioritize needed stability operations
capabilities, (2) develop measures of effectiveness to evaluate
progress in achieving these capabilities, (3) achieve greater
interagency participation in the development of military plans, and (4)
fully incorporate lessons learned in the planning process. The
Secretary's report should also identify challenges to achieving an
integrated, interagency approach to stability operations, and potential
solutions for mitigating those challenges.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed
with our eight recommendations but did not discuss what specific steps,
if any, it plans to take to implement our recommendations. (DOD's
comments appear in their entirety in app. III.) State was also afforded
an opportunity to comment on this report, but declined to do so. In its
written comments, DOD highlighted traditional DOD methodologies and
approaches to developing capabilities, measures of effectiveness,
coordinating with other agencies and incorporating lessons learned that
it believes are adequate to address our recommendations. Although DOD
is making progress in achieving a greater focus on stability operations
through its new directive, our report notes it has made limited
progress in certain areas, such as establishing measures of
effectiveness, due to the limited guidance provided to DOD components.
As a result, we continue to believe our recommendations are warranted
and that DOD should take specific steps to address them. Because it is
unclear what specific steps, if any, DOD plans to take to implement our
recommendations, we have added a matter for congressional consideration
suggesting that the Congress require the Secretary of Defense to
develop an action plan and report annually on the specific steps being
taken to address our recommendations and the current status of its
efforts. The report should also identify challenges to achieving an
integrated interagency approach to stability operations, and potential
solutions for mitigating those challenges.
DOD provided three overall comments to the report. First, DOD commented
that GAO began the field work for this report in October 2005, one
month prior to the issuance of DOD Directive 3000.05, and observed that
much of our field work was therefore conducted prior to activities DOD
undertook to implement the directive. The department is mistaken in
this observation. In October, 2005, we held our entrance conference
with DOD officials, but conducted the majority of our field work from
January 2006 through March 2007. We believe the timing of our field
work enabled us to focus on the approach DOD was taking to implement
the directive, observe how key organizations began implementing this
approach over a 1-year period, and highlight impediments that may
impair DOD's ability to achieve the results intended by the directive-
-improved stability operations capabilities. Therefore, we believe our
work and related recommendations are particularly relevant and
important because they address systemic issues associated with DOD's
approach and could assist DOD organizations tasked with implementing
the new directive.
Second, DOD commented that our report is directed exclusively at DOD;
that stability, security, transition, and reconstruction activities are
inherently interagency in nature; and that DOD can only implement
recommendations under its purview. While we agree that stability
operations are inherently interagency in nature, we disagree that our
work is focused exclusively on DOD. Specifically, our audit work
included discussions with State and USAID officials in Washington,
D.C., and at each of the combatant commands included in our review to
gain their views and perspectives. We have also included
recommendations to improve interagency participation in the development
of military plans that are directed to the Secretary of Defense because
the military planning process is conducted under the purview of the
Secretary of Defense. However, acknowledging that interagency
participation in DOD planning cannot be forced, we are recommending the
Secretary of Defense coordinate with the Secretary of State to
implement these recommendations. Furthermore, as we discussed with DOD
officials during the course of our review and stated in this report, we
have other work underway to evaluate State's efforts to lead and
coordinate stabilization operations in conjunction with other U.S.
agencies, and plan to report on those issues separately.
Third, DOD commented that the identification and development of
stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations
capabilities are not so different from other DOD capabilities that they
require a new or separate methodology to identify and develop military
capabilities and plans. We disagree. As we discuss in this report, DOD
has made limited progress in identifying and prioritizing needed
capabilities, the identification of stability operations requirements
was occurring in a fragmented manner, and each service is using a
different approach to improve stability operations capabilities. To
date, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has not identified and
prioritized needed stability operations capabilities and military plans
do not fully reflect an integrated, interagency approach to stability
operations. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendations
in these areas are still warranted, as discussed below.
Regarding our recommendation that DOD provide comprehensive guidance,
including a clear methodology and time frames for completion, to
combatant commanders and the services on how to identify and address
stability operations capability gaps, DOD stated that existing,
mandated capability assessment methodologies already effectively
address stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations
capability needs at the combatant commands and the services. It also
stated that under this process, the combatant commands assess and
communicate to DOD the capabilities required to conduct these missions
just as they do for other assigned missions. However, as discussed in
this report, we found that the combatant commands included in our
review had made limited progress in identifying stability operations
requirements because DOD had not issued guidance or set specific time
frames to complete this task, and there was confusion over how to
define stability operations. During the course of our work, DOD refined
the definition of stability operations, which was a positive step, but
has not clarified the guidance or set specific time frames for
identifying stability operations requirements. Because combatant
command officials indicated to us that the absence of guidance and
timeframes was a significant contributor to the lack of progress in
developing requirements, we believe our recommendation would assist the
department in accomplishing this task.
In response to our recommendation that DOD provide comprehensive
guidance to DOD organizations on how to develop measures of
effectiveness, the department stated that it already develops measures
of effectiveness in general, and a special process is not needed for
stability operations. We believe this response is not consistent with
DOD Directive 3000.05, which requires each organization tasked under
the directive to develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate
progress in meeting their respective goals listed in the directive. In
addition, as discussed in this report, and as acknowledged by officials
from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) in a
progress report to the Secretary of Defense, the department has made
limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness related to
stability operations. We found this limited progress was caused by
significant confusion over how this task should be accomplished, and
because minimal guidance was provided by the office of Policy. The
department recognizes this confusion exits, and as discussed in this
report plans to establish workshops to assist organizations in these
efforts. We believe this is a positive step that should be complemented
with improved guidance that would be available to all organizations
tasked with this responsibility, and therefore continue to believe our
recommendation is appropriate and necessary.
In response to our recommendations that DOD coordinate with State and
provide specific implementation guidance to the combatant and component
commanders on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and encourage
interagency participation in the development of military plans, and
that the two departments develop a process to share planning
information, DOD provided the same response to both recommendations.
The department believes that National Security Presidential Directive
44 should, by itself, provide sufficient direction on the structures
needed and a process to share planning information. The department also
stated it would continue to include other agencies in planning and
exercising for stability operations. We believe the department's
response is inadequate because NSPD-44 is a high-level directive that
sets forth goals for improved interagency participation in stability
operations, but does not contain details on mechanisms to achieve those
goals. During the course of our review we received consistent comments
from DOD and State officials that it is clear interagency participation
in DOD planning is needed, but it is very unclear to as to how to
accomplish this goal. Therefore, as detailed in this report, we found
that interagency participation in the development of military plans at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels was very limited in
every command included in our review in part because DOD's guidance did
not provide details on how to engage relevant agencies in planning or
on the specific mechanisms that would facilitate interagency planning,
and because DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of planning
information. Combatant command officials cited significant limitations
in current coordinating groups, and various ad hoc methods were in
place to gain interagency perspectives on DOD planning efforts. State
officials were concerned that DOD practices limit the appropriate
sharing of DOD planning information as plans are developed, and it
therefore had minimal impact as plans are being constructed. These
fundamental and systemic issues will not be resolved with the guidance
provided by NSPD-44. We continue to believe that systemic solutions are
needed and can be achieved with improved guidance and more effective
processes to appropriately share planning information with interagency
representatives.
In response to our recommendation that DOD, in coordination with State,
develop an approach to overcome differences in planning culture,
training, and capacities among the affected agencies, DOD stated that
it will continue to work to understand and accommodate differences in
these areas, offer non-DOD organizations opportunities to participate
in DOD training courses, and detail DOD personnel to other agencies. We
believe these are positive steps and agree DOD should continue to
pursue them. However, our work indicates that these measures are not
adequate to fully address the magnitude of differences in the planning
culture and capacity between DOD and other agencies. As discussed in
this report, State officials believe that new and innovative practices
need to be identified and pursued, such as "virtual" collaborative
planning between DOD and State. Therefore, we continue to believe that
our recommendation for DOD and State to work together to develop more
comprehensive and innovative solutions to overcome these differences is
an important and necessary step to take.
In response to our recommendations that DOD update its current planning
guidance to direct military planners to include lessons learned as they
develop plans, and to update current planning guidance to require that
the plan review process include a step to verify that lessons learned
have been considered and adopted as appropriate, DOD stated that the
current planning methodology takes into account lessons learned when
constructing or modifying a plan. As discussed in our report, this is
not always the case. In the course of our field work, we found sporadic
use of lessons learned in the planning process and a lack of formal
guidance directing consideration of lessons learned in both
constructing and in reviewing plans. According to DOD, taking lessons
learned into account during planning is at the heart of all effective
military (or nonmilitary) planning. However, the Joint Staff's manual
on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System encourages, but
does not direct planners to review lessons learned as they develop
plans. We agree that lessons learned are being used by planners, but
inconsistently. As a result we believe that our recommendations should
be implemented in order to increase the potential that lessons are
actually incorporated into plans as appropriate.
In response to our recommendation that DOD include non-DOD stakeholders
in the development of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System at
an earlier point than currently planned, DOD agreed to invite
stakeholders to participate in the system at an earlier stage, but
expressed concerns that these stakeholders face shortfalls in capacity
and resources and therefore cannot ensure their interactive
participation. We believe this is a positive step and responsive to our
recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. We are also
sending a copy to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
officials in the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S.
Pacific Command. We will also make copies available to other interested
parties upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4402 or by e-mail at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To evaluate the Department of Defense's approach to improving stability
operations and DOD's identification of stability operations
capabilities and development of performance measures we obtained and
analyzed DOD Directive 3000.05, National Security Presidential
Directive 44, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Building Partnership
Capacity Roadmap, the Military Support to Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction Operation Joint Operating Concept, and
the Defense Science Board studies on Institutionalizing Stability
Operations within DOD. We interviewed current and former officials at
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint
Staff and Services, three Regional Combatant Commands (European
Command, Pacific Command, and Central Command), and U.S. Joint Forces
Command. In these interviews we reviewed relevant information and
discussed implementing guidance for completing responsibilities
outlined in the Directive, the interviewees' understanding of their
roles and responsibilities in completing assigned tasks, progress in
implementing the Directive, challenges that have been encountered, and
input provided for the first report to the Secretary of Defense on
implementing the Directive. Finally, we reviewed the first report to
the Secretary of Defense and discussed the report's findings with
officials within the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy.
To identify the extent to which DOD is planning for stability
operations and whether the department's planning mechanisms encourage
and facilitate consideration of non-DOD capabilities, we reviewed and
analyzed NSPD-44, DOD Directive 3000.05, joint planning guidance and
manuals, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Building Partnership
Capacity Roadmap, and combatant command processes. We interviewed
officials at the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Bureau of Political Military
Affairs, and the United States Agency for International Development to
obtain other agencies' perspectives regarding DOD's planning process
and the inclusion of non-DOD perspectives in contingency plans. To
understand DOD's planning process, mechanisms for interagency
involvement in planning, and impediments to interagency coordination,
we met with representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy as well as planners from three regional combatant
commands, which included the Pacific, European, and Central commands,
members of each combatant command's Joint Interagency Coordination
Group, and fourteen combatant command component commands responsible
for contingency operation planning. We also reviewed examples of
interagency coordination contingency planning documents to gain an
understanding of the level of detail to which the commands planned
coordination efforts. We did not, however, assess the extent to which
these roles and responsibilities, including those of DOD, are
appropriate. Our review did not include the planning for ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD's contingency plans are
classified documents and a complete review of the contingency plans was
beyond the scope of this audit, and as a result we did not develop a
comprehensive list of documents to draw a representative sample of
contingency planning documents related to interagency coordination.
However, we worked with combatant command officials to identify
examples of planning documents related to interagency coordination and
the level of detail to which the commands planned coordination with
other agencies. We did not include in our review any current or planned
coordination between DOD and non-U.S.-government organizations, foreign
governments, or international organizations.
To determine the extent to which DOD planners are applying lessons
learned from past operations and exercises we reviewed relevant DOD
guidance, and discussed with DOD officials their consideration of
lessons learned during planning. In order to understand the
requirements for utilizing lessons learned in the planning process and
the purpose and scope of the Joint Lessons Learned Program, we analyzed
DOD's planning guidance and manuals, lessons learned instructions for
the Joint Lessons Learned Program, and the services' lessons learned
guidance.
To assess the type and extent of strategic stability operations lessons
learned available, we identified organizations that produced studies or
reports that included lessons learned relevant to stability operations,
both within and outside DOD. To identify strategic level lessons within
DOD's Joint Lessons Learned Program, we obtained access to the four
armed services lessons learned databases (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force), the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and obtained
stability operations studies from the Defense Science Board. In order
to identify relevant non-DOD organizations conducting lessons-learned
research, we contacted individuals identified as subject matter experts
in stability operations and asked them to identify non-DOD agencies
that published reports and studies regarding stability operations that
they recognized as being leaders in the field. In this manner, several
non-DOD organizations were identified, including the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and the United States Institute of
Peace. After obtaining search results from the DOD lessons-learned
databases and non-DOD organizations, we reviewed the materials and
selected analytical products for further examination based upon whether
the report or study included original data collection and analysis
related to the conduct of stability and reconstruction in Operations
Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, or the operations of the Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa. We also excluded reports and analysis focused
primarily on combat operations, including tactics, techniques, and
procedures, after action-reports, and handbooks. We reviewed over 200
reports or studies, and found 38 documents that met these criteria. We
entered all of the individual lessons and observations from the 38
reports into a database resulting in over 3,500 individual lessons and
observations. Two GAO analysts independently reviewed the individual
lessons and observations using the following criteria for inclusion.
Inclusive Criteria:
We included lessons related to: U.S. forces performing or supporting
local governance functions in areas such as health care, utilities,
infrastructure, and law enforcement; and U.S. forces interacting with
local civil authorities to enhance the viability of these authorities
and strengthen their capacity to provide basic services to the local
population.
Exclusive/Restrictive Criteria:
We excluded lessons related to: tactics, techniques, and procedures for
combat operations (e.g., marksmanship and weapons maintenance; house
takedown; cordon and search); general purpose logistical support and
systems sustainment; combat operations that are primarily offensive in
nature. (Note: This does not include operations or use of force in
direct support of the noncombat activities described above. For
example, we would select lessons regarding the depth and composition of
forces required to provide security for Provincial Reconstruction
Teams.)
Following the independent review, the team compared their individual
results and, when agreement between the independent reviewers could not
be reached, a third independent reviewer decided upon the inclusion or
exclusion of the lesson. This analysis resulted in 1,074 individual
lessons that met GAO's criteria, which we reviewed for commonalities
from which we developed our 14 major themes. After developing the
themes, we categorized each lesson or observation, by consensus, into
one or more categories based upon the content of the lesson. We used
these themes and our knowledge of the lessons-learned systems and
guidance as a basis for discussions with combatant command and
component command planners regarding the use of lessons learned in the
planning process. We recognize that this analysis is not based upon an
exhaustive review of all reports and studies on the subject of
stability operations.
We conducted our review from October 2005 through March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Major Lessons-Learned Themes and Descriptions:
Listed below are the 14 major themes that we developed after reviewing
and categorizing 1,074 lessons learned. We used our analysis to provide
insight into the types of stability operations lessons available to
planners and to facilitate our discussions with Department of Defense.
Our coding methodology often resulted in a lesson falling into one or
more categories based upon the content of the lesson. Furthermore,
several categories, such as Civil Military Operations and Provisional
Reconstruction Teams, were considered to be functional categories, or
topical areas, and the lessons were often included in another theme.
The first column lists the theme GAO developed. The second column
provides a general description of the types of lessons included within
the theme. The third column lists the total number of lessons coded
into each theme. Our analytical methodology was developed to support an
insight as to the types of lessons available and does not does imply a
ranking of themes in terms of importance or critical needs. A detailed
discussion of our methodology is included in appendix I.
Table 3:
GAO Themes: Cultural Sensitivity, Awareness, and Engagement; Theme
Definitions: Cultural sensitivity, awareness as it pertains to U.S.-to-
host nation and host nation-to-U.S. engagement before and during
deployments; Total Number of Lessons: 177.
GAO Themes: Language; Theme Definitions: Training of U.S. forces and
the use of interpreters; Total Number of Lessons: 55.
GAO Themes: Civil Military Operations; Theme Definitions: Functional
category related to lessons concerning psychological operations, civil
affairs, public affairs, and information operations, which were viewed
as included within civil military operations. (Lessons in this category
are often included with one of the other themes that talk to a more
specific issue.); Total Number of Lessons: 301.
GAO Themes: Intelligence; Theme Definitions: Processes and products,
including: intelligence preparation of the battlespace; operational
security; counterintelligence; human intelligence; Total Number of
Lessons: 133.
GAO Themes: DOD Coordination with non-DOD Organizations; Theme
Definitions: Planning and coordination related to nonmilitary
activities with other U.S. agencies, non-U.S.-government organizations,
and host nation governments; Total Number of Lessons: 212.
GAO Themes: Force Composition and Restructuring of Forces; Theme
Definitions: While deployed, temporary changes in the primary role of
U.S. forces to meet immediate or unanticipated operational needs. For
example, transition and reconstruction activities; Total Number of
Lessons: 12.
GAO Themes: Welfare and Force Protection; Theme Definitions: Includes
providing for the care, feeding, and security of military and U.S.
government or coalition civilian forces; Total Number of Lessons: 39.
GAO Themes: Unity and/or Exercise of Command; Theme Definitions:
Addresses the question of who is in charge and how is the authority of
command being used; Total Number of Lessons: 21.
GAO Themes: Transition and Reconstruction; Theme Definitions: Examples
include Corps of Engineers and contracted construction. Transfers of
authority/responsibility of activities to host nation; election
support; Total Number of Lessons: 138.
GAO Themes: Automation, Communication, and Systems; Theme Definitions:
Capability, capacity, and compatibility of U.S. military communication
and information systems in the theater of operation; Total Number of
Lessons: 64.
GAO Themes: Military to Military Coordination; Theme Definitions: U.S.,
coalition, and host nation military coordination, planning, and
capacity. Instances showing how units are working together. This
category addresses military-to-military; Total Number of Lessons: 167.
GAO Themes: Human Capital--Skills, Capabilities, and Capacity; Theme
Definitions: Military personnel authorization issues. Are units staffed
with enough personnel in the right grade with the right skills and
military specialties all the time, temporarily, or not at all?; Total
Number of Lessons: 236.
GAO Themes: Preparation for Operations; Theme Definitions: What is
being done to prepare before a unit needs to deploy. Includes: issues
of doctrine, training, and logistics; and lessons learned that will
result in changes to training and logistics to prepare for future
operations; Total Number of Lessons: 149.
GAO Themes: Provisional Reconstruction Teams; Theme Definitions:
Functional category related to lessons concerning Provisional
Reconstruction Teams. (Lessons in this category are often included with
one of the other themes that talk to a more specific issue.); Total
Number of Lessons: 31.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Special Operations/ Low-Intensity Conflict:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
MAY 09 2007:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: US Government
Accountability Office: 441 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-07-549, "MILITARY OPERATIONS: Actions Needed to Improve
DoD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning,"
dated April 10, 2007 (GAO Code 350743).
DoD appreciates having the opportunity to respond to the draft report.
There are three important circumstances that influence our response:
* First, the field work for this report began in October 2005. DoD
Directive 3000.05 "Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction Operations" (DoDD 3000.05) was issued on
November 28, 2005. Much of the field work therefore occurred prior to
activities DoD has undertaken to improve its ability to conduct these
operations.
* Second, stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations
are inherently interagency in nature, but the report is directed
exclusively to DoD. DoD will work to implement those recommendations
under its purview, but cannot adopt recommendations on behalf of other
relevant Government agencies.
* Third, DoDD 3000.05 was issued within an existing, well-developed
system for the identification and development of military capabilities
and plans. Stability, security, transition and reconstruction
operations capabilities are not so different from other DoD
capabilities that they require a new or separate methodology.
DoD's detailed response to the report's recommendations is attached.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Joseph J. McMenamin:
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: Stability Operations
Capabilities:
Attachment:
As stated:
Dod Response To Recommendations Of Gao Draft Report: "MILITARY
OPERATIONS: Actions Needed to Improve DoD's Stability Operations
Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning" (GAO CODE 350743/GAO-07-549,
dated April 10, 2007):
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to provide comprehensive
guidance, including a clear methodology and timeframes for completion,
to the combatant commanders and the Services on how to identify and
address stability operations capability gaps.
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs. The requirement to identify and
address stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations
capability needs at the combatant commands and Services is effectively
addressed by existing, mandated capability assessment methodologies.
Under the terms and spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, force capability
analysis is generated by addressing the missions assigned to the
combatant commands. DoDD 3000.05 is, in itself, the direct "policy
guidance" enhancing the stability, security, transition and
reconstruction mission in relation to major combat operations. DoDD
3000.05 identified stability, security, transition and reconstruction
operations as a core US military mission and directed that they be
given priority comparable to combat operations. The combatant commands
assess and communicate to DoD the capabilities required to conduct
these missions just as they do for all other assigned military missions.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to provide comprehensive
guidance to DoD organizations on how to develop measures of
effectiveness as directed by DoD Directive 3000.05, including those
measures related to identifying and developing stability operations
capabilities.
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs. DoD is developing measures of
effectiveness in general, no more or less so in the area of stability,
security, transition and reconstruction operations than for any other
mission. Under existing DoD policy, all military activities are
required to be measured against established measures of effectiveness.
While establishing measures of effectiveness for stability, security,
transition and reconstruction operations might prove especially
challenging, DoD can still address this issue through its existing
process for establishing measures of effectiveness. A new, unique
methodology is unnecessary.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, provide specific
implementation guidance to combatant and component commanders on the
mechanisms that are needed to facilitate and encourage interagency
participation in the development of military plans that include
stability operations-related activities.
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs. Subject to existing structures put
in place by the President through National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD) 44, the directive should, by itself, provide
sufficient direction. We will continue to work with other agencies of
the Government to include them in planning and exercising for
stability, security, transition and reconstruction-related activities.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, develop a process to share
planning information with the interagency representatives early in the
planning process.
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs. See the response to Recommendation
3.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, develop an approach to
overcome differences in planning culture, training and capacities among
the affected agencies.
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs. DoD has worked, and will continue
to work, to understand and accommodate differences in planning,
training and capabilities development. DoD has provided, and will
continue to provide, all possible assistance by opening its training
courses to non-DoD Government agencies, detailing DoD personnel to
other Government agencies, and actively participating in all
interagency processes relating to this subject.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), to update the current planning
guidance to direct military planners to include lessons learned as they
develop plans.
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs. Current DoD policy and military
planning methodology takes into account "lessons learned" when
constructing or modifying a plan. This is. at the heart of all
effective military (or non-military) planning. This is already being
done for stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), to update the current planning
guidance to require that the plan review process include a step to
ensure that lessons learned have been considered and adopted as
appropriate.
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs. See the response to Recommendation
6.
RECOMMENDATION 8: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working with the
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), to include non-DoD stakeholders in
the development of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System at an
earlier point than currently planned.
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs, to the extent it means that the
relevant non-DoD stakeholders are invited to participate in the System
at an earlier stage. These stakeholders face shortfalls in the capacity
and resources; DoD can invite them to access the lessons-learned
system, but cannot ensure their interactive participation in it.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Robert L. Repasky, Assistant
Director; T. Burke; Stephen Faherty; Susan Ditto; Ron La Due Lake; Kate
Lenane; Jonathan Carver; Maria-Alaina Rambus; and Christopher Banks
made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Reports:
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning
the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to
Future Operations Planning. GAO-07-639T. Washington, D.C.: March 22,
2007.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning
the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to
Future Operations Planning. GAO-07-444. Washington, D.C.: March 22,
2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting,
Security, and Capacity Challenges. GAO-07-426T. Washington, D.C.:
February 15, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-07-308SP. Washington,
D.C.: January 9, 2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and
Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and
Sustainable Progress. GAO-06-179T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing
Challenges. GAO-06-697T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing
Challenges. GAO-06-428T. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2006.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating
Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S.
Goals. GAO-05-742. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2004.
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services,
and Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.
Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited
Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed.
GAO-04-403. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004.
Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-03-792R. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Sep
2006). This term and definition was also added to the Department of
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication
1-02, as amended through September 17, 2006.
[2] Recent changes are included in the National Security Strategy, NSPD-
44, DOD Directive 3000.05, and DOD Joint Publications.
[3] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.0l, Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning
Policies and Procedures) (Sept. 29, 2006); Department of Defense
Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Nov. 28, 2005); and
Department of Defense, Military Support to Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept
(Washington, D.C., December 2006).
[4] Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
[5] Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
[6] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations.
[7] DOD defined stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
missions as activities that support U.S. government plans for
stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition operations,
which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. In many
cases stability operations and stability, security, transition, and
reconstruction terminology is used interchangeably.
[8] United States Joint Forces Command, J7 Pamphlet, U.S. Government
Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and
Conflict Transformation (December 2005).
[9] The Integrated Priority List is a succinct statement, prepared
annually, of key capability gaps that could hinder the performance of a
combatant commander's assigned missions.
[10] The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for conducting a Joint
Quarterly Readiness Review, which is a scenario-based readiness
assessment that identifies capabilities and risks associated with
missions that support strategic-level planning guidance. Participants
in this review include the Combatant Commanders, senior representatives
from DOD, the Military Services, and other DOD components.
[11] The Marine Corps's Security Cooperation Training Center
coordinates Marine Corps education and training programs in support of
Department of Defense Security Cooperation efforts to enhance
interoperability with allied and coalition partners in the conduct of
traditional and irregular warfare and in support of the global struggle
against violent extremism.
[12] Foreign Area Officers are a group of military officers with a
broad range of military skills and experiences; knowledge of political-
military affairs; familiarity with the political, cultural,
sociological, economic, and geographic factors of the countries and
regions in which they are stationed; and professional proficiency in
one or more of the dominant languages in their regions of expertise.
[13] Interim Progress Report on DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations (Washington, D.C., August 2006).
[14] To focus the guidance provided in the national strategy, and to
meet statutory requirements of Title 10 of the United States Code, the
Secretary of Defense provides written policy guidance to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation and review of
contingency plans every 2 years, or more frequently as needed. This
written guidance, called the Contingency Planning Guidance includes the
relative priority of plans and drives DOD's contingency planning
efforts. To meet the requirements of the Contingency Planning Guidance,
combatant commanders develop plans focused on their specific areas of
responsibility.
[15] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations.
[16] GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability,
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2004).
[17] NSPD-44 directs this through NSPD-1. Specifically, NSPD-44 states
"Within the scope of this NSPD, and in order to maintain clear
accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or
stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting
responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using
the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting
relationships will be redesignated as transitions are required."
[18] Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
[19] Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
[20] Our analysis of DOD's lessons learned data is discussed in more
detail in the next section of this report.
[21] Department of Defense, Interim Progress Report on DOD Directive
3000.05.
[22] GAO, Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and
Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational
Crewing, GAO-05-10 (Washington, D.C.: Nov 10, 2004); Chemical Weapons:
Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could Be Improved and
Expanded, GAO 02-890 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2002).
[23] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, CJCSM 3122.01.
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